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ADMIN NOTES. Mid-Term Results Part III, Balkans. SAMPLES OF BEHAVIOR. - Identify the three vital interest the United States and its NATO allies had at stake during the Kosovo crisis. - State the five NATO objectives established in April 1999. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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ADMIN NOTES• Mid-Term Results

- Part III, Balkans

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SAMPLES OF BEHAVIOR- - Identify the three vital interest the United

States and its NATO allies had at stake during the Kosovo crisis.

- - State the five NATO objectives established in April 1999.

- - State the three key strategic objectives of Operation ALLIED FORCE.

- - Identify the key lessons learned by the US military in Operation ALLIED FORCE.

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The Balkans: A Brief History

- After World War II, monarchy abolished; Communist Party leader Tito proclaimed the country the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, with himself as prime minister- Eliminating opposition, the Tito gov’t executed Mihajlovic in 1946 - Tito died in 1980, and the fragility of the federation he ruled quickly became apparent

Tito

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Three ethnic groups fell into conflict

Serbs—Dominant in Yugoslavia's politics and army, orthodox Christianity makes them natural allies of Russia Croats—Roman Catholics, closer to the West than Serbs and exposed to Western influencesMuslims—Living mainly in ethnically mixedtowns and cities in Bosnia-Herzegovina

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The Crisis in Bosnia

28 Feb 1994, NATO aircraft shot down four warplanes violating the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina• This was the first military

engagement ever undertaken by the Alliance

Oct 1992, UN Security Council Resolution 781 established a no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina

Operation Deny Flight• Enforced the no-fly zone• Provided close air support to UN troops• Conducted approved air strikes under a dual-key command arrangement with the UN

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The Crisis in Bosnia NATO objectives

• Bosnian Serb compliance to cease attacks on Sarajevo and other safe areas

• Withdrawal of Bosnian Serb heavy weapons from the total exclusion zone around Sarajevo

• Complete freedom of movement for UN Forces and personnel, and nongovernment officials

• Unrestricted use of Sarajevo airport

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The Crisis in Bosnia NATO missions of Operation Deny Flight

• To conduct aerial monitoring and enforce compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 816

• To provide close air support for UN troops on the ground at the request of, and controlled by, UN forces

• To conduct approved air strikes against designated targets threatening the security of the UN-declared safe areas

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The Crisis in Bosnia Operation Deny Flight lasted from 12 Apr 1993 to

20 Dec 1995• Almost 100,000 sorties flown

A formal closure ceremony was held in Vicenza, Italy on 21 Dec 1995• Forces associated with Operation Deny Flight

were then transferred to Operation Decisive Endeavor as part of the overall NATO operation Joint Endeavor.

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The Crisis in BosniaLessons Learned

Lack of doctrine Tactical air and space power

problems Bases weren’t large enough to

accept the contingency surges Coalition/Joint problems Technological problems

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KOSOVO

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Kosovo Crisis Kosovo lies in southern Serbia and has a

mixed population, the majority of which are ethnic Albanians (Muslims)

Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic altered the status of the region, removing its autonomy and bringing it under the direct control of Belgrade, the Serbian capital

The Kosovar Albanians strenuously opposed the move

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United States and NATO Interests at stake

Serb aggression threatened peace throughout the Balkans and the stability of NATO’s SE region

Belgrade’s repression in Kosovo created a humanitarian crisis of staggering proportions

President Milosevic’s conduct directly challenged the credibility of NATO

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NATO Action After the failure of repeated international

diplomatic efforts since the spring of 1998 to peacefully resolve the conflict in Kosovo

North Atlantic Council decided on 23 March 1999 to authorize NATO air strikes

Aimed at strategic targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to end the repression of Kosovar Albanians by the Yugoslav government

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NATO’s Objectives A stop to all military action and the

immediate ending of violence and repression

The withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police, and paramilitary forces

The stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence

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Military Objective “Degrade and damage the military and

security structure President Milosevic has used to depopulate and destroy the Albanian majority in Kosovo.”

William Cohen, SECDEF15 April 1999

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NATO Strategic Objectives Demonstrate the seriousness of

their opposition to Belgrade’s aggression in the Balkans

Deter Milosevic’s attacks on helpless civilians, and reverse ethnic cleansing

Damage Serbia’s capacity to wage war against Kosovo

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Lessons Learned onKosovo War Objectives

US Grand Strategy

Maintain a peaceful, prosperous US-led Europe

Convince NATO to transition from old Cold War common defense against external threats to new Continental security coalition

Persuade NATO to acquire means and will to conduct out of area military ops

European Strategy

Maintain a peaceful, prosperous, and independent Europe

Prevent spillover into Albania and Macedonia, then to Greece and Turkey

Maintain NATO relationship with Russia and give it a role in helping end the crisis

Demonstrate European unity

Kosovo War Aims Stop the Serbian

slaughter and expulsion of ethnic Albanians

Remove Milosevic from power

Accomplish the above with minimal collateral damage and NATO casualties

Common Effort Concealed Widely Differing Objectives

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Lessons Learned by US Military

United States air refuelers were stretched thin during the operation

Force structure numbers and resources were inadequate for current level of commitments (all services); support and training as important to victory as strike

Older platforms with smart weapons may be seen as good enough; smart weapons may be better than smart platforms

Need the right force structure for the future C4ISR is currently the weakest link in joint and coalition ops On the brink of another “hollow force”

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Political Lessons Learned by Europeans

Militarily, Europe remains dependent on Americans• Best technology, weapons, and platforms “Made in USA.”• Politicians unwilling to pay the cost of matching unique US capabilities

United States cannot always be counted on to serve the Alliance’s interests• US focus shifted with opinion polls• Fear US commitment could falter if US forces take heavy casualties

European Union can provide diplomatic muscle (Martti Ahtisaari saves the day); many foreign policy interests are similar among EU Nations • Refugee issue• Humanitarian (ethnic cleansing)• Threat of rising Islamic fundamentalism• Need to build external identity

Europe can overcome internal diversity to maintain cohesion• German Luftwaffe conducted first combat missions since 1945• Greece provided logistical support despite popular opposition• Italy and France (which have Communist ministers) offered air bases

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Impact of Kosovo Lessons Learnedon Future DOD Budget Trends

No DOD/Allied spending surge like post-Desert Storm

International defense market continues to shrink

Readiness and retention will increasingly consume $$$$ for modernization

Inevitable tax cut legislation will further erode DOD budgets

Services must eventually deal with the bow wave

Old platforms with smart weapons were good enough

Congress may balk at big bills for new platforms (JSF, F-22, CVX, DD-21)

Support Forces will need big $$$$ too

“We have to make a trade between smart weapons and platforms...We need to encourage the services to concentrate more on smart weapons.”

Jacques Gansler

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Summary Background to the Gulf War Conflict Iraqi Threat Air Defense Threat The Plan of Attack Concept of Operations Five Strategic Rings Target Systems Campaign Overview Video Clip - Beyond the Wild Blue

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Summary Operation PROVIDE COMFORT/NORTHERN

WATCH• Background to conflict and lessons learned

Operation SOUTHERN WATCH• Background to conflict and lessons learned

Operation PROVIDE RELIEF/RESTORE HOPE• Background to conflict and lessons learned

History of the Balkans• Background• Ethnic Groups

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Summary Operation DENY FLIGHT

• Background to conflict and lessons learned Operation ALLIED FORCE

• Background to conflict• NATO actions• Operation ALLIED FORCE begins

Operation ALLIED FORCE• Lessons learned by US Military• Political lessons learned• Impact of lessons learned on future DOD budget

CFD Review

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Next Week- Air and Space Power Today: The Global War on Terrorism -- Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom and GWOT

Read Chapter 21