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1. FRANCISCO LECAROZ & LENLIE LECAROZ vs. SANDIGANBAYAN &

PP

G.R. No. 130872 March 25, 1999

FACTS:

In the 1985 election of the Kabataang Barangay Jowil Red won the

KB Chairman of Barangay Matalaba. Red was appointed by then

President Marcos as member of the SB of Santa Cruz representing

the KBs of the municipality. However, Mayor Francisco Lecaroz

(Mayor) informed Red that he could not yet sit as member of the

municipal council until the Governor of Marinduque had cleared hisappointment. Meanwhile with the approval of the Mayor, Lenlie

Lecaroz (Lenlie - former KB Chairman) continued to receive his salary

for more than a year. Finally Red was able to secure appointment

papers from the Aquino administration after three years and nine

months from the date he received his appointment paper from

President Marcos. Subsequently, Red filed with the Office of the

Ombudsman several criminal complaints against the Mayor and

Lenlie arising from the refusal of the two officials to let him assume

the position of KB sectoral representative. After preliminary

investigation, the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan

thirteen informations for estafa through falsification of public

documents against petitioners, and one information for violation of

the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the Mayor alone.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an officer is entitled to stay in office until his

successor is appointed or chosen or has qualified.

HELD:

YES. To resolve these issues, it is necessary to refer to the laws on

the terms of office of KB youth sectoral representatives to the SB

and of the KB Federation Presidents. Section 7 of BP Blg. 51 and Sec.

1 of the KB Constitution respectively provide - Sec. 7. Term of

Office. - Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective officials

hereinabove mentioned shall hold office for a term of six (6) years,

which shall commence on the first Monday of March 1980. In the

case of the members of the sanggunian representing the association

of barangay councils and the president of the federation ofkabataang barangay, their terms of office shall be coterminous with

their tenure is president of their respective association and

federation .

In the instant case, although BP Blg. 51 does not say that a

Sanggunian member can continue to occupy his post after the

expiration of his term in case his successor fails to qualify, it does

not also say that he is proscribed from holding over. Absent an

express or implied constitutional or statutory provision to the

contrary, an officer is entitled to stay in office until his successor is

appointed or chosen and has qualified. The legislative intent of not

allowing holdover must be clearly expressed or at least implied in

the legislative enactment, otherwise it is reasonable to assume that

the law-making body favors the same.

2. TOLEDO vs. CSC and COMELEC

G.R. No. 92646-47 October 4, 1991

FACTS:

Petitioner Atty. Augusto Toledo was appointed by the COMELEC

Chairman as Manager of the Education and Information Department

of the COMELEC when he was more than 57 years old. This was his

first time to join government service. No prior request for

exemption from the provisions of Section 22, Rule III of the Civil

Service Rules on Personnel Action and Policies (CSRPAP) was

secured. Said provision prohibits the appointment of persons 57

years old or above into the government service without prior

approval by the CSC. Atty. Toledo officially reported for work and

assumed the functions of his office. COMELEC, upon discovery of

the lack of authority required under the CSRPAP issued Resolution

No. 2066, which declared Toledos appointment as void ab initio.

Toledo appealed the foregoing Resolution to the CSC. CSC

Resolution No. 89-468 disposed of the appeal by declaring the

appointment of Toledo as merely voidable and not void ab initio and

declaring Toledo as a de facto officer from the time he assumed

office to the time of the issuance of COMELEC Resolution No. 2066.

ISSUE:

WON Sec. 22, Rule III is valid.

HELD:

NO. The provision on 57-year old persons in the Revised Civil Service

Rules implementing RA 2260 cannot be accorded validity. It is

entirely a creation of the Civil Service Commission, having no basis in

the law itself which it was meant to implement. The statute itself

(RA 2260) contained no provision prohibiting the appointment or

reinstatement in the government service of any person who was

already 57 y/o. The provision at issue is an unauthorized act on the

part of CSC a supererogation since it has no relation or

connection with any provision of the law supposed to be carried in

effect. The power vested on the CSC was to implement the law or

put it into effect, not to add to it; to carry the law into effect or

execution, not to supply perceived omissions on it. Apart from this,

the CSRPAP cannot be considered effective as of the time of the

application to Toledo of a provision thereof, for the reason that said

rules were never published.

3.ESTRADA vs DESIERTO [G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001]

ESTRADA vs ARROYO [G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001]

(Thanks to Coffeeholic for this digest. I did some truncations.)FACTS:

In the May 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected

President while respondent Gloria Arroyo was elected VP. From the

beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by problems

that slowly eroded his popularity. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur

Governor Chavit Singson accused the petitioner, his family and

friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expose

immediately ignited reactions of rage. On November 13, 2000,

House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment

signed by 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members

of the House of Representatives to the Senate. On November 20,

2000, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the

petitioner. On January 16, 2001, by a vote of 11-10, the senator-

judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope which

allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3

billion in a secret bank account under the name Jose Velarde.

On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide

administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the

Philippines. On the same day, petitioner issued a press statement

that he was leaving Malacanang Palace for the sake of peace and in

order to begin the healing process of the nation. It also appeared

that on the same day, he signed a letter stating that he was

transmitting a declaration that he was unable to exercise the powers

and duties of his office and that by operation of law and the

Constitution, the VP shall be the Acting President. A copy of the

letter was sent to Speaker Fuentebella and Senate President

Pimentel on the same day.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President

(2) Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as

President

Held:

The Court held that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be

doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacanang. In the press

release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the

oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic, but with

the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving

the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in

order to begin the healing process of the nation. He did not say he

was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was

going to reassume the presidency as soon as the disability

disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the

opportunity to serve them; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from

any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of

the country; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the

promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and

solidarity.

The Court also tackled the contention of the petitioner that he is

merely temporarily unable to perform the powers and duties of the

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presidency, and hence is a President on leave. Congress has clearly

rejected petitioners claim of inability. The Court cannot pass upon

petitioners claim of inability to discharge the powers and duties of

the presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed

solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue which

cannot be decided by the Court without transgressing the principle

of separation of powers.

5. ROMULO vs YNIGUEZ

G.R. No. 71908 February 4, 1986

FACTS:

Respondents Speaker and the Members of the Committee on Justice

of the Batasan Pambansa contend that that the petition should be

dismissed because (1) it is a suit against the Batasan itself over

which this Court has no jurisdiction; (2) it raises questions which are

political in nature; (3) the Impeachment Rules are strictly in

consonance with the Constitution and even supposing without

admitting that the Rules are invalid, their invalidity would not nullify

the dismissal of the complaint for impeachment for the Batasan as a

body sovereign within its own sphere has the power to dismiss the

impeachment complaint even without the benefit of said Rules; and

(4) the Court cannot by mandamus compel the Batasan to give due

course to the impeachment complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court can interfere with the Batasans power of

impeachment

HELD:

NO.

1. The dismissal by the majority of the members of the Batasan ofthe impeachment proceedings is an act of the Batasan as a body in

the exercise of powers that have been vested upon it by the

Constitution beyond the power of this Court to review. This Court

cannot compel the Batasan to conduct the impeachment trial

prayed for by petitioners. A dismissal by the Batasan itself as a body

of the resolution and complaint for impeachment makes irrelevant

under what authority the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and

Good Government had acted.

2. Aside from the fact that said Committee cannot recall from the

Archives said resolution and complaint for impeachment without

revoking or rescinding the action of the Batasan denying MP Mitra's

motion for recall (which of course it had no authority to do and,

therefore, said Committee is in no position to comply with any order

from the Court for said recall) such an order addressed to the

Committee would actually be a direct order to the Batasan itself.

3. The Court held that if it has no authority to control the

Philippine Senate, then it does not have the authority to control the

actions of subordinate employees acting under the direction of the

Senate. The secretary, sergeant-at-arms, and disbursing officer of

the Senate are mere agents of the Senate who cannot act

independently of the will of that body. Should the Court do as

requested, there will be the spectacle presented of the court

ordering the secretary, the sergeant-at-arms, and the disbursing

officer of the Philippine Senate to do one thing, and the Philippine

Senate ordering them to do another thing.

4. The writ of mandamus should not be granted unless it clearly

appears that the person to whom it is directed has the absolute

power to execute it.

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6. Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez vs. The House Of Representatives

Committee On Justice, et.al.

G.R. No. 193459 February 15, 2011

FACTS:

On July 22, 2010, private respondents Baraquel group filed an

impeachment complaint against petitioner. On August 3, 2010,

private respondents Reyes group filed another impeachment

complaint. On August 10, 2010, House Majority Leader Neptali

Gonzales II instructed the Deputy Secretary General for Operations

to include the two complaints in the Order of Business, which was

complied with by their inclusion in the Order of Business for the

following day.

On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., the HRep simultaneously referred

both complaints to public respondent. Public respondent found

both complaints sufficient in form, which complaints it considered to

have been referred to it at exactly the same time.

Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings ofthe 15th Congress was published on September 2, 2010.

On September 6, 2010, petitioner tried to file a motion to reconsider

the September 1, 2010 Resolution of public respondent. Public

respondent refused to accept the motion, however, for prematurity;

instead, it advised petitioner to await the notice for her to file an

answer to the complaints, drawing petitioner to furnish copies of

her motion to each of the 55 members of public respondent.

After hearing, public respondent found the two complaints, which

both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of

public trust, sufficient in substance. The determination of the

sufficiency of substance of the complaints by public respondent,

which assumed hypothetically the truth of their allegations, hinged

on the issue of whether valid judgment to impeach could be

rendered thereon.

ISSUE: When is impeachment deemed initiated? (Does the present

impeachment complaint violate the one-year bar rule under the

Constitution?)

Held: The one-year bar rule. Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of

the Constitution reads: No impeachment proceedings shall be

initiated against the same official more than once within a period of

one year. Petitioner reckons the start of the 1-year bar from the

filing of the first impeachment complaint against her on July 22,

2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th

Congress. She posits that within 1 year from July 22, 2010, no

second impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to

public respondent. Following petitioners line of reasoning, the

verification of the complaint or the endorsement by a member of

the House steps done prior to the filing would already initiate

the impeachment proceedings.

Contrary to petitioners emphasis on impeachment complaint, what

the Constitution mentions is impeachment proceedings. Her

reliance on the singular tense of the word complaint to denote the

limit prescribed by the Constitution goes against the basic rule of

statutory construction that a word covers its enlarged and plural

sense. The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of

an impeachment complaint, for it is the matchstick that kindles the

candle of impeachment proceedings. The filing of an impeachment

complaint is like the lighting of a matchstick. Lighting the matchstick

alone, however, cannot light up the candle, unless the lighted

matchstick reaches or torches the candle wick. Referring the

complaint to the proper committee ignites the impeachment

proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints

filed, more than one lighted matchsticks light the candle at the same

time. What is important is that there should only be ONE CANDLE

that is kindled in a year, such that once the candle starts burning,

subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle.

Under the Rules of the House, a motion to refer is not among those

motions that shall be decided without debate, but any debate

thereon is only made subject to the five-minute rule. Moreover, it is

common parliamentary practice that a motion to refer a matter or

question to a committee may be debated upon, not as to the merits

thereof, but only as to the propriety of the referral. With respect to

complaints for impeachment, the House has the discretion not to

refer a subsequent impeachment complaint to the Committee on

Justice where official records and further debate show that an

impeachment complaint filed against the same impeachable officer

has already been referred to the said committee and the one yearperiod has not yet expired, lest it becomes instrumental in

perpetrating a constitutionally prohibited second impeachment

proceeding. Far from being mechanical, before the referral stage, a

period of deliberation is afforded the House, as the Constitution, in

fact, grants a maximum of three session days within which to make

the proper referral.

As mentioned, one limitation imposed on the House in initiating an

impeachment proceeding deals with deadlines. The Constitution

states that [a] verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by

any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon

a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be

included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and

referred to the proper Committee within three session days

thereafter.

x x x We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non

quieta movere. As pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment

proceeding is not initiated when the House deliberates on the

resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something

prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is

already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or

beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a

verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice

for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps

that follow.

Allowing an expansive construction of the term initiate beyond the

act of referral allows the unmitigated influx of successive

complaints, each having their own respective 60-session-day period

of disposition from referral. Worse, the Committee shall conduct

overlapping hearings until and unless the disposition of one of the

complaints ends with the affirmance of a resolution for

impeachment or the overriding[ of a contrary resolution (as

espoused by public respondent), or the House transmits the Articles

of Impeachment (as advocated by the Reyes group), or the

Committee on Justice concludes its first report to the House plenary

regardless of the recommendation (as posited by respondent-

intervenor). Each of these scenarios runs roughshod the very

purpose behind the constitutionally imposed one-year bar. Opening

the floodgates too loosely would disrupt the series of steps

operating in unison under one proceeding.