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8/10/2019 Admin Case4

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AGGABAO vs. COMELEC

GR No. 163756

FACTS:

Based on the results of May 2004 elections, Miranda garnered the highest number of

votes as Isabela 4th District Congressman. Aggabao, herein petitioner and a rival

candidate of Miranda, appealed with the COMELEC 2nd Division protesting that the

PBC erred in excluding certain COCVs in the canvass which allegedly appeared

regular and properly authenticated.

Two days after the proclamation of the remaining winning candidates of Isabela

(including Miranda), petitioner filed before the SC, a petition for certiorari contesting

the validity of said proclamation. Petitioner asserted that the COMELEC En Banc

acted without jurisdiction in directing the proclamation during the pendency of theformer's appeal with the COMELEC 2nd Division.

ISSUE:

Whether SC has jurisdiction over the case

RULING:

No, petitioner's remedy is not this petition for certiorari. It is undisputed that Miranda

has already been proclaimed, taken his oath and assumed office. As such, petitioner'srecourse would have been to file an electoral protest before the HRET.

RATIO:

The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election,

returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a

winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a

Member of the House of Representatives, COMELECs jurisdiction over election

contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own

jurisdiction begins.

CHAVES V. COMELEC 2004

FACTS:


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Petitioner Chavez, on various dates, entered into formal agreements with certain

establishments to endorse their products. On August 18, 2003, he authorized a certain

Andrew So to use his name and image for 96 North, a clothing company. Petitioner

also signed Endorsement Agreements with Konka International Plastics

Manufacturing Corporation and another corporation involved in the amusement and

video games business, G-Box. These last two agreements were entered into onOctober 14, 2003 and November 10, 2003, respectively.

Pursuant to these agreements, three billboards were set up along the Balintawak

Interchange of the North Expressway. One billboard showed petitioner promoting the

plastic products of Konka International Plastics Manufacturing Corporation, and the

other two showed petitioner endorsing the clothes of 96 North. One more billboard

was set up along Roxas Boulevard showing petitioner promoting the game and

amusement parlors of G-Box.

On Jan. 6, 2004, respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6520, which containedSection 32, the provision assailed. On Jan. 21, 2004, petitioner was directed to comply

with the said provision by the COMELEC's Law Department. He replied, on January

29, 2004, by requesting the COMELEC that he be informed as to how he may have

violated the assailed provision. He sent another letter this time asking the COMELEC

that he be exempted from the application of Sec. 32, considering that the billboards

adverted to are mere product endorsements and cannot be construed as paraphernalia

for premature campaigning under the rules.

The COMELEC ordered petitioner to remove or cause the removal of the billboards,

or to cover them from public view pending the approval of his request.

Feeling aggrieved, petitioner Chavez asks this Court that the COMELEC be enjoined

from enforcing the assailed provision.

ISSUE: 1. WON Section 32 is a violation of the Fair Elections Act?

WON Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 is invalid because of

overbreadth?

HELD: 1. NO. Petitioner's argument is not tenable. It only regulates their use toprevent premature campaigning and to equalize, as much as practicable, the situation

of all candidates by preventing popular and rich candidates from gaining undue

advantage in exposure and publicity on account of their resources and popularity.11

Moreover, by regulating the use of such election propaganda materials, the

COMELEC is merely doing its duty under the law.


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2. NO. A statute or regulation is considered void for overbreadth when it offends the

constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities

constitutionally subject to State regulations may not be achieved by means that sweep

unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.12The

provision in question is limited in its operation both as to time and scope. It only

disallows the continued display of a person's propaganda materials and advertisementsafter he has filed a certificate of candidacy and before the start of the campaign

period. Said materials and advertisements must also show his name and image.

There is no blanket prohibition of the use of propaganda materials and advertisements.

During the campaign period, these may be used subject only to reasonable limitations

necessary and incidental to achieving the purpose of preventing premature

campaigning and promoting equality of opportunities among all candidates.

The provision, therefore, is not invalid on the ground of overbreadth.

DELA PAZ v. ADIONG 465 scra 34 (2005)

FACTS:

Oct. 22, 2004- Judge Santos B. Adiong was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law

in A.M. No. RTJ-04-1863 for which he was meted a penalty of six months suspension

without salary and benefits. Nov 23, 2004- Judge Adiong was found guilty of gross

ignorance of the law and abuse of authority with a penalty of six months suspensionwithout pay in the instant administrative case.

Judge Adiong now comes before the Court with an Urgent Motion for Clarification

inquiring on whether the two decisions each imposing penalties of six months

suspension should be served simultaneously or successively. In the alternative, Judge

Adiong prays that should said two penalties be served successively, the six months

suspension in the present case be reconsidered and modified to a Fine reasoning the ff:

he admits his procedural lapses, has served the judiciary for 38 years, his continued

suspension will cause the clogging of the courts docket considering that the acting

judge .

-Hon. Amer Ibrahim is at the same time the Executive Judge and is busy attending to

his own cases which includes electoral protest cases needing preferential attention; d)

in one case, Admin. Case No. 532-MJ[1]

, the Court reconsidered the six months suspension of the respondent therein to a Fine;


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e) he is the family breadwinner with 6 children ages 5, 7, 8 and 9 and the other two

still in college

f) he is suffering from prostrate cancer and severe gout/arthritis but has to stop

medication because of financial restraint

g) in 1990, they were attacked by a losing litigant as a result of which, his wife died

from gunshot wounds and he survived because of timely medical attention; and, h) he

intends to file an application for optional retirement. Judge Adiong also informs the

Court that he has already served the penalty of six months in A.M. No. No. RTJ-04-

1863.

ISSUE:WON SUSPENSION SHOULD BE SERVED SUCCESSIVELY?

HELD: YES. SUSPENSION IS TO BE SERVED SUCCESSIVELY. These two cases

arose from two different causes of action and, therefore, the penalties should both beserved. Moreover, in the en banc Resolution dated Feb25, 1992, the Court

categorically stated that in case of two or more suspensions, the same shall be served

successively by the erring lawyer.

Anent Judge Adiongs prayer that the six months suspension be converted to a Fine.

Adm. Case No. 532- MJ is not applicable in the present case for the facts obtaining in

the aforesaid case are different. In the said case, the respondent judge was found

guilty of ignorance of the law with a penalty of six months suspension without pay.

Pending resolution of his Motion for Reconsideration, he continued to perform hisjudicial duties. However, the Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the Court, in

contemplation of the said decision, withheld payment of the salary of the respondent

judge for six months.

When the motion for reconsideration was denied, six months have elapsed. Upon a

Clarificatory Manifestation on whether he will still be suspended for six months but

with pay since the monetary portion of the judgment had already been satisfied when

his salary for the period had been withheld from him, the Court amended the penalty

to the effect that the respondent judge is sentenced to pay a Fine equivalent to his

salary for six months.

The prayer for a modification of the penalty to a Fine is DENIED for lack of merit.


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SULTAN USMAN SARANGANI, SORAIDA M. SARANGANI and HADJI NOR

HASSAN, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HADJI ABOLAIS

R. OMAR, MANAN OSOP and ATTY. NASIB D. YASSIN,respondents.

Facts:

* On September 15, 1997, a petition for annulment of several precincts and annulment

of book of voters in Madalum, Lanao Del Sur was filed with the COMELEC by

private respondents.

* Among the precincts sought to be annulled was Padian Torogan.

* Comelec created an investigation team to look into the matter.

* On June 18, 1998, an ocular inspection was conducted on the alleged ghost

precincts.

* The report states that when the team arrived in Padian Torogan, it appears that there

are only 2 structures: One is a concrete house with no roof, and the other is a wooden

structure without walls and roof.

o Also, it came out that the name Padian-Torogan means a cemetery not a residential

place.

o So this contradicts the records being brought by the COMELEC Team from the

Census saying that the area has 45 households with a total population of 285.

o Besides, the Team asked the people around who among them is a resident or a

registered voter in the so-called Barangay Padian-Torogan, and no one answered

affirmatively.

* On the basis of the foregoing, COMELEC issued an order finding "Padian Torogan

as ghost precinct."

Issue: Whether COMELEC erred in declaring Padian-Torogan as ghost precinct.

HELD: NO.

* The petition states that precinct No. 27A located in Barangay Padian Torogan was

the one declared as a ghost precinct by the COMELEC although the assailed Order

did not mention any specific precinct but simply declared "Padian Torogan as ghost

precinct."


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* It must be noted that under the Omnibus Election Code, there should be at least one

precinct per barangay.

* In designating election precincts, the COMELEC usually refers to them by number.

* Nevertheless, the determination of whether a certain election precinct actually existsor not and whether the voters registered in said precinct are real voters is a factual

matter.

* Upon review of the records, the Court finds that the COMELEC had exerted efforts

to investigate the facts and verified that there were no public or private buildings in

the said place, hence its conclusion that there were no inhabitants.

* If there were no inhabitants, afortiori, there can be no registered voters, or the

registered voters may have left the place.

* It is not impossible for a certain barangay not to actually have inhabitants

considering that people migrate.

* A barangay may officially exist on record and the fact that nobody resides in the

place does not result in its automatic cessation as a unit of local government.

* Under the LGC, the abolition of an LGU may be done by Congress in the case of a

province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision.

* In the case of a barangay, except in Metropolitan Manila area and in culturalcommunities, it may be done by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang

Panglunsod concerned subject to the mandatory requirement of a plebiscite conducted

for the purpose in the political units affected.

* The sacred right of suffrage guaranteed by the Constitution is not tampered when a

list of fictitious voters is excluded from an electoral exercise.

* Suffrage is conferred by the Constitution only on citizens who are qualified to vote

and are not otherwise disqualified by law.

* On the contrary, such exclusion of non-existent voters all the more protects the

validity and credibility of the electoral process as well as the right of suffrage because

the "electoral will" would not be rendered nugatory by the inclusion of some ghost

votes.

* Election laws should give effect to, rather than frustrate the will of the people.


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LAZARO C. GAYO, petitioner, vs. VIOLETA G. VERCELES, respondent.

FACTS: In 1977, respondent migrated to USA with her family but retained her

citizenship as a Filipino. In 1993, she returned to the Philippines for good. In 1995,

the respondent registered herself as a voter of Precinct No. 16 in Tubao, La Union.

She then abandoned her status as lawful permanent resident of the U.S.A. and on1998, she surrendered her alien registration receipt card before the American Embassy

in Manila.

She then ran on the 1998 elections and was elected Mayor of Tubao, La Union and

was re-elected on the 2001 elections.

Petitioner, also a candidate for Mayor during the May 2001 elections, filed a petition

with the RTC of Agoo, La Union praying that the respondent be declared disqualified

to hold the position of Mayor and that she be proclaimed as the duly-elected mayor on

the ground that Verceles failed to satisfy the one year residency requirement as anessential qualification for persons running for public office under Section 39 of the

Local Government Code.

Respondent contended that she had already renounced and waived her right to

permanently reside in the USA even before she surrendered her green card in 1998.

The RTC dismissed the petition ruling that the respondent was qualified to occupy the

position as Municipal Mayor as she was no longer a permanent resident of the USA

during May 2001 elections because she had already waived her green card even prior

to the filing of her certificate of candidacy when she first ran for mayor in the 1998elections. Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed this petition for review.

ISSUE: WON respondent met the residency requirement for municipal mayor during

the May 2001 elections.

HELD: YES. Jurisprudence provides that the term residence, as used in the election

law, imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence

in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. It is to be understood

not in its common acceptation as referring to dwelling or habitation, but rather to

domicile or legal residence, that is, the place where a party actually orconstructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at

any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).

The respondent effectively abandoned her residency in the Philippines by her

acquisition of the status of a permanent US resident. Nonetheless, respondent

reacquired her residency in the Philippines even before the holding of the May 2001


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elections as she surrendered her green card to the Immigration and Naturalization

Service of the American Embassy in 1998. By such act, her intention to abandon her

US residency was made clearer. Moreover, she was elected Mayor in the 1998

elections and served as such for the duration of her term. Such act was sufficient to

establish that the respondent intended to stay in the Philippines indefinitely and,

ultimately, that she has once again made the Philippines her permanent residence.

Poe vs. COMELEC , GR 16134 , March 3, 2004

FACTS: Petitioners questioned the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in taking

cognizance of and deciding the citizenship issue affecting Fernando Poe Jr. They

asserted that under Section 4(7) , Article VII of the 1987 Constituition, only the

Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue of the

case. ISSUE: As the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) , does the Supreme Courthave jurisdiction over the qualifications of presidential candidates? RULING: No. An

examination of the phraseology in Rule 12, 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the

Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court on April 1992

categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the

election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the

Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto

proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps,

intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. In such context, the

election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a

registered candidate who would have received either the second or third highest

number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-

election scenario. It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,

defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases

directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the

presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.

Laban v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161265. February 24, 2004

Meaning of Certificate of candidacy

Facts: Prior to the MAy 2004 elections, the LAban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) has been

divided because of a struggle of authority between Party Chair Edgardo Angara and Part Secretary

General Agapito Aquino, both having endorsed two differentsets of candidates under the same

party, LDP.

The matter was brought to the COMELEC. The Commission in its resolution, has recognized the

factions creating two sub-parties: LDP Angara Wing and LDP Aquino Wing.


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Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in recognizing the two

sets of nominations and endosements by the same party.

Held: The COMELEC erred in its resolution. Only those Certificates of Candidacy (COC) signed by

the LDP Party Chairman Angara or his duly authorized representative/s shall be recognized.

A certificate of candidacy makes known to the COMELEC that the person therein mentioned hasbeen nominated by a duly authorized political group empowered to act and that it reflects accurately

the sentiment of the nominating body.

AKBAYANYouth ET Al Vs. Commission On Election

Facts:

* Petitioner seeks to direct the COMELEC to conduct a special registration before the

General Election (May 14, 2001) for the youth who have failed to register on orbefore the deadline (December 27, 2000) set by the COMELEC.

* A Public hearing with the COMELEC as initiated by Senator Raul Roco as the

Chairman of the Committee on Electoral Reforms, Suffrage and Peoples

participation, to discuss the extension of registration.

* A memorandum was submitted by the COMELEC Commissioners who attended the

public hearing to address the 2 day additional registration request.

* A Consultation meeting among COMELEC commissioners, regional heads and

representatives and a number of senior staff has disapprove/denied the request on the

grounds under Section 8 of RA 8189 through a resolution.

* Michelle Betito a student of UP filed a petition for Mandamus to direct the

COMELEC to provide a special registration day under the continuing registration

provision under the Election code.

* Petitioners contention that their constitutional rights of suffrage has been

undermined and disenfranchised their right to vote.

Issue:

* Whether there was grave abuse of discretion in issuing the COMELECs resolution

to deny the extended registration?

* Whether the court can compel the COMELEC through an extraordinary writ of

Mandamus to conduct a special registration?


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Ruling: NO

* The right of suffrage is not at all absolute. It is subject to existing substantive and

procedural requirements embodied in the constitution, statute and other repositories of

law.

* Substantive aspects is provided under Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution

o At least 18 yrs of age

o Resided in the Philippines for at least 1 year

o Resided in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least 6 months immediately

preceding the election.

o No Literacy, property or other substantive requirement shall be imposed.

* Procedural aspect, the right to vote is necessarily conditioned upon certain

procedural requirements; among others is the process of registration.

* Registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage and is part and

parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in the election process.

* Section 8 of RA 8189 which provides a system of continuing registration:

System of Continuing Registration of Voters. - The Personal filing of application ofregistration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer

during regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the

period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety

(90) days before a special election,"

* There would be an operational impossibility of conducting the special registration

from which can no longer be accomplished within the time left to the Commission.

* It is an accepted doctrine in administrative law that the determination of

administrative agency as to the operation, implementation and application of a lawwould be accorded great weight considering that these specialized government bodies

are, by their nature and functions, in the best position to know what they can possible

do or not do, under prevailing circumstances.

* COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Under these circumstances, in

denying the request of petitioners to hold a special registration, acted within the

bounds and confines of the applicable law on the matter


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* Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment

as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, when the power is exercised in an arbitrary

or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent

and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty enjoined or to act at all in

contemplation of laws

* An extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to

perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one. mandamus will not issue to control

the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty

to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act,

because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court

PETRONILA S. RULLODA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

(COMELEC), ELECTION OFFICERLUDIVICO L. ASUNCION OF SANJACINTO, PANGASINAN; BARANGAY BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF BRGY.

STO. TOMAS, SAN JACINTO, PANGASINAN, Board of Election Tellers of Prec.

Nos. 30A/30A1, 31A, 31A1, and 32A1, and REMEGIO PLACIDO, respondents.

Facts:

In the barangay elections of July 15, 2002, Romeo N. Rulloda and Remegio L.

Placido were the contending candidates for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San

Jacinto, Pangasinan. On June 22, 2002, Romeo suffered a heart attack and passed

away

Petitioner Petronila Betty Rulloda, wrote a letter to the Commission on Elections

seeking permission to run as candidate for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas in lieu

of her late husband.

Election took place and petitioner garnered 516 votes while respondent Remegio

Placido received 290 votes. Despite this, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed Placido

as the Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas.

COMELEC denied the request for substitution of the petitioner based on Sec.9 ofCOMELECs Resolution No. 4801 dated May 23, 2002, which reads:

Sec. 9. Substitution of candidates. There shall be no substitution of candidates for

barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials.

ISSUE: WON petitioner can substitute her late husband in the brgy. Election?


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Held: YES, petitioner is declared duly elected Barangay Chairman

There is no dispute that petitioner garnered 516 votes while respondent got only 290

votes.

In our jurisdiction, an election means the choice or selection of candidates to publicoffice by popular vote through the use of the ballot, and the elected officials which are

determined through the will of the electorate. An election is the embodiment of the

popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people. The winner is the

candidate who has obtained a majority or plurality of valid votes cast in the election.

Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who receive the

highest number of votes cast in the election for that office. For, in all republican forms

of government the basic idea is that no one can be declared elected and no measure

can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal

votes cast in the election.

PAGCOR vs Anggara

Respondents Beatriz T. La Victoria (La Victoria) and Marita A. Angara (Angara) were Slot Machine

Roving Token Attendants (SMRTAs) of petitioner Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation

(PAGCOR) assigned at its casino in Davao City.

The PAGCOR Board of Directors dismissed them from service, effective June 28, 1997, for loss of

trust and confidence.

It appears that respondent La Victoria was dismissed for alleged short selling of tokens while

respondent Angara was dismissed for alleged token passing and condoning or actively assisting La

Victoria in covering up her shortage.

Respondents filed their appeal memorandum with the Civil Service Commission (CSC). CSC

directed PAGCOR Chairman Alicia Ll. Reyes to submit her comment. Instead of filing a comment,

petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, on the ground that the appeal was filed out of time.

CSC issued Resolution, reversed the respondents dismissal and ordered their reinstatement.

Issue:

1.) W/N (CSC) ERRED IN DECLARING PRIVATE RESPONDENTS DISMISSAL is WITHOUT

CAUSE AND WITHOUT DUE PROCESS EVEN WITHOUT AWAITING THE COMMENT OF THE

PETITIONER AND THE COMPLETE RECORDS OF THE CASE, WHERE THE MERIT OF THECASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN FAIRLY AND IMPARTIALLY ASSESSED

2.) W/N LA VICTORIA AND ANGARA HOLD CONFIDENTIAL POSITIONS WHOSE REMOVAL

FROM THE SERVICE CAN BE JUSTIFIED THROUGH LOSS OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE.

Held:


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No. The CSC did not err in ruling that respondents were not dismissed for cause and after due

process since loss of trust and confidence is not one among the grounds for disciplinary action and

there was no formal investigation conducted but a summary proceeding.

2. No.

It is the nature of the position which determines whether a position is primarily confidential, policy-

determining or highly technical.

From the nature of respondents functions, their organizational ranking, and their compensation

level, occupying one of the lowest ranks in petitioner, cannot be considered confidential employees.

Petitioner, therefore, cannot justify respondents dismissal on loss of trust and confidence since the

latter are not confidential employees.

Moreover, the petitioner cannot claim it was deprived of due process of law when the CSC granted

respondents appeal without the comment of the petitioner or the records before it. Petitioner was

directed to file its comment but chose instead to move for the dismissal of the appeal.

It must be remembered that the CSC, being an administrative body with quasi-judicial powers, is not

bound by the technical rules of procedure and evidence in the adjudication of cases, subject only to

limitations imposed by basic requirements of due process

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