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China Reaction DA

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Uniqueness – US military presence growing now as a reaction to increasing Chinese military presence in East AsiaSouthfront 7-31-15

Southfront Solutions, military and foreign policy consulting group, http://southfront.org/foreign-policy-diary-the-us-china-standoff-in-the-indo-asia-pacific-region/

The US sea services have released a new maritime strategy, a plan that describes how the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard will design, organize, and employ naval forces in support its global dominance. The new strategy titled, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” highlighted “forward,” “engaged,” and “ready” as key words and kept the original theme of “ensuring our capability to intervene overseas.” It calls for increasing the Navy’s forward presence to 120 ships by 2020, up from about 97 ships today. This includes forward-basing four ballistic-missile-defense destroyers in Spain and stationing another attack submarine in Guam by the end of 2015. The Navy is scheduled to increase presence in Middle East from 30 ships today to 40 by 2020. The strategy reinforces the continued need to strengthen partnerships and alliances by stressing the importance of operating in NATO maritime groups and participating in international training exercises. The US strategy emphasizes operating forward and making proxies across the globe, especially in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Thus, the hard anti-Russian rhetoric of the Washington is a side of the global stand-off. Very same time, the United States is preparing to go deeper in deal with China. The US strategists are concerned about rise of Chinese naval forces and its expansion to the Pacific Ocean. Particularly, they aimed to prevent a situation when China will be able to defend particular zones of sea communications from foreign intervention. This is Chinese DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile purpose. In 2008 the U.S. Department of Defense estimated that China had 60-80 missiles and 60 launchers. The risk of establishing area denied operational environment, for instance in South China Sea, worries architects of the strategy. Since the American ‘pivot’ toward Asia, a tolerant term for the US deterrence policy against China, in 2011 United States Navy has deployed 60 percent of all it powers in Asia-Pacific region. Indeed, the US Navy is ready to deploy more in order to establish own control in China’s zone of interest.

Link – Strategic reversal. Chinese policymakers will perceive the aff advocacy as US weakness and increase its military aggressiveness. Obama’s first term proves the reaction cycle.Gompert and Saunders 11

David C., Distinguished Research Fellow in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University (NDU), a Professor for National Security Studies at the U.S. Naval Academy, and an Adjunct Fellow of the RAND Corporation; Phillip C., Distinguished Research Fellow and Director of Studies in the Center for Strategic

Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University (NDU). He also serves as Director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs

The Paradox of Power: Sino-American Strategic Restraint in an Age of Vulnerability, 2011, ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/paradox-of-power.pdf, pp. 44-45

The net result is a complex, multifaceted, and ambiguous relationship where substantial and expanding areas of cooperation coexist

with ongoing strategic tensions and suspicions. China’s sense of its room for maneuver (and potential strategic vulnerability) with respect to the United States rests on the global balance of power, the relative military balance, China’s domestic political vulnerabilities at any given moment, and the “balance of need” in terms of which country needs the other more. During the Obama administration’s first 2 years in office, these factors have produced a negative dynamic in bilateral relations. Chinese analysts saw broad trends toward multipolarity and the diffusion of power reducing U.S. international dominance; many concluded that the financial crisis and U.S.

commitments in the Middle East were accelerating the U.S. decline. At the same time, many Chinese believed that China’s rising economic, political, and military power allowed it to be less deferential to the concerns of the United States and other Asia-Pacific states and to push its own agenda by calling for reductions in U.S.

arms sales and political support for Taiwan and by taking a tougher line on maritime sovereignty disputes. These perceptions were reinforced by expressions of nationalist sentiment in the Chinese media (including a number of articles by retired PLA officers) that criticized any signs of compromise by Chinese leaders and called on the government to punish the United

States for actions such as arms sales to Taiwan.3 These perceptions coincided with Obama administration efforts to expand the areas of U.S.-China cooperation and encourage China to take on more responsibility in

addressing global challenges such as climate change, nonproliferation, and the stability of the international economic system. Chinese leaders likely concluded that these proposals—intended to increase China’s stake and role in

sustaining the current international system—were a reflection of American weakness and indicative of a shift in the “balance of need” in China’s favor. Improved cross-strait relations, which reduced China’s need for

U.S. support in reining in possible Taiwan moves toward independence, were another factor in this assessment. China’s temporary shift away from its “charm diplomacy” and military restraint toward a more assertive posture in 2009–2010 alarmed its neighbors and revived concerns about a threat to regional stability. A more assertive China and a series of provocative North Korean actions (including a second nuclear test, the sinking of the Republic of Korea Navy corvette Cheonan, and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island) have reinvigorated U.S. security alliances with Japan and South Korea. They have also produced a broader demand in Asia for an enhanced U.S. political and security role in the region.

Impact – South China Sea war goes nuclearGoldstein 13 (Avery Goldstein, professor University of Pennsylvania department of Political Science, China's Real and Present Danger. Foreign Affairs [serial online]. September 2013;92(5):136-144. Available from: Military & Government Collection, Ipswich, MA. Accessed July 30, 2015 LC)

Uncertainty about what could lead either Beijing or Washington to risk war makes a crisis far more likely, since neither side knows when, where, or just how hard it can push without the other side pushing back. This situation bears some resemblance to that of the early Cold War, when it took a number of serious crises for the two sides to feel each other out and learn the rules of the road. But today's environment might be even more dangerous.¶ The balance of nuclear and conventional military power between China and the United States, for example, is much more lopsided than the one that existed between the Soviet Union and the United States. Should Beijing and Washington find themselves in a conflict, the huge U.S. advantage in conventional forces would increase the temptation for Washington to threaten

to or actually use force. Recognizing the temptation facing Washington, Beijing might in turn feel pressure to use its conventional forces before they are destroyed. Although China could not reverse the military imbalance, it might believe that quickly imposing high costs on the United States would be the best way to get it to back off.¶ The fact that both sides have nuclear arsenals would

help keep the situation in check, because both sides would want to avoid actions that would invite nuclear retaliation. Indeed, if only nuclear considerations mattered, U.S.-Chinese crises would be very stable and not worth worrying about too much. But the two sides' conventional forces complicate matters and undermine the stability provided by nuclear deterrence. During a crisis, either side might believe that using its conventional forces would confer bargaining leverage, manipulating the other side's fear of escalation through what the economist Thomas¶ Schelling calls a "competition in risk-taking." In a crisis, China or the United States might believe that it valued what was at stake more than the other and would therefore be willing to tolerate a higher level of risk. But because using conventional

forces would be only the first step in an unpredictable process subject to misperception, missteps, and miscalculation, there is no guarantee that brinkmanship would end before it led to an unanticipated nuclear catastrophe.¶ China, moreover, apparently believes that nuclear deterrence opens the door to the safe use of conventional force. Since both countries would fear a potential nuclear exchange, the Chinese seem to think that neither they nor the Americans would allow a military conflict to escalate too far. Soviet leaders, by contrast, indicated that they would use whatever military means were necessary if war came--which is one reason why war never came. In addition,

China's official "no first use" nuclear policy, which guides the Chinese military's preparation and training for conflict,

might reinforce Beijing's confidence that limited war with the United States would not mean courting nuclear escalation. As a result of its beliefs, Beijing might be less cautious about taking steps that would risk triggering a crisis. And if a crisis ensued, China might also be less cautious about firing the first shot.¶ Such beliefs are particularly worrisome given recent developments in technology that have dramatically improved the precision and effectiveness of conventional military capabilities. Their lethality might confer a dramatic advantage to the side that attacks first, something that was generally not true of conventional military operations in the main European theater of U.S.-Soviet confrontation. Moreover, because the sophisticated computer and satellite systems that guide contemporary weapons are highly vulnerable to conventional military strikes or cyberattacks, today's more precise weapons might be effective only if they are used before an adversary has struck or adopted counter-measures. If peacetime restraint were to give way to a search for advantage in a crisis, neither China nor the United States could be confident about the durability of the systems managing its advanced conventional weapons.¶ Under such circumstances, both Beijing and Washington would have incentives to

initiate an attack. China would feel particularly strong pressure, since its advanced conventional weapons are more fully dependent on vulnerable computer networks, fixed radar sites, and satellites. The effectiveness of U.S. advanced forces is less dependent on these most vulnerable systems. The advantage held by the United States, however, might increase its temptation to strike first, especially against China's satellites, since it would be able to cope with Chinese retaliation in kind.

World War IIISoros 6-3-15

George, international financier and philanthropist, as quoted by Shen Hua, “Will South China Sea Dispute Lead to World War?” Voice of America News, http://www.voanews.com/content/will-south-china-sea-dispute-lead-to-world-war/2806950.html

Well-known American investor George Soros also expressed concerns about the Chinese aggression in the South China Sea in recent months. He said at a recent World Bank forum that if China suffers economically, it is likely to initiate a third world war in order to achieve national solidarity and to get itself out of the economic difficulties. Even if China and the U.S. do not engage in a war directly, Soros said, there is a high possibility of military conflicts between China and one of the U.S. security partners, Japan. World War III could follow as a result, Soros said.

Action-Reaction Link ExtensionsChina reacts opportunistically to perceived US weaknessLowther and Yannakogeorgos 12

Adam and Panayotis, research professor and cyber-defense analyst at the Air Force Research Institute, “Think Like a Dragon,” The National Interest, March 26, 2012

http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/think-the-dragon-6680

Finally, unfolding geopolitical events (seen as Daoism’s path) are carefully watched by the Chinese. America should expect China, consistent with its strategic culture, to take advantage of opportunities (perceived or real American weakness) when they arise. But do not expect this to occur with a clear end state in mind—remember that Chinese strategic culture teaches us that in this respect, Eastern and Western thinking are not the same.

US has a policy of containment towards China nowReuters 5/20/15

(Tim Kelly writing for Reuters, 5/20/15 “U.S.-Asia amphibious force gathering signals nudge to China containment” accessed 7/29/15 from http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/20/us-hawaii-marines-idUSKBN0O51AH20150520 LC)

Military commanders from Japan, Australia, the Philippines and 20 other mostly Asia-Pacific nations huddled around a large tactical map, poring over satellite images in readiness for an amphibious raid on Hawaii's most populous island Oahu.¶ Although only a drill, it represented a glimpse of cooperation

and integration among non-Chinese amphibious forces in Asia that the United States is belatedly encouraging.¶ A senior U.S. official told Reuters the-first-of-its-kind gathering also signifies a nudge towards containing China, as Beijing grows increasingly assertive in pushing its territorial claims in the South China Sea.¶ The shift has left supporters of engagement with China "under pressure", said the source, who declined to be identified because he was not authorized to speak to the media.¶

Wag the dog – Any Chinese internal problems risk South China Sea warCole 14

(J. Michael Cole, senior fellow at the China Policy Institute, University of Nottingham, 7/10/14 “Where Would Beijing Use External Distractions?” in The Diplomat, accessed 7/29/15 from

http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/where-would-beijing-use-external-distractions/ LC)

Throughout history, embattled governments have often resorted to external distractions to tap into a restive population’s nationalist sentiment and thereby release, or redirect, pressures that otherwise could have been turned against those in power. Authoritarian regimes in particular, which deny their citizens the right to punish the authorities through retributive democracy — that is, elections — have used this device to ensure their survival during periods of domestic upheaval or financial crisis. Would the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), whose legitimacy is so contingent on social stability and economic growth, go down the same path if it felt that its hold on power were threatened by domestic instability?¶ Building on the premise that the many contradictions that are inherent to the extraordinarily complex Chinese experiment, and rampant

corruption that undermines stability, will eventually catch up with the CCP, we can legitimately ask how, and where, Beijing could manufacture external crises with opponents against whom nationalist fervor, a major characteristic of contemporary China, can be

channeled. In past decades, the CCP has on several occasions tapped into public outrage to distract a disgruntled population, often by encouraging (and when necessary containing) protests against external opponents, namely Japan and the United States.¶ While serving as a convenient outlet, domestic protests, even when they turned violent (e.g., attacks on Japanese manufacturers), were about as far as the CCP would allow. This self-imposed restraint, which was prevalent during the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, was a function both of China’s focus on

building its economy (contingent on stable relations with its neighbors) and perceived military weakness. Since then, China has established itself as the world’s second-largest economy and now deploys, thanks to more than a

decade of double-digit defense budget growth, a first-rate modern military.¶ Those impressive achievements have, however, fueled Chinese nationalism, which has increasingly approached the dangerous zone of hubris. For many, China is now a rightful regional hegemon demanding respect, which if denied can — and should — be met with threats, if not the application of force. While it might be tempting to attribute China’s recent assertiveness in the South and East China Seas to the emergence of Xi Jinping, Xi alone cannot make all the decisions; nationalism is a component that cannot be dissociated from this new phase in Chinese expressions of its power. As then-Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi is said to have told his counterparts at a tense regional forum in Hanoi in 2010, “There is one basic difference among us. China is a big state and you are smaller countries.”¶ This newfound assertiveness within its backyard thus makes it more feasible that, in times of serious trouble

at home, the Chinese leadership could seek to deflect potentially destabilizing anger by exploiting some external distraction. Doing so is always a calculated risk, and sometimes the gambit fails, as Slobodan Milosevic learned the hard way when he tapped into the furies of nationalism to appease mounting public discontent with his bungled economic policies. For an external distraction to achieve its objective (that is, taking attention away from domestic issues by redirecting anger at an outside actor), it must not result in failure or military defeat. In other words, except for the most extreme circumstances, such as the imminent collapse of a regime, the decision to externalize a domestic crisis is a rational one: adventurism must be certain to achieve success, which in turn will translate into political gains for the embattled regime. Risk-taking is therefore

proportional to the seriousness of the destabilizing forces within. Rule No. 1 for External Distractions: The greater the domestic instability, the more risks a regime will be willing to take, given that the scope and, above all, the symbolism of the victory in an external scenario must also be greater.¶ With this in mind, we can then ask which external distraction scenarios would Beijing be the most likely to turn to should domestic disturbances compel it to do so. That is not to say that anything like this will happen anytime soon. It is nevertheless not unreasonable to imagine such a possibility. The intensifying crackdown on critics of the CCP, the detention of lawyers, journalists and activists, unrest in Xinjiang, random acts of terrorism, accrued censorship — all point to growing instability. What follows is a very succinct (and by no means exhaustive) list of disputes, in descending order of likelihood, which Beijing could use for external distraction.¶ 1. South China

Sea¶ The South China Sea, an area where China is embroiled in several territorial disputes with smaller claimants, is ripe for exploitation as an external distraction. Nationalist sentiment, along with the sense that the entire body of water is part of China’s indivisible territory and therefore a “core interest,” are sufficient enough to foster a will to fight should some “incident,” timed to counter unrest back home, force China to react. Barring a U.S. intervention, which for the time being seems unlikely, the

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has both the numerical and qualitative advantage against any would be

opponent or combination thereof. The Philippines and Vietnam, two countries which have skirmished with China in recent years, are the likeliest candidates for external distractions, as the costs of a brief conflict would be low and the likelihood of military success fairly high. For a quick popularity boost and low-risk distraction, these opponents would best serve Beijing’s interests.

Specific Case Links

JapanUS presence in Japan is key to preventing Chinese hostility Pollmann 15 (Mina Pollmann, editorial assistant at The Diplomat and a student in the Walsh School of Foreign Service class of 2015 majoring in International Politics with a concentration in Foreign Policy. 4/28/15 “Japan, US Talk Okinawa, South China Sea

at Ministers’ Meeting” in The Diplomat, accessed 7/29/15 from http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/japan-us-talk-okinawa-south-china-sea-at-ministers-meeting/ LC)

At the joint press conference, Kerry promised the United States would defend Japanese territory, including the Senkaku Islands. President Barack Obama personally already made that promise when he visited Tokyo a year ago, when he explicitly said that the Senkakus are covered by the U.S.-Japan security treaty because they are administered by

Japan. Still, such repeated expressions of commitment are reassuring to Japan, which is increasingly alarmed by Chinese bellicosity in the East China Sea.¶ In addition, both sides agreed that Japan and the United States are both interested in and concerned by the problems in the South China Sea because it is an important issue for the region’s peace and stability. Cooperating in the South China Sea is one issue area where Japan can do more to become a more equal partner with the United States within the

alliance framework.¶ The emphasis of the alliance’s role in preventing unsettled maritime borders in East Asia from erupting into a major conflict is aptly summarized by the Nikkei Asian Review: “Making China think twice about projecting sea power forms an unstated aim of the first

overhaul of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation in 18 years.”

US presence in Japan directly related to South China Sea adventurismWhelden 15

Craig, MARFORPAC executive director, as quoted by Dennis Chan, reporter, Saipan Tribune, May 5, http://www.saipantribune.com/index.php/nmi-has-role-in-us-forward-presence/

“The South China Sea is being contested, if not daily, certainly weekly,” he said. “All these contests of will in the South China Sea—between them [the Chinese], the Filipinos, the Japanese, and other countries are putting the area at some risk. …Having a forward presence…demonstrates the will of the United States to be here for our friends, our allies,” he said.

Okinawa Presence in Okinawa is key to deter North Korea nuclear strikesRoos 10

(John V, American Ambassador to Japan, 1/29/10 “The Enduring Importance of our Security Alliance”

Accessed 7/29/15 from http://japan2.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20100129-71.html LC)

The current mix of U.S. forces in Japan is based on our assessment of the military capabilities we need to achieve this goal of stability and deterrence in this crucial part of the world.¶ The U.S. Air Force, for example, deploys top line aircraft for air superiority, counterstrike, and intelligence collection. The presence of our naval forces in Yokosuka and Sasebo would enable us to react in a matter of days rather than weeks to any situation that may arise. Our naval forces also work on a daily basis with their Japanese counterparts to track the growing foreign submarine presence in the waters around Japan. Our Army would provide logistical support in the event of a conflict in this area, as well as integrating with the

Navy, Air Force, and Japanese Self Defense Forces to provide ballistic missile defense for Japan.¶ The Marine Corps presence in Okinawa, which I am sure you have all been hearing about, is perhaps the least understood by the general

public, but in reality is among the most critical of the forces we deploy in both peacetime and in the unlikely event of conflict. So let me be a little more detailed here and a little technical, because I think it is important for all

of us to understand. The III [third] Marine Expeditionary Force in Okinawa brings together the core capabilities of all of our other services into a rapidly deployable self-contained fighting force known as the Marine Air-Ground Task Force. The Marines combine air, ground, and logistical forces together, so that in any contingency or emergency there would be no need to wait for complicated logistical and airlift support from other

services. The short range helicopters assigned to the Marines in Okinawa would be able to rapidly move our ground combat and support units on Okinawa across the island chain that links Northeast and Southeast Asia to wherever they would be required. For heavier or longer-range operations, the Marines would be supported by our naval fleet in Sasebo, just a few days sailing time away, which could project both

Marine ground and air power anywhere in the region. This mobility and forward presence is why the Marines in Okinawa are routinely our primary responder to major natural disasters in Asia, such as the 2004 Asian Tsunami, mudslides in the Philippines, or the recent typhoon in Taiwan. A little known fact is that the Marines, along with other U.S. forces, have led or participated in 12 significant humanitarian assistance/disaster relief missions in the last five years alone, helping to save hundreds of thousands of lives in this region. The Marines in Okinawa would play a similar rapid response role in any armed conflict in the region, arriving first on the scene to secure critical facilities, conduct civilian evacuations, and provide

forward land and air strike power.¶ If the Marines were moved entirely off of Japan, their mobility and

effectiveness in the region would be impacted, and it could be perceived negatively with

regard to the United States' commitment to this region. The next closest ground combat troops available are Army contingents based in Hawaii, and the distance that they would have to travel would delay U.S. responsiveness in regional contingencies.¶ In addition, the ability of the Marines and all our forces in Japan to conduct realistic training exercises ensures not only that they are ready to

respond to any situation, but also serves as a visible deterrent. What we do here in Japan is carefully

watched throughout the region. Whether it is F-15 air-to-air combat drills off of Kadena Air Force Base or visits by Ballistic Missile Defense-equipped Aegis destroyers to civilian ports on the Sea of Japan, publicly exercising our forces' capabilities to defend Japan makes it less likely that we will ever need to use them in a real conflict.¶ Of course, behind our forward-based forces in

Japan is also the full weight of U.S. national military power, both conventional and nuclear. If, God forbid, a conflict were to erupt, our front line units would be stretched to maintain a sustained conflict without reinforcement. That is why we routinely bring military assets such as the F-22s to Japan to ensure that we could deploy the necessary resources as quickly as possible in the event the need ever arises.¶ Let me take a moment to address our nuclear posture.

The nuclear deterrent we provide to Japan is obviously important given North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons and the existence of two major acknowledged nuclear powers in the

region. As you know, President Obama is fully committed to the goal of totally eliminating nuclear weapons, and we must continue to work very hard to achieve that goal. Until we reach that objective, however, preserving an effective nuclear deterrent for ourselves, Japan, and our other allies remains an absolutely unshakable commitment of the United States.¶ Of course, our Alliance could not operate effectively without the shared responsibilities and partnership of Japan. Under the terms of the Mutual Security Treaty, we are required to provide the land, air, and naval forces necessary to defend Japan. In exchange, Japan is responsible for providing bases and areas for U.S. forces to protect Japan and to maintain peace and security in East Asia. This is the

basic compact that has served our two nations - and the region - so well over the five decades. The presence of the U.S. personnel in Japan reassures the region of America's commitment to maintaining peace. We could not fulfill this role or our treaty commitments without the bases that Japan provides. At the same time, the U.S. recognizes that it must always seek measures to better structure our basing presence here. In this regard, the Realignment Roadmap Agreement we reached in 2006, which has been the subject of so much discussion, reflected in part a shared realization of the need to re-structure our forces to respond to the changing Japanese demographics over the past several decades. While we must maintain the necessary deterrent capability over the longer term, we must also reduce the footprint of our forces in heavily populated areas.¶ Nowhere is this truer than in Okinawa. Due to its strategic location, Okinawa suffered severely during the war. Since that time and for the same strategic reasons, it has hosted a much larger share of U.S. bases than the other parts of Japan.

Unfortunately, given trends in the security environment, Okinawa is becoming not less but more important for the defense of Japan and maintenance of peace in the region. This is why, for example, the Japan Self-Defense Forces are reorienting their posture to focus on the Ryukyu Islands chain.

South Korea withdrawal

China wants US military presence on the Korean peninsula and fears withdrawal because of the Japanese responseStratfor 2K

International News and analysis consulting firm, July 28, http://www.military.com/Content/MoreContent?file=SL27july

Beijing will not accept a large force that reinforces Washington's hegemonic power in Asia, but it wants the force large enough to guarantee stability and a status quo of the regional power balance. Tokyo will not accept a force so small that it would leave Japan as the frontline of U.S. defense in Asia.

Northeast AsiaUS needs to devote more military to Asia to prevent China takeoverRogin 4/2/15

(Josh, Bloomberg View columnist, previously worked for the Daily Beast, Newsweek, Foreign Policy magazine, the Washington Post, Congressional Quarterly and Asahi Shimbun 4/2/15 “U.S. Misses Real Threat of China’s Fake Islands” Accessed 7/30/15

http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-04-02/u-s-misses-real-threat-of-china-s-fake-islands LC)

The Barack Obama administration has been very busy dealing with nuclear negotiations with Iran, a war against the

Islamic State, a new conflict in Yemen and the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. Yet the understandable focus on these

other crises has obscured China's efforts to speed up its militarization of the South China Sea .

Now, Chinese progress has reached the point that senior Pentagon officials and Congressional leaders are demanding the administration do something about it.¶ There is no shortage of evidence of China’s rapid buildup of infrastructure and armaments in disputed territory far from its physical borders. Satellite photos released last month show that in the past year, China has built several entirely new islands in disputed waters using land-reclamation technology, and then constructed military-friendly facilities on them. In the Spratly Islands, new Chinese land masses have been equipped with helipads and anti-aircraft towers, raising regional concerns that Beijing is using thinly veiled military coercion to establish control in an area where six Asian nations have claims.¶ Admiral

Harry Harris, commander of U.S. Pacific Fleet, sounded the alarm in a speech in Australia on Wednesday, calling the Chinese project “unprecedented” and saying that the construction is part of a larger campaign of provocative actions against smaller Asian states.¶ "China is creating a 'Great Wall of Sand' with dredges and bulldozers over the course of months,” he warned, adding that it raised "serious questions about Chinese intentions."¶ For example, satellite photos taken by Airbus Defence and Space and published by Jane's in February, show that over the past year China has built an 800,000-square-foot island on top of Hughes Reef in the Spratly Islands, where no island existed before. China also began a reclamation and construction project at nearby Gavin’s Reef. Both islands now have helipads and anti-aircraft towers.¶

China has also expanded its already created islands on the Spratlys' Johnson South Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Gaven Reef and Fiery Cross Reef -- the last of which can accommodate an airstrip, according to

the U.S. military. Harris said China has created more than 1.5 square miles of “artificial landmass” in the South China Sea. China’s claims are based on what’s known as the nine-dash line, which if implemented would grant

China 90 percent of the entire Sea.¶ Top Asia watchers in Congress have been asking the Obama administration to confront China on the issue and devote more attention to the increasingly tense situation in the region. In the late hours of the debate over the Senate budget last weekend, three senators added two amendments aimed at pushing the Obama administration to reinvigorate its so-called Pivot to Asia.¶ The first of those amendments, sponsored by Senate Foreign Relations Committee members Robert Menendez, Cory Gardner and Ben Cardin, calls on the administration to develop and make public a comprehensive strategy to ensure freedom of navigation in the Pacific. It would also allow Congress to fund more training and exercises by the U.S. military and its Asian partners.¶ A second amendment, authored by Gardner, the new chairman of the Asia subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, calls for an independent agency such as the Government Accountability Office to review what the administration is actually spending on the Asia pivot and to make recommendations on how it might be better managed.¶ “It’s important that the American people have a full accounting of the resources that have been devoted to this important policy and whether they have been prioritized effectively,” Gardner told me in a statement.¶ These pieces of legislation are the latest effort by Congress to find out exactly what the administration is doing to counter China’s moves. On March 19, all four leaders of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees wrote a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry and Defense Secretary Ashton Carter calling on the administration to wake up to the graveness of the situation in the South China Sea. “Without a comprehensive strategy for addressing the PRC’s broader policy and conduct," the senators wrote, "longstanding interests of the United States, as

well as our allies and partners, stand at considerable risk."¶ The letter points out that $5 trillion in global trade transits through the South China Sea each year. They assert that China stands in violation of 2002 agreement it signed with the ASEAN countries in which all parties pledged self-restraint and avoid actions that could complicate the situation or escalate tensions.¶ Bob Corker, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, told me that the Chinese are taking advantage of the Obama administration’s focus on the Middle East: “China understands that where this administration is, it’s a place where they can in fact move ahead in the world.” ¶ Asked about the congressional letter, State Department spokesman Jeff Radke insisted that the U.S. is increasing its coordination

with countries affected by China’s moves and confronting the Chinese leadership privately. “We have consistently and frequently raised with China our concerns over its large-scale land reclamation, which undermines peace and stability in the South China Sea, and more broadly in the Asia Pacific region,” he said.¶ But James Clapper, the director of national intelligence, testified to Congress last month that the Chinese don’t seem to be getting the message. He called their actions “aggressive” and said Chinese claims in the South China Sea are “exorbitant.” ¶ “Although China is looking for stable ties with the United States, it’s more willing to accept bilateral and regional tensions in pursuit

of its interests, particularly on maritime sovereignty issues,” Clapper said.¶ The Beijing government has stated clearly that it believes its expansion in the South China Sea is both legal and non-threatening, refusing to address the region’s concerns in any substantive way. It complained loudly when the U.S. and India took the relatively innocuous step of issuing a joint statement referring to their desire to address the issue.¶ No matter the

state of the Middle East and Eastern Europe, the Obama administration's lack of response to China’s maritime aggression is worrisome. China is testing how far it can push the status quo before Washington does something. The Pentagon and Congress are clearly telling Obama that the response needs to come before China’s military takeover of the South China Sea is complete.

American military presence in Northeast Asia key to regional stabilityHagel 14

(Chuck Hagel, Secretary of Defense, 5/31/14 “The United States’ Contribution to Regional Stability: Chuck Hagel” accessed 7/31/15 from https://www.iiss.org/en/events/ shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/2014-c20c/plenary-1-d1ba/chuck-hagel-a9cb LC)

As America strengthens its ties across the Asia-Pacific, we also welcome the region’s democratic development. We welcome democratic development because democracies are America’s closest friends, and because democracies are much more likely to live with their neighbors in peace.¶ The United States will continue to strongly support our friends who are pursuing democratic development – in Myanmar and elsewhere around the region. We will also respond when nations retreat from democracy, as in Thailand. We urge the Royal Thai Armed Forces to release those who have been detained, end restrictions on free expression, and move immediately to restore power to the people of Thailand, through free and fair elections. Until that happens, as U.S. law requires, the Department of Defense is suspending and reconsidering U.S. military assistance and

engagements with Bangkok.¶ The Asia-Pacific’s shifting security landscape makes America’s partnerships and alliances indispensable as anchors for regional stability. As we work to build a cooperative regional architecture, we are also modernizing our alliances, helping allies and partners develop new and advanced capabilities, and encouraging them to work more closely together.¶ In Southeast Asia, that means continuing to help nations build their humanitarian and disaster relief capabilities, and upgrade their militaries. One important example is our first-ever sale of Apache helicopters to Indonesia, which I announced during my visit to Jakarta last year. This sale will help the Indonesian Army defend its borders, conduct counter-piracy operations, and control the free flow of shipping through the Straits of Malacca. We are also providing robust assistance to the Philippines’ armed

forces, to strengthen their maritime and aviation capabilities.¶ In Northeast Asia, our capacity-building efforts include strengthening Allies’ capabilities with sophisticated aircraft and ballistic missile defense – especially to deter and defend against provocation by Pyongyang.¶ Two months ago, we signed an agreement with the Republic of Korea. We signed that agreement for its purchase of Global Hawk, which will dramatically enhance its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. South Korea also intends to acquire the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter – which means that America and its most capable allies in this region, including Australia and Japan, will soon be operating the world’s most advanced, fifth-generation tactical aircraft.¶ We are also making significant progress in building a robust regional

missile defense system. Last month in Tokyo, I announced that the United States will deploy two additional

ballistic missile defense ships to Japan – a step that builds on the construction of a second missile defense radar site in Japan, and the expansion of America’s ground-based interceptors in the continental United States, which I reviewed this week in Alaska during my trip to Singapore.¶ Modernizing our alliances also means strengthening the ties between America’s allies, enhancing their joint capabilities – such as missile defense – and encouraging them to become security providers themselves. Yesterday, I held a trilateral meeting with my counterparts from Australia and Japan, and today I will host another

trilateral meeting with my counterparts from Korea and Japan.¶ The enhanced cooperation America is pursuing with these close allies comes at a time when each of them is choosing to expand their roles in providing security around the Asia-Pacific region, including in Southeast Asia. Seven decades after World War II, the United States welcomes this development. We support South Korea’s more active participation in maritime security, peacekeeping, and stabilization operations. We also support Japan’s new efforts – as Prime Minister Abe described very well last night – to reorient its Collective Self Defense posture toward actively helping build a peaceful and resilient regional order.¶ To

complement these efforts, the United States and Japan have begun revising our defense guidelines for our first time in more than two decades. We will ensure that our alliance evolves to reflect the shifting security environment, and the growing capabilities of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces.

Impacts

Biodiversity LossSouth China Sea expansion kills coral reefs causing massive loss of biodiversity—the Coral Triangle is threatenedDeutsche Welle 15

(Deutsche Welle news interview of David Rosenberg, visiting fellow at the Australian National University, 4/16/15 “Beijing’s South China Sea projects ‘highly disruptive’ to local ecosystems” accessed 7/29/15 from

http://www.dw.com/en/beijings-south-china-sea-projects-highly-disruptive-to-local-ecosystems/a-18387012 LC)

The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs said on April 13 that "China's massive reclamation activities are causing irreversible and widespread damage to the biodiversity and ecological balance of the South China Sea." It also said that the destruction of coral reef systems resulting from Beijing's land reclamation projects is

estimated to lead to economic losses to coastal states valued at $100 million annually.¶ Recently published satellite images show that China is quickly reclaiming land around a submerged reef within an area the Philippines views as its exclusive economic zone. Reclamation is well advanced on six other reefs in the Spratlys. Beijing claims almost the entire South China Sea, rejecting rival claims from Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei and triggering territorial disputes.¶ In a DW interview, David Rosenberg, a visiting fellow at the Australian National University (ANU), talks about the impact the building projects and territorial disputes are having on the ecology and about how the international community should react to China's ambitions in the region.¶ DW: What environmental impact are China's land reclamation projects having on the South China

Sea?¶ David Rosenberg: The current Chinese and Taiwanese construction projects in the Spratly Islands are primarily military installations. But they are small in size. Itu Aba, the largest land feature in the Spratly Islands, has less than half a square kilometer in total area. It is occupied by Taiwan which is expanding its port there to accommodate

frigates and coast guard cutters, and is also making improvements to its 1,200 meter runway.¶ In the short term, the environmental impact of all these building projects is highly disruptive to local ecosystems due to sand dredging, coral mining, and cement pouring. The long-term impact is not yet clear.¶ What economic impact could the destruction of the coral reefs have on the Spratlys?¶ It is difficult in the short term to attribute any

specific economic losses to coral reef destruction. In the long run, however, the costs could be catastrophic. Coral reefs are the foundation of the maritime food chain. They provide the habitat and spawning grounds for numerous fish species, including many of the world's most valuable and productive stocks of tuna and shrimp.¶ The "Coral Triangle" formed by the South China Sea, the Sulu Sea, the Sulawesi Sea and adjacent waters is widely recognized as the global center of marine biodiversity. The area also has extraordinary scientific value in learning more about the evolution of life on earth, as Charles Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace discovered generations ago in the Malay Archipelago.

Loss of ocean biodiversity means extinction – oxygen production is lostCoyne and Hoekstra 07

(Jerry Coyne, professor U Chicago department of Ecology and Evolution, John L. Hoekstra, Associate professor, Harvard Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, 9/24/7 “The Great Dying” In New

Republic, accessed 7/29/15 from http://www.newrepublic.com/article/environment-energy/the-greatest-dying LC)

Aside from the Great Dying, there have been four other mass extinctions, all of which severely pruned life's diversity. Scientists agree that we're now in the midst of a sixth such episode. This new one, however, is different - and, in many ways, much worse. For, unlike

earlier extinctions, this one results from the work of a single species, Homo sapiens. We are relentlessly taking over the planet, laying it to waste and eliminating most of our fellow species. Moreover, we're doing it

much faster than the mass extinctions that came before. Every year, up to 30,000 species disappear due to

human activity alone. At this rate, we could lose half of Earth's species in this century. And, unlike with previous

extinctions, there's no hope that biodiversity will ever recover, since the cause of the decimation - us - is here to stay. To scientists, this is an unparalleled calamity, far more severe than global warming, which is, after all, only one of many threats to biodiversity. Yet global warming gets far more press. Why? One reason is that, while the increase in temperature is easy to document, the decrease of species is not. Biologists don't know, for example, exactly how many species exist on Earth. Estimates range widely, from three million to more than 50 million, and that doesn't count microbes, critical (albeit

invisible) components of ecosystems. We're not certain about the rate of extinction, either; how could we be, since the vast majority of species have yet to be described? We're even less sure how the loss of some species will affect the ecosystems in which they're embedded, since the intricate connection between organisms means that the loss of a single species can ramify unpredictably. But we do know some things. Tropical rainforests are disappearing at a rate of 2 percent per year. Populations of most large fish are down to only 10 percent of what they were in 1950. Many primates and all the great apes - our closest relatives - are nearly gone from the wild. And we know that extinction and global warming act synergistically. Extinction exacerbates global warming: By burning rainforests, we're not only polluting the atmosphere with carbon dioxide (a major greenhouse gas) but destroying the very plants that can remove this gas from the air. Conversely, global warming increases extinction, both directly (killing corals) and indirectly (destroying the habitats of Arctic and Antarctic animals). As extinction increases, then, so does global warming, which in turn causes more extinction - and so on, into a downward spiral of destruction. Why, exactly, should we care? Let's start with the most celebrated case: the rainforests. Their loss will worsen global warming - raising temperatures, melting icecaps, and flooding coastal cities. And, as the forest habitat shrinks, so begins the inevitable contact between organisms that have not evolved together, a scenario played out many times, and one that is never good. Dreadful diseases have successfully jumped species boundaries, with humans as prime recipients. We have gotten aids from apes, sars from civets, and Ebola from fruit bats. Additional worldwide plagues from unknown microbes are a very real possibility. But it isn't just the destruction of the rainforests that should trouble us. Healthy ecosystems the world over provide hidden services like waste disposal, nutrient cycling, soil formation, water purification, and oxygen production. Such services are best rendered by ecosystems that are diverse. Yet, through both intention and accident, humans have introduced exotic species that turn biodiversity into monoculture. Fast-growing zebra mussels, for example, have outcompeted more than 15 species of native mussels in North America's Great Lakes and have damaged harbors and water-treatment plants. Native prairies are becoming dominated by single species (often genetically homogenous) of corn or wheat. Thanks to these developments, soils will erode and become unproductive - which, along with temperature change, will diminish agricultural yields. Meanwhile, with increased pollution and runoff, as well as reduced forest

cover, ecosystems will no longer be able to purify water; and a shortage of clean water spells disaster. In many ways, oceans are the most vulnerable areas of all. As overfishing eliminates major predators, while polluted and warming waters kill

off phytoplankton, the intricate aquatic food web could collapse from both sides. Fish, on which so many

humans depend, will be a fond memory. As phytoplankton vanish, so does the ability of the oceans to absorb carbon dioxide and produce oxygen. (Half of the oxygen we breathe is made by phytoplankton, with the rest coming from land plants.) Species extinction is also imperiling coral reefs - a major problem since these reefs have far more than recreational value: They provide tremendous amounts of food for human populations and buffer coastlines against erosion.

South China Sea Nuclear WarInstability causes South China Sea warCole 14

(J. Michael, senior fellow at the China Policy Institute, University of Nottingham, 7/10/14 “Where Would Beijing Use External Distractions?” in The Diplomat, accessed 7/29/15 from

http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/where-would-beijing-use-external-distractions/ LC)

Throughout history, embattled governments have often resorted to external distractions to tap into a restive population’s nationalist sentiment and thereby release, or redirect, pressures that otherwise could have been turned against those in power. Authoritarian regimes in particular, which deny their citizens the right to punish the authorities through retributive democracy — that is, elections — have used this device to ensure their survival during periods of domestic upheaval or financial crisis. Would the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), whose legitimacy is so contingent on social stability and economic growth, go down the same path if it felt that its hold on power were threatened by domestic instability?¶ Building on the premise that the many contradictions that are inherent to the extraordinarily complex Chinese experiment, and rampant corruption that undermines stability, will eventually catch up with the CCP, we can legitimately ask how, and where, Beijing could manufacture external crises with opponents against whom nationalist fervor, a major characteristic of contemporary China, can be

channeled. In past decades, the CCP has on several occasions tapped into public outrage to distract a disgruntled population, often by encouraging (and when necessary containing) protests against external opponents, namely Japan and the United States.¶ While serving as a convenient outlet, domestic protests, even when they turned violent (e.g., attacks on Japanese manufacturers), were about as far as the CCP would allow. This self-imposed restraint, which was prevalent during the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, was a function both of China’s focus on

building its economy (contingent on stable relations with its neighbors) and perceived military weakness. Since then, China has established itself as the world’s second-largest economy and now deploys, thanks to more than a

decade of double-digit defense budget growth, a first-rate modern military.¶ Those impressive achievements have, however, fueled Chinese nationalism, which has increasingly approached the dangerous zone of hubris. For many, China is now a rightful regional hegemon demanding respect, which if denied can — and should — be met with threats, if not the application of force. While it might be tempting to attribute China’s recent assertiveness in the South and East China Seas to the emergence of Xi Jinping, Xi alone cannot make all the decisions; nationalism is a component that cannot be dissociated from this new phase in Chinese expressions of its power. As then-Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi is said to have told his counterparts at a tense regional forum in Hanoi in 2010, “There is one basic difference among us. China is a big state and you are smaller countries.”¶ This newfound assertiveness within its backyard thus makes it more feasible that, in times of serious trouble

at home, the Chinese leadership could seek to deflect potentially destabilizing anger by exploiting some external distraction. Doing so is always a calculated risk, and sometimes the gambit fails, as Slobodan Milosevic learned the hard way when he tapped into the furies of nationalism to appease mounting public discontent with his bungled economic policies. For an external distraction to achieve its objective (that is, taking attention away from domestic issues by redirecting anger at an outside actor), it must not result in failure or military defeat. In other words, except for the most extreme circumstances, such as the imminent collapse of a regime, the decision to externalize a domestic crisis is a rational one: adventurism must be certain to achieve success, which in turn will translate into political gains for the embattled regime. Risk-taking is therefore

proportional to the seriousness of the destabilizing forces within. Rule No. 1 for External Distractions: The greater the domestic instability, the more risks a regime will be willing to take, given that the scope and, above all, the symbolism of the victory in an external scenario must also be greater.¶ With this in mind, we can then ask which external distraction scenarios would Beijing be the most likely to turn to should domestic disturbances compel it to do so. That is not to say that anything like this will happen anytime soon. It is nevertheless not unreasonable to imagine such a possibility. The intensifying crackdown on critics of the CCP, the detention of lawyers, journalists and activists, unrest in Xinjiang, random acts of terrorism, accrued censorship — all point to growing instability. What follows is a very succinct (and by no means exhaustive) list of disputes, in descending order of likelihood, which Beijing could use for external distraction.¶ 1. South China

Sea¶ The South China Sea, an area where China is embroiled in several territorial disputes with smaller claimants, is ripe for exploitation as an external distraction. Nationalist sentiment, along with the sense that

the entire body of water is part of China’s indivisible territory and therefore a “core interest,” are sufficient enough to foster a will to fight should some “incident,” timed to counter unrest back home, force China to react. Barring a U.S. intervention, which for the time being seems unlikely, the

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has both the numerical and qualitative advantage against any would be

opponent or combination thereof. The Philippines and Vietnam, two countries which have skirmished with China in recent years, are the likeliest candidates for external distractions, as the costs of a brief conflict would be low and the likelihood of military success fairly high. For a quick popularity boost and low-risk distraction, these opponents would best serve Beijing’s interests.

South China Sea war goes nuclearGoldstein 13

(Avery, professor University of Pennsylvania department of Political Science, China's Real and Present Danger. Foreign Affairs [serial online]. September 2013; 92(5):136-144. Available from: Military & Government Collection, Ipswich, MA. Accessed July 30, 2015 LC)

Uncertainty about what could lead either Beijing or Washington to risk war makes a crisis far more likely, since neither side knows when, where, or just how hard it can push without the other side pushing back. This situation bears some resemblance to that of the early Cold War, when it took a number of serious crises for the two sides to feel each other out and learn the rules of the road. But today's environment might be even more dangerous.¶ The balance of nuclear and conventional military power between China and the United States, for example, is much more lopsided than the one that existed between the Soviet Union and the United States. Should Beijing and Washington find themselves in a conflict, the huge U.S. advantage in conventional forces would increase the temptation for Washington to threaten to or actually use force. Recognizing the temptation facing Washington, Beijing might in turn feel pressure to use its conventional forces before they are destroyed. Although China could not reverse the military imbalance, it might believe that quickly imposing high costs on the United States would be the best way to get it to back off.¶ The fact that both sides have nuclear arsenals would

help keep the situation in check, because both sides would want to avoid actions that would invite nuclear retaliation. Indeed, if only nuclear considerations mattered, U.S.-Chinese crises would be very stable and not worth worrying about too much. But the two sides' conventional forces complicate matters and undermine the stability provided by nuclear deterrence. During a crisis, either side might believe that using its conventional forces would confer bargaining leverage, manipulating the other side's fear of escalation through what the economist Thomas¶ Schelling calls a "competition in risk-taking." In a crisis, China or the United States might believe that it valued what was at stake more than the other and would therefore be willing to tolerate a higher level of risk. But because using conventional

forces would be only the first step in an unpredictable process subject to misperception, missteps, and miscalculation, there is no guarantee that brinkmanship would end before it led to an unanticipated nuclear catastrophe.¶ China, moreover, apparently believes that nuclear deterrence opens the door to the safe use of conventional force. Since both countries would fear a potential nuclear exchange, the Chinese seem to think that neither they nor the Americans would allow a military conflict to escalate too far. Soviet leaders, by contrast, indicated that they would use whatever military means were necessary if war came--which is one reason why war never came. In addition,

China's official "no first use" nuclear policy, which guides the Chinese military's preparation and training for conflict,

might reinforce Beijing's confidence that limited war with the United States would not mean courting nuclear escalation. As a result of its beliefs, Beijing might be less cautious about taking steps that would risk triggering a crisis. And if a crisis ensued, China might also be less cautious about firing the first shot.¶ Such beliefs are particularly worrisome given recent developments in technology that have dramatically improved the precision and effectiveness of conventional military capabilities. Their lethality might confer a dramatic advantage to the side that attacks first, something that was generally not true of conventional military operations in the main European theater of U.S.-Soviet confrontation. Moreover, because the sophisticated computer and satellite systems that guide contemporary weapons are highly vulnerable to conventional military strikes or cyberattacks, today's more precise weapons might be effective only if they are used before an adversary has struck or adopted counter-measures. If peacetime restraint were to give way to a search for advantage in a crisis, neither China nor the United States could be confident about the durability of the systems managing its advanced conventional weapons.¶ Under such circumstances, both Beijing and Washington would have incentives to

initiate an attack. China would feel particularly strong pressure, since its advanced conventional weapons are more fully dependent on vulnerable computer networks, fixed radar sites, and satellites. The effectiveness of U.S. advanced forces is less dependent on these most vulnerable systems. The advantage held by the United States, however, might increase its temptation to strike first, especially against China's satellites, since it would be able to cope with Chinese retaliation in kind.

Japan RearmamentChinese dominance causes Japanese rearmament Hunkovic 08

(Lee J, Masters in Peace Operations “The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan and the United States of America” American Military University, Accessed 7/29/15

from http://lamp-method.org/eCommons/Hunkovic.pdf LC)

From a national security standpoint, Marquand (2004) states that Chinese military action¶ could also destabilize Asia, giving nationalist factions in Japan “every excuse they need”,¶ according to one Japanese scholar, to develop the nuclear weapons capability that many in¶ Tokyo are already in favor of. He lists another

economic liability of invasion as the possibility¶ that the Japanese would do everything in their power to redirect the markets of Asia, including¶ their own, away from China, even at the expense of losing their own money in trade. A further¶ economic and national security risk that Marquand (2004) notes is the possibility that Russia ¶ could use Chinese aggression as an excuse to sell oil exclusively to Japan, as Russia is not¶ desirous of China developing quickly into a superpower and China reportedly [as of then] only¶ has a 20-day reserve and is 75 percent reliant on Middle Eastern oil, which could have¶ disastrous repercussions. Additionally, he notes that China has no desire to destroy its relationship with the U.S.

Japanese rearmament triggers nuclear war with North KoreaRatner 03

(Ellen, White House correspondent and bureau chief for the Talk Radio News service. She is also Washington bureau chief and political editor for Talkers Magazine. In addition, Ratner is a news analyst at the Fox News Channel. 1/17 “Engage North Korea!” accessed 7/29/15 from

http://www.wnd.com/2003/01/16781/ LC)

Remember your history. As long as the United States was a guarantor of security to both South Korea and Japan (hostile as those two are to one another), the Japanese never had to worry about rearming. This was a benefit to everybody, starting with the Japanese. They were spared the expense of massive military budgets and so could focus on their economy. China, North Korea and South Korea as well as Russia – remember that the Japanese military soundly defeated them in the 1904 Russo-Japanese War – also benefited. Memories were lucid and bitter about the havoc once wreaked by a militarily ambitious Japan. Better to keep Tokyo focused on a percolating economy. It was win-win for

the entire region.¶ That is now threatened by North Korea’s brazen stupidity. By rattling the nuclear saber, withdrawing from non-proliferation treaties and tossing out U.N. inspectors, the North Koreans are on the verge of making one of the colossal blunders of world history. If North Korea is not reined in, then it is likely that Tokyo will rearm – and experts predict that with Japan’s high-tech, industrial economy, they could assemble a full nuclear arsenal and bomb delivery

systems within three years.¶ This would be a disaster. Not only would it trigger a new, intra-Asian arms race – for who could doubt that if Japan goes nuclear, China and North Korea would be joined by South Korea and even Taiwan in building new and more weapons? Likewise, given the memories, who could doubt that such a scenario increases the risks of a nuclear war

somewhere in the region? By comparison, the old Cold War world, where there were only two armed camps, would look like kid stuff.

Asian InstabilityU.S.-Sino relations key to East Asia stabilityBandow 10

(Doug, Senior Fellow at Cato Institute, 5/25/10 “Engaging China to Maintain Peace in East Asia”, accessed

7/13/15 http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11845 LC)

How to maintain the peace in East Asia Washington must engage the PRC on both issues. America's relationship with Beijing will have a critical impact on the development of the 21st century. Disagreements are inevitable; conflict is not. China is determined to take an increasingly important international role. It is entitled to do so. However, it should equally commit to acting responsibly. As the PRC grows economically, expands its military, and gains diplomatic influence, it will be able to greatly influence international events, especially in East Asia. If it does so for good rather than ill, its neighbors will be

less likely to fear the emerging superpower. Most important, responsible Chinese policy will diminish the potential for military confrontation between Beijing and Asian states as well as the U.S. In

return, Washington should welcome China into the global leadership circle if its rise remains peaceful and responsible. American analysts have expressed concern about a Chinese military build-up intended to prevent U.S. intervention along the PRC's border. But the U.S. cannot expect other states to accept American dominance forever. Any American attempt to contain Beijing is likely to spark — predictably — a hostile response from China. Instead, Washington policymakers should prepare for a world in which reciprocity replaces diktat. The U.S. could encourage Chinese responsibility by adopting policies that highlight the importance of the PRC's role in promoting regional peace and stability. Such an approach is most

needed to deal with the Korean peninsula and Taiwan. For instance, Beijing could play a critical role in restraining and ultimately transforming the North. So far the PRC has declined to apply significant pressure on its long-time ally. In fact, North Korea's Kim Jong-il recently visited China, presumably in pursuit of additional economic aid and investment. His quid pro quo might have been a professed willingness to return to the Six-Party nuclear talks. But few analysts believe there is much chance of a nuclear deal whether or not these negotiations proceed — and almost certainly no chance unless the PRC is prepared to

get tough with the North, including threatening to cut off generous food and energy shipments. To encourage Beijing, Washington should suggest that China would share the nightmare if an unstable North Korea expands its nuclear arsenal.

East Asian instability leads to World War IIILanday 2k

(Jonathon S., national security reporter for McClatchy and Knight-Ridder, “Top administration officials warn stakes for U.S. are high in Asian conflicts”, Knight-Ridder News Service, 3-11, Lexis/Nexis)

Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe. "Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile," said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution,

a Washington think tank. "We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster."

2NC Links

2NC Links: JapanUS Presence in Japan is key to regional stability Kelly 09

(Robert E., Professor Pusan National University, Department of Political Science and Diplomacy, 12/18 “Should the US Pull out of South Korea (2): No” Accessed 7/29/15 from

https://asiansecurityblog.wordpress.com/2009/12/18/should-the-us-pull-out-of-south-korea-2-no/ LC)

1. If we leave, everyone in Asia will read it as a sign that we are weak and that we are leaving Asia generally. Yes, this is the credibility argument straight out of the Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan debates. But the world sees US power today as wavering; we are the tottering giant, especially in Asia. If we leave during the GWoT, that image will be confirmed, and the Chinese will push hard in Asia. A US departure will touch off an arms race as regional uncertainty rises. Asia is not where Europe

or Latin America are in terms of regional amity. The US presence is more needed in this region, and it earns the US the friendship of the local democracies. It is hard to see how a spiraling arms race, as Japan and China openly start competing for

regional leadership, plus perhaps India and China, would help the US. The US could very well be pulled back in later. A US departure from Korea (and Japan next?) will be read as a clear victory for China in the Sino-US regional competition.

US military presence in Japan solidifies Asian diplomatic relations—only way to check China Roos 10

(John V, American Ambassador to Japan, 1/29/10 “The Enduring Importance of our Security Alliance”

Accessed 7/29/15 from http://japan2.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20100129-71.html LC)

China is perhaps the best example of the complexities we face in the world today. There is no doubt that

the economies of the United States, Japan, and China are increasingly interdependent. The United States relies on Japanese and Chinese capital. China could not succeed without U.S. and Japanese technology. And Japan and China

depend on U.S. markets and we depend on China's markets. The interplay among our three countries has emerged as a driver in the global economy. China's leadership is also very important to solving global problems from climate change to North Korea's nuclear program. President Obama has emphasized that the U.S. seeks a positive cooperative and comprehensive relationship with China, and the world is counting on Beijing to work with the United States, Japan, and the international community to address some of the key issues of our day. Recently, for example, China has worked with us as a partner in stabilizing the international financial system, and in protecting vital sea lanes from piracy. Given Japan's and the United States' overlapping interests as allies, we believe that Japan's active bilateral engagement with China is a positive and complements our

own. The relations among and between our three countries are not, as some would suggest, a zero sum game.¶ Yet, even as the U nited S tates and Japan work with China as a partner, we have questions about China's accelerating military modernization, especially in areas like cyber warfare, anti-satellite weapons, and the rapid modernization of its nuclear, submarine, and strategic forces. The build-up of military capabilities across from Taiwan over the past decade has the potential to erode the long-standing cross-strait military

balance which is so essential to peace and prosperity. Many countries in the region share our concerns about China's recent efforts to limit freedom of navigation in international waters beyond territorial limits. As major maritime trading partners, freedom of navigation is essential to the futures of both the United States and Japan.¶

So while I want to be careful not to overstate these concerns, among these types of uncertainties in this region the deterrent effect of a robust U.S.-Japan Alliance is crucial to ensuring that the dramatic changes in the security environment do not negatively affect this region's future peace and prosperity. The purpose of maintaining a credible deterrent capability is to make the price of using force greater than any potential political or economic gains that could be obtained through the use of force. This is vitally important here in East Asia, which has four of the five largest armed forces in the world. The cost of a military conflict in this region is beyond imagination. In addition to the human toll, even a short conflict would set the global economy back years, if not longer. This is why there has been some concerns expressed these past several weeks about the perceived tensions in our alliance by leaders and editorialists from Singapore to Taiwan to Seoul. Our Alliance is the critical stabilizing force in this area of the

world.¶ The fundamental role of U.S. forces in Japan is to make those who would consider the use of force in this region understand that that option is off the table. The forward deployment of U.S. forces puts us in a position to react immediately to emerging threats, and serves as a tangible symbol of our commitment. The 49,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines in Japan are our front line forces.

US naval presence in Japan is key to preventing China takeoverSheridan 09

(Greg, Foreign Editor for The Australian 9/5/9 “Hatoyama Poised for Global Struggle” Accessed 7/29/15 from

http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2009/09/05/hatoyama_poised_for_global_struggle_97137. html LC)

The Pentagon outlines China's continuing massive military build-up, vastly outstripping its economic growth. Much of the Chinese military spending is hidden, but the Pentagon estimates it could reach up to $US160billion ($190bn) a year.¶ This may seem small compared with the US's military budget in excess of $US500bn, but the US has vast global security responsibilities in Iraq,

Afghanistan and all over the world, which China does not. And as the Pentagon report shows, much of China's furious military effort, apart from its gigantic expansion plans for its nuclear weapons arsenal, is directed

squarely against the US, and designed to make it extremely costly for the US navy to continue to operate in the waters near China's east coast.¶ Here again, Japan is central . Although Japan's modest military build-up has been incremental, it is very hi -tech and is aimed precisely at building a new level of inter-operability with US forces in the context of a revived and newly reciprocal US alliance.¶

This is a minor revolution in Asia-Pacific security, and is one way the US alliance system has maintained the regional balance of military power.¶ At the same time, China and India cannot resolve their long-running border disputes, and the military of each nation eyes the other with barely disguised suspicion.¶ Australia and the US have both conducted modest naval exercises with China as a sensible form of confidence-building. But these exercises reflect

another reality.¶ China's navy is going to be much more active in the Asia-Pacific, and its navy, along with

the navies of the US, Japan and in due course even Australia, will start bumping into each other, so to speak. There is a real need for security capabilities to manage these encounters.

XT Asia Instability US-China relations key to Asian Instability VOA Editorial 11

(Voice of America 7/2/11 “Asia-Pacific Consultations” accessed 7/31/14 from

http://editorials.voa.gov/content/asia-pacific-consultations-124947204/1482582.html LC)

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell recently hosted Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai for the inaugural U.S.-China

Consultations on the Asia-Pacific in Honolulu.¶ "The United States began the dialogue by highlighting that it is an Asia-Pacific country with an abiding national interest in peace, stability, and prosperity in the region," Assistant Secretary Campbell said at a news briefing after the consultation meeting. "[And] it welcomes a strong, prosperous and successful China to play a greater role in regional and world affairs."¶ The United States conducted open, frank, and constructive discussions with China to better understand each other's intentions,

policies and actions toward the Asia-Pacific region. ¶ The United States underscored the importance of its existing alliances, which are the cornerstone of its strategy in the Asia-Pacific region, and its efforts to build new partnerships in the region. The United States emphasized its support for strengthening the role of regional institutions. In

that context, the United States and China discussed ways for both countries to promote greater cooperation on the challenges facing the region.¶ Assistant Secretary Campbell and Vice Foreign Minister Cui discussed each sides' objectives for the upcoming meetings of the Association of South East Asian Nations' Regional Forum, the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation Leaders Meeting that will be held in Hawaii, the Pacific Islands Forum, and the East Asia Summit.

¶ The United States and China also had discussions about Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific, with particular attention on timely issues such as North Korea, maritime security in the South China Sea, and Burma.¶ The Asia-Pacific Consultations are similar to dialogues the United States holds with many other Asia-Pacific nations, and complements existing U.S.-China dialogues on other critical regions of the world. The two sides agreed to hold another round of talks in China at a mutually convenient time.

Asian stability stops nuclear war—cooperation coordinates effective resistance Desperes 01

(John, senior fellow at Rand 2001 “China, the United States, and the Global Economy” pp. 229 accessed 7/31/15 from http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2006/MR1300.pdf LC)

Nevertheless, America’s main interests in China have been quite¶ constant, namely peace, security, prosperity, and a healthy environment.¶ Chinese interests in the United States have also been quite¶ constant and largely compatible, notwithstanding sharp differences¶ over Taiwan, strategic technology transfers, trade,

and human rights.¶ Indeed, U.S.-Chinese relations have been consistently driven by¶ strong common interests in preventing mutually damaging wars in¶ Asia that could involve nuclear weapons; in ensuring that Taiwan’s¶ relations with the mainland remain peaceful; in sustaining the¶ growth of the U.S., China, and other Asian-

Pacific economies; and, in¶ preserving natural environments that sustain healthy and productive¶ lives.¶ What happens in China matters to Americans. It affects America’s¶ prosperity. China’s growing economy is a valuable market to many¶ workers, farmers, and businesses across America, not just to large¶ multinational firms like Boeing, Microsoft, and Motorola, and it¶

could become much more valuable by opening its markets further.¶ China also affects America’s security. It could either help to stabilize¶ or destabilize currently peaceful but sometimes tense and dangerous¶ situations in Korea, where U.S. troops are on the front line; in the¶ Taiwan Straits, where U.S. democratic values and strategic credibility¶ may be at stake; and in nuclear-armed South Asia, where renewed¶ warfare could lead to terrible consequences. It also affects America’s¶ environment. Indeed, how China meets its rising energy needs and¶ protects its dwindling habitats will affect the global atmosphere and¶ currently endangered species. Nevertheless, America’s main interests in China have been quite¶ constant, namely peace, security, prosperity, and a healthy environment.¶ Chinese interests in the United States have also been quite¶ constant and largely compatible,

notwithstanding sharp differences¶ over Taiwan, strategic technology transfers, trade, and human rights.¶ Indeed, U.S.-Chinese relations have been consistently driven by¶ strong common interests in preventing mutually damaging wars in¶ Asia that could involve nuclear weapons; in ensuring that Taiwan’s¶ relations with the

mainland remain peaceful; in sustaining the¶ growth of the U.S., China, and other Asian-Pacific economies; and, in¶ preserving natural environments that sustain healthy and productive¶ lives.¶

What happens in China matters to Americans. It affects America’s¶ prosperity. China’s growing economy is a valuable market to many¶ workers, farmers, and businesses across America, not just to large¶ multinational firms like Boeing, Microsoft, and Motorola, and it¶ could become much more valuable by opening its markets further.¶

China also affects America’s security. It could either help to stabilize¶ or destabilize currently peaceful but sometimes tense and dangerous¶ situations in Korea, where U.S. troops are on the front line; in the¶ Taiwan Straits, where U.S. democratic values and strategic credibility¶ may be at stake; and in nuclear-armed South Asia, where renewed¶ warfare could lead to terrible consequences. It also affects America’s¶ environment. Indeed, how China meets its rising energy needs and¶ protects its dwindling habitats will affect the global atmosphere and¶ currently endangered species.

Arab Gulf

1NCAmerican influence in Arab Gulf high nowPellerin 7/29

(Cheryl Pellerin, science writer for DoD News, 7/29/15 “Carter: Nuclear Deal Limits Iran, Not the Defense

Department” accessed 7/31/15 from http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=129368 LC)

WASHINGTON, July 29, 2015 – The U.S.-Iran nuclear agreement limits Iran’s ability to produce a nuclear bomb but puts no limits on the Defense Department or the United States, Defense Secretary Ash Carter told a Senate panel today.¶ The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action reached in Vienna this month must receive congressional approval before it is implemented.¶ Carter and Army Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on U.S. interests and the military balance in the Middle East.¶ When implemented, Carter

said, the agreement will effectively cut off Iran’s pathways to fissile material for a nuclear bomb, but it places no limitations on the Defense Department.¶ No U.S. Limitations¶ “It places no limits on our forces, our partnerships and alliances, our intensive and ongoing security cooperation, or on our development and fielding of

new military capabilities -- capabilities we will continue to advance,” he told the panel.¶ The department will continue to maintain a strong military posture to deter aggression, bolster the security of Israel and other allies and friends in the region, ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf, check Iran’s malign influence, and degrade and ultimately defeat the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, Carter added.¶ “We're also continuing to advance our military capabilities that provide all options, as [President Barack Obama] has directed, should Iran walk away from its commitments under this deal,” he said.¶ Carter called the Iran agreement is an important step that keeps Iran from getting a nuclear weapon in a comprehensive and verifiable way.¶ “Once implemented,” he added, the agreement “will … remove a critical element of risk and uncertainty from the region.”¶ Other Areas of Concern¶ In his remarks, Dempsey said that, if followed, the Iran deal “addresses one critical and the most dangerous point of friction with the Iranian regime. But … there are at least five other malign activities which give us and our regional partners concern.”¶ These, he said, include ballistic missile technology, weapons trafficking, the use of surrogates and proxies to naval mines and undersea activity, and malicious activity in cyberspace.¶ “The negotiating deal does not alleviate our concerns in those five areas,” he said, “[or] change the military options at our disposal. And in our efforts to counter the Iranian regime's malign activities, we will continue to engage our partners in the region to reassure them and to address these areas.”¶ The agreement’s successful negotiation is one part of the broader U.S. foreign and defense policy, Carter said, noting the Middle East remains important to U.S. national interests.¶ “As a

result,” the secretary said, “the Department of Defense is committed to confronting the region’s two principal security challenges: Iran and ISIL.”¶ Describing his recent trip to the Middle East, Carter said he spoke with some of the men and women in uniform who are carrying out the Middle East strategy to let them know that the department is continuing full speed ahead, standing with its friends, standing up to ISIL, and standing against Iran’s malign activities.¶ “On ISIL … we have the right strategy in place, built on nine synchronized lines of effort to achieve ISIL’s lasting defeat. But we continue to strengthen execution,” Carter said.¶ Working with Partners¶ In Iraq and elsewhere, the department is working with partners on the ground and in a global coalition to enable capable and motivated ground forces to win back Iraq’s sovereignty and peace in its own territory, he added.¶ “I saw several parts of this effort last week and spoke with some of our partners on the ground. We're headed

in the right direction in this counter-ISIL effort: we've made some progress but we need to make more,” he told the panel.¶ “If Iran were to commit aggression, our robust force posture ensures we can rapidly surge an overwhelming array of forces into the region,” the secretary added, “leveraging our most advanced capabilities, married with sophisticated munitions that put no target out of reach.”¶ Iran and its proxies still present security challenges, Carter said, noting Iran’s support of Hezbollah and the Assad regime in Syria, its contribution

to disorder in Yemen and its hostility and violence toward Israel.¶ The secretary said he made it clear last week in Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Iraq that the department will continue to meet its commitments to friends and allies in the region, especially Israel, and continue to build on and enhance such cooperation.¶ “I also made clear that we will continue to maintain our robust regional force posture ashore and afloat, which includes tens of thousands of American personnel and our most sophisticated ground, maritime, air and ballistic-missile defense assets,” he said.¶ “Our

friends understand, despite our differences with some of them about the merits of this deal,” Carter added, “that we have an enduring commitment to deterrence and to regional security.”

Plan makes way for Chinese-Iranian partnership to make Iran a regional hegemonSingh 7/21

(Michael Singh, the Lane-Swig Senior Fellow and Managing Director at The Washington Institute 7/21/2015 “The Sino-Iranian Tango” Accessed 7/28/15 from

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-07-21/sino-iranian-tango LC)

As a recently released military white paper makes clear, China is seeking to expand its forces’ ability to “effectively secure China’s overseas interests.” This has manifested in Chinese warships’ participation in counterpiracy missions in the region, the P eople’s L iberation A rmy

Navy’s evacuation of thousands of Chinese nationals from Libya in 2011—the first operation of its kind by

China—and Beijing’s reported plan to establish a naval facility in Djibouti. As Beijing seeks to expand its power and influence, Iran is a logical partner. It is the only large, powerful state in the region not already allied with the U nited S tates, and it sits astride land and sea routes of vital importance to Beijing. Little wonder, therefore, that in October 2014, the Chinese defense minister publicly expressed Beijing’s desire to expand military ties with Iran (a sentiment Iran has reciprocated by inviting China to expand its naval presence in Iran), and that China’s top counterterrorism official recently visited Iran to seek

expanded cooperation against extremists.¶ The growth in Sino-Iranian economic and security ties could prove challenging for the United States. China and Iran both appear committed to chipping away at the existing U.S.-led international order. China has established regional security and economic institutions that compete with those dominated by the U nited S tates and its allies, and Iran has vocally challenged the authority of the UN Security Council and U.S. hegemony in the Middle East. Furthermore, both enjoy alliances of convenience with Russia, which similarly competes

with the United States. ¶ Increased Sino-Iranian cooperation would not be a mere diplomatic nuisance, however. As sanctions on Iran lifted, China has the capacity—through military assistance, economic investment, and the transfer of technology—to facilitate Iran’s rise as a regional power. Given Iran’s record of working through proxies, Chinese assistance could also indirectly strengthen nonstate actors supported by Iran. And Iran can offer China a strategically important foothold in the Middle East, should it choose to challenge U.S. influence there.

Iranian hegemony in the Middle East causes nuclear Armageddon—proximity to Tel Aviv makes strikes unstoppable Nikolic 15

(Andrew, member of Australian Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, and the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade January 6, 2015 “Iran: still a pressing danger” in The Strategist Australian Strategic Policy Institution Accessed July 28, 2015 from

http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/iran-still-a-pressing-danger/ LC)

The first is the question of whether the ‘Iranian leopard can change its spots’. Iran has played—and continues to play—a resolute and determined long game. For more than a decade it has been steadfastly unwilling to compromise or cooperate with the international community. Why would it? It hates the liberal and free West, and consciously eschews more than essential minimal interaction with it.¶ Notwithstanding Iran’s confrontation of daesh, nothing has emerged in recent times to suggest any prospect of the

leopard changing. Make no mistake, Iran has a deep investment in its nuclear program and a determination to leverage the anticipated benefits of that investment. To think otherwise is for the West to bury its head in the sand—to the further advantage of an established Islamic State, and one which is potentially far more dangerous than its much-publicised namesake.¶ The second issue is that of an ‘opportune smokescreen’, behind which Iran has advanced its nuclear ambitions. This is due to the competing regional strategic distractions of Iraq, Afghanistan, and now, daesh. Each has—and continues—to soak up Western blood, treasure and resolve, now closer to evaporation than at any other

time since September 11.¶ Meanwhile, Iran’s leadership has pursued its nuclear ambitions, unfettered by the West’s democratic challenges of factional division and dissenting public opinion. That situation is now further exacerbated by an increasingly constrained US President, with less than 700 days left in office, a frustrated domestic and international agenda, and diminishing executive authority, both symbolically and practically.¶ It’s been a good time for Iran to fly under the international radar of scrutiny, at a time when there should have been increased, not diminished, transparency and accountability. Near-term strategic priorities have crowded out a supremely-important dilemma.¶ Lastly, to the matter of the scale and dimension of the looming threat.¶ The threat posed by daesh is grim but at its ‘high-water mark,’ their barbarity and mayhem is

counted in thousands. However, the threat now posed by a nuclear malevolent Iran is emphatically much worse, with the resulting chaos almost unimaginable in its wake, turbulence and duration.¶ As the crow—or more aptly, the missile—flies, the distance between Tehran and Tel Aviv is just

under 1600 kilometres (approximately 1000 miles). Hence, the time from launch to impact is brief; potentially mere minutes to Armageddon and the worst crisis the world has seen since 1945. The ripples and ramifications of such an event would extend to the end of the 21st century.¶

No, Iran hasn’t gone away; nor will its strategic aspirations be dissipated by a near-term and welcome outbreak of common sense. To date, containment hasn’t worked. Nor have the much-anticipated and variously described—‘useful/helpful/intense/continuing’—negotiations in Geneva, designed to break the impasse of 12 years of Iranian delay and obfuscation.¶ The self-imposed deadline of November 24, 2014 to resolve the standoff has passed. An unnamed member of Tehran’s delegation was quoted in recent days as saying that uranium enrichment and how to remove sanctions remain as sticking points. Another seven months of talks to follow. More delay and obfuscation as Iran’s nuclear program

develops into an even more serious threat to regional and international security¶ In the end, Iran is neither just a Middle East nor a US problem. Rather, it’s a pressing global concern, to which a global collective solution must be found.

UQNo Chinese influence nowSun 3/11/15

(Degang, professor and deputy director, Middle East Studies Institute, Shanghai International 3/11/15 “China’s Soft Military Presence in the Middle East” accessed 7/31/15

http://www.mei.edu/content/map/china%E2%80%99s-soft-military-presence-middle-east LC)

At present, the United States has deployed approximately 50,000 personnel and established military bases in the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, Turkey, Djibouti, and Afghanistan. Its military influence is unparalleled. Britain and France have built military bases and deployed about 3,000 personnel in Cyprus, the UAE, and Djibouti. Their military presence ranks second to that of the United States. Russia and Japan constitute a third tier, having

deployed about 200 personnel to Syria and Djibouti, respectively, and each having one military base. In contrast, China, India, and

South Korea have not established military bases in the Middle East, though they do have convoy fleets and peacekeeping forces in the region and in the waters off Somalia.

After the Iran nuclear deal, US military presence deters Iran from dominance of the Arab GulfGoldenberg 6/18/15

(Ilan Goldenberg, senior fellow and director of the Middle East Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, 6/18/15 “An American Strategy for Making the Iran Deal Work” accessed 7/29/15 from

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/american-strategy-making-the-iran-deal-work-13139 LC)

First, the United States should increase its efforts to counter Iran’s regional surrogates and proxies. Such an approach is intended to deter Iranian meddling in the region by signaling to Iran’s leadership that Iran is not ascendant in the region and that if it pushes too far it risks a direct conflict with the United States. These actions would also signal to America’s Arab partners that the United States is not abandoning them. The United States could for example increase interdictions of Iranian weapons shipments, improving intelligence

cooperation with its partners, and pursue more aggressive joint covert actions against Iranian supported terrorism.¶ At the same time, the United States should maintain its current conventional military presence in the Middle East after an agreement to deter bad Iranian behavior and reassure partners. The United States could also consider increased arms sales to the gulf states. Ideally, these should focus on defensive capabilities such as minesweepers and ballistic missile defense.

2NC LinksPost-Iran Deal it’s even more key that the United States maintain a strong presence—plan clears the way for Sino-Iranian partnershipRosenberg and Sullivan 7/31/15

(Elizabeth, a Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy, Economics and Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, and Alexander, associate fellow in the Asia-Pacific Security Program, 7/31/15 “Why China likes the Iran deal” CNN accessed 7/31/15 from

http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/31/opinions /rosenberg-sullivan-china-iran-deal/ LC)

True, some forms of China-Iran cooperation are positive for U.S. interests. For example, regional economic development, including

in Iran, should be welcomed if it is done according to international best practices and lifts people out of poverty. Likewise, if China can, with Iran's help, contribute to Afghanistan's stability, so much the better.¶ Other forms of China-Iran cooperation, however, have the potential to do serious harm to U.S. policy in the Middle East and beyond. An Iran that is overly dependent on China will bolster Beijing's efforts to create alternative political forums that exclude Washington. Meanwhile, if the United States does not take a prominent role in Afghanistan's peaceful reconstruction and the development of Eurasia more broadly, it will cede influence in a

pivotal region.¶ Ultimately, China's ties to Iran will become an important theater of future U.S.-China relations. The best way to balance China vis-à-vis Iran is to keep Sino-American interests in the Middle East constructive, not competitive. One way would be for the United States to consider sending its own companies into Iran to engage in commercial diplomacy. And it should also seek opportunities for regional security cooperation with

China but channel it into inclusive multilateral frameworks.¶ Taking such steps would help the United States promote stability in the region, solidify its leadership and ensure that China and Iran both see their respective strategic relationships with the United States as more important than the one that they have with each other.

Removal of US military presence from the Arab Gulf causes fill-in by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army—they will want to ensure Chinese oil interestsThompson 12

(Loren, Former Deputy Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University “What Happens When America No Longer Needs Middle East Oil?” Forbes 12/3/2012 accessed July 28, 2015

http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2012/12/03/what-happens-when-america-no-longer-needs-middle-east-oil/ LC)

If you trace your finger on a globe northward over the pole from the U.S. Navy’s main naval base on the West Coast, you’ll discover that the entrance to

the Persian Gulf is roughly on the opposite side of the world. The Gulf is so far away that prior to World War Two, few Americans thought there was any reason to visit the sparsely populated region, much less establish a permanent military presence there.¶ But after the war ended, world demand for oil surged while America gradually exhausted most of its easily-tapped domestic reserves. As U.S. oil

companies joined the global search for new sources, geologists came to believe that two-thirds of the world’s exploitable oil reserves and one-third of its natural gas lay under a handful of states bordering on the Persian Gulf. As a result, the security of Gulf oil states became of paramount concern to U.S.

military planners.¶ Now, that could be changing. The latest edition of the International Energy Agency’s World Energy

Outlook says America will surpass Saudi Arabia as the biggest oil producer in 2020 and become self-sufficient in energy by 2030 as new drilling technologies, alternative fuels and declining consumption reduce the need to import oil. The U.S. may continue to use

oil from Canada, Venezuela and other nearby countries if prices are competitive, but the IEA predicts Asian nations will end up consuming 90% of the oil produced in the Persian Gulf.¶ That’s good news for America, however it could have

ramifications that are not good for the rest of the world. If the United States no longer needs access to Middle East oil under any foreseeable circumstances, then the priority Washington assigns to the region will plummet. Many analysts believe that a unified global pricing structure for fossil fuels will keep America engaged, but with U.S. spot prices for natural gas currently running at a fraction of what the fuel costs in Europe and East Asia, it appears global pricing isn’t so integrated after all.¶ Even

if it were, Washington’s options for insulating U.S. energy markets from global price swings are multiplying as domestic production grows. If you know the history of global oil in the years before World War Two, then you realize there is nothing new about America enjoying energy independence as Asia worries about its own needs. What definitely is new, though, is that in the near future there might be no western nation capable of

or willing to police the Persian Gulf.¶ Britain carried that burden from the late 1700s until World War Two, but its circumstances were so diminished in the war’s aftermath that it soon exited all of its military bases “East of Suez.” As Britain receded in the Middle East, America’s role there grew — especially after successive energy crises engineered by members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries alerted

Washington to its growing dependence on foreign oil. So the Pentagon became accustomed to assuring the security of oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz, maintaining a continuous naval presence in and around the Gulf while periodically deploying ground forces to protect fragile oil-producing states.¶ Nothing lasts forever, though, and now a combination of energy independence and economic necessity may lead Washington to become more insular in its outlook, the same way London did after the war. With less need for foreign oil and an increasingly urgent requirement to rein in federal borrowing, it doesn’t take a genius to figure out where the political system will be inclined to cut spending. It will be in distant places that have

ceased having an impact on how elections turn out.¶ With the prospect of OPEC-induced energy shortages off the table, at least in America, political leaders are sure to begin asking why the U.S. Navy is carrying the burden of making sure China has secure sources of oil. The answers they get from Pentagon strategists aren’t likely to be well received in a nation where economic growth has slowed to a crawl due in no small part to Chinese mercantilism.¶ So there’s a real possibility that Washington will go through the same East-of-Suez debate that London did in the 1960s. The Obama Administration’s new Asia-Pacific military posture may be the first, tentative sign that America is losing its enthusiasm for securing Middle East oil supplies. Of course,

everyone in the administration will vigorously reject any such interpretation. But just for fun, let’s ask the question of who wins and who loses if America decides it’s had enough of being the policeman on the beat in the Persian Gulf.¶ The biggest losers would be the Arab oil states grouped in the Gulf Cooperation Council, most of which are monarchies kept in power by a combination oil dollars and American military power. Despite their oil revenues, none of these countries except Saudi Arabia has the wherewithal to defend itself against military pressure from Iran if America leaves the stage – or for that matter from Iraq, which has repeatedly laid claim to oil fields in Kuwait and

other nearby states. The vacuum created by an American departure would force nations like Bahrain and Qatar to seek new military protectors, either by submitting to the influence of bigger regional powers or by reaching out to China.¶ The second category of losers would be the economies of East Asia, which the International Energy Agency says will be the main consumers of Persian Gulf oil in the years ahead. China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are heavily

dependent on the flow of oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz, and yet do little to assure that flow is not disrupted by local tensions. If

America pulls out of the Gulf, the nations of East Asia will either have to play a bigger military

role in the Middle East, or find other sources of oil. America might have sufficient new-found reserves of fossil fuel to supply Japan and

South Korea in an emergency, but concern about access to Persian Gulf oil would undoubtedly exacerbate tensions over who owns contested oil reserves in the South China Sea and elsewhere.¶ Israel too would likely be a big loser. Washington spends billions of dollars each year subsidizing the security of the Jewish state. The reason that isn’t controversial even though Americans usually want to cut foreign aid ahead of every other type of federal spending is because it is hard to separate securing Israel from securing Middle East oil. The same U.S. military forces and programs that help protect Israel from Iranian missiles and Islamist terror groups also protect Arab oil-producing states. But if America’s role in securing the oil were to wane, it would be harder to ignore the cost of defending Israel, and that might force Jerusalem to become more self-sufficient.¶ There would be plenty of other losers too, from the nations that depend on a steady flow of Middle East oil to stabilize global energy prices to the shippers that count on the Fifth Fleet for protection to the local companies that help sustain U.S. forces in the region. No doubt about it, a lot of players dependent on America’s military presence in and around the Persian Gulf would be hurt if America went home. But there would be winners, too.¶ One big winner would be Iran, because it would no longer find its regional pretensions blocked by America’s military. Although there are ethnic and religious differences separating

Persians from their Arab neighbors on the western side of the Gulf, Iran’s big population and economic resources over time could come to dominate the region. Homegrown terrorist groups might also thrive in America’s absence, although Arab governments could feel freer to deal with them in the

absence of American concepts about freedom and justice. The biggest winner of all, though, might be China’s Peoples Liberation Army, which would have a compelling reason for extending its presence outside of East Asia in order to secure the Middle Kingdom’s most important foreign sources of petroleum.¶ If you’ve stayed with me up this point, you’re probably thinking something like, “Gee, this energy independence thing sure has a lot of potential downside.” Well you’re right — if it becomes an excuse for pulling the joint force out of the Persian Gulf. But that doesn’t Youmean it won’t happen, because despite all the possible drawbacks, U.S. taxpayers would still benefit hugely from a scaling back of U.S. security commitments in the Middle East if that were accompanied by real self-sufficiency in energy. How much would they benefit? Potentially by a hundred billion dollars or more in annual budget savings as the military was downsized for a more limited role on the far side of the world.¶ If that sounds fanciful, then go read what the International Energy Agency says about America’s rapidly improving energy outlook — and try to keep in mind that the need for Persian Gulf oil is the main reason why the U.S. military showed up in the Middle East after having almost no role there for the first two centuries of the Republic’s history.

Gulf presence deters aggression from Iran and maintains regional stability via alliesEntous 14

(Adam, National Security Correspondent, Wall Street Journal, “Hagel Assures Gulf Allies of Continued U.S. Military Presence, 5/14/14, http://www.wsj.com/articles/ SB10001424052702304547704579561321483535490 accessed 7/29/15)

∂ JEDDAH, Saudi Arabia—U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel told Saudi Arabia and other Gulf allies on Wednesday that the U.S. would maintain its military presence in the region to deter Iran even if negotiations to curb its nuclear program are successful.∂ ∂ Negotiators will begin drafting terms of a final agreement on the future of Tehran's nuclear program this week in Vienna. A deal would end a decade-long standoff between Tehran and the West and put into place greater assurances that Iran won't be able to

build a bomb, in return for a major easing of Western sanctions.∂ ∂ The U.S. pulled its troops out of Iraq and has sought to shift its focus to Asia, unnerving Gulf states worried about Iran's regional ambitions.∂ ∂ Addressing a meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council in Jeddah, Mr. Hagel said the U.S. would "under no circumstances trade away regional security" for concessions from Iran over its nuclear program.∂ ∂

"While our strong preference is for a diplomatic solution, the United States will remain postured and prepared to ensure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon and that Iran abides by the terms of any potential agreement," Mr. Hagel said at the Conference Palace.∂ ∂ "No matter the outcome of the nuclear negotiations, the United States remains committed to our Gulf partners' security," Mr. Hagel added. Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates make up the regional bloc.∂ ∂ The main area of disagreement in the nuclear talks continues to be the scope of Iran's uranium-enrichment facilities, which could be used to produce weapons-grade fuel for a bomb, according to U.S. and European officials.∂ ∂ Advertisement∂ ∂ The U.S. military currently has 35,000 military

personnel in the region, including the Navy's 5th Fleet and advanced missile defense systems.∂ ∂ The Pentagon wants to strengthen its Gulf allies, and the GCC as a whole, to enable them to assume more responsibility for regional security. But tensions between member states, particularly Qatar and Saudi Arabia, have hampered those efforts.∂ ∂ Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E. and Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar in March to protest Doha's support for the Muslim Brotherhood, a group labeled a "terrorist organization" by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Subsequent mediation by

Kuwait has calmed the unusually public quarrel but deep differences remain.∂ ∂ In his address, Mr. Hagel called on the GCC to step up its role in the region, from assuming command of a combined maritime force in the Gulf to increasing cyberdefense cooperation with the U.S.∂ ∂ Israel and Saudi Arabia are calling for a complete dismantling of Iran's nuclear installations so the country couldn't maintain the capacity to build nuclear weapons.∂ ∂ Mr. Hagel will also visit Israel this week to tell its leaders that the U.S. remains committed to its security.

ImpactsIran’s nuclear ambitions trigger an arms raceShabaneh 6/15/15

(Dr. Ghassan, associate professor of international studies at Marymount Manhattan College in New York City, 6/15/15 “The Implications of a Nuclear Deal with Iran on the GCC, China, and Russia” Al Jazeera Centre for Studies accessed 7/29/15 from

http://studies.aljazeera.net/ResourceGallery/media/ Documents/2015/6/14/20156148505316734Iran.pdf LC)

The Lausanne framework on Iran's nuclear ambitions, if implemented, is likely to change¶ many notions of the prevailing balance of power in the Middle East and to usher in a new¶ arms race among many aspiring regional powers in the Arab World and beyond. Signing¶ a nuclear deal with Iran

without a careful review of the military and security landscape of the region is likely to cause an unprecedented tension between the U.S. and many of its¶ Arab allies and threatens a stormy transition of the unipolar system to an era of¶ imbalance and military competition among all the ambitious powers in the area: China,¶ Iran, Russia and Turkey. All the aforementioned powers are waiting to replace any¶ poorly planned American departure from the region. Thus, it is the responsibility of the¶ U.S. to slow the demise of the unipolar system in the Middle East and usher in a peaceful¶ transition of power to avoid a bloody and a complicated one by clarifying the nature and¶ the mechanisms of a future nuclear deal with Iran.¶

Iranian heg causes a US strike and regional arms raceCharbel 10

(Bechara Nassar, June 4, taught @ American University in Beruit, Middle East Online, http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/opinion/?id=39390, Accessed 7/2) CM

Second, we are confronted with Iranian hegemony over the region. With its nuclear program, Iran could be encouraged to follow a more hard-line and active foreign policy in the region. From observation, it has become evident that the Islamic Republic has gained place in new negotiations in the region—ranging from Iraq, Palestine,

Lebanon and Syria, because of its large presence in the Arab region, through its alliances with Hezbollah and Hamas in Damascus. It has gained this influence at the expense of the role of Gulf countries—especially Saudi Arabia—that always played an influential role in the process of forming Middle East policies. There is also the likelihood of a military strike. In case a military strike is carried out against Iran, Gulf countries in alliance with the United States would find themselves at the forefront of this conflict because of the presence of military bases on their lands. In addition, there is concern for oil security, which is the main artery for Gulf countries. In this regard, recent exercises by Iranian Revolutionary Guards in the Arab Gulf and

Strait of Hormuz deserve to be noticed. In addition to direct threat of war or sanctions on Iran, the above-mentioned reasons could also lead to a scenario of an escalation in arms race in the Gulf. However, it is not farfetched that a nuclear race ensues, if Iran is able to continue with its nuclear project due to lack of international

resolve and its exceptional capabilities in negotiating to the very brink of the abyss. A nuclear race of this kind would drain the potential of Gulf Arab countries and Iran alike. It will impede development in countries, where most

of the population is young and in need of jobs. It will pit the region in the face a dangerous sectarian division that would make the mission of the moderate forces impossible and would make the calls for dialogue futile and useless.

Africa

1NCEconomic competition in Africa nowSun and Olin-Ammentorp 14

(Yun Sun, senior associate with the East Asia Program at the Stimson Center and Jane Olin-Ammentorp, Research Contractor of Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. 4/28/14 “The US and China in Africa: Competition or Cooperation?” Accessed 7/31/15 from

http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2014/04/28-us-china-africa-policy-sun LC)

African policymakers need effective and efficient policies to benefit from the competition between the U.S. and China. At the moment, such policies are lacking. Many experts note that, if African countries can prioritize and be clearer in their demands in engagement with these powers, Africa can exploit the different comparative advantages of the U.S. and China. China’s advantage is frequently cited to be speed, as AGI Senior Fellow Amadou Sy noted during our April 16 discussion. Infrastructure projects built by Chinese companies are quickly popping up around the continent. On the other hand, the U.S. has superior technology and capacity to provide an operator role in the oil and gas industry and to supply African countries with high-tech machinery. In addition, some research suggests that countries with increased exports to the United States, as opposed to the European Union and China, have experienced enhanced productivity, labor demand and value addition.

Plan destroys economic competition, resulting in Chinese economic domination in AfricaSun and Rettig 14

(Yun Sun, senior associate with the East Asia Program at the Stimson Center and Michael Rettig, communications associate at the Brookings Institution. 8/5/14 “American and Chinese trade with Africa:

Rhetoric vs. reality” in The Hill Accessed 7/29/15 from http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/international/214270-american-and-chinese-trade-with-africa-rhetoric-vs-reality LC)

On Aug. 4, President Obama welcomed leaders from across the African continent to Washington for a three-day U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit. One major topic of discussion, in addition to the political and security issues, will inevitably be how to enhance U.S.-Africa

economic relations.¶ Since 2000, U.S. trade relations with Africa have been dictated by the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). As a unilateral preference scheme of the U.S. to promote trade and investment in

Africa, AGOA was meant to boost U.S. trade with Africa and the development of the continent. However, 14 years in, U.S. trade in goods with Africa has demonstrated a perplexing downward trend since 2011. U.S.-Africa trade dwindled from $125 billion in 2011 to $99 billion in 2012 and $85 billion in 2013. For the first five months of 2014, U.S.-Africa trade in goods totaled about $31 billion. At this rate, the total trade volume in 2014 could be well

below $80 billion in a continuation of the declining trend.¶ In comparison, Beijing has been quite low-key in disseminating its Africa trade promotion efforts, although its trade with Africa has been growing exponentially. China surpassed the U.S. as Africa's largest trading partner in 2009. China-Africa trade reached $166 billion in 2011, an 83 percent rise from 2009. The bilateral trade further increased another 19.3

percent to $198 billion in 2012, and passed the $200 billion threshold to $210 billion in 2013. In terms of trade volume, Chinese trade with Africa not only dwarfs U.S. trade with Africa, but the gap is as large as 2.5 times the magnitude of last year.¶ The rhetoric and realities of American and Chinese trade with Africa present an

interesting contrast. Despite the callings in the U.S. to boost economic relations with Africa and to "compete" with the expanding Chinese economic influence on the continent, the results seem

less than impressive. On the other hand, although the Chinese have remained quieter about their Africa trade promotion, the trade figures have been growing fast.¶ The decline of U.S. trade with Africa is largely attributable to the watershed 2008 financial crisis. Before the crisis, U.S.-Africa trade had been progressively increasing, but aside from a short 2010-2011 rebound, it has fallen since. In efforts to explain the decline, much was made by some analysts of reduced remittances or uncertainty around the 2012 renewal of AGOA's third-country fabric provision. However, while these dynamics might have affected certain countries, they did not necessarily have a major effect on the overall U.S.-Africa trade relationship.¶ Instead, the data point largely to just one culprit: oil and gas. In the wake of the financial crisis, African exporters faced a one-two punch: U.S. oil consumption began a 9 percent decline (from 20.7 million barrels per day in 2008 to 18.9 million in 2013) and the cost of oil dropped 70 percent from $140 per barrel to as low as $32 per barrel within a year. From 2008 to 2013, oil and gas exports from AGOA countries to the U.S. plummeted by 66 percent from $60 billion to $20 billion. By contrast, non-oil exports fell only $400 million, or about 6 percent, during the same period, and U.S. exports to those same countries actually grew. Because the U.S.-Africa trade relationship is so dependent on African oil exports, however, it was remarkably vulnerable to oil price shocks. Indeed, after oil, some of the next top U.S. imports from Africa (though far less in value) include precious stones, cocoa and ores — more commodities vulnerable to price shocks and reflective of a not-so-diversified trade relationship.¶ The most recent U.S. effort to turn this trade relationship around was released in Tanzania in July 2013 under the framework of Trade Africa. Among the goals in the initial phase, the plan intends to increase exports to the U.S. from the East African Regional Community (EAC) by 40 percent. To facilitate that goal, the U.S. plans to explore an investment treaty, operate a trade hub that will "provide information, advisory services, risk mitigation and financing ... to U.S. and East African investors and exporters," and advance its "Doing Business in Africa" campaign, which includes "trade missions, reverse trade missions, trade shows, and business-to-business matchmaking in key sectors."¶ Admirable on the surface, it remains questionable whether the plan will come to pass. Forming a sustainable U.S.-Africa trade relationship would require not just growth, but also diversification away from reliance on commodities. Oil discoveries in the EAC may very well contribute to a 40 percent increase in U.S.-Africa trade, but such trade would still remain vulnerable to global price shocks. If instead, Trade Africa were to include sector-specific benchmarks for manufacturing or the EAC's burgeoning tech sectors, any resulting growth in trade could be more resilient.¶ On Chinese trade with Africa, although the total trade volume has still grown in 2013, the speed of such growth has slowed down — from 19.3 percent in 2012 to 5.9 percent in 2013. Such a rate is also lower than the growth of China's overall foreign trade: 7.6 percent in the same year. While the broad context is the slowdown of China's economic growth and of its foreign trade, exports by Africa suffer in particular because, like the U.S., China's demand for raw materials has declined.¶ China ran a small deficit of $24.6 billion in its trade with Africa, while its exports are still largely dominated by finished products including machineries, electronics, automobiles, textiles, etc. Meanwhile, despite the reiterated efforts that China would reduce the percentage of natural resources imports in Sino-African trade, natural resources remain dominant. In total, China's crude oil imports from Africa made up 23 percent of China's global imports in 2013, making Africa the largest exporter of crude oil for China.¶ China bears high hope for the development of Sino-African trade. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang pronounced the plan to double bilateral trade to $400 billion by 2020. As China struggles with its own economic restructuring, it has been hoped that emerging markets such as Africa would assist the process. China aims to transfer some of its labor-intensive and manufacturing sectors such as textile, garment and household appliances to Africa for an "alignment of industrial development

strategies between China and Africa." And to boost such a development, China is eager to contribute to the infrastructure of the continent, including active involvement in highway, railway, telecommunications, electric power and other projects that facilitate regional connectivity. At

the same time, the ambition will translate into heightened investment efforts in Africa and a growing market for Chinese infrastructure contractors.¶ While these may be good news for Africa and Sino-Africa relations, they also have significant implications for the United States .

Most evidently, if the U.S. is to successfully compete with China on economic engagement in Africa, the pressure is mounting. As the interest in a U.S.-China competition in Africa rises and people question whether the U.S. is losing out to China, it should be noted that if the U.S. is not enhancing its own investment and trade efforts in Africa anyway, portraying China as a threat does not necessarily help improve America's position.¶ Despite enthusiastic rhetoric in some corners, U.S. trade with Africa seems on faulty footing and unlikely to grow. U.S. oil consumption remains down since 2008, and imports are now further held down by a natural gas boom at home. Non-oil trade between the U.S. and Africa is growing, but only modestly overall. U.S. businesses continue to view private investment in Africa as risky, and government actions to mitigate such risk

will prove harder as Congress looks to eliminate tools like the Export-Import Bank. If the U.S. values a strong economic relationship with Africa, or seeks to balance a Chinese presence there, much remains to be done in both diversifying and growing trade.

Chinese economic dominance leads to global economic instability Krauss and Bradsher 7/24/15

(Clifford Krauss, New York Times national business correspondent covering energy and Keith Bradsher, New York Times business and economics reporter 7/24/15 “China’s Global Ambitions, With Loans and Strings Attached” New York Times, accessed 7/31/15 from

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/26/ business/ international/chinas-global-ambitions-with-loans-and-strings-attached.html LC)

While China has been important to the world economy for decades, the country is now wielding its financial heft with the confidence and purpose of a global superpower. With the center of financial gravity shifting, China is aggressively asserting its economic clout to win diplomatic allies, invest its vast wealth, promote its currency and secure much-needed natural resources.¶ It represents a new phase in China’s evolution. As the country’s wealth has swelled and its needs have evolved, President Xi Jinping and the rest of the leadership have pushed to extend China’s reach on a global scale.¶ China’s currency, the renminbi, is expected to be anointed soon as a global reserve currency, putting it in an elite category with the dollar, the euro, the pound and the yen. China’s state-owned development bank has surpassed the World Bank in international lending. And its effort to create an internationally funded institution to finance transportation and other infrastructure has drawn the support of 57 countries, including several of the United States’ closest allies, despite opposition from the Obama administration.¶ Even the current stock market slump is unlikely to shake the country’s resolve. China has nearly $4 trillion in foreign

currency reserves, which it is determined to invest overseas to earn a profit and exert its influence.¶ China’s growing economic power coincides with an increasingly assertive foreign policy. It is building aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines and stealth jets. In a contested sea, China is turning reefs and atolls near the southern Philippines into artificial islands, with at least one airstrip able to handle the largest military planes. The United States has challenged the move, conducting surveillance flights in the area and discussing plans to send warships.¶ China represents “a civilization and history that awakens admiration to those who know it,” President Rafael Correa of Ecuador proclaimed on Twitter, as his jet landed in Beijing for a meeting with officials in January.¶

China’s leaders portray the overseas investments as symbiotic. “The current industrial cooperation between China and Latin America arrives at the right moment,” Prime Minister Li Keqiang said in a visit to Chile in late May. “China has equipment manufacturing capacity and integrated technology with competitive prices, while Latin America has the demand for

infrastructure expansion and industrial upgrading.”¶ But the show of financial strength also makes China — and the world — more vulnerable. Long an engine of global growth, China is taking on new risks by exposing itself to shaky political regimes, volatile emerging markets and other economic forces beyond its control.

Economic collapse leads to extinction Harris and Burrows 09

[Mathew, PhD European History at Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/ twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf]

Increased Potential for Global Conflict Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so,

history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not

likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the

ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the

international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach.

Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks_and newly

emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would

almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a

nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the

Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking

place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines

between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined

with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack

of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of

Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge,

particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In

the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval

capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for

multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

2NC: LinksUS presence key to prevent Chinese dominance—otherwise war and economic collapseKane and Carpenter 06 (Lt. Col. Gregory C. Kane and Col. Patrick O. Carpenter, US Army, 3/15/6 “Strategic Competition for the Continent of Africa” accessed 7/31/15 from handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA449648 LC)Over the past decade the United States has been slow to expand its business and¶ political enterprises in the continent of Africa. In the interim, China, the world’s most populous¶ country, the fourth

largest economy, and the third largest standing military force, has jumped¶ onto the continent full force. In other words, “the Chinese, sensing Africa’s tremendous¶ potential upside, are making strategic economic inroads into a continent that, outside of oil¶ investments, has long been written off by most Western companies as

too risky because of poor¶ governance or threat of conflict. US companies, in particular, have been caught flat-footed by¶ the Chinese financial strikes, according to American and other experts on Africa’s economic¶ potential.”1¶ Chinese investments, both public and private sector, are aimed at securing further¶ access to a largely untapped market, ensuring the continued flow of resources to fuel their economic growth, and building alliances around the region to counter the United States as the¶ world’s most influential and economic power. This is an economic and political struggle that¶ could conceivably lead to the US and other western nations being cut off from required energy¶ resources, squeezed out of future markets, and faced with stagnating or negative economic¶ growth. In other words: “China’s aggressive search [for oil specifically] is putting it in growing¶

competition with the United States, the world’s largest oil consumer. Some observers even¶ warn of a possible

showdown between the two economic giants.”2

2NC: Economic Dominance BadUS-China economic competition in Africa creates jobs best way to stimulate the future and prevent al-Shabaab recruitmentLee and Vogt 7/28/15

(Carol E., a White House correspondent in the Washington bureau and Heidi, Wall Street Journal East Africa correspondent. 7/28/15 “Obama Becomes First U.S. President to Address African Union” in The

Wall Street Journal Accessed 7/29/15 from http://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-becomes-first-u-s-president-to-address-african-union-1438090849 LC)

ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia—President Barack Obama on Tuesday became the first American president to address the African Union in the institution’s 52-year history, a moment lauded for its historical significance but one that underscored

how far behind the U.S. is in investing in the continent.¶ Mr. Obama’s visit capped a five-day African trip where he pledged enhanced U.S. economic ties. The U.S., however, is playing catch-up to other world powers, particularly

China, which built the 54-member Union’s headquarters where Mr. Obama spoke.¶ His statements reflected the way that burgeoning Chinese investment in Africa has changed the way major

Western powers like the U.S. approach the continent. The promise of rapid economic growth has dramatically increased many African economies’ leverage with foreign powers. Mr. Obama spent as much time courting African governments as criticizing Ethiopia’s repression of opposition leaders and calling out Burundi’s president

for ignoring constitutional term limits.¶ “African governments are in a better position because they can negotiate,” between the U.S. and China, said Ahmed Salim, an East Africa analyst with Teneo Intelligence in Dubai.

“From an African government perspective, it’s a win.”¶ The president has made the case in Kenya and Ethiopia that African economies should embrace the U.S. over other world powers because America’s approach isn’t to simply give aid but also to build the continent’s capacity to flourish on its own.¶ “Now, the United States isn’t the only country that sees your growth as an opportunity,” Mr.

Obama told an enthusiastic audience Tuesday in a hall named after the late South African leader Nelson Mandela. “But economic relationships can’t simply be about building other countries’ infrastructure with foreign labor or extracting Africa’s natural

resources,” he said. “Real economic partnerships have to be a good deal for Africa—they have to create jobs and capacity for Africans.”¶ Mr. Obama used this trip to Africa to market America’s particular offering—one that is shorter on direct funding and more slanted toward encouraging private businesses to invest—such as the Obama administration’s trademark Power Africa program, which is designed to expand access to electricity on the continent, but has been slow to show concrete results.¶ “The pledge of private money can’t really be a pledge. It’s only a hope,” said Deborah Brautigam, the director of the China Africa Research Initiative at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. Ms. Brautigam called it a

myth that Chinese investment doesn’t create jobs, saying Chinese projects often employ many African workers as well as Chinese contractors. She said the U.S. has a lot of catching up to do if it is going to compete with China on infrastructure projects in Africa. “The U.S. is only recently moving into that area and we’re doing it very slowly and with not much in terms of money,” Ms. Brautigam said.¶ Even while Mr. Obama highlighted the business potential of the African continent on this trip, the visit didn’t include any new African initiatives. Instead, Mr. Obama found himself defending Power Africa—saying it takes time to build power plants—and announcing funding for entrepreneurship globally.¶

Mr. Obama also called on African leaders to end widespread government corruption and advance democracy and human rights as part of the continent’s drive toward economic growth. At the same time, he used China as an example of how he engages with countries that don’t share U.S. governing values.¶ “I may interact with a government, out of necessity, where we have common interest,” Mr. Obama told civil-society leaders in Kenya on Sunday. “But if there are areas where I disagree, I will also be very blunt in my disagreement. And that’s true whether it’s Russia or China, or some of our European friends, or a great friend like Kenya.”¶ On Tuesday, Mr. Obama received some of his most enthusiastic applause for sharp comments on democracy, particularly his calls for African leaders who cling to power without term limits.¶ “We all know what the ingredients of real democracy are. They include free and fair elections, freedom of speech and the press, freedom of assembly,” Mr. Obama said. “Democracy is not just formal elections.”¶ Mr. Obama singled out Ethiopia as a burgeoning democracy that held elections without violence. He didn’t, however, repeat his characterization of Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn as “democratically elected.”¶ Mr. Obama’s decision to

engage with leaders such as Mr. Desalegn rather than isolate them is fundamental to his approach to foreign policy and an acknowledgment that if he doesn’t another country will.¶ “These countries have options,” said a senior administration official traveling with the president. “It’s not as if they have nowhere to go. This is the world as it is, and engagement is our best lever.”¶ Mr. Obama used a personal anecdote to argue why term limits can benefit a democracy.¶ “I actually think I’m a pretty good president. I think if I ran I could win,” Mr. Obama said, referring to a third term. “But I can’t.”¶ The trip was a personal journey for Mr. Obama as the first African-American U.S. president whose father was born in Kenya. His familial ties to Africa and the story of his unlikely ascent to the presidency gave added weight to his words.¶ The White House hopes it will also help the U.S. more quickly make up for

the lack of time Mr. Obama has spent focusing on Africa.¶ Mr. Obama, in Kenya and Ethiopia, focused on his two signature

Africa initiatives: a program for African farmers, Feed the Future; and Power Africa. He noted on Tuesday his

plans to host a U.S.-Africa Business Forum next year focused on trade and investment.¶ “America’s approach to development—the central focus of our engagement with Africa—is focused on helping you build your own capacity to realize that vision,” Mr. Obama said.¶ He described engaging young Africans as the most urgent challenge facing the continent, given the growth in population and the spread of terrorist groups like Somalia-based al-Shabaab.¶ Security threats are among Mr. Obama’s most pressing challenges in engaging Africa. Mr. Obama said he will host a summit at the United Nations this fall aimed strengthening international support for peacekeeping, including in Africa.¶ “The choices made today will shape the trajectory of Africa for decades to come,” Mr. Obama said. “As you build the Africa you believe in, you will have no better partner and friend than the United States of America.”

Generic/All Regions

LinksMilitary presence acts as a deterrent—symbolic commitment sends signals to hostile nationsDavis et. al. 09

(Jacquelyn K., Ph.D. in international relations from the University of Pennsylvania executive vice president of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Dr. Charles M. Perry, James L. Schoff, 2/2009 “Updating U.S. Deterrence Concepts and Operational Planning” Accessed 7/29/15 from

http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/Updating_US_Deterrence_Concepts.pdf LC)

Symbols have always been important to the Alliance and to the concept of deterrence, and for¶ many years the

American emphasis on forward-deployed forces in Europe and Asia was seen¶ as emblematic (and proof) of the U.S. extended deterrence commitment. In Europe, the deployment¶ of V and VII Corps Headquarters was perceived as the substance of that commitment,¶ while in Asia the deployment of 100,000 forces was explicitly identified as the key to operational¶ planning and to the credibility of American commitments to Japan and South Korea. The¶ 100,000 level of forward-deployed U.S. forces was considered to be necessary to implement¶ operational plans, but it also had a profound political and psychological importance in relation¶ to counter-proliferation

and deterrence planning. Hence, when the Bush administration began¶ to de-emphasize the 100,000-troop threshold in Asia and discount the two

major theaters of war¶ (MTW)-construct in 2001, and as U.S. military personnel were moved out of Korea along with

planned re-deployments from Japan and Europe as part of the Pentagon’s Global Posture Review¶ (GPR), suspicions of a global U.S. retreat grew in alliance capitals in Europe and Asia. Despite U.S.¶ efforts to characterize global troop re-deployments in the context of military transformation and¶ modernization, these tangible symbols of the extended deterrence construct have been devalued,¶ leaving us with the dilemma of how to convey and signal our deterrence commitments and the¶ credibility of extended deterrence at a time when more and more U.S. forward deployed assets¶ are being drawn back to the continental United States (CONUS). One answer to this dilemma lies¶ in the development of a well considered strategic communications/information operations (IO)¶ roadmap designed to reassure allies and to convey the seriousness of our intentions to prospective¶ adversaries. Specifically, this IO roadmap should highlight the capabilities of U.S. forces in the¶ region and demonstrate their potential through realistic training exercises with allies.

ImpactsUS-Sino competition goes nuclear—more tension than the Cold WarKeck 14

(Zachary, Assistant Editor of The Diplomat and a graduate student in the Department of Public and International Affairs at George Mason University. 1/28/14 “US-China Rivalry More Dangerous Than Cold

War?” in The Diplomat, accessed 7/31/15 from http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/us-china-rivalry-more-dangerous-than-cold-war/ LC)

The prominent realist international relations scholar John Mearsheimer says there is a greater possibility of the U.S. and China going to war in the future than there was of a Soviet-NATO general war during the Cold War.¶ Mearsheimer made the comments at a lunch hosted by the Center for the National Interest in Washington, DC on Monday. The lunch was held to discuss Mearsheimer’s recent article in The National Interest on U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East. However, much of the conversation during the Q&A session focused on U.S. policy towards Asia amid China’s rise, a topic that Mearsheimer addresses in greater length in the updated edition of his classic treatise, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,

which is due out this April.¶ In contrast to the Middle East, which he characterizes as posing little threat to the United States, Mearsheimer said that the U.S. will face a tremendous challenge in Asia should China continue to rise economically. The University of Chicago professor said that in such a scenario it is inevitable that the U.S. and China will engage in an intense strategic competition, much like the Soviet-American rivalry during the Cold War.¶ While stressing that he didn’t believe a shooting war between the U.S. and China is inevitable, Mearsheimer

said that he believes a U.S.-China Cold War will be much less stable than the previous American-Soviet one. His reasoning was based on geography and its interaction with nuclear weapons.¶ Specifically, the center of gravity of the U.S.-Soviet competition was the central European landmass. This created a rather stable situation as, according to Mearsheimer, anyone that war gamed a NATO-Warsaw conflict over Central Europe understood that it would quickly turn nuclear. This gave both sides a powerful incentive to avoid a general conflict in Central Europe as a nuclear war

would make it very likely that both the U.S. and Soviet Union would be “vaporized.”¶ The U.S.-China strategic rivalry lacks this singular center of gravity. Instead, Mearsheimer identified four potential hotspots over which he believes the U.S. and China might find themselves at war: the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait and the South and East China Seas. Besides featuring more hotspots than the U.S.-Soviet conflict, Mearsheimer implied that he felt that decision-makers in Beijing and Washington might be more confident that they could engage in a shooting war over one of these areas without it escalating to the nuclear threshold.¶

Chinese-US Conflict causes massive war and global reorderingWyne 6/5/15

(Ali Wyne contributing analyst at Wikistrat 6/5/15 “The balance of power between the U.S. and China” in The Washington Post, accessed 7/31/15

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-us-china-rivalry/2015/06/05/6bc7ffb0-e456-11e4-81ea-0649268f729e_story.html LC)

Thomas J. Christensen opens his new book by observing that post-1978 China has achieved economic progress that is “unprecedented in world history” and has registered “equally dramatic” advances in its economic and diplomatic

ties abroad. Since the mid-1990s, moreover, its official military budget has grown even faster than its economy.¶ It was perhaps inevitable that such a dramatic rise — or resurgence, from China’s perspective —

would elicit exaggerated analysis. Especially in the United States, to whose preeminence that phenomenon poses a singular challenge, one tends to encounter depictions of China as either a fearsome juggernaut or a paper

dragon. Christensen, a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, avoids both fallacies, offering instead a model of judicious analysis: Carefully deconstructing the economic, military and diplomatic balances between the United

States and China, he reveals the magnitude of the latter’s challenge without inflating it.¶ First, the bad news: While China’s conventional and nuclear capabilities are a long way from approximating America’s, they pose growing threats to U.S. interests, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. Christensen notes that an increasingly confident China “enjoys military superiority over most, if not all” of America’s regional allies, three of which (Japan, the

Philippines and Taiwan) have intractable territorial disputes with China.¶ Of greater long-term concern, in his estimation, is enlisting its support in upholding the liberal world order that has been so instrumental to its ascent: “No government has experience . . . persuading a uniquely large developing country with enormous domestic challenges and a historical chip on its national shoulder to cooperate actively with the international community.” Christensen focuses on the obstacles to U.S.-China cooperation in the arenas of nonproliferation, global economic management, peacekeeping and, most vexing of all, climate change.¶ Still, “The China Challenge” strikes a tone of cautious

optimism, and Christensen makes a persuasive case that conflict between the United States and China is far from inevitable. The scale of economic interdependence worldwide is unprecedented, and transnational production, a marginal feature of economic activity in the run-up to World War I, has exploded over the past quarter-century. In 2012, China’s trade with the United States, formal U.S. allies in East Asia and U.S. security partners in Asia accounted for roughly two-fifths of its overall trade (about a fifth of its gross domestic product) and one-third of official foreign direct investment flowing into the mainland. Conflict would risk those benefits and compound China’s diplomatic isolation: Christensen observes that it “lacks any strategically important allies.”¶ Finally, while China regards today’s world order as more of a Western imposition than a just consensus — alternatively reacting with confusion and irritation to America’s exhortation to become a “responsible stakeholder” — it has neither a coherent alternative to offer nor a compelling rationale for posing a systemic revisionist challenge: Japan, Germany and the Soviet Union suffered greatly for undertaking that

course in the 20th century.¶ Yet one wonders if America and China’s sensible rhetoric — about forging a new type of great-power relations and avoiding what Graham Allison calls the “Thucydides trap” (in his words, “the natural, inevitable

inescapable discombobulation that accompanies a tectonic shift in the relative power of a rising and [a] ruling state”) — belies increasing pessimism about the trajectory of their relationship. Christensen notes that “John Mearsheimer is seen by many Chinese as the one honest American strategist, willing to admit that the United States has deep-seated national interests in delaying and halting China’s rise.” In the new, concluding chapter of “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,” orginally

published in 2001, Mearsheimer, a distinguished political scientist at the University of Chicago, warns that “if China continues to grow economically, it will attempt to dominate Asia the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. The United States, however, will go to enormous lengths to prevent China from achieving regional hegemony.”¶ The path of least resistance, but also of greatest danger, would be for the two countries to conclude that they are prisoners of history. While implementing their shared desire for a constructive partnership will be among the most daunting projects of the new century, they must spare no effort in pursuit of that goal.

Answers to 2AC Pan KPan is epistemically reductionist. Reject the aff voting criteria because they can’t meet their own standard.Jones 14

David Martin, Professor of Politics at University of Glasgow, PhD from LSE, Australian Journal of Political Science, February 21, 2014, 49:1, "Managing the China Dream: Communist Party politics after the Tiananmen incident.”

Notwithstanding this Western fascination with China and the positive response of former Marxists, such as Jacques, to the new China, Pan discerns an Orientalist ideology distorting Western commentary on the party state, and especially its international relations (6). Following Edward Said, Pan claims that such Western Orientalism reveals ‘not something concrete about the orient, but something about the orientalists themselves, their recurring latent desire of fears and fantasies about the orient’ (16). In order to unmask the limits of Western representations of China’s rise, Pan employs a critical ‘methodology’ that ‘draws on constructivist and deconstructivist approaches’ (9). Whereas the ‘former questions the underlying dichotomy of reality/knowledge in Western study of China’s international relations’, the latter shows how paradigmatic representations of China ‘condition the way we give meaning to that country’ and ‘are socially constitutive of it’ (9). Pan maintains that the two paradigms of ‘China threat’ and ‘China opportunity’ in Western discourse shape China’s reality for Western ‘China watchers’ (3). These discourses, Pan claims, are ‘ambivalent’ (65). He contends that this ‘bifocal representation of China, like Western discourses of China more generally, tell us a great deal about the west itself, its self -imagination, its torn, anxious, subjectivity, as well as its discursive effects of othering’ (65). This is a large claim.

Interestingly, Pan fails to note that after the Tiananmen incident in 1989, Chinese new left scholarship also embraced Said’s critique of Orientalism in order to reinforce both the party state and a burgeoning sense of Chinese nationalism. To counter Western liberal discourse, academics associated with the Central Party School promoted an ideology of Occidentalism to deflect domestic and international pressure to democratise China. In this, they drew not only upon Said, but also upon Foucault and the post-1968 school of French radical thought that, as Richard Wolin has demonstrated, was itself initiated in an appreciation of Mao’s cultural revolution. In other words, the critical and deconstructive methodologies that came to influence American and European social science from the 1980s had a Maoist inspiration (Wolin 2010: 12–18).

Subsequently, in the changed circumstances of the 1990s, as American sinologist Fewsmith has shown, young Chinese scholars ‘adopted a variety of postmodernist and critical methodologies’ (2008: 125). Paradoxically, these scholars, such as Wang Hui and Zhang Kuan (Wang 2011), had been educated in the USA and were familiar with fashionable academic criticism of a postmodern and deconstructionist hue that ‘demythified’ the West (Fewsmith 2008: 125–29). This approach,promulgated in the academic journal Dushu (Readings), deconstructed, via Said and Foucault, Western narratives about China. Zhang Kuan, in particular, rejected Enlightenment values and saw postmodern critical theory as a method to build up a national ‘discourse of resistance’ and counter Western demands regarding issues such as human rights and intellectual property. It is through its affinity with this self-strengthening, Occidentalist lens, that Pan’s critical study should perhaps be critically read. Simply put, Pan identifies a political economy of fear and desire that informs and complicates Western foreign policy and,

Pan asserts, tells us more about the West’s ‘self-imagination’ than it does about Chinese reality. Pan attempts to sustain this claim via an analysis, in Chapter 5, of the self-fulfilling prophecy of the China threat, followed, in Chapters 6 and 7, by exposure of the false promises and premises of the China ‘opportunity’. Pan certainly offers a provocative insight into Western attitudes to China and their impact on Chinese political thinking. In particular, he demonstrates that China’s foreign policy-makers react negatively to what they view as a hostile American strategy of containment (101). In this context, Pan contends, accurately, that Sino–US relations are mutually constitutive and the USA must take some responsibility for the rise of China threat (107). This latter point, however, is one that Australian realists like Owen Harries, whom Pan cites approvingly, have made consistently since the late 1990s. In other words, not all Western analysis uncritically endorses the view that China’s rise is threatening. Nor is all Western perception of this rise reducible to the threat scenario advanced by recent US administrations.

Pan’s subsequent argument that the China opportunity thesis leads to inevitable disappointment and subtly reinforces the China threat paradigm is, also, somewhat misleading. On the one hand, Pan notes that Western anticipation of ‘China’s transformation and democratization’ has ‘become a burgeoning cottage industry’ (111). Yet, on the other hand, Pan observes that Western commentators, such as Jacques, demonstrate a growing awareness that the democratisation thesis is a fantasy. That is, Pan, like Jacques, argues that China ‘will neither democratize nor collapse, but may instead remain politically authoritarian and economically stable at the same time’ (132). To merge, as Pan does, the democratisation thesis into its authoritarian antithesis in order to evoke ‘present Western disillusionment’ (132) with China is somewhat reductionist. Pan’s contention that we need a new paradigm shift ‘to free ourselves from the positivist aspiration to grand theory or transcendental scien- tific paradigm itself’ (157) might be admirable, but this will not be achieved by a con- structivism that would ultimately meet with the approval of what Brady terms China’s thought managers (Brady: 6).

The Pan K ignores reciprocal Chinese threat construction of the US. It should be rejected for its epistemic limitations. Callahan 05

(William, professor of international politics and China studies at the University of Manchester and codirector of the British Inter-university China Center, Review of International Studies (2005), 31, 701–714, doi:10.1017/S0260210505006716

Indeed, analysts increasingly criticise the political consequences of an Euro-American mode of representing China as a threat;10 since Chinese security discourse is rarely analysed it is now necessary to explore the political consequences of China’s modes of self-representation and how ‘China threat theory’ is produced in the PRC. Indeed, this example will add to the critical examination of two of the main research themes of security studies: strategic culture and threat perception. To put it another way, the emergence of China is not simply an issue of international diplomacy and national security. It has important intertextual overlaps with other discourses that frame questions about China and the world, such as the dynamic between domestic and international politics, economics and politics, dangers and opportunities – as they produce Western and Chinese identity. A recent article in the popular Chinese news magazine, Liaowang, explains how China’s ‘peaceful rise’ is intimately linked with ‘China threat’ in an overlap of domestic and international politics:11 The world knows about the achievements of China’s

reform and opening. But since the beginning of the 1990s, ‘China threat theory’ has been churned out from some corners of the world . . . to smear China’s image and to contain China’s rise. With the appearance of ‘peaceful rise theory’ international opinion suddenly realises the weaknesses of ‘China threat theory’. . . . Peaceful rise is the formula that sums up the essence of domestic policy and foreign relations in reform China. Indeed, the articles in this Forum likewise speak of dangers when they discuss China’s opportunities. This suggests that as in the popular Chinese phrase ‘weijicrisis’, danger (wei) and opportunity (ji) are not separate, but are intimately linked. To understand the opportunities of China, it is necessary to see how the mirror-image of peaceful rise – the China threat – shapes the image of rising China not just abroad, but within China itself. Many writers take the meaning of ‘China threat’ as self-evident, and then proceed to either agree or disagree with it. This introduction will examine the production of ‘China threat theory’ in order to provide a critical background for the discussion of China’s place in the world examined in the remaining articles. First, it will examine Western warnings of a China threat, and Chinese responses to them. Some commentators frame this as a geopolitical debate in Sino-US public diplomacy, and warn that it risks spinning out of control in a security dilemma. While I do not disagree with this concern, the essay will show that because the Chinese reaction is much stronger than the American action, something else is going on. The main purpose for these Chinese language texts is not to correct foreign misunderstandings; the key audience for ‘China threat theory’ is domestic, for identity construction in the PRC. I will argue that Chinese texts gather together a diverse and contradictory set of criticisms of the PRC and use ‘China threat theory’ discourse to collectively label them as foreign. By then refuting the ‘China threat theory’ criticisms as fallacies spread by ill-intentioned foreigners, the texts assert ‘peaceful rise’ as the proper way to understand China’s emergence on the world stage. Thus in a curious way, the negative images of the PRC that are continually circulated in Chinese texts serve to construct Chinese identity through a logic of estrangement that separates the domestic self from the foreign other. Although Chinese discussions of ‘China threat theory’ are successful in generating national feeling within China, the discourse actually tends to reproduce China as a threatening power abroad because refutations of ‘China threat theory’ end up generating a new set of foreign threats. Hence rather than engaging in critical security studies to question the international order, these refutations of ‘China threat theory’ actually buttress the existing geopolitical framework of international relations. In the conclusion, I argue that we need to question how Realism has colonised the ‘rise of China’ debate by deliberately using theory to open up critical space for the issues discussed in this Forum’s consideration of China’s rise.

8 Johnston, ‘Is China a Status Quo Power?’, p. 6.

9 David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, revised edition. (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), p. 5.

10 See Johnston, ‘Is China a Status Quo Power?’; Emma Broomfield, ‘Perceptions of Danger: The

China Threat Theory’, Journal of Contemporary China, 12:35 (2003), pp. 265–84; Chengxin Pan,

‘The ‘‘China Threat’’ in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics’, Alternatives, 29:3 (2004), pp. 305–31.

11 Ling Dequan, ‘‘‘Heping jueqi’’ gangju muzhang’ [Explaining ‘Peaceful rise’], Liaowang,

5 (2 February 2004), p. 6.

The Pan K reinscribes threat construction by imagining China as victimCallahan 05

(William, professor of international politics and China studies at the University of Manchester and codirector of the British Inter-university China Center, Review of International Studies (2005), 31, 701–714, doi:10.1017/S0260210505006716

Hence by turning China threat into a theory, the discourse moves from merely responding to criticism in a negative way, actively

producing positive meaning. Rather than simply ‘putting an end to ‘‘China threat theory’’ ’ as the first article

on the topic advised in 1992,37 the discourse continually reproduces and circulates this set of images of a peacefully rising China that is the victim of criticism that only comes from abroad. Although Taiwan is a site of much discussion of a ‘China threat’, Taiwanese people are rarely criticised in the mainland’s ‘China threat theory’ texts. This underlines how the category ‘China threat theory’ is used to sort out the domestic from the foreign: Taiwanese are seen by Beijing as Chinese compatriots. Because Beijing frames ‘China threat theory’ as a ‘foreign fallacy’ and Cross-Straits relations as an issue of domestic politics, the large and vociferous cache of ‘China threat’ texts from Taiwan are erased by ‘China threat theory’ discourse. Although Chinese premier Zhu Rongji sought to change the subject from China threat to China opportunity, many ‘China threat theory’ articles engage in a proliferation of foreign threats. As a former Deputy Chief of Staff of the PLA reasons: ‘If we follow the logic of ‘‘China threat theory’’, who benefits from it, and who thus can be a threat to other countries’ security?’38 The common response to China threat theory thus is that America is the real threat.39 Yet it is not just the sole superpower that is seen as a threat. ‘China threat theory’ articles also generate a ‘Japan threat theory’ and an ‘India threat theory’. Many articles tell us that real reason for Japanese scholars, politicians and officials warning of a potential China threat is to justify rearming Japan and reviving the imperial Japanese militarism of the early 20th century.40 This concern provided the back-story that motivated the mass anti-Japanese demonstrations that rocked China in April 2005. As Shih concludes about Sino-Japanese diplomacy more generally, ‘the perception of a threatening Japan serves to differentiate China from Japan and consolidate an otherwise shaky national identity in China’.41 Likewise, when India’s leaders stated that their reason for becoming a nuclear power in 1998 was not the threat from Pakistan so much as the threat from China, a Chinese response was to create an ‘India threat theory’. An anonymous author concludes that if India continues to be unfriendly, the PRC will have to contain India. This policy would encircle India with a network of hostile alliances and foment Islamic fundamentalism in Kashmir and beyond.42 The message is clear; if a country rejects China’s ‘peaceful overtures’, then China will fight diplomatically, militarily, and rhetorically, including spreading an ‘India threat theory’ in South Asia and beyond. Although ‘China threat theory’ is ascribed to the Cold War thinking of foreigners who suffer from an enemy deprivation syndrome, the use of containment as a response to threats in Chinese texts suggests that Chinese strategists are also seeking to fill the symbolic gap left by the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was the key threat to the PRC after 1960.

Refutations of ‘China threat theory’ do not seek to deconstruct the discourse of ‘threat’ as part of critical security studies. Rather they are expressions of a geopolitical identity politics because they refute ‘Chinese’ threats as a way of facilitating the production of an America threat , a Japan threat, an India threat, and so on. Uniting to fight these foreign threats affirms China’s national identity.

Unfortunately, by refuting China threat in this bellicose way – that is by generating a new series of threats – the China threat theory texts end up confirming the threat that they seek to deny: Japan, India and Southeast Asia are increasingly threatened by China’s protests of peace.43

No link. Our scenario constructs China as reactive and opportunistic, not as a threatCallahan 05

(William, professor of international politics and China studies at the University of Manchester and codirector of the British Inter-university China Center, Review of International Studies (2005), 31, 701–714, doi:10.1017/S0260210505006716

The argument of this essay is not that China is a threat. Rather, it has examined the productive linkages that knit together the image of China as a peacefully rising power and the discourse of China as a threat to the economic and military stability

of East Asia. It would be easy to join the chorus of those who denounce ‘China threat theory’ as the

misguided product of the Blue Team, as do many in China and the West. But that would be a mistake,

because depending on circumstances anything – from rising powers to civilian aircraft – can be interpreted as a threat. The purpose is not to argue that interpretations are false in relation to some reality (such as that China is fundamentally peaceful rather than war-like), but that it is necessary to unpack the political and historical context of each perception of threat. Indeed, ‘China threat’ has never described a unified American understanding of the PRC: it has always been one position among many in debates among academics, public

intellectuals and policymakers. Rather than inflate extremist positions (in both the West and China) into irrefutable truth, it is more interesting to examine the debates that produced the threat/opportunity dynamic. This essay has examined how ‘China threat theory’ is enthusiastically reproduced and circulated beyond the Beltway in Chinese texts to show how Chinese elites engage in their

own threat interpretations and national identity productions. Thus it underlines how ‘China threat’ and ‘China opportunity’ are not diametrically opposed as sites of total truth or falsity; threat and opportunity are intimately related as complementary opposites that entail each other.

Our epistemology is better. We question the automatic assumption that engagement with China is good.Menon 01

Rajon, scholar with the New America Foundation, Commentary, Vol. 111, No. 2, February 2001, p.

https://lists.lsit.ucsb.edu/archives/gordon-newspost/2001-May/001274.html

With few exceptions, American Sinologists are proponents of engagement. Draw China into a web of political and economic transactions, they argue, and with time Beijing will acquire a stake in managing, rather than challenging, the

prevailing order in Asia and elsewhere. Indeed, in a classic case of what the social psychologist Irving Janis termed “groupthink,” engagement has become the orthodoxy. The Chinese government, heir to

a long and rich tradition of courting “barbarians,” has, with great finesse and subtlety, encouraged the preaching of this gospel in the West—above all in the United States. Though our Sinologists will therefore not like what Aaron L. Friedberg has to say, his essay deserves to be read widely precisely because it is an act of heresy.

We turn back the discourse voting issue. Repression of predictive talk makes them more likely to happenMacy 1995

(Joanna, general systems scholar and deep ecologist, “Working Through Environmental Despair,” in Ecopsychology, http://www.rainforestinfo.org.au/deep-eco/macy.pdf

There is also the superstition that negative thoughts are self-fulfilling. This is of a piece with the notion,

popular in New Age circles, that we create our own reality I have had people tell me that “to speak of catastrophe will just make it more likely to happen.” Actually, the contrary is nearer to the truth. Psychoanalytic theory and personal experience show us that it is precisely what we repress that eludes our conscious control and tends to erupt into behavior. As Carl Jung observed, “When an inner situation is not made conscious, it happens outside as fate.” But ironically, in our current situation, the person who gives warning of a likely ecological holocaust is often made to feel guilty of contributing to that very fate.

Aff

Northeast Asia

Turn: US Presence is the cause of Chinese aggressionUS Presence causes hostility in South China Sea—aff solves by sending a signal of cooperation with ChinaHernández 7/30/15

(Javier, writer for The New York Times 7/30/15 “China Blames U.S. Military Actions for Tensions in the South China Sea” accessed 7/31/15

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/31/world/asia/china-blames-us-military-actions-for-tensions-in-the-south-china-sea.html LC)

HONG KONG — A top Chinese official said Thursday that American military drills and surveillance flights in the South China Sea were threatening regional stability, a harsh assessment that seemed likely to heighten tensions between the two countries before several crucial meetings.¶ The official, Col. Yang Yujun, a spokesman for the Ministry of National Defense, said it was the U nited S tates, not China, that was to blame for rising tensions in the resource-rich South China Sea, where China and several other countries are engaged in territorial disputes.¶ “The Chinese side expresses its deep concern about the U nited S tates pushing the militarization,” Colonel Yang said at a

news conference in Beijing. “The behavior by the U nited S tates can only lead one to suspect whether the American side is driven by a desire to see the world in turmoil.”¶ The dispute over the South China Sea, one of the world’s busiest trade routes, has emerged as a serious point of contention between China and the United States.¶ It is likely to be high on the agenda when President Xi Jinping visits the United States to meet with President Obama in September, and when Secretary of State John Kerry goes to Malaysia next week for a meeting of Asian nations.¶ China has argued that it is entitled to 90 percent of the sea, putting it at odds with several nearby countries, including the Philippines and Vietnam. In recent months, it has accelerated its efforts to build artificial islands hundreds of miles off its shore, capable of holding runways, radar and missile systems. China maintains that the islands will primarily be used for rescue operations and scientific research.¶ While the United States has not taken a formal position on the territorial disputes, it has called on China to resolve the disagreements in international courts, an idea that Beijing has resisted. American officials have also worked to deepen military ties in the region, for example, by participating in joint military exercises with the Philippines, as well as air and sea surveillance operations.¶ In his remarks on Thursday, Colonel Yang took aim at those efforts, pointing to a recent seven-hour surveillance flight over the South China Sea by the

commander of the United States Pacific Fleet, Adm. Scott H. Swift. Colonel Yang warned that the United States should maintain a “safe distance to avoid unexpected incidents.”

Sino-US war only likely if US maintains presence—China blames US for rising tensionsReuters 7/30/15

(No Author 7/30/15 “China Slams U.S. for ‘militarizing’ South China Sea” accessed 7/31/15 from

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/07/31/asia-pacific/china-slams-u-s-militarizing-south-china-sea/#.VbxX1xNViko LC)

China’s Ministry of National Defense on Thursday accused the U.S. of militarizing the South China Sea as Beijing makes increasingly bold moves to assert its claim to virtually all of the sea’s waters, islands and reefs.¶ Spokesman Yang Yujun’s remarks were prompted by comments last week from the head of the U.S. Pacific Command, Adm. Harry Harris, criticizing Chinese projects to build up islands in disputed waters.¶ Harris warned such work could undermine international norms that have long supported the global economy and political order.¶ Speaking at a monthly news conference, Yang said China rejected

such claims totally and accused the U.S. of ulterior motives.¶ “The U.S. side disregards and distorts the facts and plays up China’s military threat to sow discord between China and the littoral states in the

South China Sea. We firmly oppose such actions,” Yang said.¶ U.S. close-in reconnaissance of the Chinese armed forces, strengthened military alliances with the Philippines and others, and frequent military exercises are raising tensions and creating risks of incidents in the air and at sea, Yang said.¶ “The Chinese side expresses its serious concern over U.S. activities to militarize the South China Sea region,” he

said. “Such actions taken by the U.S. side would inevitably arouse suspicion from others that, does the U.S. want nothing better than chaos in the region?”

US Not NecessaryJapan can successfully counter Chinese aggressionReuters 7/16/15

(No Author Reuters 7/16/15 “Japan may conduct South China Sea patrols says military chief” accessed

7/31/15 from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/17/japan-may-conduct-south-china-sea-patrols-says-military-chief LC)

Japan’s top military commander, Admiral Katsutoshi Kawano, said on Thursday he expected China to become increasingly assertive in the South China Sea and it was possible Japan would conduct patrols and surveillance activities there in the future.¶

Arab Gulf

Non-uniqueNuclear deal makes China-Iran strategic cooperation inevitable – triggers the impactRosenberg and Sullivan 15 [Elizabeth Rosenberg is director of the Energy, Economics and Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, and Alexander Sullivan is an associate fellow in the center's Asia-Pacific Security Program, Why China likes the Iran deal, CNN.com, http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/31/opinions/rosenberg-sullivan-china-iran-deal/]

(CNN)As members of Congress debate whether to back the deal over Iran's nuclear program, one source of support seems guaranteed -- China. It's one of the biggest winners in the agreement, with the lifting of sanctions as Iran pulls back key elements of its enrichment program set to allow Beijing to deepen its historic partnership with Tehran. While China is undoubtedly eyeing the potential

economic benefits, Beijing also likely sees an opportunity to challenge U.S. influence in the Middle East. China has been an important critic of Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions and a supporter of nuclear diplomacy. It is therefore likely to hold ranks with the United States and other international partners during the hard work and political turbulence involved in implementing the accord. And if Iran cheats, Beijing can be relied upon to at least join in a strong statement of condemnation -- and may go along with the reimposition of sanctions on Iran.

But China also sees an important strategic opportunity in a renewed relationship with Iran, and can be expected to expand its traditional friendship in four key areas: infrastructure development, energy, limited regional security cooperation and political cooperation to dilute U.S. influence in the region. First, through its "One Belt, One Road" initiative, China aims to link itself with Eurasia and the Middle East through trillions of dollars in infrastructure investment. Sanctions-scarred Iran is in desperate need of new infrastructure and is keen to expand the flow of people and commerce across its borders. Iran is an attractive target for such investment both economically and geopolitically, with its overland borders and proximity to key energy shipping routes. Such commerce will help China and Iran meet their reported target of $160 billion additional trade volume by 2024. Second, as some of the only foreign energy companies left in Iran under the stranglehold of sanctions, Chinese energy giants are well-placed to invest in Iranian oil and gas development in a post-sanctions environment. The bilateral energy relationship isn't without disagreements and pique, and China will see real competition in Iran with technically superior European companies. However, Iran and China both have a stake in bolstering their ties in the energy arena. Doing so will support the goals of both nations to diversify their energy partners, balance Saudi Arabia's oil market dominance and lock in strategic energy trade for the

future. Security cooperation between China and Iran will be a third important feature of their relationship in the post-sanctions era. Once-robust naval cooperation is showing signs of revival. On land, they will no doubt cooperate to try and stabilize

Afghanistan following the withdrawal of U.S. and other coalition forces at the end of 2016. Both nations are deeply invested in preventing ISIS from gaining a foothold in Afghanistan -- Iran will not tolerate insurgents on its eastern border, while China fears the spread of radicalism to its restive Uyghur population in neighboring Xinjiang province. Indeed, Chinese President Xi Jinping has already pledged unprecedented security assistance to Afghanistan, and China has reportedly brokered peace talks between the Afghan government and the

Taliban. Unfortunately, the fourth renewed area of Sino-Iranian cooperation may be the expression and amplification of anti-Western, and especially anti-U.S., sentiment. With the nuclear impediment removed, China and Iran are likely to join forces diplomatically in criticizing the United States for its enduring focus on human rights and its

international activism. Beijing may also seek to boost Iran's role in China-led multilateral institutions that do not include the United States, especially the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. True, some forms of China-Iran cooperation are positive for U.S. interests. For example, regional economic development, including in Iran, should be welcomed if it is done according to international best practices and lifts people out of poverty. Likewise, if China can, with Iran's help, contribute to

Afghanistan's stability, so much the better. Other forms of China-Iran cooperation, however, have the potential to do serious harm to U.S. policy in the Middle East and beyond. An Iran that is overly dependent on China will bolster Beijing's efforts to create alternative political forums that exclude Washington. Meanwhile, if the United States does not take a prominent role in Afghanistan's peaceful reconstruction and the development of Eurasia more broadly, it will cede influence in a pivotal region.

China and Iran are already strategic partners – nuclear deal provesKahn 15 [Tzvi, Senior Policy Analyst for the Foreign Policy Initiative. He previously served as Assistant Director for Policy and Government Affairs at the American Israel Public Affairs

Committee (AIPAC), FPI Bulletin: China-Iran Strategic Partnership Undermines Nuclear Talks, The Foreign Policy Initiative, http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/fpi-bulletin-china-iran-strategic-partnership-undermines-nuclear-talks#sthash.J8CZT6fh.dpuf]

Indeed, Beijing opposes the imposition of automatically reversible sanctions on Iran, also known as “snapbacks,” to ensure compliance with a final deal. While analysts have questioned the practical feasibility of such sanctions in any event,

China’s stated position suggests that its economic ties with Iran take precedence over securing Tehran’s compliance. As such, any sanctions relief Beijing grants as part of a final agreement is likely to remain permanent even if Iran violates it.

Put differently, the Iran-China partnership helps bolster Tehran’s intransigence at the negotiating table and

gives the Islamist regime little incentive to compromise. It effectively offsets the international isolation Iran has experienced due to Western sanctions, supplying Tehran with a powerful patron that shares its foremost adversary.

Conclusion

The United States must first demonstrate it understands that Tehran and Beijing are working together to undermine American leadership in the Middle East. Then it must act to prevent them from doing so.

Unfortunately, by failing to combat Iranian regional aggression and seeking a deal that would allow the regime to become a threshold nuclear state, the Obama administration conveys the message that Beijing and Tehran’s efforts are succeeding.

Link TurnNo Chinese-Iran partnership—China sees Iran as a competitor not an allyShabaneh 6/15/15

(Dr. Ghassan, associate professor of international studies at Marymount Manhattan College in New York City, 6/15/15 “The Implications of a Nuclear Deal with Iran on the GCC, China, and Russia” Al Jazeera Centre for Studies accessed 7/29/15 from

http://studies.aljazeera.net/ResourceGallery/media/ Documents/2015/6/14/20156148505316734Iran.pdf LC)

¶ Geopolitics, energy, and China’s desire for hegemony in Asia and beyond complicate the¶

Sino-Iranian relations and overshadow any possible peaceful resolution to Iran’s¶

disagreements with the West . Publically China states its desire for a peaceful resolution¶ between Iran and the West over the nuclear issue, but China has much to worry

about if¶ Iran is to conclude such an agreement anytime soon. China has built a complex network of relations with many Arab, Islamic, Western, and Latin American countries in the last¶ three decades, and many of these relations clash with Iranian interests in the short and¶ long runs. Both countries have hegemonic economic and military agendas in Asia and¶ aspire to expand their maritime influence and establish themselves as substantial naval¶ powers. Therefore, China sees Iran as a potential competitor rather than a close ally.

Iran DealUS-China have shared goals in GCC—cooperation on Iran deal provesReuters 4/3/15

(No Author, 4/3/15 “China: Iran deal good for Sino-U.S. relations” accessed 7/31/15 from

http://www.cnbc.com/2015/04/03/china-iran-deal-good-for-sino-us-relations.html LC)

This week's framework nuclear deal with Iran was also good for boosting relations between China and the United States, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said in a call with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry.¶ The agreement can be attributed to all sides seizing a historic opportunity through concerted efforts, Wang told Kerry, China's foreign ministry said in a statement released late on Friday.¶ "China and the United States, both taking on major responsibilities in safeguarding the international nuclear non-proliferation system, maintained good contact with each other during the negotiations, while instilling positive energy into bilateral relations," the statement cited Wang as saying.¶ "In a bid to finalize a

comprehensive deal as scheduled, China will maintain close coordination with all parties concerned, including the United States, and continue to play a constructive role during the process," Wang added.

Nuclear deal already solidified Sino-Iranian relationsRosenberg and Sullivan 7/31/15

(Elizabeth, a Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy, Economics and Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, and Alexander, associate fellow in the Asia-Pacific Security Program, 7/31/15 “Why China likes the Iran deal” CNN accessed 7/31/15 from

http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/31/ opinions/rosenberg-sullivan-china-iran-deal/ LC)

As members of Congress debate whether to back the deal over Iran's nuclear program, one source of support seems guaranteed --

China. It's one of the biggest winners in the agreement, with the lifting of sanctions as Iran pulls back key elements of its enrichment program set to allow Beijing to deepen its historic partnership with Tehran. While China is undoubtedly

eyeing the potential economic benefits, Beijing also likely sees an opportunity to challenge U.S. influence in the Middle East.¶ China has been an important critic of Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions and a supporter of nuclear diplomacy. It is therefore likely to hold ranks with the United States and other international partners during the hard work and political turbulence involved in implementing the accord. And if Iran cheats, Beijing can be relied upon to at least join in a strong

statement of condemnation -- and may go along with the reimposition of sanctions on Iran.¶ But China also sees an important strategic opportunity in a renewed relationship with Iran, and can be expected to expand its traditional friendship in four key areas: infrastructure development, energy, limited regional security cooperation and political cooperation to dilute U.S. influence in the region.¶ First, through its "One Belt, One Road" initiative, China aims to link itself with Eurasia and the Middle East through trillions of dollars in infrastructure investment. Sanctions-scarred Iran is in desperate need of new infrastructure and is keen to expand the flow of people and commerce across its borders.¶ Iran is an attractive target for such

investment both economically and geopolitically, with its overland borders and proximity to key energy shipping routes. Such

commerce will help China and Iran meet their reported target of $160 billion additional trade volume by 2024.¶ Second, as some of the only foreign energy companies left in Iran under the stranglehold of sanctions, Chinese energy giants are well-placed to invest in Iranian oil and gas development in a post-sanctions environment. The bilateral energy relationship isn't without disagreements and pique, and China will see real competition in Iran with technically superior

European companies. However, Iran and China both have a stake in bolstering their ties in the energy arena. Doing so will support the goals of both nations to diversify their energy partners, balance Saudi Arabia's oil market dominance and lock in strategic energy trade for the future.¶ Security cooperation between China and Iran will be a third important feature of their relationship in the post-sanctions era. Once-robust naval cooperation is showing signs of revival. On land, they will no doubt cooperate to try and stabilize Afghanistan following the withdrawal of U.S. and other coalition forces at the end of 2016.¶ Both nations are deeply invested in preventing ISIS from gaining a foothold in Afghanistan -- Iran will not tolerate insurgents on its eastern border, while China fears the spread of radicalism to its restive Uyghur population in neighboring Xinjiang province. Indeed, Chinese President Xi Jinping has already pledged unprecedented security assistance to Afghanistan, and China has reportedly

brokered peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban.¶ Unfortunately, the fourth renewed area of Sino-Iranian cooperation may be the expression and amplification of anti-Western, and especially anti-U.S., sentiment. With the nuclear impediment removed, China and Iran are likely to join forces diplomatically in criticizing the United States for its enduring focus on human rights and its international activism. Beijing may also seek to boost Iran's role in China-led multilateral institutions that do not include the United States, especially the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.¶

A2: Iranian HegemonyNo Iranian heg – economy is weak and proxies are too unstableZapfe 3/30/15 [Martin, Center for Security Studies, “The Middle East’s Thirty Years’ War?,” The International Relations and Security Network, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=189508]

Fragile Iranian hegemony

Iran has, so far, been the great winner in the turmoil that has beset the region since 2003, as the last years have seen the advance of Iranian proxies throughout the Middle East. In Lebanon, no political issue can be decided against objections of Hizbollah; in Iraq, Tehran has secured a government dominated by Shi’ites, and it has the last word on most matters of importance; and in Yemen, Shi’ite rebels allegedly supported by Tehran appear to have the upper hand in a violent struggle for power in Sana’a. However, as

impressive as Iran’s influence in the region is at the beginning in 2015, it stands on shaky ground, and it is not at all clear that this influence can be transformed into the regional hegem ony that Tehran aspires to. Two

factors are reason enough for skepticism. First, in economic terms, Iran is rela tively weak, suffering from years of in creasingly effective international sanc tions and, lately, the punishing effects of the drop in world oil prices. Iran is estimated by the IMF to need an oil price of USD 131 to finance a balanced budget; at the

time of writing, the price hovered around USD 50. As Anthony Cordesman has noted pointedly in a study for the Geneva Center for Security Policy (GCSP), Iran’s economic performance is al ready dwarfed just by the combined GCC states – not taking into account the other Sunni Arab states not at all friendly with Iran.

Second, and more important, in a region made up of overwhelmingly Sunni Arab states and people, Shi’ite Iran is an outlier. It cannot hope to dominate the region against a united front of Arab states; therefore, its only hope lies in dominating the states individually through Shi’ite prox ies , either in the form of regimes or through de-facto independent forces like Hizbollah. This proxy-based he - gemony is inherently unstable, fuels a violent sectarianism, and would in no way resemble the long-term struc tural hegemony that many observers fear . It is here that the IS constitutes a paradoxical threat to Iran: The in stability caused by the war benefits Iranian involvement through proxies; however, a collapse of the state-based order would be detrimental to Irani an interests, as it needs those states to dominate the system.

Iran can’t dominate the Middle East – stopped by Saudi Arabia and TurkeyNader 15

[Alireza, senior international policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, “Relax, Iran Is Not Taking Over the Middle East,” the National Interest, February 11, http://nationalinterest.org/feature /relax-iran-not-taking-over-the-middle-east-12222]

The nuclear program, which has cost Iran tens of billions of dollars through sanctions, has hardly been a boon to Iranian power.

Rather, the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the Arab uprisings, and the collapse of weaker regional states have allowed Iran to fill the regional vacuum. But Iran is not alone in this. Tehran faces competing powers such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, both of which are also expanding their influence, and not always in line with U.S. interests. The corrosion of state authority in the region is hardly just due to Iran’s “malign” influence. Nevertheless, Iran does pose certain challenges to the United States, and devising the right approach to dealing with them should remain a key focus. This effort must begin by first identifying key American interests.

Africa

Non UQNon-unique—China is already China’s largest trading partnerShinn 7/9/15

(David, former U.S. ambassador to Burkina Faso and Ethiopia. 7/9/15 “China, Africa and Food Security” in International Policy Digest, accessed 7/31/15 from

http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/ 2015/07/09/china-africa-and-food-security/ LC)

China and Africa together constitute more than a third of the world’s population. China is Africa’s largest trading partner and an important source of investment and aid. As a result, the China-Africa relationship has significant implications for global food security. Neither China, with 1.4 billion people, nor the 54 countries of Africa collectively, with 1.1 billion people, are food self-sufficient. Although they both export food, they have become net food importers.

A2: China Econ DominanceChina can’t be a global economic leader—stock market crash provesAvni 7/30/15

(Benny Avni, UN-based journalist and writer for New York Post, 7/30/15 “China’s crisis means opportunity as well as risk for America” New York Post accessed 7/31/15 from

http://nypost.com/2015/07/30/chinas-crisis-means-opportunity-as-well-as-risk-for-america/ LC)

This week’s spectacular crash of the Shanghai stock market tells us two things about China’s recent economic troubles: It’s less predictable, and less easily influenced by state intervention, than previously thought.¶ China’s most important stock index lost 8.5 percent Monday, the largest drop in the Shanghai exchange since 2007. Ouch. Worse: The selloff defied the government’s desperate

attempt to prop up stocks and end days of market free-fall.¶ That’s because Beijing still hasn’t figured out what role it should play in its insanely volatile markets.¶ More broadly, Communist Party bigwigs struggle to square a circle:

China has a top-down political system, but the secret to its fast-growing economy is its exposure to

some measure of market freedom. [We do not endorse the Ableist rhetoric in this card.]

China can’t maintain African economic dominance Sun and Olin-Ammentorp 14

(Yun Sun, senior associate with the East Asia Program at the Stimson Center and Jane Olin-Ammentorp, Research Contractor of Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. 4/28/14 “The US and China in Africa: Competition or Cooperation?” Accessed 7/31/15 from

http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2014/04/28-us-china-africa-policy-sun LC)

Due to weak consular protection and constrained military deployment overseas, Beijing largely lacks the capacity to provide physical protection to its nationals and interests in Africa. Although Chinese investments have contributed revenue and infrastructure to African countries, the transactional and mercantilist nature of some Chinese investments has also damaged China’s international prestige and undermined project successes on the ground. Many experts maintain that the isolating effect of some of China’s practices will work to its disadvantage over time. Indeed, with cumulative investments of around $22 billion (though the actual amount of FDI is debated and perhaps even two or three times this figure) and over 1 million Chinese nationals living in Africa, China is facing pretty large obstacles in addressing rising and now more pressing security risks threatening the physical safety of Chinese projects and people. In response, China has started to increase its fight against piracy and

provide more support to United Nations missions in Africa.¶ Similarly, China is facing an ongoing reputational risk by continuing to make investments that, at times, can undermine the strengthening of democratic institutions and governance in Africa. It continues to invest in countries with governance challenges (which Western governments generally avoid), such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This tendency could be due to a different assessment of risks or comparative advantage, but experts predict that investment in these areas is generally not producing expected returns. Thus, many argue that Chinese investment will continue to evolve and likely result in a model similar to Western foreign investment.

Military Presence Doesn’t Help EconLarge military presence doesn’t harms economic ties between Africa and the USAgence France Presse 7/22/15

(No author, 7/22/15 “America in Africa: Military footprint growing but its trade lags behind China and

Europe” access 7/31/15 from http://mgafrica.com/article/2015-07-22-america-in-africa-military-footprint-growing-but-its-trade-lags-behind-china-and-europe LC)

Washington (AFP) - President Barack Obama's keenly-awaited trip to Africa this week comes as the US superpower's military

footprint on the continent is growing.¶ But US diplomatic and trade ties in Africa have not kept pace with defense cooperation, and lag far behind those of Europe and China.¶ - Targeted military presence -¶ Compared to its large-scale bases in Europe and Korea, and ongoing operations in the Middle East and Afghanistan -- the US deployment in Africa is discreet.¶ Indeed, the US military's Africa Command is still based in Stuttgart, Germany, having failed to find a suitable host country on the continent itself.¶ The United States has also deployed a joint task force in the Horn of Africa that operates from a base in Djibouti and carries out missions in the broader region.¶ View galleryIn this image released by the US Department of Defense, …¶ In this image released by the US Department of Defense, US Marine Corps 1st Lt. Mark Robinson inspec …¶ In sub-Saharan Africa itself, the US military concentrates efforts on training and supporting local forces in the battle against extremist militant groups.¶ "Our efforts on the African continent are all about creative and innovative ways to have small –- very small elements to advise and assist and support the African nations -- doing that," AFRICOM commander General David Rodriguez said last year.¶ He acknowledged most African countries would not welcome a large US military presence on their soil, and said US forces would instead help build up local armies to face mutual enemies.¶ The exception to this rule is the Djibouti base, which houses 3,200 US personnel, including units able to launch drone strikes and commando raids against jihadist targets in Yemen and Somalia.¶ US non-profit group the Bureau of Investigative Journalism estimates that in the past four years US forces have conducted between 10 and 14 drone strikes in Somalia and conducted between eight and 11 secret missions.¶ View galleryA Harrier jet aircraft assigned to the 26th Marine …¶ A Harrier jet aircraft assigned to the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (26th MEU) returns on March 21 …¶ - Terrorism and Ebola -¶ Smaller counterterrorism missions and one limited humanitarian deployment have also brought American boots onto African ground in recent years.¶ In Niger, 200 US personnel have been assigned to assist the French forces of Operation Barkhane against the jihadist groups roaming the Sahel desert.¶ Up to 300 special forces and other US experts can be assigned at any one time to central Africa -- based largely out of Uganda -- to help track down Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army rebels.¶ Late last year, 2,800 personnel briefly deployed to West Africa to offer hands-off logistical support to the battle against the Ebola epidemic.¶ View galleryChadian army soldiers sit in a military vehicle in …¶ Chadian army soldiers sit in a military vehicle in Malam Fatori, northern Nigeria, on May 25, 2015 ( …¶ - China rising -¶ But while military action occasionally grabs the headlines, the inroads made by America's great power rival China go deeper -- as Beijing gathers African raw

materials and invests in industry and infrastructure.¶ Last month, Obama renewed AGOA -- the 15-year-old African

Growth and Opportunity Act -- which offers trade advantages to some African products seeking US markets.¶ Trade between the United States and Africa rose to $73 billion last year, roughly half each way, but with the United States enjoying a slight $3.5 billion surplus over its poorer partners.¶ And the African countries who benefit most from AGOA are not fledgling manufacturers or financial services hubs, but crude oil exporters like Angola and Nigeria.¶ Recent steep falls in the price of oil -- in part due to US success in developing its own shale oil -- helped force Africa's exports under AGOA down by 47 percent last

year.¶ Meanwhile, the broader engagement by resource-hungry China and Africa's former colonial powers

in the European Union saw their trade with Africa hit $200 billion and $140 billion respectively.

Plan avoids the impacts—Shifting away from strong military presence is best for African economic developmentNsia-Pepra 14

(Kofi, Associate Professor of Political Science (International Relations/Comparative Politics) at Ohio Northern University, January-February 2014 Military Review “Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy in Africa: Strategic Gain or Backlash?” LC)

Obviously, it would be naïve to ignore the rel-evance of military force in overseas contingency¶ operations, but U.S. failure to address the causes of growing insurgency in Africa is also a strategic miscalculation. Gates recommends bolstering the civilian efforts

that he considers vital to U.S. success overseas. According to Gates, “the most persistent and potentially

dangerous threats will come less from emerging ambitious states, than from failing¶ ones that cannot meet their basic needs much less the aspirations of their people.”53 The priority is

rather¶ to resolve the problems of poverty, promote good governance, help build weak state capacities, and promote responsible use of the country’s wealth to develop the human capacity of all the citizenry. Weak and failed states, due to their inherent weaknesses,¶ are safe havens for terrorism and international crimi-¶ nal activities such as drugs and money laundering, which finance terrorism. The U.S. must work with¶ African states to arrest the decline in state capacities.¶ The State Department and United States Agency for International Development’s unprecedented Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review to enhance civilian capabilities of U.S. statecraft are most welcomed. The review must design a clear vision that will help build stronger and more effective governance in weak states, reduce corruption, pro-¶ mote rule of law, stimulate economic development, reduce poverty, and promote long-term develop-ment.54 International coordination and trust-building¶ are what makes America strong, and Judah Grunstein articulates this very well by stating :¶ Much of our national security strategy depends on securing the cooperation of other¶ nations, which will depend heavily on the extent to which our efforts abroad are viewed as legitimate by their publics. The solution is . . . the steady accumulation of actions and results that build trust and credibility over time.55 To enlist the cooperation of Africa in achieving its¶ interests, the U.S. should formalize good relations with all African states and design a framework that harmonizes their security interests, which

includes Africa’s human-security needs. This requires an¶ operational paradigm shift from primarily selec-¶ tive bilateral military policy to one that prioritizes collaborative and multilateral actions with both Africa and global partners. All African states’ issues demand equal attention if the United States¶ is to obviate the imminent threats to its interests in¶ Africa. The challenges we face today are complex¶ and demand collective efforts and use of both hard¶ and soft powers. Selectivity and militarization alone would fail to overcome these challenges. It is prudent the United States debunks its neoreal-¶ ist “hard power” policy and adopts liberal “soft power” policies in line with its idealist values and ends to capture Africa’s support in fulfilling its stra-tegic aspirations on the continent. President Bush¶ acknowledged the ineffectiveness of America’s over-reliance on force alone as a foreign policy, stating that the promotion of freedom was “not primarily the task of arms,” and the United States would not impose its own style of government upon the world. “Our goal instead is to help others find their own voice, attain their own freedom, and make their own way.”56 To demonstrate real com-¶ mitment to develop a new

partnership with Africa, the United States needs to redirect the focus away from strengthening military capacity and toward¶ promoting human development in Africa. The¶ United States, as the only super power in a unipolar world, stands to benefit from a stable, developed, and peaceful Africa. The United States could help¶ create the conditions needed for peace and stabil-¶ ity by restricting the flow of military weapons and¶ training and increasing support for sustainable¶ development policies. The United States can also¶ champion a cause of international arms sales code¶ of

conduct based on human rights, nonaggression, and democracy. The United States should provide¶ increased development assistance to Africa and encourage civil-society building.

A2 Chinese Economic DominanceChina’s economic dominance doesn’t pose a threat—focus on domestic needs and trading arrangements shield Subramanian 11

(Arvind, an Indian economist and the current Chief Economic Adviser to the Government of India, 2011 “Eclipse: Living in the Shadow of China’s Economic Dominance” pp. 171 accessed 7/31/15 from

http://www.piie.com/publications/chapters_preview/6062/09iie6062.pdf LC)

China’s economic dominance going forward is more likely to manifest itself in its own protectionism more than via monopolizing access to resources or by entering into discriminatory arrangements. As Aaditya Mattoo and I (forthcoming) argue, energy is becoming more diversified in terms of type and geographic location; and barriers in other countries have come down in a way that makes discriminatory trading arrangements by China less of a threat. So, it is preventing a reversal of liberalization of the Chinese market and facilitating its further opening that will be of main concern to outsiders. But can these be achieved though international cooperation?

Reducing Military Presence GoodPlan avoids the impacts—Shifting away from strong military presence is best for African economic developmentNsia-Pepra 14

(Kofi, Associate Professor of Political Science (International Relations/Comparative Politics) at Ohio Northern University, January-February 2014 Military Review “Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy in Africa: Strategic Gain or Backlash?” LC)

Obviously, it would be naïve to ignore the rel-evance of military force in overseas contingency¶ operations, but U.S. failure to address the causes of growing insurgency in Africa is also a strategic miscalculation. Gates recommends bolstering the civilian efforts

that he considers vital to U.S. success overseas. According to Gates, “the most persistent and potentially dangerous threats will come less from emerging ambitious states, than from failing¶ ones that cannot meet their basic needs much less the aspirations of their people.”53 The priority is

rather¶ to resolve the problems of poverty, promote good governance, help build weak state capacities, and promote responsible use of the country’s wealth to develop the human capacity of all the citizenry. Weak and failed states, due to their inherent weaknesses,¶ are safe havens for terrorism and international crimi-¶ nal activities such as drugs and money laundering, which finance terrorism. The U.S. must work with¶ African states to arrest the decline in state capacities.¶ The State Department and United States Agency for International Development’s unprecedented Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review to enhance civilian capabilities of U.S. statecraft are most welcomed. The review must design a clear vision that will help build stronger and more effective governance in weak states, reduce corruption, pro-¶ mote rule of law, stimulate economic development, reduce poverty, and promote long-term develop-ment.54 International coordination and trust-building¶ are what makes America strong, and Judah Grunstein articulates this very well by stating :¶ Much of our national security strategy depends on securing the cooperation of other¶ nations, which will depend heavily on the extent to which our efforts abroad are viewed as legitimate by their publics. The solution is . . . the steady accumulation of actions and results that build trust and credibility over time.55 To enlist the cooperation of Africa in achieving its¶ interests, the U.S. should formalize good relations with all African states and design a framework that harmonizes their security interests, which

includes Africa’s human-security needs. This requires an¶ operational paradigm shift from primarily selec-¶ tive bilateral military policy to one that prioritizes collaborative and multilateral actions with both Africa and global partners. All African states’ issues demand equal attention if the United States¶ is to obviate the imminent threats to its interests in¶ Africa. The challenges we face today are complex¶ and demand collective efforts and use of both hard¶ and soft powers. Selectivity and militarization alone would fail to overcome these challenges. It is prudent the United States debunks its neoreal-¶ ist “hard power” policy and adopts liberal “soft power” policies in line with its idealist values and ends to capture Africa’s support in fulfilling its stra-tegic aspirations on the continent. President Bush¶ acknowledged the ineffectiveness of America’s over-reliance on force alone as a foreign policy, stating that the promotion of freedom was “not primarily the task of arms,” and the United States would not impose its own style of government upon the world. “Our goal instead is to help others find their own voice, attain their own freedom, and make their own way.”56 To demonstrate real com-¶ mitment to develop a new

partnership with Africa, the United States needs to redirect the focus away from strengthening military capacity and toward¶ promoting human development in Africa. The¶ United States, as the only super power in a unipolar world, stands to benefit from a stable, developed, and peaceful Africa. The United States could help¶ create the conditions needed for peace and stabil-¶ ity by restricting the flow of military weapons and¶ training and increasing support for sustainable¶ development policies. The United States can also¶ champion a cause of international arms sales code¶ of

conduct based on human rights, nonaggression, and democracy. The United States should provide¶ increased development assistance to Africa and encourage civil-society building.

China Does Africa BetterChinese aid to Africa is better—no conditions for loans, aims at independence, and best technological developmentWenping 07

(He, researcher for the Institute for West Asian and African Studies 6/7/7 “China’s loans to Africa won’t cause debt crisis” accessed 7/31/15 from

http://www.china.org.cn/english/international/213038.htm LC)

These principles clearly state that the Chinese government does not attach any conditions to its aid nor demand any privileges; that China provides aid to the recipients in the form of interest-free or low-interest loans and will reschedule repayment if necessary; that Chinese aid is aimed at helping the recipients embark on the road to economic independence and self-reliance rather than increasing their dependence on China; that China promises to help the recipient countries master the technology in its technical aid; that China will try to provide the best possible equipment and materials it makes and that Chinese experts sent to the recipient countries should be treated the same

as local experts, without special privileges.¶ Under these principles, China has provided African countries with a total of 44.4 billion yuan (US$5.55 billion) in aid as of May 2006. It has helped build textile mills, hydropower stations, sport venues, hospitals and schools, more than 800 projects in all.

Africans prefer Chinese aid to American aid—it’s not condescending Harman 07

(Danna, correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor 6/27/7 “China takes up civic work in Africa” in The Christian Science Monitor, accessed 7/31/15 from

http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0627/p01s05-woaf.html LC)

Whether or not this largess has ulterior economic and strategic motives behind it, or whether it is propelled by nothing more than a desire to boost China's international image, the bottom line is that it is welcome by many on the continent.¶ "The Chinese interest in Africa ... their coming

into our markets is the best thing that could have happened to us," says small-business contractor Amare Kifle, during a recent meeting with a Chinese investor in Ethiopia's capital, Addis Ababa. " We are tired

of the condescending American style . True, the American government and American companies have done and do a lot here, but I always feel like they think they are doing us a favor ... telling us how to do things and punishing us when we do it our own way.¶ "These Chinese are different," he says. "They are about the bottom line and allow us to sort out our side of the

business as we see fit. I want to have a business partner and do business. I don't want to have a philosophical debate about Africa's future."

China’s poverty reduction expertise makes them uniquely suited toward developing AfricaLu 07

(An Lu, policy analyst for China Daily 6/27/7 “China-Africa Development Fund Boosts Win-Win” accessed

7/31/15 from http://www.chinabidding.org/news/432472 LC)

While both China and many African countries recognize the mutual benefits of such a development fund, unfortunately, some quarters have criticized China for investing in the continent. ¶ Some development experts have attacked the practice of tying economic assistance to the purchase of goods and services from the donor country as wasteful and inefficient. That may be true for many aid projects

developed countries have launched in the past, but it does not necessarily apply to China's aid for and investment in Africa. ¶ As a developing country, China can share with African countries its own important, unique experience in reducing massive poverty. ¶ It was China's reform and opening-up that created the right policy condition for its economy to take off about three decades ago. However, the increasing availability of adequate infrastructure has also proved essential for economic development in China.

African businesspeople prefer the Chinese model over the US model Kempe 07

(Frederick, president of the Atlantic Council and a Columnist for Bloomberg 7/3/7 “China Challenges U.S., Europe in African Push: Frederick Kempe” accessed 7/31/15 from

http://www.bloomberg.com /apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=afTuHQTUr5HY LC)

Many in the West view the Chinese in Africa as a strategic threat, but African business leaders I met in South Africa and Nigeria last week see an historic opportunity without equal since the end of the Cold

War.¶ In contrast to the U.S. and Europe, the Chinese are determined investors, willing to take more risks, offer more subsidized loans, pose fewer human rights and democratization conditions, pay

more bribes and operate in more remote places. They are also willing to undercut local labor markets and

manufacturers by shipping in tens of thousands of their own workers and low-cost goods.¶ ``They are changing the African development model in ways the West has not yet grasped,'' says Greg Mills of South Africa's Brenthurst Foundation, who assembled the group at Tswalu with the Atlantic Council of the U.S.

China model Kempe 07

(Frederick, president of the Atlantic Council and a Columnist for Bloomberg 7/3/7 “China Challenges U.S., Europe in African Push: Frederick Kempe” accessed 7/31/15 from

http://www.bloomberg.com /apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=afTuHQTUr5HY

It's hard to fault Africans for embracing China after 50 years of development help from the West that has left them with just 2 percent of world trade, down from 7.5 percent in 1948. With

notable exceptions, Africa remains the captive of poor governance, corruption and fragile economies that fuel war, rebellion and poverty.¶ China is succeeding on the continent not because its model makes more sense to African business leaders, most of whom still prefer further

democratic evolution, but because it is focused and strategic, having defined Africa as a vital interest in a way the U.S. and Europe have not. President Hu Jintao has visited 17 Africa countries in the past 12 months, more than any head of state.

China has expertise and influence solvesLyman 05

(Princeton N., Director of Africa Policy Studies Council on Foreign Relations 7/21/5 “China’s Rising Role in

Africa” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed 7/31/15 from http://www.cfr.org/china/chinas-rising-role-africa/p8436 LC)

Chinese influence and involvement nevertheless waned in the 1980s as it was unable to compete with western aid programs and no longer was as fearful of Taiwan’s presence – though reducing recognition of Taiwan remained (and remains today) an important

Chinese objective. What has changed in recent years, however, is China’s emergence as a significant world player on the economic scene and its own need for oil and other natural resources. China returns to Africa in the 21st century with not only a need for economic resources but with the cash to play the game dramatically and competitively.¶ David Shinn will be illustrating China’s

involvement in east Africa and the Horn. Suffice to say here that China has become the principal investor in Sudan’s oil industry and related transport and infrastructure projects. China was able to do so because western companies, in particular American and Canadian firms, were pressured to withdraw because of Sudan’s civil war and charges of both persecution and use of slavery against the people of the south,

including in the region of oil production. Sudan represents the clearest example of how China comes to Africa with what one analyst has called the “complete package:” money, technical expertise, and the influence in such bodies as the UN Security Council to protect the host country from international sanctions. China, together with its partner Malaysia, replaced western companies and enabled Sudan to become a net exporter of crude. China has become its biggest customer. Meanwhile, China has successfully prevented the UN Security Council from serious sanctions or other preventive measures in face of the alleged genocide and crimes against humanity perpetrated in the Darfur region of that country.

Generic/All Regions

Withdrawal GoodUS presence in Asia causes China warChan 10 (John, staff writer for the World Socialist specializing in international affairs and East Asian political actions, 2/1/10 “US China tensions the result of rise of China’s power” accessed 7/31/15 from

https://mlyon01.wordpress.com/2010/02/01/us-china-tensions-the-result-of-rise-of-chinas-power/ LC)

The secretary of state emphasised that the “future of this region depends on America”. It was in the interests of Asian countries to have the US as “a dynamic economic partner and a stabilising military influence”. She highlighted Washington’s formal defence treaties with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines as the

cornerstone of US policy in Asia.¶ These remarks sought to send a message that the US would not allow Beijing to use its economic power to exclude the US from the region, and would contain China militarily. Clinton was more explicit in comments to reporters on Monday, declaring: “Everyone’s aware that China is a rising power of the 21st century. But

people want to see the U nited S tates fully engaged in Asia, so that as China rises the United States is there as a

force of peace.”¶ Far from being a “force for peace,” the US military build-up raises the dangers of conflict between the two powers. As its economic power has waned, Washington has increasingly used its military might to further its interests. Its alliances in Asia form part of a longstanding US strategy of encircling China with allies, strategic partners and military bases. As planned in 2006, the US will deploy 6 of its 11 aircraft

carriers and 60 percent of its submarine fleet in the Pacific this year, shifting from its previous strategic focus on the Atlantic.¶ The Pentagon is acutely aware of China’s rising military strength. A recent assessment by the US Office of Naval Intelligence estimated that China’s naval expansion would be at its height in the next 10–15 years, with “one or more aircraft carriers” and 75 submarines operating beyond Taiwan and South China Sea to protect

China’s vital sea lanes, particularly to the Middle East and Africa.¶ The growing rivalry between the US and China is reverberating throughout the region. Every government has been compelled to try to balance economic relations with China against concerns to maintain relations with the US. Those issues would certainly have dominated Clinton’s discussions in Australia, which relies heavily on exports of minerals and other raw materials to China, but depends on its military alliance with the US, not least to back its interventions in neighbouring island states.¶

No China WarChina will not go to war—its foreign policy is deeply rooted in a culture that emphasizes long-term solutionsYongnian 12

(Zheng, PhD in political science from Princeton, Professor and Director of East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore 3/19/12 “Cultural Reasons China won’t go to war with US” in “The Straits Times”

pA20 accessed 7/13/15 from http://newshub.nus.edu.sg/news/1203/PDF/CULTURAL-st-19mar-pA20.pdf LC)

After the United States’ declaration of a “return” to Asia, Sino-American relations entered an unusually tense period. Many have asked if the two big powers will go into conflict, and even a war. If one looks at the essence of Chinese culture, the answer is no.¶ Culture matters in international affairs and influences foreign policy as a way of thinking. The mode of thinking is not a cause of conflicts, but the interactions between two different ways of thinking is likely to lead to conflict. Culture can also be mobilised and utilized to influence foreign policy. Once mobilised, the impact of culture is infinite. ¶ So why is a war an impossibility between the two? One should distinguish between small-scale conflicts and major wars. All kinds of

conflicts such as trade disputes and ideology-oriented debates on human rights are inevitable and normal. But for the China-US conflict to result in a major war is unlikely.¶ Here is the cultural argument. A long undisputed history of several thousand years has bestowed China with a rare sense of “big history”. China perceives long-term issues with a long-term vision. China is slow in dealing with international issues, while the

Americans sometimes become impatient. China’s normal approach to problems is to find the best solutions before acting on them. China sees many problems as inherent in the process of development and believes solutions will eventually emerge with time. ¶ An analogy can be made here with Chinese medicine, which is slow in curing an illness but is considered better in completely curing one. The American way is similar to Western medicine’s delivering of quick fixes.¶ The differences between cultures are also demonstrated in the different understanding of strategy. The West views China’s “Tao Guang Yang Hui” (translated literally as “hiding brightness and cherishing

obscurity”) strategy as something temporary and believes China is waiting for better opportunities to emerge. This strategy is apparent in China’s reactive and defensive foreign policy of the last few centuries. Its defensive foreign policy is best reflected in China’s Great Wall, which was built for defending aggressive invasions. Although such defensive strategies are not very successful in Chinese history, they are deeply rooted in Chinese

culture.¶ This defensive culture also prevails in China’s military development. The military philosophy of “zhi ge wei wu” simply means that the purpose of developing weapons is to use them to stop their usage. For the West, it is deterrence while for the Chinese it is defense. China develops a certain kind of weapon

or military plan only to counteract weapons and military plans directed at it. China is rarely pre-emptive like the US. China has repeatedly stressed its nuclear policy of maintaining a minimum deterrence with a no-first-use pledge. Chinese defense policy is very different from the ones adopted by the Soviet Union, Germany and Japan before World War II, which all had a state will and plan to achieve hegemony.¶ The reactive elements is also in the daily practices of China’s foreign policy, which runs on a reactive mode like firefighters. This scant regard for foreign policy can be seen in China’s chess game, “weiqi” (Japanese go). In Dr Henry Kissinger’s new book, On China, he uses an analogy of weiqi to depict the difference between Western and Chinese strategic culture. Western strategic culture is like a game of chess which tends to be a zero-sum game, while

the Chinese weiqi is a non-zero-sum game where relative gains are possible. ¶ In the West, be it the presidential system or the Cabinet system, the minister of foreign affairs is a prominent and influential position. By comparison, the weiqi philosophy emphasises relative gains. Chinese-style foreign policy could

be likened to doing business: you may make more profits today, but I may make more tomorrow. With such a mentality, foreign policy is never an urgent matter. Unlike his counterpart in the West, the Chinese minister of foreign policy occupies an extremely low position in the administrative hierarchy and has limited influence.¶ Chinese culture is also unique because of its secular

nature. It does not have a mission to change others. In international affairs, it is reflected in the Chinese understanding of sovereignty. Sovereignty in the West means homogeneity and convergence, while Chinese sovereignty emphasizes

“harmony in diversity”. Western countries have the tendency to change the polities of other countries to conform to their own, whereas China is strongly against such practices and values coexistence of different countries.

2AC Pan K of the China Reaction DAChina is painted as a threat not because we have an objective understanding but because it fits within our definition of ourselves and justify US power politics. These constant predictions of war leave no choice but to prepare for war—turning the disad. Vote affirmative to reject these representations—allowing for a more effective foreign policy. Pan 04

(Chengxin, Professor of Political Science, Australian National University, “The ‘China Threat’ in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics”, Alternatives, June-July)

I have argued above that the "China threat" argument in mainstream U.S. IR literature is derived, primarily, from a discursive construction of otherness. This construction is predicated on a particular narcissistic understanding of the U.S. self and on a positivist-based realism, concerned with absolute certainty and security, a concern central to the dominant U.S. self-imaginary. Within these frameworks, it seems imperative that China be treated as a threatening, absolute other since it is unable to fit neatly into the U.S.-led evolutionary scheme or guarantee absolute security for the United States, so that U.S. power preponderance in the post-Cold War world can still be legitimated. Not only does this reductionist representation come at the expense of understanding China as a dynamic, multifaceted country but it leads inevitably to a policy of containment that, in turn, tends to enhance the influence of realpolitik thinking, nationalist extremism, and hard-line stance in today's China. Even a small dose of the containment strategy is likely to have a highly dramatic impact on U.S.-China relations, as the 1995-1996 missile crisis and the 2001 spy-plane incident have vividly attested. In this respect, Chalmers Johnson is right when he suggests that "a policy of containment toward China implies the possibility of war, just as it did during the Cold War vis-a-vis the former Soviet Union. The balance of terror prevented war between the United States and the Soviet Union, but this may not work in the case of China."^^ For instance, as the United States presses ahead with a missile defence shield to "guarantee" its invulnerability from rather unlikely sources of missile attacks, it would be almost certain to intensify China's sense of vulnerability and compel it to expand its current small nuclear arsenal so as to maintain the efficiency of its limited deterrence. In consequence, it is not impossible that the two countries, and possibly the whole region, might be dragged into an escalating arms race that would eventually make

war more likely. Neither the United States nor China is likely to be keen on fighting the other. But as has been demonstrated, the "China threat" argument, for all its alleged desire for peace and security, tends to make war preparedness the most "realistic" option for both sides. At this juncture, worthy of note is an interesting comment made by Charlie Neuhauser, a leading CIA China specialist. on the Vietnam War, a war fought by the United States to contain the then-Communist "other." Neuhauser says, "Nobody wants it. We don't want it, Ho Chi Minh doesn't want it; it's simply a question of annoying the other side."94 And, as we know, in an unwanted war some fifty-eight thousand young people from the United States and an estimated two million Vietnamese men, women, and children lost their lives.

Therefore, to call for a halt to the vicious circle of theory as practice associated with the "China threat" literature, tinkering with the current positivist-dominated U.S. IR scholarship on China is no longer adequate. Rather, what is needed is to question this un-self-reflective scholarship itself, particularly its connections with the dominant way in which the United States and the West in general represent themselves and others via their positivist

epistemology, so that alternative, more nuanced, and less dangerous ways of interpreting and debating China might become possible.

The United States creates enemies to define ourselves as a great civilization—China fulfills this role when we treat them as a threat. Instead, we ought to question this vision of universal American hegemony. Voting aff against the disad serves this imperative.Pan 04

(Chengxin, Political Science, Australian National U, “The ‘China Threat’ in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics”, Alternatives, June-July)

What does this U.S. self-knowledge have to do with the way in which it comes to know others in general and China in particular? To

put it simply, this self-knowledge is always a powerful analytical framework within which other societies are to

be known. By envisioning a linear process of historical development with itself at its apex, the United States places other nations on a common evolutionary slope and sees them as inevitably traveling

toward the end of history that is the United States. For example, as a vast, ancient nation on the other side of the Pacific, China is frequently taken as a mirror image of the U.S. self. As Michael Hunt points out, we imagine ourselves locked in a special relationship with the Chinese, whose apparent moderation and pragmatism mirror our own most prized attributes and validate our own longings for a world made over in our own image. If China with its old and radically

different culture can be won, where can we not prevail? Yet, in a world of diversity, contingency, and unpredictability, which is irreducible to universal sameness or absolute certainty, this kind of U.S. knowledge of others often proves frustratingly elusive. In this context, rather than questioning the validity of their own universalist assumptions, the people of the United States believe that those who are different should be held responsible for the lack of universal sameness. Indeed, because "we" are universal, those who refuse or who are unable to become like "us" are no longer just

"others," but are by definition the negation of universality, or the other. In this way, the other is always built into this universalized "American" self. Just as "Primitive ... is a category, not an object, of Western thought," so the threat of the other is not some kind of "external reality" discovered by U.S. strategic analysts, but a ready-made category of thought within this particular way of U.S. self-imagination. Consequently, there is always a need for the United States to find a specific other to fill into the totalized category of otherness.

Link extensions

Crisis Management LinkLiterature that talks about crisis management with China is just as implicated in threat construction as literature that explicitly identifies China as an enemy—both justify US will to dominate the worldPan 04

(Chengxin, Political Science, Australian National U, “The ‘China Threat’ in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics”, Alternatives, June-July)

The discursive construction of the U.S. self and the "Chinese threat" argument are not innocent, descriptive accounts of some "independent" reality. Rather, they are always a clarion call for the practice of power politics. At the apex of this power-politics agenda is the politico-strategic question of "what is to be done" to make the United States secure from the (perceived) threats it faces. At a general level, as Benjamin Schwarz proposes, this requires an unhindered path to U.S. global hegemony that means not only that the United States must dominate wealthy and technologically sophisticated states in Europe and East Asia— America's "allies"—but also that it must deal with such nuisances as Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosevic and Kim Jong II, so that potential great powers need not acquire the means to deal with those problems themselves. And those

powers that eschew American supervision—such as China—must be both engaged and contained. The upshot of "American leadership" is that the United States must spend nearly as much on national security as the rest of the world combined.6' This "neocontainment" policy has been echoed in the "China threat" literature. In a short yet decisive article titled "Why We Must Contain China," Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer insists that "containing China" and "undermining its ruthless dictatorship" constitute two essential components of "any rational policy toward a rising, threatening China." Not only is a policy other than containment considered irrational, but even a delay to implement it would be undesirable, as he urges that "containment of such a bully must begin early in its career." To this end, Krauthammer offers such "practical" options as strengthening regional alliances (with Vietnam, India, and Russia, as well as Japan) to box in China; standing by Chinese dissidents; denying Beijing the right to host the Olympics; and keeping China from joining the World Trade Organization on

the terms it desires.^^ Containing China is of course not the only option arising from the "China threat" literature. More often than not, there is a subtle, business-style "crisis management" policy. For example, Bernstein and Munro shy away from the word containment, preferring to call their China policy

management.^^ Yet, what remains unchanged in the management formula is a continued promotion of controlling China. For instance, a perusal of Bernstein and Munro's texts reveals that what they mean by management is

no different than Krauthammer's explicit containment stance. TM By framing U.S.China relations as an issue of "crisis management," they leave little doubt of who is the "manager" and who is to be "managed." In a more straightforward manner, Betts and Christensen state that coercion and war must be part and parcel of the China management policy: In addressing the China challenge, the United States needs to think hard ahout three related questions: first, how to avoid crises and war through prudent, coercive diplomacy; second, how to manage crises and fight a war if the avoidance effort fails; third, how to end crises and terminate war at costs acceptable to the United States and its allies.^^ This is not to imply that the kind of perspectives outlined above will automatically be translated into actual China policy, but one does not have to be exceedingly perceptive to note that the "China threat" perspective does exert enormous influence on U.S. policy making on China. To illustrate this point, I want now to examine some specific implications of U.S. representations of the "China threat" for U.S.-China relations in relation to the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis and the "spy plane" incident of 2001.

Stereotyping China LinkClaiming that China will be dangerous because of geography, or economic destiny, or inevitable political clashes engages in the same type of threat construction as explicitly identifying China as a military threat. The common thread is the construction of a mysterious other that poses a threat to the international order. Pan 04

(Chengxin, Professor of Political Science at Australian National University, “The ‘China Threat’ in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics”, Alternatives, June-July)

=Likewise, with the goal of absolute security for the United States in mind, Richard Betts and Thomas Christensen argue: The truth is that China can pose a grave problem even if it does not become a military power on the American model, does not intend to commit aggression, integrates into a global economy, and liberalizes politically. Similarly, the United States could face a dangerous conflict over Taiwan even if it turns out that Beijing lacks the capacity to conquer the island. . . . This is true because of geography; because of America's reliance on alliances to project power; and because of China's capacity to harm U.S. forces, U.S. regional allies, and the American homeland, even while losing a war in the

technical, military sense.*>' By now, it seems clear that neither China's capabilities nor intentions really matter. Rather, almost by its mere geographical existence, China has been qualified as an absolute strategic "other," a discursive construct from which it cannot escape. Because of this, "China" in U.S. IR discourse has been objectified and deprived of its own subjectivity and exists mainly in and/or the U.S. self. Little wonder that for many U.S. China specialists, China becomes merely a "national security concern" for the United States, with the "severe disproportion between the keen attention to China as a security concern and the intractable neglect of China's [own] security concerns in the current debate."^^ At this point, at issue here is no longer whether the "China threat" argument is true or false, but is rather its reflection of a shared positivist mentality among mainstream China experts that they know China better than do the Chinese themselves.^^ "We" alone can know for sure that they consider "us" their enemy and thus pose a menace to "us." Such an account of China, in many ways, strongly seems to resemble Orientalists' problematic distinction between the West and the Orient. Like orientalism, the U.S. construction of the Chinese "other" does not require that China acknowledge the validity of that dichotomous construction. Indeed, as Edward Said point out, "It is enough for 'us' to set up these distinctions in our own minds; [and] 'they' become 'they' accordingly. "64 It may be the case that

there is nothing inherently wrong with perceiving others through one's own subjective lens. Yet, what is problematic with mainstream U.S. China watchers is that they refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy of the inherent fluidity of Chinese identity and subjectivity and try instead to fix its ambiguity as absolute difference from "us," a kind of certainty that denotes nothing but otherness and threats. As a result, it becomes difficult to find a legitimate space for alternative ways of understanding an inherently volatile, amorphous China^^ or to recognize that China's future trajectory in global politics is contingent essentially on how "we" in the United States and the West in general want to see it as well as on how the Chinese choose

to shape it.^^ Indeed, discourses of "us" and "them" are always closely linked to how "we" as "what we are" deal with "them" as "what they are" in the practical realm .

Exaggerated threat perceptions are based on misunderstanding and simplistic projections of US values onto China. This demonization has rhetorical advantages for the arguer but is undermining our ability to have an effective foreign policy with China. Lubman 04

(Stanley, Lecturer in Law and Visiting Scholar at the Center for the Study of Law and Society, University of California ( Berkeley), "The Dragon As Demon: Images Of China On Capitol Hill" (March 4, 2004). Center for the Study of Law and Society Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program. JSP/Center for the Study of Law and Society Faculty Working Papers. Paper 18, http://repositories.cdlib.org/csls/fwp/18).

The arguments of members of Congress on abortion, religious freedom, and dissent are grounded in domestic issues of high “symbolic” significance to some Americans. Such arguments, however, are one-dimensional, and project American values and institutions onto a different society and culture without nuance or awareness of the difficulty of transplanting those values and institutions. As already noted, these critics of China give no hint that American leverage over China’s domestic policies might be extremely limited. Nor is there any evidence of recognition that considerable time would be required to realize any program of political reform undertaken in China. Free from doubt, adamant in their moralism, unrelenting in their emotional criticism, and insistent on expressing the most idealistic representation of American values, the members of Congress who form an anti-China coalition have a significant debating advantage over those members who favor engagement. The latter must look to a future in which, they hope, economic and political reform will grow in a China benefited by trade, foreign investment, and a peaceful international environment. That future is uncertain, but the critics who have been quoted here can express their beliefs and hopes

buttressed by a moral certainty that pro-enagement members cannot affect. ... It is impossible to differentiate among the reasons underlying the demonizing of China by some in Congress, but some ignorance, willful or not, underlies the words of the demonizers. More than ignorance is involved, of course, and inquiry into the dynamics of Congressional participation in making China policy obviously must go behind the

Congressional debate that forms the public record. Whatever other factors are at work, however, the rhetoric that dominates discussions of China by some members of Congress promises to continue to deform not only their personal perspectives, but the contribution that Congress makes to formulation of this country’s China policy. At the very least, administration policymakers are “diverted from other tasks…Much time is spent dealing with often exaggerated congressional assertions about negative features of the Chinese government’s behavior…The congressional critics are open to a wide range of Americans— some with partisan or other interests – who are prepared to highly in often graphic terms real or alleged policies and behaviors of the Chinese government in opposition to US interests.”41

Debates about the threat posed by China ignore that political descriptions do not just name threats but also create them—the silly assumption that their authors are objective ignores that reality is always socially constructed and ideology feeds the drive for US military expansion. Pan 04

(Chengxin, Professor of Political Science at Australian National University, “The ‘China Threat’ in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics”, Alternatives, June-July)

While U.S. China scholars argue fiercely over "what China precisely is," their debates have been underpinned by some common ground, especially in terms of a positivist epistemology. Firstly, they believe that China is ultimately a knowable object, whose reality can be, and ought to be, empirically revealed by scientific means. For example, after expressing his dissatisfaction with often conflicting Western perceptions of China, David M. Lampton, former president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, suggests that "it is time to step

back and look at where China is today, where it might be going, and what consequences that direction will hold for the rest of the world."2 Like many other China scholars, Lampton views his object of study as essentially "something we can stand back from and

observe with clinical detachment."^ Secondly, associated with the first assumption, it is commonly believed that China scholars merely serve as "disinterested observers " and that their studies of China are neutral, passive descriptions of reality. And thirdly, in pondering whether China poses a threat or offers an opportunity to the United States, they rarely raise the question of "what the United States is." That is, the meaning of the United States is believed to be certain and beyond doubt. I do not dismiss altogether the conventional ways of debating China. It is not the purpose of this article to venture my own "observation" of "where China is today," nor to join the "containment" versus "engagement" debate per se. Rather, I want to contribute to a novel dimension of the China debate by questioning the seemingly unproblematic assumptions shared by most China scholars in the mainstream IR community in the United States. To perform this task, I will focus attention on a particularly significant

component of the China debate; namely, the "China threat" literature. More specifically, I want to argue that U.S. conceptions of China as a threatening other are always intrinsically linked to how U.S. policymakers /mainstream

China specialists see themselves (as representatives of the indispensable, security-conscious nation, for example). As such, they are not value-free, objective descriptions of an independent, preexisting Chinese reality out there, but are better understood as a kind of normative , meaning-giving practice that often legitimates power politics in U.S.-China relations and helps transform the "China threat" into social reality. In other words, it is self-fulfilling in practice, and is always part of the "China threat" problem it purports merely to describe. In doing so, I seek to bring to the fore two interconnected themes of self/other constructions and of theory as practice inherent in the "China threat" literature—themes that have been overridden and rendered largely invisible by those common positivist assumptions. These themes are of course nothing new nor peculiar to the "China threat" literature. They have been identified elsewhere by critics of some conventional fields of study such as ethnography, anthropology, oriental studies, political science, and international relations.* Yet, so far, the China field in the West in general and the U.S. "China threat" literature in particular have shown remarkable resistance to systematic critical reflection on both their normative status as discursive practice and their enormous practical implications for international politics.^ It is in this context

that this article seeks to make a contribution. I begin with a brief survey of the "China threat" argument in contemporary

U.S. international relations literature, followed by an investigation of how this particular argument about China is a discursive construction of other, which is predicated on the predominant way in which the United States imagines itself as the universal, indispensable nation-state in constant need of absolute certainty and security. Continues… Similarly, when they claim that "China can pose a grave problem," Betts and Christensen are convinced that they are merely referring to "the truth."25 In the following sections, I want to question this "truth," and, more

generally, question the objective, self-evidentiary attitudes that underpin it. In my view, the "China threat" literature is best understood as a particular kind of discursive practice that dichotomizes the West and China as self and other. In this sense, the "truism" that China presents a growing threat is not so much an objective reflection of contemporary global reality, per se, as it is a discursive construction of otherness that acts to bolster the hegemonic leadership of the United States in the post-Cold War world. Therefore, to have a better understanding of how the discursive construction of China as a "threat" takes place, it is now necessary to turn attention to a particularly dominant way of U.S. self-imagination.

Impact ExtensionsRepresentations are key in the context of China—they deeply shape our policies and Chinese reactionsGoh 05

(Evelyn, Assistant Professor at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore and Visiting Fellow at the East-West Center, Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974: From 'Red Menace' to 'Tacit Ally', p. 6-9, DB)

The alternative questions posed in this study may be recognized as the "how possible" queries emphasized by constructivists, in

contrast [end page 6] to the basic "why" questions that realists try to answer. 16 Constructivist approaches prioritize ideas and identity in the creation of state interests because they work from the basis that all reality is socially constructed. 17 The international system, for instance, does not exert an automatic "objective" causal

influence on states' actions. Rather, state policy choices result from a process of perception and interpretation by state actors, through which they come to understand the situation that the state faces and to formulate their responses. Furthermore, actors may, by their actions, alter systemic structures and trends. 18 Even beyond that, some constructivists argue that actors themselves change as they evolve new ideas and conceptions about identity and political communities. Thus, the constructivist understanding of "reality" centers upon the interaction of the material and the ideational. 19 The forging of this intersubjective context is a contentious process, but often

particular representations are so successful that they become a form of "common sense," encompassing a system of understanding about a body of subjects, objects, and issues with implicit policy consequences. This structure of representation may be termed a discourse, and a radical change in policy occurs when the prevailing discourse is challenged and altered . The key

conceptual focus in this study is on discourses, rather than on ideas, belief systems, or ideology, because the

former conveys more effectively the multifaceted process by which meaning is constituted by policy actors and by which policy choices are constructed, contested, and implemented. Discourses may be understood as linguistic representations and rhetorical strategies by which a people create meaning about the world, and they are critical to the process by which ideas are translated into [end page 7] policy in two ways. 20 First, they perform a constraining or enabling function with regard to state action, in the sense that policy options may be rendered more or less reasonable by particular understandings of, for instance, China, the United States, and the relations between them. 21 Second, discursive practice is an integral element of sociopolitical relations of power. 22 As a key means of producing the categories and boundaries of knowledge by which reality is understood and explained by society, discourses are often deliberate and instrumental. In representing subjects and their relationships in certain ways, political actors have

particular objectives and specific audiences in mind. Here, the focus on changing discursive representations of China and China policy in official American circles allows us to study in particular the policy advocacy process – within internal official circles, to the public, and to the other party in the bilateral relationship – in a significant policy reversal . Bringing to bear the understanding that the creation of meaning by discursive practice is an essential means of influencing political action, this book investigates the contested process by which the different actors and parties defined and redefined identities, generated new knowledge, and created new meanings in order to construct and maintain a new U.S.-China relationship. In this study, each discourse about China may be understood to encompass the following elements: an image or representation of China; a related representation of U.S. identity; an interpretation

of the nature of U.S.-China relations; and the "logical" policy options that flow from these representations. For ease of reference,

each subdiscourse that is identified here is centered upon the core image of China upon which it is built. An image is simply the perception of a particular object or subject, the normative [end page 8] evaluation of it, and the identity and meaning ascribed to it. 23 The concept of images is employed here mainly as an analytical shorthand, as the image is but one of four subcomponents of each discourse. 24

China is very sensitive to threat discourse—representations uniquely shape reality in this context Krolikowski 08

(Alanna, doctoral student in International Relations at the Department of Political Science of University of Toronto, MA in International Relations at the Munk Centre for International Relations of the University of Toronto; “State Personhood in Ontological Security Theories of International Relations and Chinese Nationalism: A Sceptical View.” http://www.utoronto.ca/ethnicstudies/Krolikowski_2008.pdf)

This inconsistency between China’s putative maladapted type and its conduct toward other actors is further indicated by changes to China’s self-representations or, in other words, to the discourses through which China describes and explains itself and its circumstances to other actors. Returning to Giddens’s formulation of ontological security, we are reminded that an important component of actors’ behaviour in the high modern period is the capacity to reflexively self-monitor and engage in reconstructions, re-orderings and

developments of their “biographical” narratives, including of their relationships to others.53 While these means of producing and reproducing self-identity and identification are typical of individuals in our epoch, healthy basic trust is a

precondition for them: actors with low basic trust are unable to engage in this type of self-identity development.54 For Giddens, this inability is a form of neurosis, which often leaves individuals paralysed by and entrapped within their identity-affirming routines. Extending the analogy with the individual, we should expect that states with rigid basic trust will not be able to engage in this type of reflexive self-identity change.

China, however, provides one of the most striking examples of a state’s deliberate attempt at changing its self-identity and its relationships of identification with other states. Yong Deng , for

instance, describes at length the processes by which China has endeavoured to counter “China Threat theory” by articulating alternative representations of its identity, reputation and role in the international system.55 China threat theory refers to “foreign attributions to China of a harmful, destabilizing, and even pernicious international reputation.”56 According to Deng, Beijing has taken stock of realist theories of international relations which posit the tragedy of the security dilemma and, specifically, of realist theories that emphasize the probability of war occurring when rising powers challenge established

hegemons.57 China is thus aware of the security dilemma that it will confront “if its threat image abroad and material capabilities grow simultaneously.” 58 Citing suggestive findings from the literature on the

democratic peace and on security communities, Deng notes that one process through which threat image can be altered or overcome is social identification.59 States that identify with each other are less likely to perceive each other as threatening and are therefore less susceptible to the constraining effects of the security dilemma, while the opposite is true for states that do not share any sense of identification. This type of consideration lies at the source of Beijing’s hypersensitivity regarding China threat theory and its consistent efforts to contest

and undermine it.60 China’s “strategy” for reducing the influence of China threat theory includes several representational and other tactics. Probably chief among these is equating China threat theory with an outdated “mentality of Cold War-style power politics” and advocating that great powers take a less alarmist approach more suited to current realities in statements to external audiences.61 A second tack involves repeatedly offering reassurances to foreign

listeners of China’s peaceful intentions and its satisfaction with the status quo world order.62 The clearest example of this type of representation is found in Beijing’s “peaceful rise” discourse, a series of pronouncements about the uniqueness of the phenomenon of the growth of China’s influence

over global economic and political processes that serves specifically to differentiate China from earlier rising powers that provoked wars.63 In a survey of official “assessments and policy designs” since the late 1990s, Jing Huang finds that this discourse is indicative of a new understanding of the international environment and concludes that it is supported by substantial changes to China’s practices, which show a more actively engaged, “cooperative and patient” China.64 Deng and Huang’s accounts of Beijing’s strategies find support in Chih-yu Shih’s analysis of Chinese academic responses to China

threat theory, in which he finds that “the introduction of IR theories to China one after another – first realism, then liberalism

and most recently constructivism – has directly affected how Chinese represent themselves, internally as well as externally.”65 Shih argues that “the self-representation of China in terms of ‘peaceful rise’ suggests the influence of liberal theory and ideology as an alternative to realism” in Chinese thought.66

Images of threats reinforce the security dilemma between states and breed mutual antagonisms that make threat-thinking self-fulfilling prophecies. Their construction of threats is based upon the grip of expert discourses that blind us to alternative views of reality—refusing this hegemony is a transformative act.Foster 94

(Gregory, Professor at the National Defense University, Alternatives, v. 19 n.1 p. 86-88)

By ridding oneself of the many bad habits of English usage we have adopted, one can think more clearly, Threattalk becomes threatthink. The resultant paranoia and intolerance invariably blind us to emerging developments and

conditions that truly threaten our well-being but fall outside the bounds of our distorted perception. This brings us to a

second fundamental issue: the effect our image of threat has on reality. The late Kenneth Boulding made the astute

observation that there is a reciprocal, escalatory dynamic associated with threat imagery. For example, Country A, feeling itself threatened (however and for whatever reasons) by Country B, increases its armaments to reduce its insecurity. This makes B feel threatened, and so B increases its armaments to bolster its security. This makes A feel even more threatened, so A again increases its armaments.

This growing threat “forces” B to further increase its armaments. And so on until either war breaks out or some other

change (such as internal economic collapse) reverses the process. This is how threatthink becomes threat. If there is a single, documentable truth to be derived from an assessment of threat-based thinking, it is that the perception of threat—at least where that threat has a human component—almost invariably becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. For this reason alone—the fact that we have shown ourselves perversely capable of creating unwanted inevitability—we must face up to a third fundamental issue: the more general failure of our overall approach to

envisioning the future. Most of us justifiably consider ourselves unqualified to divine the future. We therefore typically defer to experts and authorities—futurists and assorted government technocrats presumably possessed of special powers or information the rest of us do not have—who end up thereby dictating not only our future but our present as well. These are the individuals who tell us not only that there are threats, but what they are and how we

must deal with them. What we refuse to recognize is that the future these purported visionaries are able to see is invariably nothing more imaginative than a simple projection of what already is happening. It also is an assured way for them to solidify and perpetuate their own power over us. The future they see, because the rest of us accept it on authority as all but inevitable, closes out any perceived need to pursue other potentially fruitful possibilities; it provides an excuse for ignoring present needs that, if fulfilled, might well produce a markedly different future; it ensures nothing more enlightened or progressive than creeping incrementalism and evolutionary drift; it creates false expectations about what can and will be; and when it fails to materialize—as it so often does because of the unexpected—it produces feelings of helplessness, not among the purveyors of the deception, but amoung those of us who have so carelessly relinquished our fate to them.

There has always been a China security threat—these perceptions are created by the US military-industrial complex. Our institutions need enemies to survive, and China fits the bill—this cycle of enemy creation necessitates the sacrificial destruction of millions.Clark 06

(Gregory, vice president of Akita International University and a former Australian diplomat. “No Rest for 'China Threat' Lobby”, Japan Times, Jan. 7, 2006, http://taiwansecurity.org/News/2006/JT-070106.htm).

For as long as I have been in the China-watching business (more than 40 years now), there has always been a China "threat." It began with the 1950-53 Korean civil war, which initially had nothing to do with China. Even so, Beijing was blamed and, as punishment, the United States decided to intervene not only in Korea but also in China's civil war with Taiwan, and later threaten a move against China by sending troops close to China's borders with Korea.

When China reacted to that move by sending in its own troops, the China-threat people moved into high gear. The next China threat was supposed to operate via the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. Coping with it meant the West had to prop up a range of incompetent, corrupt rulers in the area, and intervene cruelly to suppress revolts by local Chinese against discrimination in Malaya and then in Sarawak. It also meant that the U.S., Britain and Australia had to work very hard and covertly to prevent the 1959 election of an intelligent Chinese, Lee Kwan Yew, to

the Singapore premiership. Lee was then seen, amazingly, as a front for those dreaded Chinese Communists. The China- threat lobby moved into overdrive over Vietnam in the early 1960s. There a clearly nationalist-inspired civil war supported more by Moscow than by Beijing was denounced by Washington and Canberra as the first step in planned Chinese "aggression" into Asia. In Moscow in 1964, I had to accompany an Australian foreign minister, Paul Hasluck, in a foolish, U.S.-instigated bid to persuade the Soviet Union to side with the West against those aggressive Chinese. Hasluck gave up only after a bemused Soviet prime minister, Alexei Kosygin, told him point-blank that Moscow was doing all it could to help North Vietnam, would continue to give help, and that it would like to see Beijing doing a lot more. In 1962, as China desk officer in Canberra, I had to witness an extraordinary attempt to label as unprovoked aggression a very limited and justified Chinese counterattack against an Indian military thrust across the Indian-claimed border line in the North East Frontier Area. Threat scenarios then had China seeking

ocean access via the Bay of Bengal. The London Economist even had Beijing seeking to move south via Afghanistan. Then came the allegations that China was seeking footholds in Laos, northern Thailand and Myanmar -- all false. U.S., British and Australian encouragement for the 1965 massacre of half a million leftwing supporters in Indonesia was also justified as needed to prevent China from gaining a foothold there. So too was the U.S. and Australia's 1975 approval for Indonesia's brutal takeover of East Timor. Since then we have seen Beijing's claims against Taiwan condemned as aggressive, despite the fact that every Western nation, including the U.S., has formally recognized or accepted China's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. China's efforts to assert control over

Tibet are also branded as aggression even though Tibet has never been recognized as an independent entity. And so it continues to the present day. With the alleged Soviet threat to Japan having evaporated, we now

have an army of Japanese and U.S. hawks -- Foreign Minister Aso included -- ramping up China as an alleged threat to Japan and the Far East. Much is made of Beijing's recent increases in military spending. But those increases began from a very low level; until recently its military were more concerned with running companies and growing their own vegetables. And Beijing faces a U.S.-Japan military buildup in East Asia that is avowedly anti-China and that spends a lot more than China does. Of course, if the Chinese military were placing bases and sending spy planes and ships close to the U.S. coast, and were bombing U.S. embassies, the U.S. role in that buildup might be justified. But so far that has

not happened. Tokyo's claims to be threatened by China in the East China Sea are equally dubious. So far, the only shots fired in anger in that area have been Japan's, in a legally dubious huntdown and sinking of a North Korean vessel. Tokyo makes much of China's challenge to Japan's claimed EEZ (exclusive economic zone) median line of control in the East China Sea (Beijing says the EEZ border should be based on the continental shelf extending close to the Ryukyu islands and proposes joint development between the two claim lines). But international law on EEZ borders still does not firmly support Japan's median line position. And the recent Australia-East Timor agreement on joint development of continental shelf oil/gas resources in the

Timor Sea, and the 1974 Japan-South Korean agreement for joint development in the East China Sea continental shelf, both

strongly suggest that Beijing's joint development proposal is not entirely unreasonable. But no doubt these details will be dismissed as irrelevant. Our powers-that-be need threats to justify their existence. As we saw during the Cold War, and more recently over Iraq, once they declare that such and such a nation is a threat, it becomes impossible to stop the escalation. The other side naturally has to show some reaction. The military-industrial- intelligence complex then seize on this as the pretext further to expand budgets and power. Before long the media and a raft of dubious academic and other commentators are sucked into the vortex. Then when it is all over and the alleged threat has proved to be quite imaginary, the threat merchants move on to find another target. But not before billions have been spent. And millions have died.

The affirmative’s construction of WMD threats is part of a cycle of otherness used to justify state intervention.Lipschutz 00

(Ronnie, professor of politics at the University of California, Santa Cruz, 2000, After Authority: War, Peace, and Global Politics in the 21st Century , p. 49)

How and where do discourses of threat and security originate? Barry Buzan (1991:37) has pointed out that “There is a cruel irony in [one] meaning of secure which is ‘unable to escape’.” To secure onself is, therefore, a sort of trap, for one can never leave a secure

place without incurring risks. Moreover, security appears to be meaningless either as concept or practice without an “Other” to help specify the conditions of insecurity that must be guarded against . James Der

Derian (1995), citing Nietzsche, points out that this “Other” is made manifest through differences that create terror and collective resentment of difference—leading to a state of fear—rather than a coming to terms with the positive potentials of difference. As these differences become less than convincing, or fail to be made manifest, however, their power to create fear and terror diminish, and so it becomes necessary to discover even more menacing

threats to reestablish difference. For this purpose, reality may no longer suffice. What is substituted, instead, is a dangerous world of imagined threats. Not imaginary threats, but threats conjured up as things that

could happen. Paradoxically, then, it becomes the imagined, unnamed party, with the clandestinely assembled and crude atomic device, and not the thousands of reliable, high-yield warheads mounted on missiles poised to launch at a moment’s

notice, that is used to create fear, terror, and calls for actio n . It is the speculation about mysterious actors behind blown up buildings and fallen jetliners, and not rather banal defects in wiring and fuel tanks, that creates the atmosphere for

greater surveillance and control. It is suspicion of neighbors, thought to be engaged in subversive or surreptitious

behaviors, listening to lewd lyrics or logged-on to lascivious Web pages, and not concerns about inner-city health and welfare, that brings calls for state intervention .

AT: Threats RealChinese threat literature is an exercise in the construction of US identity—not “true” statements about China. Pan 04

(Chengxin, Professor of Political Science at Australian National University, “The ‘China Threat’ in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics”, Alternatives, June-July)

Instead, China as a "threat" has much to do with the particular mode of U.S. self-imagination . As Steve Chan notes: China is an object of attention not only because of its huge size, ancient legacy, or current or projected relative national

power. . . . The importance of China has to do with perceptions, especially those regarding the potential that Beijing will become an example, source, or model that contradicts Western liberalism as the reigning paradigm. In an era of supposed universalizing cosmopolitanism, China demonstrates the potency and persistence of nationalism, and embodies an alternative to Western and especially U.S. conceptions of democracy and capitalism. China is a reminder that history is not close to an Certainly, I do not deny China's potential for strategic misbehavior in the global context, nor do I claim the "essential peacefulness" of Chinese culture." Having said that, my main point here is that there is no such thing as "Chinese reality" that can

automatically speak for itself, for example, as a "threat." Rather, the "China threat" is essentially a specifically social meaning given to China by its U.S. observers, a meaning that cannot be disconnected from the dominant U.S. self-construction. Thus, to fully understand the U.S. "China threat" argument, it is essential to recognize its autobiographical nature. Indeed, the construction of other is not only a product of U.S. self-imagination, but often a

necessary foil to it. For example, by taking this representation of China as Chinese reality per se, those scholars are able to assert their self-identity as "mature," "rational" realists capable of knowing the "hard facts" of international politics, in distinction from those "idealists" whose views are said to be grounded more in "an article of faith" than in "historical experience."41 On the other hand, given that history is apparently not

"progressively" linear, the invocation of a certain other not only helps explain away such historical uncertainties or "anomalies" and maintain the credibility of the allegedly universal path trodden by the United States, but also serves to highlight U.S. "indispensability." As Samuel Huntington puts it, "If being an American means being committed to the principles of liberty, democracy, individualism, and private property, and if there is no evil empire out there threatening those principles, what indeed does it mean to be an American, and

what becomes of American national interests?" In this way, it seems that the constructions of the particular U.S. self and its other are always intertwined and mutually reinforcing.

China is not a threat even by realist standardsYe 02

(Jiang, Visiting Professor at College of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University, Japan, Professor, Humanity College, Shanghai Normal University, China; Will China be a “Threat” to Its Neighbors and the World in the Twenty First Century?, http://www.ritsumei.ac.jp/acd/cg/ir/college/bulletin/e-vol1/1-4jiang.pdf)

Realist Perspectives on the Issue of “China Threat” The above comments on the theory of “China threat” are made through liberal IR theories such as the theory of globalization analyzed by liberal IR scholars. Needlessly to say, it is mainly the realist IR theory that

helps Western analysts to argue about the “China threat”. As well known, power politics is the basis of realist IR theory. For realists international relations are best understood by focusing on the distribution of power among states, because relations among states take place in the absence of a world

government, which means that the international system is anarchical. According to those who have argued

that China has been or will be the “threat,” it is mainly because China’s national power has been increased recently that the international power structure has undergone great changes, which will lead China to be a “threat” to its neighbors in the region and to the world at large. But even if we agree with the method of realist argument, we still need to ask a key question-whether China’s national power has really increased to such an extent that it will threaten the security of the region and even that of the world. Power is hard to measure because it is hard to create a formula that allocates realistic relative weights to military might, economic capacity, leadership capability and other factors in the power equation. On the other hand power is constantly in flux which means power is

dynamic. In order to create a framework to measure power according to its characteristics, most IR scholars tend to agree that when we measure any state’s power it should be divided into two types, one is “hard power” or “coercive power” and the other is “soft power” or “persuasive power” . Any state’s military, economic and other assets contribute to “hard power” which traditionally can make another countries to do or not do something. The assets as moral authority or technological excellence that enhance a country’s image of leadership contribute to “soft power”. With the division of the two types of power in mind, let us measure whether China’s power has been great enough to be a threat in

a realistic way. As anyone agrees, China is a rising power. From 1979 to 1997 China’s GDP grew at an average annual rate of 9.8% and even against the background of Southeast Asia financial crisis, China’s GDP grew at 7.8% in 1998 and even above 8% in 1999. From 2000 China’s real GDP began to exceed US$1,000 billion.15 According to Chinese official data that China’s 2001 real GDP has reached 9,593.3 billion Chinese Yuan which almost equals to US$1.16 trillion.16 China’s GDP is now the seventh largest in the world

and mainland China (except Hong Kong) is now the tenth-ranked international trader. China’s foreign currency reserve is the second largest in the world after Japan. Yet, if we read all these numbers against the background of China’s huge population the picture will be quite different . China’s population has already exceeded 1.3 billion, which means that China’s real per capita GDP is only 7379.46 Chinese Yuan or less than US$1,000. Even according to CIA’s questionable PPP (purchasing power parity) estimation, Chinese per capita GDP is US$3,600, much lower than the world average US$7,200, and ranked at 133th.17 With such low per capita GDP China at best can be ranked as a median ranged

power that Gerald Segal described in his article, “Does China Matter? ” in Foreign Affairs in 1999.18 Just as China’s per capita GDP shows that China’s hard power is not as strong as those who argue about the “China threat” have imagined, China’s real military power, which is the core of hard power, remains a second-rate power . According to China’s official announcement that from this fiscal year 2002-2003, China’s defense spending will have a 17.6 percent increase. Actually China has already raised its military budget by one-third over the course of the last two years. But considering the gap between China’s US$20 billion defense budget and the US defense budget of about

US$ 400 billion, or even the disparity between China’s defense budget and the Japan’s US$40.77 billion defense budget, China’s military power should be considered very limited, to say nothing of the immense and growing technological gap between China and the U.S. or Japan. Just as former US assistant secretary of defense

Lawrence J. Korb expressed in a recent article: “China is not, and is extremely unlikely to be, a strategic military threat the way the Soviet Union once was.” 19 Some Western sources and analysts prefer to estimate

China’s defense budget much bigger than China’s officially announced figure. The estimation by CIA of China’s defense budget put it in the range from $45 billion to $65 billion for 2002, which still shows a big gap between China and the U.S. in military spending. If we use the per capita defense expenditure index, the gap

between China, the U.S. and Japan will be huge. While China’s hard power is essentially quite limited, its soft power is probably facing more serious challenge. For any state the core of the soft power may be the governing capacity-the capability of the government to mobilize political support, to provide public goods and to manage internal tensions. As we know, it is the policy of reform and opening to the world that has made possible the resent economic progresses in China such as consistently high growth rates, recent entry into the WTO, and the huge amount of foreign direct investment (US$46 billion in 2001).

At the same time, globalization has also brought about dramatic transformation in China’s economic, social, and to some extent political systems. During the transition period that began in the early 1980s, the Chinese government has faced and is still facing very series challenges to its governing capacity. There is no denying the fact that the gap between the rich and the poor in Chinese society has been widened tremendously as the economic reform has deepened. More than twenty years of pro-market reforms have produced a small number of millionaires and billionaires in China and a much larger number of impoverished people-the losers from reform. The urban unemployment rate is roughly around 10% while the unemployment and underemployment in rural areas are even more

substantial. With limited revenue the state is unable to provide assistance to the weak groups in society created in the process of

the reform. What makes the situation more grave is that the corruption is widespread, as some of the ruling elite converted their public political power into private economic gains, building and profiting from patronage machines during the process of the economic reform, while the number of the poor people multiplied. All of these have undermined the political support to the government, although the Chinese government has tried to persuade the Chinese people to believe that the government would do its best to fight against corruption and help those week groups by executing some corruptive officials and by reforming the social security system . Although Chinese government has made tremendous efforts to provide enough public goods such as education, public health, law and order while promoting the reform and opening to the world, its recent performance still lags behind that of many developing countries. For a considerable period China’s education spending has been around 2.5 percent of its GDP22, below the average of 3.4 percent for most developing countries. China’s public health-care system has also been lagging behind many developing countries. According to the World Health Organization, China’s health system ranked 144th in the world, placing it among the bottom quartile of WHO members, behind India, Indonesia, and Bangladesh.23 Because the capabilities of the Chinese government to mobilize political support and to provide public goods have been weakened, the government’s capability to manage the internal tensions also faces a great challenge, which has led some western scholars to argue that China is facing a hidden crisis of governance.24 The argument that China is facing a hidden crisis of governance needs to be made with stronger evidence and systematic theoretical analysis.

One thing seems clear: even from a realist perspective, China’s soft power is almost the same as its hard power, that is, far from strong enough to “threaten” its neighbors and the world. Actually it is Chinese ruling elites themselves who are more aware of China’s realities in terms of both hard power and soft power, especially during the period of its leadership succession. The pervasive propaganda of the “Three Represents” theory25 demonstrates that the top ruling elites are deeply concerned about the legitimacy of the ruling Party-CPC and are really worried about the government’s capability of governance. At the same time the official acceptance of the inevitable trend of globalization and the willingness of moving along in harmony with globalization indicates that Chinese elites are keenly aware of the relative weakness of China’s power and the absolute necessity of cooperating with other countries in the international systems formed by the force of globalization.

China is peacefully integrating into the world system—self-interest motivates international cooperationYe 02

(Jiang, Visiting Professor at College of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University, Japan, Professor, Humanity College, Shanghai Normal University, China; Will China be a “Threat” to Its Neighbors and the World in the Twenty First Century?, http://www.ritsumei.ac.jp/acd/cg/ir/college/bulletin/e-vol1/1-4jiang.pdf)

No doubt, globalization has led the integration and the interdependence of all the actors in the international system to an unprecedented degree and the cooperative attitude of the state-still the main actor in the international system. Importantly, China as a rising power seems to be orienting itself much more than the established powers towards cooperation, because it perceives that the political authority of the states in the contemporary international system is in decline. For example, Chinese premier Zhu Rongji went to Washington to discuss China’s admission to the World Trade Organization, in April 1999 when NATO led by the United States was conducting air strikes against Yugoslavia, which China did not support and during which Chinese Embassy was hit by U.S. missiles. Obviously, the Chinese premier’s visit reflected the tremendous change in Chinese attitude toward the international system. Unlike Germany in the late 19th and early 20th century or Japan in the period between the two world wars, China as a rising power prefers to merge into the international cooperative regimes like WTO and tries its best to cooperate with the established powers and follow the international norms and rules. The behavioral change of the rising power is caused by the changes in the international system. In the traditional international system dominated by power politics the level of integration and interdependence was very low because there were no efficient international organizations such as WTO, IMF, World Bank, etc, nor were there any orientation towards cooperation for both the established or the rising powers. While in the contemporary international system pushed by the force of globalization both established powers and rising powers are willing to cooperate with

each other. With the behavioral changes of the actors in the contemporary international system in mind, it will be easier for us to find the flaws in the arguments about China threat. The Chinese official attitude towards the phenomenon of globalization can also help us to see how the structural change of the international

system since the end of the Cold War has influenced the rising power itself. According to China’s official statement, economic globalization is an inevitable trend of the economic development of the contemporary world. The Chinese government openly admits that “since the beginning of the 1990s, with the end of the Cold War, science and technology have developed rapidly and transnational companies have continued their expansion. The globalization process has obviously sped up, with conspicuous expressions found in the accelerated flow and disposition of production factors in the global sphere, the deepening of mutual influence of the economies in various countries and the strengthening of interlinks.” 8 With the guidance of such a new ideology that moved away from orthodox Marxism, China has adjusted its attitude toward the world

economic system from self-reliance to cooperation. China has already become a member of the IMF, the World Bank, and other international economic institutions and has been very active in those institutions that it once condemned as tools of capitalist imperialism. In December 2001 Chinese government proudly declared to the world that China had become the member of the WTO after long negotiations with United States and the European Union. All these actions exhibit clearly the willingness of the Chinese government to integrate China into the world market system and catch up with the quick pace of globalization. This is in sharp contrast with the actions of Germany and

Japan in the period between the two world wars. Germany and Japan carried out autarkic economic policies in the 1930s, which led them to leave the world market and caused them to confront the established powers like Great Britain and United States. In contrast China has not only shifted its attitude towards the world market from self-reliance to cooperation but also has been taking a more active role in those international economic regimes. One of the main reasons why China as a rising power has not followed the examples of Germany and Japan in the 1930s is that the international system has changed. All states-the main international actors-operate in the international social-economic-political geographic environment and the specific characteristics of the international system help determine the pattern of the behaviors and intentions of the states. In the traditional power politic international system before World War Two there were few international cooperation regimes to regulate the behavior of the actors and the space for the rising powers was so narrow that the

main method for them to further their national interests was to concur and conflict with the existed powers. While under the development of globalization the international cooperation regimes are playing more and more important roles in the present international system and it will be more difficult for the rising power to further its national interests without cooperation with other powers within those regimes. That is why China has tried and is still trying its best to join and to act positively in the international organizations such as UN, WTO, IMF, and so on. China’s engagement with the world market and the multilateral international economic organizations is companied by its involvement in international and regional security institutions. The past few years have already seen the increasing interests and willingness of China to embrace the multilateral security mechanism, including its engagement with ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The ARF was initially established as a partial response to the territorial disputes (South China Sea) with China and the concerns of US military readjustment in East Asia after the

Cold War. China’s engagement with ARF, the regional multilateral security institution, has been widely recognized as a significant contributing element to encourage the development of features of inclusive nature of multilateralism. China’s participation in the security institutions9 shows that in the globalized international system self-interested actors prefer to construct institutions to enhance cooperation on security issues. Perhaps the adjustment of China’s behavior came from its anticipation of other states’ preference for cooperation within international security institutions, or from the institutions’ monitoring and sanctioning provision. But the fact remains that China is experiencing a kind of socialization under the international security institutions. It is worth noting that China’s confidence and further interest in deeper and broader participation in the regional security regimes improve its cooperation quality in reinforcing the process of norm diffusion. With all of these in mind, one must be very cautious when arguing about the China threat in the new century. It is quite common for Western IR scholars to argue that Chinese history and its domestic affairs cause China to prefer assertiveness strategy that will lead to China’s threat to the region and to the world. But a deep appreciation of Chinese history and its culture would tell one that such argument is lopsided if not prejudiced. The Chinese are proud of their culture and long history, and the traditional Confucian ideology of “restraining oneself and restoring the ritual to the world” has taught the Chinese not to impose its culture or world view upon others. Traditionally, Chinese elites would rather lead by example than by forceful conversion when China was a dominant power in the region in premodern times. Even when communist ideology prevailed and China’s foreign policy contained an element of exporting revolution, China was much less active than was the Soviet Union in trying to convert others. This is not to say that there have never been any assertive or aggressive elements in Chinese foreign policy. The point is that under the strong influence of Confucian

tradition China has been modeled and cultivated to be reactive rather than aggressive. While

there were assertive and aggressive elements in terms of military action on the part of China in pre-modern times, many Western scholars have pointed out that historically Chinese military action has been defensive or punitive in nature and seldom imperialistic. Even the late Gerald Segal, a prominent western scholar for Chinese studies who was not so friendly to China, also conceded the same point in his book Defending China.10 From a Chinese perspective, military force is only used for domestic stability as in the case of Tibet and Taiwan or for national defense as in the case of Korea, India, and Vietnam.11 The traditional Confucian doctrine of “mean and mediocre” has helped the Chinese to adjust itself with ease in the transition from the great power politics to the current international politics that places emphasis on multilateralism and interdependence with the backdrop of globalization. Since the People’s Republic of China was founded, the pillar of China’s foreign policy has been the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” laid out by the late Premier Zhou Enlai. Although Chinese behavior in the international community during the Mao era often contradicted the “Five Principles” to some extent12, such a contradiction has largely disappeared since the 1980s when Deng Xiaoping began to change Mao’s revolutionary ideology and initiated the policy of reforming and opening up to the world. With considerable speed the Chinese economy has been moving into global capitalist market system while extensive economic and cultural ties have already developed between China and the rest of the world especially between China and the West. It has been estimated that since the beginning of the 1990s’ as much as 20-40 percent of China’s gross national product has come from foreign trade.13 This certainly will lead China to persist in the policy of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in dealing with any other countries, especially with its neighbor countries such as Japan and its main trade partners like USA. A breakdown of the relationships across the Pacific would be disastrous for China. Roughly 35 percent of China’s exports go to the United States. Moreover two of its

most important trading partners, Japan and South Korea, also depend on their ability to export to the American market.14 It is hard to imagine that China will be able to make any profit by de-stabilizing the stability of the Pacific region or by stirring up trouble with United States.

China’s rise is peacefulXiao 10

(Ren, Professor of International Politics at the School of International Relations and Public Affairs at Fudan University, Acting Director and Senior Fellow at the Department of American Studies at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, "The International Relations Theoretical Discourse in China: One World, Different Explanations", Journal of Chinese Political Science, Vol. 15, Issue 1, March 2010, July 21st 2010, p. 18, DOI 10.1007/s11366-009-9084-4)

The above words are a discussion about China’s distinctive international relations discourse. The Chinese viewpoints have changed over the years, sometimes because the leadership changed, sometimes due to a change in the international environment, and sometimes because the leaders’ thinking about the international environment changed, even though the environment did not change much.24 Some changes were fundamental such as that in China’s identification of current era from “war and revolution” to “peace and development.” The latter’s role in Chinese foreign policy making can never be overestimated. However, in the reform and opening years, continuation is clearly the major aspect of the Chinese foreign policy thinking. Over the past three decades,

China has adopted its own “independent and peace-oriented foreign policy.” From China’s

perspective, independence means that China does not simply follow others. Rather, it has its own views of the world and its own principles about international and regional disputes, and it makes objective and fair-minded judgments according to the rights and wrongs of the matter itself. Peace-oriented diplomacy means any diplomatic action has to be in favor of world peace, since development can only be achieved in a peaceful environment. And a crucial part of Chinese foreign relations is

good neighbor policy, which seeks to actively develop relations with the neighboring countries.25 In addition, a core foreign policy is that China neither attaches itself to any great power or power group, nor yields to any great power’s pressure, and does not ally with any great power. This is a conclusion reached after China has

summed up its experience over the past decades, and has become a long-term policy. Thus, IR theoretical discourse in China is inseparable from this “independent and peace-oriented foreign policy.” In other words, the theories are a logical result of China’s carrying out an independent foreign policy. Along with the rise of China’s international status, the possibility for China’s ideas to be accepted by others is also growing . For instance, “multipolarization” which China espouses and encourages, has been written down in the Sino-Russian Joint Communiqué on World Multipolarization and the Establishment of New International Order in April 1997, and

later in the Sino-French Joint Communiqué in May 1997. The latter states that “the two sides decide to closely cooperate further and enhance the world multipolarization process, ...[and] oppose any attempt

to dominate in international affairs in order to achieve a more prosperous, stable, secure, and balanced world.” China’s rich historical and cultural tradition, plus its varied foreign policy practice, breeds its own diplomatic thoughts and theoretical discourse. In addition to this analysis, substantial work remains to be done in the future.

The claim isn’t that the material reality conditions that create “threats” don’t exist—it’s that the meaning of those material conditions are molded in discourse, and that saying that some are threatening while others are not is entirely constructed and can be changed on a discursive level. Weldes 99

(Jutta, professor of international relations at the University of Bristol, 1999, Cultures of Insecurity, p. 12-13)

At this point it is important to clarify what we mean in referring to insecurities as social constructions, in order to preempt objections that some readers may have. Critics of constructivism sometimes understand a phrase such as, for example, “the social construction of the Soviet threat” (e.g., Nathanson, 1988) to mean that the Soviet threat did not in fact exist, that it was purely a fabrication. However, to refer to something as socially constructed is not at all the same as saying that it does not exist. A brief discussion of the example of nuclear insecurity may help define the distinctive nature of a constructivist perspective in security

studies. Our constructivism would not deny that nuclear weapons exist, that their use could maim and kill millions of people, and that a number of states possess a nuclear capability (including the United States, Russia,

Britain, France, China, Israel, India, and Pakistan, at least). On this a constructivist and the most empiricist arms-control experts can agree. However, our constructivism is interested in how one gets from here to such widely shared propositions as these: that the United States is threatened by Russian, but not by British, nuclear weapons; that Third World states are more likely to use their nuclear weapons than Western countries; that Iraq’s nuclear potential is more threatening than the United States’ nuclear arsenal; and that the United States is safer with nuclear weapons than it would be without them. In the face of the heterogeneous

dangers represented by nuclear weapons, there is nonetheless an established common sense, made real in collective

discourse, that foregrounds some dangers while repressing or ignoring others so that, for example, Americans are likely to be more afraid of Pakistani than of British nuclear weapons, although neither have ever been used. It is this discursive constitution of the threat represented by nuclear weapons that we refer to as “construction,” and it means not that the weapons have been made up but that their meaning has been molded in discourse. As the nuclear

example immediately makes clear, these are not simply academic issues without significance in the “real world.” It matters deeply for a host of social relations whether one is more afraid of, say, an Iraqi or Swedish bomb, of carcinogens produced at the Rocky Flats plutonium plant or of a Russian first strike. Although conventional approaches in security studies might produce claims of a clear answer to such questions, a critical constructivist analysis works more deconstructively, producing not simple answers but forms of analysis that show how such answers become, in Roland Barthes’s phrase, “falsely obvious” (1972: 11).

Even if threats are real, the question of how we choose to frame and react to them is crucial. Tuathail 01

(Gearóid Ó, Professor of Government and International Affairs and Director of the Masters of Public and International Affairs program at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, "Understanding Critical Geopolitics: Geopolitics and Risk Society", Geopolitics, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 22, Issue 2/3, 2001, July 16th 2010, p. 12.

None of this is to suggest that so-called "rogue states' are not threats that sometimes require resolute international response. Rather, it is to challenge the ways in which the threat is represented as a territorial threat 'out there' from 'non-Western others' rather than as a pervasive threat from our very own techno-scientific modernity. Behind the territorializing of global risks in 'rogue stales' is a broader geopolitical question that is central to geopolitics today and likely to remain so into the twenty-first century: how does the West respond to the inevitable diffusion of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, techno-scientific capabilities pioneered by superpower military-industrial complexes, to developing states, to rogue stales

and even to failing states? Put differently, how is the Enlightenment West going to deal with the diffusion of its most deadly weapons, substances and delivery vehicles to the non-West? Whether the West responds by acknowledging that the problem is techno-scientific modernity as a whole - acknowledging that "we (too) are the enemy', that 'our' laboratories, 'our* corporations and 'our' scientists first developed most of the weapons that now threaten us - or whether it responds by territorializing logics that view the problem as 'out there' with 'them' is a crucial question.

Realists have seized upon China as an example of their theories—ignoring that their conclusions arise out of fears over an uncertain American future and the will to justify military domination, not a “true” picture of China. Pan 04

(Chengxin, Professor of Political Science at Australian National University, “The ‘China Threat’ in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics”, Alternatives, June-July)

Having examined how the "China threat" literature is enabled by and serves the purpose of a particular U.S. self-

construction, I want to turn now to the issue of how this literature represents a discursive construction of other, instead of an "objective" account of Chinese reality. This, I argue, has less to do with its portrayal of China as a threat per se than with its essentialization and totalization of China as an externally knowable object, independent of historically contingent contexts or dynamic international interactions. In this sense, the discursive construction of China as a threatening other cannot be detached from (neo)realism, a positivist. ahistorical framework of analysis within which global life is reduced to endless

interstate rivalry for power and survival. As many critical IR scholars have noted, (neo) realism is not a transcendent description of global reality but is predicated on the modernist Western identity, which, in the quest for scientific certainty, has come to define itself essentially as the sovereign territorial nation-state. This realist self-identity of Western states leads to the constitution of anarchy as the sphere of insecurity, disorder, and war. In an anarchical system, as (neo) realists argue, "the gain of one side is often considered to be the loss of the other,"''5 and "All other states are potential threats."'•^ In order to survive in such a system, states inevitably pursue power or capability. In doing so, these realist claims represent what R. B. J. Walker calls "a specific historical articulation of relations of universality/particularity and self/Other."^^ The (neo) realist paradigm has dominated the U.S. IR discipline in general and the U.S. China studies field in particular. As Kurt Campbell notes, after the end of the Cold War, a whole new crop of China experts "are much more likely to have a background in strategic studies or international relations than China itself. ""^^ As a result, for those experts to know China is nothing more or less than to undertake a geopolitical analysis of it, often by asking only a few questions such as how China will "behave" in a strategic sense and how it may affect the regional or global balance of power, with a particular emphasis on China's military power or capabilities. As Thomas J. Christensen notes, "Although many have focused on intentions as well as capabilities, the most prevalent component of the [China threat] debate is the assessment of China's overall future military power compared

with that of the United States and other East Asian regional powers."''^ Consequently, almost by default, China emerges as an absolute other and a threat thanks to this (neo) realist prism. The (neo) realist emphasis on survival and security in international relations dovetails perfectly with the U.S. self-imagination, because for the United States to define itself as the indispensable nation in a world of anarchy is often to demand absolute security. As James Chace and Caleb Carr note, "for over two centuries the aspiration toward an eventual condition of absolute security has been viewed as central to an effective American foreign policy."50 And this self-identification in turn leads

to the definition of not only "tangible" foreign powers but global contingency and uncertainty per se as threats. For example, former U.S. President George H. W. Bush repeatedly said that "the enemy [of America] is unpredictability. The enemy is instability. "5' Similarly, arguing for the continuation of U.S. Cold War alliances, a high-ranking Pentagon official asked, "if we pull out, who knows what nervousness will result? "^2 Thus understood, by its very uncertain character, China would now automatically constitute a threat to the United States. For example, Bernstein and Munro believe that "China's political unpredictability, the always-present possibility that it will fall into a state of domestic disunion and factional fighting," constitutes a source of dangers. In like manner, Richard Betts and Thomas Christensen write: If the PLA [People's Liberation Army] remains second-rate, should the world breathe a sigh of relief? Not entirely. . . . Drawing China into the web of global interdependence may do more to encourage peace than war, but it cannot guarantee that the pursuit of heartfelt political interests will be blocked by a fear of economic consequences. . . . U.S. efforts to create a stable balance across the Taiwan Strait might deter the use of force under certain circumstances, but certainly not

all.54 The upshot, therefore, is that since China displays no absolute certainty for peace, it must be, by definition, an uncertainty, and hence, a threat. In the same way, a multitude of other unpredictable factors (such as ethnic rivalry, local insurgencies, overpopulation, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, rogue states, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and international terrorism) have also been labeled as "threats" to U.S. security. Yet, it seems that in the post-Cold War environment, China represents a kind of uncertainty par excellence. "Whatever the prospects for a more peaceful, more democratic, and more just world order, nothing seems more uncertain today than the future of post-Deng China,"55 argues Samuel

Kim. And such an archetypical uncertainty is crucial to the enterprise of U.S. self-construction, because it seems that only an uncertainty with potentially global consequences such as China could justify U.S. indispensability or its continued world dominance. In this sense, Bruce Cumings aptly suggested in 1996 that China (as a threat) was basically "a metaphor for an enormously expensive Pentagon that has lost its bearings and that requires a formidable 'renegade state' to define its mission (Islam is rather vague, and Iran lacks necessary weights)."56

Their realism inevitable argument does not apply to China—our relationship and the ways in which we choose to construct them are fluid. Yaqing 10

(Qin, Assistant President of the Foreign Affairs College at Bejing and Professor of English and International Studies, International Society as a Process: Institutions, Identities, and China’s Peaceful Rise", The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2010, July 21st 2010, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 21-22).

Identity in process means that an actor’s identity is constructed and re-constructed by processual forces which come from relations in motion. If we follow Buzan’s categorization, any state could be called a revisionist, including the United States, the UK, or France, for in their identity revisionist elements can be easily detected. This is essentially the

concept of ‘identity in fixity’, static and non-transformable. The reality is that any identity is identity in process. In the past three decades, China’s success in peaceful rise has been mainly due to its own change, which comes from interaction with and practices in international society.45 We did not have another cold war because, to a large extent, China changed and brought the change as well as itself into international society . It is often argued over the question that such change is tactical or fundamental, or as a

result of calculation or of ideational reshaping.46 It is a false question, for the two again are inseparable.47 Change includes behavior change and identity change, which are inter- and correlated. Action starting from interest calculation leads an actor into a process and once inside the process mere interest calculation will not work, for the process has its own dynamics and the complex relations may entangle the actor in endless intersubjective practices. The intensive interaction among the actor and other actors and between the actor and the process is powerfully transformative.48

Bian thus is the key to understanding such processes. Continuity through change and change through intersubjective practices is the key to the process-oriented interpretation of society as well as of identity. Buzan argues that it will be extremely difficult for China to accept the primary institutions of international society. We may use one example to illustrate the opposite. Even if we take a brief look at the case of the market institution, we may see how

the process approach works. The story tells us how China has accepted the institution of market economy and together with it how China has gradually changed its identity from a most rigidly planned economy to largely a market economy. The process is a difficult, gradual, and through all the ups and downs, but it is not necessarily violent. Market economy has been long a primary institution of

the Western international society. China’s acceptance of the institution of market economy was extremely difficult and painful at the beginning. For thirty years since 1949, China adopted the planned economy model and practiced it to the extreme during the Cultural Revolution. Market was not a mere economic issue. Rather it was related to China’s identity as a socialist state and to the Chinese Communist Party’s identity as a revolutionary party. The first serious test for China’s reform and opening up was therefore whether China would accept the market institution. Using the three steps in the process approach we argue that the key to this test was how to look at the two opposites: market and planning.

Discourse Voting IssueNegative and simplistic caricatures of China are racist and weaken our ability to create intelligent foreign policy.Lubman 04

(Stanley, Lecturer in Law and Visiting Scholar at the Center for the Study of Law and Society, University of California ( Berkeley)"The Dragon As Demon: Images Of China On Capitol Hill" (March 4, 2004). Center for the Study of Law and Society Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program. JSP/Center for the Study of Law and Society Faculty Working Papers. Paper 18 http://repositories.cdlib.org/csls/fwp/18).

In Congress, alliances of partisans of single issues insist vocally on highly negative views of China. Critics of China’s human rights practices, including a repressive criminal process and suppression of dissent, have joined with members who speak for the religious right in decrying China’s birth-control policies and hostility to religions not licensed by the state. Supporters of Tibetan independence and an autonomous Taiwan add further heat to debate, as do others in whose geostrategic perspective China has already become a threat to American security. Underlying the views of some, echoing the labor

unions, is a commitment to protectionism. One respected Senator suggested during the debates that latent racism may lurk even deeper. These views cloud debate because they often caricature a complex society and foster unconstructive moralizing rather than analysis of the problems that they address. By demonizing China they obstruct the formulation and maintenance of a coherent American policy toward China and weaken Congress’ contribution to making US policy .