addressing refugee security - unhcr - the un refugee agencyaddressing refugee security of all the...

Addressing refugeesecurity

Of all the reasons that drive refugees to flee their homes, none is as great as fear. Itmay be fear of direct physical attack, or of a conflict where rape, torture and ethniccleansing are part of military strategy. In their attempts to escape refugees may dodgebullets in a war zone, be chased by human traffickers or risk their lives crossing stormyseas on leaky boats. Even if they survive these dangers and make it to another country,they may find that their fears continue to dog them. The conflict they tried to escapemay have followed them, and their lives and dignity may still be threatened.

Ensuring the physical safety of refugees is one of the most pressing concerns ofUNHCR and its partners. The refugee protection regime was created by theinternational community to shelter those fleeing direct threats to their lives. But thisvery fact has meant that refugee protection has always been profoundly affected bylarger security issues. Real and perceived security threats not only influence thewillingness of states to provide asylum to refugees, they also determine the quality ofthe refuge provided. At another level, insecure environments weaken the ability ofUNHCR and allied humanitarian agencies to assist and protect refugees—and thus touphold their basic rights.

The beginning of the twenty-first century has seen a number of new developmentswith regard to refugee security. For one, UNHCR has become much more involved insecurity issues, especially as they affect ongoing operations. For another, theemergence of new security concerns for states, such as terrorism, has led to the‘securitization’ of practices related to asylum. Lastly, issues of migration,development and relief have become more closely linked to security.1 Indeed, there isan increasingly widespread view that the viability of the refugee protection regimehinges on its real and perceived impact on international security.2

This chapter will outline the importance of security in refugee protection andillustrate the increasing interconnectedness of refugee, state and global security. Itdescribes recent legal and operational developments related to security both at theinter-state level and on the ground. The concluding part of the chapter highlights theways in which preventive and ‘soft’ measures integrated into refugee protection andassistance can help defuse many of the security threats faced by refugees and theirhosts alike.

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In Sri Lanka, UNHCR-supported 'open relief centres' have been maintained in areas of conflict since 1990.The civilian character of these centres has been respected due to an informal understanding between UNHCR,the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. (UNHCR/M. Kobayashi /1999)

Addressing refugeesecurity

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In Sri Lanka, UNHCR-supported 'open relief centres' have been maintained in areas of conflict since 1990.The civilian character of these centres has been respected due to an informal understanding between UNHCR,the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. (UNHCR/M. Kobayashi /1999)

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Security and refugee protection

Refugees have always been a by-product of war, which is still the most clearlyidentifiable and direct threat to national security. Within the global refugee protectionregime, security concerns motivate state responses to refugee flows and are of primaryimportance in UNHCR’s operations. The linkage of national and international securityconcerns and humanitarian assistance and asylum is not new. It can be seen inaccounts of the emergence of organized refugee assistance in Europe following theSecond World War.3 In the 1960s and 1970s, African governments in particularattached considerable importance to security concerns arising from refugeemovements.4

Aware of the potential of conflicts to spill over borders via refugee flows,5 theinternational community has always emphasized that asylum must be recognizedas a neutral, non-political act embedded in a system of multilateralism. In additionto this most fundamental norm, the 1951 UN Refugee Convention contains anexplicit system of checks and balances which address states’ security concerns.6

The system serves to provide protection to individuals and to defuse potentialinterstate tension.

But the challenge of integrating the differing security interests and strategies of thevarious parts of the international refugee regime has grown more complex. Theproblems arising from operating in war zones and continuing protection concernsrelated to refugees in protracted situations are partly responsible. So too is the rise ofxenophobia and fear of asylum seekers in many countries, which has led to a tendencyto see refugees not as victims but as perpetrators of insecurity. That kind of thinkinghas inspired more aggressive interception measures, higher barriers to entry andindiscriminate detention, all of which pose new security risks to refugees. Meanwhile,many states see their responsibility for refugees as shared with the internationalcommunity. While some see this practice as an offloading of state responsibility, italso reflects recognition that the security concerns of states as well as refugees arebest met by ensuring that the multilateral and humanitarian character of refugeeprotection is maintained.

Human security: establishing linkages

All involved in refugee protection, be they states, host populations or humanitarianorganizations, share some broad security concerns. Yet how they interpret theseconcerns can differ widely. To account for such differences, traditional perceptions ofsecurity purely in terms of a state’s territorial integrity have increasingly been linked tonew concepts of human security. This new thinking has been adopted by manymembers of the United Nations family and incorporated into the foreign-policyagendas of countries such as Canada and Japan.7

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The State of the World's Refugees

Security and refugee protection


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The new view of human security highlights the interdependent nature of thesecurity threats in refugee situations. It recognizes that long-term state security isultimately dependent on the security provided to non-state actors such as refugeesand that, inversely, refugee protection may be impossible in situations of acute andcontinuous state insecurity.8 The new perspective on human security also links thesecurity concerns of individuals and communities to a wider range of threatsincluding, but not restricted to, physical violence. Indeed, the concept of effectiveprotection has evolved along with changes in the perception of the various dimensionsof human security. For instance, protection now means safeguarding not just thephysical integrity but also the human dignity of every refugee.

Refugee security

Threats to the physical security of refugees emanate from a variety of sources,including organized crime, errant military and police forces, anti-governmentmilitants, local populations and the refugee community itself. The vulnerability ofrefugees is magnified where they have limited material and financial resources andtheir family and community structures have been strained or destroyed. The physicalthreats to refugees range from theft, assault and domestic violence to child abuse,rape and human trafficking. Furthermore, in their vulnerable state refugees may beeasily manipulated for political ends.

The presence of armed elements in refugee flows and settlements poses afundamental threat to the civilian and humanitarian character of asylum, creatingserious security concerns for refugees, host communities, local authorities andhumanitarian workers alike.9 The task of identifying combatants within a mass influx ismade harder by the vast numbers involved. Besides, members of militia groups rarelyidentify themselves, and often hide their weapons in order to blend in with the civilianpopulation.

Armed groups in refugee situations have been known to divert humanitarian aidfrom those who need it most, either through outright theft or through voluntary andinvoluntary ‘taxation’. Both methods have been linked to malnutrition among refugeeswhen increased rebel activity demands higher contributions. Rebels may also engagein forced recruitment of young men and children or use refugee camps as rest andrecuperation sites. Many of these problems are exacerbated when refugees reside forlong periods in countries of asylum where they lack educational and economicopportunities.

The presence of armed elements can also increase the risk of armed attacks onrefugee settlements by opposing forces. In some cases, armed elements maychallenge the implementation of durable solutions such as voluntary repatriation andlocal integration. For example, in the aftermath of the 1999 East Timor crisis,pro-Indonesian militiamen used violence and false information about conditions inEast Timor to try and prevent refugees in West Timor from returning home.10

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Addressing refugee securityAddressing refugee security

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The new concept of human security also raises awareness of threats to the physicalsecurity of refugees other than direct attacks or military activity. These include anunderstanding of the existential insecurity introduced by insufficient or irregularsupplies of food because of ration cuts or other restrictions. Such shortfalls not onlythreaten lives but are linked to an increase in domestic or sexual violence and othercrimes in protracted refugee situations. In other circumstances urban refugees, whooften lack any assistance or secure legal status, may be targeted for crimes and abuseby the host population (see Box 2.4).

State security strategies within and across borders

In the late 1990s a number of UN Security Council resolutions marked the increasingattention of states to security issues arising from refugee movements. In theseresolutions, states recognized that massive population displacement could constitutea threat to regional and international peace and stability, and even represent a

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The State of the World's RefugeesThe State of the World's Refugees

Sexual and gender-based violenceWar magnifies the everydayinjustices that many women livewith in peacetime. During periods ofarmed conflict, all forms of violenceincrease, particularly violenceagainst women and girls. Womenforced to flee their homes are oftencaught in a vicious cycle of abuse,exposed to sexual exploitationthroughout the refugee experience.Sexual and gender-based violenceranges from harassment, domesticviolence and rape to female genitalmutilation and the withholding offood or other essentials unless paidfor with sex.

It is now acknowledged within thehumanitarian community thatdisplacement has very specificgender dimensions, and that theprotection concerns of refugeewomen and girls differ in manyrespects from those of men. Forinstance, in addition to beingdisproportionately affected by sexualand gender-based violence, womenoften do not get equal access tohumanitarian assistance and asylumopportunities.

Protection concerns

Sexual and gender-based violence canoccur at every stage of the refugeecycle: during flight, while in the

country of asylum and duringrepatriation. For example, in Darfur(Sudan) where civil war has displacedmore than a million people,gender-based violence has beenrampant. In 2004, AmnestyInternational conducted interviewswith hundreds of internally displacedand refugee women from Darfur, whohad suffered rape, abduction, sexualslavery and torture. With the majorityof displaced people still trappedacross the border, and the widespreadstigma of rape keeping many womensilent, those interviewed comprisedbut a small fraction of the totalnumber of victims.

Unfortunately, camps may not alwaysbe safe havens for women. Separatedfrom the security offered byextended networks of family andcommunity, unaccompanied womenand girls may be regarded by campguards and male refugees as sexualprey. Those who are lucky enough toflee with their family often find thatthe tremendous strains of refugeelife increase the incidence ofdomestic violence. Poorly plannedcamps that do not take into accountthe needs of women and girls canalso expose them to abuse; attacksare more common when women areforced to travel unprotected to

remote areas in search of food, waterand firewood.

When food and other necessities arein short supply, women may not geta fair share of what is available. TheUnited Nations Development Fundfor Women (UNIFEM) has warnedthat women in camps get less ofeverything from plastic sheeting tosoap. If men are the sole distributorsof food and supplies, the likelihoodof sexual exploitation is muchhigher. Sadly, there have been caseswhere humanitarian workers andpeacekeepers, the very peopleresponsible for the well-being andprotection of refugees, have abusedtheir power.

Prevention and response

Due to powerful socio-cultural andlegal obstacles, sexual andgender-based violence is one of themost challenging issues for ahumanitarian organization. It is anextremely under-reported crime incountries where victims of sexualassault are stigmatized. Women andgirls remain silent due to shame andthe acute fear of being shunned bytheir families and communities.Moreover, traditional justice systemsdo not always provide the victim withprotection; verdicts can sometimes

Box 3.1

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deliberate strategy of war. More concretely, the Security Council linked populationdisplacement to threats to international peace and security and considered suchthreats grounds for international action in Haiti, Iraq, Kosovo, Liberia, Rwanda andSomalia.11

Displacement has certainly contributed to the endemic instability in Africa’s GreatLakes region. The volatility here is to some extent the result of a tradition amongrefugee warriors of allying themselves with political factions—whether in governmentor opposition—in their host state and becoming entangled in that state’s internalpolitics (see Box 3.2).12 Here and elsewhere, refugees have become linked to theforeign-policy strategies of states, undermining the very notion of the non-politicalnature of asylum.13 Indeed, while many states do not possess the resources to identifyand disarm combatants within refugee groups, others actively encourage such armedelements on their soil, using them as a bargaining chip in relations with the country oforigin.14

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result in further human rightsviolations. In some cultures a womancan be forced to marry her attacker.

Many countries of asylum have failedto incorporate into domestic law theprovisions in international or regionalhuman rights instruments—whichthey ratified—on the protection ofwomen. Combined with gender-biased provisions in domestic law,they work to minimize women’sopportunities to seek legal recourse.

Throughout the 1990s, UNHCRsupported initiatives which addressedsexual and gender-based violence.Published in 1991, UNHCR’sGuidelines on the Protection ofRefugee Women went beyondconventional ideas of protection bystressing two very important points:the intrinsic relationship betweenprotection and assistance, and thenotion that the participation ofrefugees in the decision-makingprocess promotes protection.Following the Guidelines, UNHCRcame out with a guide for protectionofficers on sexual and gender-basedviolence, increasing awareness of theissue, and established legal andcounselling services in the field.

In 1993, the Women Victims ofViolence Project in Kenya, later

passed on by UNHCR toCARE-Kenya, established drop-incentres that enabled women toreport sexual violence. In order toreduce the vulnerability and exposureof women to assault while collectingfirewood, UNHCR and itsimplementing partners carried outthe Firewood Project in 1997. Thisassisted with firewood distribution,covering 30 per cent of householdfirewood consumption in the Dadaabcamps in Kenya. In Guinea, thegovernment collaborated withUNHCR and NGOs on educationcampaigns on women’s issues withinthe refugee community. In therefugee camps for Burundians inTanzania, UNHCR and itsimplementing partners focused onawareness-raising and the provisionof proper legal, medical andpsycho-social support to victims ofsexual violence. Efforts were alsomade to involve more women inhealth and education activities.

Conclusion

Addressing sexual and gender-basedviolence has proven a challenge forthe humanitarian community, thoughconsiderable progress has been madeon the issue. While there have beensignificant efforts over the last two

decades to place sexual andgender-based violence on internationaland national policy agendas, glaringgaps in the protection of womenagainst abuse still exist. According toUNHCR, in 2004 alone 157incidents of sexual and gender-basedviolence were reported in Bhutaneserefugee camps in Nepal, 259 caseswere recorded in the Dadaab refugeecamp area in Kenya, and more than1,200 cases were documented inrefugee camps in Tanzania. These arejust some of the instances wherewomen have suffered violence withlittle recourse to medical,psychological or legal help.

Today, UNHCR is working towards amore coordinated approach tocombat sexual and gender-basedviolence. Known as the multi-sectoralapproach, it seeks change throughthe involvement of all actors whoprovide services to the survivors ofsexual and gender-based violence.This approach recognizes that suchwomen and girls may need thesupport of a number of sectors,including health and communityservices, the judiciary and lawenforcement. When it comes toviolence against women, all have arole to play both in preventing it andresponding to it.

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Another facet of the interplay between refugee flows and states relates to internalsecurity and stability. This is linked to the greater availability of small arms in conflictzones, as well as potential conflicts over resources created by the presence of largegroups of refugees. Rapid and massive refugee flows can aggravate instability in statesfacing economic problems, political uncertainty and ethnic or social tensions.Tensions between refugees and their host population may be the result of actual or

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The Great Lakes: regional instability and population displacementIt is estimated that at least 3.5million people have perished ineastern Congo since 1998. Atpresent, one thousand die there eachday as a result of violence, starvationand disease. More than 3 millionCongolese, Burundians andRwandans remain displaced in theregion. Furthermore, according to UNestimates, some 20,000–40,000child soldiers have been recruitedinto the ranks of warring groups andmore than 40,000 women have beenvictims of sexual violence. Overall,some two-thirds of the population inthe Democratic Republic of Congo(DRC) suffers from malnutrition.Approximately 70 per cent of thechildren in the country do not go toschool.

The unrest continues to revolvearound the rivalries among the Tutsi,Hutu and other ethnic groups in thearea that have been exploited by thegovernments of the DRC and itsneighbours to advance theirrespective agendas. Porous nationalborders and ethnic, cultural andhistorical links between theinhabitants of these countries havetransformed intra-state unrest intointer-state conflicts. These haveassumed a regional dimension andproduced massive populationdisplacements within and acrossborders.

Concern about continued politicalinstability and populationdisplacement in the region hasprompted a number of outside actorsto try and contain or resolve thepolitical and humanitarian tragedy.Beginning in 1999, the UN SecurityCouncil created a peacekeepingmission (MONUC) for the DRC. Themission’s mandate and size were

gradually expanded, and by 2004 ithad become the largest UNpeacekeeping operation in the world.Furthermore, between 1999 and2003, mediation efforts led by SouthAfrica prompted neighbouring statessuch as Angola, Burundi, Namibia,Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe towithdraw their troops from the DRC.

Despite these initial steps, the cycleof violence and displacement in theDRC intensified. The country’seastern neighbours continued toexploit ethnic cleavages and usedCongolese proxies to pursue theirobjectives. The scale of the fightingand population displacement wasparticularly extensive in Ituri,adjacent to Uganda. MONUCestablished a limited presence inIturi to monitor the situation. Buthumanitarian agencies in the regionfaced many obstacles in gainingaccess to victims because of thevastness of the territory, poorinfrastructure, the impenetrability ofthe rain forest where many displacedpeople sought refuge, andintimidation and violence by armedelements. Between 1999 and 2003,more than 50,000 people were killedand some 600,000 displaced in Iturialone, with 10,000 refugees enteringUganda. The populationdisplacement peaked in mid-2003,by which time a total of 3.4 millionCongolese had been forced to fleetheir homes.

A significant milestone was reachedin July 2003 with the creation of theGovernment of National Unity andTransition in Kinshasa whichincluded the various Congolesepolitical factions. This arrangementwas brokered with the assistance ofSouth Africa. As a consequence,

hundreds of thousands of internallydisplaced persons and refugeesreturned to their homes. Meanwhile,negotiations between the Burundiangovernment and several rebel groupsbore fruit, resulting in a ceasefireagreement that paved the way forthe return of thousands of refugeesand internally displaced persons.

But in spite of the positivedevelopments, the cycle of violenceand displacement in the eastern partof the DRC continued. In SouthKivu, a mutiny by Congolese armyunits in May 2004 prompted tens ofthousands of people to flee thefighting, crossing into Burundi andRwanda. Only weeks later, in July,armed clashes in Ituri between localmilitias led to the displacement of35,000 Congolese. Furthermore,when Rwandan forces launchedcross-border operations in the DRCto pursue Rwandan Hutu insurgentsin late 2004, more than 100,000people were displaced by thefighting; some 40,000 becamerefugees in Burundi and Rwanda.

The violence and displacement ineastern Congo continue to threatenregional security and the welfare ofthe entire population of that area.Some progress is being achieved onthe political, humanitarian andsecurity fronts, albeit in a gradualmanner. Extricating the region fromthe spiral of destruction anddisplacement entails the disarmingof militias by the Congolese militaryand MONUC. Also required are apolitical process that fostersreconciliation and generous measuresof humanitarian assistance anddevelopment investment.

Box 3.2

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The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by theUnited Nations. Geographical data sources: UNHCR, Global Insight digital mapping - © 1998 Europa Technologies Ltd.

Map 3.1 The Great Lakes Region, June 2005The Great Lakes Region, June 2005

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perceived competition for resources or of resentment when refugees are seen asprivileged in relation to their poorer hosts. This has been the case in Kenya, forinstance.

These tensions may lead to other security concerns. In Ethiopia, Kenya andTanzania, the areas around refugee camps are prone to banditry, the blame for whichoften falls on refugees. Such problems are aggravated in poor states and those inwhich a weak governing authority is unable to exercise sovereignty effectively.15 Insuch places, the security threats faced by refugees and the local population are oftenthe same.

Host communities and humanitarian workers

Protracted refugee situations pose additional difficulties, especially when uprootedpeople lack educational and economic opportunities and where their prospects fordurable solutions are limited. This is often the case in host countries where localinhabitants also struggle to survive. Some 90 per cent of the world’s refugees live indeveloping nations, where economic stagnation and unemployment are high andgeneral opportunities low. The resulting competition, be it real or perceived, for scarceresources leads to friction between refugees and the local population. The latter oftenblame the former for a variety of problems, including increases in crime.

The existence of a link between high crime rates and the presence of refugees iswidely accepted, even though the nature of this link is often unclear. In somesituations refugees resort to illegal activities as a result of general economicscarcity—or to fill breaks in their food supply. Yet crime rates are influenced not onlyby refugees but also by changing patterns of conflict across borders. Furthermore,refugees’ attempts to breach restrictions on their freedom of movement, economicactivity or self-reliance are sometimes labelled crimes.

The security threats that host populations and refugees often share, such as rebelactivity, ongoing conflict and scarcity may also bring them into direct conflict witheach other. Where existing problems are exploited by politicians with intolerantagendas, the result in both rich and poor countries is xenophobia and attacks onrefugees (see Box 3.4).

Conflict-prone environments also endanger the humanitarian workers who helprefugees. The surge in attacks on such workers risks undermining the fundamentalviability of humanitarian assistance in many of today’s conflict zones. Staff of various UNagencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and NGOs have beenintimidated, physically threatened, kidnapped or killed while trying to carry out theirduties (see Box 3.3). The UN Security Council has stressed that guaranteeing the securityof aid workers is a major challenge when providing assistance to populations of concern.16

Yet, although humanitarian workers in war zones are at risk, their presence can alsodiscourage attacks on the displaced. This was frequently the case in the Balkans andin the African Great Lakes region in the 1990s.17 The dangers faced by humanitarianpersonnel have raised difficult questions about the role of the military and other

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security forces in refugee protection. More recently, in Afghanistan and Iraq, ongoingpolitical conflict and military intervention have risked undermining the perceivedneutrality of aid workers, with direct consequences for their security.

Developing responses

Some of the security threats outlined above are of long standing. However, in recentyears there has been more awareness of the interconnectedness of various threats aswell as a more concerted effort to address them. Conceiving of security as a sharedconcern also means conceiving of it as a shared responsibility. Under internationallaw, a state is obliged to ensure the physical protection of all those who reside withinits borders—refugees included—and it remains the responsibility of the host state toprevent the militarization of refugee-populated areas. At the same time, the security ofrefugees and their hosts is also a collective endeavour, both to prevent dangeroussituations from occurring and to stop their escalation.

The principle of shared responsibility for refugee security among all multilateral andbilateral actors was inscribed in UNHCR’s Executive Committee Resolution 58 of1987, when international concern was focused on armed attacks on refugee camps.18

Recent years have seen further acceptance of this principle both in multilateralforums and in operational practice. This acceptance can also be seen as a response tonew concerns such as terrorism or sexual and gender-based violence, all of whichthreaten the security of refugees in multiple ways. At its worst, however, it can meanan outsourcing of state responsibility to international actors.

Enlarging the multilateral mandate

Since the early 1990s and the crises in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Rwanda inparticular, security has become a bigger issue in refugee assistance. At the UnitedNations, this shift is reflected in Security Council resolutions 1208 (1998) and 1296(2000), which directly address the security and neutrality of refugee camps.19 Amongother things, these resolutions establish the legal parameters for authorizing actionunder the UN Charter, which could involve the deployment of international militaryforces and monitors to address insecurity in camps. In line with expanded notions ofsecurity, the resolutions also aim to link up humanitarian, political and militaryactivities.

Security has also been the subject of informal discussions among governmentsfollowing UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s report on the causes of conflict in Africaand his two reports on the protection of civilians in armed conflict.20 During thisprocess states have called on UNHCR to provide advice, training and technicalassistance to host states to help them discharge their responsibilities to refugees.

UNHCR’s Executive Committee concluded in 1993 that the organization ‘maymonitor the personal security of refugees and asylum seekers and take appropriate

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Addressing refugee security

Developing responses


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Security of humanitarian workersA survey of the period 1985–98registered a total of 256humanitarian workersi killed in theline of duty, or an average of 18 peryear. For later years the counts arehigher, estimates ranging from anannual average of 22 to 41 violentdeaths over a seven-year period.Combined with front-page mediareports of dramatic securityincidents, such figures havecontributed to the widespread notionthat humanitarian workers today areat greater risk of violent death thanbefore. But what do these numbersmean?

Has the security risk increased?

Statistics in this area are notoriouslypoor, making it difficult to determinetrends and assess risk. It isindicative that the only two carefulstudies done in recent years arrive atvery different conclusions. A reportpublished by the European

Commission’s Humanitarian Office(ECHO) in 2004 counted 158violent deaths among humanitarianworkers in the period 1997–2003;an annual average of 22.ii Given thevast growth in humanitarianactivities—there has been a fivefoldincrease in internationalhumanitarian aid in the past twodecades—the conclusion must bethat the security risk to theindividual worker has decreasedsubstantially. However, a similarreport undertaken by theGeneva-based Centre forHumanitarian Dialogue (CHD) in2005 and covering the same periodfound almost twice as many violentdeaths, i.e. 291.iii Even allowing forthe increase in humanitarianworkers worldwide, a doubling ofthe annual rate of violent deaths(i.e. from 18 to 41) compared toearlier years studied suggests verysignificant risk.

The different conclusionsdemonstrate the depth of theassessment problem. There are nostatistics on the number ofhumanitarian workers worldwide andno common reporting procedures fordifferent agencies. The definition ofwhat constitutes violence againsthumanitarian workers differs. Forexample, should it include a scufflewith a security guard or an assaulton a local driver on short-term hire?Analysts can apply very differentdefinitions and arrive at verydifferent conclusions, as is apparentabove. Nevertheless, someconclusions seem reasonable:� The increasing number of deaths

reflects above all the expansion ofhumanitarian activities in or nearconflict zones. The most markedincrease in humanitarian aidoccurred after the Cold War, whenthe number of civil wars and newpossibilities for collective

Box 3.3

CHD 2005

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Figure 3.1 Estimates of humanitarian workers killed 1997-2003

Sources: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, No Relief, Geneva 2005;ECHO, Report on Security of Humanitarian Personnel, 2004;both based on D. King, 'Chronology of Humanitarian Aid Workers Killed in 1997-2003', 15 January 2004.

Figure 3.1 Estimates of humanitarian workers killed 1997-2003

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intervention brought more aidoperations into theatres of conflict.

� The security risk to individualhumanitarian workers has probablydecreased. Humanitarian aid—andtherefore probably humanitarianoperations as well as the numberof workers in the field—hasexpanded faster than theincidence of violent death amonghumanitarian workers, even if weuse the high death estimates forrecent years. This is especiallyclear from the late 1990s andonwards (except in 2003). In goodyears, the security risk toindividual staff members was byany measure very low. Forinstance, by the beginning of thiscentury, the United Nations hadsome 60,000–70,000 staff aroundthe world.iv In 2001, according tothe Secretary-General, three werekilled; the following year thenumber rose to six (not includingthree who died in a helicoptercrash).

� The security risk is not evenlyspread. One crisis could have a

major impact not only on themedia and public opinion,but—given the overall smallnumbers—on the casualtystatistics as well. Thus, therelative stability and even declinein violent deaths amonghumanitarian workers since 1997was abruptly broken by the eventsof 2003. The bombing of the UNheadquarters in Baghdad andviolence in Afghanistan accountedfor about half of the deaths ofhumanitarian workers that year. Adecade earlier, events in twocountries—Bosnia andHerzegovina, and Rwanda—similarly made the death countrise sharply in one year (1994).Overall, however, Africa is theregion where the most aid workershave been intentionally targeted inrecent years.

Threats and targetsMost humanitarian workers who dieon the job are intentionally killed.Accidents (such as airplane and carcrashes), bombing raids andlandmines account for the rest. This

has been the pattern since themid-1980s, but with one maindifference—traffic accidents havedeclined dramatically from 16 percent of the violent deaths in the1985–98 study to only 3 per cent inlater years. Increased road-safetyconsciousness among humanitarianorganizations has evidently made adifference.

Most security incidents do not endwith death. Humanitarian workersface a range of threats, variouslymotivated and accompanied bydifferent kinds of violence. Banditryremains a major worry, involvingtheft of office property and vehicles,the ransacking of warehouses andhijacking of relief convoys.Hostage-taking, bomb threats andharassment are also widespread. Arecent survey of security incidentsexperienced by UN agencies andfour major NGOs recorded almost3,500 in one year alone, notincluding accidents. According to theCHD 2005 report, most frequentwere cases of theft (1,833),unspecified non-lethal violence and

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Figure 3.2 Humanitarian aid 1971-2003

Source: OECD/DAC, Paris. Values in constant 2003 dollars.

Figure 3.2 Humanitarian aid 1971-2003

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assault on the agency or itspersonnel (1,166), harassment(302), bomb threats (40) and deaths(37).

Deadly violence takes different formsin different regions. In Iraq,humanitarian workers are most likelyto be killed or injured by bombs. InAfghanistan, they face ambushes andexecutions. In Angola, they riskrunning across landmines. More localstaff are killed than internationals—information from 1997–2003suggests about twice as many,v butthere is little systematic data toexplain why. The number of localstaff may be larger at the outset, ormore exposed in the field, as in thecase of security guards and drivers.Agencies may employ more nationalthan international staff in high-riskareas such as Iraq. Local employeesmay be more vulnerable for politicalreasons than expatriates.

Until recently, most of thehumanitarian workers killed were UN

staff—only a third worked forNGOs.viThis started to change in1999, and soon the pattern wasreversed, with two NGO staff killedfor every UN employee who sufferedthe same fate.vii Lack of systematicinformation makes it difficult toprovide precise explanations for thedifference, but there may be several.

The expansion of NGO activitiesstarted in the early 1990s. However,the simple increase in numbers—andthe addition of inexperienced peoplein the field—tells only part of thestory. Different security strategies arealso important. As the securityenvironment deteriorated in the early1990s, UN agencies soughtprotection by ‘hardening targets’(erecting outer compound walls,requiring two vehicles for fieldmissions, etc.). This may havereduced the casualty rate evenbefore the minimum operatingsecurity standards (MOSS) wereinstituted in 2001. Most NGOs,however, continued to rely on good

relations with the local populationfor protection, using the so-called‘acceptance’ approach. From anotherperspective, this appeared as agreater willingness to take risks.

Security and neutralityViolence against humanitarian workersdoes not strike only at the new andinexperienced. Nor does it spareagencies that stringently adhere tothe neutrality principle—the ICRCheadquarters in Baghdad wasbombed. Some NGOs, by contrast,have long expressed the primacy ofsolidarity over strict neutrality—atradition that goes back to the Biafrawar of the late 1960s—and have notbeen targeted for that reason. Rather,the growing violence againsthumanitarian workers reflects thechanging context and nature ofwarfare as well as an assertive andexpanding humanitarian response.

Not only did the internationalhumanitarian regime grow in the1990s, it also began to mount more

Asia

Africa

Middle East

Europe Latin America

Figure 3.3 Intentionally killed humanitarian workers, 1997-2003,by region

Source: D. King, 2004.

Figure 3.3 Intentionally killed humanitarian workers, 1997-2003,by region

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operations within areas of conflict.More humanitarian agencies movedfrom assisting refugees safely behindbattle zones to working on thetypically shifting front lines ofconflict. Meanwhile, paramilitaryforces and militias attacked civilianpopulations without respecting theRed Cross and Red Crescentsymbols. State military forces alsoviolated international humanitarianlaw.

In wars where population movementand relief supplies were strategicassets, humanitarian workers becamepart of the struggle. As the politicalelement of humanitarian actionbecame more explicit,neutrality—and the safety it wasthought to provide—eroded. Seekingprotection from international militaryforces or even UN peacekeepers, assome humanitarian workers did,further underlined the tensionbetween the need for security andthe principle of neutrality.

Since the first Gulf War (1991),military forces have taken on morehumanitarian tasks. Westernmilitary forces provided criticallogistical functions in the Rwandarefugee crisis in 1994 and builtrefugee camps and organized reliefsupplies during the Kosovo crisis in1999. US and NATO forces haveexplicitly combined humanitarian,political and military operationsthrough joint civilian–military teamsdeployed in insecure areas, as inAfghanistan. This militarization ofhumanitarian space has reducedthe perceived neutrality of aidworkers.

Western military intervention forpurposes of regime change hasintensified the neutrality dilemmaof humanitarian agencies. Ifhumanitarian workers entered inthe wake of controversial andcontested interventions, they riskedbeing perceived as partisan even iftheir intentions were strictly

humanitarian. Funding fromintervening states accentuated thisperception, and insecurityincreased markedly. It is strikingthat more humanitarian workerswere victims of targeted killings in2003—the year of high casualtiesin Iraq and Afghanistan—than inthe three preceding years takentogether.

Whether humanitarian action isperceived as a fig leaf for politicalinaction, as in Bosnia andHerzegovina, or as bandaging thewounds after military action, as inIraq, the security of aid workers iscompromised. Aid agencies haveresponded in varied ways—bywithdrawing or suspending aid,hardening targets, or seekingprotection from the military. Butnone of the responses comes withoutcost, and some entail limits onhumanitarian action.

3%3%

6%

12%

intentionally killed plane crash landmines car accidents aerial bombings

Figure 3.4 Humanitarian workers killed 1997–2003,cause of death

Source: D. King, 2004.

Figure 3.4 Humanitarian workers killed 1997–2003,cause of death

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action to prevent or redress violations thereof.’ Security Council Resolution 1208 alsostressed the need for refugee-hosting countries to develop institutions and proceduresto implement the provisions of international law. The resolution repeatedly called forthe location of camps away from borders to prevent the involvement of refugees in theconflict from which they fled.

Furthermore, in 2002 UNHCR’s Executive Committee called on the agency todevelop mechanisms to ensure the demilitarization of refugee camps. TheRwandan emergency in the mid-1990s pushed this enlarged security agendaforward by bringing home the security challenges confronting refugee operations inthe absence of an existing security apparatus, be it of the host government or theUnited Nations.

The ‘ladder of options’ and beyond

Wherever armed elements or combatants might be present, assuring the civilian andhumanitarian character of asylum and of the areas hosting refugee populationsinvolves a range of measures. These include disarming and demobilizing armed exiles,preventing the flow of arms between refugees, protecting refugees from attack andintimidation, and separating combatants or war criminals from refugees.

There are various ways in which the international community has tried to addressthis challenge, most prominently by developing the so-called ‘ladder of options’.21 Theladder represents an assessment-and-response tool. It describes a series of possibleand ideally multilateral responses to escalating threats to the civilian andhumanitarian character of refugee camps and to the security of refugees andhumanitarian personnel. These threats are then dealt with by a continuum ofmeasures ranked in order of their ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ nature, depending on the localcontext. Most of these measures represent different ways to assure separation andexclusion of persons who—mainly because of their continuing involvement inmilitary conflict—cannot be defined as refugees.

The ‘soft’ measures of the ladder include preventive and corrective steps whichbuild cooperation with national law-enforcement mechanisms. ‘Intermediate’measures include international support for national security forces and the deploymentof international fact-finding missions and observers as well as international policeforces. ‘Hard’ methods involve the use of regional or international military forces.

Under the harder measures, once a mandate is secured, regional and internationalmilitary forces may perform a number of roles alongside national military forces. Theiractivities may range from monitoring and intelligence-gathering to reconnaissanceand situation assessment. They may also be involved in the separation, disarmamentand demobilization of combatants; border control; camp-perimeter security; and thetraining of national military forces.

These measures have both positive and negative aspects. On the one hand, thepresence of military forces in a refugee camp undermines the humanitarian andcivilian character of the camp and may increase the risk of it becoming a military

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target. On the other, the presence of a well-disciplined and well-equipped militaryforce in the vicinity of a camp may act as a deterrent against attack and themilitarization of the camp.

The deployment of ECOMIL (Economic Community of West African States Missionin Liberia) troops in August 2003 had an immediate impact, reducing security fears inand around the camps for refugees and internally displaced people in the vicinity ofthe Liberian capital, Monrovia. It secured the camps and forced armed militiamen towithdraw. Arguably, the rapid deployment of humanitarian and security personnel inand around refugee-populated areas during the initial phase of a humanitarianemergency helps deter armed elements from infiltrating the population or targetingrefugees. The ECOMIL troops were eventually replaced by international civilian policeofficers.

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UN aid workers, escorted by Australian peacekeepers, board a helicopter to evacuate the border town of Atambua inWest Timor, Indonesia, on 7 September 2000. Dozens of foreign aid workers fled West Timor that day after a mob ledby pro-Indonesian militia gangs killed three UN workers and three local people. (AP Photo/UN/P. Green/2000)

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In Nepal, the introduction in 2003 of a well-equipped security force in the areaaround refugee camps has reduced the movement of unidentified groups at night andprevented attacks on the camps. In Uganda, on the other hand, the lack of a fullyeffective military force in the north of the country has allowed the Lords ResistanceArmy rebels to attack settlements of refugees and internally displaced people.

The use of international civilian police (CIVPOL) monitors, authorized under the UNCharter to train and assist police in ensuring camp security, is one way theinternational community can support refugee security when it cannot be guaranteedby the host state. CIVPOL monitors may be deployed—without the express permissionof the host state—as part of a multinational peacekeeping or peace-building force.However, they will be less effective if the host state does not acknowledge theirmandate. The United Nations authorized such monitors for Angola, Bosnia andHerzegovina, Cambodia, East Timor, Haiti, Kosovo, Mozambique and Somalia.CIVPOL officers were involved in these interventions as advisers, monitors andinstructors. Later, in Kosovo and East Timor, CIVPOL was replaced by armedlaw-enforcement officers with full executive authority, including the right to usedeadly force.22

Security packages

The aim of the ladder of options is to enhance the effectiveness of responses tosecurity threats in refugee situations. In practice its application has been largelyrestricted to operations which fall broadly under the ‘soft’ end of the ladder.Frequently, due to the absence of states with the capacity or willingness to engagethemselves, so-called ‘security packages’ have been implemented by UNHCR inconsultation with host governments and some bilateral donors. In the best-casescenario such programmes are aimed at building and sustaining the capacity of ahost state to provide and promote refugee security. However, where relationshipsamong all actors deteriorate, these measures may introduce new securityproblems.

During the Rwandan refugee crisis in the mid-1990s, UNHCR hired a contingent ofZairean soldiers to support security in the Congolese camps. The move was initiallysuccessful; later, however, these troops became embroiled in the conflict as well. InKosovo, UNHCR issued guidelines for quasi-national security forces, and in the late1990s more formal arrangements to improve refugee security based on securitypackages were concluded, first with Tanzania and then with Kenya and Guinea. Theseexperiences paved the way for similar strategies in other countries, among themGhana, Liberia, Sierra Leone and, most recently, Chad.

Broadly, the aim of security packages is to reduce the level of insecurity andcriminality in refugee camps and safeguard their civilian and humanitarian character.The packages increasingly contain specific references to a reduction in sexual andgender-based violence. They are linked to the deployment of specially trained policeofficers both in and around refugee settlements who collaborate with international

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Field Safety Advisors (FSAs). The FSAs also liaise with the law-enforcementauthorities at the district and regional levels on all security matters, monitor thedeployment of police officers and their performance, and participate in the training ofnew police contingents. Ideally the underlying agreement with the host governmentalso includes commitments to instruct both refugees and hosts on the refugee–relatedlaws and regulations in the country as well as international refugee law. Securitypackages may be linked to provisions for joint screening and the separation of armedcombatants from refugees.

The responsibilities of police in such packages include the disarmament of refugeesprior to their admission to camps; the maintenance of controls to prevent the entry ofarms into camps; and the identification, arrest and prosecution of criminals. The hopeis that their presence alongside humanitarian actors may deter criminal or rebelactivity, besides providing recourse to law when crimes are committed.Law-enforcement personnel may include national police, paramilitary forces andrefugee security guards. Where such a presence does not exist, the problems are alltoo apparent. In Nepal, it is very difficult to get the police or members of ajoint-security force to a refugee camp at night—the area around the camps isconsidered too insecure.23 With the police reluctant to show up, crime in the campshas increased.

Another challenge is that of aligning police practices with protection. It has beenshown in both Guinea and Tanzania that when security forces are trained tounderstand refugee law and issues related to sexual and gender-based violencethey are better able to provide camp security. Codes of conduct for the police areused to define appropriate behaviour and contribute to greater accountabilitywithin the force.

With proper supervision and training, security mechanisms that involve refugeeguards, wardens, patrols and watch teams can be highly effective. But such teams canbe successful in maintaining security and order only if their roles and responsibilitiesare clearly defined, and they have good relations with the host country’slaw-enforcement authorities. Refugee participation is seen in a system of refugeesecurity volunteers (Sungu-sungus) in Tanzania, community-watch teams in Liberiaand a neighbourhood-watch system in Ghana.24

In Zambia, which hosts Angolan and Congolese refugees, neighbourhood-watchprogrammes have led to a reduction in crime, the identification of armed elementsand improvements in aid distribution. In Sierra Leone, the active cooperation ofLiberian refugee wardens with the local police has improved camp security. Overall,refugee security mechanisms function effectively when they complement orsupplement the general law-enforcement system of the host country. However, if notmonitored properly, both such refugee-empowerment initiatives and theintroduction of external police could lead to vigilante justice or harassment ofless-powerful refugees.

In this context, attention must be paid to the criteria by which activities may bejudged detrimental to the civilian and humanitarian character of camps in order to

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prevent arbitrary arrest or punishment. Finally, such programmes cannot succeedwithout continuous coordination, exchange of information and monitoring ofperformance.

Defining obligations and strengthening the rule of law

Because of the sometimes very different interests of the many actors involved inrefugee security, statements of intent are essential if policies are to be effective.Indeed, they are an essential tool in defining obligations and responsibilities and informalizing the commitments of all actors involved. Such declarations are generallyfollowed by agreements outlining the rights and responsibilities of the various parties.They also provide a means by which international bodies can define the extent of theirsupport for a host country. That support may include developmental and financialcomponents, such as provisions for training, protection workshops, the payment ofallowances and the donation of vehicles and communication equipment. Thestatements also reaffirm the host state’s responsibility for promoting the best interestsof the refugee population.

When primarily financed internationally, security packages help to acknowledgeand reduce the burden on the host government. However, international funding canalso create dependence on the part of the host state, sometimes generating unrealisticexpectations. Moreover, in some security packages operational and legal lacunae havebeen identified in the processing of separated combatants and the management offacilities.

Ultimately, policing alone does not provide effective security, and the range ofissues linked to security packages has expanded. UNHCR is now engaged in helpingwith reform of the legal sector and prisons in various countries. Measures under thesoft end of the ladder are increasingly used to deal with the daily issues of physicalprotection relating to crime, low-level violence and harassment, particularly of women.At the same time, UNHCR is focusing less on issues related to the exclusion of thosedeemed not entitled to protection and separation of combatants. This is partly due tothe political and practical difficulties associated with exclusion and separationprocesses, but it also reflects an awareness of the broader range of security threatsaffecting refugees and their hosts. This awareness was heightened followingrevelations of sexual violence and exploitation of refugee women and children in Eastand West Africa. Those revelations made it painfully evident that a security packagehas to be complemented by protection and community-service activities.

The deployment of poorly paid and undisciplined police and security forces mayexacerbate security problems, sexual abuse and the looting of relief supplies. Statecapacities to safeguard refugee security cannot therefore be enhanced withoutbettering the quality of law enforcement and the judiciary and promulgatingappropriate legislation. The judicial system has two primary roles: it continues andconcludes the work of the police and it checks for potential flaws or abuse, tacklingproblems that may arise. The rule of law provides an impartial arbitrator in what are

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Xenophobia and refugeesHost communities sometimes viewrefugees with suspicion and mistrust.Refugees are perceived as a threat totheir hosts’ economic prosperity,social stability and cultural identity.Even where the local populationwelcomes refugees, their compassioncan falter if refugees increasepressure on housing, social servicesand the environment, or if they stayfor longer than anticipated. Suchconditions can create fertile groundfor the emergence of xenophobia andintolerance. Furthermore, thesituation could be exacerbated byirresponsible news media andmanipulation of the refugee issue byself-serving politicians.

Over the past several years,conditions have deteriorated incertain countries. There has been anincrease in violent attacks onrefugees and harsh rhetoric frompoliticians who use refugees asscapegoats, blaming them for socialills and economic problems. Thistrend gathered pace following theevents of 11 September 2001,especially in the West, whererefugees from Muslim countries werevulnerable to xenophobia anddiscrimination. In the EuropeanUnion, where there are ongoingefforts to harmonize asylum policies,media reports and public debatesquite often blurred the distinctionbetween issues such as asylum,economic migration and terrorism.

These developments promptedUNHCR to list ten areas of ‘mostconcern’. Among them were thethreat of increased xenophobia andracism, and the possibility thatgovernments would introducelegislation that would discriminateagainst refugees from particularreligious, ethnic, national or politicalbackgrounds. In late 2001, UNHCRexpressed deep concern aboutxenophobia and discriminationagainst Muslims, and urged‘governments and politicians to avoidfalling into the trap of makingunwarranted linkages betweenrefugees and terrorism.’ It alsoasserted that ‘genuine refugees arethemselves the victims of terrorism

and persecution, not itsperpetrators.’ Similar concerns wereechoed by the UN HighCommissioner for Human Rights,emphasizing the need to combatxenophobia and cautioning againstweakening the international refugeeprotection regime.

Even in countries that have had atradition of extending a warmwelcome to refugees, a change inpolitical, economic or socialconditions can lead to theemergence of xenophobia. The caseof Côte d’Ivoire serves as a poignantexample. Until 2002, this was oneof the most stable countries in WestAfrica, renowned for its vibranteconomy, ethnic and religiousdiversity, and hospitality towards the70,000 refugees from Liberia in thecountry. The Liberians, who hadarrived in 1989, had been wellreceived and been allowed to residein villages in the western provincesof Côte d’Ivoire rather than inrefugee camps. Moreover, theyenjoyed access to work, educationand healthcare, and were free tomove about the country.

But things changed in September2002, when a coup attempt againstPresident Laurent Gbagbo provoked afull-scale civil war that severelyaffected the western provinces.Suspicions that foreign countries,including Liberia, had been involvedin the attempted coup led to the riseof anti-foreigner sentiment amongIvorians. Some Ivorian politiciansand newspapers added fuel to thefire by accusing the refugees ofaiding the rebels. UNHCR tried toensure the safety of 43,000 Liberianrefugees by relocating them awayfrom the conflict areas and resettlingthe most vulnerable in thirdcountries. Many refugees were thevictims of torture, murder andforcible recruitment by both theIvorian rebel and government forces.In spite of a subsequent peaceagreement between the governmentand rebels, the situation remainsfragile and Liberian refugees in Côted’Ivoire now live in precariousconditions.

Across the Atlantic Ocean, twodecades of conflict between theColombian government and rebelgroups has created the worsthumanitarian situation in theWestern Hemisphere. Some 3 millionColombians have been internallydisplaced, while as many as700,000 have fled to neighbouringVenezuela, Ecuador, Panama andCosta Rica. In recent years, politicaland economic problems coupled withthe destabilizing spillover effects ofthe unrest in Colombia have givenrise to xenophobia in thesecountries. The involvement ofColombian guerrillas in violence,kidnapping and drug trafficking inthe border regions has not helped.

UNHCR has pursued a regionalstrategy to strengthen protection andassistance for Colombian refugeesand asylum seekers and counterxenophobia. It has tried to boostpublic awareness of the refugees’plight through radio advertisements,photo exhibits and educationalprogrammes.

The fight against xenophobia is aglobal struggle. But substantivemoves in the right direction havebeen taken by the internationalcommunity. In 2001, the finalDeclaration and Program of Actionadopted by the UN-sponsored WorldConference against Racism andXenophobia contained 15 paragraphsrelating to refugees. They dealt withroot causes, respect and equitabletreatment, durable solutions,responsibility sharing and upholdingthe 1951 UN Refugee Conventionand its 1967 Protocol. Furthermore,in 2003 the Organization ofAmerican States adopted a resolutionat its general assembly in Santiago,Chile, calling on member states toestablish national mechanisms toprotect refugees and asylum seekersand combat xenophobia and racism.However, there will be no end todiscrimination against refugees untilpoliticians encourage positiveattitudes towards diversity and thedisplaced.

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frequently emotionally or politically charged environments. Both refugees and localsare more likely to feel that justice is done if they have access to a fair and impartialjudicial system.

Beyond training and material support, in some cases accessibility to justice hasbeen improved by the introduction of mobile courts which convene periodically in acamp, or through the construction of new courts close to refugee-populated areas. Inthis respect there is a need to ensure that refugees are aware of their rights and theappropriate channels to turn to when these rights have been disregarded. They mustalso be made aware of their obligations to conform to the laws of the country of refugeand abstain from actions that would compromise the security and neutrality of theircamp or settlement.

Preventive strategies

The challenge for the international community and host states is to comprehend theways in which refugee policies and assistance may themselves help to reduce securitythreats. Understanding these connections has become an important step in the searchfor refugee security.

Separating militants from the general refugee population is frequently not asimportant as addressing the root causes of refugee involvement in crime, violence andmilitary or subversive activities. Some argue that more effort should go towardsensuring good camp management and providing general physical protection torefugees. This necessitates increasingly comprehensive approaches to securitymeasures, and strategies for a broad range of refugee situations which engage keyactors at every stage of the humanitarian effort.25

Information channels

One of the most effective strategies in reducing security risks for refugees is theeffective dissemination of reliable information. Dependable information is the basis ofan effective early warning and assessment system which improves refugee security byensuring that appropriate assistance measures are put in the right place at the righttime.

At the country or regional level, early warning of impending emergencies can providean indication of the composition and needs of refugee groups. Early assessment of thegeneral situation will help gauge requirements regarding the size and location of transitfacilities, camps or settlements and other assistance centres. It will allow local andinternational actors to prepare for potential conflicts or risks. Ideally, it prevents securityproblems from arising, rather than just dealing with them when they occur. The earlyassessment of the security situation in the Presevo Valley in Kosovo, for instance,helped prevent an outbreak of violence in the area (see Box 4.1).

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Of equal importance to refugee protection are specific assessment andreconnaissance missions designed to provide a detailed evaluation of the securitysituation, determine the extent of infiltration by armed elements and recommendappropriate measures. For example, a security plan would document the best meansto distinguish armed elements or combatants from bona fide refugees; identifytraditional conflicts or grievances within the refugee population or between refugeesand local groups; and indicate the location of landmines or unexploded ordnance inthe vicinity of settlements, among other things.

The development of effective and objective information channels as well asreporting and complaint mechanisms is crucial to refugee assistance and protection.Camp situations are often breeding grounds for rumour and misinformation. Credibleinformation channels are therefore vital to give refugees the accurate informationrequired to defuse tensions. Regular and non-confrontational discussions betweencamp authorities, humanitarian agencies and representatives of host and refugeecommunities would allow grievances to be voiced and develop a forum for constructivedialogue.

Keeping information channels open is a priority if programmes addressing sexualand gender-based violence are to succeed. An atmosphere of awareness is aprecondition when creating an environment in which vulnerable women and childrencan air their concerns without fear of retribution or social stigma.

Relationships of trust are the most basic building blocks of preventive securitystrategies. Trust relies not only on transparent procedures but also on direct and easyaccess to humanitarian and protection personnel, encouraging refugees to reportsecurity incidents and fears. This in turn provides a more accurate picture of thesecurity situation and reinforces understanding and respect for mutual responsibilitiesand obligations under the law.

Another dimension of information is its transformative and educational force.This applies to efforts to accurately inform host populations about the plight ofthose arriving in their midst, thereby helping to combat prejudice and xenophobia.In many refugee situations peace-education programmes serve a crucial role inhelping to resolve conflict at all levels. Such initiatives often require thatgovernments and humanitarian workers alike recognize the importance of refugeeself-expression, and challenge them to distinguish between illicit political activityand the necessary and legitimate expression of human concerns. Efforts which aimto engage refugees in peace processes in their home countries may help preventarmed conflict by allowing the channelling of grievances peacefully and byre-establishing constructive relationships between their former homes and placesof exile.

National legislation

All states that have acceded to the international instruments relating to the protectionand assistance of refugees have an obligation to implement national legislation which

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is consistent with those instruments. Where a country has not acceded to theseinstruments, it may still have laws that support the protection of refugees andformalize the customary international norm of non-refoulement.

Where national legislation ignores the rights of refugees, it limits their ability tobecome self-reliant. For example, restrictive legislation in Kenya and Tanzania doesnot allow refugees to leave camps; as a result, most refugees in these countries remainentirely dependent on international assistance. Besides putting a large financialburden on the international community, this dependence contributes to a climate ofidleness and apathy in the camps which may push refugees into crime or militaryactivity.

The same dangers exist in richer countries. Here, government policies which riskundermining the principle of non-refoulement or take greater recourse to thedetention of asylum seekers present new risks to refugee security.26 Indeed, as a resultof states’ increasing fears of international terrorism, many countries have passedrestrictive legislation that has made it more difficult for genuine refugees to reachsafety. This forces refugees to turn to human smugglers and take ever greater risks inan attempt to reach safety. Indiscriminate detention poses a direct threat to thesecurity of individuals and drives genuine refugees underground. It also links refugeesand common criminals in the public mind, increasing prejudice and xenophobicresponses. This is just one example of the way in which national refugee policy cancreate conflicts between refugees and local populations.

Put in simple terms, governments have two options in dealing with refugees: one isto restrict contact between them and the host community; the other is to enhancemutual understanding and thereby help in the creation of common controlmechanisms. In this respect, the efforts of some governments to restrict refugeemovement do not seem to have had the desired effect of reducing tensions with thelocal population. Rather, the opposite seems to be the case. Sudanese refugees havebeen targeted by local communities in Kenya and Uganda. In the former, the majorityof the Sudanese belong to an ethnic group that has a history of enmity with the localTurkana people over cattle-rustling. In the latter, the Sudanese Acholi people havetraditionally been disliked by the local population.

In contrast, in some areas of Pakistan the government has successfully establisheda number of informal community-cooperation arrangements to enhance relationsbetween encamped refugees and surrounding communities. In Sierra Leone, wherelocals have generally regarded the refugee population with suspicion, the separation ofarmed elements and the direction of resources towards local communities havedefused these tensions.

Refugee camps

Camps may be a convenient way to channel and distribute humanitarian aid to largegroups of refugees. At the same time, they are unnatural, closed environments whichcan leave refugees vulnerable to manipulation and exploitation, with the danger

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increasing where such situations are prolonged.27 Where encampment cannot beavoided in the first instance, planning is essential to ensure that the size, layout andorganization of a refugee camp are conducive to the maintenance of security,especially for vulnerable groups such as female-headed households, single women,unaccompanied children and the elderly.

Here size and location can make a difference. In Kenya, the huge refugee campof Kakuma, with 90,000 refugees, and the three camps of Dadaab (Dagahaley, Ifoand Hagadera) with more than 35,000 people each, are quite difficult to managein terms of aid distribution and oversight.28 To mitigate some of the adverse effectsof encampment, guidelines advise that a camp’s population should not exceed20,000 and that it should provide at least 45 square metres per person.29

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HIV/AIDS and refugeesWhile the refugee status shouldnot be equated with an increasedrisk of contracting HIV, the natureof a refugee environment mayincrease the vulnerability ofpeople—especially women,adolescents and children—to thedisease. HIV/AIDS spreads fasterwhere there is poverty, lawlessnessand social instability; these are theconditions that often give rise to,or accompany, forceddisplacement.

The link between the respect andprotection of human rights andeffective HIV/AIDS programmes isclear. People will not seekHIV-related counselling, testing,treatment and care if lack ofconfidentiality, discrimination,refoulement, restrictions on freedomof movement or other negativeconsequences could follow a positivediagnosis. For these reasons, anessential component in refugeeprotection is the creation of a legaland ethical environment which isprotective of the human rights ofHIV/AIDS victims. Towards that aim,in June 2004 UNHCR became thetenth co-sponsor of UNAIDS, therebyhelping to broaden and strengthenthe UN response to the globalepidemic. Since then, UNHCR hascollaborated with other organizationsto advocate the inclusion of refugeeissues in countries’ plans, proposalsand policies related to HIV/AIDS.

Examples of such cooperationinclude:� Nigeria: UNHCR received funds

from UNAIDS for an HIV/AIDSprevention project at Oru Camp.

� Pakistan: UNHCR and othersponsors provided funds to supporta National HIV/AIDS programmeofficer for three years.

� Indonesia: Training of asylumseekers on HIV/AIDS preventionwas supported by UNAIDS.

� Yemen: A joint UNAIDS–UNHCRmission to assess the prevalenceof HIV/AIDS among refugees inYemen was undertaken.

� Great Lakes Initiative on AIDS:The UNAIDS Secretariat, theWorld Bank and governments inthe region have cooperatedextensively on this innovative andimportant sub-regional initiative.

� Mano River Union (MRU) Initiativeon AIDS: UNHCR has increasedcollaboration with the UNAIDSSecretariat, UNFP, the AfricanDevelopment Bank and theGovernments involved in theMRU.

Given the movements of displacedpopulations, UNHCR emphasizes asub-regional approach linkingcountries of asylum and origin.These initiatives acknowledge two

key points. The first is thatrefugees and other migrantpopulations have frequent andsometimes sustained interactionswith surrounding host communities.This regular contact places bothgroups at increased risk ofcontracting or transmitting HIV.The second is the inherent mobilityof these populations. The frequentmovements of refugees and othermigrant populations often make itmore difficult to provide them withthe HIV services they require. Thecreation of regional and/orsub-regional plans will help toensure that refugees, returnees andother migrant populations find carethroughout their travels, potentiallyreducing the risk of HIVtransmission in the host-countrypopulation.

Sub-regional and regional HIV/AIDSplans provide services to people whomight not otherwise receive regularcare. They allow more mobilepopulations, such as refugees andthose in the transport sector, tocontinue to be treated. Morecomprehensive interventions, such asanti-retroviral therapy, are also madepossible. The ability to provide andsustain such treatment has becomeincreasingly important in movingtoward the goal of providing accessto HIV/AIDS treatment to all thosewho need it.

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Furthermore, adequate access to basic services such as water, latrines, distributionpoints and educational facilities can help enhance security, as can proper lightingat night.

Placing or relocating refugee camps a significant distance from national borders orareas of lawlessness helps improve security. But this can only be done with theapproval of the host government. In 2003, the Government of Guinea accepted therelocation of refugees from the south to more central locations in order to reduce thethreat posed by combatants infiltrating the settlements.30 In Panama and Chad,relocation has helped ease security concerns for Colombian and Sudanese refugees,respectively.31 Often, however, host governments are reluctant to have camps movedto, or established in, locations away from the border for political reasons. They mayfear that the further from the border the refugees are, the more difficult it will be tosend them home.

In some contexts, resistance to relocation may come from the refugees themselves.They may share ethnic, linguistic, religious or cultural traits with local communitiescloser to the border, making assimilation or cohabitation easier. Indeed, locatingcamps in areas where a sense of community can be fostered is beneficial to both localand refugee populations. The trade-offs inherent in such decisions must be carefullyevaluated in consultation with the refugees.

Improving refugee–host relations

Real or perceived competition for scarce resources is bound to breed mistrust andintolerance and sometimes open aggression. In this sense, effective refugeeprotection needs to address the relationship between refugees and their hosts; ideallyit would integrate the needs and rights of both populations to the greatest extentpossible. In developing countries this means minimizing disparities between thestandards of living of refugees and host populations. Improvements to theinfrastructure for water, sanitation, health and roads must benefit the entire localcommunity if refugees are not to be perceived as a privileged group and therebyresented. Communication strategies must link material assistance to the themes ofco-existence and respect for human rights, while public-information programmesteach the local population about refugees.32 Local authorities should be helped tocommunicate with refugee representatives to promote trust between the communitiesand provide a mediation mechanism in case of conflict.

The establishment of programmes to raise ecological awareness in large refugeepopulations can help stimulate the local economy and minimize the impact ofrefugees on the environment, thereby reducing potential conflicts with the localpopulation. Programmes in which firewood is harvested from sustainable sources orpurchased from local contractors and supplied to the camps may help to dissuaderefugees from sourcing it themselves, again reducing conflicts with the localcommunity.

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Empowerment of refugees

Ultimately, the ability of people to act on their own is critical to human security.33 Itenhances the credibility of information and allows people to exercise their potential asindividuals and to re-establish or reintegrate into peaceful and functioningcommunities. The participation of refugees in the physical planning and managementof a camp is thus as essential as their involvement in the mechanisms governingassistance and protection. This applies to the smallest unit of human organization, thefamily unit, which is a vital mechanism for security and stability in a refugee camp.Parental responsibility enhances the safety and discipline of children and youths.Moreover, it increases the protection of women and children from sexual abuse andprevents the recruitment of youths for military purposes.

In this context, educational opportunities and training programmes not only provideopportunities for the future but also help prevent the recruitment of youths by armedand subversive elements. In protracted refugee situations primary and secondaryeducation, vocational training and income-generating programmes help refugeesbecome economically self-sufficient and restore their self-esteem. Such initiatives aregenerally seen to have a positive impact on security both in the short and long term.

Future concerns

UNHCR’s mandate is to uphold the human rights of people who lack nationalprotection. It has remained constant since the organization was established in 1950.Yet the challenges it meets in addressing these basic principles have changed overtime, and past experiences have provided lessons for the future. The refugeeprotection regime was not established to address the root causes of conflict that createrefugees, but the nature of the task of refugee protection will ensure that securityissues will always be an integral part of it.

Today, security has multiple and interdependent dimensions. Expanded notions ofhuman security recognize the importance of non-state agents and redefine a range ofinterventions as relevant to security. The awareness of these dimensions is fundamentalto addressing the security concerns involved in refugee assistance. However, it risksevaluating the problems of refugees purely through the lens of security.

It is also important to remember that the many dimensions of security cannotalways be integrated into one response. Almost all refugee-security strategiesunderline the need of the host state to fulfil its obligation to protect refugees within itsborders. If a host state is unwilling or unable to do so, United Nations practicesuggests that some type of international response may be an option. Securitypackages, while ameliorating some threats, often risk trying to do too many things atonce. They cannot, ultimately, respond to the problems of militarization of refugeecamps or cross-border conflict. These are issues which cannot be resolved solelythrough humanitarian response, but rather require intervention at the political level.

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1 N. Van Hear, ‘Recasting Societies in Conflict’, COMPASWorking Paper No. 22, University of Oxford, Oxford,2005, pp. 1-5.

2 G. Loescher, ‘Refugees as Grounds for InternationalAction’, in E. Newman and J. van Selm (eds), Refugeesand Forced Displacement: International Security, HumanVulnerability, and the State, United Nations UniversityPress, Tokyo, 2003, pp. 31-6.

3 H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, Meridian,New York, 1957, p. 288.

4 G. Loescher, The UNHCR and World Politics: A PerilousPath, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, p. 125;J. Crisp, ‘Africa’s Refugees: Patterns, Problems andPolicy Challenges’, New Issues in Refugee Research,Working Paper No. 28, UNHCR, Geneva, 2000, p. 9.

5 B. Posen, ‘Military Responses to Refugee Disasters’,International Security, vol. 21, no. 1, 1996, pp. 72-111;M. Weiner, ‘Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods:

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An Inquiry into the Causes of Refugee Flows’,International Security, vol. 21, no. 1, 1996, pp. 5-42.

6 V. Türk, ‘Forced Migration and Security’, InternationalJournal of Refugee Law, vol. 15, no. 1, 2003, p. 117.

7 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘Efforts toTackle Various Global Issues to Promote HumanSecurity’, Japan’s Foreign Policy in Major DiplomaticFields, 2004, p. 184,www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/index.html; see alsoCanada’s Human Security Website, Foreign AffairsCanada, www.humansecurity.gc.ca/menu-en.asp.

8 Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now,New York, 2003, pp. 49-50.

9 Ibid.10 T. G. Weiss, Military-Civilian Interactions: Humanitarian

Crises and the Responsibility to Protect, Rowman andLittlefield, Lanham, Maryland, 2005, pp. 137-8.

11 G. Goodwin-Gill, ‘Editorial: Refugees and Security’,International Journal of Refugee Law, vol. 11, no. 1,1999, p. 3; G. Loescher, ‘Refugees as Grounds forInternational Action’, pp. 39-40.

12 A. Hammerstad, ‘Making or Breaking the Conflict Cycle:The Relationship between Underdevelopment, Conflictand Forced Migration’, in S. Castles and N. Van Hear,Developing DFID’s Policy Approach to Refugees andInternally Displaced Persons, Final Report, University ofOxford, Oxford, 2005, pp. 14-18.

13 H. Adelman, ‘The Use and Abuse of Refugees in Zaire’,in S. J. Stedman and F. Tanner (eds), RefugeeManipulations: War, Politics, and the Abuse of HumanSuffering, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC,2003, pp. 95-134.

14 G. Loescher, ‘Refugees as Grounds for InternationalAction’, p. 35.

15 Ibid., p. 34.16 United Nations, ‘Recent Killings of Humanitarian

Workers Demonstrate Changing Landscape for UNOperations, Security Council Told by HumanitarianAffairs Head: Briefs on Challenges Faced in ProtectingCivilians in Conflict Areas’, Security Council 4877th

meeting, UN Doc. Press Release SC/7947,9 December 2003.

17 S. Ogata, The Turbulent Decade: Confronting theRefugee Crises of the 1990s, W. W. Norton, New York,2005, p. 327.

18 J. Crisp, ‘A State of Insecurity: The Political Economyof Violence in Refugee-Populated Areas of Kenya’,New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 16,UNHCR, Geneva, 1999, p. 13, footnote 36.

19 United Nations, Resolution 1208 adopted by theSecurity Council at its 3954th meeting on 19 November1998, UN Doc. S/RES/1208 (1998), 19 November1998; United Nations, Resolution 1296 adopted by theSecurity Council at its 4130th meeting on 19 April 2000,UN Doc. S/RES/1296 (2000), 19 April 2000.

20 UNHCR, Regional Symposium on Maintaining theCivilian and Humanitarian Character of Asylum, RefugeeStatus and other Locations, Pretoria, Southern Africa,26-27 February, 2001, p. 2,www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/global-consultations.

21 UNHCR, ‘The Security, and Civilian and HumanitarianCharacter of Refugee Camps and Settlements’, ExecutiveCommittee Doc, EC/49/SC/INF.2, 14 January 1999, pp.2-4; UNHCR, ‘The Security, Civilian and HumanitarianCharacter of Refugee Camps and Settlements:Operationalizing the "Ladder of Options",’ in RefugeeSurvey Quarterly, vol.19, no. 1, 2000, pp. 93-8.

22 W. Lewis, E. Marks and R. Perito, ‘EnhancingInternational Civilian Police in Peace Operations’,Special Report 85, US Institute of Peace, April 22,2002, p. 3.

23 UNHCR, 2004 Annual Protection Report: Nepal, p. 2.24 R. da Costa, ‘Maintaining the Civilian and Humanitarian

Character of Asylum’, Legal and Protection PolicyResearch Series, Department of International Protection,UNHCR, June 2004, p. 63.

25 Ibid, p. 54.26 V. Türk, ‘Forced Migration and Security’, pp. 115-6.27 J-F. Durieux, ‘Preserving the Civilian Character of

Refugee Camps: Lessons from the Kigoma Programmein Tanzania’, Track Two, vol. 9, no. 3, November 2000.

28 UNHCR, 2005 Country Operations Report: Kenya.29 UNHCR, Handbook for Emergencies, Second Edition,

2000, p. 137.30 UNHCR, ‘Hot Spots Brief on Guinea’, July 17, 2003.31 UNHCR, 2004 Annual Protection Report: Panama, p. 12.32 Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now,

pp. 124-5.33 Ibid., pp. 1-12.

Chapter 3 boxes

i The overall death toll recorded by the study was 375,which included UN peacekeepers (88 cases) as well asdeaths due to disease and natural causes (31).See Mani Sheik et al., ‘Deaths among HumanitarianWorkers’, British Medical Journal, no. 321, July 2000,pp. 166-8.

ii ECHO, Report on Security of Humanitarian Personnel,Brussels, 2004, www.europa.eu.int/comm/echo/other_files/security/echo_security_ report_en.doc.

iii Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD), No Relief,Geneva, 2005, www.hdcentre.org.

iv Ibid.v D. King, ‘Chronology of Humanitarian Aid Workers Killed

in 1997-2003’, 15 January 2004,www.vranet.com/Govt1027/Docs/chron1997-2003.html.

vi M. Sheik et al., ‘Deaths among Humanitarian Workers’.vii D. King, ‘Chronology of Humanitarian Aid Workers’;

CHD, No Relief.

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