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NAVAL PROJECTION FORCES: THE CASE FOR A RESPONSIVE.MAF

INTRODUCTION

The contingency of a short-warning , conventional attack by theWarsaw Pact against Central Europe poses one of the most s~çveredefense problems facing the United States and its allies.~~ Whilethe United States has taken initiatives to improve its forces

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already in Europe, little progress has been made in improving the• rate at which U.S. -based reinforcements can be employed. Because

reinforcement by sea is thought to take so long,. Defen~’e plannerscontinue to look to additional airlift~, rather than to sea lift., to• help offset NATO’s early deficit in forces., However, it is possibleto improve the responsiveness of forces coming by sea. One suchpossibility is to employ the amphibious force earlier) rather thanlater, in a NATO contingency . - -

The argument is that with appropriate changes in fleet opera-tions, a Navy projection force of MAF size can be about as respon-sive as airlifted Army forces,.2 Amphibious shipping , already inthe Defense program, is sufficient to move the Assault Echelon (AE)of the East Coast Marine Amphibious Force (MAF)~ to Northern Europein 14 to 16 days from the time of first warning. Assuming anadditional 4 to 5 days to debark and to take up positions, a largeMarine force could be fully employed in about 21 days~ This responsetime compares favorably with estimates for airlift. For example,it might take 21 days or more for the U.S. -based , 2 1/3 Armydivisions to fly to Europe , move to and draw their prepositioned

1The combination of strategic nuclear parity and of Pact advantages• in conventional forces relative to the forces of NATO has raised• the importance of NATO planning for short-warning and for short-war

contingencies. The seriousness of this problem and the likelihoodof a continuing NATO deficit in conventional forces for the earlydefense of Central Europe reportedly was a central issue in therecent Presidential Review Memorandum #10, a review of national

• security strategy. Evans and Novak, “Conceding Defeat in Europe,”The Washington Post, 3 August 1977, p. A- l9.

Marine Amphibious Force (MAP) is a task-organized force builtaround a Marine division and a Marine air wing. The current FleetMarine Force can task organize three MAPs from its active structure.They are II MAF on the East Coast, I MAF on the West Coast, andIII MAF in Japan/Okinawa with an independent brigade in Hawaii.Although there are three MAPs , the programmed amphibious shippingwill be adequate to lift the Assault Echelons (AE) of 1 1/3 MASs.

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equipment, and then move to their employment areas.3 Former Secre-tary of Defense , James Schlesinger, estimated in 1974 that about 19days would be required to move the troops and the equipment of oi~eArmy division using only the airlift assets of the Uniited States4.

The AE of a MAF has about 34,000 Marines , equipment and 15days of consumables. With their own helicopter lift , Navyand Marine tactical air , and modern antitank weapons , the MAFwould increase substantially the combat reinforcements availableto SACEUR within the first month. For example , if it is assumedthat the earliest of the Army reinforcements begin arriving in

• their combat areas with their equipment in the first week, the flowof Army reinforcements could reach 65,000, the equivalent of fourdivisions, by M+2l.5 The addition of the MAF would raise theestimated reinforcements to 97,000. In terms of division equivalents,the MAF would represent about a 25 percent increase in reinforcements.However, to make an early contribution within the programmed budget ,current Navy practices would have to change substantially.

To gain a responsive MAF , without expanding the amphibiousfleet, routine peacetime deployments would have to be reduced orended and three-fourths of the amphibious fleet would have to beconcentrated in the Atlantic. This proposal poses a significantstrategic choice. The choice is between continuing to operate withthe priority on worldwide peacetime presence (foregoing any signi-ficant early participation in the defense of Europe with Marine

3Robert Lucas Fischer, “Defending the Central Front: The Balanceof Forces,” Adelphi Paper No. 127, IISS, (London: 1976), p. 4.

4U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Defense De~partment Report BY 1975,p. 158-159.

5The assumption includes: (a) dedication of the airlift capacity ofthe United States, (b) a total movement time that encompassesassembly at airfields, flight time , movement from airfields toequipment storage areas (POMCUS sites), marry-up of troops and

• equipment, and movement to area of combat employment, Cc) anaverage employment rate of 4,000 combatants per day from M+5 through •

M+20, of the 2 1/3 Army division equivalents, with prepositionedequipment, and an additional Army battalion plus equipment per day,(d) no enroute attrition of air or sea lines of communication andno interdiction of air or sea ports or the POMCUS storage sites.

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— forces), or to emphasize the early defense of Europe deemphasizing• peacetime presence. Amphibious assets are insufficient to do both.

The alternatives and some of their implications are developed below.

CURRENT PRACTICE: PEACETIME PRESENCE AND A NATO RESERVE

Currently, there are 4 reinforced battalion-size Marine unitsin the routine deployment schedule. Two operate in the WesternPacific and two operate in the Atlantic/Mediterranean. They continuea pattern that goes back to 1948 in the Mediterranean, to 1959 inthe Atlantic , and to 1960 in the Western Pacific.

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Marine deployments are supported by the active amphibious• fleet that is about equally divided between oceans. The present

fleet of 62 ships is fully committed to the deployment schedule.It takes 4-6 ships for each Amphibious Ready Group (ARG/MAU ) anda rotational backup of 2+ ships for each ship forward.6 By 1981,four new-construction ships (LHAs) will bring the active fleetto 66 ships. In addition to the active fleet, there are threeNaval Reserve Fleet (NRF) ships and the AGF-LaSalle (an LPD) thatmight be available to support Marine forces in the future. Thus,the 1981 amphibious fleet could consist of 70 ships. Table 1shows the approximate lift capacity of a 70-ship fleet, the require-ments for lifting a Marine Amphibious Force (MAF), and the percentageof one MAF that the 70-ship fleet could lift simultaneously .

If current practices continue, the 1981 amphibious fleetwill be divided about equally between the Atlantic and the Pacificoceans. An equal distribution of a 70-ship fleet will support thelong-established pattern of deployments . However, it is insufficientto lift a MAF without swinging about 20 ships through the Panama

• • Canal. For example, to move the East Coast MAF (II MAP) to NorthernEurope, Atlantic-based ships would have the capacity to deliverabout 60 percent of the Assault Echelon in about 16 days. Theremainder of the MAP would then have to await shipping from theEastern Pacific and the Western Pacific. These swing times are about12 and 20 additional days respectively .7 Thus, the best time

• 6For a more detailed quantitative treatment of amphibious lift capa-bilities, see (CNA) Memorandum (CNA)76-3046 , “Amphibious Lift Capa-bilities 1976 and 1980,” Unclassified, Desmond P. Wilson, 30 Apr 1976.7Closing times assume an 18 knot transit speed, an unobstructedPanama Canal, one day to transit the Canal, and seven days for the• combined alert, assembly and loading of forces and ships at theports of embarkation.

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t TABLE 1

( 1981 LIFT CAPABILITY70 SHIPS

Vehicles Cargo- thousands thousands Helo Landing

Troops of sq. ft. of Cu. ft. ~pots craft

Net lift*available 44,000 840 1,620 368 440

1 MAF (AE)requirement 34,000 690 1,200 350 350

Percent1M A F (AE) 129 122 135 105 126

*Assumes that net lift reduces the gross lift by tactical integrityfactors applied to troops and to vehicle square. In addition,there is a 10 percent ship nonavailability factor due to overhaulsthat is applied to all lift categories.

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attainable for the last elements of the MAF (AE) to arrive inNorthern Europe would be M+36. While this is the best time under : -the current mode of operating the fleet, it is not the best responsetime possible. The M+36 figure is an implicit preference for thecurrent deployment practices and the concept of the Marines as aNATO reserve, over an alternative that would emphasize responsive-ness to NATO.

THE ALTERNATIVE: A RESPONSIVE MAP

The responsive MAP concept differs from current practices byoffering arrival times in Europe of 16 instead of 36 days. Toaccomplish this with the programmed fleet , roughly 54 amphibiousships--three quarters of the 1981 amphibious fleet- -would have to be

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concentrated in the Atlantic.8 Table 2 shows an equal distributionof the fleet and one alternative distribution to support the strategyof a responsive MAF . The 16 ships remaining in the Pacific wouldbe enough to support 1 battalion-size unit (ARG/MAU) on routineforward dep loyments, or to lift a small brigade - (MAB) on an inter-mittent basis.

TABLE 2

ALTERNATIV E DISTRIBUT IONS OF A70-SHIP AMPHIBIOUS FLEET

1981

Equal mix Atlantic-heavy mixPacific Atlantic Pacific Atlantic

Number of ships 35 35 16 54

Net lift availab le:portion of 1 MAF (AE ) ~2/3 ‘~2/3 ‘4/3 1

The Assault Echelon of II MAF is located within 100 miles ofEast Coast embarkation ports. By using organic vehicles and byflying the nonseif-deployable aircraft to the ships, the AE couldbe fully loaded for combat within 7 days in that portion of theamphibious fleet that was located within 2-4 days steaming of theembarkation ports at the time of the alert. An additional 8 to 9days would be required for the transit to Northern Europe for atotal of about 16 days to arrive in an objective area for either anopposed or unopposed landing. Whether the MAF makes an unopposedlanding over a beach or debarks at developed port facilities, itcould be unloaded and moved to interior defensive positions in anadd itional 5 days , or by M+2l.

8Calculations are based on MAP lift requirements as set forth intable 1. However, it should be noted that the MAP is a task-organized force and could be made smaller or larger with consequencesfor lift requirements. The complete MAF consists of the AssaultEchelon CAB), the Assault Follow-On Echelon (AFOE), and a Fly InEchelon (FIB). The AE has the combat force and 15 days of suppliesand would go in the amphibious ships. The APOE is the supportingforce for sustaining the combatants for an additional 45 days ..Current plans call for the APOB to move in merchant shipping. Theresponsiveness of the AFOE and the FIB is not considered in thisanalysis.

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One way to view the contribution of an early-arriving MAP isto compare Mar ines, Army and allied forces assigned to divisionsor divisional equivalents. Compared in this way, the Army has 4divisions and 6 brigades for a total of 6 division-equivalents orabout 84,000 in divisional manpower in Central Europe . As shownin table 3 airlift would add about another 65 ,000 by M+2 1 for atotal of 149,000. To this latter figure, a 17,000-man Marinedivision would increase total U.S. divisional manpower by 11 percentand would represent 26 percent of the U.S. reinforcements capableof arriving with equipment and being in position in 21 days. Using

. the same divisional manpower as a basis for comparison, the Marinedivision would make about a 3 percent contribution to NATO ’s totalmobilization potential (including France).

TABLE 3

MAF (AE) CONTRIBUTION TO EARLYREINFORCEMENT OF CENTRAL EUROPE

(Manpower in U.S. Ground Combat Units*)

M Day +7 +14 ~fl

U.S. w/o MAP 84,000 90 000 122,000 149,000 158,000

U.S. w/MAF 84,000 90,000 122,000 166,000 175,000

Percentincrease - - - 11 10

*Notes:

a. Based on the 17,000 Marines in division units. The AssaultEchelon of a MAP totals about 34 ,000 and includes helicopters andother direct and indirect support.

• b. Army manpower in ground combat units is based on troops indivision equivalents.

c. Other than M Day , prepositioned-Army forces , all Army movesby airl if t. Marines move by amphibious ships. Airlift of Armyforces assumes 2 1/3 division-equivalents between M+7 and M+2l , plus1/11th division per day from M+5 onwards . Source : Fischer , op. cit.,p. 23.

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• OTHER MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS

There are a number of other military issues implied by theproposal for us ing amphibious forces. These are discussed brieflybelow.

Flexibility. The early reinforcement of NATO with U.S.forces now relies exclusively on airlift . The responsive MAFconcept would help diversify the means of movement and give SACEUR

• added flexibility to hedge against the uncertain course of a war.For example , the MAF offers flexibility in unloading. It could usemany of the num erous European por ts, or it could go ashore in mostunimproved areas. Furthermore, it offers flexibility in employment .

— It might be employed alongside Army forces as a conventionalinfantry division, or it might be used in an early amphibiousassault depending upon the needs at the time . The point is thatthe MAP could load out for an amphibious assault but could becommitted in a number of different places as the situation evolvesduring the transit phase.

Amphibious Assault. The concept of the opposed amphibiouslanding has critics who doubt its viability, particularly in aNATO setting . However, the responsive MAP may improve the credibil-ity and relevance of the amphibious concept. Historically, largelandings have taken place after a conside rable lapse of time fromthe beginning of a war. In a NATO/PACT war, a landing in the 2ndmonth or beyond may mean fac ing a mechan ized opponen t who has hadtime to consolidate defen ses ashore and poss ib ly mine the seaapproaches to the landing sites. In contrast , the responsive MAPmight contend for or counter preemptive grabs for territory ofimportance to both the sea and the land campaigns. The conflictsituation might be similar to a meeting engagement except that theenemy forces would more likely be airborne or nava l infantry andin the relative disarray of having just arrived. In short, some

• of the problems of an amph ib ious force going against a powerfulopponent may be overcome by shortening the response times and bygetting to an objective area earlier rather than later.

Vulnerability. The early use of sea l i f t is criticized forits vurnerability to submarines and to long-range aircraft . Whilethe threat of interdiction is indeed significant , the relevant ,but unanswered , questions have to do with the severity of the threat,and with the comparative capabilities of both sea and air l i f t systemsto produce equipped reinforcements in forward areas . Air transportmay be less vulnerable than sea transport . But , the problems withthe airlift system are at the landing sites , the equipment storagesites , and with the intra-theater move~nent of troops to their equip-ment and onto their tactical positions . The essential point is that

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both reinforcement systems are vulnerable. It is not obvious• a priori that sea lift is more vulnerable than airlift. Both the

relative and the absolute vulnerability of the two systems dependsupon many uncertainties such as the amount of warning, submar inedeployments and doctrine , and the quantity and quality of antisub-marine warfare and antiair warfare. Until more is understood aboutthe severity of the interdiction threat, continuing to plan for theearly reinforcement of NATO by whatever means is assumed preferableto withholding early reinforcements for some safer future.

. Manpower. Another issue and an added reason for consideringan alternative to the current amphibious force deployment routineis the difficulty of retaining trained personnel. To some extentthe problem of retention is due to the turbulence that resultswhen the supply of personnel is insufficient to meet routine afloatdeployments and other commitments without excessive and disruptivetransfers. This problem is apt to continue or to worsen in anenvironment characterized by all volunteers drawn from a declining

- youth population. Turbulence might be alleviated if the “demand”side of the problem was relaxed. Since the responsive MAF conceptwould trade off some of the routine peacetime deployments forquickly deployable, larger and more combat-capable Marine forces,turbulence might be favorably influenced.

Fleet Size. Planning the amphibious fleet is another issuethat w~ii1d be affected by the responsive MAF concept. The rationalefor sizing the fleet rests on the lift requirements for a wartimeassault, currently established at 1 1/3 MAFs. However, tne useof the fleet differs substantially from this rationale and, &snoted, incurs a penalty of deferred responsiveness with a MAP-sizeforce. Reducing the differences between program rationale and actualuse of the force could improve planning. Put differently, there isa need to clarify the role of amphibious forces, resolve issues offorce structure and purpose , and to clar ify the rela tionship betweenthe size of the fleet and the size of the FMF. For example, tocontinue the emphas is on routine , forward-afloat deployments, thesize of the fleet may be excessive or near the absorbable limit of

. the curren t FMF since Mar ine manpower is pressed to sustain thedeployment schedule. On the other hand, if war time assaul t withMAP-size forces is the direction that Navy/Marine Corps plannersshould follow, then the size of the programmed fleet may be minimalfor the current size of the FMF.

THE STRATEGIC ISSUE

Amphibious forces can emphasize either a posture of peacetimepresence and a de ferred wartime responsiveness , or a posture of

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wartime responsiveness and a reduced peacetime presence. Bothcannot be pursued simultaneously with the human and materialresources that are likely to be available to the Navy and to theMarine Corps.

The issue of strategic choice is important . Amphibious forceswill cost about $6 billion (ships and Marine forces) to operatein 1978, or roughly 7 percent of the budget for General PurposeForces. Furthermore, the deficit in conventional forces in NATOis a real problem that has a high priority in U.S. defense planning.While a responsive MAF is not going to solve the reinforcementprob lem, a timely contribution on the order of a 10 percent-or•-moreincrease in US, forces is not trivial. On the other hand , theopportunity cost of a responsive MAF is a Naval deemphasis of thePacific. In particular , the template-like routine of forward-afloatdeployments would change and Marine forces in the Pacific would haveto rely more on airlift for their mobility . One of the importantelements in making a rational choice is an assessment of a forward-afloat, peacetime presence .

• The principal arguments for afloat deployments tend to becouched in terms of their symbolic contribution to deterrence andin terms of their responsiveness to local crises. Evaluating thefirst point , the deterrent value of an afloat Marine AmphibiousUnit, is an extremely squishy problem. Like most naval presences,the significance of the afloat unit probably depends heavily uponthe larger foreign policy context and thus varies with circumstances.

The second argument , proximity to local crises , is a moreempirically accessible question. In a list of 93 crises over thepast 20 years, amphibious forces responded to 55 of them. However,most of the responses were in a permissive environment for humani-tarian and evacuation purposes. There were no cases where afloatforces of MAU si7e acted in a combat situation without reinforce-ments from the United States or from other forward bases.1° If theforward-afloat force must wait for reinforcements , then the advan-tages of afloat proximity are lessened or lost. Furthermore , in the

9A recent essay that discusses the changing environment for usingmilitary force is Klau s Knorr , “Is International Coercion Waningor Rising? ,” International Security, Spring 1977

list of responses is in Robert B. Mahoney ’s “U.S. Navy Responsesto International Incidents and Cr ises , 1955-1975,” CRC 322, Vol. 1,(CNA) July 1977

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humanitarian and evacuation missions , alert times frequently havebeen sufficient to organize a force and sail from the United Statesor other forward bases. In short , there are a number of effective-ness issues in connection with routine afloat deployments. In mostregions of the world of the 1970s the MAU is too small to be asignificant military fo.. e, but it may be too large to be an econom-ical symbol of a peacetime presence. Nevertheless , routine , forward-afloat deployments supported by an equally divided fleet continueto be the principal peacetime activity of the amphibious force asit is with much of surface Navy .

CONCLUSIONS

The responsive MAF concept:~

•~,7Improves arrival times in Europe by at least 20 -

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days over the current mode of operating amphibious forces~-

• ~Is an equal-cost alternative for employing the —

amphibious force . ~—Excluding the one-time relocationcosts of moving ships from the Pacific to the• Atlantic , the responsive MAF could be implemented

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within the programmed, ship-procurement budget~~~,.—

Offers savings in added prepositioned equipmentand airlift procurement to reduce the currentdeficit in early reinforcements for NATOj)

• 6Diversifies and adds flexibility to the exclusivereliance on airlift for reinforcing NATO within thefirst 30 days~ o~w4~•)•~~~educes the Navy ’s presence in the Pacific.~

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CNA Professional Papers 1973 to Present

PP 103 PP 116 PP 126 - Cleaufl.d.Frinebinni, Rcb.rt L., “PolitIcal Asp..t. of Oc..c Relsm, Allan S.. “An Aen.snten~ of Milrtary Op...Ecology” 48 pp., Feb 1973. published I. Who Pro hon. R.iae.ch in th. USSR.” 19 pp., SaP 1Q73, PP 127tics. 4*. Dc.... . John L.wrencs H.rgror,. (.4.) (St. oRep.int.d from Proc..dinW. 3Otis MiIit.ty Opera- or.gn.cn G.ory. S “TIs. Sosict Uninq,’, Guan forPaul W.tt Publ~~ Co.. 1914). published by the lion. R.isatch Symposium (U) . S.c’.t D.c 1972) Acce., to Natal F.clliti.. In E ypt Prrn, to theAm.ric.n Socl.ty of lntsrn.tional Law) AD 770 116 Just. Wet of 1967,” 64 pp.. .M.I 1974. AD 39$ 348*0 752 935

P9117 99 128PP 104 McWhit., Peter P and If .114*, H. Dor*.ld. “Di Stoloff , Pet.. and Lod,nsen. Roburt F., ~‘Evalu.tlon

Schick . Jads M,, “A Raeiew of Jam., Cabin, Gun’ finding a Loflst ltz Sy,t.m linde. Meting of Need Officer P.rfo.nssnc.,” 11 pp., (Prese.at.dboat Diplomacy Political Application. of Limited Attack.’’ 24 pp•, A.g 1976 (to be sub.nitt .d for

~ fbi 62nd Annual Concentlon of d~e Am.flcanNaval Parcel.” 5 pp., Feb 1973, (R.rww.d in the p.bf:c.tion n Renal Res.arch Logistic. Quarterly), P,ychologicei As.ociation, 1914) Aug 1974.Am.eic.n Political Scm.,. Review , Vol . LXV I . D.C presented a, 444* National Meat,,1. Oparattsns Re AD 784 0121972) .arcb Society o~ America, November 1973,

ADA030 454 99 129PP 106 •U,re,rrs,ty of Flonde. Holen, Arlene s.d Horowitz, Stanley, “Partial Un’

• Corn, Robert J. end Phillips, Gary R•, “O. Optimal • fieora.’ch wppotTd ” part under Ofhre of M,aa~ .mploynmnl Ins.,.... Benefit, ~id the E,tant ofCorrection of Gun)),. Error,,” 22 pp., Mar 1973. Remnrrh Contract Nct3074680273 (K)7 7 Partial Unemployment,” 4 pp., Aug 1974, (Pub’AD 761 574 Ij ihad .n th Journal of Human $eeou.csn. Vol. IX ,

P9119 No. 3, Sun.m.r 1974) AD 784 010PP 105 Barfoot , C. Barnard . “ Markon Duel,, 18 pp., Apr

Stoloff. Pets. H., “User ’, Guide for Generalized 1973. (Reprinted trom Operations Research , Vol. PP 130Factor Analysis Program (FAC’IAN).” 35 pp., Feb 22. No 2, M.r-Apr 1974) Oismuk et Bradford, “Role, and Miw.ons of Soviet1973, (Indude. en addendum publi.h.d Aug 1874) Natal Genie .) Purpo .. For... in Wartime: Pro’AD 703824 • PP 119 SSBN Operation,” 20 pp., Aug 1974, AD 796 320

Stoloff , P.r.. end Locknran , Robert F,, “D.nelopPP 107 nrant of Nery Human Rit.t,on, Quastionna,r.,” 2 99 131

Stoloff , P.t.r H., “Relating Factor Analytically Do- pp Mey 1974. )Publ,,hed ,n Anrencan Psycho- Weinland, Robert 0., “Analytis of Gor,hkov ’,nvad M.aau,e, to Enogeno.. Variable,.” 17 pp. , logical As,oci.t,00 Proceadings . 81s t Annual Con- Nav,~, in Wac and Pear,,” 45 pp,, App 1974 , PubMar 1973, AD 769 820 sent..,,. 1973) AD 719 240 l,, hed in Soniet N.val Policy, ed Mid,a.l

M.cGwira : New York : Pr..g..) AD 796 31999 108 P9 120

McConnell, Jam., M and K.ly, Anna M., “Super- Smith. Michael W• and Schr,rnp.r. Ronald A ., PP 132power Navel Osplomacy in the lndo-Pek,stani “Econom,c AnalySis of the ln•r.city Dnp.r,ion of Klernmen Sam,.) 0., “Racsal Dlftar.nc.s in doursCried,” IS pp., 5 Feb 1973, (Ps.blrsh.d. with rn Criminal Act istty,” 30 pp., Jun 1974 . (Presented at Worked in the P ew.. - . PrelimInary R.port .” 77vision,, in S,rein.l, Non/D.c 1973) AD 761 675 the Econometric Sodety M..tings, 30 Dec 1973) pp. , Feb 1675, (Peps. ‘sd on 26 Oct 1974 at

AD 780 539 East.r n Econo ’nlc AUocsat~ n Convention iiPP 109 ‘Econorrr o-s. North Carolina State t’r rer.ity. Albany, N.Y.) AL A 006 517

Bergisoafor, Fred 0., “S..mne—A Fremawork for*5 Study of Tried,” 9 pp - Dec ‘473. )Ptdenlsad PP ~2) 99 133in Revs,.. of Income and Wealth, S.r,et 18, No. 4, Den,nn, Eugene J “Procurement and Retention of Squires, Michael L , “A Stochastic Model of RepweD.c 1972) Nary Physicians . 21 pp., Js.n 1974, (Presented at Orange is. Lana America.” 42 pp., Feb 1976,

the 49th Annual Conference, W.,tern Econom,c AD A 007912PP 110 Ast o c:a t ro n Los Veges, Nat ., 10 Jun 1974)

Applanta. Jo.eplt, ‘A Crrtsqo. of Cost Analysis ” 9 AD 180 539 p9 134PP., Jul 1973. AD 166 376 Root , If . M and Cunniff, P. F. ,~

,A Study of tlsePP 122 Shock Spectrum o f . TamD.gr.e.of-Preedoms New

PP 111 Kelly , Anne M - ‘The 50,4* Naref Prenance During t.n.er Vibatory System,” 39 pp., D.c 1979, 19mb-Hee,icls, Robert W. , “Th. USSR’, ‘Blue Bait of the lrag’Kuwart : Border Disputs March-April lobed in the condensad rerun. of The Jen , ofD.fenae’ Conc.p.: A Unshed Military Plan I., Da- 1913 .” 34 pp., Jun 1974 . (Publi.h.d .n Sondt the Acoustic Society. Vol 50. No. 6. D.c 1979, p,.fin.. Ags.n.t Seeborn. Nud.ar Attack by SIr,),, Navel Policy, ad. Micheal MccGwre . N e t York: 1314Carriers and Polarit/Po,..don S$BNs ’ 18 pp. , May Preeger) AD 180 592 Depw’rmarr of M.thanicakn~~,gert.’,, Urvmeni ry1973, AD 796375 of Maryland

PP 12399112 Pet.,,.., Cherret C.. “t he Sonrst Port-Ct.ersng p9 135

0.nibarg. Lawrence H., ELF Atmonpftern None Operetta. in Bangiadlsh, March 1972-O.c.mber Qoradnesu, K.nn.t8, S.: kuirnack. Richud A.:Level Statistic, for Pro eca SANGUINE ,” 29 pp. , 1973,” 35 pp. , Jun 1974 , (Prsblish.d in Mid,..) Wind..,... Karen, “Analysis of Close r. AlIsr.s .Apr 1974, AD 796 969 MccGwire, en el. (.ds( Sosret N.,.) Policy : Ob4ec’ tin., (or Navel StatIons and Naval Al. Steorgaw,” 47

toes and Constra,nts. (New York: Pr..ger Pub pp.. 3 Jun 1975 )Rapplnt.d front “H.erlng beforePP 113 l,sher, 1974) AD 780 540 the Subcomnsitt.e on Military Cos.tteuctlofl of 4*.

Ginsberg, Lawrence H., “Propeption Anomalies Commits., on Armed Service,” U.S. knit. . 93rdDuring Prciact SANGUINE Et,puriments,” 5 pp., PP 124 Congru., 1.1 Session, Put 2. 22 Jun 1973)Apr 1974 . AD 795 968 Friadhaim, Robin L. end Jelin, Mary E. . “Antici-

patina Soviet Behavior at the Third U N. Law of pp 136PP 114 the Sea Conf,r.nfe USSR Po,.tmn, and Dilem- StaNinge. WIle.,, “Cyb....ed.,. end Sah.rlor

Moloney, Arthur P., “Job Sautfiction and Job met,” 37 pp., 10 Apr 1974, fPublr.hed in Sorrel Tls.rspy,” 13 pp., han 1975Tumoeer,” 41 pp., .hd 1973, AD 768 410 Navel Pohcy, it Michael M.cGw,ra . N.m York :

Preegerl AD 783 701 PP 13799 115 Peter,... Clean.. C., “The SovIet Union end *n

99cm .,.. , Lester P. , “79. Dateensissas.ts of Enser- PP 125 ReopenIng of the isa.. Cased: MIp,.ciluting ~~ -pasey and Elective Atheiwlon, ~ HospItal,,” 145 Weisslend. Robert 0.. “Sontat Naval Operation,- ito.. in the Gulf of Beat,” 30 pp,, Aug 1975.pp~, 18 Jul 1973, AD 789 377 Ten Y.ars of Change,” 17 pp., Aug 1974 , (Pub A0A 015 37S

t,,h ed ,n Soviet Naval PoIscy , .4 M.d...)

MacOwes. New Y~ek Preegar l AD 793962

CNA Prof.,alonal Papri wIth an AD ,snmb.r may be obtained from hi National Tschnlcal Information SgeVICS, U.S. Departmentof Commerce. SprIngfi.Id. V irqinia 22151. Other papers are .vpIIabIe from th. author at the Canter fo~ Naval Ana$yaas. 1401 W)I,on

Bou levard , Arlington, VirgInia 22209. . 1.

-- -~~. -.,-- -.,‘nrw ’-r -. ’— . —---—-‘—-— —.- —.. ~ - ,.— - .

—‘ - - . .-‘,

P9 139 P9 149 P9 160$tealln—_, Wblleeen, “BRIDGE: An lntensctirr. Die’ Squire., Mid,..) L, “Counterforce Effactiomee.: A Wilson, ~~~~5pØp4 9,, 1., “The-U.S. $lsth Plait aridIog,a.’Gener.tlon Fedllty.” 5 pp.. Aug 1975 (Re’ Comparison of the T,spe K” Measun. end a Cons’ die Contennioeal Defens, of See.,.,” 50 pp., aappainted fros.. IEEE Treniections on Syatennt, Man, purer Simsiletion,” 24 pp., Mar 1976 )Presentad at 1976 (SubmItted 1w publlceelon In Adelplnl Pepeno.and CybernetIc.. Vol 6, Ng, 3, May 1975) the International Study Association Me.ting,, 27 11 8,5 London) AD A030 467

Feb 1979) AD A022 591P9 139 99 101

Moepn Milieu F., Jr.. “Beyond Polklore and PP 150 MelIds Midlael S. end Peel, Vise Ad.,,. Bay (Lu ff .Fabler In Forestry to Poeitlve Economics,” 14 pp., Kelly, Anne M. end Peternen, Char).,, “Recent If eelr.~J “Fleet Conunard.. : Afloat or *jsorer)Pr.eented at Soudnan Economic Asnaci.tlon Change. in So.iat Naval Policy: Proepectn for Aims 9 pp.. Aug 1978 (Reprinted from U.S Wesef las.Meet ings Novemb.r . 1974) Aug 1975, Limitation, in the Meditarreneen and Indian ~~~~~~~~~~~ fu n 1979) AD *030 469AD A 016 293 Oceen.” 28 pp.. Apr 1916, AD A 023 723

P9 102P9 140 99 151 Frindinelm, Robert L,, ‘Paeil...etibe, Dplos ey.”

Mahoney. Robert end Orsad,unan, Daniel’. “Sims.).’ Honowito. Stanley A., “79. Economic Con’ UM pp. Sep i P7~ AD *033309rio.,, Expenimentetlon. end Context,” 36 pp., 1 Sep sequences of Political Ptsiloeophy.” S pp., Apr 19761976. (Published in Simulation & Gain... Vol 9, (Reprinted from Economic Inquiry, Vol. XIV , No. PP 163No. 3, Sap 1976) 1, Mar 1916) Lodimen, Robert F., “A Modal for Plodiosing Re’‘Mal!s*natic,e, Inc. ceuit Lose..,” 9 pp., Sep 1a78 (Presented at the

PP 152 94th annual convention of the American Pigolso’PP 141 Mizrahi, Maurice M., “On Patti Inteprel Solution. of io icol Association, WashIngton. D.C., 4 Sep 1910)

Micrahi, Maurice N., “GeneralIzed Hermit. Pofy’ the Sdwodinger Equation, Without Limiting Pro’ so *030 459stomils,” 5 pp., Feb 1979 (Reprinted from the ceder.,” 10 pp., Apr 1976 (Reprinted fromJoanna) of Computational and Applied Mach. Journal of Mathematical Physic,, Vol. 17 , No. 4 99 t64nisetlc,. Vol. 1, No. 4 (1975) , 273~277). IApr 1976), 501.515). Mahoney, Robert B~, Jr., “An Ase.seasi.nt of PublicRl.sarch pjppo,t.d by dw National Science Raera,ch supported by the National Science and Elite Perceptions In Preesoe. The UnIted KIs*

Foundation Fournition do.,, and the Federal Republic of Germany. 31pa,, Feb 1977 (Presented at Confer. ... “ Percep’

PP 142 PP 153 lion of the U.S. - Soviet Balance and the PolItic.)&ochmen. Robert F.. Jabs., C)enintopher, end Mlzr.hi, Maurice M., ‘18KB E’ip.nelon, by Pith Ur.n of MilItary Poom” eponeored by Director,$hs4sart, Willem F. II , “Models foe Estimating Pr. Integeals, With Applications to the Anharmonic Advanced Resppch Prolect, Agancy, AprIl 1979)mature Loom and Raauitlng District Pan. 0scillator,”~ 131 pp., May 1976, AD *025 440 AD 036 599f.rsnanoe,” 39 pp., Dec 1976 (Presented at the Aes.arch supported by the N,tione~ Scat’,cpRAND Conference on Defense Manpower, Feb Foundat io~ PP 1651976; to be publithed in the tonferenc. pro- Jondrove, Jesse. N, “Effects of Trade Raseriction.ceadinge) AD A 020 443 PP 154 on Import, of Steel.” 67 pp., N,,..aaber 1975.

MIzralsi, Maurice N., “On the Senni.Chosicsl Ets’ (Delivered at ILAB Conference In Dec 1976)PP 143 pension In Ouantum Mechanics for Arbitrary

Horowitz , Stanley and Sleenssen, Allen (LCdr. , Harrsiltoniane,” 19 pp. . May 1976 (Published in PP 166USN), “Maintenance Psnsonnel Eff.ctinaneot In the Journal of M.th.nselical Phynics. Vol. 19, No. 4, P Feldman, Paul, “Impediments to the leeipI.menta’Na,y,” 33 pp., Jan 1979 (Presented at the RAND 71$, Apr 1977). AD *025 441 Dan of Desirable Change. In she Repletion ofConference on Defense Manpower, Feb 1979; to be Urban Public Trannportot)on,’ 12 pp., Oct 1979,published las the conference prociedinga) PP 155 AD *033 322*0 *021 581 Squires, Mictsaal L. “Soviat For.sgn Policy end

Third World Nation,,” 26 pp., Jun 1976 (Prepared pp 166 — Raisedp~ 144 for presentation at di. Midwest Political Science Feldm~~, Paul, “Why lt’a DIfflmift to Change Rep’

Curds. William J. , “Th . Navy of the Republic of A,aociation meetings, Apr 30. 1976) AD *028 388 latiOn.” Oct 1976Chine — History. Problese., and Pl’oep.ctn.” 66 pp.,Aug 1976 (To be published n A Guid, to Asietic PP 166 PP 197Fleets,” ad. by Berry N, Bi.chmen; Nasal Institute Stalling,. William. “Approaches to Clesnese Charec- Klelnmen, Semuel, “ROTC Semi.. Cossessltmasito: .fee.) AD *030 440 tee Recognition,” 12 pp., Jun 1976 (Reprinted Comsgsa4,e,,” 4 pp., Nov 1976, (To be published l~(nor,. Pent.,. Recognition (Psngemon Press) , Val. B, Public Choice, Vol . XXI V . Fell 197$)

PP 145 pp. 87-95, 1979) AD *026 992 AD *033 306k.9y, Anne SI., “Port Visit, end the “In ter-netionetist Mission” of the Soviet Navy,” 36 pa,, PP 157 99 ieiApr 1979 AD A023 436 Morgan, William F., “Uneesployn.esrt and the Pent. Lockssnw~ Robert F,, “Reedldetlon of CE4A

pan Budget: Is The,. Anythisig in the Empty Peek Support Peratnnel Selection Meaeearea.” 36 pp., No,PP 140 Barrel?” 20 pp., Aug 1979 AD A030 45k 1971

Pelmotar, Vernon E., “Alt.nnatina, for InereeslngAce... to ScientifIc Journal,,” 6 pp., Apr 1975 PP 158 Pp 169iPr,e.ntad at III. 1975 IEEE Conference on Halielt , LCdr. Ridsard 1’,. (USNI, “E.penlmantal Jaoobaon, LouIs S., “EansInge Loge.. of WeakenScientific Joursneh. Cherry HIll. N C., Apr 2830; ValIdation of Probebilisy Predctlos..,” 26 pp., Aug Dis.ple.d from Manufecsurlng lsttheas,les,” 39 pp.,

• published lii IEEE Transection. on Professional 1979 (Presented at We MilItary Opeeetione Re’ Moe 197$, (O,lI,ered at ILAB Confenenma Is, Des• Cone,s.esloatlon. Vol. PC.1S, No. 3, Sep 1975) aaerch Sodaty Mseting, Fee 1971) AD A030 468 1971), AD *039509

AD A021 799= P9 169 pp~~75

PP 147 McCons,eP, Jensen N., “The Goneliko, *,tlele,, The 9calsesi~g, Frank P.. “5 mesa Sarlea A,selyalo ofKesder. J. ChrIstian, “Legal Iseuge in Protecting New Gorslskc, Book and Their Rebel.. so PolIcy.’ Labs. Tannover ” No. lilt )bell,.red it N.MOffshore Stnactsaree,” 33 pp., Jun 1970 (Prepared 93 pp., Jul 1971 )Piabllnfsed NP Soviet Naval In’ Conference in Dec 1971)under reiN order N00014.18.A.00910023 for ffuw’ce: Oome.tic end Foreips Dimersenane, .4, byOWN) A D ACeS 399 N, MacOwl,. and J. McDonnell; New York; pp 171

Preeger. 1977) AD *029 227 flaleton. Jar,.. N., A DIlgusloes Modal (en GaP99 148 Red LED Depr.d.tlon,” 10 pp., No, 1978, (Plib.

N.Connail, Acne. N., “Mlllteiy’Polltloel Tasks °~ liahed 151 Jour..) of Applied Pplee, Vel. 47, pa~tie. SovIet Navy hi War end Peace,” 92 PP.. Dec 4611.4627, Oct 157$)1575 (Publl.h.d Ni Soviet Ooee.s. DevelopmentBeady of Senate Commerce Committee October1979) AD ACeS 690

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P9172 P9 153 P9 192Claeeen, Kidideen P., “Uesemploys.aent lnsaaranca K.eeiag, David, “DIsangee 155 SovIet Navel Forge.,’ Hole., Arlene., “tReats of U~_.pl,.,.,.._t I.e.and the Lutrqlh of Ueesngloyseesst,” Dec 1575, 33 pp., ~~~~~~~ 197$, (Published at port of nuance E” ~~ ,_.,,se on Deistlo, end JIb kuds(Fraeentad at the (Jnleeralty of Nodeeesae Labor Chapter 3, “General Purpose Force.: Navy and Cult... ,” Asapat 1977, S p,. (Rpprlett.d fromNerlialsop on IS Non 1971) Mann. Corp.,” In Arise., Men, and Mllliaey Budgets, InduetrIel and Labor Rolatlee. Rime.., Vol., 39.

Francis P. Hoebar end William Sdsnolder. Jr. (ash.), No. 4, Jul 1971)P9 173 (Cress.. R.ee.k S Company, Inc,: New York),

KIgls.nnsas, *aeieael 0., “A Note on Racial Qlf. 1977), 50 *040 lOS 99 153fer.sscae Ni die Add.d’Woeker~0lea.urapd.Workar HorowItz, Steedey A,, “A Model .1 U-

~~~~~~~~Cantru.orey,” 2 pp., D.c 1970. (Publleleed in the P9 154 lnsaaeenee and die Weak Teat,” Aapat 1977, 7 ~~American Ecosisonslet, Vol XX, N.. 1, Spelng 197$) Lookman, Robert F., “An Oeervi.w of the OSDI (Reprinted Irons lsndss.t,lal said Labor NWelona Re’OWN Conf.,.n.a on Pint Tern, Enlisted Attoltion,” ,l .w. Vol. 30, No. 40, be 19771

P9 174 22 pp., Jun. 1917, (Presented so the 39th NORSNalsonsy. Robert S., Jr., “A Co.ssperieon of the Woeklesg Group on Manpower end Personnel P9 154shookings and International Incidents ProI..ts.” 12 Planning, Ansn.poiln. Md., 24.30 June 1577), C$aasen, Kathleen 9,, “The Effect. of tJoew~~aypp. Feb 1577 AD 037 200 AD *043 518 meant (messiest. on die Dur.tlase of U.c,.,,.L ,.,,. ,,t

a end iu~ ~isnt t.sslisgs,” Aepet 1977, 7 pp. (Na’

P9 175 P9 156 prInted from Isselactrial said Labor Reladone Na’Levine. Desniel: Stoloff, Peter end Sprull, Nancy. Kaeelng, David. “New T,dsnalodr and Nasal Pore. view, VoL 30, No, 40. be 1977)“Psablis Dreg Trt.tment said Addict Crime,” June in the South Atleettlc,” 22 pp. (ThIs paper wet tie.1975, IPuiellelsed In Jos&rssal of t.egsl Studies, Vol. b.eic for a preeaentatlo.n reed. at the Inarittat. for PP III5, No, 2) ForeIgn Policy Analyses, C.ansbeldga, Mae.., 21 April 9r.clslin , Freed,. “U,..,,,p l,,,,,.,.c Imsesr.nea Tea.

1977), AD A043 019 and Labor Tsarssoe.r: temeemy of Theoretical99 119 Fi.idlsap.’ IC pp. (Reprlentad fret. lesataete(el said

Pelts, Waasdl, “Corrslet. of Retention and Promo’ PP 154 Labor Relatlossa Reelasa, Vol. 30, N.. 40, be 1977)Don for USNA Graduate.,” 31 pp , Mar 1977, MIrrafil, Maurice N., “Thee. Ipate Integral,, Wlth~AD *039 040 out Lseslting Procedure,’ 31 pp., May 1917, lIe’ 99 IN

riled paper preaanted at tine Ill? NATO Issetlteate Raloson. I, N. sand Loela.,, 0,0,, ~~~~~~ of99177 on Peels Integrals and Their Application in Bush ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Efficiency irs las, O’Dsped

Loduman. Robert F, said Werts.r. John T., “Pr.’ DIsiantum Statistical. end Solid State Physics, GaP LED’s.” July 1977, S pp. lR...d t,4 fromdIatIts~ Att rition: A Test of Allernati,. Antw.rp, 9.l~um, July 17-30, 1977) lpvbllsas.d in IEEE Tren.atl.ns on Electron D.el.ee, Vol.A.,.,...,,,L ,” 33 pp. Ner 1977. (Pre.ent.d at di. Journal of ~~~~eeitsti.el Plsyelct 19(11, p. 21& Ieee E0-24, No, 7, July 1977)050/CNN Geesfe,..,.,. on Eelleaed Attrition Xero. 197$), AD *040 107Ienterseatl.asel Trelnlng Cetster. L.eeberg, Vlrpnle. P9 Iii4.7 April 1577), *0*039047 99197 WelIs, Aenilsossy N., “The GesitaS for Noel

Cola. Russell C., ~~~~~~~~~~ for Oper.tlasn. N. Analyses,” 14 39,, Dec 1977, AD 504919799179 seards.” 30 pp., April 1977, l9r~~~ea4 at the Joint

Kleinesseas, Se.uel 0,, “Ama E,eleaatloas of Navy Uss’ Natlosnel MoeIIes~ Of dee Op’atlanm Nae.rds PP 199re.fct.d LIeie Officer A.se.alon Program.,” 23 pp. Society 1 Aae.da said lisa Inatituge for Manep’ CNoen. Kedduen 9., “'The OMalimlanal Efleeta ofAprI 1977, (To be prse.need at the NATO Con’ meest Service., San Pren.eao, California, S Nay Un .,,,.asy lssn.eeme,” 39 pa,, Sept. 1977fore,., ass ~~~~~~~~~~ Plsanaslesg and Orgenizatlon 1977), *0*043 $20 IPIe.esng.d at a Noo.er Inatllestlo.t C.ad..,,._ enDeUgss, Bar... Italy. 20 Jesse 1977), AD *035059 Inaassla DIe.e~~~leai. øat 7.9, 1977)

P9 199P9 179 Curd s, WIllaae J., ‘l,k... cL.., rt....,a ,, sand PP IN

$saf.ff Peter H, end Iciest, Mopissas J., “Vacate: A Cul.on.. Pa.a.ell.,, fee Meilellaeerel Nege ialI..... - Deeds, WiNe. 1., “R~~ lation Frees A P.A,N. -Natal for Peresnasel lsseentgry Pisasniog Under Teetln 0,5. Appeseed,” 53 pp. Mc, 1977 191. The C.eI ., Armed Posies In Afrise sand the MiddleChsa~~ag Pulley,” 14 pp. AprIl 1977, pared for preoentallos, as the lUlls Anneal Geese..’ tact.” Sap 1977, II pa, AD *959(Praaested at the NATO Conference on .,.... Slots of the lne.rtsatl,ssal Studlee Amoslellon, Ch..PlannIng arid Grgse.laathn Deelge, St...., lady, 20 Park Plate Hotel, St Lassie. Mie.onm, North 14.20. 99 300June 1977), AD ACeS 059 1977), AD *542272 Powers. Wee. P., “The Usnlsed Wee. Navy,” 40

pa= Dec 1977. (To be pesbllslsed . a alsapier In TheP9 190 99 11$ US No Maims.. by Wei’s,.t.. Saab. Ni d

H.eowlu Stesd.y & 14 $s.,,ees , All,, . “TIi . Coil., Russell C., “Error Detection an C.seputsefzel darNs, 1939). AD *399109Ch_,,.cseiiati.,. gIl $av.~ Personnel said Personnel Information Netrle,l Date 9... .,” July. 1977, 13Prjfer.—_e—a~” 1$ pp. AprIl 1977. (Presented at tie. pp. Presented at We Slsitls CrassAcid Inverneglonal 99 201NATO C ,,..,. on L~~ ... PIsaaiIee aasd C.J~ ._,, on P ’ ~~-L~~ lafe. ejots Storage and Goads. Wiulae, J., “ma Cole. Military be AMMoGrgsnlasglost Deelgsn, have, lady , 20 ~~. 1177), Retrieval Si*sa,e, Cresftald Isistilete of Teds- asid Tile Mi*9e tall: Prose Mpela to Asigela,”AD *499990 .olsey, Cienfield. Bedford. tn and. *29 July Se~ 1177, 97 PP.. AD *995179

1977, AD *043506P9 191 P9 202Wet, Sleds., J. said 51.1.11 , Paver, “An Iasv.Masy PP 190 Feldman, P.ci, ‘~~~y r ,, j’~~~~~

’ O.e.m’s Noel,,”— Plaveelng Natal for Navy SatI at.d Pen.msel.” 39 Nooflay. Robert I, . Jr., “Ear.p.an Pe,..ptli IR.priasaed item r.A,~hj Chetpp end NaPe,.• pp., Nay 1177, (Prepared for ,,,,...e.$aA at the asid het’We. Cempatitlass.’ 9 0 3 9., July 1177 A, she Repitefaci MWesa*l rd Amadew e V ” ’

Jalett Wetland Naellseg .1 the Opes.glena R.sm.eh (Pispered for prassr*ation at the eased meeting of Economy. V.1. XXIX. MariNa, 1171, N., 1.) SipSalty of A..fl.. sand The InetlOat. for Manage’ tie. hntustatlonel Beadle. A.,.al. *.... It, LouIs, 1977, S pp. S

meat Sale,.., S May 1977, Ia, P,satale.a, Call’ Ma., Mardi, 1177), AD *043491Pealed, AD *942 221 99 203

P9 Iii Feldman. Pal. “EfUeleaay, DlMi*.U,,,,. end MaP9 192 lawyer, MardI. “lies I ,Ie, i.. ,t Field Aedge Male ~I 0.,.., .,,,,,.,t Is a Nokat leesnawy,” me

Mamay. Weds. 2sid, “Tile Gee. for the Piafeat mere: Ge. Mali’s Vices,” Asapat 1177,2939. pelemI (is. The Journal eF Poland £nslesmy,Sealip or My Pleat 1139 Day, at CN*.” 17 pp., Vel 79. Na. 3, NaylJec. 1971,) 1pp 1177, lip’.,ApeS 1*77 *0*055575

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I P9 215 ‘

lieU.. Asatheasy N., “Tie. 1157 Jun. Wee: So,lsi Dale, Rau.ll C., “Ca.sesast, on: ¾sdptha of he’ ~~~~~~~ T -‘Navel Mylesea.y aid The INsds Pleat — A N. bm,sation RaO*sW by Mandrel koalseen, 10

~~~,

Nan~ t. Not. r54w.sI of Pappasal,” Cit 1177, 30 pp., AD *017 235 No 7S, (Plallialiad — a Latter as 9., tallar.

5t • PP.. 0 be ~~~~‘

Journal of Dowateesntasl,as. VoL 31, No. 4 seed for , 1.5 J.uenl of Statlati.elPP ~~~ 216301, Oecsassber 1979) “'C ’

Cels, Naeeall C., “A Sibliomeoft Esesinotlon ofMa UglIer. Neat Theo.y of Scientific Pusai,eg.los~ P9 215 ,, -l’i..I..J. *,,” (Preesasted at the .st.sual mash es, of Calls, Rue.5 C., “Lola’. Frequency ~~~ Ibsatson Nangel. Not. Rels.ailon at Critical Points:the MNlean localy for Information Science, of lelsantillc Pro*satl.Ity,” 1$ pp., Feb 1979, (Pub. ~~~~~~~~ aId Sled.aatlc Thesry, 14 pp., ,iean05leage, IIl,l se, 25 “-~~--“er 1577.) Oct 1977. 5 liahed let the Journal of di. American Society for - 1975 (To be esthessitted for publication hi Jo..salpp., *0*947 237 Infcrsisalon $dan.e, Vol. 29, No. 5, pp. 356370, ~f Ma ,..atLi PIstils.)

— N,... ,.,ie.. 1577)p9 205 P9 229

‘ ~~~~~~~ Ju.s M,, ~~tratepe end Mleelosis of the 99 217 IbetIal, Not, “Dfliuelon Theory of ReeatlonIavI.t thy Is Ma V.. 2000,” 49 pp., N., 1977, CoIl.. Ruoeall C,, “Blblise.trlc Itsadle. of Scientific Rat... I, Foanssid.tlan end Einaseln’Ulnsb.ahewim

• (Pre..aad at a C~~~~~ ,.. on p a ~~~ ~p Prodsaatinfty,” 17 pp., Men 7$, (Presented at ins ~~~~~ 10 P.~. Jan 1579Power s e e App,eeeb the 21ee ceasey, ipo_..,,.a Aassvaal meeting of tie. Aisnericen Society for In.by the A.erlaaes Intespelas lallsate for PaNIc formation ScIence 1511 in San Francisco. Callfornis, PP 230

,9e ~~~~~ S 0~eo~~ 1577. pr4 subeaquently October 197t) Man,el. Marc. ‘D(flea.eon- Th..rl, of Reetteonlinad 155 a aalle.ia, of payers by Ma lost’ Rate., II Deeatelsn’Uldeeslecl. Aporoasetoatson. 14

• seed. AD *547 254 P9 211 — Clsealfiod, PP. F.b 1979

P9 297 P9 219 P9 231

~~~~.,,, (.~~~..... ‘~~sea’iWeet.a.. .. of P.. Hssntslsiger. R. L Var, “Nokat Analysis wIth Wiloon. Deosssoesd P., la.. “Naval Prt(.cl Ian Forces:laMed Pelti Pulse Aifaatmu Nea.e.h ~ Retard Eupectetlons: Theasy and Estimation,’ ~~ lit, Case for a Responsive NAP, Aug ISiSC’ndap’_t Sp~~”*a,ss be Ma Ass., Steal end pp., Apr 79 (To be submitted for publication letPoet I..*.ISL . 31 pp., Oat Ill? . (Presented at Jotanial of EconometrIcs)Sa~~~~sa —i r—sla-’ Meatinge bePalug Jacob.on, Louis. “Can Policy Q.sesp. be ~~~2 Nas. *~tr 1977) P9 ~~~ Acceptabl, to Labor?’ Au, 157$ (To be submitted

Wearer, Donald E., “Dlapsnelization by oroup (or pesblicetion In Indla,trlal and Labor Relation.99355 Natrlaea,”2S pp., *pr 71 Review)

ReMote. Ippie. , S., “Tile Dedhe. of Ma 0..s.esSlaUsa Plee.: 735 (JoiNt See.. Aalatlc Pleat arid P9 221in. Wienpial Wee, iIU~” lip’, No 1*77, (ReV Welsilesid. Robert 0., “Bags_ ..... Naval DIpio-printe d Ru. TI. A.wIe.s Nsps.na, Vol. eey Is Ma October 1973 Asdi’lareell War,” 75XX*VW., No.3, *9i~ 1977), AD *557 345 UP.. Jose 1579

___ P9 222Nlas.lsI, Maurice N., “Coereapoasdence Rules end

pp ~~~ Path hntquels,” 30 pa,, Jun 1975 (I,s,ltad paperKesal~~ Wed, ‘1’l~~ atla. TI. Fleet.” lOp’, presented at the CNRS meeting oat “Madsarnatical1177 Myipered for Ma Amselees Isiseasrlm Inst . Pioblesina In P.ynmen’s Path Intepals.” Mar.11).,t.l. 0u~~~e,,.. en P5*1.,. of Sea Power as We F1a~ee. May 22~2S. 1971)Appse~~ Ma Slat Century. October 5.7, 1577),*0*595 159 P9 223

Mos,al, Mare, “Itodsertlc ~~~~~~~~~~~ of Molecule’99 211 loss Molecule Naaatlane,” 21 pp., lees 1*79 (To be

NoelL Maurle. N., “0, Appreolmseln, Ma Ch ase. submitted for pithllcaticen las Jae,rd of MaIls.I. Cie.ege Pussatl.es,” 14 p’. Feb 1*75 nnatlcal P(eyalc.)

99212 P92 24Mmpal, Mare, “On Slnpslaa Ch~~~t.,No Initial Man al. Marc. “A re,sdon, Nfiarc.tion, end

Prcb5ane, wIlls UnIque $afodare ” 20 pp,, Eetlnc*lon In E.pI.lted AsedI P~~~~~_ ’~ °,’ ISJon 1979 ITo be .ab,,,M44 for publication in pp., Mar 1979 (To be submitted (or publication belateral of FtIL~~ .l.J Analyale end Ito Applic. AtuiarMoes Ns$arallel)dana) ‘Amy/asic of mA me, tasted ci 9.. Inosttot.

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(AsAwoly of bAnk CeAsselt, thcouep, Das.~~99 214We~~~~~ Relent S., “A - ,~,j i.t DIfferent VI.. ~~- - of lBs Uglel ~~~ P*ere,”37 p’, Jo, 197$ NaN.,, J. N. e.d I, li ~~~~~ ‘g~glj s’jg ~~U’i,,......J at ins 1*79 C........L... .1 ~. Annerleen Descent Csp~~ Of ~~p~~l1 - be Nat.ApMsd Sale.,, ~~~~~~~~~~ (*29*/PUS Panel on ImItilsig 0.9 LIDs,” 34 pp., Jon 1579

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