Requisites of Judicial ReviewA. Actual Case or ControversyPACU vs. Secretary of EducationFacts:The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities made a petition that Acts No. 2706 otherwise known as the “Act making the Inspection and Recognition of private schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction” and was amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional on the grounds that 1) the act deprives the owner of the school and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of Law; 2) it will also deprive the parents of their Natural Rights and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency and 3) its provisions conferred on the Secretary of Education unlimited powers and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute towards unlawful delegation of Legislative powers.The petitioner also complain that securing a permit to the Secretary of Education before opening a school is not originally included in the original Act 2706. And in support to the first proposition of the petitioners they contended that the Constitution guaranteed the right of a citizen to own and operate a school and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise the said right On the other hand, the defendant Legal Representative submitted a memorandum contending that 1) the matters presented no justiciable controversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional question; 2) Petitioners are in estoppels to challenge the validity of the said act and 3) the Act is constitutionally valid. Thus, the petition for prohibition was dismissed by the court.

Issue:Whether or not Act No. 2706 as amended by Act no. 3075 and Commonwealth Act no. 180 may be declared void and unconstitutional?

Held:The Petitioner suffered no wrong under the terms of law and needs no relief in the form they seek to obtain. Moreover, there is no justiciable controversy presented before the court. It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury and it is not sufficient that he has merely invoke the judicial power to determined the validity of executive and legislative action he must show that he has sustained common interest to all members of the public. Furthermore, the power of the courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interest of litigant require the use of judicial authority for their protection against actual interference. As such, Judicial Power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies and the authority to pass on the validity of statutes is incidental to the decisions of such cases where conflicting claims under the constitution and under the legislative act assailed as contrary to the constitution but it is legitimate only in the last resort and it must be necessary to determined a real and vital controversy between litigants. Thus, actions like this are brought for a positive purpose to obtain actual positive relief and the court does not sit to adjudicate a mere academic question to satisfy scholarly interest therein. The court however, finds the defendant position to be sufficiently sustained and state that the petitioner remedy is to challenge the regulation not to invalidate the law because it needs no argument to show that abuse by officials entrusted with the execution of the statute does not per se demonstrate the unconstitutionality of such statute. On this phase of the litigation the court conclude that there has been no undue delegation of legislative power even if the petitioners appended a list of circulars and memoranda issued by the Department of Education they fail to indicate which of such official documents was constitutionally objectionable for being capricious or pain nuisance. Therefore, the court denied the petition for prohibition.

Tan vs. MacapagalFacts:On October 6, 1971, a five page petition was filed by Eugene A. Tan, Silvestre J. Acejas and Rogeli V. Fernandez for declaratory relief as taxpayers. They challenged the validity of the Laurel-Leido resolution that deals with the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. The petitioners contended that the Constitutional Convention did not have the power to consider, discuss and adopt proposal that seek to revise the present Constitution through the adaptation of a form of government other that the form currently outlined in the 1935 Constitution.

Issue:Whether or not the petition filed contains the requisite of actual case or controversy as a requisite for judicial review.Whether or not petitioner has complied with the requisites of making a taxpayers suit as basis for legal standing.

Held:Judicial inquiry is to be postponed in the meanwhile. It is a prerequisite that the Constitutional Convention has already accomplished or performed an enactment of proposed amendments. Only after concrete actions that shows what it intends to submit for ratification can the court interpose judicial oversight.The doctrine of separation of powers calls for other departments being left alone to discharge of their duties as they see fit. The judiciary will neither direct nor restrain executive or legislative action. Such a principle also applies when the competence of the Constitutional Convention is concerned. The judiciary ought to leave it to fulfill its responsibility and its autonomy respected. Otherwise, it cannot perform its function well. It is therefore imperative that the rule of non-interference be strictly adhered to until the appropriate time comes.On the other hand, as to the requirement in making a taxpayers suit as a basis for legal standing, a negative answers has been contemplated. The person who impugns validity of a statue must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result to its enforcement. The case of Gonzales v Comelec is different with the case at bar. Furthermore, a Senator is usually considered as possessed of the requisite personality to bring such a suit.Motion for reconsideration is DENIED. No costs.

Dumlao vs. ComelecFacts:A petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injuction and/or Restraining Order filed by Patricio Dumlao a former Governor of Nueva Viscaya, seeking to enjoin Comelec from implementing section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, for being unconstitutional, discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection rights. Petitioner Dumlao join the suit filled by petitioner Igot and Salapatan to declare the said provision as null and void for being violative of the Constitution.

Issue:Whether or not the petition filed contains the requisite of actual case or controversy as a requisite for a review on certiorari?

Held:It is basic that the power of judicial review is limited to the determination of actual cases and controversies. The petitioner assails the constitutionality of the said provision and seeks to prohibit the respondent COMELEC from implementing such, yet the petitioner has not been adversely affected by the application of that provision. There is no ruling of that constitutional body on the matter on which the court is being asked to review on certiorari. Courts are practically unanimous in the pronouncement that laws shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt. It is within the competence of the legislature to prescribe qualifications for one who desires to become a candidate for office provided they are reasonable, as in this case.The constitutionality of paragraph 1 section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 is clear and unequivocal thus it does not discriminate and violate the equal protection rights of the petitioner.The first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is declared VALID.

Lacson vs. PerezFacts:On May 1, 2001, Malacañang was assaulted by a violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons. President Arroyo immediately issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region. The AFP and PNP were ordered to suppress the rebellion through General Order no. 1. Thereby, warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters were affected. The state of rebellion was lifted on May 6, 2001.For fear of imminent danger of being arrested without warrant, the petitioners filed for prohibition, injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus with an urgent issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.

Issue:Whether the petition filed is qualified as a “ripe” controversy as a necessary ground for judicial review.

Held:The prayer of the petitioners that the appropriate court before whom the information against petitioners are filed to desist from arraigning and proceeding with the trial of the case, until the instant petition is finally resolved is deemed premature. As of the date the court hears the pleas of the respondents, no complaints or charges have been file against any petitioners for any crime.Furthermore, the lifting of the state of rebellion makes the case moot and academic.Petitions are dismissed adding petitioners are enjoined from arrest without necessary judicial warrant for all acts committed in relation or connection to the May 1 siege of the palace.

Enrile vs. Senate Electoral TribunalFacts:On January 20, 1995, Sen. Aquilino Pimentel filed with the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) an election protest against Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile and other senatorial candidates who won in the May 1995 senatorial elections.On June 30, 1995, the petitioner, Sen. Enrile, filed his answer in counter-protest. Issues having joined, the SET required the parties to submit the list of pilot precincts number not more than 25% of the total precints involved.On Aug. 21, 1997, SET held a press conference at the Supreme Court Session Hall announcing the partial and tentative results of the revision of ballots in the pilot precincts without resolving the protest. In the tabulation presented, the petitioner’s name dropped to the 15 th position in the senatorial race.On September 24, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside Partial Results in Sen. Pimentel’s Protest and to Conduct Another Appreciation of Ballots in the Presence of All Parties. Respondent and Sen. Coseteng filed separate comments alleging petitioner’s motion is premature considering the SET has not resolved respondent’s election protest.Nevertheless, the SET denied petitioner’s motion holding no sufficient basis to discard the partial tabulation. The SET also denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.A petition for Certiorari assailed for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion the resolution that denied petitioner’s Motion to Annul/Set Aside Partial Results in Pimentel’s Protest and to Conduct another Appreciation of Ballots in the Presence of All Parties.

Issue:Whether or not there is still useful purpose that can serve in passing upon merits of said petition.

Held:The Court finds the petition becoming moot and academic. The tenure of the contested senatorial position subject to respondent’s protest expired on June 30, 1998. The case became moot considering there is no more actual controversy between the parties and has no useful purpose that can serve in passing upon any merit.Where issues have become moot and academic, justiciable controversies are lost, thereby rendering the resolution of no practical use or value.The petition is dismissed.

Ople vs. TorresFacts:A petition filed by Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion.

Issue:Whether or not the petition filed by the petitioner has an actual controversy.

Held:The petition filed by the petitioner has an actual controversy and it is ripe for adjudication. The petition is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. The petitioner, as a senator and member of the legislator, also claim that the official action complained is of infringes upon their prerogative as legislators.Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card. All signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait for the formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality.

DESAMA vs. GozunFacts:A petition for mandamus and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, together with the IRR issued by the DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40, s. 1996 (DAO 96-40) and of the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) entered into on 20 June 1994 by the Republic of the Philippines and Arimco Mining Corporation (AMC), a corporation established under the laws of Australia and owned by its nationals.After several unsuccessful actions to cancel the FTAA agreement with the government, the petitioners finally submitted a petition to the court. In their memorandum petitioners pose whether or not Republic Act No. 7942 and the CAMC FTAA are void because they allow the unjust and unlawful taking of property without payment of just compensation , in violation of Section 9, Article III of the Constitution issues, among others issues.

Issue:Whether there has been an actual controversy or issue with respect to the unlawful and unjust taking of property without payment of just compensation.

Held:Public respondents are of the view that petitioners’ eminent domain claim is not ripe for adjudication as they fail to allege that CAMC has actually taken their properties nor do they allege that their property rights have been endangered or are in danger on account of CAMC’s FTAA. In effect, public respondents insist that the issue of eminent domain is not a justiciable controversy which this Court can take cognizance of. A question is considered ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.However, the court cannot await the adverse consequences of the law in order to consider the controversy actual and ripe for judicial intervention. Actual eviction of the land owners and occupants need not happen for this Court to intervene. By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged act, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.Nevertheless, the petition was still dismissed due to the baseless contention of the issues submitted. The FTAA was in full compliance with the necessary requirements of the law and Constitution. The allegation of the lack of payment of just compensation was dismissed since the court has had authority in eminent domain cases to make sure the proper amount was established regardless of the fact that there would be an intervention from an executive department or legislature to make any initial determination of the amount.

Senate of the Philippines vs. ErmitaFacts:On September 28, 2005, President Arroyo issued EO 464, “Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes.”October 11, 2005, Petitioner Senate of the Philippines, alleging its vital interest in the resolution of the issue of the validity of EO 464 for it stands to suffer imminent and material injury as it directly interferes with and impedes the valid exercise of the Senate’s power and functions and conceals information of great public interest and concern, filed its petition for certiorari and prohibition, and prays that EO 464 be declared unconstitutional.

Issue:Whether or not there is an actual controversy or case to subject petition to judicial review.

Held:The Supreme Court finds respondents’ assertion that the President has not withheld her consent or prohibited the appearance of the officials concerned immaterial in determining the existence of an actual case or controversy. It would make no sense to await any further event before considering the present case ripe for adjudication.While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined it so, and that the President has not overturned that determination. Privilege cannot be set up by an unsupported claim. The facts upon which the privilege is based must be established.However, demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials, such a power belong only to Congress.Petitions are partly granted. Sec’s 2(b) and 3 of EO 464 are declared void, while Sec’s 1 and 2(a) are held valid.

Prof. Randolf S. David vs. Gloria Macapagal-ArroyoFacts:On Feb. 24, 2006, Pres. Arroyo declared a state of national emergency and orders the armed forces to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, and suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion. A lot of permits to form rallies were revoked and those who have already formed to gather were dispersed, and warrantless arrests were rampant. Among those arrested was the petitioner.The state of emergency was lifted after a week from declaration and after a lot of petitions was filed.

Issue: Whether or not the case may be subjected to judicial review even on the grounds that the proclamation contested by the petition has already been lifted.

Held: Power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts a "self-starting capacity” Courts may exercise such power only when the following requisites are present: first, there must be an actual case or controversy; second, petitioners have to raise a question of constitutionality; third, the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and fourth, the decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. However, The Solicitor General refutes the existence of such actual case or controversy, contending that the present petitions were rendered "moot and academic" by President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021. Such contention lacks merit. A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. The Court holds that President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic. And therefore, it can be subjected to judicial review.