active shooter incident response for the clearsreek fire...

Running head: ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENT RESPONSE 1

Active Shooter Incident Response for the Clearcreek Fire District

Stephen D. Agenbroad

Clearcreek Fire District, Springboro, Ohio

ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENT RESPONSE 2

CERTIFICATION STATEMENT

I hereby certify that this paper constitutes my own product, that where the language of others is

set forth, quotation marks so indicate, and that appropriate credit is given where I have used the

language, ideas, expressions or writings of another.

Signed: _______________________________________________


ABSTRACT

Emergency responders do not know when or where tragedy will strike but they must be prepared

for when it does. The United States has seen a significant increase in active shooter incidents in

recent years. The problem was the Clearcreek Fire District did not have a response plan for an

active shooter incident. The purpose of this research was to develop an active shooter response

plan for the Clearcreek Fire District. The action research method was utilized to develop an

active shooter response plan for the Clearcreek Fire District. To develop the response plan the

following research questions were answered (a) What procedures are other fire departments

utilizing for active shooter incidents? (b) What options exist for the Clearcreek Fire District

when responding to active shooter incidents? (c) What can be done to prepare the Clearcreek

Fire District for an active shooter incident? The procedures used in the applied research project

include literature review of written documents related to the problem statement and an

assessment of how the Clearcreek Fire District conducts their emergency operations as it relates

to active shooter incidents. The results of this applied research project indicate the Clearcreek

Fire District needs to take a more active role in their response to active shooter incidents. The

recommendations made include developing a general operating guideline for active shooter

incidents, working collaboratively with local law enforcement, the business community, and

school administration to develop comprehensive plan for active shooter response, and train

Clearcreek Fire District personnel on the plan.


Table of Contents Abstract.......…….………………………………………………………………………………....3 Table of Contents....………………………………………………………………….....................4 Introduction.……………………………………………………………………………………….5 Background and Significance………………………………………………………….………….6 Literature Review.………………………………………………………….……………………..9 Procedures.……………………………………………………….………………………............28 Results.……………………………………………….…………………………………………..29 Discussion.………………………………...……………………………………………………..51 Recommendations.…………….………..………………………………………………………..56 References…………..…………………………..………………………………………………..60 Appendix A – Active Shooter and Mass Casualty Incident Checklist (USFA)

Appendix B – Clearcreek Fire District Active Shooter Incident General Operating Guideline


INTRODUCTION

Where will the next Active Shooter Incident (ASI) happen? Nobody, except the gunman

can answer that question. An ASI can happen anywhere at anytime. The problem is the

Clearcreek Fire District (CFD) does not have a response plan for an active shooter incident. The

purpose of this research is to develop an active shooter response plan for the Clearcreek Fire

District. The action method of research was chosen for this project. The research questions to be

answered are: a) What procedures are other fire departments utilizing for active shooter

incidents? b) What options exist for the Clearcreek Fire District when responding to active

shooter incidents? c) What can be done to prepare the Clearcreek Fire District for an active

shooter response?

It is significant the Clearcreek Fire District does not have an established response plan for

ASIs. These high risk / low frequency incidents devastate the communities where they happen. If

an ASI were to happen within the CFD and the citizens discovered there was no response plan in

place it may cause the community to lose complete faith in the fire department and its

administrative staff. With that in mind it is paramount that a plan involving the responding police

agencies, the school district or effected business, and the fire district be researched, developed,

and implemented in the event an ASI takes place.

The intent of this research is to focus on developing a plan for larger occupancies within

the Clearcreek Fire District, to include Springboro city school buildings, Warren County Career

Center, and the larger commercial occupancies. The idea is to develop an initial response plan

for these occupancies to give first responders and subsequent scene commanders a framework to

operate in for the entire incident. This plan will be used as a template for ASI response to any


facility within the CFD response district. The idea is if the plan is developed for larger more

integrate occupancies it will be easily adapted for use in smaller buildings with less occupants.

BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE

Unfortunately, there are people who wish to do harm to others. There is no place in

America immune to this fact. The City of Springboro is a municipality located within the

Clearcreek Fire District. Springboro was recently ranked the seventh best town to live

(nerdwallet, 2013) and the eighth safest city to live (safewise, 2014) within the State of Ohio.

This is something that can lull a community to believe tragedies only happen in other parts of the

country, and the “not in my town” mentality can develop.

When it comes to school shootings recent years have seen an extreme increase in the

number of attacks. When analyzing the number of school shootings from 1891 until

present there are many gaps in years between shootings until 1976. At this point the gap

narrows to nearly four years between attacks until 1991. Beginning in 1991 there have

been school shootings every year, with the exception of 2000 (Borelli, 2007).

While a number of these attacks can be considered violent crimes, which have occurred

on school grounds many, do not fall into this categorization. These can be differentiated

by the fact that the assailant was still actively firing on civilians after the arrival of first

responders. In such attacks at Columbine, Virginia Tech, Case Western Reserve

University, California State University and Red Lake High this was the case. It is

imperative that first responders have some level of preplanning established before they

are placed into this type of situation (Davis, 2009).

These shootings are occurring at such an alarming rate it is critical the CFD plan for how

it will mitigate the situation in the event an ASI does happen. The decision whether to take an


active role in the tactical operations or stage units until the police department can give an “all

clear” needs to be decided before the incident happens. Without a procedure to follow for an ASI

crews may be placed in situations that require an unacceptable level of risk and may not know

how to appropriately respond to the incident unfolding before them.

For the law enforcement community, April 20, 1999 changed everything in reference to

their response to an ASI. This is the day Columbine High School was attacked by two of its own

students. Prior to this date, the method of operation for an ASI was to utilize road patrol officers

to set up a perimeter and wait for units equipped with specialized weapons and trained in

specialized tactical operations to mitigate the situation.

Shortly after the Columbine shootings in 1999 the law enforcement community began

making changes in the way it responds to ASI’s dictating the need for fast and aggressive

actions aimed at stopping the violence. Utilizing Immediate Action Rapid Deployment

(IARD) tactics when confronting ASI’s has become expected practice in the law

enforcement community (Armellino, 2007).

While the law enforcement community has taken a progressive approach towards responding to

ASI’s after Columbine, the fire service has not. Perhaps it is time the fire service takes a page

from the law enforcement community and looks at response to ASI from a different perspective.

It has been standard practice for the fire service to simply stage at an ASI until law

enforcement can give an “all clear” of the building. This can take a very long time, sometimes

hours, to give an “all clear” of a large building such as a school. Through coordinated planning

and training there may be a more effective and efficient way to handle an ASI other than just

staging apparatus and personnel until the “all clear” is given.


Although ASI have been thought of as primarily law enforcement situations in the past, it

will take a team effort on many levels to generate a positive outcome for this type of event. This

positive outcome will only happen if a unified command structure utilizing the National Incident

Management System is established early in the incident. Many agencies will be required to work

in unison in order to accomplish this common goal. A unified command will greatly increase the

likelihood of a successful outcome of an ASI. By working together agencies involved in the

incident with specialized knowledge can utilized a team approach to increase the chance of a

successful outcome. For example the police department has more experience and training in

dealing with gunman, the fire department has more experience and training dealing with the

incident command system and mass casualty incidents, and the facility representatives have

intellectual knowledge of the building and its occupants.

Another concern for the CFD is how the initial arriving crews will react when they

respond to an incident where harm is being done and the shooter has not been neutralized. People

drawn to emergency services work tend to have an aggressive personality and are considered to

be action oriented. Without the proper training and procedure(s) put in place first responders may

react instinctively and create a worse situation by entering an area that is too hazardous for them

to operate safely.

First responders are accustomed to taking action upon their arrival, however, when acts

of violence are still occurring after their arrival they are sometimes at a loss as to what

level of risk should be assumed. ASI’s can be the most terrifying types of incidents

imaginable, especially for non-Law Enforcement first responders. This is due to the need

to react but the lack training and preparation to do so safely (Davis, 2009 p.10).


There are many variables to consider when planning the emergency medical response for

an ASI. The primary decision to consider is whether the CFD should 1) take the conservative

approach and stage units until given the “all clear by the police department or 2) take a more

active role in the tactical deployment of resources into the building utilizing solid risk

management principals to make an informed and educated decision on whether emergency

medical personnel can enter to render aid in a safe manner?

This research accomplishes the goal established in the third objective of the United States

Fire Administration’s Strategic Plan to improve the fire and emergency services’ capability for

response to and recovery from all hazards by explaining the importance developing a response

plan for active shooter incidents (USFA, 2012).

LITERATURE REVIEW

A literature review was completed evaluating what has been published in respect to

ASI’s. While conducting research into ASI’s it was apparent until recently, the law enforcement

community has taken a more progressive approach towards response to ASI’s than the fire and

emergency medical services. This may be due to the fact that an ASI was believed to be a police

matter and fire and EMS took a more supportive role. It also may be due to the fact the law

enforcement community was highly scrutinized by the way they responded during to the

Columbine High School incident (Armellino, 2007).

Recently, the United States Fire Administration (USFA), the International Association of

Fire Chiefs (IAFC), and the International Association of Firefighters (IAFF) has come out with

opinions backed by thorough research and data on how fire and EMS departments should

respond to the ASI (USFA, 2013). These leading fire service entities are in agreement on the

different options available in regards to responding to ASI’s. The USFA recently published the


report; Fire/Emergency Medical Services Department Operational Considerations and Guide for

Active Shooter and Mass Casualty Incidents, which states the following:

This paper was developed as a fire and Emergency Medical Services (EMS) resource that

can be used to support planning and preparation for active shooter and mass casualty

incidents (AS/MCI’s). These complex and demanding incidents may be well beyond the

traditional training and experience of the majority of firefighters and emergency medical

technicians (USFA, 2013).

The USFA’s Fire/Emergency Medical Services Department Operational Considerations and

Guide for Active Shooter and Mass Casualty Incidents report also provided and executive

summary of its findings. They are as follows:

Background

More than 250 people have been killed in the United States during what has been

classified as active shooter and mass casualty incidents (AS/MCIs) since the Columbine

High School shooting in 1999. AS/MCIs involve one or more suspects who participate in

an ongoing, random or systematic shooting spree, demonstrating the intent to harm others

with the object of mass murder.

It has become evident that these events may take place in any community impacting fire

and police departments, regardless of their size or capacity. Local jurisdictions must build

sufficient public safety resources to handle AS/MCI scenarios. Local fire/Emergency

Medical Services (EMS) and law enforcement (LE) must have common tactics,

communications capabilities and terminology to have seamless, effective operations.

They should also establish standard operating procedures (SOPs) for these very volatile


and dangerous situations. The goal is to plan, prepare and respond in a manner that will

save the maximum number of lives possible (USFA, 2013).

Maximizing Survival

Extraordinary efforts on the part of local fire/EMS agencies and direct pre-planed

coordination with LE is required during response to these events in order to rapidly affect

rescue, save lives, and enable operations with mitigated risk to personnel. It is essential

that local policies be put in place before AS/MCIs happen to ensure coordinated and

integrated planning, preparation, response, treatment and care.

The recognition of AS/MCI’s as a reality in modern American life has led to the

assembly of a number of public safety organizations representing various disciplines to

share and develop strategies for combating the problem. One group, convened by the

American College of Surgeons and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Hartford,

Connecticut, developed a concept document for the purpose of increasing survivability in

mass casualty shootings. The paper, The Harford Consensus, describes methods to

minimize loss of life in these incidents.

The Hartford Consensus identifies the importance of initial actions to control hemorrhage

as a core requirement in response to AS/MCIs. Experience has shown that the number

one cause of preventable death in victims of penetrating trauma is hemorrhage. Well-

documented clinical evidence supports the assertion.

The Hartford Consensus focused on early hemorrhage control to improve survival. These

very practical recommendations include the critical actions contained in the acronym


THREAT:

T – Threat suppression H – Hemorrhage control RE – Rapid extrication to safety A – Assessment by medical providers T – Transport to definitive care

The THREAT concepts are simple, basic and proven. The Harford paper points out that

life-threatening bleeding from extremity wounds are best controlled by use of

tourniquets. Internal bleeding results from penetrating wounds to the chest and trunk are

best addressed through expedited transportation to a hospital setting (USFA, 2013).

Coordinated / Integrated Planning and Response

To increase survivability of victims, fire and EMS agencies must incorporate THREAT

principles as SOPs. At a minimum, SOPs should include:

• Jointly developing local protocols for responding to AS/MCIs. Fire/EMS and LE

should plan and train together.

• Planning for and practicing rapid treatment and evacuation, including who, what,

when, where and how it will be carried out.

• Using the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Incident

Command System (ICS). Accordingly, fire/EMS and LE should establish a single

Incident Command Post (ICP) and establish Unified Command (UC).

• Fire/EMS, LE and all public safety partners planning and training together.

• Including AS/MCIs in tabletop and field exercises to improve familiarity with

joint protocols. Regularly exercise the plan.

• Using common communications terminology. In addition to NIMS and ICS

terminology, fire department personnel must learn common LE terms and vice


versa. Share definition of terms to be used in AS/MCIs and establish a common

language.

• Incorporating tactical emergency casualty care (TECC) into planning and training.

Training must include hemorrhage control techniques, including use of

tourniquets, pressure dressing, and hemostatic agents. Training must also include

assessment, triage and transport of victims with lethal internal hemorrhage and

torso trauma of definitive trauma care.

• Providing appropriate protective gear to personnel exposed to risks.

• Considering fire hazards secondary to the initial blast if improvised explosive

devices (IEDs) are used.

• Considering secondary devices at main and secondary scenes.

• Determining how transportation to and communications with area

hospitals/trauma centers will be accomplished.

AS/MCIs are volatile and complex. Research and history have indicated that the active

risk at most incidents is over before first responders arrive on scene, or shortly thereafter,

but they may also require extended operations. Extensive planning, recurrent training,

and preplanned coordination are all required for optimal results. Coordinated

involvement by the whole community is essential. The public, fire/EMS, law

enforcement, medical transportation, and medical treatment facilities must be engaged

cooperatively in order to maximize survivability and minimize deaths due to AS/MCIs

(USFA, 2013).

In September of 2013 fire chiefs from around the world, United States Fire Administrator

Ernest Mitchell, and members of the International Association of Firefighters participated in the


National Fire Protection Associations - Urban Fire Forum (UFF) in Quincy, Massachusetts. The

group endorsed the document “Active Shooter and Mass Casualty Terrorist Events Position

Paper (UFF, 2013). This group came to an agreement on options for fire/EMS departments to

respond to ASIs. They stated the following:

The emerging threat of terrorism and asymmetric warfare, specifically small unit “active

shooter” and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, is a concern for the fire service.

An attack by radicals armed with weapons in public areas, such as schools, shopping

malls, churches or any other location where people congregate is a real threat to a sense

of security and daily lives.

An active shooter event is an event involving one or more suspects who participate in an

ongoing, random, or systematic shooting spree, demonstrating the intent to harm others

with the objective of mass murder.

Given the recent state of what has become known as “active shooter” scenarios unfolding

across the nation, fire and police departments, regardless of size or capacity, must find

ways to marshal appropriate and effective responses to these events. Therefore, local

jurisdictions should build sufficient public safety resources to deal with active shooter

scenarios.

It is imperative that local fire and police departments have common tactics, common

communications capabilities, and a common lexicon for seamless, effective operations.

Local fire and police departments should establish standard operating procedures to deal

with these unusual, highly volatile, and extraordinarily dangerous scenarios. Standard

operating procedures should include at minimum the following objectives.


1) Use of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) in particular the

Incident Command System (ICS). In accordance with NIMS guidance, Fire and

Police should establish a single Command Post (CP) and establish Unified

Command (UC).

2) Police and Fire Departments should train together. Initial and ongoing training

and practice is imperative to successful operations.

3) Use of common communications terminology. Fire department personnel must

understand common police terms, such as Cleared, Secured, Cover, Concealment,

Hot Zone/ Warm Zone/ Cold Zone and related terms (red, green etc.), and others.

4) Provide appropriate protective gear to personnel exposed to risks. Firefighters,

EMT’s, and paramedics should be provided ballistic vests and helmets if they are

to participate in a rescue task force (RTF).

5) Consider secondary devices at the main scene and secondary scenes in close

proximity to the main scene. Acts of terror using an IED, as well as active

shooters often prepare or actually begin their attacks at a location separate from

the area designated as the main scene.

6) For events including IEDs, consider fire hazards secondary to the initial blast. For

example, in public areas such as restaurants, clubs, schools and churches, natural

gas is used to food preparation and heating; therefore, responders should check to

ensure that gas lines and valves have not been compromised (UFF, 2013).

The UFF position statement discussed utilizing a Rescue Task Force (RTF) in the event

of an ASI. These task forces would be deployed, escorted, and protected by law enforcement


officers to perform medical treatment to the wounded. The UFF position statement said the

following in regards to a RTF:

A Rescue Task Force (RTF) is a set of teams deployed to provide point of wound care to

victims where there is an on-going ballistic or explosive threat. These teams treat,

stabilize, and remove the injured in a rapid manner, while wearing Ballistic Protective

Equipment (BPE) and under the protection of Police Department (PD) officers. An RTF

team should include at least one ALS provider.

An RTF response may be deployed to work in, but not limited to, an “active shooter” in a

school, business, mall, church, conference, special event, or any other scene that is or has

the possibility of an on-going ballistic or explosive threat.

Prior to deploying an RTF team, Police/Fire Unified Command (UC) should consider

IED or other secondary devices. Threat zones must also be identified by the UC. Threat

zones include the following.

• Hot Zone – Area where there is a known hazard or direct and immediate life

threat (i.e. any uncontrolled area where an “active shooter” could directly engage

an RTF team). RTF teams will not be deployed into a Hot Zone.

• Warm Zone – Area of indirect threat (i.e. an area where PD has either cleared or

isolated the threat to a level of minimal or mitigated risk). This area can be

considered clear but not secure. The RTF will deploy in this area, with security, to

treat victims.

• Cold Zone – Areas where there is little or no threat, due to a geographic distance

from the threat or the area has been secured by police (i.e. Casualty Collection


Points, the area where the FD may stage to triage, treat, and transport victims

once removed from the warm zone).

Each RTF member should be equipped at a minimum with a Kevlar helmet, body armor,

flashlight, radio, and exam gloves. Remote microphones with earpieces are required for

communication with UC.

RTF should only be deployed upon agreement of unified police/fire command. RTF

teams of two firefighter/EMTs or Paramedics should only be deployed with two

personnel from PD acting as security. UC should establish an accountability process for

all incident responders using a check in/out procedure. Firefighters should not self deploy

into the warm zone.

When teams make entry, they should treat the injured using Tactical Emergency Casualty

Care (TECC) guidelines. Any victim who can ambulate without assistance should be

directed by the team to self-evacuate down the cleared corridor under police direction,

and any victim who is dead should be visibly marked to allow for easy identification and

to avoid repeated evaluations by additional RTF teams.

A RTF can be deployed for victim treatment, victim removal from warm to cold zone,

movement of supplies from cold to warm zone, and any other duties deemed necessary to

accomplish the overall mission. RTF teams should work within PD security at all times.

To sustain skills and readiness, RTF skills and operations should be taught annually and

practiced regularly. RTF initial and ongoing training for all EMS providers should

include TECC guidelines and practical skills applications.

Tactical Emergency Casualty Care


The TECC guidelines are the civilian counter part to the US military’s Tactical Combat

Casualty Care (TCCC) guidelines. The TCCC guidelines were developed for military

personnel providing medical care for the wounded during combat operations. These

guidelines have proven extraordinarily effective in saving lives on the battlefield, and

thus provide the foundation for TECC. TECC takes into account the specific nuances of

civilian first responders.

The specifics of casualty care in the tactical setting will depend on the tactical situation,

the injuries sustained by the casualty, the knowledge and skills of the first responder, and

the medical equipment at hand. TECC provides a framework to prioritize medical care

while accounting for ongoing high-risk operations, and focuses primarily on the intrinsic

tactical variables of ballistic and penetrating trauma compounded by prolonged

evacuation times. The principle mandate of TECC is the critical execution of the right

interventions at the right time.

TECC is applied in 3 phases, direct threat/indirect threat/evacuation care, as defined by

the dynamic relationship between the provider and the threat. Indirect threat care is

rendered once the casualty is no longer under a direct and immediate threat (i.e. warm

zone). Medical equipment is limited to that carried into the field by RTF personnel and

typically includes tourniquets, pressure dressings, hemostatic agents, occlusive chest

seals and adjunct airways.

Tactical EMS or Tactical Medics Differ from the RTF Concept

Tactical EMS is NOT routine EMS. Tactical EMS or “Tactical Medic” refers to a select

EMS provider assigned to a SWAT or similar specialized tactical law enforcement team.

Tactical EMS requires the medic to be trained and equipped with the special skills


necessary to support these law enforcement teams. Tactical medics should be members of

agencies such as fire departments or EMS services who are specifically chosen and

trained to be part of the tactical law enforcement team. In contrast, RTF responders come

from the cadre of firefighter/EMTs and paramedics who respond daily to calls for help

and should not be confused with Tactical Medics (UFF, 2013).

In February 2013 the State of Connecticut, Department of Emergency Services and

Public Protection Commission on Fire Prevention and Control developed the document “Model

Procedures for Fire Department Response to Hostile Situations”.

The purpose of this document is to provide guidance to Connecticut’s Fire Service

Incident Commanders and first arriving units that respond to a hostile or violent situation

or a situation that may become hostile or violent. The primary goal is to minimize the risk

to fire/EMS personnel and to provide a common framework on which fire departments

may build a local protocol tailored to their specific community (Connecticut, 2013).

This document may have been produced for use by the fire departments in Connecticut

but it references universal principles that can be utilized nationwide. The State of Ohio currently

does not have any type of template to utilize and the one produced by the State of Connecticut

appears to be a quality model. The introduction states:

Fire Department (F.D.) responses to hostile and violent situations are becoming more

frequent. Such incidents include, but are not limited to, large-scale complex incidents such

as school shootings, workplace violence, and terrorist activities, as well as smaller

scale/less complex incidents such as suicide attempts, single patient shootings and

stabbings, domestic violence injuries, and assaults. The goal of this guide is to ensure


coordination between agencies resulting in scene control, patient treatment, and evidence

preservation while maintaining the safety of all emergency personnel.

One of the most serious and dangerous of these types of incidents is the active shooter

incident. An active shooting event can occur at any time or any place. During the past

several years, there have been active shooter incidents where we shop (2007…Gunman

kills 5 and injures multiple others at a Utah mall), where we exercise our free speech

(2011…Congresswomen Giffords critically shot while meeting with constituents at a

market – 6 people killed and 3 others injured), where we learn (1999…Columbine High

School 12 students and 1 teacher killed; 2007 Virginia Tech 32 killed and many others

wounded; 2008 Northern Illinois University 5 students killed on campus), and where we

work (2010…Gunman opens fire at Connecticut beer distributor, killing 8 people).

Most recently in 2012; the Newtown, CT elementary school shooting (…26 children and

adults killed), the Webster, NY shooting of firefighters at the scene of a working fire (…4

firefighters shot, 2 fatally) and Hoover, Alabama where firefighters responded to a medical

and were shot at by the caller.

These incidents differ greatly from routine incidents due to an increase in safety

requirements and the necessity of a unified command structure for incident mitigation and

coordination of resources. Though it is the culture and nature of the fire service to go into

any situation in order to save the lives of those they serve, hostile and violent situations

require a different mindset in order to have a positive influence on the outcome.

The time has come for Fire Departments to evaluate various policies and procedures

currently in place. The following model procedure, based on existing practices and sound

principles, centers on the safety of fire department personnel, complements the concepts of


unified command and mutual aid and generates a standard framework of operating

guidelines that all departments will recognize. The role of the Emergency

Telecommunicator (Dispatcher) will be critical to the outcome of any Hostile/Violent

incident.

Many of the concepts used in this guide are similar to a Hazardous Material incident

response. A Hazardous Materials incident also has unseen dangers, can change rapidly,

uses different response modes and requires a need for safety zones (Connecticut, 2013).

The policy development is based on the following items:

Model Baseline Policy

During a response to or arrival at a hostile/violent incident, the fire department will

maintain a safe work environment for its firefighters and EMS personnel and will provide

essential emergency and rescue services, in coordination with law enforcement, to the

public as long as the safety of the responders is not endangered by the incident.

Model Operational Guidelines

Incident Priorities:

As with all responses the following incident priorities will be safely achieved:

1. Life Safety

2. Incident Stabilization

3. Property Conservation

Response:

If Fire Responders are aware of a hostile incident, fire units should consider one of

two response modes:

1. Stage for Police Department (P.D.) and wait for the scene to be secured.


2. Respond directly to the confirmed, secured scene and proceed with caution.

In all cases, the first arriving unit or Incident Commander (IC) will collect as much

information as possible and rapidly communicate that information to responding

companies. This may require a windshield survey as an initial scene size-up. The first

arriving unit or IC will make the decision of which response mode to use. If possible, the

F.D. Incident Commander should monitor the P.D. frequencies being used for the

incident.

If F.D. companies respond to an incident of an unknown nature and find themselves in a

hostile/violent situation, they will immediately retreat to a safe location. Emergency radio

traffic priority should be used. Dispatch should be advised of the need for rapid P.D.

response.

The primary responding agency shall be responsible for establishing command. As

soon as possible, a Unified Command should be established.

For larger, more complex incidents, safety zones should be created. Personnel shall

understand that these zones are dynamic and can change as the incident develops.

• Hot Zone is an operational (geographic) area, consisting of the immediate incident

location with a direct and immediate threat to personal safety or health (not a

secure area).

• Warm Zone is an operational (geographic) area with a potential threat to personal

safety or health. The warm zone typically exists between the hot zones and the cold

zones. This zone is established and secured by PD. Rescue teams may be able to

enter and remove patients without providing treatment. Personnel shall wear vests

or jackets for easy identification while in the warm zone.


• Cold Zone is an operational (geographic) area surrounding the warm zone where

first responders can operate with minimal threat to personal safety or health. In this

zone personnel can provide treatment to patients.

Response – Issues:

NO SELF-DISPATCH – A common problem that occurs during unique emergency

incidents is fire department personnel making a decision to dispatch themselves, often in

personal or department issued vehicles. Often with the best intentions and nature of the

fire service being to go into any situation in order to save lives, these persons become

part of the problem rather than the solution. Safety and accountability issues are only

some of the problems caused. If not formally requested, do not self dispatch.

Unified Command:

Unified Command is the integration of command personnel from each responding agency

to a multi-jurisdictional or multi-agency operational event to enhance communication,

planning, and logistics for all responding agencies by the utilization of shared resources,

knowledge, and expertise.

• Upon announcement of establishment of unified command, all various agency

command personnel shall report to the Command Post (CP). The CP shall be

established in a safe location, preferably located in the Cold Zone or at a remote

location.

• In most cases the police department should designate this area.

• Expand the Incident Command structure as needed.

a. The size and complexity of the organizational structure, obviously, will be

determined by the scope of the emergency.


b. The only change in using the ICS on a very large incident rather than a

small incident is the method of growth of the emergency management

organization to meet the increased need within the Unified Command.

c. The determination to expand the organization by the Incident Commander

would be done when a determination is made that the existing ICS

structure is becoming insufficient.

• Command vehicles may be co-located to facilitate command post operations.

• Other agency representatives (e.g. DOT, School Administration, and Division of

Emergency Management and Homeland Security [DEMHS]) shall participate in

Unified Command as needed.

• The IC shall develop an incident action plan.

• The IC shall designate a command-operating channel.

• Designation of a Public Information Officer for the incident.

• Consideration of deploying an Incident Management Team.

• Consideration of a Critical Incident Debriefing Team response for responders.

Incidents with Active Fire:

At hostile or violent incidents the coordination between agencies at the CP, with

consideration of scene control, patient treatment, and evidence preservation while

continually maintaining the safety of all emergency personnel, will ultimately determine

F.D. actions toward extinguishment of active fires, regardless of size.

Incidents with an Active Fire situation should consider the following priorities:

• Active Fires will be allowed to burn until confirmation of a secure scene has

occurred.


• Additional Fire Resources should be pre-staged, with consideration of the worst-

case scenario, should the Active Fire be allowed to burn with exposure and

weather considerations.

• An Incident Action Plan should be developed specifically for fire attack.

In Appendix D of the Connecticut plan there are nine questions to ask and answer to

assist in the development of the departments response plan. Each sample question has a

paragraph of items to consider when answering the question. The nine questions with the items

to consider are as follows:

1. Do you use risk/benefit for every call? “With incidents where there is a threat

of, or actual violence, it must be remembered that a judgment is required to

ensure that risks to personnel are not out of proportion to the benefits to be

gained from achieving a given task” (Labor Research Department, 2005). Risk

Management is not new to the fire service. The balance of perhaps limited

potential benefit in light of substantial risk should be foremost in every

responder’s mind.

2. Do you have an effective relationship (both at the ‘boss’ level and ‘street’

level) with the law enforcement agencies in your community? As noted by

the Columbine Review Commission (2001), familiarity of personnel and roles

prior to an incident through training and planning exercises provides for better

communication and operation during the event. Fire Department personnel

should have access to, and use, law enforcement intelligence information in

order to preplan response to incidents. This may include information regarding


domestic terrorism, gang violence, known or suspected drug factories and/or

houses.

3. How good is the information you get from you Dispatcher? Response to an

incident of violence carries significant uncertainties. The ability of the dispatch

staff to reduce the uncertainty while increasing the level of information

provided is critical. It is also helpful for responders to have the ability to

communicate on a specific, shared, common, radio frequency to remove the

potential for message corruption as it is passed through another person.

Dispatch staff should critically and carefully monitor the operations radio

channel of personnel responding to and operating at incidents of violence and

perform Personnel Accountability Report (PAR) checks on a prescribed

interval.

4. Do you allow members to ‘first respond’ directly to the scene? Many

jurisdictions have response and deployment plans that include the dispatch of

individual first responders and/or a single person in a response vehicle. This

should be prohibited or at least limited to the extent possible. The ability of a

single person to react to an act of violence is limited. It may not even be

possible to retreat. Responding and deploying in a group provides added

protection, awareness, and visibility.

5. Does your law enforcement agency use an incident management system?

Each agency should strive to ensure that the IMS used in that community is

applied as uniformly as possible. Fire departments should take a leadership role


in assisting their law enforcement compatriots, particularly at the street or

service delivery level, to understand and apply an IMS.

6. When responding to a potential violent incident, do you seek out a law

enforcement officer when you arrive? Fire department personnel should

communicate, face-to-face, directly with the law enforcement component on

scene. Direct face-to-face communication, with clear understanding of the

hazards, risks associated, potential outcomes, and planned actions on the part of

each agency should precede any fire department response into a hazard area.

7. Have you told your fire officers/personnel that it is OK to leave the scene if

things go ugly? If fire department operations have commenced and violence

erupts, fire service personnel should consider leaving the scene until the law

enforcement component has stabilized the situation.

8. Is there a point where we don’t respond or limit our response to violent

incidents? Fire department personnel may not respond into a hazard area due

to the potential for additional violence or because the situation is not yet under

control. Some responders and organizations fear their community will view this

in a negative light. A 2005 Labor Research Department report stated “the key

issue here is the extent to which fire crews can make decisions when dealing

with an incident and with the confidence that they will be backed up by senior

management if criticized by the local community or in the press for leaving a

fire to burn or holding back from attending (responding to) an incident.” It is

imperative for the department leadership to establish relationships with key


stakeholders in the community to ensure they understand and support the

response protocol.

9. What does your uniform look like? Uniform insignia, style, and color should

be of sufficient difference that fire department personnel would not be mistaken

for police officers.

To summarize, this literature review included publications, standards, various internet

resources, and other relevant resources necessary to develop an active shooter incident response

plan for the Clearcreek Fire District. This literature review demonstrated the fire service is taking

active shooter incidents seriously and are beginning to devote numerous resources to assist in the

development of a comprehensive response plan.

PROCEDURES

In the development of this research project the following procedures were utilized and the

action research method was chosen. The majority of current research information came from the

internet utilizing search engines such as Google and Bing. The internet search was performed in

order to determine what trade journals, books, periodicals, peer reviewed documents, and

industry studies were available for reference. A search of the internet was conducted utilizing

topics such as fire department response to active shooter incidents, police department response to

active shooter incidents, standard operating procedures for active shooter incidents, etc. This

information is the foundation for this research project.

There is a limitation involved in the development of this applied research. The literature

review revealed this field of study is new and untested. Normally when conducting research the

newest information is the most up to date and that is what the researcher is looking for. However,

many of the recommendations made have not been tested in real life situations. At this point,


these recommendations are what many industry experts believe is the best way for emergency

medical services to respond to an ASI. With this said, we do not know if they will work or not

because they have not been vetted under live fire conditions. With this in mind, any decisions

made from this research in the development of an ASI response for the Clearcreek Fire District

needs to be monitored for updates from end users in the field and modified as necessary.

RESULTS

In his applied research paper, Charlotte Fire Department Responses to Active Shooter

Incidents – A Critical Analysis, Kent Davis conducted a survey of numerous fire departments in

an attempt to find out how prepared are the fire departments around the United States to respond

to an ASI. The results of his survey questions are as follows:

1. Do you have a written procedure for active shooter incidents at this time?

43% = Yes 57% = No 2. Has your department conducted training for this type of incident?

42% = Yes 58% = No 3. Do you provide equipment to your personnel that is designed for active shooter incidents? 12% = Yes 88% = No 4. Does your department take an active role in the incident or does your department require companies to stage?

13% = Active Role 87% = Stage

The report goes on to say there is a mindset within the Charlotte Mecklenburg first

responder community that non-law enforcement personnel should stage outside of the


area of hostility until CMPD gives the all clear. Once the all clear is given then first

responders will move in and provide care to the injured. However the all clear, according

to after action reports from previous ASI’s around the country and to CMPD’s

experiences, does not come for an extended period of time. This is due to the amount of

time that it takes to clear a building. This will place the beginning of medical intervention

well outside the golden hour (Davis, 2009).

The results of the survey demonstrate the fire service as a whole has taken a very passive

and conservative approach when it comes to an ASI.

The culture within the CFD lends itself to the concept that company officers are expected

to observe each situation for what it is and base their decisions on these observations. The

SOP’s that are utilized within the department do not spell out step-by-step what officers

should do in different situations. Instead company officers are given the leeway and

autonomy to handle situations as they see fit. While this may lend itself to creating an

organization in which company officers feel free to base their decisions on the situation at

hand and not try to force every incident into a cookie cutter format it does leave officers

in a precarious situation. Without clear guidance as to the expectations that the

department places upon its officers they are left to decide and ultimately defend their

actions based upon ambiguous guidance from the administration (Davis, 2009).

The mindset of the Charlotte Fire Department is not unlike that of the Clearcreek Fire

District. The company officers at the Clearcreek Fire District do not have a standard operating

procedure or any other type of formal guideline to provide guidance in the event they respond to

an ASI.


Research Question #1. What procedures are other fire departments utilizing for active shooter

incidents?

While conducting the literature review there was little written prior to 2013 on fire

department response to ASI. The law enforcement community is far more advanced in this area

than the fire service. The author was unable to identify a specific catalyst for the sudden interest

in fire department response to ASI in 2013. Prior to 2013 the mindset of fire and EMS agencies

was to stage units and wait until the threat was neutralized by law enforcement. Once law

enforcement gave the all clear and the scene was determined safe to enter, fire and EMS would

treat the ASI as a mass casualty event because the shooter was neutralized and there was no

longer a threat.

In September of 2013 the USFA produced the Fire / Emergency Medical Services

Department Operational Considerations and Guide for Active Shooter and Mass Casualty

Incidents document. This comprehensive and detailed document provides much needed guidance

to the fire service on how to respond to an ASI. The Guideline utilized states the following:

Background: Active Shooter and Mass Casualty Incidents (AS/MCIs) require

extraordinary efforts on the part of the local fire/rescue and EMS agencies. Although

these attacks usually end within a few minutes from the time they begin, the incident and

response actions may play out over an extended period of time. Also, they may include a

“direct threat” or “hot zone” with an ongoing active shooter(s); multiple casualties

requiring extensive triage, treatment and transportation efforts; and large numbers of

response personnel, bystanders and spontaneous volunteers.

Research from prior AS/MCIs has shown that casualties sustaining only minor injuries in

most cases will self-evacuate and may seek care from responding fire, EMS and LE


assets on the periphery of the event. This creates a diversion and causes a delay in

medical response to the area with people who are significantly wounded. Conversely,

minor injured patients may directly self-transport to nearby local hospitals, thus arriving

and creating emergency department crowding before the transportation of the more

severely injured. If not prepared, this “reverse triage effect,” where the least injured enter

the medical system first, can greatly impede response operations, demand organizing and

managing large amounts of logistics, and require coordination among several disparate

agencies, often from differing levels of government.

While the environment and circumstances will differ from incident to incident, there are

an overarching series of actions that seem common to most, and awareness and planning

will better position public safety agencies to effectively deploy when faced with an

AS/MCI. The resultant monograph is intended to serve as a generic guideline in assisting

fire/rescue and EMS agencies in preparing for and responding to AS/MCIs. While this

document is intended to be comprehensive in scope, each agency will have to determine

which parts of the information have value to their circumstances and those that will

require additional development for local agency use. It is the intent of the USFA that this

be a viable and dynamic document. As agencies engage in this work, we look forward to

receiving comments, additional ideas, and suggestions for improvements in future

editions.

Active Shooter and Mass Casualty Incidents (AS/MCI): This is a general term

intended to cover active shooter incidents involving one or more subjects who participate

in a random or systematic shooting spree, demonstrating their intent to continuously harm

others. Since the purpose of this document is not focused on the LE operations, we will


use AS/MCI range as the incident descriptor. AS/MCIs range from extensively planned

terror-related events to unplanned, revenge-motivated or random events.

Successful command and control of AS/MCIs are based on multiple levels of planning

and coordination including intra-agency among the fire/EMS response assets; interagency

among all of the public safety and private sector responder agencies; externally with the

facility personnel who provide expertise regarding facilities and technical matters; and

regionally with the hospitals and receiving medical facilities. Using the ICS provides a

framework for managing the incident and should be utilized by the responders and

incident infrastructure operators. Effective planning requires mutual goals, critical

reviews, evaluation, revision and continued practice. Planning, coordination,

communication and information sharing must be common if not daily practiced among all

of the first responders to such an incident. Most often these agencies interact on routine

calls on a daily basis providing for multiple, albeit less complex, interagency relationship

building, communication and coordination. There must be a commitment to prepare and

plan for such an incident before it occurs.

General AS/MCI Operational Principles: AS/MCIs are complex operations, and each

requires the intricate coordination of people and other resources. They are extremely fast

evolving incidents. Each one is conducted real time under intense news and social media

scrutiny and public interest. Several responding disciplines must work together to achieve

the best possible outcome. Success in response to AS/MCIs requires prepared leadership,

planning, communications, training and competent execution. Although overall

operational priorities are unchanged from most routine incidents, for example, life safety,


incident stabilization and property conservation, in AS/MCIs, the life safety and incident

stabilization will be the nexus of the operation.

1. ICS: NIMS advocates the use of ICS. USFA has been a longtime supporter of the

National Wildland Coordinating Group ICS. Public works, LE, military, education, and

heath agencies and associations have joined in supporting the use of ICS for all

emergency incidents as well as special planned events. It is used by federal, state, tribal,

territorial and local governments and is now embedded in most first responders’

operations. As such, this document supports ICS use. ICS should be the command and

control system implemented for all AS/MCIs. The impact of well-deployed and practiced

use of the ICS among providers who are likely to respond together cannot be overstated.

The notion of a “unified” command must be well understood and practiced by all for

successful command and control.

2. UC: AS/MCIs are, at their most basic level, crime scenes that have injured people in

need of treatment, rescue and expedient evacuation. Each incident is a primary LE event

but requires coordination between the LE on-scene lead and the fire/rescue/EMS on-

scene lead. UC provides the proper vehicle for command and control of AS/MCIs;

therefore, responders should establish UC and a UC post (UCP) as soon as possible. Fire

and EMS command elements should recognize that the LE on-scene lead will be actively

sending LE officers into the impacted area to directly engage the threat, secure the

perimeter to ensure the perpetrator doesn’t evade, and to exclude inappropriate entry by

additional perpetrators. Additionally, from almost the moment of arrival on-scene, the LE

lead will be determining LE resource requirements, developing intelligence on the

incident, trying to identify the location and viability of the victim(s), and many other


tasks. Thus, the fire and EMS commands should move to the LE Command Post (CP)

and establish UC as planned.

Depending on local plans, there are several fire/rescue and EMS functions that can occur

during the time frame that the LE lead will be making tactical decisions regarding

operations prior to establishing threat zones for combined LE/EMS casualty rescue

operations. These functions include establishment of fire/rescue and/or EMS branches or

groups. Assist the LE on-scene lead by supporting the ICS functions that may not have

been addressed yet. It is essential that UC protocols be pre-established, planned and

practiced. Operational command and control of large scale, multidiscipline/

multijurisdictional responses requires proactive and exercise to become effective. The

selection of the Operations Section Chief (OSC) position is usually assigned to the

agency having the highest priority for achieving the UCP incident action plan objectives.

Hence the initial selection of a LE officer for the OSC position with assistance from

fire/EMS, as the deputy OSC, in accordance with a UC system.

3. Plan for treatment of Casualties: It is the perpetrator’s intended purpose to kill or

injure people. Plan for casualties, when and where they will be treated, and how they will

be evacuated from the point of wounding. THREAT principles (hemorrhage control,

rapid extrication, assessment by medical, transport to definitive care), to improve

survivability, should be an integral part of planning. Determine which agency or

personnel will locate casualties, triage them, provide point of wounding medical

stabilization, and/or remove them to a safe location. There should be preplanning

discussions with medical directors, medical control and with the primary receiving

medical centers regarding the principles of TECC. As the civilian equivalent of the


military combat medical guidelines, the TECC guidelines account for the unique

operation considerations and limitations of medical operations in high-risk conditions and

prioritize and focus medical efforts to only what must be done to affect survival.

Considerations should be made for all potential first responders, including LE patrol

officer, to be trained to the basic tenets of TECC. Training, equipment and protocols

around use of TECC for medical first responders should be explored, considered and

implemented when feasible. The survival benefit of TECC is based on rapid application

of point-of-wounding care, thus the equipment must be forward deployed for care to be

immediately implemented. This requires that TECC equipment and supplies be carried

with all other medical aid and equipment. In short, TECC equipment could become a

valuable part of the standardized equipment for fire/EMS response assets.

Usually police resources in the initial moments of AS/MCIs are focused on locating,

containing, and eliminating the threat, thus the local fire/EMS resources should

emphasize planning for rapid triage, treatment and extrication of the wounded. Tactical

EMS support personnel are not a typical resource because they are usually very limited in

number, not immediately available, and committed to their tactical team’s assignment.

This will prelude them from casualty care activities until the tactical team’s objective is

met. Considerations, planning and interagency training should occur around the concept

of properly trained armored medical personnel who are escorted into areas of mitigated

risk, which are clear but not secure areas, to execute triage, medical stabilization at the

point of wounding, and provide for evacuation or sheltering-in-place. Some jurisdictions

accomplish this through the deployment of Rescue Task Forces (RTFs). Were there is an

ongoing ballistic or explosive threat, under the protection of LE officers these teams treat,


stabilize and remove the injured rapidly while wearing ballistic protective equipment. An

RTF team should include at least one advanced life support (ALS) provider. A few

agencies should plan for warm zone, indirect threat-area medical operations to provide

TECC-driven point-of-wounding care according to their resources and capabilities.

Consider secondary devices at the main scene and secondary scenes in close proximity to

the main scene. Such threats, if identified, would necessitate upgrading the area to one of

direct threat requiring rapid evacuation of all medical personnel and surviving patients.

4. News Media/Public Information Officer: The community-specific Emergency

Operations Plan (EOP) should have predetermined media connections, and the Public

Information Officer (PIO) should be activated. Large extended events may necessitate the

use of a joint information system. Media may appear quickly and may aggressively

attempt to enter the CP, the exclusion zone, or other places to obtain direct surveillance

and communications with survivors, family members and/or responders. They may also

have aviation assets that may be so-opted for use in scene surveys but which should be

controlled to ensure safety of the operation. If aviation units become problematic, the

Incident Commander (IC) can request the Federal Aviation Administration to issue a

restriction for the incident area air space.

Strong consideration should be given for the use of a Joint Information System (JIS) that

consolidates all agency and incident information flow from the multitude of agencies

involved. A JIS further establishes as well-controlled information-sharing plan.

Utilization of the Joint Information Center (JIC) may be considered to house the JIS

efforts. Experience at previous AS/MCIs demonstrates the advantage of locating the JIC

at a different location than the CP. DO NO CO-LOCATE THE JIC AND THE ICP. The


PIO must have a plan for media announcements regarding a staging area for parents and

relatives of victims. In school shootings, the scene is quickly inundated with parents and

bystanders. Considerations should be given to assigning PIOs or liaison officers to

support families of casualties in handling media requests.

5. EOP: It is unlikely that any community can anticipate specific AS/MCI scenarios they

may experience, but it is possible to develop a generic plan that provides a model to

apply in almost every situation that arises. Each community needs to have a detailed and

comprehensive EOP. The EOP may provide the framework for command and control at

AS/MCIs. In the absence of existing plans, the fire/rescue and EMS agency leadership

should develop a plan for AS/MCI operations. The EOP must provide the framework for

coordinating the activities of police, fire, rescue, and other supporting agencies. Here are

some things that should be considered in the development or revision of the AS/MCI

annex to an EOP:

a. The EOP is a written document.

b. The EOP should reflect the multiagency, multidisciplinary nature of the incident.

c. The EOP establishes command, control, and communications procedures.

- Use of common communications terminology is imperative.

- Personnel must understand common police terms to include:

-- Cleared

-- Secured

-- Cover

-- Hot zone / Warm zone / Cold zone and related terms

-- Concealment


-- Rally points

-- Casualty collection points (CCPs)

-- Other

d. In accordance with NIMS guidance, EOP provides for the establishment of a

single ICP.

e. The EOP plans for UC.

f. All emergency responders need to be apprised of LE plans and procedures,

strategy, and tactics:

- LE personnel may bypass injured victims to subdue the perpetrators.

- LE protective gear will not protect them from all threats.

- LE personnel may attempt to enter an AS/MCI area without waiting for

additional units in order to contain or neutralize an active treat.

- Most LE agencies will not wait for SWAT to engage active shooters.

- LE may request fire/rescue/EMS equipment to force structural elements or

to access roofs or other areas, or other needs. LE may request

fire/rescue/EMS personnel to assist with operating specialized equipment.

- LE may request fire/rescue/EMS personnel to assist with victim triage,

treatment and/or removal from the danger zone. LE should train to

accompany personnel into areas of higher risk to perform these duties.

- LE should be aware of fire/rescue/EMS capacities and procedures.

g. The EOP establishes the pre-incident requirement for discipline and integrated

training in use of the plan.


h. The EOP directs a coordinated public messaging process through the PIO and/or

JIC.

i. The EOP should address aviation considerations including establishing heliport,

landing zones, control of aircraft in the incident area, and excluding unauthorized

aircraft. The EOP should include communications plans between aviation assets

and incident operations and consider establishment of an Air Ops Branch.

j. The EOP must consider the use of additional community resources. Agreements

for automatic and mutual aid should be formalized.

k. To the extent possible, in advance, designate staging areas, rally points, CCPs,

and the CP. Consider designating primary, secondary and alternate positions in

the event that one of your designated positions is in the “hot zone” and unusable.

If possible, avoid obvious locations such as police or fire stations that may already

be targets.

l. The EOP should consider specific target hazards and relocation and support areas

in the pre-incident planning process. The incident may require facilities where

outside persons will need to contact or interact with the “surviving victim

population” (for example, schools, day care centers, hospitals, entertainment

venues, hotels, and other public assembly areas) and identify and staff a family

assistance center. The assistance center should be readily identifiable, large

enough to hold and administratively process survivors as they are released to

families, provide basic amenities, make referrals to post-incident counseling

services, and have adequate traffic flow (buses may be used in large incidents)


and parking. The family assistance plan includes custodial care, reunification,

guardianship, accountability, mortuary service planning, and victim tracking.

m. The EOP should address the process for obtaining additional support and

resources from external resources. Supporting agencies and resources should be

integrated into the UC.

- Liaison officers and systems should be planned, empowered and

understood by the US and supporting agency.

- Management of spontaneous volunteers must be addressed by UC and

supporting agencies.

n. The EOP should be reviewed, endorsed and supported by the community

policymakers, including medical and educational communities.

o. The EOP should be reviewed, exercised and updated regularly. After the AS/MCI,

wherever located, consider the timeliness, completeness and efficacy of the EOP.

EOPs are only effective when they are exercised, updated and regularly used. Where

possible, jurisdictions should follow the Department of Homeland Security’s Homeland

Security Exercise and Evaluation Program. The improvement model used in this

program will help the jurisdiction to enhance response readiness.

Interagency On-scene Practices: Many of the standard operating practices an agency

uses in its day-to-day operations may be unchanged for AS/MCIs. Some will require

reconsideration and perhaps modification. AS/MCIs usually involve a perpetrator trying

to maximize casualties, so responders need to exercise due caution en route to the

incident as well as after arrival. A single ICP is crucial. LE should always maintain a

presence at the UCP to coordinate operations and ensure the safety of all personnel


operating on the incident scene, even if the OSC assignments shifts from LE to

fire/rescue/EMS.

a. Use a deliberate and cautious approach to the scene.

b. While the community-accepted practice has been staging assets at a safe distance

(usually out of line-of-site) until a perimeter is established and all threats are

neutralized, considerations should be made for more aggressive EMS operations

in areas of higher but mitigated risk to ensure casualties can be rapidly retrieved,

triaged, treated and evacuated. Rapid triage and treatment is critical to survival.

c. Consider turning off emergency lights and warning devices before arrival.

Remember many frightened citizens may be fleeing the event and are likely to act

in an unsafe manner, so use extreme caution. Clarify this procedure with LE

authorities since there have been reports wherein the perpetrator ends the threat

when they hear or see public safety personnel or units arrive on-scene.

d. If exposed to gunfire, explosions or threats, withdraw to a safe area.

e. Consider/Investigate the use of apparatus’ solid parts such as motor, pump, water

tank and wheels as cover in the hot zone. Understand the difference between

cover (protection from direct fire) and concealment (protection from observation).

f. Remove victims from the danger zone in a manner consistent with predetermined

agency training and standards of practice. LE officers may bypass casualties in

order to eliminate the threat.

g. Use internal CCPs for large area facilities with multiple casualties where

evacuation distances are long. Point-of-wounding medical stabilization should

occur prior to evacuation to the CCP, which should provide cover to the injured


and responders and be secured by LE officers. Identify people at CCP for

accountability and protection of staff.

h. For larger geographic incidents or incidents with travel barriers, consider the use

of multiple staging, triage and other supporting setup areas.

i. Establish the single UC ICP in a safe location. Secure the CP. Remember the CP

may become a target.

j. Events with mobile perpetrators or sequenced attacks may necessitate CP

relocation and additional protection or security.

k. Establish PIO and JIC.

l. Establish UC with LE as lead operational component.

m. Establish ICS structure necessary to manage the incident. Consider fire and EMS

branches in operations.

n. The UC/LE lead determines the type of operation and direct strategy.

o. LE “on-scene” radio report should not be construed to imply that the scene is

secure or safe. A scene is not considered secure until a detailed deliberate search

of the entire area is concluded.

p. Stage fire/EMS resources, identify and prepare personnel for operations in areas

of higher risk, if appropriate, and await instruction. The first unit/responder in

staging capable of managing staging until the appointment/arrival of a designated

staging officer should assume that responsibility.

q. The staging area should provide hard cover and concealment from perpetrators.

r. Minimize people exposed to unnecessary risk. Provide appropriate protective gear

to personnel operating in indirect threat areas.


s. If bystanders become hostile, extricate yourself. Advise UC.

t. Have a “duress code” known to all responder personnel.

u. UC should have the communications center alert area hospitals. UC may ask for

activation of their Multiple Casualty Incident Plan. Some casualties may “self-

present,” and emergency rooms need to be aware of the situation.

v. Consider early ordering for additional triage, treatment and transportation

resources. This should be detailed in a preplan established order by predetermined

resource needs based on the extent, scope and anticipated duration of the event.

w. Use identification that is discernible from a distance. Police snipers at Littleton

were unable to identify a fire officer and treated him as a suspect. Be aware that

responders may be wearing uniforms and civilian attire, so exercise caution in

identifying individuals.

x. Work as teams or in pairs as a minimum. If possible, assign an extra responder to

serve as a team spotter. Their role is to observe, identify and avoid threats while

the balance of the team executes their tactical assignment. This is similar to some

of the safety precautions used in wildland/interface firefighting.

y. Have medics and personnel who might be in situations requiring indirect threat-

area operations for point-of-wounding care train to the tenets of TECC for

guidance on prioritization and familiarization with the management of ballistic

and explosive wounds. Departments should train and equip fire/rescue/EMS

personnel to work with LE within areas that are clear but not secure, representing

an indirect threat risk, for immediate lifesaving interventions. The RTF concept is

designed for this purpose.


z. Mental and physical health for responders remains a tactical consideration

throughout the incident. It is possible that some of the responders know the

aggressors and/or victims. The UC should determine how to utilize or relieve

these responders.

aa. Assign extra communications personnel for the CP to monitor inbound

intelligence from responders. These types of incidents provide a tremendous

amount of radio traffic with real time updates coming from fleeing civilians and

responder. Due to the critical time factors involved in getting intelligence back to

the entry team personnel, extra communications personnel should be allocated to

receive, analyze and rebroadcast (per the UC) the many data transmissions

received.

Operational Practices En Route and On-scene: As a part of the initial assignment or

for a senior officer en route to AS/MCIs, there are several additional considerations.

These may include:

a. Obtaining the maximum information/intelligence en route. If closed circuit

camera systems allow visual monitoring of the area or specific elements, they

should be utilized.

b. On-scene, verifying what you can as a part of the size-up.

c. Determining threats to response personnel as well as additional civilians.

d. Obtaining as much information as possible from persons who have fled the event.

This is usually done by LE personnel, but may also be done by fire/EMS, in

certain situations. Fire/EMS personnel must provide LE with any

intelligence/information obtained during patient/casualty contact or treatment.


Medical facilities should also be trained to provide any non-Health Insurance

Portability and Accountability Act information to LE.

e. Considering IED possibility or other secondary devices. This speaks to the

consideration of a second level of staging for the balance of responding resources

until they are needed and can be advanced in safely.

f. If first on-scene, ensuring LE and other necessary resources are en route.

g. Expanding alarm as required, but using smallest response appropriate. Ideally, to

the extent possible, this should be preplanned by the number of anticipated

victims.

h. Identifying a safe staging area for inbound resources.

i. Establishing command (done by initial officer).

j. Establishing CP as soon as possible.

k. Using single CP to establish UC.

l. Using PIO/JIC function for release of information. Exercise caution regarding

releases to avoid compromise of operations.

m. Accounting for victims on the scene, those who may be relocated to safer reunion

areas, and those transported to medical or other facilities. (Accounting by name, if

practicable, or by gross numbers should be protected information). Most agencies

will have explicit policies in that regard and have noted the tracking location of

children to be essential.

n. Accounting for response personnel. Establish an accountability process for all

incident responders to the incident. Use a check-in/check-out procedure.


o. Communicating all movement on the incident, especially if the threat has not yet

been contained, to the ICP and units in the operations section.

p. Calling for resources trained in AS/MCIs necessary to staff ICS to the appropriate

level. This speaks to having an adequate number of ICS-trained and capable

personnel to expand to the incident size. Reassess every 30 minutes or during

periods of low activity.

q. Basing the assignment of staff on qualifications, available resources, and the need

for extended operational periods.

r. Considering the possibility of spontaneous volunteers attempting to participate in

the incident. Determine how/if they may be used, informed, controlled and

dismissed. In AS/MCIs it is possible some volunteers will be armed. Consider this

in planning.

Post-Incident /Demobilization: While stand down is an appropriate time to decompress

and refresh, it also is the best time to capture staff recollections of specific events that

may not have been well documented. Obtain responder listings and tasks performed.

This is also the time to account for equipment, pack supplies, complete records, and

release staff to duty or home. A demobilization plan will include member information

regarding post-incident briefings, stress management briefings, and family support

information.

a. Establish and manage a formal unit-release process.

b. Collect incident management records and unit logs.

c. Determine and announce an incident debriefing strategy (UC).

d. Assign a debrief team to prepare a report of the incident.


e. Determine and announce a stress debrief plan.

f. The PIO position may stand down, returning that responsibility to the IC.

Based on the size of the incident, there may be a need for ongoing support

of this function.

g. Set up an EOP AS/MCI plan review and evaluation team (UC).

h. Prepare evaluations by position (UC).

i. Close down the CP.

j. Prepare and review the EOP AS/MCI report and evaluation (UC or

command group, the community policymakers, and others as determined

by policy). The report may be sensitive and involve an ongoing

investigation. It should be reviewed by the appropriate legal authorities

prior to release based on agency policy.

k. Assure appropriate stress debriefing and management resources for all

personnel (USFA, 2013)

Research Question #2. What options exist for the Clearcreek Fire District when responding to

active shooter incidents?

When deciding how to respond to an ASI the Clearcreek Fire District needs to decide

how aggressive it wants to be in regards to an ASI. While conducting the literature review there

was a common theme amongst the research, the thought of taking a passive approach and just

staging until law enforcement gives the “all clear” is no longer an acceptable way to respond to

these incidents. Many of the top minds in the fire service and EMS industry have agreed this

passive approach is not acceptable. While the industry experts appear to be in agreement this

conservative approach is not acceptable it appears that is where the agreement ends.


Many experts believe an aggressive response utilizing EMS response personnel as

Rescue Task Forces (RTF) equipped with ballistic protection such as body armor, tactical

helmets, communications equipment, and other specialized tactical gear is the most appropriate

response. These personnel deploy with law enforcement protection into the “warm zone” to

render aid utilizing tactical emergency casualty care (TECC) following the THREAT (Threat

suppression, Hemorrhage control, Rapid Extrication to safety, Assessment by medical providers,

and Transport to definitive care). Other experts believe a more passive approach where a

decision is made by “unified command” that the incident has been stabilized enough to insert

EMS personnel into the “warm zone” with law enforcement escort but the EMS personnel will

not be equipped with specialized tactical equipment. This group of experts have taken a much

different approach of wearing high visibility vest identifying the response personnel with “EMS”

and uniforms different from law enforcement so there is no confusion the entering personnel are

EMS and not police. The thought process behind this methodology is the shooter would not want

to cause harm to EMS personnel.

The question to answer is which direction does the Clearcreek Fire District believe is the

best in order to meet its mission statement to “Provide customer-oriented health, safety, fire, and

emergency services with professionally trained personnel in an efficient and cost effective

manner, utilizing resources provided by the community” (Clearcreek, 2012).

Research Question #3. What can be done to prepare the Clearcreek Fire District for an active

shooter incident?

There are many things that can be done to prepare the Clearcreek Fire District for an ASI.

The first thing that needs to take place is the development of a strategic plan explaining how the

department should respond in the event of an ASI. A General Operating Guideline (GOGL)


should be developed, adopted, and disseminated to all personnel outlining the Clearcreek Fire

Districts response to ASIs.

Once the GOGL is created, extensive training will need to be provided to all personnel.

This training will include topics such as defining the expectations of the GOGL, outlining

administrative processes involved in the response such as unified command, joint information

system, law enforcement terminology, and any other item specific to this type of response.

Training specific to tactical emergency casualty care (TECC) following the THREAT (Threat

suppression, Hemorrhage control, Rapid Extrication to safety, Assessment by medical providers,

and Transport to definitive care). The Clearcreek Fire District’s training division will need to

liaison with the Springboro Police Department, the Clearcreek Township Police Department, the

Springboro Community City School District Administration, and the Warren County Career

Center Administration to confirm their procedures and training align with that of the Clearcreek

Fire District.

Once all the entities are on the same page a tabletop exercise should be scheduled to

review procedures and processes at the administrative level. This tabletop exercise will focus on

identifying items that did not work or were not considered in the planning portion, and should

involve an all around administrative critique of the response plan. Once this critique is complete

and the response plan is believed to be complete, a full-scale exercise will be conducted to test

the response plan. The full-scale exercise will identify anything that did not work, was not

considered in the planning and tabletop exercise, and will result in a comprehensive critique of

the response plan. Once this full-scale exercise is complete and the recommended changes are

made to the response plan, the final response plan will be implemented and distributed to the

appropriate individuals and agencies.


Once the response plan and GOGL are developed specialized equipment will be

purchased. A review of the budget will be done to ensure there are sufficient funds to purchase

the necessary equipment. If there are not sufficient funds in the current budget, equipment

purchases may need to wait until the next fiscal year or an alternate means of funding may need

to be identified. In conjunction with the training element, once the appropriate equipment is

identified it will need to be purchased and employees will need to be trained prior to placing it on

the appropriate apparatus.

DISCUSSION There are many elements to consider during the decision making process of how a fire

department should respond to an ASI. The role of the fire department will be directly linked to

the intent of the shooter upon the arrival of law enforcement. “What happens upon first contact

by law enforcement personnel is the most defining moment in this type of incident. Whether the

perpetrator actively engages with law enforcement, flees, surrenders, or commits suicide”

(Davis, 2009 p.10-11). This among many other variables will need to be taken into consideration

by the unified command team.

More than 250 people have been killed in the United States during what has been

classified as active shooter and mass casualty incidents (AS/MCI) since the Columbine

High School shootings in 1999. It has become evident that these events may take place in

any community impacting fire and police departments, regardless of their size or

capacity. Local jurisdictions must build sufficient public safety resources to handle

AS/MCI scenarios. Local fire/EMS and law enforcement must have common tactics,

communications capabilities and terminology to have seamless, effective operations.

Extraordinary efforts on the part of local fire/EMS agencies and direct pre-planned

coordination with LE is required during response to these events in order to rapidly affect


rescue, save lives, and enable operations with mitigated risk to personnel. It is essential

that local policies be put in place before AS/MCIs happen to ensure coordinated and

integrated planning, preparation, response, treatment and care (USFA, 2013).

The author agrees it is essential that local policies be put in place before ASIs happen to

ensure coordinated and integrated planning, preparation, response, treatment, and care. The

problem is where does the Clearcreek Fire District find the resources? Davis (2009) estimates the

cost of the PPE, medical equipment, and ancillary equipment required to place one Tactical

Emergency Medical Services company in service to be $30,774. Preparing the Clearcreek Fire

District to respond to an ASI will be a costly endeavor and a cost / benefit analysis must be

conducted. When assessing the benefit side of the cost / benefit analysis the first question asked

is, do we need something like this? The answer is yes.

In incident after incident, from Columbine to LAX, victims have waited long periods of

time for medical help. Consider some recent incidents:

• Oregon City Police Officer Robert Libke, shot after responding to a report of a

house fire with an armed man at the scene, laid where he fell for 90 minutes,

gravely injured from a gunshot wound to the head before he was carried to an

ambulance. Firefighters and paramedics were kept at a distance “so they would

not become targets.” Libke died from his injuries the next day.

• TSA Agent Gerardo Hernandez lay bleeding for 33 minutes after being shot at

Los Angeles International Airport. Paramedics waited 150 yards away until police

declared the terminal safe to enter before airport police put Hernandez in a

wheelchair and ran him to an ambulance.


• According to a published timeline, the Washington Navy Yard shootings began at

about 8:15. Police were on scene within three minutes, but uncertainty about the

number of shooters continued “for several hours.” At 9AM, a Park Police

helicopter may have lifted some victims out of the scene. At 9:30, ambulances

began taking more victims to area hospitals. At 10:55, SWAT teams were still

helping survivors out of the building.

When conducting the cost / benefit analysis the second question asked is can we afford

it? The answer is yes, it’s free. One of the things the fire service is known for its resourcefulness.

Years ago, progressive thinking fire service leaders realized they were going to have fires that

would take more fire engines than they had to put out the fire. What did they do? They

developed the mutual aid response system. Fast forward to today. Progressive thinking fire

service leaders realized if they have an active shooter / mass casualty incident it would take more

resources than they have to handle the situation. What have they done? Developed a mutual aid

system specifically geared towards ASI.

The Dayton Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) has developed a multi-

jurisdictional Rescue Task Force response team. This concept is essentially mutual aid for active

shooter incidents. Any agency that functions under the Greater Miami Valley Emergency

Medical Services Standing Orders may participate in this program, provided the department

signs up as an RTF agency.

Equipment and supplies are being provided using Dayton MMRS grant funds. There are

no costs to the Clearcreek Fire District. There is also no cost for the training of personnel other

than their time. The commitment comes in the form of participating departments agree to

respond on a mutual aid basis to any requesting jurisdiction, on an as available basis. In the event


of a RTF activation, individual RTF members will be notified. It is up to each department’s

internal policies whether to permit response at the time of such an incident, as well as whether to

permit off-duty personnel to respond. Like any other mutual aid agreement, issues such as

workers compensation, injury policies, insurance, and related matters are covered by the

Clearcreek Fire District.

There are currently 22 caches of RTF material. Each cache contains helmets, ballistic

vests, rifle plates, and medical kits for four (4) EMS personnel. That means there is enough to

outfit two Rescue Task Forces. Twenty-one departments have been selected to house those

caches to provide the most effective coverage of the region (MMRS, 2013). The PPE in the

caches are Level IIIA Tactical Vests with Level IVA front and back rifle plates plus Level IIIA

Ballistic Helmets. The color of the gear was specifically chosen to be easily distinguished from

law enforcement and SWAT teams. The gear includes identification with a Dayton MMRS

patch, and “Rescue TF” patches on the front and back.

The safety precautions utilized by the Dayton MMRS follow guidelines that have been

accepted nationally to mitigate risks to the greatest degree possible. The ballistic gear provided

provides protection levels higher than those utilized by many law enforcement agencies, and

sworn and armed law enforcement personnel will always accompany the RTF personnel. MMRS

RTFs will mitigate risks in an active shooter environment the same way risks are mitigated at fire

and hazardous materials incidents – with procedures, plans, training, and equipment. All the RTF

procedures were developed with the safety of personnel in mind (MMRS, 2013).

There is no cost to participate in the program and the Dayton MMRS will provide free

training to any department or department member who would like to be a member of a RTF. The

Clearcreek Fire District can sign up as many or as few members as it chooses. The level of


participation is up to the department. Some agencies plan to train their entire department. Others

plan to train only a few. The initial training will require approximately eight hours consisting of

both online and live components. Continuing education will be provided for all RTF training.

There are five segments to RTF training:

1. The prerequisite for all other training components are a series of online presentations,

each of which includes a post-test.

2. Next, there will be live sessions for Train-the-Trainers (T-t-T’ers), conducted at different

locations in the region. Preference for those will be given to personnel who are EMS

instructors, Standing Orders trainers, or who have other background that will enable them

to effectively conduct additional trainings. The program has been designed to be easily

reproducible at the department level by the T-t-T’ers. The Clearcreek Fire District will

not need to purchase equipment or supplies when the live training is given.

3. After having been trained, all the RTF T-t-T’ers need to let the Dayton MMRS office

know that they are going to conduct a class, and borrow equipment and supplies for those

classes. There will be numerous classes to train RTF personnel throughout the region;

each will follow the same teaching guide.

4. There will be biennial refresher training for all RTF personnel (CE credit will be given).

5. In nearly every community, many schools, law enforcement agencies, businesses, and

others conduct periodic “active shooter” exercises. Every agency with RTF personnel is

strongly encouraged to participate in those exercises, and Dayton MMRS RTF equipment

will be made available for doing so (MMRS, 2013).

This Dayton MMRS seems almost too good to be true. Like everything in life there are

negative aspects to the Dayton MMRS RTF. This is a very new plan and is not fully functional


and certainly has not been tested. There are many items that need to fall into place in order to get

this up and running. While the plan is still in its infancy, this is a good time for the Clearcreek

Fire District to get involved. Getting involved in the early stages can allow the department to

participate in building this program from the ground up.

RECOMMENDATION When considering fire department response to active shooter incidents progressive and

foreword thinking fire service leaders need to realize the way we have always done it is not good

enough anymore. Should the Clearcreek Fire District participate in the RTF concept? The answer

is yes.

In numerous cases, from Aurora to LAX, EMS has been criticized publically for delayed

victim care. The Rescue Task Force concept has been endorsed by the International

Association of Firefighters, the International Association of Fire Chiefs, and the United

States Fire Administration, as well as countless law enforcement agencies (including

police departments in our region). The goal of the plan is simply to gain access and

provide lifesaving treatment to victims faster (MMRS, 2013).

In the event of an active shooter situation is there sufficient time to contact the Dayton

MMRS and have the caches arrive on scene quickly enough to affect a positive outcome? Based

on the history of these incidents, it will take some time before law enforcement can arrive, enter

the building, determine “warm zones”, assign personnel to RTF’s, and take other actions

necessary before a RTF can enter. For most of our region, that would be enough time for a RTF

cache to arrive on scene. To help minimize delays, Dayton MMRS has produced a checklist or

“Job Aids” for dispatch agencies. These Job Aids should be provided to dispatchers to assist

them during an ASI. In an active shooter or other terrorist incident, our recommendation is that


the RTF caches should be activated immediately by the dispatch center upon dispatching police,

fire, and EMS to a reported active shooter. This will significantly reduce the time it takes to have

the cache arrive on scene (MMRS, 2013).

It is the author’s recommendation the Clearcreek Fire District participates in the RTF

program. In order for this to occur the Clearcreek Fire District must enact the policy found in

Appendix B of the research paper. This policy outlines how the fire district personnel will

initially respond to an ASI.

This policy consists of activating the Dayton MMRS active shooter Rescue Task Force

while still responding to the scene. In addition, ten additional EMS units will be requested to

stage in close proximity to the scene but not commit. This is an effort to mobilize resources early

and get them responding quickly. The rest of the fire district personnel will stage in a safe

location away from the incident. The on duty shift commander will get together with the

appropriate police supervisor to establish a Unified Command (UC). The police department

supervisor will function as the initial Operations Section Chief (OSC) until the shooter is either

neutralized or no longer an immediate threat. Once there is no longer a threat and upon

conferencing with the police supervisor, the ranking fire district member on scene will become

the OSC. A Joint Information Center (JIC) will be established at the City of Springboro’s

municipal building utilizing their Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to manage the overall

incident.

The Clearcreek Fire District will become involved with the Dayton MMRS active shooter

program. The Clearcreek Fire District’s EMS coordinator will be the liaison between the MMRS

and the fire district. The EMS coordinator will continuously assess and critique the MMRS

program to validate its existence and assess whether the Clearcreek Fire District should remain


active participants or seek a different direction in regards to ASIs. The fire district will began

training its members in Tactical Emergency Casualty Care (TECC). The fire district currently

has enough Mass Casualty Incident (MCI) equipment and supplies to manage the initial phases

of an ASI while awaiting additional resources through the mutual aid response system and the

Dayton MMRS. In the event UC decides to send fire district personnel into the warm zone to

initiate TECC the firefighters will not be armed but they will be accompanied by at least two

police officers to provide security. Force security for the RTF is the first priority with the

treatment of victims being the second.

A successful response to an ASI will require a team effort. The Clearcreek Fire District

will have to work with local law enforcement and other affected parties to ensure all entities are

on the same page. These groups will need to work collaboratively to develop plans and response

procedures. These plans shall work together and ensure all entities communicate shared

objectives and work collaboratively. Once the response plan is developed and reviewed a

tabletop exercise will be done to test the plan. Once the tabletop exercise is completed and

corrections are made to the plan through the lessons learned from the exercise, a full-scale mock

training will be conducted to once again test the response plan. Once the full-scale mock training

is completed and corrections are made to the plan through the lessons learned from the exercise,

a final active shooter response plan will be produced. This plan will be reviewed and trained on

annually to ensure it is up to date.

In the United States if someone wants to cause harm to someone else, they can. That is

one of the downsides to living in a free society. As Americans we exercise freedoms not seen in

other places in the world. These freedoms are the principals our country was founded upon. With

freedom comes great responsibility as a society. Sometimes people do the unthinkable and


commit heinous acts against us. When they do, it is the responsibility of local first responders to

manage and mitigate the incident to the best of their ability. The recommendation made in this

applied research meets that objective.


References

Armellino, R (2007, December). Protecting citizens form killers takes bravery, aggression and

speed. PoliceOne.com, Retrieved January 24, 2014, from http://www.policeone.com/active-

shooter/articles/1630799-Protecting-citizens-from-killers-takes-bravery-aggression-and-

speed/

Borelli, F (2007). The history of school attacks in America. Retrieved January 24, 2014, from

Borelli Consulting website: http://borelliconsulting.com/articles/asir1.htm

Clearcreek Fire District Annual Report (2012). Retrieved January 24, 2014 from

http://www.clearcreektownship.com/FireEMS/PDFs/2012%20Annual%20Report.pdf

Connecticut, Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection Commission of Fire

Prevention and Control (2013, February). Model procedures for fire department response to

hostile situations. Retrieved January 24, 2014, from

http://www.ct.gov/cfpc/lib/cfpc/modelProceduresHOSTILESITUATION2013FINAL.pdf

Davis, K (2009, July). Charlotte Fire Department responses to active shooter incidents – a

critical analysis. Retrieved January 24, 2014, from

http://www.usfa.fema.gov/pdf/efop/efo43715.pdf

Dayton Metropolitan Medical Response System (2013, October). EMS response to active

shooter incidents. Retrieved January 24, 2014 from http://www.mvfea.com/resources/ems-

news/item/89-ems-response-to-active-shooter-incidents

National Fire Protection Association (2007). Standard on occupational safety and health

programs (NFPA 1500).

Nerdwallet (2013, October 27). The best towns in Ohio for young families. Retrieved from

http://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/2013/best-towns-ohio-young-families/


Safewise (2014, January 6). The best towns in Ohio for young families. Retrieved from

http://www.safewise.com/blog/50-safest-cities-ohio/

United States Fire Administration (2013, September). USFA: Fire/Emergency Medical Services

Department Operational Considerations and Guide for Active Shooter and Mass Casualty

Incidents. Retrieved from

http://www.nfpa.org/~/media/Files/Research/Resource%20links/First%20responders/Urban

%20Fire%20Forum/UFF%20active_shooter_guide.pdf

United States Fire Administration (2012, September 19). USFA: Strategic Plan. Retrieved

January 25, 2014 from http://www.usfa.fema.gov/about/strategic/

Urban Fire Forum (2013, September). UFF position statement: active shooter and mass casualty

terrorist events. January 24, 2014 from

http://www.nfpa.org/~/media/Files/Research/Resource%20links/First%20responders/Urban

%20Fire%20Forum/Urban%20Fire%20Forum%202013%20Active%20Shooter%20Position

%20Statement.pdf


APPENDIX A

Active Shooter and Mass Casualty Incident Check List X # Responsible Item Preincident 1 EMA/AHJ Multiple victim incident EOP completed Incident 2 LOG CP established and secured 3 LOG U/C and communications method established and communicated to all personnel an

communications center 4 U/C UC/LE establishes goals and overall strategy;

Emphasize Rapid Triage, Treatment and Extrication 5 U/C ICS established; command and general staff positions established 6 OPS Establish staging manager and staging areas 7 U/C PIO PIO staffed, JIS considered 8 OPS Fire, medical, and/or rescue branches or groups established in operations 9 EMS Establish casualty collection points, evacuation routes and LZs 10 OPS Size-up and determine resource requirement 11 UC and LOG Request required resources 12 U/C Notify hospitals to activate MCI plans 13 OPS Develop operational plan 14 PLN Start IAP process 15 OPS Aviation division established by air assets planned or airspace control required 16 OPS Safe, hard cover staging area established (multiples for discipline or geographically 17 LOG/ALL Personnel have readily identifiable ID 18 U/C Duress code provided to all responders 19 U/C Plan approved by AHJ 20 OPS Accountability for victims and civilians involved — established 21 EMS Medical branch or group establishes rapid triage, treatment (include hemorrhage

control), and transportation portals and sites 22 EMS Account for persons triaged, treated and/or transported (record and track locations) 23 PLN Provide for rotation and maintenance of on-scene personnel 24 LOG Provide refueling, battery charging, and replenishment of expendable materials 25 PLN Demobilization plan in place 26 PLN After action report process established 27 PLN ICS evaluation report plan in place 28 PLN Debriefing personnel planned 29 LOG Critical stress debrief action planned 30 PLN Personnel released Post-incident 31 PLN After action report prepared and completed 32 U/C After action report submitted to AHJ 33 PLN Improvement plan established 34 PLN Plan updates processed 35 AHJ Plan updates promulgated 36 AHJ Training and exercises based on plan updates


APPENDIX B

Clearcreek Fire District

General Operating Guideline 5.4

RESPONSE TO AN ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENT

PAGE 1 OF 5

DATE OF ISSUE: TBD EFFECTIVE: TBD AUTHORIZING RESOLUTION: TBD

REVISED: TBD

DISTRIBUTION: DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL

AUTHORIZING RESOLUTION: TBD

ISSUED BY: Robert Kidd, Fire Chief REVIEWED BY: Ronald Wilhelm, Assistant Administrator/Safety Director

INDEX As: 5.1 Purpose

5.1.1 Definitions

5.1.2 Procedure

5.1.3 Responsibility


5.1 Purpose This procedure establishes guidelines for Clearcreek Fire District personnel who may respond to an Active Shooter Incident (ASI). The goal is to provide effective rescue and treatment procedures, common communication, and coordination with local law enforcement, as well as provide for firefighter safety while working at an Active Shooter Incident. 5.1.1 Definitions

Active Shooter Incident (ASI) – An armed person (shooter) who has used deadly physical force on other persons and continues to do so while having unrestricted access to additional victims. Active Shooter Cold Zone – The location of the support functions of the ASI incident including the command post, staging, and medical group if an MCI is declared. Active Shooter Warm Zone – The location already cleared and deemed secure by law enforcement contact teams. Fire personnel may work in this area if force protection is in place. Active Shooter Hot Zone – The location that law enforcement contact teams are working to isolate or neutralize the ASI threat. Firefighters will not work in this zone. Casualty Collection Point (CCP) –A location where casualties are kept and receive basic medical care until they can safely be moved to a medical treatment area. This location should be inside the cold zone whenever possible, but some situations may require it to be in the warm zone. Firefighters will work as rescue groups (RGs) with law enforcement protection in this area. Contact Team (CT) – A law enforcement team assigned to confine or eliminate the shooter(s) that normally operate in the hot zone. Force Protection Group (FPG) – Uniformed law enforcement officers (two or more) assigned to protect fire (RG) personnel. Note: Officers in plain clothes will not constitute force protection. Individual First Aid Kit (IFAK) – An individual (or improved) first-aid kit that carries medical equipment to immediately address the preventable causes of death. Incident Action Plan (IAP) – A document put together as the event unfolds. This document will contain objectives, strategies, and tactical priorities, as well as safety concerns. Incident Command Post (ICP) –A location within the cold zone where command and control objectives are established. Joint Hazard Assessment Team (JHAT) - A capability consisting of SWAT Teams, the Haz-Mat Teams, and Bomb Squads working together to secure the scene. These entities are all trained to operate as a single team, if needed. Law Enforcement (LE) - Law enforcement personnel and equipment.


Operations Sections Chief - position assigned to the agency having the highest priority for achieving the UCP incident action plan objectives. Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) - The minimum for fire will be a ballistic vest and ballistic helmet and IFAK. Rescue Group (RG) - A team consisting of single fire unit (no more than 4 fire personnel), with at least two Fire Department rescuers and gear with at least two Law Enforcement officers and weapons. The LE officers are to provide protection to the Fire Department rescuers. The goal of the RG is to rapidly treat in place or move ASI victims from CCP to the TA for medical treatment. Crew integrity and accountability is critical and needs to be maintained at all times. Tactical Emergency Casualty Care (TECC) - Hemorrhage control techniques, including use of tourniquets, pressure dressing, and hemostatic agents. The ability to make assessment, triage and transport victims with lethal internal hemorrhage and torso trauma to definitive trauma care. Treatment Area (TA) – An area designated in the cold zone where patients from the CCP are moved and receive medical treatment. Normally MCI operations will be conducted in the treatment area. 5.1.2 Procedure

The first arriving Command Staff Officer (Battalion or Chief Officer) will enter into a Unified Command with local Law Enforcement, determine what additional resources are needed, and assist with the development of the Incident Action Plan (IAP) (ICS-201). Both a Law and Fire Branch will be established with a common command radio channel. A separate tactical radio frequency for fire as well as for law enforcement will be used and confirmed. Responders must use common ICS nomenclature and clear text communications. 5.1.3 Responsibility

Warren County Communications Center (WCCC) WCCC shall obtain the following information from Law Enforcement Dispatch and include it in the initial Fire Dispatch information:

• LE command post location (if established) • Safe access route to command post • Updates related to the scope and size of the incident • Remain in contact with L.E. dispatch and relay all info both verbally and to

MDCs.


Law Enforcement Law Enforcement (LE) will arrive and make the determination the incident involves an active shooter or other ongoing acts of violence. The first responding patrol officers will form a Contact Team (CT) to locate and isolate the suspect(s) followed by additional CTs. The role of the Contact Team (CT) is to engage the suspect(s) to limit the possibility of injury or death to victims. As additional officers arrive, a safe perimeter will be established and contact will be made with local fire officials on site. The first arriving Law Enforcement supervisor will take command of the incident (Incident Command - IC) and establish the location of the Incident’s Command Post (ICP) until a higher-ranking LE Officer arrives. The ranking LE officer should then enter into Unified Command with the ranking Fire Officer as soon as possible. The ranking LE will be the Operations Section Chief (OSC) at least until the shooter(s) is neutralized. Fire Officers The first arriving Command Staff Officer (Battalion or Chief Officer) shall make contact with the on-scene Law Enforcement Incident Commander, enter into a Unified Command, and confirm the location of the Incident Command Post. The IC will then broadcast the specific location of the ICP to responding resources. The Command Staff Officer (Battalion or Chief Officer) shall also advise responding fire and EMS units of the designated incident staging location(s) and then provide a face-to-face briefing to fire resources, if possible. Radio communication directly related to the police tactical operation should not be transmitted over non-encrypted channels. The responding Command Staff Officer (Battalion or Chief Officer) must identify an ASI event has occurred or is occurring and dispatch the appropriate resources:

Re-dispatch the Battalion tone and for an ASI 3 Engines 1 Truck Company 10 Medic Units 1 Mass Casualty Unit

Joint Information System A Joint Information System shall be utilized to consolidate all agency and incident information flow from the multitude of agencies involved. For incidents occurring in the Township; the JIS will be established at Clearcreek Township Government Center. For incidents occurring in the city; the JIS will be established at the Springboro Municipal Building.

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