action research 2003 gustavsen 153 64

New forms of knowledge

production and the role of

action research

Bjørn GustavsenWork Research Institute, Oslo

A B S T R A C T

In efforts to combine theory and practice, action research con-fronts a challenge that pertains to all kinds of research. It is, consequently, a challenge that is subject to much discussion, not least in fields like epistemology. These discussions providevaluable points and insights but they cannot be converteddirectly into research positions, which also demand considera-tion of practical issues. When research sets out to learn frompractices a new challenge emerges: how is this learning to takeplace? Can the single researcher understand the world or is therea need for social relationships between (many) actors to developthis learning? This contribution discusses the theory-practicechallenge and the need for new forms of social relationshipswithin the research community itself.

Action Research

Volume 1(2): 153–164: 038146[1476-7503(200310)1:2]Copyright© 2003 SAGE PublicationsLondon, Thousand Oaks CA, New Delhiwww.sagepublications.co.uk

S H A P I N GT H EF U T U R E

K E Y W O R D S

• action research

• critical theory

• networking

• phenomenology

• pragmatism

• social capital

153

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Introduction

In 1997, the political authorities in Sweden introduced development as a ‘thirdtask’ for the universities and other institutions of higher learning, in addition to research and education (Brulin, 2001). The third task has given rise to severaldiscussions, to some extent of a controversial nature: first, concerning the legiti-macy of the task itself; second, if the task is found legitimate, how to live up to it.In this context action research has made its appearance, or rather, reappearance,since from the 1960s there have been several projects and programmes that correspond to the idea of action research. Action research, as it emerges as a partof the history of social research, is not, however, automatically embraced by allas the most adequate response. Partly it is seen by many conventional academicsas an esoteric kind of research, which generally has difficulty gaining academicacceptance. Even those who may look more favourably upon action research,often find it difficult to relate to. Actual, ongoing projects, be they in Sweden orelsewhere, seem strongly linked to their local contexts and, consequently, to showa lot of variation. What, then, does action research really mean? What should theperson who would like to join the ranks of action researchers actually do?

The purpose of this contribution is not to try to answer the basic questions.The purpose is more modest: to look at the way in which the questions areapproached. When we want to develop an answer to a question, how do we setabout doing it? Do we, for instance, try to find one single project that is thoughtto represent all good things about action research or do we look at a number ofprojects simultaneously, to compare, to add, or to learn from differences?

Throughout most of its history action research has been project-bound.Single cases have tended to form the focal points for most of the discussions. Eachresearcher has had the expectation that ‘the project that I am doing just now’ is theproject that will answer, if not all questions, at least the most burning ones. Eachproject has tended to be its own island of understanding, meaning and action.Against this there have been some broader programmes where projects have beengrouped, or clustered, in such a way that interaction between projects has beenpossible (Gustavsen, 1992, 2001). Even these, however, have been linked to contexts that are not particularly broad when seen in a global perspective.

The emergence of the Handbook of Action Research (Reason and Brad-bury, 2001) has changed this picture in the sense that for the first time there is abroad overview available. This overview prepares the ground for a discoursewhere the relationships between action research projects are placed in focus.

This is, in itself, a many-sided issue. Some of the issues have been dealt withby this contributor in other contexts; in particular the use of a programaticapproach (Gustavsen, 1992, 2001, 2003). This topic will be bypassed here infavour of two others. First I will touch, however, briefly upon the theory-practice problem in general as it has appeared in theory of science, partly to

Action Research 1(2)154 •



remind ourselves that this is a general problem that has to be confronted by allkinds of research, partly to point out that we cannot deal with operationalresearch challenges purely by developing theoretical arguments. Second, I willdiscuss a theme that is seldom commented on in research: the broader social rela-tionships among researchers. If we want to develop arguments based on linkingexperience from a broad range of projects, there is a need for certain kinds ofsocial relationships between the researchers who work in the different projects.

Theory and practice

Through performing not only research but also action, action research has alwaysexisted in a field of tension between theory and practice. In its most pointed formthe tension amounts to the thesis that if research becomes involved in practicalaction the ability to perform good research is lost. For those who, this notwith-standing, have wanted to combine research and action, the question has been towhat extent this tension can be overcome: is it possible to find ways in which theory and practice can be combined without the ability to perform good researchbeing lost?

A number of reasons from theory of science can be mobilized in this con-text. Here only a very brief overview of some of the main positions can be given.

First, it is important to note that the distinction between theory and prac-tice in its most radical form is in itself a historical product. Starting withDescartes, the distinction has been linked to the specific conditions prevailing in17th-century Europe, in particular a growth in the size and strength of the bourgeois class. This class did, it is often argued, not only launch a struggle forpolitical and economic hegemony, but also one for new forms of reason. The corethrust of this new form was to decouple reason from its previous links to religion,as in the Middle Ages, or to practice, as during the Renaissance, and make itstand on its own feet. However, others, such as Toulmin (1990), have pointed lessat bourgeois reason than at bourgeois unreason, in particular in the form of allthe conflicts and wars that characterized the 17th century. The 30-years war, inparticular, implied a breakdown of relationships, organization and stability thatmay have been surpassed only during the first half of the 20th century. Reasoncould survive only in the mind, not in human practices.

This effort to decouple mind from matter, theory from practice, thoughtfrom action, subject from object did not go unchallenged. One of the mostfamous of all contributions to philosophy, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, is, as the title indicates, a critique of the idea of a reason that is completely self-sufficient and independent of any condition outside itself.

Of more significance to research was, perhaps, the position developed byKierkegaard, since it gave rise to phenomenology, and eventually also to more

Gustavsen New forms of knowledge production • 155



specific research strategies. In its simplest form, the question raised by Kierke-gaard is: do we understand the world better through the eyes of theory? Havingread Hegel, Kierkegaard found reason to voice skepticism. Theory – or otherforms of conceptual schemes that are thought in some way or other to exist andbe adopted prior to a confrontation with reality – can act as filters and screeningmechanisms that steer us in a wrong direction as much as in a right. The point isto understand the world as it is by confronting it directly; by trying to grasp thephenomena as they really are.

A somewhat different approach to the theory-practice problem was devel-oped by the pragmatists. The ultimate purpose of any theory is to enable us to dosomething better in the real world (Peirce, 1931–1958; see also Reason, 2003, onthe modern pragmatist Richard Rorty). The point is not to what extent the theoryresembles the world but to what extent it helps us perform rational action. A theory can be anything, from a large text to a short formula; the point is that itidentifies action to be performed and levers to be pulled if we want to do some-thing about reality.

What eventually came to be called critical theory has its roots in the 19thcentury as well, in particular with Marx. Of the various efforts to convert Marxinto specific research positions it is perhaps those that were mediated by theFrankfurt school that came to exert most influence in the period after the secondWorld War (Horkheimer, 1982). In brief, the core point here is that the world can be understood only if it is understood that it could have been different. Noportrait of the world as it is will tell us much since it makes the world appear asa metaphysical destiny and consequently hides the reasons why it is as it is.Instead, whatever is must be seen against a background of what might have been.The role of theory, then, is not only to help us make a picture of the world as itis, but also – and of greater importance – actually to make us see how the worldcould have been. Understanding is consequently something that plays itself outbetween three reference points: theory, practices as they are and practices as theycould have been.

Research responses

The research positions to emerge out of these schools of thought are many andvaried, in particular since the relationship between theory on a philosophical leveland actual research practices is not a simple one. With this reservation, one maypoint at some lines between the phenomenology of Kierkegaard and positionssuch as anthropological field studies, participant observer methodologies, theChicago school (Whyte, 1955), the idea of ‘thick descriptions’ (Geertz, 1983) andthe kind of action research called ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967). Of inter-est to note is that these forms of research, when they emerged, played important




roles, developed new insights and rightfully attracted a lot of attention. It is alsoclear that they are, if not gone, no longer core thrusts in contemporary researchactivities. They provide inspiration, questions and concerns, but it is obvious thatanother detailed study of the mores of a Pacific tribe will hardly exert the influ-ence that the studies of Mead, Malinowski and other students of ‘the natives asthey really are’ once had.

In some ways, the research positions inspired by pragmatism may be morestrongly present in the contemporary landscape. There are links between prag-matism and the idea of the experiment – in the laboratory and in the field – aswell as between pragmatism and practice-oriented pedagogics, action learningand similar. However, there has been no simple solution to how to give ideas ofthis kind expression in research terms. If we see at least some of the main streamsof Western action research as related to pragmatism, we also need to face thepoint made by Greenwood (2002), that even though action research may haveenjoyed advances and even some elements of prestige in some contexts, the over-all story of action research is far from one of linear success.

Critical theory has always had an ambivalent relationship to actualresearch positions. There is a certain degree of skepticism running through mostof critical theory towards the kind of commitment to and contacts with societynecessary to perform research. The most famous effort of this school to enter thefield of empirical research, the authoritarian personality studies (Adorno,Brunswick, Levinson & Sanford 1950), gave rise to a major debate carried on inthe form of the so-called positivist dispute in German sociology (Adorno, Albert,Dahrendorf, Habermas, Pilot & Popper, 1976). In the relationship between crit-ical theory and actual research much remained unsolved. Instead, critical theory in the early Frankfurt school version reached its peak in the year 1968,when students all over the world tried to put into practice the idea that we needto understand how the world should be, before it is possible to understand howit actually is.

However briefly and unjustly they have been presented here, certain pointsemerge from these schools of thought and their various fates.

First, there is no simple answer to the theory-practice problem. None of theperspectives on the relationship between theory and practice inherent in theseschools are particularly easy to convert into research positions. Action research,with its claim to be able to transcend this division, consequently faces some majorchallenges. But those who criticize action research on the basis of the Cartesianargument have hardly considered the critique against this argument. The propo-nents of purely descriptive-analytic research maintain their position simply byoverlooking this critique rather than responding to it.

However, the point that all the research positions to which these schools ofthought have given rise seem to have followed a rise-and-fall curve, indicates thatpositions on a philosophical level cannot provide full answers to the challenges of




operative research. Topics like ontology and epistemology can identify some ofthe challenges that have to be met and provide some ideas on how to meet them,but they are not the same as specific research positions. Nor can we meet the chal-lenges of today simply by recirculating, say, the thick descriptions of Geertz or theaction research of Lewin and associates (Lewin, 1943). There is no Golden Agethat can be recaptured. Research positions must be formed to meet the specificconditions under which research is to operate.

The new production of knowledge

What, then, are the conditions and requirements of today? Let us turn to theanalysis (Gibbons, Limoges, Nowotny, Schwartzmann, Scott & Trow, 1994). Hispoint of departure is that research is becoming more and more interwoven withsociety. The boundaries are changing and so are the transactions across theboundaries. Research acts, for instance, more and more within the framework ofsubstantial innovation systems, often with a number of other actors in denseinteraction but with different roles. Nor is research linked only to thinking aboutthe outcome; research can contribute to design, production, marketing and more.When research becomes more and more strongly interwoven with other actors itmeans, to an increasing degree, to operate in contexts defined by others. Thesecontexts are, furthermore, not identical. There is hardly any area within modernsociety where research is not present. This means that the themes, or objects, differ across a very broad field and that there is a need for different researchstrategies. As pointed out by Toulmin (1996), one can hardly expect studies of,say, birds in flight, people in a traffic jam or the movements of heavenly bodies tobe performed in exactly the same way. The need for differentiation is growing.Science or research can hardly be defined through one set of simple criteria appli-cable everywhere. It is to a growing extent something that has to be worked outin each specific context. Again we see that the research process is conditioned byexternal factors which can be seen as the practices of society. But to what con-clusions does the new production of knowledge lead to for action research?

Although the context is radically different, the high-tech research team inthe pharmaceutical laboratory shares one point with the medieval monk brewinghis broth of roots and frogs: whatever ingredients they work with, the ingredientsdo not speak back. In the social field, however, which is not excluded from theanalysis of Gibbons and colleagues, the situation is different: the new boundariesand forms of work change the relationships between subjects since subjectivitydoes not belong to theoretical actors only but to practical ones. Consequently, weenter the difficult terrain already staked out by the schools of thought indicatedabove, among others. Given the rise-and-fall pattern that seems to characterize allhistorical efforts to transcend the theory-practice division in research terms, we




also face the problem that the research responses to the theory-practice challengeare still with us. Today there are more situations and contexts that bring this challenge to the surface. What to do; where to turn?

Since there is little hope of inventing a new basic position in epistemologi-cal terms, nor of deducing new ways of expressing the old ones as an exercisepurely of the mind, there is only one direction in which to turn: towards thoserelationships to practice and practical actors that constitute the challenge in thefirst place. This can be done in two different ways.

One is to look at the research practices to which the new contexts give rise, in this case modern action research: in what contexts does it operate, whatchallenges does it try to meet, what does it actually do. This is largely done inReason and Bradbury (2001) and the picture to emerge is that action research is,on the one hand, a fairly widespread activity and on the other hand also highlycontext-bound. If we want to learn from research practices as they actually are,we need to be able to compare, and in other ways work with, a broad range ofdifferent projects and activities. Then, however, a new challenge emerges: how isthis to be done? Here it can be of interest to explore the practices of other actors:those that research, work with, and write about it.

Learning from practices

Social capital, in terms of understanding, communication, trust and solidaritybetween people, is found to promote such phenomena as innovation. In this con-text, social capital refers to something that exists between other people; thosepeople that research writes about. What, however, about research itself? Can thenotion of social capital be applied to the research community? Since researchtends to become an actor among many in larger innovation systems, can researchavoid being a participant in the kind of relationship that is referred to as socialcapital?

If research itself is to be caught by its own concepts, what does it mean? Tostick to the example of social capital, it would mean relationships of this kind notonly between research and its partners but within the research system itself. Butis the research community not already characterized by relationships of under-standing, trust and solidarity? If this is the case, it is not because of classical epis-temologies and research positions. Researchers operating on the basis of thesepositions are generally forced into an individualist role by such a position. Eachresearcher is brought to see him- or herself as a complete rational subject capable,as an individual, of understanding the world. Why, then, work with others?

Relationships of understanding, trust and solidarity would dramaticallyincrease the communication potential in the research community. It would be fareasier to exchange experiences and develop common pools of knowledge.




Misunderstandings would be radically reduced and the number of wasted debateslikewise. Only then can study build on study, different experiences be applied injoint learning processes and results from a broad range of projects broughttogether to form a joint pattern. The strength that cannot be reached by the individual researcher can be reached by working together. Working together is,furthermore, not only – not even primarily – a question of working in groups. Thepoint is to be able to form innovation systems that span far beyond the face-to-face group in terms of scale.

Social capital can emerge under a broad range of different circumstances.Most favourable, as well as most in need of social capital, are situations charac-terized by actors who are in a position of equality in relation to each other andwho need to work together on the basis of complementarity. Complementarityimplies that all actors have something unique to contribute and that no actor cansubstitute for another. This means, however, that the idea of the single rationalsubject evaporates. It is the network as a whole that generates the understandingsas well as the actions that the understandings give rise to. There is no single pointin the network that provides an overview superior to that which can be gained inother points and no single actor who can provide all relevant elements of under-standing and action (Shotter & Gustavsen, 1999). The idea that reason resides in collectivities rather than individual subjects is not new. What is new is that the modern production of knowledge – knowledge production in Mode II inGibbons’ terms – is an actual expression of this principle in practical organiza-tional terms rather than a theoretical stipulation still waiting to be given practicalexpression.

Social capital is one dimension that can be thrown back at the research system on the basis of its own studies. Another example can be objectivity. InCartesian theory of science the need to decouple theory from practice seeks someof its foundations in the need for theory to be objective, neutral or disinterested.Objectivity becomes a concept to be defined in terms of theory of science, througha process of self-reflection performed by the individual researcher. It has, how-ever, turned out to be notoriously difficult to reach unequivocal groundings thatall can agree on for requirements like objectivity. In fact, if there is any main con-clusion to emerge out of the postmodern and deconstructive tendencies of the lastdecades it is that scientific theory can provide no such groundings (Baynes,Bohman & McCarthy, 1987). There is no argument available, no position we canenter, no words we can use, that ensure objectivity irrespective of what we actually do when we carry out our tasks. In this sense research is in the same posi-tion as, say, a referee in a football match: he is under continuous scrutiny fromthe public who will immediately notice if he breaks with the idea of objectivity. Ifsuch breaks occur, the referee will not be much helped by arguing that he has aphilosophy of objectivity that the public does not understand. Objectivitybecomes, in other words, a set of practical requirements. When research is actu-




ally performing its tasks it is in the same kind of situation. In fact, given all thecomplex relationships that research has to enter into under present forms of pro-duction of knowledge, the demand for objectivity has probably never been high-er and more critical than at present. The challenge is to find practical ways ofhandling practical challenges and such a task can best be approached by lookingat what research actually does when it makes an effort to be objective, underwhat conditions research comes under criticism for not being objective, and soon, but also at what other actors do when they make an effort to be objective.

A third example, introduced by Johannisson (2003), is entrepreneurship.Even here we have a concept that attracts much attention from research, but assomething pertaining to somebody else. Johannisson makes the point, however,that we may also see research as an entrepreneur. Why not learn from thoseactors who seem able to create something although it may be in entirely differentfields? This perspective will, in many ways, lead towards the social capital per-spective. Whereas it used to be common, to see the entrepreneur as a deviant, ithas become more common to see the entrepreneur as someone who may haveespecially strong networks and relationships.

One may ask if such an incorporation of practices into research implies thatout of the three main efforts to overcome the theory-practice separation indicatedabove, pragmatism is actually chosen above the other ones. To some extent thisis true, but it is also defensible on the grounds that pragmatism is setting out tocreate an interplay between theory and practice (Reason, 2003) and not only, asphenomenology, to find new ways of understanding the world. Compared withcritical theory, pragmatism has a stronger constructivist orientation and will notas easily fall victim to the argument that it offers only critique, no alternative.

The reasons for improving on the possibilities for learning from practicesacross project boundaries can be sought in the overall situation of action re-search. They can, however, also be anchored in more specific needs emanatingout of specific contexts: This contributor generally works within the field ofwork, organization and participation, to a large extent within a Nordic perspec-tive. If we count, say, all the projects that are unfolding or have been taking placerecently on the level of single organizations in this field, the Finnish NationalWork Organisation Program (Alasoini & Kyllønen, 1998) recently concluded aphase with 500 enterprise projects. There are between 100 and 200 projects ofthis kind going on under the framework of the Norwegian Value Creation 2010programme at the moment. Sweden has no comparable programmes but there isno lack of projects here either, since most universities and university colleges –plus a number of research foundations and other research organizations – haveresponded individually to the demands of the third task. In Denmark several topically oriented initiatives are unfolding in the same field. The sum total oforganization development projects that can claim attention is approaching a four-digit figure. In actual practice the number of cases really worth consideration is of




course far less, but the gross figure nevertheless gives some indication of the scaleof the challenge. There is, of course, some communication, but the overall pictureremains characterized to a large extent by each project being a closed universewhere communication is difficult because others ‘do not understand’.

The Nordic countries do not constitute the ultimate framework for com-munication. Beyond the Nordic countries there is a global audience. Even thisaudience can, however, be reached only if there is some kind of shared frame ofreference, something that does, in turn, demand some social relationships thatcan provide understanding and trust (Ennals & Gustavsen, 1998).

Concluding remarks

In its effort to link reflection and action, theory and practice, action research con-fronts one of the most basic of all challenges facing research. The challenge is notunique to action research, but is something that has several consequences. Onecannot, for instance, bypass the theory-practice challenge simply by rejectingaction research. The challenge remains, nonetheless. It also means, however, thataction research is not the only branch of research where this problem is attacked.Any discourse on the relationship between theory and practice does not enter vir-gin terrain but a terrain that is quite well-filled with actors, discourses and views.

A number of these discourses take place in fields like ontology and episte-mology. They can help clarify the challenges and provide points and arguments,but they do not contain full specifications for research positions. In developingresearch positions other concerns need to enter the picture as well, not least con-cerns emanating from the more specific tasks research sets out to deal with andthe context in which it is done.

By influencing tasks and contexts, practice makes its impact on research.How do we set about understanding these tasks and contexts? Do we, forinstance, set about it in the same way as when working with theoretical issues? Inthe last case it is generally assumed that the researcher is a rational point fromwhich everything can be seen and understood, if not in detail at least in a broadoutline. If we imagine that practice cannot be fully understood in theoreticalways, the idea of the rational, all-encompassing subject evaporates. Practices mayneed forms of understanding that are, in themselves, practical. What other actorsdo when they want to understand practical issues is to form relationships witheach other. Where innovation is to be promoted, these relationships encompassnot only mutual understanding in a way sufficient to read each other but go fardeeper in terms of mutual trust, ability to rely on tacit knowledge etc. To learnfrom practices, research needs to develop social relationships; internally withinthe research community as well as in relation to other actors. ‘The new produc-tion of knowledge’ as identified by Gibbons and colleagues (Gibbons et al., 1994)




is above all a network activity, and research cannot stay outside this process andremain as isolated individuals looking at the world from up above.

Notes

1 This contribution is a revised and translated version of a keynote speech origin-ally held during the conference ‘University and society in co-operation’, Ronneby,Sweden, 14–16 May 2003.

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Bjørn Gustavsen is research director for a workplace development programme inNorway and is visiting professor at several institutions. His main field of interest isthe use of research to support society level processes, in particular within the field ofwork, organisation and co-operation. Address: Work Research Institute, P.O. Box6954 St. Olavs Plass, NO 130 Oslo, Norway. [Email: [email protected]]




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