acrp 4-01 aircraft overrun and undershoot analysis for runway safety areas manuel ayres, ph.d
TRANSCRIPT
ACRP 4-01ACRP 4-01Aircraft Overrun and Undershoot Analysis for Runway Safety Areas
Manuel Ayres, Ph.D.
SummarySummary
Objective Approach Functional Hazard Analysis Accident/Incident Database Normal Operations Data Normalization Risk Models Analysis Software
ACRP 4-01 ProjectACRP 4-01 Project Airport Cooperative Research Program (ACRP) Objective: develop near-term practical solutions to problems faced by
airports Industry-driven program focused on applied research to airport operators Authorized in December 2003 as part of the Vision 100-Century of
Aviation Reauthorization Act Oct 2005, FAA executed a contract with the National Academies
(through TRB) to serve as manager of the ACRP Program oversight and governance are provided by representatives of
airport operating agencies
http://www.trb.org/crp/acrp/acrp.asp
Project TeamProject Team ARA Team
ARA Jim Hall – PI Manuel Ayres – PM Rich Speir Hamid Shirazi Tara Puzin Other
Loughborough University David Pitfield Robert Caves Andrew Appleyard Derek Wong
ESR-Technology Mark Eddowes
ACRP Staff Responsible Michael R. Salamone, CM
BackgroundBackground
71% of Accidents occur during landing and take-off 41% of onboard and 3rd party fatalities Landing overruns, landing undershoots, take-off
overruns, and crashes after take-off Runway safety areas (RSA) are prescriptive resulting
in ‘averaged’ degrees of protection Current RSA dimensions based on studies by FAA in
the 80s
Reason’s Swiss CheeseReason’s Swiss Cheese
Hazards
Holes are active failures & latent conditions
Successive layers of defenses, barriers and Safeguards
Accidents/ Incidents
The cheese is moving!
Objective of ACRP 4-01Objective of ACRP 4-01
Collect historical information related to overrun and undershoot accidents and incidents
Develop risk models for overrun and undershoot events
Evaluate risks associated with standard and non-standard RSA dimensions
Develop prototype software for overrun and undershoot risk analysis
Functional Hazard AnalysisFunctional Hazard Analysis
Formal and systematic process for the identification of hazards (similar to hazard and operability (“HAZOP”) studies)
Gathering together a multi-disciplinary team Determine relevant causal factors of overrun and
undershoot accidents and hazards to aircraft associated with airport operations
Support the data collection and development of risk models
Functional Hazard AnalysisFunctional Hazard Analysis
CategoriesAircraft characteristics and system faultsAirport characteristics and system faultsWeather characteristicsPilot related issues
Landing Overruns – Major FactorsLanding Overruns – Major Factors
Weather Tailwind Cross wind Visibility Ceiling
Airport Surface contaminants and friction (water, snow, ice, rubber
deposits) Pilot
Landing long Landing high Landing fast
Aircraft System faults
Takeoff Overruns – Major FactorsTakeoff Overruns – Major Factors
Weather Tailwind
Airport Surface contaminants and friction (water, snow, ice,
rubber deposits) Pilot
Delay to abort Aircraft
System or component malfunction require to abort takeoff
Landing Undershoots – Major FactorsLanding Undershoots – Major Factors
Weather Visibility Ceiling Wind variations (gusts, shear)
Airport Surface contaminants and friction (water, snow, ice,
rubber deposits) Pilot
Visual illusion
Visual IllusionVisual Illusion
Runway dimensions Runway and terrain slope Intensity of runway lighting Visibility Wet runway Crosswind
Source: David Newman and Flight Safety Foundation
A B
Other FactorsOther Factors Wind variations (gusts, shear) Temperature, Altitude Landing/Takeoff Distance (LDA vs. LDR; ASDA vs. ASDR) Slopes (longitudinal and transverse) Runway profile System faults Unstabilized approach “Press-on-itis” Incorrect (delay) application of thrust reverse, spoilers and brakes ‘Over-consideration’ for comfort Incorrect interpretation of reported operation conditions Selecting wrong runway Weight Availability of navigational aids Approach too low Attempt to land too close to arrival end of the runway
Database SourcesDatabase Sources
NTSB Accident Database & Synopses (Accidents and Incidents)
FAA Aviation Safety Reporting System - ASRS (Incidents) Accident/Incident Data System - AIDS (Incidents)
Transportation Safety Board of Canada (Accidents & Incidents) UK CAA-Safety Regulation Group (SRG) Mandatory Occurrence
Reporting Scheme (MORS) Database (Accidents & Incidents) Australian Transport Safety Bureau (Accidents & Incidents)
DATA CollectionDATA Collection
Cost of Investigation& Availability of
InformationCo
nse
que
nce
s
Accidents
Incidents
# Reported EventsProbability and# of Events
Database FiltersDatabase Filters
Both accidents and incidents North American, Western European, Australia, New
Zealand Fixed-wing Part 121, 125, 129, 135 and Part 91F Operations Aircraft with MTOW > 12500 lb Excluded single engine and piston engine aircraft
Access Database
• ~ 300 fields/record• Basic Data• Aircraft Data• Airport Data• Consequences• Details
• Flight Data• Obstacles• Terrain• Injuries• Weather• Wreckage
Accident LocationAccident LocationAccident LocationAccident Location
y
x
Wreckage Location
Summary TableSummary Table
Database Landing Overruns
Take-off Overruns
Landing Undershoots
FAA Accident/Incident Data System (AIDS)
13 (only incidents)
3 (only incidents)
21 (only incidents)
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS)
87 (only incidents)
7 (only incidents)
13 (only incidents)
NTSB Accident Database & Synopses
226 (only accidents)
166 (only accidents)
65 (only accidents)
Transportation Safety Board of Canada
21 (accidents and incidents)
4 (accidents and incidents)
2 (accidents and incidents)
UK CAA-SRG MORS 26 (accidents and incidents)
6 (accidents and incidents)
Total (so far) 373 186 101 Grand Total (so far) 628
Normal Operations DataNormal Operations Data
Approach Evaluate number of operations that experience
certain factors benignly, singly and in combination. Generate risk ratios and quantify the importance of
risk factors Source: FAA's Enhanced Traffic Management System
Counts (ETMSC) & a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) weather database
Normal Operations DataNormal Operations Data
NOD was sampled from a total of 78 selected airports Sampled airports account for 48,924,040 operations
from 2000 to 2005 inclusive (25.5% of all relevant traffic in the period)
Flights on the first day of February, May, August and November of 2002, 2003 and 2004 were sampled to constitute the NOD sample
After eliminating incompatible traffic, the final NOD sample consists of 24,240 flights
NormalizationNormalization
Small pool of relevant data available Data from different airports, operation conditions,
aircraft performance Comparing apples and apples Only raw distances between the final wreckage
location and the runway end have been used to develop current RSA recommendations
Assume an infinitely long hard surface runway
Normalization ProceduresNormalization Procedures
Correcting (overrun and undershoot) distances for Temperature Altitude Slope (when available) Aircraft performance Landing/Takeoff distance available Terrain (type, slope)
Risk ModelsRisk Models
Frequency Location Severity (Injuries, Cost)
Landing overrun Takeoff overrun Landing undershoot
Risk ModelsRisk Models
Three-Part Risk Model
Accidentprobability
model
Locationprobability
model
Accidentconsequences
model
Operationconditions
(accident and NOD data)
Operation conditions, terrain
Operation conditions, obstacles and terrain
Risk
Three-Part Risk Model
Accidentprobability
model
Locationprobability
model
Accidentconsequences
model
Operationconditions
(accident and NOD data)
Operation conditions, terrain
Operation conditions, obstacles and terrain
Risk
Frequency ModelsFrequency Models
Probability = Ni/a / Nn (under certain operation conditions)
P{Accident_Occurrence} is the probability (0-100%) of an accident type occur given certain operational conditions.
Xi = f(runway friction, ceiling, visibility, crosswind, tailwind, etc.)
...33221101
1}_{
XbXbXbbeOccurenceAccidentP
Location Model - OverrunsLocation Model - Overruns
RSA
naxexLocationP }{
mbyeyLocationP }{
x
y
Stop LocationProbability Distribution
Location Model - OverrunsLocation Model - Overruns
RSA
Frequency Contours
Decreasing Probability
Location Model - UndershootsLocation Model - Undershoots
RSA
naxexLocationP }{
mbyeyLocationP }{
x
y
Touchdown LocationProbability Distribution
Consequences ModelConsequences Model
Distance to Obstacle
Probability of Occurrence
Operation Conditions
Consequences Model
Type, Size of Obstacle
InjuryDamage
Terrain
High
Medium
Low
Distance to Obstacle
Probability of Occurrence
Operation Conditions
Consequences Model
Type, Size of Obstacle
InjuryDamage
Terrain
High
Medium
Low
High
Medium
Low
Prototype Analysis SoftwarePrototype Analysis Software
User-friendly application in Visual Basic for MS Excel Input operation conditions Normalize the data Estimate risks Denormalize data
Contact InfoContact Info
ARAJim Hall, [email protected]
Manuel Ayres410-540-9949 [email protected]
ACRP StaffMichael R. Salamone (202) [email protected]
Questions?