accidents by gard

8/6/2019 Accidents by Gard

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NavigationA selection o articles previouslypublished by Gard AS



© Gard AS, March 2011

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Introduction 4Loss o anchors and chain 5Ports and places o reuge in South Arica 8Limitations o a vessels’ anchoring equipment 10Increased risks o grounding in Barranquilla, Colombia 11Communication in pilotage passage planning 15Harbour towage and pilotage 16ECDIS - Charting the uture o navigation 18Anchoring within Malaysian waters o Singapore 20Dangerous anchoring in the Singapore area 21Damage to xed objects when manoeuvring in conned waters 22“What i...?” – Planning or the unexpected beore an emergency develops 23Pilot error survey 26What happens to the pilot ater a casualty? 26Global wave watch system 27Typhoon season precautions – Hong Kong area 28Double typhoon trouble 29Don’t all asleep on the job - No let-up in atigue-related casualties 31Collisions at sea - Unavoidable? 33A collision that should have been avoided 36

Is the pilot a part o the bridge team? 37Navigation through the entrances to the Baltic Sea 39Operations in extremely cold climates 40Winter season in Northern Baltic Sea 42Severe ice conditions in the northern Baltic Sea 43Anchoring - Getting into a sae haven or into a potential disaster? 44Rubicon - The point o no return 46“Pilot on board!” 47Pilot on the bridge - Role, Authority and Responsibility 49Who is to blame? 53Collisions - Why do they occur? 55

Hydrodynamic interaction between ships 56TRICOLOR - The collision, sinking and wreck removal 57Wash damage 60Hull and Machinery incident - The innocent victim (o an unsuccessul berthing manouevre) 61Hull and machinery incident - Consequences o a blackout 62Reducing maritime casualties through awareness o nautical saety 63Ship simulators - 65

Virtual reality without P&I liability 65 Voyage Data Recorders - Black box technology paves its way into shipping 67Computerisation o bridges and engine rooms - Progress or regression? 69The interace between hull and machinery insurance and P&I rom the P&I claims handler’s

perspective 71

Contents




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Introduction

This booklet contains a collection o loss prevention materials relating tonavigational accidents, training andother issues which have been publishedby Gard over the last ive years. Thecompilation may be used or individualstudies, as parts o training schemes, oras individual topics in saety meeting oreducation.

There is a growing concern within

the industry about the increase innavigational claims. The pattern seemsto be a steady number o claims pership but the severity o each claimincreases every year. In the last 4 yearsalone, Gard has seen a doubling inthe value o the claims paid as a resulto navigational errors. Navigationalincidents represent approximately 40per cent o the numbers o all claimsand 50 per cent o the costs.

There is a human error behind themajority o navigational claims. Theoccasional technical ailure, normally

resulting in limited damage to piersand ships’ sides are rare and not o

major concern. Human error is thecause behind at least 80 per cent o all navigational accidents. This igureseems to be the generally agreedindustry wide.

Several actors have been pointed outas possible reasons or the increasingnumber o human error incidents:

- Integrated and complicated bridge

systems- High traic density- High commercial pressure- Larger and aster ships- Reduced manning- Increased administrative tasks onboard- Increased number o inspections- Fatigue- Lack o experience- Lack o competence- Poor decision making

The discussion about these actors willcontinue as long as ships ply the seas

but there are some areas that needto be addressed by ship operators

to improve the perormance o theshipping industry:

Education, training and crew selectionis paramount to obtain and keep highquality crew. Lack o positive correctiveaction is a common direct cause o accidents.

Situational awareness is a term usedto describe what is missing within

the bridge team when this happens.To achieve such awareness it isnecessary to conduct teamwork andcommunication training.

The human being is the only intelligentbarrier in our systems and only the crewcan halt the current development andprotect the value o ships, cargo andenvironment.

Disclaimer

The inormation contained in this publication is compiled rom material previously published by Gard AS and isprovided or general inormation purposes only. Whilst we have taken every care to ensure the accuracy and qualityo the inormation provided at the time o original publication, Gard AS can accept no responsibility in respect o anyloss or damage o any kind whatsoever which may arise rom reliance on inormation contained in this publicationregardless o whether such inormation originates rom Gard AS, its shareholders, correspondents or othercontributors.




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Loss o anchors andchain

Gard News 201,February/April 2011

Gard has noted an increase in caseso lost anchors. The Club experiences

about one case per 200 ships per yearand class societies experience abouttwice as many: one anchor lost per 100ships a year. Most Gard cases involving lost anchorsare P&I-related. More and more portauthorities require that lost anchorsbe removed rom the sea bed, sothese cases become “wreck removal”operations. There are ewer casesrelated to hull and machinery insurance,as the value o the lost anchor andchain is normally lower than theapplicable deductibles.

The weakest linkGard has looked at the technicalreasons behind loss o anchors, andnoted that anchors may be lost dueto breakage o a common chain link,

joining shackle, swivel, anchor shackleor crown shackle, and also throughbreakage o the anchor itsel. One orboth lukes may break and, surprisingly,also the solid anchor shank.

“A chain is only as strong as its weakestlink” is an old saying, and when a parto the chain breaks it may be due to

wear and corrosion or to over-stressingo that part. Class societies requireanchors and chain to be ranged indry-dock every ive years and that is

the time to pay attention to every parto the chain. Gard’s advice to vessels’

masters and superintendents is to takean active part in the inspection, and not just to leave it to the yard and the classsurveyor. Class societies will require thecommon chain links to be measured atthe ends, where they are most worn,and allow a reduction o up to 12 percent o the diameter.

Second-hand chains are on oer in themarket, but one should not buy themwithout a certiicate o quality. Consultthe class society. One should also beaware that chains and anchors havebeen oered with alse class certiicates.

The low price may be an indicator.

In addition to reduction by wearand corrosion, one o the commonproblems o anchor chain is loose orlost studs. The studs are there to keepthe sides o the common links apartduring pulling, to avoid that the chain“kinks”, and they also add weight tothe chain. I a stud is lost, the strengtho the link is severely reduced. It iscommon to see loose studs beingwelded up, but one should be verycareul in doing so. The class societyshould always be consulted, the

amount o welding should be limited,and the link should be both pre-heatedand slowly cooled down aterwards.In many cases it would be better to

scrap the length o chain or to replace asingle link by a joining shackle.

An anchor chain is composed o lengths o 15 athoms (27.5 metres)

joined by kenter shackles, as well asa “ore-runner” next to the anchor.It is relatively rare or a swivel or akenter shackle to break, but i a wornchain has to be replaced, the “ore-runner”, consisting o swivel, large linkand joining shackles, should also berenewed. The spile pin, i.e., the conicalpin locking the kenter shackle partstogether, is important. It is hammeredin and sealed by a lead pellet, and thishas to be done in a proper way. Be sure

to buy only quality goods with propercertiicates.

Lost spile pinsThe pin o the anchor shackle(D-shackle), which links the “ore-runner” to the crown shackle o theanchor, is sealed in the same wayas or kenter shackles. There havebeen several cases where a chain ingood condition comes up withoutthe anchor and without the pin o the anchor shackle. The spile pin,securing the main pin o the shackle,seems to all out relatively oten, and

Gard’s investigation saw two reasonsor that. One is ound at the shipyardwhere the chain was itted. The conicalshape o the spile pin must match the

Anchor windlass and chain stopper.. Photo courtesy of Aker Pusnes AS.




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hole in the shackle parts perectly,so this is a question o quality at themanuacturers. Sealing the hole o the spile pin used to be done in theshipyard by hammering in a lead pelletwith a special tool, but today this issometimes done by pouring meltedlead into the hole. That lead may shrinkduring cooling, and needs a hammeringto serve its purpose. That is not alwaysdone.

The other reason or lost spile pins isound on board. Most anchors, i notall, will hammer within the hawse pipewhile on voyage in heavy seas. Therepeated hammering may at timesloosen the spile pin o the anchorshackle and cause it to all out. Theanchors should be secured as tightly aspossible by tensioners or turnbuckles/lashing wire, etc., to reduce anchormovements on voyage.

BreakageI parts o an anchor break, there aregood reasons to suspect deects o the cast metal, like inclusions andissures, but it can also be caused byuncontrolled dropping o the anchoron a rocky seabed. Gard has alsoseen some anchor shanks breakingo, and that has been a surprise.Normally one would expect a chainlink to part under strain long beorethe anchor shank. Examinations o theremaining part o the broken shankshave revealed a brittle metal structure,caused by insuicient annealing at themakers’. The anchor shank and anchorcrown are made o cast steel, whichrequires a long heat treatment atercasting. The manuacturers may havespeeded up the production, cut time

and temperatures needed or heattreatment, and that may not have beendiscovered by the authorities involvedin testing and certiication. I an anchorshank breaks, Gard recommendssending the remaining part to a testacility and comparing the results withthe certiicate.

Operational circumstancesAs or operational circumstances whenanchors are lost, some happen duringnormal anchoring, i one is not ableto control the speed o the drop bythe windlass brake, or i the anchor is

dropped while the vessel is still movingorward. Anchors and chains may alsobe lost when anchoring in an areaexposed to bad weather, i the vesselstarts driting. In such situations, there

This anchor was almost lost due to thepin of the anchor shackle (D-shackle)falling out. The spile pin, securingthe main pin of the anchor shackle,is missing. (Photos courtesy of OleMartin Terjesen).




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is o course also a risk o losing thevessel, or causing collisions, which havehappened more than once. A vesseldragging its anchor also risks causingdamage to pipelines and cables on theseabed, a very expensive aair. Anchorshave also been lost when anchoring intoo deep water and when attempting

to stop a vessel as a last resort in ablack-out situation.

Gard also has some cases o anchorsdropping out while at sea, obviouslya result o inadequate securing. I ananchor drops out while the vessel isunder way, it has overcome the chain-stopper, the lashing-wire/tensioningarrangements and the windlass brake,or these have not been correctlyengaged. I an anchor has dropped outwhile at sea, this would normally be eltby a smaller vessel’s behaviour, suchas loss o speed or tendency to steer

to the side o the anchor. However,Gard has experienced cases where thepersonnel on the bridge blames a losso speed on the conditions o wavesand winds, or the lack o eiciency o the engine, instead o going orwardto check the securing o the anchors.Approaching ports or shallow passageswith an anchor in tow can become veryexpensive i cables and pipelines on theseabed are pulled o or damaged.

The eiciency o the windlass brakeis extremely important, and wornbrake band linings should be replacedwithout delay. Also, be aware that whenthe lining is worn, this makes the bandmore “roomy” and a ull braking orcewill not be obtained by tighteningthe brake spindle alone. On large

windlasses there is an arrangementat the lower part, to adjust the brakeband. Service people working or awindlass manuacturer report that thisis hardly ever done by the crew. It is

just a case o reading the maintenancebooklet and acting accordingly toobtain a better braking eiciency.

Class rulesThe rules regarding speciications o anchoring equipment are establishedby the class societies. It is importantto be aware that these requirementsare minimum requirements, and also

to be aware o assumptions made inthe calculations used. Class societiesstress that anchoring equipment is onlyintended or temporary mooring o avessel, within a harbour or a shelteredarea, when awaiting berth, tide, etc. Itis also underlined that the equipmentis not designed to hold a ship o a ullyexposed coast in bad weather or tostop a vessel rom driting. The class

rules will only require the vessel to havean anchoring equipment designed tohold the vessel in good holding ground,and are based on the assumption thata scope o chain cable between 6 and10 is used. Such a scope, being theratio between the length o chain paidout and the water depth, is just not

obtainable or large ships in some o the deeper designated anchorages.With these limitations in mind, and thetype o incidents mentioned above, itbecomes apparent that some mastersmay at times put too much trust in theirvessel’s anchoring equipment, and thatthey should be more proactive and putout to sea more oten when the weatherdeteriorates.

The ull text o the rules or anchoringequipment can be ound at theIACS website at www.iacs.org.uk/document/public/Publications/Uniied_

requirements/PDF/UR_A_pd148.PDF.Gard has addressed these rules in LossPrevention Circular No. 12-10, whichcan be ound at www.gard.no.




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Ports and places oreuge in South AricaBy Alan Reid and Mike Heads,

P&I Associates (Pty) Ltd, Durban, South Arica


The subject of ports and places of refuge around the world has steadily

become a topic of much debate amongvarious interest groups, especially afterthe breaking of the PRESTIGE off thecoast of Spain.

No doubt when the PRESTIGE accidentoccurred there were several issues atstake regarding what should be donewith the vessel and what steps shouldbe taken by the various authorities.After the incident some experts arguedthat if the vessel had been taken intoa port or place of refuge the resultantoil spill could have been controlled.This is not the first time that such a

debate has occurred, since the issue ishighly sensitive. The PRESTIGE case,however, does illustrate the need for asensible approach when dealing withships in difficulty. In the case of the MSCNAPOLI, a decision had to be takenon what to do with the vessel after shedeveloped a crack, and it was decidedthat a beached landing would be thebest solution in order to limit andcontrol the damage to the environment.

It is against this background that SouthAfrica has looked at its contingencyplans in order to deal with ships indifficulty and what it should do if facedwith any of the above scenarios.

South Africa is surrounded by 2,798

km of coastline that splits the Atlanticand Pacific Oceans. At certain times of

the year this length of coastline can beone of the most dangerous stretchesof coastline in the world, especiallywhen one takes the weather, currentsand rugged rocks into account. It is forthese very reasons, that it is importantto have a plan in place and to be awareof the options available to the country inorder to deal with potential ecologicalcatastrophes should one ever arise.The coastline is littered with wrecksstretching back hundreds of years and,therefore, the next maritime casualtycould be imminent.

A sensible and commercialapproachTo deal with the scenario of a ship indifficulty, the South African governmenthas passed legislation and approvedthe appointment of the South AfricanMaritime Safety Authority (SAMSA) toconsider their options, together withother local marine experts, on theprocedures to follow should a vessel runinto trouble.

South Africa has adopted a verysensible and commercial approach tothe issue of ships in difficulty and the

need to have ports and places of refugeavailable for a vessel in case of anemergency. There are places of refugeavailable in South Africa for deep draft

vessels, together with certain ports,provided certain requirements can bemet.

There are three possible places of refuge on the South African coast:1. St Helena Bay - a deep water bay butexposed to the wind from the northwest2. False Bay - very good area that offersmuch protection3. Algoa Bay - good shelter only from

the west

In addition, there are eight commercialports in South Africa: Saldanha Bay,Cape Town, Mossel Bay, Port Elizabeth,Coega, East London, Durban andRichards Bay.

Anchoring a vessel at will is illegalA shipowner or master can not simplyanchor a vessel along the South Africancoastline at their own will. Variouspieces of legislation have been passedto prevent this:- The Marine Traffic Act, Act 2 of 1981;

- South African Maritime SafetyAuthority Act, Act 5 of 1998;- Merchant Shipping (Maritime Security)Regulations 2004, which incorporateRegulation X 1-2/9 of SOLAS (ISPS);- Marine Pollution (Control and CivilLiability) Act, Act 6 of 1981;- Wreck and Salvage Act, Act 94 of 1996;- Merchant Shipping Act, Act 57 of 1951(as amended);- National Ports Authority Act, Act 12 of 2005.

The Marine Traffic Act deals with avessel entering and departing from

international waters and states thatthere are regulations regarding theimmobilising, laying up, stopping oranchoring outside harbours or fishingharbours. It is an offence under the Actfor any vessel to lay up on the SouthAfrican coastline without the necessarypermission. Permission to lay up a vesselmust be given by the relevant ministerthrough SAMSA, who may demand, interalia, that various conditions be met. Forexample, SAMSA may demand that a tugbe made fast to the vessel at all timesthroughout the duration of the lay-up.The tug would therefore be able to movethe vessel in case of an emergency. If sheis made fast, then there is little delay inmoving or relocating the vessel shouldthe need arise.

Nautical chart of Valsbaai (False Bay).




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SAMSA’s roleSAMSA also has the power to demandthat the master or owner of the shippost security to the satisfaction of SAMSA in an amount determined bySAMSA for the recovery of any costsincurred by SAMSA in enforcing anycondition applicable to the immobilising

or laying up of the ship, or in theexercise of its powers under the Act.

SAMSA have the authority to prevent avessel coming towards the coast to seekrefuge and this authority stretches toall bays and anchorage areas. Althoughthe ports are operated by the TransnetNational Ports Authority (TNPA), theywill often turn to SAMSA for advice andassistance. Before a vessel can seekrefuge at a place or port in South Africa,SAMSA must first give their authority,and if it is a port, then TNPA will alsohave to be consulted and give their

approval. SAMSA will always considerthe safety of life as being paramountand the Maritime Rescue Co-ordinationCentre in Cape Town co-ordinates allrescue activities with the harbour masterat the nearest port. The next priorityis the environment. Once the abovefactors have been taken into account,one would then give consideration tothe safety of property.

South Africa has always had an excellentapproach to the subject of vesselsseeking a port or place of refuge andSAMSA should be commended for

their role in such matters. SAMSAhave a difficult function to fulfil andit has always been our advocacy thatshipowners looking to utilise SouthAfrican waters as a place of refuge

should act with utmost good faithwhen dealing with SAMSA. A failureto disclose a particular fact may leadto a vessel being barred from gainingrefuge.

Where a vessel’s structure has beencompromised, SAMSA will want to

inspect the vessel and assess theproblem before granting permission forthe vessel to get close to the coast. Once permission has been granted, itmay be subject to certain conditions, forexample:- The vessel may be requested toproduce a valid hull and machineryinsurance certificate.- The vessel may be requested toproduce a valid P&I insurance certificateof entry.- All fuel bunkers and black oil (includingcontents of engine sumps) may have to

be removed from the vessel.- The vessel must be attended to by anadequately powerful salvage tug thathas to be made fast.- A salvage contractor must beappointed by owners (the contractorshould be an International SalvageUnion member).- An operational plan must be preparedand approved by SAMSA- A suitable guarantee might berequested.

The request for valid insurancecertificates is a new development and

an essential one. If vessels want to makeuse of our coast, then owners mustunderstand that South Africa needsto protect itself from having to incurand bear the costs of removing vessels

which may eventually be abandoned bythe owners. Having suitable insurancein place provides a level of protectionshould an unfortunate event or risk ariseduring the period of refuge.

Both SAMSA and TNPA recognise andaccept Club letters of undertaking from

IG clubs. The wording of this letter hasbeen agreed upon with the clubs andis only a slight variation of the standardIMO wording for ports of refuge. Thevariation is that it incorporates SouthAfrican law.

ResourcesSouth Africa is fortunate to have variousresources available on its coastline toassist vessels in difficulty or which mayhave to lay up. South Africa was the firstcountry to recognise the need to have atug solely for the above purpose, whichresulted in the rest of the world also

introducing emergency towing vessels(ETV).

Two salvage companies have officesin Cape Town with fully equippedwarehouses. Resources are available toprovide, inter alia, fenders and transferhoses.

Co-operation is paramountSouth Africa, as a coastal state, doesrecognise the need for vessels to seekrefuge and in general will assist in thisprocess. However, it is imperative thatthe requirements of the authorities are

met and that the owners, the ship andtheir respective insurers co-operate atall times.




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Limitations o a vessels’anchoring equipment

Loss Prevention CircularNo. 12-10

Gard has seen an increasing number o cases involving lost anchors, and romclass societies we learn that as manyas one anchor per 100 ships is lostannually. The reasons or loss o anchorsand chain are many, and includelack o seamanship and inadequatemaintenance, but also instances o thechain and anchor breaking, leaving aquestion mark as to the quality o suchparts as provided by the manuacturers.

In Gard, about one in 200 ships ayear has an anchor related claim.Most o these are due to the loss o anchors at designated anchorageswhere the authorities require the lostitems to be removed, thus resultingin a “wreck removal” case. The moreserious and very costly cases are whena vessel starts dragging its anchor inbad weather, and where this leads tocollisions with other vessels, groundingsand loss o the ship, or to damage tocables and pipelines on the seabed.

Strength and limitations oanchoring equipmentThe rules or anchoring equipment,the grade, length and size o chain,number and weight o the anchors,the strength o the chain stoppers andthe power o the anchor windlassesand the brakes, are established by theclass societies. They can be ound inthe rules o the individual societies,or in the uniied rules o IACS, theInternational Association o ClassSocieties. It is important to be awarethat these are minimum requirements,and to know the assumptions made in

the calculations.

For each vessel the class society willcalculate an Equipment Numberby using a ormula, where thedisplacement o the vessel, the breadtho the ship and the height rom thesummer load waterline to the top o theuppermost house, as well as the proileview area o the hull, superstructuresand houses above the summer loadwaterline are included. Thus, the orceson the ship by current and wind romboth the ront and the sides are takeninto account. The ormula is basedon an assumption that the speedo the current may reach 2.5 m/sec,and wind speed o 25 m/sec, whichrepresent quite high orces, but it is

also assumed that the vessel can usea scope between 6 and 10, the scopebeing the ratio between length o chainpaid out and water depth. However,large ships at deep anchorages do nothave suicient chain onboard to reachscopes o such magnitude.

I a ship is at anchor in ballast condition,the Master should also bear in mindthat wind orces acting on his ship may

be much larger than the calculationshave accounted or, as larger shipside areas are now exposed, while themeasurements entered in the ormulawas taken rom the summer load waterline. Vessels in ballast will also be morevulnerable i they have to move away inbad weather, as both the steering andthe propulsion may be aected.

Class societies make it clear that theuse o the anchoring equipment isonly or the temporary mooring o avessel, within a harbour or a shelteredarea, when awaiting berth, tide, etc.

It is particularly emphasized that theequipment is not designed to holda ship o a ully exposed coast inbad weather or to stop a vessel romdriting. The anchoring equipment, asdesigned in accordance with the classrules, will only hold the vessel in goodholding ground, while the holdingpower is signiicantly reduced in poorholding ground.

RecommendationI a vessel is anchored in an areaexposed to weather, it is necessary tohave a policy as to when to leave. There

have been cases when Masters havebeen under commercial pressure notto leave the anchorage, and disastershave happened because the Masterwas tempted “to wait and see untilthe morning”, although the weatherorecast was bad. In making his decisionwhether to stay or to leave, the Mastershould also be aware o the limitationso his anchoring equipment. SomeMasters may not have ull knowledgeo these limitations, however, they arelaid down by the class societies in theirrules or calculating the dimensions,weights and strengths o the anchoringequipment.

With the mentioned limitations inmind, it can be seen rom cases o

ships dragging anchors in bad weatherthat Masters have at times placed toomuch trust in their vessel’s anchoringequipment. Today’s weather orecastsare usually very reliable and Mastersshould more oten choose to weighanchors and go out to sea in time i heavy weather is orecast.

The ull text o the rules or anchoring

equipment can be ound in thedocument “Requirements concerningmooring, anchoring and towing”,by searching the web pages o the International Association o Classiication Societies: www.iacs.org.uk, or directly in www.iacs.org.uk/vduniiedrequirements/ur_a_pd148.pd.




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Increased risks ogrounding in Barranquilla,

Colombia

Figure 1- Magdalena River & Rio Caucareaches the sea in Barranquilla

to the current and turning at the wrongtime. In addition to the groundings,the excess water fow has also led toother incidents such as collisions due tomiscalculating the speed and strengtho the current.

With the increasing volume o water,the silting up o the river bed ando the mouth o the river has alsoincreased, causing changes in the

pattern o silt deposits, creating shoalsand reductions o depth where therepreviously were none. The changes inthe river bed also have a bearing onthe speed and direction o the current.The current in the navigational channelhas increased due to the Bernoulliprinciple2. This has changed thehydrodynamics o the River.

The authorities have expressedconcerned and have increasedthe requency o bathymetries andsoundings o the river bed. They havealso started to provide inormation

more regularly (bi- or tri- monthly,rather than once a month). In addition,a permanent dredge is now stationedat Bocas de Ceniza to cope with thechanging circumstances.

RecommendationsDue to the unusual conditionsin Barranquilla, Gard stronglyrecommends Masters to be awareo the risks involved and take theabove into consideration whenplanning the arrival or departure.

Vessels entering the port shouldrequest their agents to provide the

most up to date bathymetric chartsand recommendations rom the localauthorities prior to entering port. Whenpossible, vessels should enter the portduring daytime.

When possible the pilot should boardthe vessel three or more miles outsidethe river mouth. This will allow the pilotmore time to get a better eel o thehandling o the ship, should there bean emergency situation. Masters shouldwork closely with the pilots in thediscussion and planning o the enteringmanoeuvre. The pilot station should becontacted well in advance to obtain anupdate on the conditions in order toget accurate data or the onboard risk

BackgroundGard and other P&I clubs have recentlyexperienced several serious casualtiesin the port o Barranquilla. The porto Barranquilla is located on the westbank o the Rio Magdalena (MagdalenaRiver) some 10 miles upriver rom themouth, known as Bocas de Ceniza, inthe Caribbean Sea. The port receivessome 300 vessels monthly. The purposeo this circular is to inorm about the

situation in Barranquilla and to helpmembers and clients to assess theincreased risk when entering or leavingthis port.

The unusual situation inBarranquillaThe 2010 rainy season in Colombia,with unusually large volumes o rainalling or considerable periods o timehas been the worst in 40 years. Therainiest months o the year are usuallyApril and October, but in 2010 due tothe La Niña1 phenomenon, the laterainy season started in late August

and is now running into December.Colombian climate experts estimatethat the rains will continue well into2011, probably until March, causing thelate rainy season o 2010 to merge withthe early rainy season o 2011. At thetime o writing, this year’s rains have soar let more than 130 people dead andclose to two million aected.

There are currently unusually largevolumes o water in the rivers, andspecial directional dams at Bocasde Ceniza have been constructedto accelerate the fow o the river to

maintain and improve depth and thusthe draught or the shipping channel.This has created unprecedentedconditions and increased the risksinvolved in navigating in the port o Barranquilla.

Increased risk when navigating in theport o BarranquillaThe severe conditions described havecaused diculties or even the mostexperienced pilots in Barranquillaand some o the incidents, includingthree serious groundings in October/November may be due in part tomisjudgement o the river conditions bythe pilots and masters. Examples o thiscould be “presenting too much hull”


assessment. The Master and the pilotshould plan together to reduce thevessel’s side exposure to the current toavoid losing rudder control o the ship.

The circular has been drated andedited by Gard’s local correspondent inColombia – Marventura Services Ltda.

1 La Niña is a coupled ocean-atmospherephenomenon that is the counterpart o ElNiño as part o the broader El Niño-Southern

Oscillation climate pattern.2 I the volume increases and the area todischarge remains the same, the same volumeis delivered but at a higher speed.




12

Communication inpilotage passage

planning

Gard News 200, November 2010/ January 2011

Good communication between masterand pilot continues to be paramount.The article “Master/pilot exchangeo inormation”, published in GardNews issue No. 154, ocused on theimportance o good communicationbetween master and pilot, a problemwhich was also highlighted in thearticles “Pilot on board!” in Gard Newsissue No. 181 and “Is the pilot a part o the bridge team?” in Gard News issueNo. 185. In the ollowing article GardNews revisits the topic once again.1

Ideally the pilot, the master and theoicer o the watch (OOW) shoulddiscuss and agree on the intendedpassage plan in pilotage watersprior to commencing the passage.Unortunately, this is oten not donein accordance with bridge teammanagement principles. For themaster and the ship’s crew to be ableto supervise the pilot’s perormance,

or even question the pilot’s actions,they all have to be aware o the pilot’sintentions.

Pilots prevent ar more accidents thanthey cause. Nevertheless, when a pilotboards a vessel there may be pressureon both the pilot and the bridgeteam in terms o time. As a result, thepassage plans o the pilot and theon-board bridge team may not beconsistent with each other. There maybe a lack o communication betweenthe bridge team and the pilot regardingthe intended passage, which may

signiicantly reduce the saety o theoperation.

Recent indings in incidentsinvestigated by Gard involving pilotsshowed that common elements werepresent in most o these cases:

(1) inormation had not been shared bythe master and the pilot,(2) there had been insuicient time orthe ship’s crew to amiliarise themselveswith the pilot’s intended passage plan,(3) the pilot boarding ground wasrequently closer to the harbour

entrance compared with the chartedboarding ground.

ECDISIn many areas pilots use their ownelectronic chart systems, displaying thepassage on a laptop or similar devicethat they bring with them on boardand connect to the vessel’s AIS pilotplug. Use o such aids to navigation,i combined with reduced planningand bad communication betweenbridge team and pilot, urther reducesthe ability o the OOW to monitorthe pilot’s intentions regarding thevessel’s track, changes o course andto question any decisions made by thepilot.

Nowadays most vessels are equippedwith ECDIS or ECS as aids to navigationand support to conventional paperchart navigation.2 When the passage isproperly represented in these electronicsystems, it is possible to enable anumber o automatic alarms, which addto the saety o navigation. However, or

these saety barriers to be eective, thepassage plan must be properly agreedbetween vessel and pilot.

In some areas pilots send passage plansor passage planning inormation or aparticular port to vessels in advance.This proactive communication enablesthe vessel’s bridge team to prepareand enter the expected passage in theon-board systems prior to the arrivalo the pilot, including activating thesaety settings on the vessel’s ECDIS/ECS. When the pilot arrives on board,the bridge team is already aware o his

main intentions and should be ableto quickly discuss and agree on thepassage plan, including any possibledeviations rom the original plan.However, this should not replace theall-important master-pilot exchange o inormation.

Given the technology available today,the transmission o intended passageplanning inormation in advanceo the vessel’s arrival by the pilot,pilotage authority or other responsiblebody through a simple e-mail wouldsigniicantly add to sae navigation and

would assist the pilot in becoming amore integral part o the bridge team.

This becomes even more importantwith the impending implementation o ull ECDIS regulation. And why not alsouse emails to send the waypoint detailsin advance?

Advance inormation leaves onlyminor technicalities to be discussed orconirmed at the time o pilot boardingand ensures that the bridge team’s ullattention can be immediately directedtowards navigation.

This is probably the way orward:communication o the pilot’s intendedpassage plan in advance o the actualoperation, which would acilitate inputo the plan in the ship’s anti-groundingmonitor system, the ECDIS. This wouldalso allow the bridge team to amiliarisethemselves with the intended passageplan and be in a better position tomonitor the pilot’s actions.

Footnotes1 See also the article “Harbour towage andpilotage”, elsewhere in this issue o Gard News.2 See article “ECDIS - Charting the uture o navigation” elsewhere in this issue o GardNews.




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Harbour towage andpilotageBy Yves Beeckman, Marine Superintendent, URS, Antwerp.


It is generally assumed that tugoperations are routine or ships’ crewsand that mooring parties will handlethem eiciently and switly. As a result,master-pilot exchanges do not usuallyaddress this issue. However, in orderto ensure eective harbour towageoperations, it is essential that therelevant inormation is exchangedbetween the master and the pilotbeorehand, so that the mooringparties can be called to their stationsin time, ully brieed on the details o the operation. Daily experience in aharbour towage department showsthat, unortunately, the number o less-skilled mooring parties is on theincrease. This lack o skill may resultin delays in securing a tug, puttingtime pressure on the crew and therebyincreasing the risk o personal injuryor o the vessel sailing in unsaeconditions, or instance in dense traic,beore the tug is ready.

Exchange inormation beorehandThe tug inormation can be exchangedduring the voyage under the pilot’sadvice, as opposed to being exchangedat the time o pilot boarding, whenthere are other navigational prioritiesto be addressed. At the start o thetowing operation the parties should allbe at their mooring stations in goodtime and have the heaving lines readyat the correct/required position. Themaster should discuss the ETA at therendezvous point and ensure that hemusters the crew on time, allowing or

the distances to the mooring stations tobe covered in time, without the need torun. I the operation is to take place atnight, the crew should have ample timeto wake up and prepare or the periodout there, possibly in adverse weatherconditions.

Inormation required to be passedrom pilot to masterDue to the dierent types and sizes o tugs, there are many dierent types o harbour towage manoeuvres, so themaster should ind out the ollowingdetails rom the pilot in order to pass

them on to his crew:- ship’s lines or tug line- type o tow wire (steel, synthetic, size,indication o their size)- method o getting the tow wire on

board or the ship’s lines to the tug.(most commonly or tug’s lines: thinheaving line rom the vessel to pickup a larger size messenger roperom the tug, which can be led to thewarping drum o a winch in order toheave on board the tow wire. Whenusing ships’ ropes, the other option isto lower a ship’s rope or send it overwith a heaving line. Most tugs will,however, not take a lowered line whenunderway), only when departing romthe berth- position or passing over the heavingline (throw rom the ship’s shoulder,which airlead the heaving line shouldbe taken through)- maximum speed or securing the tug,so the bridge team can monitor- bollard pull o the tug(s)- VHF channels to be used or workingwith the tugs

Inormation required to be passed

rom master to pilotThe master should provide theollowing inormation to the pilot:- SWL o the mooring / towingequipment- Which airleads are suitable orsecuring the tugs. I they are o centreand only one tug is to be used, thismust be speciically brought to theattention o the pilot.- Pushing point strength, i known. I no pushing points are indicated on thehull, but the ship has a reinorced beltall around, it is important to convey thisact to the tug master.

What the crew should knowThe oicer in charge must ensurethat the mooring party knows whichbollard(s) will be used or the tug(s),how the messenger line will be ledtowards the warping drum and how thetow wire will be stopped o in orderto allow the strain to be taken o themessenger line and the sot eye to beput over the bollard. They should alsobe aware o the releasing procedure.

In order to avoid disruption, i therehas been a crew change, the new crew

should amiliarise themselves with themooring equipment beore taking theirstations or the irst time.

Regular meetings should be held

to remind the crew o the risks o handling tow wires and to discuss theprocedures.

During the operationThe commands used by the oicerin charge should be clear and wellunderstood by the deckhands; standardterminology may be developed, subjectto the ship’s working language.

The crew should wear leather workinggloves or gloves made rom equivalentmaterials when handling a tow wire,never cotton gloves. Very loose workclothing should also be avoided.Overalls should be tight, especiallyaround the wrists and ankles.

Many serious personal injury incidentsin mooring areas involve parting lines.It is thereore important to note thata “snapback zone” exists when amooring line is under tension. Crews

should take that into account duringoperations and it may be a good ideato indicate these areas permanently onthe deck. As soon as the tug is secured,all crew stand back rom the snapbackzones. Crew members should also bewarned to beware o hands and ingers:sudden jerks in the tow wire whiletaking the line on board or releasing thetug can easily lead to personal injury.

The oicer in charge must always bein visual contact with the tug duringsecuring up, so he can exchange handsignals with the tug crew, which is

usually better than trying to handle awalkie-talkie VHF in windy conditions.There are ships in which the bulwarksare so high that the tug crew can notsee anybody on the (orecastle) decko the vessel, or anything that goes onthere. In such conditions, it is absolutelyessential to have one person in aspeciic location or signalling visuallyto the tug. The crew should alwayssignal to the tug when the tow wire issecured and the tug can saely startapplying power. Status o the towwire should also be conirmed to themaster (secured, in the water, propeller

cleared).

Only a suitably weighted heavingline should be used. Monkey’s istsshould not have additional weight,




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but a heaving line should not bethrown without a monkey’s ist. Thelatter may be blown away and maybe impossible to get across to thetug. The crew should have a secondheaving line ready to throw in case theirst one should end up in the water.The ship’s crew should always warn the

tug crew beore sending the heavingline across. The crew should neveruse a thick messenger line to throw tothe tug, instead o a normal heavingline: the weight o the line comingdown may injure the tug crew; it is alsomore diicult to tie two messengerlines together (a rope messengerline will typically be a three strandpolypropylene rope o 24mm diameter).

A tow wire should never be grabbedrom below, but always rom above.1 I the wire has to be released quickly inan emergency, it is always easier to just

release your grip on the wire and letgravity do the work than to pull youringers away rom underneath the wire.

The messenger line must never bedisconnected rom the tow wire. Asan alternative, ater securing thewire over the bitt, the shackle can bedisconnected rom the sot eye o thetow wire and reconnected immediately,over the wire behind the sot eye, asa “running” shackle. This provides ameans to give suicient power to thetow wire to create enough slack so thatthe sot eye can be lited easily rom the

bollard. I this is not done, the shackleconnecting the messenger line to thetow wire should not be allowed tobecome jammed between the bollardand the tow wire. This would cause a

sharp bend in the tow wire under load,which might cause it to snap. The towwire should never be stopped by simplyputting it on deck and standing on it;the wire is too heavy and you may bethrown o your eet or dragged along.

Very serious injuries will result in mostcases. The crew should also beware o

“snaking” messenger lines when theyare released and run out. They couldseriously hurt someone upon impact.

Normally, the bow tug will have noproblems when the tow wire is releasedin one go; the tug will be moving awayrom the vessel and there will be littlerisk o the tow wire ending up in thetug’s propellers. However, the crewshould always try to obtain conirmationrom the tug o how they want thisdone. The stern tow wire must alwaysbe released in a controlled way (slackedaway by means o the messenger line,

in co-ordination with the tug crew).When you let it go in one motion, itwill most probably end up in the tug’spropellers.

Tug emergency “let go”proceduresTugs working on a towing winch have a“let go” system. The ship’s crew doesnot have to do anything to disconnectthe wire; that will be done by the tugmaster. He will set his winch drum reeand let the wire run out, until it breaksrom its securing bolt on the winchdrum, while he manoeuvres his tug to

saety.

However, this leaves the ship’s crew witha problem: the vessel will be trailingup to 140m o steel wire, which has to

be recovered rom the water beorethe tug can make a new approach(to secure up with its spare towingwire). When making speed throughthe water, this will be a diicult job orthe mooring party, because once themessenger line is entirely on boardor on the warping drum, it will bemuch more diicult, probably evenimpossible, to wind the remainingtowing wire in on the warping drum. Inthis case, a stopper must be used, anda (second) messenger line tied to thetowing wire urther down the line, andthen winding the wire on board canbe resumed. This process may have tobe repeated a considerable numbero times. It will probably be necessary,i conditions allow, or the vessel toreduce speed. This is a dangerousoperation and great care must be takenwhen carrying it out.

Footnotes1 Towing wires typically have theollowing dimensions: or 45 ton bollardpull: 42mm diameter; or 65 ton bollardpull: 48mm diameter; or 80 ton bollardpull: 54mm diameter.




15

ECDIS - Charting theuture o navigation


An Electronic Chart Display andInormation System displays a ship’sposition on electronic nautical chartsin real time with very little eort on thepart o the navigator, and is generallyhailed to be an invention set torevolutionise and vastly improve thesaety o navigation.

Amendments to the InternationalConvention or Saety o Lie at Sea

(SOLAS) Chapter V, Regulation 19 (V/19)make the carriage o an ElectronicChart Display and Inormation System(ECDIS) mandatory or ships lyingthe lag o contracting states.1 Theamendment will come into orce on 1stJanuary 2011.

The ollowing ships must be ittedwith ECDIS i engaged in internationalvoyages:- passenger ships o 500 GT or upwardsconstructed on or ater 1st July 2012;- tankers o 3,000 GT or upwardsconstructed on or ater 1st July 2012;

- cargo ships, other than tankers, o 10,000 GT or upwards constructed onor ater 1st July 2013;- cargo ships, other than tankers, o 3,000 GT or upwards but less than10,000 GT constructed on or ater 1stJuly 2014;- passenger ships o 500 GT or upwardsconstructed beore 1st July 2012 mustbe itted not later than the irst surveyon or ater 1st July 2014;- tankers o 3000 GT or upwardsconstructed beore 1st July 2012 mustbe itted not later than the irst surveyon or ater 1st July 2015;

- cargo ships, other than tankers, o 50,000 GT or upwards constructedbeore 1st July 2013 must be itted notlater than the irst survey on or ater 1stJuly 2016;- cargo ships, other than tankers, o 20,000 GT or upwards but less than50,000 GT constructed beore 1st July2013 must be itted not later than theirst survey on or ater 1st July 2017;- cargo ships, other than tankers, o 10,000 GT or upwards but less than20,000 GT constructed beore 1st July2013 must be itted not later than theirst survey on or ater 1st July 2018.

As can be seen rom the above, ECDISwill become mandatory or certainnew ships on delivery. Existing ships

not itted with ECDIS will be requiredto retroit the equipment “at theirst survey”, in accordance with theapplicable schedule above. Althoughthe “irst survey” may not coincide withdry-docking, owners should be awarethat substantial work could be involvedin retroitting this equipment, whichcould take the ship out o service. IMOhas recommended that considerationshould thereore be given to carrying

out the necessary modiicationsin dry dock beore the mandatoryimplementation date. The agreemento the ship’s lag administration wouldbe required to postpone retroittingbeyond this date.

Existing ships that will be permanentlytaken out o service within two years o the applicable implementation datemay be exempt rom its application.

The mandatory carriage o ECDISalready applies to high-speed cratbuilt ater 2008, with the requirement

applying rom 2010 to high-speed cratbuilt beore 2008.

Chart carriage requirementsFrom 1st January 2011 carriage o ECDIS will be accepted as compliancewith the carriage o nautical chartsrequirement in SOLAS V/19, paragraph2.1.4, as long as the ECDIS meets thelatest IMO perormance standards2 and the ship has in place a back-upsystem as required by IMO and thelag state. An electronic chart displaysystem that does not meet IMO ECDISrequirements is called an ECS, and

does not ulil the SOLAS chart carriagerequirement.

In order to comply with chart carriagerequirements ECDIS can only useSOLAS-approved charts (oicial charts).3 To meet SOLAS requirements the chartmust be issued by or on the authorityo a government, a hydrographicoice authorised by a contractingstate or another relevant institution soauthorised.

Electronic Navigation Chart (ENC) isthe database used with ECDIS. ENCsare vector charts, issued oiciallyby or on the authority o a state,authorised hydrographic oice or otherrelevant government institution and

is designed to meet the requirementso marine navigation. An ENC meetsthe standards set by the InternationalHydrographic Organization (IHO) anduses a data ormat deined by IHO,known as S-57.

Although ENCs are available or mostrequently used routes and ports, itmay be some time beore ENCs coverall navigational areas, especially more

remote parts o the world. I ENCs arenot available or a certain area, ECDISmay be operated in Raster ChartDisplay System (RCDS) mode. TheRCDS mode uses Raster NavigationCharts (RNCs), which are digital copieso paper charts and are issued oicially.The use o RNCs requires the approvalo the lag state, and the vessel is alsorequired to carry an approved portfolio of charts (APC), for use together with RNCs.

Regular updates are available or ENCsand RNCs. This inormation is normallyavailable in digital ormat, but manual

updating is also possible. Manualupdates would normally be emergencyupdates which may be provided by wayo warnings using systems like Navtexor Marine Notices. Remote updatingmay also be a possibility. It is o extremeimportance that the perormance o the ECDIS is not compromised duringinstallation o updates.

I an ECDIS uses unoicial charts,it no longer complies with SOLASrequirements, and enjoys the samestatus as an ECS. ECDIS will provide acontinuous warning i the chart in use

has not been issued oicially.

LimitationsIn addition to alarms and alertsgenerated by ECDIS to indicatesystem malunctions, ECDIS providesautomatic route checking in theplanning stage and automatic alarmsand alerts to respond to set parametersduring the route planning andmonitoring stages. Irrespective o thechart on display, ECDIS will generatealerts with reerence to the largest scaleavailable o the relevant chart. However,as the ECDIS automatic alarm unctionis lost when it is operated in theRCDS mode, it is recommended thata corresponding paper chart is usedor ensuring that the best situational




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awareness is achieved, as the ECDISscreen size restricts the size o the chartdisplay.

ECDIS is an aid to navigation that isliable to malunction or power loss.As such, it is required that a vesselshould have an approved back-up or

ECDIS that meets IMO and lag staterequirements. The two most commonback-up systems are expected to beeither an approved portolio o papercharts or an additional ECDIS. I ECDISis used as a back-up, the back-upshould be connected to an electricalsource independent o the primaryECDIS and should have independentGPS input. Like the primary ECDIS, it isa requirement that the back-up systemcontains up to date inormation. Theback-up should be so arranged that incase o ECDIS ailure the transition tonavigation using it should be as smooth

as possible and should not in any waycompromise the saety o navigation.

Although ECDIS is a sophisticatedpiece o equipment, and may havethe acility to display and use datarom various other equipment,including overlay o inormation suchas radar targets and inormation, AISinormation, etc., its primary unction isto acilitate route planning and routemonitoring to ensure that a vessel getssaely to her destination. Even thoughthe additional inormation available maybe useul to navigation, it may clutter

the display or result in inormationoverload that may serve to distract thenavigator or lull the navigator into aalse sense o security. Non-chart datashould be used judiciously, and theoperator should be aware o how toactivate the unction that will instantlydisable all non-chart data.

As an example, ECDIS is not areplacement or radar, GPS or othernavigational systems. The radar shouldcontinue to be used or anti-collision.Cross-checks should regularly becarried out to veriy the integrity o

ECDIS, such as, but not restrictedto, veriication by visual reerencesand in poor visibility by radar. Mostimportantly, lookout by sight andhearing should be maintained asrequired by the “Collision AvoidanceRegulations”. I these simple importantrules are not ollowed, the navigatorcould quite easily lose situationalawareness and ail to notice anydeviations that may result in direconsequences. Over-reliance onelectronic systems is quite common.It is easy to be lulled into a sense o complacency, especially when there

has been no cause or concern overextended periods. Such complacencyleads to the navigator being out o theloop to the extent that he ails to notice

errors or discrepancies which wouldhave been noticed i watch-keepingguidelines and bridge managementprocedures were correctly adhered to.Such lapses have oten led to accidentsthat should have been avoided. Thehuman should be in control at all times.

TrainingECDIS is a very useul navigation tool,but does not replace the navigator.ECDIS is designed to make navigationsaer and to reduce the workload onnavigators by replacing paper chartswith an electronic system capable o useul automatic unctions. However,the eiciency and useulness o theequipment is deined by the operatingskill o the navigator, his understandingo the inormation displayed, hisappreciation and management o anyshortcomings o the equipment andhis ability to make optimum use o the

inormation in order to ensure saenavigation. This can only be achievedby proper training.

ISM and STCW make it incumbent onthe owner/operator o the vessel toensure that their navigating oicersare adequately trained to ensuresae operation o their ships. Thereare many sources o ECDIS training,such as maritime colleges, specialistlag state-approved training centres,courses run by the manuacturers o the equipment, etc. As unctionalityand operational controls o equipment

may vary considerably depending onthe make and model o the ECDIS,training should be not only generic butalso speciic to the equipment to beused, and o a structure that recognisesthe complexity o the equipment. It isquite normal or port state inspectorsto check that the ship’s personnel areadequately trained to perorm theirduties; navigating oicers using ECDISwill need to provide the inspector withsatisactory evidence o such training.Certiicate o successul completiono the ECDIS course should begovernment-approved.

The above amendments to SOLAShave been introduced on the backo results o studies carried out byvarious organisations. A DNV technicalreport4 indicated that the use o ECDISmay reduce grounding requency by11 per cent to 38 per cent. This wasbased on the actual current and near-uture ENC coverage at the time thereport was issued. One would hopethat with continuing improvementin ENC coverage a high reductionin groundings will be seen. Onewould also hope that with propertraining the human-machine interacewould operate at levels high enoughto achieve results ar better thanpredicted.

Read more about ECDISMore detailed inormation is availablerom the IMO, IHO and BIMCOwebsites and rom various bookspublished on the topic, such as ECDISand Positioning by Dr Andy Norris,published by the Nautical Institute.

Footnotes1 As set out in regulation V/19,Paragraph 2.10.2 In the EU, ECDIS compliance with thelatest IMO perormance standards isdenoted by a label on the equipmentcomprising a wheel. In addition, thelabel will denote the InternationalElectrotechnical Commission (IEC)standard to which the equipmentis approved. IEC is an independentapproval required by lag states; thestandard or ECDIS is IEC 61174.3 As deined by SOLAS V Regulation2.2.

4 Report No: 2007-0304, rev. 01.




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Dangerous anchoring inthe Singapore area

The Maritime and Port Authoritieso Singapore (MPA) recently called ameeting with representatives o the P&IClubs to discuss particular problems o dangerous anchoring in the Singaporearea.

Vessels not anchoring within Singaporeport limits are, or commercial reasons,opting to anchor in outer port limitareas (OPL). The East and West OPLareas used or anchoring are, however,rather narrow spaces situated betweenthe port limits and the traic separationscheme (TSS) through the SingaporeStrait. These areas are becoming verycongested, being popular with ownersor the purposes o bunkering, takingsupplies, change o crew, repairs or justwaiting or cargo operations. Due tothe congestion, some anchored vesselsare straying into the TSS, and are thusviolating the International Regulationsor the Prevention o Collisions at Sea

(COLREG). The MPA states that vesselsin breach o COLREG Rule 10 (g) byanchoring in the TSS are being reportedto their respective lag administrations.It appears rom the vessels having beenreported, that Singapore authoritiesalso seem to report vessels anchored inPrecautionary Areas or being in breacho COLREG.

When it comes to bunkering atSingapore, and the tendency to bunkerin OPL areas, it should be noted thatthe risks actors concerning bothbunker quality and quantity have been

considered higher in OPL areas thanrom suppliers operating within themuch more regulated port limits. Thereare also two bunker anchorages in thewestern sector o the Singapore Port,located conveniently close to the TSS,where vessels o 20,000 GT and above,staying less than 24 hours, may takebunkers at reduced port dues. Vesselsother than gas tankers and chemicaltankers, with a drat o 11.5 metersor less, may also be exempted romcompulsory pilotage at these bunkeringstations.

The MPA has also pointed to severalinstances o damage to subsea cablesby incorrect anchoring and has alertedthe P&I Clubs to this problem. When avessel is anchoring too close to charted

cables and pipelines, the owners o the cables/pipelines are inormed o the vessel’s particulars, to enable themto make a claim against the vessel,should any damage occur. OPL is a“loose” term, but the Eastern OPLis considered bound to the north byJohore Port limits and to the south bythe westbound TSS. It should be notedthat this 5 mile long area is very narrowand there are several submarine cablesrunning the length o it.

We have also been advised that theMPA is in discussion with Malaysianand Indonesian port authorities, inorder to reach an agreement or vesselsanchoring in the TSS, or damagingsubsea cables and pipelines, tobe penalised by the State having

jurisdiction over the area.

The problem o congestion o vesselso Singapore is not easy to solve,but there is always the possibility o seeking designated anchorages insideSingapore port limits. Vessels should

not anchor in the TSS or PrecautionaryAreas, and care should be taken notto anchor too close to subsea cablesand pipelines. Claims or damagecaused by anchoring in way o cables


and pipelines, or by dragging anchorsacross such equipment are very costlyto the Club.

There have been a number o contactdamages between ships at anchorin OPL areas during recent months,mostly in the East area. For anchoringin congested areas, ull alertness isrequired and anchoring at night shouldbe avoided i possible. In locations suchas the congested Singapore OPLs, windand tidal currents must be considered;

an anchor watch should be kept at alltimes and the engine at the ready. Forthe time being, when anchoring o Singapore, the key message is extremecaution.

For urther inormation on anchoring ingeneral please see the ollowing GardpublicationsGard News 193 What i... ?’ - Planningor the unexpected beore anemergency developsGard News 177 Anchoring - Gettinginto a sae haven or into a potentialdisaster?

Gard Loss Prevention Circular No.14-08: Anchoring and deterioratingweather conditionsGard Guidance to Masters, section2.14.3 Anchoring.




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“What i...?” – Planning orthe unexpected beore

an emergency developsWe plan very well or situations whichwe know will cause us problems. Thesituations which we tend not to planor very well, and which thereorecatch us by surprise, are those wherethe potential or harm has not beenoreseen or is considered too remote.

Things could have been dierent orover 1,500 people who lost their lives inthat incident i the master and oicers

o the TITANIC had asked themselves(amongst other things): “what i the icehas progressed urther south so as toaect our intended course?”.

In today’s busy world, especially onships, there is little time to stop andthink about potential problems, to ask“what i…?”. There are response plansand checklists available or emergencysituations which have the clear potentialto cause the crew and ship harm – orexample, steering gear ailure and ire.However, many serious incidents startlie when there is no emergency as

such, and develop into emergenciesbecause the potential or harm has notbeen oreseen or has been consideredtoo remote. Instead o asking ourselves“what i…?” we tend to persuadeourselves that something bad will nothappen. In the wider context, asking“what i…?” is very much a part o situational awareness. The developmento bridge resource management hasdone much to address deicienciesin situational awareness, by stressingthe importance o a team approach.However, i the members o a team aretoo preoccupied with tasks at hand, or

other human actors (such as atigue)are at play, there will be a much greaterchance o potential emergencies (or“what is…?”) not being considered atall.

What i…? – The weatherThere is a lot o current debate aboutclimate change and storms which aremore severe or sudden than orecast.Claims experience, however, suggeststhat in many cases the crew simplyunderestimates the eects o weatheron the ship. A case mentioned in arecent UK investigation report serves asa useul example. A tanker was in ballast(riding high) and dragged its anchoracross a gas pipeline in bad weather.The report concluded that the master

chose to remain at the anchoragedespite it not being a recommendedanchorage in the circumstances anddespite deteriorating (but orecast)weather conditions, which increased thepotential risk o windlass ailure. Suchailure did indeed occur due to shockloading and the crew were unable toslip the anchor due to tension on thebitter end. Had the master consideredthe potential problems (i.e., the “what

is…?”), he would probably have letthe anchorage and rode out the storm.Another recent case was the subjecto an investigation by the Australianauthorities, who ound that the masterdid not appropriately ballast thevessel and did not weigh anchor untilit dragged in very bad (but orecast)weather. The investigation report wenton to ind the master had incorrectlyassumed that the port authority wouldinstruct ships to put out to sea whenconditions were bad – he probably didnot ask himsel “what i they do not,and what i my anchor does not hold?”.

The obvious common actor in thesetwo incidents is that both vessels wereat anchor. In contrast to cases wherevessels have been caught out by badweather when alongside a berth andwhen the ship’s crew will oten be verybusy, these two cases suggest thatpotentially dangerous scenarios aresimply being overlooked, even duringthe more relaxed (perhaps too relaxed)periods when at anchor.

What i…? – Pilot errorPilot error is probably not the irst

thought to come to mind when apilot walks onto the bridge. Perhaps itshould be – they are not expected tomake mistakes, but they do. A recentive-year study o claims in excesso USD 100,000 recorded by each o the Clubs in the International Groupo P&I Clubs revealed that some 262claims were caused by pilot error,with an average cost per incident o USD 850,000.1 Several cases romGard’s claim iles have been previouslyeatured in Gard News.2 In a recentcase, the shipowners’ dock damageliability resulted in a payout o severalmillion dollars. The case involved theberthing o a partly laden VLCC. Thevessel had three tugs, the tide wasslack and the wind light. However, one

1 See article “Pilot error survey” in Gard News

issue No.186.2 See article “Pilot on the bridge – Role,authority and responsibility” in Gard News issueNo.160.3 “Rubicon – The point o no return”.


o the two pilots was in his inal phaseo training or the ship type/berth andhe had the control o the vessel. It wasnight and the shore Doppler readoutwas not working. The approach speeds,angles and bow/stern distances werethereore communicated to the pilotby VHF (one can imagine the diiculty).The vessel was not brought undercontrol beore she made her inalapproach to berth and investigation

suggests that she exceeded themaximum angle (three degrees) andspeed (21 t/minute) o approach,making contact at about six degreesand a speed o 60 eet/minute (whichinterestingly increases the berthingorce by a actor o nine). Insurers otendo not get to hear about cases wherethe master intervened and stopped thepilot, aborted the approach and startedagain. O course, it is a diicult situationor masters, but there is a need to bedecisive, especially since it is he and theowners who are most likely to bear thebrunt o the consequences o a pilot

error. It should be kept in mind that themaster is in command o the vessel’snavigation at all times with only oneexception: when transiting through thePanama Canal.

A United States Coast Guardinvestigation report into the groundingo a bulk carrier serves as a goodexample o the need to be strong whena pilot has the control o the vessel. Thereport concluded that the pilot, whoailed to give a helm order at a turn ina channel, asserted his responsibilityon the bridge by reusing to honour

the master’s request to sign the pilotexchange card. The report went onto say that the pilot’s authoritativepresence on the bridge created anatmosphere wherein the mate didnot eel he could “speak up” or“challenge” the decision o the pilot.

What i …? – Risk o collisionAsking “what i…?” where there is arisk o collision should be natural orthe bridge watch-keeper. Unortunately,




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the growing number o navigationalaccidents suggests that this is notthe case. In a recent incident it wasortunate that both crews escapedunharmed and that there was minimalpollution. However, one o the vesselswas badly damaged and oundered,requiring an expensive salvage

operation o ship and cargo. Theincident is described in Image 1, below.

In Image 1 the two vessels are seenapproaching each other in a routingscheme. Vessel A is heading south andvessel B is heading north-east. Both areroughly ollowing the route as depictedby purple wavy lines, which meet south-east o a buoy marking the westerlyedge o the route. The intention o vessel A was to alter to starboard atthe buoy to ollow route X as opposedto route Y. Unortunately, vessel B wasnot sure which route vessel A intended

to ollow. As the vessels closed, vesselA altered course to starboard asintended and very shortly ater thatvessel B altered course to port. Theincident resulted in insurance claimstotalling in excess o USD 20 million andperhaps it could have been avoidedhad the bridge team on vessel B askedthemselves “what i vessel A intends toalter to starboard to route X rather thancarrying straight on to ollow route Y?”and the bridge team on vessel A askedthemselves “what i my intentions (interms o which route I intend to take)are unclear?”. The investigation into the

incident concluded that neither vesselmade timely contact with the other toarrange or a sae passage.

The above collision was one in whichboth vessels had plenty o time to react,but that may not always be the case.In another collision case investigatedby the Danish authorities, the vesselswere passing on reciprocal courses in aone mile wide deep water route. Oneo the vessels suered a steering ailureat the moment o passing and even thedouble hull o the other vessel, a tanker,could not prevent a large spill o uel

oil rom one o her cargo tanks. Whatcould the tanker have possibly done?The investigation report concluded thata contributing actor was the decisiono both vessels to use the route, whenthere was a note on chart saying thatthe route should only be used by shipswhich, because o their drat, are unableto saely navigate outside. By using theroute, the closest point o approach(CPA) between the vessels wasconsiderably less than i they had usedthe recommended direction o traiclow and the available time or evasiveaction considerably reduced.

What i …? – Repairs at seaI recent media reports are to bebelieved, many incidents today

involve damage to engines, otenon board new ships, indicating thatmachinery systems are not becoming

more reliable. Any vessel with anengine problem, especially a new andexpensive one close to the shore,generates a certain level o concern.Even vessels that at irst ind themselvesar o land in no immediate dangercan end up perilously close whenrepairs do not progress as expected.In some cases repairs carried out bycrew are unsuccessul and externalassistance is called in to save the day.In others assistance is not called oror does not arrive in time and vesselsind themselves in trouble. A classicexample o the latter was eatured in

an article in Gard News issue No. 1813 in a case where the chie engineer’soptimism as to when repairs wouldbe successully completed was sharedby the master or too long. When themaster inally sought external assistancethere were no vessels or tugs availablein the area that could possibly reach thevessel in time. The vessel grounded andbecame a total loss, luckily without losso lie.

A multitude o “what i …?” questionsarise and ought to be consideredin such cases, quite apart rom the

obvious one as to when externalassistance can reach the ship. Forexample, what i the engine ault hasbeen wrongly diagnosed, what i thewrong spare part is on board, whati someone gets injured during therepair?

A very tragic case o another vesselgrounding ater unsuccessul repairswas the subject o an investigation bythe US authorities. The vessel ounditsel in extremely bad weather in a veryremote part o the world and severalcrew members died during evacuationrom the vessel. Soon ater the engineailure the ship’s superintendent wascalled by the master and told that thevessel was in no immediate danger or

close to land (she was 46 nautical milesrom the closest point o land – anisland). The superintendent agreed

with the proposed action to repair theengine, but it soon became apparentthat external assistance would benecessary. The irst tug arrived some30 hours ater the engine had ailed,by which time engine repairs had beenstopped due to the danger posedto the crew by the extremely roughweather. A second tug arrived tenhours later, but never connected aline, and ater a urther three hours theirst tug’s line had parted. The weatherprevented other attempts to connecttow lines and, despite the use o thevessel’s anchor as she approached

shallower water, she eventuallygrounded some 53 hours ater theengine had initially ailed.

It is perhaps questionable whether,in this case, a state o emergencyexisted at the time the engine ailed,particularly given the remote locationand bad weather. Either way, asking“what i …?” at that moment mighthave bought some extra time.

Planning or the unexpected – ProblemsHow do you plan or something you donot oresee happening? Oten there isno checklist or response plan speciic toeach exact situation and it is impracticalto produce checklists and plans orevery eventuality, every “what i …?”.Indeed, checklists can be dangerousbecause they may omit to reer tocrucial considerations speciic to thecircumstances. Perhaps at the end o every checklist the question “have youconsidered other eventualities?” shouldbe added.

Another problem is that sometimesthere may be very little time to takeaction, and that is particularly relevantto pilot error. However, before thepilot embarks, the plan can simplybe to identify the critical aspects of




22

the pilotage where the bridge teamwill have to be particularly alert. Theplan can also involve reminding thewhole bridge team that pilots canmake mistakes and that it is thereforeimportant for the team to be mentallyalert and prepared to speak up if thereis any concern over the pilot’s orders.

Perhaps a final consideration to apre-pilotage plan would be whetheror not to proceed with the pilotage. If,for example, the weather conditionsbecome marginal or the master is notfully satisfied with the pilot’s plan (oreven his competence) he may deem itprudent to hold back and to re-assessthe situation.

Many situations, such as thosementioned in the above cases, occuron ships every day and although eachsituation will be dierent, time will otenpermit a plan to be developed to deal

with a situation rom the moment itbecomes real.

Planning or the unexpected – BarriersIt is important to recognise potentialbarriers to planning or the unexpectedand, perhaps more importantly, tocarrying out plans. Amongst many thatcould be mentioned, the ollowingexamples are given:– Language and cultural dierences –These can generate reluctance withinthe bridge team to speak up i thereis concern in a particular situation.

The pilotage case involving the bulkergrounding mentioned above is a goodexample.– Shore sta support – Even i onlyperceived, a suspicion may exist onthe vessel that the shore sta will notsupport a decision taken on the vessel,or example not to proceed with apilotage.– Customer satisaction – The need toavoid upsetting a charterer by taking alonger route.– The need or speed – To quote arecent UK investigation report ona major casualty, “speed and quick

turnarounds appear to have becomethe ocus o the industry at the expenseo the sae operation o its vessels.”– The desire to save money – For avessel without her engines ar o landone can appreciate the temptationto attempt repairs beore callingin potentially expensive externalassistance.

Planning or the unexpected– SolutionsPerhaps the most important solution ismental preparation. I crew membershave their minds preoccupied withother things, or have persuadedthemselves that something bad will nothappen, then chances are that they will

not consider “what i…?” scenarios andwill not react properly in a developingsituation. Training, exercises and drillsare good opportunities to test crewreaction to scenarios that have thepotential to develop into an emergency.It is also possible to encourage peopleto think in terms o “what i …?”. One

way to do that is to give positive praiseor challenging attitudes and prudentover-reaction. So i a junior oicerchallenges a senior oicer on his choiceo course he should be praised, eveni the junior oicer’s concern turns outto be unounded. The junior oicershould not be chastised. I the master’sdecision to take an extra tug is notwholly unreasonable, his action can besupported.

At the moment a situation doesarise, which calls or a plan, it will beimportant to bring together minds

to discuss “what i…?” scenarios. Inmany o the cases mentioned above,the deck oicers could have had aquick brainstorming session beorethey ound themselves in a developingsituation which required them to reactwithout a plan. In cases involvingengine ailure, the session wouldobviously involve the engineers and thevalue o shore sta involvement shouldnot be underestimated, since theyare likely to be less distracted by thesituation itsel. An agenda or a “whati…?” brainstorming session mightinclude the ollowing:

– situation description– what are the main dangers/risks to thecrew/vessel?– what could change that wouldincrease/ alter the danger/risk?– what are the worse case scenarios?– what is the plan?– what is the back-up plan?– what i …?

In a collision situation, a brainstormingsession is less likely to be practical, butthe oicer o the watch should not bearaid to discuss potential problemswith the lookout, e.g., “do you think

that vessel clearly understands ourintentions?”.

The investigation o near misses isworth a mention. These can be vital interms o detecting whether any barriersexist and may provide an opportunityto do something about them beorea near miss becomes an emergencywhich is out o control.

ConclusionAsking “what i …?” in a developingsituation on board a ship and planningaccordingly may make the dierenceas to whether or not that situationdevelops into an emergency. At thevery least, it may buy the crew and

ship vital extra time. Even i your ownship has what is considered to be thebest crew, the much debated skills’shortage and ever-expanding worldleet raises questions about watch-keepers on other vessels, pilots andwhether they will behave as expected.As or the weather, it can always do

the unexpected and perhaps climatechange will make orecasting even lessreliable.

Two small words, “what i …?”, areworth keeping in mind.




23

Pilot error survey

loating objects was USD 400,000. Thereport recommends better training orbrieing o bridge team managementto operate with the pilot on board,especially in relation to passageplanning.

Collisions involving pilot erroraccounted or 24 per cent o claims bynumber and 24 per cent by cost. Onaverage there were 14 collision cases

per year involving pilot error and theaverage cost o each case was USD800,000. The report recommendsbridge teams to keep a proper look-outand not to orget that their eyes are stillthe most sophisticated aid to do so.

Groundings, pollution and generalaverage/salvage cases involving piloterror each accounted or about threeper cent o the incidents by number.There were on average two incidentsin each o these categories every year.Groundings accounted or 35 per cento all incidents by cost. The average

cost o each grounding involving piloterror was USD 7.85 million and o

International Group o P&I Clubsreports on pilot error-relatedclaimsThe Pilotage Sub-committee o theInternational Group o P&I Clubs (IG)has published a report on claims overUSD 100,000 involving pilot error.Inormation pooled by IG Clubs relatingto 260 such claims has been included inthe study, which covers the period rom20th February 1999 to 20th February

2004.

Important observationsThe average number o incidents peryear involving pilot error was 52. Therequency did not increase rom yearto year. The average cost o each claimover the ive year period was USD850,000. The average cost did notincrease rom year to year either.

Claims or damage to ixed and loatingobjects (FFO) involving pilot erroraccounted or 65 per cent o claims bynumber (37 claims per policy year) and

33 per cent by cost. The average costo each claim or damage to ixed and

What happens to thepilot ater a casualty?A glimpse at pilot error rom a dierentperspective.

When a vessel with a pilot on boardis involved in an accident, the usualpractice is that the pilot leaves thevessel as soon as possible, otenbeing replaced by a new pilot. Hence,examination or questioning is avoided.The pilot is “the shipowner’s servant”,and aults or errors made by thepilot are generally covered by theshipowner’s insurance policies. Only inmajor casualties can one expect thatthe pilot will be orced to give evidence

and to be cross-examined. In thesecases, the normal procedure is or thepilot to demand a written letter o indemnity rom the shipowner prior toany hearing.

One should thereore believe thatpilots involved in casualties do notget any reproach as a consequence o their aults. However, some (or perhapsmost) pilots’ associations have theirown internal investigations ollowing acasualty, although very seldom is onemade aware o sanctions imposed.In a particular recent collision case,Gard received a copy o the relevantpilots’ association’s investigation,which proved that some pilots in actare properly sanctioned. In the casein question, the pilots’ association’sinvestigation concluded that the pilot

was responsible or:– wrong understanding o the distancebetween his vessel and the mooredvessel with which it eventually collided;– his approach was too ast;

– the timing o turning was wrong;– other waiting vessels made him over-hasty in his operations.

Due to the above, the pilot wassuspended rom business or 21 days.He was degraded to a lower rank orthree months, including a salary cuto USD 1,000 per month or the sameperiod. In addition, he was orced totake navigational simulator training athis own expense.

Notwithstanding, the damage to thevessels had to be covered by the

shipowner’s insurers.

each pollution incident involving piloterror the average cost was USD 1.8million. The report recommends bettertraining or brieing o the bridge teammanagement to operate with the piloton board, with emphasis on the master/pilot exchange o inormation.

Groundings are the most expensivepilot error claims. They are more thanour times as expensive as pollution

claims and almost 20 times moreexpensive than FFO claims.

The IG is currently maintaining adatabase o pilot error incidents rom21st February 2004 to the present andthereater.

The complete report can bedownloaded rom the IG website atwww.igpandi.org under “News andInormation”.

Gard News 186,May/July 2007





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Global wave watchsystem

The winter season in the northernhemisphere has again claimed victims

at sea as severe weather conditionscontinue to be a challenge or ships andtheir crews. The majority o the largecasualties occurred when the ship wasaected by stormy weather. It appearsinormation about and preparations orsevere weather conditions may not beat the required level.

Wave Watch IIIOne important piece o inormationis an accurate and understandableweather orecast. Shipsalready receive inormation about theexpected winds and temperatures but

not all have access to wave inormation.

Wave Watch 3 is a service providedby the US Navy through the Fleet

Numerical Meteorology andOceanography Center. The service is

open to the general public and ree o charge and may be subject to periodso non-availability.

Wave Watch 3 (WW3) is a web servicewhich provides global wave orecasts.It presents the orecasts or dierentoceans in a sel explanatory andinormative way. Not all ocean areas arecovered and the service sets out themain wave patterns produced by thedierent pressure systems. The modelshows signiicant waves, swell, windwaves and whitecap probability. Theheights and directions are indicated

by two dierent color schemes.WW3 is presenting the orecast wavedevelopment in 12 hour intervals up toa maximum o 6 days ahead.

The orecasts are presented as lowerresolution pictures which can easily be

copied and orwarded by e-mail orvessels with limited internet connectionon board.

The web page can be ound at https://www.nmoc.navy.mil and the WW3 isound at the bottom let o the pageunder the menu item Oceanographyor https://www.nmoc.navy.mil/PUBLIC/WW3/index.html.





25

Typhoon seasonprecautions – Hong Kong

areaIntroductionSevere weather continues to be achallenge or vessels and their crews.Owners, agents and charterers shouldremind their ship masters o the needto take precautionary measures duringthe approach o tropical cyclones.This circular provides inormationon speciied mooring regulationsin operation in Hong Kong duringtyphoons, however, due considerations

or proper moorings should be madeduring typhoon conditions in anylocation. Similar requirements may alsoapply in ports other than Hong Kongand owners may be well advised tocheck or any additional requirements i their vessels call at such ports.

SpecicationsMasters, owners, agents and otherindividuals in control o vessels arereminded o their obligation underSections 61 and 62 o the Shipping andPort Control Ordinance, Cap. 313 o the Laws o Hong Kong SAR, to comply

with any direction o the Director o Marine concerning the sae operationo vessels at the port, or in relation toany matter as to which the Directormay give directions under the aboveOrdinance. All government Class “A”

and “B” moorings are available or useduring typhoons with the exception o:— “A” mooring – A17, A29, A35,

A39, A43, A46; and— “B” mooring: B1, B2, B3, B4.

The status o any government Class“A” and “B” moorings is subject tochange without prior notice. Up-to-date inormation can be obtained romthe Vessel Traic Centre, at telephone

+852 233 7808, telex 63607 MDVTS, oracsimile +852 858 6646.

Recommendations— The master o a ship moored at a

government mooring may, at hisdiscretion, drop a bower anchorunder oot to lessen the tendencyto sheer. This should not impairthe eiciency o the mooring,although an anchor should notbe used during normal weatherconditions.

— Masters are reminded that everyvessel within the waters o Hong

Kong must maintain a continuouslistening watch on the VHF radiochannel appropriate to the VHFsector in which the vessel islocated, or another VHF channelas may be speciied by the Vessel

Traic Centre (call sign “Mardep”)unless the vessel is released romthis obligation by the Centre. TheCentre will broadcast tropicalcyclone inormation rom time totime when the tropical cyclonewarning signals have beenhoisted. Masters should listen tolocal radio broadcasts or advisoryweather inormation bulletins.

— ome vessels have been ound

to not have adequate manningonboard during periods whentropical cyclone warning signalsare hoisted. The attention o masters, owners, agents andcharterers o vessels is thereoredrawn to Regulation 26(1) o the Shipping and Port ControlRegulations, which states that:“A ship shall, while within thewaters of Hong Kong, haveonboard at all times such number of crew as is, in the opinion of theDirector, qualified and capable of carrying out all duties which may

reasonably be required to ensurethe safety of the ship havingregard to the circumstancespertaining thereto.”





26

Double typhoon trouble

The incident described below occurredwhen a vessel sailed right through thecentre o a typhoon in Japan.

The incidentThe incident involved a two-year-oldcar-carrier with space or about 6,000cars.

One aternoon, while loading at Yokohama or carriage to the West

Indies and US, the vessel was requestedby the port authorities to leave the portdue to the approach o typhoon HIGOS.The vessel let Yokohama promptly. Theintention was to circumvent the Izu-Oshima Island or Suruga Wan and drituntil the typhoon had passed Tokyo Bay.Unortunately, the typhoon ollowed adierent course rom that expected bythe master. This caused the vessel tocome more or less in the dead centreo HIGOS, leading to loss o speed andengine orce due to the heavy wavesshe encountered. Additionally, the tallship-sides acted more or less as a sail

in the ierce winds. Finally, in the earlyevening the vessel grounded on a rockyseabed in shallow waters approximately50-60 metres rom the shoreline nearHabu Port on the south eastern tip o Izu-Oshima Island, ater irst havingbeen orced onto a bank where herrudder and propeller were lost.

All members o the crew wererescued by the Japanese Coast Guardduring the early hours o the nextmorning. There were no personalinjuries. Following medical checksand interrogation by the Japanese

authorities the crew members wererepatriated to the Philippines.

Ater the grounding the vesseldeveloped a list o 16-18° to port.

Various inspections revealed severestructural damage to her doublebottom. Parts o the bottom had beenlited by as much as nine metres. Theengine room was looded and most o the double bottom uel tanks appearedto be empty. Signiicant quantities o oilhad penetrated the car decks above.Further structural damage to the hulloccurred over the next ew days as aresult o heavy weather.

SalvageThe shipowners immediately enteredinto a Lloyd’s Open Form 2000 salvage

contract with Nippon Salvage Co.Scopic was invoked by the salvors romthe beginning. It soon became clearthat the vessel could not be salved.The owners claimed a constructive totalloss, which was accepted by the hullunderwriters and Scopic remunerationwas paid.

LimitationFollowing meetings with Japaneselawyers, it was made clear that theshipowners would not be entitledto limit liability in respect o Scopicremuneration paid to the salvor, or

liabilities, costs and expenses incurredin respect o wreck removal or pollutionclean-up and prevention. The ownerswere entitled to limit liability in respecto cargo claims and other pollutiondamage, including claims rom isheriesor, inter alia, loss o revenue.

According to the 1976 LimitationConvention1 as incorporated intoJapanese law, the owners’ limit o liability or property claims based onthe vessel’s tonnage was about USD11.5 million. Two months ater theincident the shipowners establisheda limitation und in the Tokyo DistrictCourt, which was secured by depositingwith the court a letter o undertakingissued by Gard.

PollutionAt the time o the incident the vesselhad about 1,300 tons o heavy uel oil

in her bunker tanks, as well as somemarine diesel and lubricating oils.The Japanese authorities ordered theshipowners to eliminate the risk o pollution, ailing which the authoritieswould take appropriate measures andpursue a recovery claim or all theircosts rom the owners. A contract oruel removal rom the tanks and cardecks was entered into with NipponSalvage Co.

The estimated quantity o uelremaining on board ater the groundingwas approximately 300 tons, which

means that some 1,000 tons o oilescaped rom the vessel during theirst couple o days ater the casualty.Fortunately, despite this signiicantescape o oil, there were only limitedtraces o oil on the beaches andshorelines in the vicinity o the wreck.The very heavy weather apparentlycaused the oil to be washed outinto the open sea, and to smotherand emulsiy in the water. Pollutionprevention measures were also takenby the Japanese authorities, and localishermen were employed to assist inthis regard.

Gard News 187,August/October 2007




27

FisheriesIzu-Oshima Island is a national park area.The grounding took place in the middleo a special ishing area or abalones andvarious shells. Claims totalling USD 14.5million were presented by local isheryunions. An expert rom Tokai University,Tokyo was appointed by the shipowners

to carry out local damage assessment.ITOPF and London experts were alsoretained or this purpose. The largestclaim related to restoration works to theseabed, which had been damaged bythe impact o the vessel. This part o theclaim was deemed by the experts to beunounded and was later withdrawn.The ishery unions’ claims were settledamicably or a reasonable sum.

CargoAt the time o the casualty, the vesselwas loaded with 3,876 new and second-hand cars, as well as some high and

heavy construction vehicles and spareparts. A helicopter was also part o thecargo. The estimated total sound valueo the lot on board was about USD42 million. All cargo had been loadedin Korea and Japan. Due to a ire onboard (described below), the cargo wasdamaged to the point o being deemedto have no residual value beyond scrapsteel. The disposal o the damagedcargo was part o the wreck removaloperation.

All claims or loss o cargo werehandled by the Tokyo District Court

under the limitation proceedings. Dueto diiculty in getting hold o somecargo interests, the cargo claims/limitation proceedings were protractedbut were inally completed ater ourand a hal years.

At the time of the incident the vessel had about 1,300 tons of heavy fuel oil in herbunker tanks.

Wreck removalThe Japanese authorities also orderedthe shipowners to remove the wreck,ailing which appropriate measureswould be taken and a recovery claimor costs would be pursued againstthe owners. Invitations or tendersor removing the wreck were then

submitted. However, shortly beoreexpiry o the deadline or bids, anothertyphoon passed through the area,which caused the vessel to break up. Asevere ire broke out on board, whichwas probably caused by twisting o thewreck in the mid section area, causingcar lashings to break and cars to smashinto each other with consequentrelease o petrol. The combination o petrol vapours and riction-generatedsparks probably caused ignition. Theire caused the wreck and cargo to betotally burnt out. Subsequently, the hullurther disintegrated to the extent that

substantial wreck parts and cargo werespread on the seabed.

Ater a new round o tenders andnegotiations, the owners entered intoa wreck removal contract with KaselSalvage (Hong Kong) Limited. Thecontract was on the Bimco Wreckstage1999 Form amended by various riderclauses, and subject to a lump sumprice plus possible additional paymentsor delays capped at 50 days. Due tothe weather situation in the area it wasimportant or the owners to limit thecost o this operation. Payments were to

be made in seven stages in accordancewith completion o deined services asconirmed by the shipowners’ specialrepresentative.

The intention was to have the wreckremoved within approximately 24months. Unortunately nature didnot co-operate and the operationlasted 36 months instead. In orderto maintain good relations with theinhabitants o the island, includingthe ishermen, the shipowners chose

to have a P&I correspondent on thespot all this time. This prevented a loto misunderstanding and agony dueto the prolonged operation and was acost-eective measure.

Total exposureThe shipowners’ total liability in thismatter was just over USD 40 million.

Footnote1 Convention on Limitation o Liabilityor Maritime Claims (LLMC), 1976.




28

Don’t fall asleep on the job -No let-up in fatigue-related

casualties

Fatigue at sea is a problem which needsurgent attention.

A serious problemThere continues to be a sharp and detailedfocus on seafarer fatigue. The Centre forOccupational and Health Psychology atCardiff University in Wales has recently(November 2006) published an 87-pagereport into seafarer fatigue.1 The NauticalInstitute is concentrating several of itsforthcoming “Alert!” bulletins on thisissue. Other industry and industry-relatedorganisations, notably the InternationalTransport Workers’ Federation, havecarried out studies into this problem.Five years ago an article in Gard News2 reported on fatigue-related casualties andpointed out that all sides of the industrywere expressing concern about fatigue inseafarers, especially officers. The articlesaid that “there are signs that the fatigueproblem is getting worse, not better.”What – if anything – has changed sincethen and how?

Regrettably, the answer seems to be“very little”. If anything, increased andincreasing commercial pressure within the

shipping industry means that companiesand individuals in these companies arecontinually required to provide the bestpossible service, in the shortest timeavailable and at the lowest cost possible.

This is not to say that any or all of theseobjectives are, by definition, wrong ordangerous. It is, however, undeniablethat cutting costs is often the easiest toachieve of these three objectives and itis sometimes the case that the greatestand possibly disproportionate emphasis isplaced on the cost factor.

As mentioned in the 2002 article, it isnatural for shipowners, operating in avery competitive environment, to wish tokeep their operating costs to a minimum.Thus many owners will crew their shipswith no more than the minimum numberof people required by the Standards of Training, Certification and WatchkeepingConvention (STCW). This is perfectlylegal and they are quite entitled to doso. Understandably, very few owners will,voluntarily, place themselves at what theywould see as a commercial disadvantageby employing more crew than they arelegally obligated to do.

Unfortunately, evidence collected inrecent years by many organisations insideand outside the industry in relation tofatigue-related casualties suggests that the

1 Copies can be obtained rom Gard. Alternatively, urther inormation may be obtained bye-mailing the author at [email protected] “Are we tired o hearing about atigue-related casualties?” in Gard News issue No. 166.


problem remains a serious one. Despite allthe attention and publicity the problem isnot going away. Indeed, with the growthin world trade and consequent expectedincrease in the number, size and value of ships, it is a major concern that not only arefatigue-related casualties going to be withus for the foreseeable future, but also thatthey are likely to increase.

Bridge Watchkeeping Safety StudyIn July 2004 the UK’s Marine AccidentInvestigation Branch (MAIB), publisheda report entitled “Bridge WatchkeepingSafety Study”. The report may be foundat www.maib.gov.uk/publications/safety_studies.cfm. Gard strongly recommendsevery shipowner and operator to read thisreport, especially those operating in theshort sea and container trades. Based onits own investigations into many casualtiesaround the UK coastline, the MAIB takesthe view that, in certain trades at least, theminimum manning levels and requiredhours of rest provided for in STCW areinsufficient to prevent fatigue-relatedcasualties continuing to occur. Particularreference is made to the system of a six-hours-on/six-hours-off watch practised on




29

many short sea vessels, where the masterand chief officer – the only two deckofficers on board – each stand two watchesin one 24-hour period. These watches arein addition to all the other tasks whichthese officers have to perform. The MAIBcomments that “as ships operating with just two bridge watchkeepers including

the master, working in opposite watches,are likely to have fatigued OOWs, and themasters of these vessels are frequentlyunable to discharge all of the dutiesrequired of them, the need for more thantwo watchkeepers is obvious”. This viewis shared by the Nautical Institute, which,in Bulletin 13 of its “Alert!” magazine,says that “in these cases, the solution issimple: increase the manning to removethe master from the watchkeeping rosterand consider an alternative watchkeepingpattern”. The MAIB believes that theirresearch “illustrates that the hours of workand lookout requirements contained in

STCW 95, along with the principles of safemanning, are having insufficient impact intheir respective areas”.

The report contains recommendationsto the Maritime and Coastguard Agency(MCA), the agency responsible forimplementing the UK government’smaritime safety policy throughout theUK, to take the findings of the report tothe International Maritime Organisation(IMO) with a view to reviewing theguidelines on safe manning for vesselsoperating a “master and mate” systemand the requirements of STCW relating

to a designated (and dedicated) lookout,working as an integral part of the bridgeteam.

Gard has seen many cases which mirror theproblems identified by the MAIB. A coupleof examples will suffice.

Example 1This is the “classic” case of a sole officerof the watch (OOW) falling asleep whileon watch. The vessel, a small short-seageneral cargo trader, entered with Gard forP&I risks, was on a voyage from Iceland tothe UK. While passing between the north

of Scotland and the Orkney Islands duringthe early hours of the morning, a time atwhich the human body is perhaps mostvulnerable to falling asleep, the OOW didexactly that. As a result, the vessel failedto change course and went aground onan island. The vessel sustained substantialdamage to her bottom. A salvage contract,on LOF terms, with SCOPIC incorporated,was signed with a salvage company. Theamount of the salvage award remains to beestablished or agreed, as does any cargoclaim.

The vessel operated with seven crew (one

more than stipulated in her Safe ManningCertificate). The master and chief officeroperated a “watch-on/watch-off” system.Many of the other crew members had

dual roles. The chief officer was on watchwhen he fell asleep. He was alone on thebridge, despite the provision within STCWthat “the OOW may be the sole lookout indaylight conditions” (our emphasis). Thechief officer woke up only when the vesselwent aground.

Investigations indicated that the chief officer had become fatigued shortly beforethe incident during periods of intense workand had been unable to obtain enoughproper rest before the voyage. When hefell asleep, there was nobody on the bridgeto wake him up. The vessel was not fittedwith a “dead man’s alarm”. Nor was sherequired to be.

For the reasons stated above, it is notknown what the final cost of this incidentwill be. However, the master has beenprosecuted by the UK authorities (theMCA) for breach of one section of the

Merchant Shipping Act 1995 and, havingpleaded guilty, he has had to pay a fineand now has a criminal record in the UK.The MCA has indicated that it also intendsto bring criminal charges against theshipowners.

It is too early to say what the total financialcost will be. It is, however, likely to besignificant. This ignores the human cost tothe master and chief officer.

Example 2A small (approximately 6,000 GT) containerfeeder vessel ran aground on an island in

the Aegean Sea. This vessel had cover forloss of hire with Gard, but her P&I coverwas with another Club. As in the previousexample, the chief officer was the OOWand was alone on the bridge at the materialtime. Due to fatigue, he fell asleep, thevessel failed to change course as plannedand grounded at full speed. The vesselsustained serious bottom damage. Oil fromher bunker tanks was spilt. An LOF salvageagreement was signed with salvors. Thevessel was re-floated and repaired.

The vessel was out of service for over 94days. The bill for the repairs and costs

associated therewith came to around EUR 2million. The amount awarded to or agreedto be payable to the salvors is not yetknown. Nor is the amount paid by the P&IClub for the oil pollution or for any otherthird party liabilities, but it is clear that thecost to owners and their various insurersarising from the chief officer’s fatigue andthe lack of anyone (or anything) to alerteither him or another member of the crewto the problem was substantial.

In addition, the chief officer was criminallyprosecuted by the Greek authorities forcausing oil pollution. He was found guilty

and sentenced to 18 months in prison. Thesentence was appealed and suspended.Nevertheless, he too has a criminal record.

ConclusionAre all masters and chief officers who takea watch without being properly restedcriminally negligent? No, of course they arenot, but there may be many who would,from their own experience, support theconclusion that, particularly on certaintrades, they are consistently overworked

and are unable to obtain the hours of reststipulated by STCW. In such circumstances,it is difficult to avoid the conclusionreached by the MAIB that, in certain trades,the requirements of STCW may not begood enough to prevent more officersfalling asleep while on watch.

When one adds in the fact that, as theexamples show, the OOW is often theonly person on the bridge and there is noalarm which operates so as to alert eitherthe OOW or anyone else to the fact thatthere is nobody navigating the vessel, onehas a recipe for disaster. The examples are

merely the tip of the iceberg.

If owners, insurers and legislators wish toremedy the problem, an industry-wideapproach is needed. It has been shownthat, where the will exists, agreementcan be reached and legislation enactedquickly. The MAIB report was publishedin July 2004. The MCA appears to haveaccepted its views and recommendations,and the IMO was looking at the issues of seafarer fatigue, work and rest hours andthe appropriate levels of safe and minimummanning.

The secretary general of the IMOsuggested that particular attention shouldbe paid to the levels of safe manning so asto ensure that watches and watchkeepinghours are correctly performed andobserved. The International ShippingFederation, representing many of theworld’s leading shipowners, reportedlycalled for STCW to be reviewed andbrought up to date, taking into accountdevelopments in ship operation andtechnology since the convention came intoforce.

It is therefore disappointing to see reports

of a recent meeting of the IMO sub-committee on STCW stating that therewas apparently “a lot of opposition at thatmeeting, mainly on financial grounds”to amending the existing regulations.According to the reports, certain countries,which one might expect to be at theforefront of safety at sea, have opposedany tightening of the rules and in factmay be seeking changes which could wellexacerbate the fatigue problem.

Fatigue at sea is a problem which continuesto affect shipowners and operators, theircustomers, the environment, insurers and

most importantly, the people on board.Gard believes it is a problem which needsurgent attention. Whether it receives itremains to be seen.




30

Collisions at sea -Unavoidable?By Captain Ronald Wöhrn, Ahlers & Vogel, Hamburg

steam, but beore the introduction

o radar or commercial shipping,insuicient lookouts as well as lacko uniorm collision prevention rulescould be considered the main cause.Once the radar was introduced, and asships’ speed increased, improper radarplotting, wrong evaluation o the radarobservations, combined with insuicientor complete lack o lookouts, causedcollisions.

And today, in an age o highlysophisticated electronic navigationalaids, where do we look when examiningthe multi-aceted possible causes o

collisions?

More and more lag states take theirresponsibility to investigate maritimecasualties seriously. Thus we know moreabout today’s causes o collisions –and we are given lessons to be learnt.

Various publications exist on thesubject o proper watch-keeping andcollision avoidance. Nevertheless, thesame errors and mistakes occur, again,and again. To be air, one has to makedistinctions when looking at the causeso collisions.

Once a collision has occurred peopleoten ask whose ault it was. The majorconcern, however, should ocus on thecause o the collision and what canbe done to avoid a similar accident inuture. Only then come the question o ault and the allocation o liability.

Multiple efectsSerious collisions have multiple eects.

Oten – too oten – crew or passengersbecome injured, or even worse, losetheir lives. This may cause individualgrievance and sorrow: wives lose theirhusbands, children lose their athers,their inancial situation becomesuncertain.

I oil or other harmul substance isaccidentally spilled, the environmentmay become seriously aected,harming not only the aquatic auna andlora, but too oten also the coastline,aecting those who earn their livingrom the sea or the coast. Expensive

clean-up operations may ollow as wellas endless disputes with aggrievedparties.

The cargo carried on board maybecome damaged, oten causingserious disruption to commercialrelations between seller and buyer,which can be more damaging than thepure material loss.

Finally, the shipowner and theinsurances behind him can be seriouslyaected by a collision. Huge inanciallosses may result not only rom the cost

o possible salvage and repairs, but alsorom the loss o time.

Causes o collisionsEvery period in the history o shippinghas had its own main cause o collisions. Beore the age o steam,adverse winds and weather and lack o manoeuvrability were the main causeso collisions, combined with poor orno navigational lights. Old “salties”,having sailed on wind-jammers, toldthat the main cause at the turn o thelast century was underestimation bythe on-coming steamer o the speedo a sailing ship. During the age o

1 International Convention on Standards o Training, Certication and Watch-keeping or Seaarers,


Manning

One undamental problem is ships’manning. Ship managers apply orthe lowest possible number o crewand lag states are oten too lenientand accept managers’ statements,neglecting the requirements orqualiication and training o thoseassigned or watch-keeping duties.As a result, we have chronically under-manned ships, especially in the short-sea trade. This in turn causes a dilemmaor the master, who is required tomaintain sae navigational watches onboard his ship.

How can the master o a ship complywith the necessity o posting a lookoutduring every watch, i the ship’scomplement is reduced to the lowestlegal limit? How can the master ensurethat his and his oicers’ maximumworking hours under the STCWConvention1 are not strained to theirlimit, or even exceeded?

Long hoursWatch-keeping periods o nine hoursand longer in coastal waters are notuncommon in the short-sea containertrade. Surveys have shown that theattention o the oicer o the watchdeclines rapidly towards the end o anormal watch o our hours.2 So, howcan an oicer o the watch be vigilant




31

ater eight or nine hours, adding thatduring the last two hours’ sailing upriverdense og prevailed and the oicerhad to take care o the VHF traic orshore radar guidance? Failure will beguaranteed under such circumstances.

Short-sea navigation in conined

waters, in adverse weather conditionsand dense traic, with an oicer o thewatch suering rom atigue, with noassistance o a lookout, creates theperect condition or a collision.

Bridge team managementAnother problem is improper bridgeteam management. I the dierentresponsibilities are not clearly allocated,members o the bridge team maynot take the required action to avoida collision. The oicer o the watch,especially i he has little experience,may assume that the master’s

appearance on the bridge automaticallypasses the responsibility to the master,when in reality the latter only wants tosupervise his new oicer. I a dangeroussituation arises then, perhaps none o the two will take the necessary steps toavoid a collision. The same may occuri the master and the oicer o thewatch rely on the pilot, without careulobservation and evaluation o the pilot’smanoeuvres. The time a pilot boards aship is not a time or rest – it is a timeor increased awareness and vigilance,because pilots may not be ully aware o the manoeuvring characteristics o the

ship just boarded.

PaperworkA lookout is required not only duringperiods o darkness or reduced visibility,but also during daylight.3 During nightwatch, as long as normal visibilityprevails, the navigational lights can bemade out easily, provided the oicero the watch and the lookout keep aproper watch. Additionally, a properwatch on the radar will assist and alertthe oicer o the watch in time. Duringdaytime oicers o the watch are toooten distracted by paperwork, a result

o the increasing bureaucracy imposedupon seaarers by various internationaland national legal requirements. Aserious collision a ew years ago in theEnglish Channel between a moderncontainership, equipped with asophisticated bridge navigation system,and a passenger ship, whose oicer o the watch was distracted by paperwork,is the classic example. Fortunately noatal injuries occurred. Lookout dutiesare not only perormed or compliancewith international regulations – they arealso carried out or the saety o all onboard. They must never be neglected.

Proper lookoutStatistics show that the most commoncauses o collisions are lack o awareness combined with poor watch-keeping practices, i.e., the lack o aproper lookout.4 Lack o awarenessarises oten out o insuicientevaluation o inormation provided by

electronic navigational aids as a resulto insuicient qualiication and trainingo those who are assigned as watch-keepers. Complacency adds to it andproessional mistakes are the result.

Sterile conditionsAnother relevant actor is theenvironment on board and the layouto modern bridge arrangements.An oicer keeping the watch inrough weather in a warm, enclosedwheelhouse, sitting in a comortablearmchair in ront o his navigationpanel, with no or hardly any possibility

o opening windows or walking outinto the resh air in the bridge wingswill soon all asleep, especially i hiswatch-keeping and working hoursare excessive. There will be nobodyto talk to during his watch i nolookout is posted. Even i a lookout isthere, communication may oten bediicult despite the requirement o the ISM Code or a common workinglanguage – are they proicient enoughin the common working language tocommunicate with each other also onsubjects not related to work?

Fatigue and social isolation on boardships with reduced crews combinedwith lack o motivation due to lowor delayed wage payments, delayedrelie or vacations and pressure romthe ship managers to keep the ship’sschedule are the best ingredients or aninadequate watch.

In such “sterile conditions prevailingon many ships, with crews o mixednationalities oten existing in a systemo voluntary apartheid”5 it is no wonderthat there are other thoughts in themind o the oicer o the watch than the

on-coming vessel steering on a coursewhich cries or disaster. I his attention isre-ocused, it is oten too late or properevaluation o the electronic navigationinstruments. The consequence is aalse perception o the other ship’sspeed and course and o his own ship’sposition.

This oicer may perhaps have joinedthe vessel only recently, not yet beingully amiliarised with its manoeuvringcharacteristics, in which case he willmost probably be unable to takeevasive action. The result can be easilypredicted.

Over-reliance on electronic aidsThe over-reliance on electronicnavigational aids and the dataprovided by the various displays –oten not arranged under ergonomicrequirements – is another cause o today’s collisions. An indicated ClosestPoint o Approach o one nautical mile

may cause the oicer o the watch tobecome complacent, with the alseperception that the passage may bewithout problems. The other vesselmay not be closely monitored andconsequently any last-minute changeso course may remain unnoticed until itis too late – as another recent collisionin the Baltic Sea has proved, this timeresulting in the tragic death o threeseaarers.

The proper working unction andreliability o electronic navigationalaids should be checked regularly, but

they rarely are. There is hardly anyoicer o the watch who compares thecourse indicated by the gyro compasswith that o the magnetic compass,although the logbook shows thecorresponding entries. All o a suddenthe wrong course maintained by theautomatic helm is discovered – otentoo late or proper evasive action. I theoicer o the watch had taken the timeto look out o the window, he wouldhave noticed the other vessel nearby.Over-reliance on instrument displayswithout a sense o the reality outsidethe windows o the wheelhouse is an

alarming trend o our time.

Mobile phonesEven i all instruments are workingproperly and the course is ree romlandalls or crossing vessels, the needto talk to somebody other than theshipmates may bring about anothercause o “modern times” collisions:the use o mobile telephones maydistract the oicer o the watch andeven the lookout – i one is posted –rom looking ahead or evaluating thenautical instruments. A master on thebridge, having taken over the watch

rom the oicer, being in the processo an evasion manoeuvre, is suddenlycalled on the mobile by the manager’soice, relaying a totally unimportantmessage. He becomes distracted andails to notice the sudden impact o tidal currents and wind, whereby theships collide. Again, modern times, butavoidable.

VHFWhen the oicer o the watch has notevaluated his own vessel’s positionproperly, the position o other shipsin the immediate vicinity can not beproperly assessed either, perhaps




32

with the additional aggravating actoro aulty settings o AIS and otherinstruments. I an emergency arises,as a last resort the oicer o the watchoten considers communicating by VHF

to ind out the other ship’s intentions.Conusion may arise i no clearlanguage is used and the other shipreplies in an ambiguous way. Valuabletime can be lost in the process. Thetime when the last undamental evasionmanoeuvre can be carried out maypass and the collision may becomeinevitable.

Collision RegulationsIt is hard to understand why theCollision Regulations6 are still notproperly ollowed. Combined withailure to reduce speed (so not to

compromise commercial schedules)and gain time to assess a situationproperly, lack o compliance with theCollision Regulations is one o the mostcommon causes o collisions.

Disregard o natural elementsWhen navigating a ship, the naturalelements are oten neglected, eitheras a result o “indoor navigation”in enclosed wheelhouses or lack o application o proessional seamanship.

The impact o the wind on ships inballast and ships with a high containerload is oten underestimated. Thesudden occurrence o wind gustsin speciic areas is not taken into

account. Tidal currents, so dierentin all parts o the world, are notsuiciently considered when carryingout a manoeuvre to avoid a collision. Inaddition, the ship’s manoeuvrability isoverestimated and the assumption that“it may go clear” ails miserably.

Sel-complacencyFinally, sel-complacency is a commonproblem. The belie that because onehas successully taken a certain actionbeore it must work this time as well isa deception. No two collision situationsare exactly the same. The trim and

draught o the ships may be dierent,the wind and weather, the speed o both ships approaching each other, thesea area, the visibility and other actors.Consequently, every approachingsituation must be taken seriously andproperly evaluated with all inormationavailable rom the electronic navigationinstruments combined with the physicalassessment o both ships’ position bylooking out o the window.

The environment on board and the layout of modern bridge arrangementsare relevant.

2 John Cappelow, Why aircrats don’t collide, North East Branch o the Nautical Institute seminar “Collisions – Controlling the Chaos”, Newcastle,11th November 2006.3 Captain Michael Lloyd FNI, Why ships really collide, SEAWAYS October 2006, p. 10.4 Svein A. Andersen, “Navigation-related incidents – what the claim gures tell us” Gard seminar “Bridge over troubled waters”, Oslo, March 2006.5 Captain Michael Lloyd, Why ships really collide, SEAWAYS, October 2006, p. 11.6 Convention on the International Regulations or Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 (COLREGs).

Conclusion – Are collisionsunavoidable?Despite the problems mentionedabove, and irrespective o ship size,watch-keeping remains the mostimportant duty on board. All other crewmembers rely upon the oicer o thewatch and his lookout. They rely upon

his attention, vigilance, seamanship,proessionalism and courage as he isresponsible or the saety o lie andproperty on board his ship – and alsoon board other ships. Proper andclear communication by and betweeneverybody in charge o the navigationo the vessel and compliance with theCollision Regulations are also veryimportant actors.

It may not be possible to avoidall navigational incidents, but therequency o collisions and theiroten dramatic consequences can be

reduced i oicers o the watch aregiven the necessary support to perormtheir duties and obligations withutmost vigilance, care and oresight,applying proper proessional skills andseamanship.

Finally – and this is an appeal toship managers and operators –globalisation, international competitionand the expectation o shareholdersare no excuse to compromise thesaety o seaarers, passenger and theenvironment.




33

A collision that shouldhave been avoided

The incident reported below showshow failure to comply with the CollisionRegulations causes collisions that couldbe avoided.

The COLREGsThe Collision Regulations1 (COLREGs)are basic rules to avoid collisions, whichare well known by all officers on merchantvessels. Nevertheless, infringement of oneor more of the apparently easy-to-follow

collision rules is the single most commoncause of collisions.

Following are some of the main rules inthe COLREGs:Rule 2 – Navigation in accordance withgood seamanshipRule 5 – LookoutRule 6 – Safe speedRule 7 – Determination of risk of collisionRule 8 – Action to avoid collisionRule 9 – Sailing in narrow channelsRule 10 – Behaviour of vessels in or neartraffic separation schemesRule 12 – Actions to be taken when

approaching other vesselsRule 13 – OvertakingRule 14 – Head-on situationsRule 15 – Crossing situationRule 16 – Action by give-way vesselRule 17 – Action by stand-on vessel

The incidentThe following casualty involved twomedium-size modern container vessels.

Vessel A departed from her loading port.It was a dark evening but visibility wasgood. A pilot was on the bridge, togetherwith the master, the third officer and the

helmsman. After passing the breakwaterthe pilot disembarked. The vessel had acourse of 095, with a speed of about 8knots and increasing.

Vessel B was heading towards the areawith a course of 353 and a speed of 13.5knots. Port authorities were informedabout the vessel’s ETA. The masterentered the bridge approximately onehour before arrival.

Vessel B contacted port radio whenentering the area and was informed thatvessel A was the only vessel departingthe port. From that time vessel A wasmonitored on the AIS. A bit later vesselB’s course was altered to 334 and the

master took over the command from thesecond officer. At the same time the speedwas reduced gradually to slow ahead.

The master of vessel B now observedvessel A visually as she came out from thebreakwater. When vessel A was about twomiles away, the master of vessel B ordereddead slow ahead and starboard 10.

Vessel B noticed that vessel A was picking

up speed about one mile away, and calledher up on the VHF. The master of vesselB said that vessel A should alter course tostarboard in order to perform a standardport-to-port passing. The master of vesselA said he would pass ahead of vesselB, probably due to the shallow area onvessel A’s starboard side, and asked vesselB to stop the engine and not to alter tostarboard. The master of vessel B repliedthat this was impossible, but received noreply.

The master of vessel B ordered full asternand hard starboard. Vessel A did not

notice vessel B before they called him onthe VHF. The master of vessel A claimedthat he could not turn starboard, that heinformed the master of B accordingly, andsaid that he was picking up speed andwould pass ahead of vessel B. The masterof vessel B replied that it was not possibleto pass ahead of his vessel. The master of vessel A claimed that he had requestedvessel B to stop her engines and turnstarboard.

The master of vessel A then ordered hardport.

At this time, the collision wasunavoidable. Vessel A had a headingof about 060 and a speed of 13.6 knotswhen the vessels collided. Vessel B hada heading of 340 and a speed of about 8knots. The angle of blow was about 80.Both vessels suffered significant damage.

The cost of repairs and the loss of incomepaid by the insurers were in excess of USD5.5 million. The apportionment of liabilitywas 75/25 against vessel A.

Analysis and lessons learnedSeveral breaches of the COLREGs causedthe collision. The most severe breacheswere the following.

1 Convention on the International Regulations or Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 (COLREGs).


This was a crossing situation, and vesselA was the give-way vessel because shehad vessel B on her starboard side.According to the rules, she should havetaken early evasive manoeuvre(s), forinstance by reducing speed, stoppingor waiting. Instead, vessel A acted asif she was the stand-on vessel. VesselA increased the speed to full ahead inorder to cross ahead of vessel B. Crossingahead of another vessel when there is

a possibility or probability of collision isnot considered to be in accordance withgood seamanship.

Vessel A kept the heading and increasedthe speed. In order to avoid collisionvessel A should have taken positive actionin ample time and with due regard to theobservance of good seamanship. Vessel Achanged heading only about one minuteprior to the collision, hence not in enoughtime and not in accordance with goodseamanship.

Vessel A did not observe vessel B before

being contacted on the VHF. By properuse of lookout and radar, vessel B shouldhave been discovered at an earlier stage.

If vessel A had used its ARPA radarproperly, it would have been evident thatcrossing ahead of vessel B would increasethe risk for collision.

Vessel B was the stand-on vessel, butmust take its share of the blame for thecollision. According to the rules, thestand-on vessel is obliged to maintain herspeed and course. However, vessel B hadthe opportunity to alter course as soon

as it became apparent that vessel A wasnot taking the expected actions. Ratherthan calling vessel A on the VHF, vesselB had the opportunity to reduce speedearlier. An early starboard manoeuvremost probably would have prevented thecollision.

Vessel B had the opportunity to givevessel A more sea room in order to passport-to-port. There was plenty of searoom for vessel B on her starboard side tostay away from the shore-side on her portside. This is considered a breach of goodseamanship.

Lesson learned: following the simple rulesof the COLREGs will reduce the numberof collisions at sea significantly.




34

Is the pilot a part o thebridge team?By Captain Erik Blom Master o the M/V BLACK WATCH,

Fred. Olsen Cruise Lines

environmental and other actors orsetting dierent watch conditions, butas a minimum on ships with crews o more than 6-7, the bridge team (BT)consists o the master, the oicer onwatch (OOW) and a sailor as helmsmanand lookout. With several shippingcompanies, especially within the cruiseand oil industry, additional crew joinsthe BT.

The BT’s responsibility is to ensurea well-unctioning Bridge ResourceManagement (BRM). Some o the mainobjectives o BRM are:– To assist the ship master in managingthe vessel’s bridge team or eachvoyage so that personnel are rested,trained and prepared to handle anysituation.– To help the ship master recogniseworkload demands and other riskactors that may aect decisions insetting watch conditions.– To ensure bridge team members

are trained and aware o theirresponsibilities.

Hopeully the answer to the abovequestion is yes, but this comes at aprice.

I have been a Captain or the last 20years, starting in the Royal NorwegianNavy, later becoming a pilot on theNorwegian coast, until I decided tochange trade and became a cruisevessel captain. Over the years I have

worked on and managed a lot o bridges, some well-unctioning and theodd ones not working at all.

Most readers will certainly know thepurpose o a well-unctioning bridgeteam. Hopeully gone are the dayswhen the Captain – with a capital C –took all the decisions without discussingwith anyone, and not listening to advicerom others. On bigger ships the masternow has a team around him on board tosupport him in his decisions: the bridgeteam.

Bridge team and its responsibilitiesThere are many combinations o

1 International Convention on Standards o Training, Certication and Watch-keeping or Seaarers, 1978.


– To help bridge team membersinteract with and support the masterand/or the pilot.

Pilot’s responsibilitiesThe pilot is on board to assist innavigation and manoeuvring. Theexchange o inormation betweenmaster and pilot does not shit theresponsibility or the saety o the vessel

rom one to the other.FatigueChapter VIII (Fitness or duty) o theSTCW Convention1 sets limits onthe hours o work and minimum restrequirements or watchkeepers.

A pilot’s work environment (irregularand lengthy working hours, workingat night, unpredictable duty rosters,and travelling to and rom their jobs)can signiicantly contribute to atigue.Moving a large vessel in coninedwaters is a high-risk task and the pilot

assigned to that task has a responsibilityto the state, the port authority and theship’s master.

Pilots are managers o high-risk




35

situations that require intenseconcentration and skill levels so that anydecrease in perormance can potentiallylead to a catastrophe. A pilot errorcaused by atigue can endanger theship, crew, port and the environment.

Only national rules apply to pilots

and they are not subject to the sameregulations as the ship-board crew. Ihave met pilots who have been on therun or more than 36 hours without adecent nap, and I can assure you itdoes not bring back happy memories.

CommunicationCommunication can not be overrated.It is the most vital part o bridge teammanagement. Communication withpilots and their organisation startsalready during passage planning.Some countries have pages and pageswith inormation within our planning

material, and the inormation otenends with the statement “…ailing toreport… might cause x hours’ delay”.I the master/ship has not been to theport beore the stress level within theBT begins to rise.

The next crucial point o contact iswhen the OOW uses the VHF to reportto Vessel Traic Service (VTS) or pilotstation. Most stations are very riendlyand helpul, but others do not reply atall when ships try to comply with thecompulsory rules to report the requirednumber o hours beore arrival. The

OOW has been inormed via passageplan that he must get in touch with thepilot station by a speciic time otherwisethe ship might be delayed. I there isno reply he will continue with repeatedcalls on all possible means, dive backinto the publications to double checkthe passage plan inormation and takethe ocus away rom his main duty – tonavigate. This in turn again increasesthe stress level.

Then the pilot boat is approaching.Being a ormer Norwegian pilot mysel I know how important it is to have

optimum conditions or the pilot boatwhen the pilot is boarding. It can lookvery calm down there rom the bridgewing, but being in the pilot boat is adierent story. Very oten the pilot boatmaster has a speciic heading he wantsus to steer. Coming into the UK is apleasure: they are always very politeusing phrases such as “Please, Sir” and“Captain”. Others merely observe theormalities and make you eel ill-at-ease. This is not a good start as you arewaiting or a person rom that particularpilot boat to come up on the bridgeexpecting him/her to be a part o the

bridge team.

Eventually the pilot is on the bridge.How the master and the pilot meet and

greet each other is the key to how therest o the passage will be. The pilot has(maybe) done this passage hundredso times and the master – not havingbeen here beore – has made his ownassumptions on how the approachshould be handled.

I have experienced pilots embarkingat the breakwater, not giving us timeto meet and greet at all, orcing memore or less to disregard the pilot asthere is no time to discuss or exchangeinormation. This is very oten the casein Mediterranean ports where you onlyhave a breakwater and a berth or two.The pilots are just there as an advancedlinesman showing us where to berth.This is a very unsatisactory situation asthe pilot is not integrated with the BTand sometimes just creates clutter tothe organisation.

In general the pilots are on the bridgein due time in order to allow or athorough “handover”/inormationexchange. In this case the masterhas a vital role in making the piloteel welcome, and the pilot needs toremember how it was coming into anew (complicated) port or the irsttime.

A lot o inormation has to beexchanged between the pilot and themaster in a relatively short time, whenthe master normally has “the conn” andthe ship is moving in conined waters

(to have “the conn” is to have soleresponsibility to control, or direct byorder, the movements o a ship, i.e., togive proper steering and engine ordersor the sae navigation o the ship).

Typically the ollowing inormation isto be exchanged between the pilotand master during the approach:ship details; originating authority;manoeuvring details; propeller details;main engine details and equipmentdeects; berth and tug details; localweather and sea conditions; details o passage plan, including navigational

hazards, abort points and emergencyplans; local regulations, including VTSreporting, maximum allowable drat,etc.; ship’s agent; year built; IMOnumber; cargo type (IMO codes i dangerous cargo); last port; etc.

At this stage it is very important that thechemistry between the pilot and themaster is good. Otherwise it might leadto dangerous situations.

The next step is transition o “theconn” rom the master to the pilot. Ihave met pilots coming on the bridge

and, without acknowledging anyone,giving the helmsman orders based onthe ship’s heading when he let thepilot boat, not realising we were on

the correct heading or the approach.Ater the exchange o inormationsummarised above I always clearlyinorm my bridge team with the phrase“Pilot has the conn” and in turn myOOW and helmsman acknowledge theinormation: the closed loop.

The “closed loop” is a communicationprotocol where inormation is given,repeated by the receiver and normallyconirmed by the issuer. This is the onlyway one can be sure an order is beingollowed and is a vital part o the bridgeteam management. Having observedthis rom all sides, it is obvious tome that you can minimise the risko misunderstanding i the “closedloop” is working. In a Canadian studywhere 200 accidents were related tohuman error, 84 (42 per cent) involvedmisunderstanding between pilot andmaster and some could probably have

been avoided i the “closed loop”protocol had been used.

LanguageI have recently returned rom a voyageto the French part o Canada. In the StLawrence River ships the same size asmine always have two pilots on boardtaking one hour watches. As in manyother countries, a new generation o pilots is being trained and in additionto the two pilots we had apprenticeson board. It was too easy or them toall back on speaking French betweenthemselves instead o speaking English

and in turn creating two “bridgeteams”, which should be avoided.

Sometimes it is not possible to avoidtwo teams due to communicationdiiculties, either on the crew or on thepilot’s side. Based on my experience,most pilots speak more than goodenough English, but as a pilot conninga ship heading or Mongstad oilterminal I have experienced that myhelm orders had to be translated intothree dierent languages beore theywere executed by the helmsman. In thatsituation it was diicult to establish a

closed loop.

The pilot is a vital part o thebridge teamProvided a ew essential premises aretaken care o, the pilot is a very vitalpart o the bridge team.

In my opinion, atigue, languagebarriers, lack o chemistry, an open loopand, last but not least, cell phone callsrom the pilot’s amily are threats toships’ saety.

“Welcome on board, Mr Pilot. Coeeor tea?”




36

Navigation through theentrances to the Baltic

Sea

This circular is based on a recent letterreceived rom The Danish Maritimeauthorities highlighting the increasednumber o navigational accidentsin Danish waters, and Gard’s ownexperience with similar accidents in thesame area.

As members and clients are aware,IMO resolution MSC.138 (76) providesrecommendations on navigationthrough the entrances to the Baltic

Sea, namely the Great Belt (Route T)and The Sound. The recommendationsinclude the use o pilots or certaintypes o ships in high traic densitywaters. The purpose o IMO resolutionMSC 138(76) was to provide thoseresponsible or the operation o ships with recommendations on saenavigation through the entrances o the Baltic Sea with the objectives toensure saety, prevent human injury orloss o lie, and to avoid damage to theenvironment, in particular the marineenvironment, and to ships and theircargoes.

In a letter to the International Groupo P&I Clubs, the Danish MaritimeAuthority has drawn the shipping

industry’s attention to IMO resolutionMSC.138 (76) and indicating that anumber o ships are disregarding therecommendations. According to asaety study conducted by the DanishMaritime Authority, during the periodrom 1st January 2002 to 30th June 2005alone, 22 ships grounded in the GreatBelt and none o these ships had a piloton board at the time.

The Danish Maritime Authority letter

illustrates and emphasises that it ishighly recommended to utilise theexpertise and local knowledge o pilots,and that as a minimum, vessels sailingthrough the Great Belt or The Soundollow IMO’s recommendation onnavigation through the entrance o theBaltic Sea.

Denmark has also launched aprocedure whereby all vessels enteringDanish waters without ordering apilot in accordance with the IMOrecommendation will be contacted inorder to draw their attention to the

recommendations on the use o pilots.When a ship does not comply, themaster will be inormed that Denmarkinds it inconsistent with sae navigation

Gard Loss Prevention CircularNo. 02-06

practices and procedures to neglect anIMO recommendation. These ships willbe reported to the maritime authority inthe ship’s lag state.

The ollowing documents are availableat www.gard.no under News in the LossPrevention section:· The Danish Maritime Authority Letter.· IMO resolution MSC.138(76)· Intertanko model charterparty clausesin recognition and support o IMO res

MSC 138(76).

General inormation on Pilotage inthe Baltic can be ound at the BalticPilotage Authorities Commissionwebsite at: http://www.balticpilotage.com and http://www.pilotage.dk

Vessels to which the IMOrecommendations do not apply areadvised to navigate with extra cautionthrough the entrances to the Baltic Sea,i.e. the Great Belt (Route T) and TheSound. A guide to navigation in Danishwaters can be ound at: http://www.rv.

dk/en/im/navigation/navigation_ntdw.htm




37

Operations in extremelycold climates

IntroductionOperations in extreme coldenvironments are perhaps the mostdemanding and challenging that avessel and her crew may experience.The extreme cold reduces the crew’seiciency considerably. In addition,sensitive deck-mounted equipment andpipelines are oten at risk o damage

i precautions are not taken in time.There is also the risk that ice damage tovessels may result in oil spills. Damage related to extreme cold andnavigation in ice occurs every year. Theyare more requent at the beginning o acold period, and vessels entering suchwaters inrequently are more exposedthan other vessels. Extreme cold causesdamage to cargo, vessel equipment andinjuries to the crew, while navigation inice causes damage to the hull, propellersand/or rudder.

An article in Gard News issue No. 1271 outlined guidelines to prevent cold

weather damages to vessels and theirequipment. Gard Services has alsotried to obtain inormation based onexperiences gained by shipownersoperating in extreme cold environmentson a requent basis. The ollowing list isnot meant to be exhaustive, but shouldserve as a reminder, as temperaturesin the Northern Hemisphere are again

very low. Deck mounted equipment– Frozen pipelines are perhaps themost common damage that occurs. Thepipelines should be properly drainedwell in advance. Do not orget irehoses and couplings, which in somecases may become inoperative i notproperly drained. Exposed pipingshould be insulated to prevent reezingwhere necessary.– Periodically purge air lines on deck toremove water condensation.– Fresh water piping systems are

particularly at risk o reezing. Considercirculating water in the resh water

1 “Navigation in ice – Cold weather procedures”.


piping system.– Deck-mounted winches and othersensitive equipment should becovered to avoid icing rom reezingspray. Hydraulic equipment shouldalso be started several hours beoreuse, in order to achieve proper oiltemperatures on hydraulic hoses beorethey are exposed to high pressure. In

some cases it is recommended to keepthe equipment going constantly. Checkthat the lubeoil has the necessaryspeciications or these climates.– Consider stowing mooring ropes andpilot ladders below deck to preventreezing and reduce the chances o icebuild up.– I possible, ballast tanks should beilled with water with a high salinity (andconsequently lower reezing point).Furthermore, to avoid reezing o theair pipes, the ballast level should bedropped. Frozen air pipes may causesevere damage both to tank structure

and pumps alike.– All spare electricity should be used




38

to heat the accommodation andcompartments exposed to the ice andcold (ore peak, etc.). Be aware o theire danger i industrial heaters or gastorches are used. Keep doors closed toretain the heat.– Engine ventilators may in some casesbe turned o (but remain open) to

avoid reezing o sensitive equipment inthe engine room.– Ice on deck should preerably beremoved with wooden ice mallets,to avoid damage to the hull paintcoatings and also to prevent rozenand brittle metal rom breaking. It isalso recommended to keep suicientstocks o glycol and salt to remove andprevent ice build up.– Saety equipment should be checkedrequently, including saety hand lines,i rigged. Remember the resh watertanks in the lie boats.– Move anchors periodically in order

to prevent chains and winches romreezing.– Alterations in speed and/or courseshould be considered to reduce theeects o reezing spray.– Deck and navigation lights can easilybe damaged by the cold and ice, andshould be checked requently to ensurethey remain in proper working order. Cargo holdsSeveral types o cargo are exposedto contamination rom water, andlow temperatures may in some casesincrease the condensation problem.

– I cargo ventilation (i installed) isused, snow and moist cold air may leadto condensation and should not beblown into the cargo holds.– When cleaning the holds, keep theuse o water to an absolute minimum.Sweep holds properly in advance o using water. Use pre-heated waterwhenever possible. Prevent dirtywater rom aggregating and reezingby removing excess water in locationswhere reezing could occur.– Remove ice and snow romhatchoaming top beore closing thehatches. Otherwise, this may later melt,

and create leakages. Leakages may alsobe created by water reezing betweenthe hatchcover panels.

Crew– Low temperatures reduce the crew’sphysical ability, eectiveness, and canimpair judgement. Proper clothing isthereore essential to maintain crewsaety and awareness.– Review rotation o watches orcrewmembers working in excessivelycold areas to ensure exposure is kept ata minimum.– Always brie the crew properly inadvance o any operation that is notcarried out on a regular basis.

Navigation in ice– A considerable amount o inormationon ice conditions and navigation inice is available on the Internet. Forexample:– http://www.natice.noaa.gov/ providesglobal and regional sea ice analysesand orecasts rom the United States

National Ice Center;– http://www.cis.ec.gc.ca providesinormation about ice conditions inCanada; and– http://ram.nrsc.no/CEO_Training/Present.htm provides generalinormation on ice conditions in theBaltic region.– Local meteorological stations aremore than willing to share importantinormation when contacted. Icecharts are also received on the weatheracsimile receiver.– Instructions rom icebreakers and localauthorities should be careully ollowed.

I you are taking shortcuts and arecaught by the ice it may be diicult toreceive timely assistance.– The eect o current on ice shouldnot be underestimated. I you arecaught in the ice with the current in anunavourable direction, this may exposethe vessel to collision, grounding orother types o contact damage.– Reversion o propellers in ice shouldbe done careully and controlledto avoid damage to the rudderand propeller blades. It may beadvantageous to run the engines aheadto wash away ice around the propeller

and rudder beore attempting to runastern, which again should be keptto a minimum to avoid the rudder orpropeller being exposed to solid ice.– Especially in ballast condition, thecooling water inlets may be chockedwith ice. This can subsequently leadto a loss o cooling water. Engine crewmust be properly brieed and madeaware in order to avoid such situations.– For vessels with high air drat orexposed rigging, icing can aect thestability o the vessel. Thereore,vessels may need to lay by and removeice with mallets or other suitable tools.

The shipyard– I the vessel is at the repair yard ordock, the vessel’s crew should checkall items at risk o cold damage, andnot leave this to the yard or sub-contractors.– I the vessel is at the repair yard asa result o damage, and additionaldamage is incurred due to extremecold whilst at the yard, the additionaldamages will be subject to a separateclaim and will in many cases, be belowthe applicable deductible. This appliesto both hull and machinery and loss o hire.

Bunkers– Whilst at port or at the repair yardin locations with an extremely coldclimate, it is imperative that heavy ueloil bunkers remain properly heatedat all times in order to retain enoughviscosity to be pumpable and to beused. I the uel oil is not kept at the

proper temperature, it could take daysbeore it is heated suiciently to beused and, will thus delay the sailing o the vessel.




39

Winter season inNorthern Baltic Sea

The 2002/2003 winter season was theworst on record since the winter o 1987. Our statistics appear to indicatethat the preceding relatively mildwinters may have lulled seaarers intoa alse sense o security. How this anduture winters will unold remains to beseen, but shipowners and operatorswould be well advised to ensure thattheir seagoing personnel are well awareo the planning, preparation and care

required while navigating in ice.

Approximately 30% o all averageswhich occurred in connection withnavigation in ice in the Baltic Sea duringthe past winter season, were collisioncases. This is a substantial number andleads us to again remind shipowners o the issues involved.

The most common cause was collisionbetween vessels in an ice convoy.Under normal circumstances blame hasbeen apportioned equally betweenthe colliding vessels. Otherwise, in

determining liability, emphasis wasplaced on:1. How the watch keeper had beenalerted by the vessels involved,2. How vessels ahead and abat hadbeen warned by the vessel which wasstuck or slowed down in the ice,3. Distances kept between the vessels,and o course4. The ice situation in general.

In some collision cases, and in particularwhen an assisting icebreaker isinvolved, the case may be settled ona “knock-or-knock” basis. This means

that both parties cover their own costo repairs. The same principle may alsobe used or agreed upon between theparties, when two merchant vessels,assisting each other when navigatingin ice, are involved in a collision.However, the above “knock-or-knock”practice is only used in “standard”cases caused by diicult ice conditions.I gross negligence or other similarcauses are involved, other methods o apportioning blame will be used.

Analysis o the collision cases showsthat the vessels involved are very otenblamed or not complying with theapplicable rules; The InternationalRegulations or Preventing Collisionsat Sea, 1972 (COLREGS 72), and theFinnish/Swedish “Rules or WinterNavigation”.

The Finnish/Swedish “Rules or WinterNavigation” are endorsed by Germany,

Denmark and the Baltic States. Inaddition to directing navigation duringthe winter period in Finland andSweden, these Rules set the standardor ice navigation in the Baltic, includingnavigation in ice in conjunction withicebreakers in the majority o the Baltic.

For urther details about the “Rulesor Winter Navigation” please see theFinnish Maritime Authority’s homepage at http://www.ma.i/e/unctions/icebreaking/

Navigation when the vessel is part

o a convoy is a risky operation, andthe crew must be alert and maintaina proper lookout at all times. It isessential that all relevant regulationsare properly complied with. Breacho COLREGS 72, especially the belowmentioned rules, appears to be themost common cause o collisions:– Rule 5 – Proper look out– Rule 6 – Sae speed– Rule 7 – Risk o collision– Rule 8 – Action to avoid collision– Rule 13 – Overtaking vessel– Rule 17 – Action by stand-on vessel– Rule 27 (a) (i) – vessel not under

command (stopped) to show two redlights

The Finnish/Swedish “Rules orWinter Navigation” require(a) Strict watch keeping both visuallyand especially by radar and immediatenotiication by VHF radio when loss o speed is experienced.

(b) In case o stoppage:– Immediate signalling in case o ailure


o other means o communication– Immediate engine manoeuvring– Immediate rudder manoeuvring

RecommendationWhen navigating in ice or in the vicinityo ice, shipowners must ensure thattheir onboard personnel are wellaware o the regulations governingsuch navigation. Furthermore, mastersmust be advised o the requirement

to ensure proper compliance withthe governing regulations and also o the utmost care required in order topromote sae navigation.

This circular has been produced withthe valuable assistanceo ormer Hull Claims Manager, CaptainJohn Hammarén in Finland.




40

Severe ice conditions inthe northern Baltic Sea

IntroductionDue to heavy ice conditions in thenorthern Baltic Sea, navigationalrestrictions have been issued. Thiscircular provides inormation on whereto ind up to date inormation on iceconditions in the northern Baltic Sea.In addition, please reer to the GardServices Loss Prevention Circular 10-01,Operations in extremely cold climates.Copies of this circular can be found on the

Gard Services website at www.gard.no. Ice condition inormationThe latest ice and navigationalinormation can be ound on theInternet at the ollowing addresses: - Finnish Institute o Marine Researchice service (www.merentutkimuslaitos.i) provide daily ice reports in Finnish,Swedish and English, ice charts, theBaltic Sea ice code, and ice orecasts.· Finnish Maritime Administration (www.ma.i) provides inormation on icebreaking and restrictions to navigation.

· Swedish Meteorological andHydrological Institute (www.smhi.se) provides inormation on ice charts, icereports, airway inormation and iceorecasts.· Swedish Maritime Administration(www.sjoartsverket.se) providesinormation on ice breaking.· In addition, Oy Gard Services (Baltic)AB, Helsinki and Gard Services SwedenAB, Gothenburg receives the latestBaltic Sea ice charts. They can provideup to date navigational inormation,restrictions on navigation, ice breakerpositions and reporting points or those

vessels bound or Finnish ports andrequiring icebreaker assistance. Thecontact details or Oy Gard Services(Baltic) AB, Helsinki are: tel. + 358 96188 380, ax. +358 9 6121 000.· Capt. Y.Nazarovs o Pandi ServicesEast has provided inormation onrestrictions in St. Petersburg, Russia.St. Petersburg’s Harbour Master’sorder No.1, dated 5th January 2003,states that as o 13th January 2003, icenavigation is not permitted in the porto St. Petersburg or the ollowing typeso vessels:– all ships with ice class less than Ëó-3o the Russian Maritime Register o Shipping classiication or correspondingice class by other ClassiicationSocieties (LR – 1B, GL – E2, E2K or E2m,

BV – Glace 11, DnV – Ice B or Ice 1B,ABS – BO – 1B); and– all ships with main engines power3500 h.p. and less. In certain cases, special ice pilotagecan be arranged with express thepermission o the Harbour Master. Nordic Agreement on ice breakingassistance or the Baltic Sea

A Nordic Agreement exists betweenFinland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden andGermany to co-ordinate their eorts toassist ships traic and keep the vesselsmoving during winter. However, thisagreement does not set out in detailhow and when assistance should beprovided. The Swedish ice-breakingoperation is governed by law, includingtheir taris, and similar arrangementsmay apply in other countries. The ice-breaking operation will assistany vessel in an emergency situation.However, a vessel without suicient

ice-class, experiencing main engine,propeller, rudder etc., damages maynot receive immediate assistanceas long as the crew or ship is not indanger, or, alternatively, until such timeas the ice-breaking operation considerthey have the time to assist the vessel. Ice-breaking assistance is ree o charge. Assistance beyond helpingvessels getting to and rom ports willbe charged according to a tari, whichis considered a statute. These tarisare, as ar as we have been able toestablish, more expensive in Finland

than in Sweden. As all aspects o theservices by the ice-breaking operation(taris, liability etc.) are consideredstatues, Lloyds Open Form (LOF) is notapplicable.

It is worth noting that ice-breakerswill not assist in towage operations i another tug is already engaged. Wherea vessel, incapable o manoeuvring outo the ice by its own power, needs to goto a repair yard, owners would irst needto contract the ice-breaking operationand then meet up with a commercialtug in ice-ree waters. Recommendations· All eorts should be made to ensurethat current up to date ice conditions


are made available to all vesselstransiting the northern Baltic Sea. Inaddition, companies should ensure theyare properly inormed on the speciicso ice breaking assistance including theNordic Agreement or the territorialwaters o all countries that the vesselwill transit through.· Shipowners, ship managers andcharterers should make every eort toensure that vessels trading in the Baltic

have the proper ice class as required bythe appropriate authorities. Althoughoperating in some o the trading areasaected by this ice problem, doesnot represent a breach o tradingwarranties, owners may not be coveredby insurance as this is an expected andoreseeable risk. The consensus inSweden is that entering these waterswithout suicient ice-class (as deinedby the Swedish Icebreaking Authority),constitutes a breach o the saetyregulations. I you have any questionsor doubts concerning insurancecover, please contact your relevant

underwriter or Club.· For vessels transiting through Finnishwaters inbound or outbound toRussian ports in the Baltic Sea, pleasenote that the ice class requirementsdier between Finnish and Russianauthorities. For example, vesselsmeeting the requirements inboundto or outbound rom St. Petersburgmay not meet the requirements o theFinnish authorities, should the vessel betrapped in Finnish waters. In instances,the vessel would be subject to themulti-state agreement mentionedabove.

· Ice breaking assistance will beavailable not only in an emergency, butalso i required by ships. The ollowinginstructions are currently in orce:– ships requiring icebreaker assistancein the Gul o Finland, on their way to aFinnish port, shall report to Helsinki VTSon channel 67 when passing the Hankolongitude.– Vessels destined or harbours inthe Sea o Bothnia and the Bay o Bothnia are requested to report name,nationality, destination and speed to

VTS Stockholm on VHF channel 84, viacoastal radio or telephone direct +46 8666 66 22 when passing the light houseSvenska Björn.




41

Anchoring - Getting intoa sae haven or into a

potential disaster?Over the years Gard has seen incidentswhere serious casualties have resultedrom anchoring problems. Many o these incidents have been caused asa result o inadequate manning and/or improper watch arrangements onthe bridge and/or in the engine room.This article describes some incidentsrelated to anchoring and discusseslessons learned rom them. Oten suchincidents have resulted in subsequent

grounding.

Being on the high seas, with lots o leeward space to land is every master’sdelight. With a irm hand on the wheeland an alert lookout, combined withwell-run machinery, he can have acomortable rest without being awakenby unamiliar vessel movements.

Lying at anchor, on the other hand, maycause any master a itul sleep.

Any small boat skipper knows hisboat by the signals he gets through

his various senses, and he sensesimmediately when something is amiss.Larger vessels give the same signals,but they become more distorted andare not so easily recognisable. Hence, amore rational and meticulous approachis required to saeguard the operationo the vessel.

The experienced small boat skipper willknow immediately when his vessel isabout to drag anchor, thus enabling himto counter the eects beore becomingadrit. On a larger vessel such operationtakes time, hence an alert watch, which

can prepare or contingencies in caseo a shit in weather or other conditions,is a must. It is thereore o utmostimportance to pick your anchoringspot careully, taking into considerationprevailing winds and currents, nature o anchoring surace, the topography bothashore and underwater, the duration o stay, the density and proximity o traic,restraints that may be imposed by thestate o the engines and anchoringequipment. The importance o maintaining the anchoring gear in goodcondition can not be over-stressed. Thecondition o the gear must be careullychecked prior to anchoring. There isno point in a good holding ground,i the anchor brake lining is worn andonly able to unction at a raction o

the design holding power, or i theadditional chain stoppers are not inproper shape and it or use.

Two incidents are described below,rom which important lessons can belearned.

Incident 1Having arrived at port to load, a strongeast to south-easterly wind prevented

the vessel rom commencing cargooperations via eeder vessels. Onthe ollowing morning, the masterreceived orders rom his agents toproceed, with pilot embarked, to amore protected location to commencecargo operations. However, BritishAdmiralty Charts o the area were notparticularly detailed. The pilot hadonly a photocopy o a larger scale localchart.

At around 1600 hrs the port anchor o the vessel was dropped approximatelyon the 50 m contour line on the

photocopy map. The vessel had eightshackles o chain (approximately 220m) in the water. The master estimatedturning radius o about two cables.

The vessel was moored on a headingo 150 degrees and, in the master’sestimation, outside the 20 m contourline should she swing right round. Thevessel’s echo sounder transponderwas situated in the bow o the vesseland when she initially anchored it wasobserved that there were 33 m o waterindicated under the keel.

The pilot assured the master that thevessel was on good holding groundand that the loaded drat would be 11.8m. The master was satisied that theship was anchored in a good position.On the inal day o loading (our dayslater), the wind had shited to the westand the vessel was now on a headingo 289 degrees. The master’s intentionwas that the ship should arrive at itsdischarge location with an even keel.Thereore, the plan was to completeloading with a trim by the stern o 45cm. In order to achieve this, it wasagreed that the last 700 tonnes o cargowere to be used or trimming purposes.

At 1520 hrs the eeder vessel gavenotice to commence loading the


remaining 700 tonnes. At 1540 hrs, thechie oicer o the vessel boarded theeeder vessel and noted the drat o hisvessel was 11.12 m orward and 10.52 mat. The trim at the head surprised him.He was concerned that they were notable to attain the 45 cm stern trim. Hechecked his calculations and in additionhe requested that the ballast tanks besounded since he believed that the shipshould not have had a head trim at the

time. At 1600 hrs the irst oicer notiiedthe master o his concern.

At 1615 hrs the at drat was checkedagain. It remained at 10.52 m despitecontinuous loading into No. 7 hold.They then realised the vessel wasaground and loading was suspended at1620 hrs. The ship’s heading remainedsteady at 289 degrees. At 1800 hrs thesteering gear was extensively damagedwith the rudderstock protrudingapproximately 20 cm above thesteering lat.

The ollowing causes contributed tothis incident:– When the wind veered,the anchor position changed rombeing in the lee o the land to being onthe windward side o the land, a mostunortunate position to be anchored in.At that point in time it would have beenprudent to change anchor positiontowards the other shore.– Eight shackles o chain or 33 manchoring depth was somewhatexcessive. The recommended ratiois three to our times the depthdepending on depth and holdingground.

– Neither the vessel nor the pilot hadthe proper charts with the requiredcontour details o the location wherethe vessel was inally anchored.– The vessel’s crew made incorrectassumptions as to the consequencesto the ship i she swung about. Thecrew should have taken continuoussoundings at the location they wereanchored since limited inormation wasavailable.– The ship’s crew were over-conidento the pilot’s assessment as to the waterdepth o where the ship was anchored.This should have led them to be morediligent.

Incident 2The ship approached the loading port




42

and was directed by the harbour masterto a nearby anchorage. The masterwas asked whether he would like theassistance o a pilot. The master politelyrejected the oer and proceeded to theanchoring position.

The vessel anchored in a position 7.5

cables (approximately 1,400 m) romthe shoreline, which was a sandy beach.The echo sounder indicated the deptho the water to be 31 m and the masterordered ive shackles (approximately140 m) on deck. The wind was a lightbreeze rom south-west and everythinglooked rather smooth. The master ranginished with engines. A combinationanchor watch and ire guard wasestablished on the bridge.

Initially the vessel was supposed tostart loadingthe next day, but loadingwas delayed due to problems at the

terminal. In the meantime the weatherorecast was indicating stronger windsrom north-west. The harbour masteralso inormed the ships at anchor thatstrong winds were expected.

During the early hours o the next daythe wind orce increased rapidly. Theanchor watch, who was alternatingbetween the bridge and ire guard duty,registered the increase in wind but didnot react. Ater another 15 minutes, ashe arrived on the bridge he realisedthe ship was not in the position it wassupposed to be. He contacted the chie

mate who arrived on the bridge someminutes later. He realised immediatelythe seriousness o the situation andcontacted the engineer on duty andordered an emergency start o the mainengine. The irst mate was sent on deckin order to let go o the other anchor.The wind was continuing to increaseand the shore line approached rapidly.The second anchor was dropped but

the ship did not stop driting. By thetime the engine was started, the shipwas stranded.

The ensuing reloating operation wasvery expensive and the loss o timeand repairs to the ship were even moreexpensive.

The ollowing causes contributed to thisincident:– A pilot has local knowledge and isamiliar with anchoring positions. Thereusal o a pilot in this case may havecontributed to the choice o a lessattractive spot to anchor.– It is important to ind an anchoragewith the most suitable bottomconditions. Sand is usually a goodholding ground but here the groundwas a combination o sand and rockand the vessel probably anchored onrocks. The lack o consideration or

common wind and current directionwhen deciding where to anchor mayhave caused the dragging o anchors.– The watch-keeping system must beadequate to handle a situation thatmight occur, such as the one described.There should always be a qualiiedindividual on the bridge, someonewho can initiate necessary actionwhen needed. I the anchor position isexposed, do not hesitate to keep theengine room on standby. An ordinarystart-up routine takes at least hal anhour and this is time you do not have inan emergency situation.

– I the weather is deteriorating itis oten much easier to leave youranchoring position in good time insteado staying there until you are orced toleave, which may be too late.

Important actors and losspreventionExperience rom accidents duringanchoring shows that a lack o ocus on

the basics o anchoring is oten the rootcause o these accidents. The ollowingkey actors should be consideredcareully, and their importance andconsequences must be communicatedto the ship’s crew:– Bottom conditions and depth o waterversus length o anchor chain.

– The importance o detailed maps andlocal knowledge.– How to handle inaccurate or lack o inormation.– Positioning aids: use, precision anderrors.– Change in prevailing conditions: wind,currents, tides, drat, traic density.– The point o no return o the leeshore.

History shows that humansunderestimate the potentialconsequences o developing situations.Accident studies demonstrate that

signals and indications o somethingwrong happening are constantlyignored by watch-keepers. It isimportant to impress on a ship’scomplement that recognising andappreciating such signals andindications is the irst step towardsavoiding a casualty. It is also importantto have in place a system whichidentiies and provides necessarytraining on an ongoing basis.




43

Rubicon - The point ono return

Delaying action until it is too late mayhave disastrous consequences.

Rubicon, or the point o no return, maybe deined as a line that, when crossed,permits no return and typically resultsin irrevocable commitment, that is, onecan no longer physically turn back. Theexpression has its origin in Caesar’scrossing o the river Rubicon in 49 BC,which at that time was the ancient

border between Italy and Gaul.

Occasionally, we experiencegroundings that include major damageto the vessel, total losses, majorenvironmental pollution, and in somecases also loss o human lives. Suchaccidents oten have their origin inan engine ailure, or ailure o othervital technical installations on boardthe ship. Investigations that ollowsuch accidents very oten reveal thatthe vessel’s initial assessment o thesituation was inadequate, and thatthis initial lack o risk assessment

contributed to, or in some casescaused, the atal outcome o theaccident. A thorough assessment o theworst-case scenario as well as a correctestimate o the point o no return arethereore decisive or a satisactoryoutcome in a critical situation.

The human actorIt is part o human nature to lookor – and ocus on – the easiest wayout o a critical situation. One hopesor the best, and the solution causingleast worries and problems is otenaccepted without much relection on

what to do i it ails. Being unawareo this mechanism may prevent theship management team (SMT) romassessing the worst-case scenario inthe situation, and valuable time andinormation may be lost.

In a recent case, the vessel had anengine ailure and the chie engineerreported a repair time o 15 hours. Theincident happened in good weatherand ar away rom the shoreline – therewas no immediate danger. The chie engineer’s solution was acceptedwithout urther questions rom themaster because it itted well with hisown perception o the situation. Whenthe estimated repair time had elapsed,the engine had still not been repaired

and the wind was increasing. A newestimate rom the chie engineerindicated a urther 8 hours o repairtime, which again was accepted by themaster. Again the repair time elapsed,and again the engine was not repaired.The chie engineer was still optimistic,and gave a new indication o a urther6 to 8 hours o repair time. The shiphad now drited closer to the shoreline,the weather was getting worse and a

rough calculation indicated that theship would ground in about 10 to 15hours i the engine was not repaired.The master started to look or potentialexternal assistance. It turned out thatthere were no vessels or tugs availablein the area that could possibly reach thevessel in time. To cut a long story short,the engine was never repaired, thevessel grounded and became a totalloss. Luckily, there was no loss o lie.

The above situation is extreme, butrom time to time Gard experiencesincidents in which a proper estimate

o worst-case scenario and point o noreturn would probably have reduced aserious accident to a minor incident.

Estimating point o no returnFirst o all, a worst-case scenarioshould be established: what will bethe consequences i our estimatesare wrong? Are spare parts andtools available, and does the crewhave the necessary competence tocomplete their task? Then the pointo no return should be established. Inorder to properly estimate the pointo no return it should be kept in mind

that vessels drit, so the time anddistance to the nearest danger pointshould be established. This includesan assessment o weather conditions,current and wave height. Further on,one should locate the closest pointo assistance (normally tugs but insome cases spare parts suppliers orspecial workers), and determine theiravailability and transit time to thevessel. The transit time will determinetime available or repair, and it is thenpossible to estimate the latest timeor requiring assistance. This shouldbe clearly marked as a line in thevessel’s chart. When the line is crossed,assistance must be immediatelyrequested, so that it can reach thevessel in time.


SalvageWhen a vessel is undergoing repairsat sea, the need or external supportand/or salvage will always have tobe considered. I time permits, suchsupport should always be required inclose co-operation with the shipownerand his hull insurers. In many cases hullinsurers have standing agreementswith local towing companies and mayalso put the vessel in contact with

local agents that may provide valuablesupport.

Lloyd’s Open Form (LOF) is also amatter o consideration. As a rule,most cases o external assistance aresettled at an early stage on a ixed-cost basis. However, i the situationis allowed to develop and the vesseldrits beyond the point o no return,a LOF may be the only possible wayout o the situation. Early and correctassessment o the situation is thereorevery important.

Summary1. Establish worst-case scenario.2. Inorm shipowner and other relevantauthorities.3. Locate available external resources.4. Establish the latest point or requiringassistance.5. Maintain close communication withassisting parties.




44

“Pilot on board!”

Gard News looks at some aspects o the relationship between pilots andseaarers.

Areas o risk“Despite the pilot’s duties andresponsibilities, his presence onboard does not exempt the Masterand the OOW rom their duties andresponsibilities or the ship’s saety.”This is quoted rom the IMO Code o

Nautical Procedures and Practices, andshould be well known to seaarers. Itis, however, a act that a large portiono navigation-related accidents occurswhen a pilot is on board. The reasonor this is obvious: the pilot is sent onboard because the national authoritiesconsider the area an increased risk,and in increased risk situations therewill always be accidents. However, it isGard’s clear understanding that pilotsprevent ar more accidents than theycause, but the picture is complex, andthere is reason to study this in moredetail.

Navigation-related accidents aretraditionally split into three maingroups: collisions, groundings and

contact damage (typically collisions withpiers, etc.). Despite more advancedtechnology, the implementation o STCW 95 and a strong ocus on thehuman element as well as atigue,the expected decline in number o accidents per year has not takenplace. In addition, the tendency is thataccidents are more severe and moreexpensive than ever beore.

As indicated above, a pilot is sent onboard because the national authoritieshave assessed that there is an increasedrisk in the area. This risk can be relatedto navigational hazards, geographicalareas that are vulnerable to pollution,there can be special regulations relatedto the cargo that the ship is carrying. Insome countries the master’s experienceis assessed, ater a number o pilot-assisted port calls the master may beapproved or entry without pilot. Therecan also be other reasons related to,or instance, military installations in thearea. It is also important to note that

pilot requirements are at each individualcountry’s discretion. Rules may and willthereore vary rom country to country.


So in situations where the navigationalrisk exceeds a given limit, nationalauthorities respond by sending apilot on board. This is where thechallenges start: to a large extentbridge team management trainingocuses on co-operation among thebridge team and less emphasis isplaced on situations where “outsiders”are introduced. Bridge manuals reerto “pilot to pilot navigation” and

little or nothing is said about how toact when the pilot has embarked. Inshort, the pilot is expected to deliverthe service he is paid to deliver andlimited consideration is given to hisco-operation with the bridge team.For that reason in many situations onedoes not achieve the desired increasedlevel o saety; on the contrary, theresponsibility or navigation is simplytranserred rom one person to another.

CommunicationIn accidents where a pilot is involvedthere is one actor that is requentlypresent: limited or no communicationbetween the master and the pilot.There may be language problems andmisunderstandings, unclear instructions




45

to the bridge personnel about howto monitor the pilot’s actions andthe bridge personnel may be over-conident about the pilot’s abilities. Insome situations the pilot may not beamiliar with the particular design o the navigational systems available onboard. Very oten these accidents may

be avoided i there are clear instructionsavailable rom the ship management onhow to handle situations with pilots onboard.

Lessons learnedIt is possible to extract some lessonsrom the above examples.

Voyage planning used to be a criticalactor and the common response romthe crew was “why should we plan thepassage when the pilot always bringswith him an alternative passage plan?”.It is Gard’s experience that this has

improved: electronic charts have madeit easy to adjust the ship’s voyage planaccording to that brought on board bythe pilot and attention rom port statecontrol oicers has put this item onthe agenda. It is also imperative thatthe pilot be brieed about the vessel’smanoeuvring capabilities. This includesrate o turn, propeller arrangement,output on the various manoeuvringorders and general ship data. In short,any inormation that can improve thepilot’s perormance must be available.Many shipowners have developed so-called “pilot cards” or that purpose.

These have proved to be eective andgreatly appreciated by the pilots.

Language barriers have been andwill continue to be a challenge; thesecan be related to communicationbetween the pilot and the crew, as wellas understanding the communicationbetween the pilot and assisting partiessuch as shore sta, mooring boats and/or tugs. Very oten these barriers can begreatly reduced by a thorough reviewo the passage prior to commencingit. The pilot can also be requested tocommunicate with external parties in

a common language, or to translatehis communication with them or thebridge team. Many accidents arerooted in surprises and unexpectedsituations that could have been avoidedi the pilot and the bridge team had acommon understanding about how thepassage would be carried out.

The impact o commercial pressureshould not be underestimated. Thismay result rom a variety o reasons:– the terminal wishes to maximiseutilisation o the piers and requireseective (high speed) approach to theterminal;– some pilots are paid per pilotage and

increase speed or that reason;– charterers require maximumutilisation o the ship, and under keelclearance may be challenged. Thisoccurs particularly in river passages.The availability and suitability o tugs and mooring boats should alsobe considered: in many situationsthese are too small or too ew or thepurpose, but are accepted due to thecommercial pressure.

Cultural dierences should also beconsidered. The pilot is perceived asan authority and in many cultures it is

diicult to correct or even questiona decision made by an authority.Corrections to obvious errors maythereore be delayed and in some casesnot put orward at all. Reluctance to getinvolved in a situation has contributedto several severe marine accidents. Inparticular, this may be a problem whenthe master is not on the bridge. It isthereore important that all memberso the bridge team have the necessaryauthority and conidence to intererei they are in doubt. This can only beachieved by active leadership andinvolvement by the master. The IMO

Code o Nautical Procedures andPractices also states: “I in any doubtas to the pilot’s actions or intentions,the oicer in charge o the navigationalwatch shall seek clariication rom thepilot and, i doubt still exists, shallnotiy the master immediately and takewhatever action is necessary beore themaster arrives”.

Common understandingThe irst step to reduce the risk o navigation-related accidents whena pilot is on board is a commonunderstanding by the bridge team

o the risks involved. These includegeographical hazards as well as culturaland management-related challenges.Introducing company “pilot handlingprocedures” in the ship managementsystem has proved to be eective. Inaddition to voyage planning, theseshould include routines or pre-voyage

brieing, monitoring o the pilot’sactivities and communication betweenpilot and oicer o the watch (OOW)/master. Exchange o inormation is alsomentioned in the IMO Code o NauticalProcedures and Practices: “Themaster and the pilot shall exchangeinormation regarding navigation

procedures, local conditions and theship’s characteristics”.

ConclusionIn summary, much progress will beachieved by implementing some simplesteps in the ship procedures:– Active use o pilot cards or transer o ship inormation.– Implementation o companyprocedures or pilot handling.– Making bridge teams aware o cultural challenges that may occur whena pilot is on board, and giving themthe conidence and authority to seek

clariication when in doubt.– Taking into consideration thecommercial pressure that may beimposed by pilots, charterers andterminals.

Bon voyage!




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Pilot on the bridge -Role, Authority and

ResponsibilityIntroductionAs you are aware, many navigationalincidents leading to groundings andcollisions involve pilots. The primaryproblems involve the role, responsibilityand authority of the pilot onboard. ThisLoss Prevention Circular focuses on4 case study examples of pilot aidedgrounding and collision followed bygeneral guidance on the prevention of these types of incidents.

Case 1: Collision with terminaldolphinAt 0200 hrs, Vessel 1 was giveninstructions to leave a pre-designatedanchorage and proceed to loadcargo at the terminal. The vessel wasunderway at 0254 hrs and two pilotsboarded at 0354 hrs. The vessel enteredthe breakwater with the Master on thebridge.

The vessel made routine visits at that

location thus the Master thus feltcomfortable with the berthing routines.The vessel passed the breakwater at8.5 knots even though the maximumpermitted speed was only 5 knots.

Although the Master observed that theywere exceeding the maximum speed,the Master did not attempt to bring thisto the attention of the pilots.

Four tugs were requisitioned toassist the vessel in berthing at theterminal. Due to the excessive speedof the vessel, the tugs had difficulty

maintaining speed to keep up withthe vessel as she made her way to theterminal.

As the vessel approached the terminal,all verbal communication between thepilots and the tugs were in the locallanguage (non-English) that was notunderstood by the Master. The aft tugwas made fast after the vessel enteredthe breakwater and was quite close tothe berth.

The forward tug approached while thevessel was only 50 metres from theberth. Furthermore, before the linecould be made fast on the vessel, thetug started pulling on the line, therebythe entire line was run out and wasno assistance to the vessel. The tworemaining tugs were of no assistanceat all.

As a result, the vessel lost control andcould not be stopped before collidingwith the mooring dolphin. Extensivedamage was caused both to the shipand to the mooring dolphin.

The following causes contributed to thisincident:(1) The vessel’s speed was excessivewhen trying to connect to the tugs.(2) There was a lack of communicationbetween the pilot and the masterat many stages while transitingthe channel. There was little or noinformation exchanged regarding thedocking plan and how the 4 tugs wereto be put to use and coordinated.(3) The Master did not insist that pilotnot exceed the maximum allowablespeed as it entered the breakwater.

(4) The pilot, when communicating withthe tugs, was speaking a language thatwas not understood by the Master. Thismade it difficult for the Master to have a


proper situational awareness.(5) The Master was over-confident as tothe abilities of the pilot.

Case 2: Grounding at mooringHaving arrived at port to load, astrong east to south-easterly windprevented Vessel 2 from commencingcargo operations via feeder vessels.On a following morning, the Masterreceived orders from his agents toproceed, with pilot embarked, to amore protected location to commencecargo operations. However, BritishAdmiralty Charts of the area are notparticularly detailed. The pilot had onlya photocopy of a larger scale local chart.

At 1606 hrs the port anchor of the vesselwas dropped approximately on the50 m contour line on the photocopymap. The vessel had 8 shackles of chain(approximately 220 m) in the water that,the Master estimated, gave a distance

of about two cables from the anchorto the stern of the vessel and thusprovided a turning radius of about twocables.

The vessel was moored on a headingof 150° and, in the Master’s estimation,outside the 20 m contour line shouldshe swing right round. The vessel’s echosounder transponder is situated in thebow of the vessel and when she initiallyanchored it was observed that therewere 33 m of water indicated under thekeel.

The pilot assured the Master that thevessel was on good holding ground andthat the loaded draft would be 11.8 m.The Master was satisfied that the shipwas anchored in a good position.

On the final day of loading (four dayslater), the wind had shifted to the westand the vessel was now on a headingof 289° . The Master’s intention was thatthe ship should arrive at its dischargelocation with an even keel. Therefore,the intention was to complete loadingwith a trim by the stern of 45 cm. Inorder to achieve this, it was agreed that

the last 700 tonnes of cargo were to beused for trimming purposes.

At 1520 hrs the feeder vessel gavenotice to commence loading the




47

remaining 700 tonnes. At 1540 hrs, the

Chief Officer of the vessel boarded thefeeder vessel and noted the draft of hisvessel was 11.12 m forward and 10.52m aft. The trim at the head surprisedhim. He was concerned that they werenot able to attain the 45 cm sterntrim. Loading was suspended while hechecked his calculations. In addition,he requested that the ballast tanks besounded since he believed that theship should not have had a head trimat the time. At 1600 hrs the First Officernotified the Master of his concern.

At 16.15 hrs the aft draft was checkedagain. It remained at 10.52 m despitecontinuous loading into no. 7 hold. Theythen realised the vessel was agroundand loading was suspended at 1620 hrs.The ship’s heading remained steadyat 289° . At 1800 hrs the steering gearwas extensively damaged with therudderstock protruding approximately20 cm above the steering flat.

The following causes contributed to thisincident:

(1) When the wind veered, the anchorposition changed from being in the leeof the land to being in the lovart side of

a new port where additional cargo wasto be loaded. It was estimated that itwould take 25 hours to complete thepassage.

The vessel had not made the enginesready for passage at the time the pilotsboarded. They had determined that the

vessel had approximately 12 hours morethan necessary to make the passage.The Master was aware that some pilotswould not take the vessel through thepassage at night and told the pilot thatdeparture could be postponed untildaybreak.

The pilot assured the Master that itwas safe to sail at night. The Masterthen suggested that they take a routewhere the channel was wider. However,the pilot preferred and recommendedanother passage. This passage wasrecommended for day passage only

and required a number of sharp turns tonavigate. However, due to commercialpressure, night passage for the routesuggested by the pilot was allowed.

The Master and pilot exchanged moreinformation about the vessel and thenthe Master ordered the engines to beprepared for departure. At 2100 hrs thecrew was called to their manoeuvringstations and began unmooring. At 2137hrs full manoeuvring speed was orderedand executed. Five persons were in the wheelhouse:

the Master, pilot, apprentice, OOW andthe helmsman. The OOW used one of the radars when unoccupied by one of the pilots and plotted fixes on the charton average of every 5 minutes.

A number of minor manoeuvres weremade between 2127 hrs and 2218 hrs.At 2218 hrs, the ship prepared to makea 60-degree turn to port at 11.5 knots.At 2225 hrs, the pilot began the plannedport turn by ordering a 10 degrees portrudder. Having observed the vessel’sreaction to this rudder angle was notquick enough, the pilot increased the

rudder angle to 20 degrees. The rateof turn increased but after the turn wascompleted, the vessel ended up closerto the shore on her starboard side thanwas intended.

From this moment on, the Masterbecame particularly vigilant and closelymonitored the rudder orders. He didnot communicate his concern to thepilot. There was little or no time toexchange opinions on this matter sincethe vessel was approaching anothertight turn of 50 degrees to starboard topass between two islands.

At the required location, the pilotissued a 10 degrees starboard rudderat a point at a point where one of the

the land, a most unfortunate position

to be anchored in. At that point in timeit would have been prudent to changeanchor position towards the other shore.(2) Eight (8) shackles of chain on 33meters depth was somewhat excessive.The recommended ratio is three to fourtimes the depth depending on depthand holding ground.(3) Neither the vessel nor the pilot hadthe proper charts with the requiredcontour details of the location theyfinally anchored.(4) The vessel crew made incorrectassumptions as to the consequencesto the ship if she swung about. The

crew should have taken continuoussoundings at the location they wereanchored since limited information wasavailable.(5) The ship’s crew were over-confidentwith the pilot’s assessment as to thewater depth of where the ship wasanchored. This should have led them tobe more diligent.

Case 3: Grounding whilenavigatingAt 2040 hrs Vessel 3, a pilot and hisapprentice at the wharf boarded thegeneral cargo ship. The vessel hadcompleted loading at approximately1600 hrs and was preparing a transit to




48

islands was 3.5 cables (0.55 km) aheadof the vessel’s wheelhouse. The Masterconsidered this rudder angle may behave been insufficient to obtain therequired rate of return but hesitatedto change the pilot’s orders. He didhowever make sure the rudder indicatorneedle moved to the requested 10° to

starboard.

The pilot observed that the vesselwas slow to react to his order of 10°starboard rudder and ordered a 20°starboard rudder. Neither the time northe vessel’s exact position was recordedwhen this order was given, however, thedistance to the island was decreasing.

Having heard the pilot’s last order,the Master ordered the rudder hardto starboard. The Master’s order wasrepeated by the pilot and was executedby the helmsman. The bow of the vessel

cleared the island and kept sweepingto starboard. However, the vessel’sport side was observed to be quicklyapproaching the island.

At 2231 hrs, with the island’s northerntip several metres off of the vessel’s portside and ahead of the wheelhouse, thepilot ordered the rudder hard to portand stop engine. A slight vibration wasfelt followed by the distinct touch of ahard object. Some seconds later, air washeard escaping from the tanks.

Although no oil was spilled in the water,

the vessel was ascertained to havedamage to her side shell plating. Theshell plating was punctured in severalplaces allowing seawater to ingress intoan empty ballast and fuel tanks.

The following causes contributed to thisincident:(1) There was a lack of proper voyageplanning. The time between when the

pilots boarded the vessel and whenthe ship got underway was quite shortparticularly since they had 12 hoursmore than necessary to make the transitto the next port.(2) The pilot insisted transiting adirection that was recommended for daytravel. The Master should have insisted

in following the recommended route.However, he was also familiar with thepilot since he had made routine visits tothis location and felt over-confident inthe pilot’s recommendations.(3) There was a significant breakdownof communication between the Masterand the pilot. Once the first order for10 degree rudder didn’t result in therequired rate of change in direction wasmade, the Master should have beenaware that another 10 degree rudderorder in the second turn would notacquire the desired results. He shouldhave communicated this to the pilot

and/or discussed the manoeuvringcharacteristics: (1) during the pre-voyagebriefing, (2) after the first 10 degreerudder order that was changed to a20 degree rudder, and/or (3) just afterthe pilot’s second 10 degree ruddercommand.(4) There was a lack of fundamentalseafaring skills used for the tight turningmanoeuvre to starboard. A standardpractice of reducing the speed of thevessel, commanding the turn, andthen bringing the vessel back up tomanoeuvring speed should have beenused.

Case 4: Grounding whilenavigatingAt 1300 hrs Vessel 4 departed partiallyloaded with two pilots on board. Thepilots agreed to alternate their watch.Pilot 1 was to conduct the vesselbetween 1300 and 1800 hrs and Pilot 2between 1800 and 2300 hrs and so on.From 1300 to 2300 hrs the passage was

without any significant incident otherthan the vessel encountering someconcentrations of fishing vessels.

After the change of watch at 0000 hrs,personnel on the bridge comprised of the second officer, who the OOW, Pilot1, and the quartermaster who was at

the helm. The visibility had been gooduntil approximately 0100 hrs when thevessel entered a light haze. The radarshad been placed on the 12-mile rangeat the time. By 0125 hrs, the visibilityhad decreased to about 150 metres. Nodedicated lookout was posted.

At approximately 0113 hrs the vesselreported its position to the local MarineCommunications and Traffic Service(MCTS). The vessel also stated that theirETA to the point where the next coursealteration was planned was 0240 hrs.

Communication between the pilot andthe OOW was conducted in English andthere were no communication barriers.

The OOW had been recording theposition of the vessel at approximately15-minute intervals on the chart in use.The pilot did not refer to those positionsnor did he refer to the chart to refreshhis memory. The pilot carried a personalcourse book that he used to navigatethe vessel. This book had no provisionsfor recording of ETA or the actual timeof course alternations. The pilot reliedsolely on his memory to keep track of

the vessel’s position.

At approximately 0130 hrs, the pilotsaw on the radar, what he believed, tobe the entrance to the passage andbegan the required course alteration tostarboard. The pilot did not reconfirmthe vessel’s position prior to the coursealteration. The OOW took a range andbearing of a point of land and notedthese values on the chart. Before the




49

OOW had time to plot the vessel’sposition on the chart, the pilot began acourse alteration. The OOW returned tothe conning position and ensured thehelmsman promptly executed the pilot’sorders.

Shortly after reaching the new heading,the pilot realised that the vessel wasnot on the proper course and ordereda hard-a-starboard helm in the hopesof bringing her around but this wasunsuccessful and the vessel groundedat 0135 hrs.

Depth soundings were taken in the areaof the grounding and it was determinedthat the bow was firmly aground and thestern was afloat in deeper waters. Thevessel sustained extensive damage toshell plating and internals in way of stemto No. 3 double-bottom tanks.

The following causes contributed to thisincident:(1) There was a substantial lack of bridgeresource management (BRM). TheOOW and/or the Master should havebeen more diligent about ensuringthat the OOW was there to reconfirm

decisions made by the pilot. This couldhave been done through better verbalcommunication between the pilot andthe OOW.(2) The pilot did not reconfirm hismental model of his position beforemaking the critical turn. The OOW,did not have the proper situationalawareness with regard to the vessel’sposition. The pilot did not reconfirmthe vessel’s position prior to the coursealteration. When the pilot gave theorder to turn, the OOW only focusedupon whether the helmsman madethe turn. He didn’t reconfirm that they

turned at the proper location.(3) The weather played a marginalrole in the grounding. However, asa precaution, the vessel may haveconsidered placing a dedicated lookout.

Recommendations and LessonsLearned(1) The Master is in command of the shipat all times with only one exception:when transiting through the PanamaCanal. Therefore, it is always the dutyof the Master and OOW to keep asituational awareness of all activitiesof the pilot. Although the pilot is mostknowledgeable about local waters, it isthe responsibility of the Master/OOWto verify position through proper use of charts, radars and other position fixingdevices and follow local rules on speedand routing.

(2) Voyage planning is crucial in allsituations including when pilots are onboard. Sufficient time should be allowedfor proper communication between theMaster, pilots and OOWs. This voyageplan should include every importantactivity starting from the embarkationof the pilot, in and out of the berth, andfinally the disembarkation of the pilot.

(3) If the pilot is to command tugsand/or personnel at a berth in alanguage that is foreign to the crew,

the Master must demand that the pilotcommunicates with the Master and/orOOW in a common language

(4) When the piloted voyage is takingthe vessel through narrow waters, youshould mark “wheel-over” points eitheron the chart or at the radar screen inorder to know when you are reaching“points of no return”. This helps toallow the pilot, Master, and/or OOW tokeep a better situational awareness.

(5) The ship’s crew is normally the

most knowledgeable regarding themanoeuvring capabilities of the ship.Detailed descriptions of the ship’smanoeuvring characteristics shouldbe communicated during the voyage

planning stage. In addition, the Masterand/or OOW should communicatemanoeuvring capabilities during thevoyage, as necessary. The Master andOOW should never feel hesitant todiscuss these matters with the pilot if they feel it necessary to do so.

(6) Ensure that the vessel is equippedwith the necessary updated charts forthe intended voyage. It is not sufficientto rely on the pilot to provide thisinformation.

(7) The OOW should always closelymonitor the activities of the pilot. Manytimes, the pilot will not necessarilycommunicate with the OOW regardingthe vessel and/or voyage. The OOWshould not hesitate to communicatewith the pilot on any relevant mattersregarding the vessel or the voyage.

(8) The OOW should not only bediligent with regard to his duties toensure the pilot’s orders are properlyfollowed but also to monitor the pilot’sactivities. If the OOW has concernsregarding the pilot’s activities, he should

contact the Master immediately.

(9) The vessel should have clearprocedures and instructions to Master’sand OOWs on what to do with a pilotonboard. These should be included aspart of the ships safety managementsystem (SMS).

(10) BRM is an important activity toensure safety. Any BRM training shouldinclude how to handle the change incommunication, command, and controlwhen a pilot takes over navigation of

the ship.




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Who is to blame?

The voyage continues and the pilotgives instructions regarding thenecessary course alterations, as theairway becomes gradually narrower.The ship is still at ull speed.

The pilot calls the harbour master (inhis native language) and tells him thatETA (estimated time o arrival) will bein hal an hour. He also gives the threetugs waiting to assist berthing the ship

an update on the situation (also in hisnative language). There is no requestor translation rom the second mateand no inormation is volunteered bythe pilot.

We continue ull ahead. Traicincreases as we enter sheltered waters.The background lights rom theharbour area make it diicult to seethe dierence between moving andstationary objects.

“Mr Mate, can you prepare to receivethe irst tug on port bow? We will have

starboard side alongside.” (Two othertugs are also ordered but this is notmentioned by the pilot).

“Aye-Aye, sir”, says the mate.

The pilot contacts the tugs on the VHFagain (still in the local language) and,as he is talking, his mobile phone rings.The mate calls the master, who entersthe bridge ater a couple o minutes.

Useul lessons can be learned rom theollowing incident, which could happenanywhere, any time, with almost anyship.

The incident“Good aternoon, Mr Captain. I’ll takeover. Starboard 10, come to two ive sixdegrees and ull ahead.”

“Starboard 10 to two ive six degrees,

ull ahead. She is all yours, Mr Pilot.”

We are on board an ordinary tanker,on an ordinary day, approaching anordinary terminal somewhere in theWestern Hemisphere. The weather isgrey but the visibility is not too bad,although it is early evening. The speedis slowly increasing and the last lighto day is rapidly disappearing. Theatmosphere on the bridge is relaxed.

“Full speed, Mr Pilot, 14 knots.”

“Full speed. Thank you, Mr Captain.”

The pilot and the master continuetalking about everyday matters such asthe weather, how long they are stayingat the berth, etc.

“I’m leaving the bridge”, says themaster. “I have to prepare some papersbeore we berth. The second mate willassist you. I you need me, just tell himand he will get hold o me.”


He consults the radar and although it ismany years since the last time he was inthis harbour, he eels somewhat uneasywith our present speed, as we arerapidly approaching the inner part o the harbour. The master is tempted toask the pilot to reduce the speed, butor some odd reason he does not. Thepilot orders hal ahead and continuesto talk in his mobile phone. We areapproaching the berth and the master

is more and more anxious about thespeed, so he politely suggests the pilotto reduce the speed. The pilot explainsthat there is another ship waiting toleave the berth and he has to board itas soon as possible.

The irst tug is closing in on port bowand is ready to receive the heaving linerom the ship. The second mate, whohas just let the bridge, is now on theorecastle making his irst attempt atthe heaving line, but misses the tug.He sees that they are now alarminglyclose to the berth and hurries to do his

second attempt. This time he succeedsand reports back to the bridge thatthe line rom the tug is on board andsecured. At the same time the pilot,who has just inished his telephone call,is at the bridge, hectically instructingthe tugs on how to berth the ship, stillin the local language – this time with araised voice.




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The tugs seem to have problemskeeping up with the speed o our shipand this is communicated to the pilot.The distance to the berth is rapidlydiminishing and the pilot asks or slowastern. The master, who is really gettingnervous now, orders slow astern andeven increases this to hal astern. The

pilot orders the at tug to start pulling inorder to reduce the speed o our ship.

The master inally realises that there isno way he can avoid hitting the berthand orders ull astern. Because o theull astern manoeuvre, the ship does anuncontrolled starboard turn and hits theberth with a speed o 2 knots, makinga 3-metre long gash on the starboardbow and causing extensive damage tothe berth.

What went wrongThe situation described above could

happen anywhere, any time, with a loto ships trading the seven seas o today.

Can we learn something rom thisincident?– The vessel’s speed was excessive.– When trying to connect to the tugsthe ship’s speed was too high.– There was lack o communicationbetween the pilot and the master atmany stages while transiting the airway.There was little or no inormationexchanged regarding the docking planand how the three tugs were to be putto use and co-ordinated.

– The master did not insist that thepilot should reduce the speed as theyapproached the harbour area.– The pilot, when communicating withthe tugs, was speaking a language thatwas not understood by the master. Thismade it diicult or the master to beully aware o the situation.– The master was over-conident o theabilities o the pilot.

– And guess what: the pilot will o course blame the master or intereringin his eorts to manoeuvre the shipsaely alongside because he orderedull astern!

Recommendations and lessonslearned

– The master is in command o the shipat all times with only one exception:when transiting through the PanamaCanal. Thereore, it is always the dutyo the master and the oicer o thewatch (OOW) to be aware o all actionso the pilot. Although the pilot is moreknowledgeable about local waters,it is the responsibility o the master/OOW to veriy the position through theproper use o charts, radars and otherposition ixing devices and ollow localrules on speed and routing.– Voyage planning is crucial in allsituations including when pilots are

on board. Suicient time should beallowed or proper communicationbetween the master, pilots and OOWs.This voyage plan should include everyimportant activity starting rom theembarkation o the pilot, entry andexit rom the berth and inally thedisembarkation o the pilot.– I the pilot communicates with tugs,etc., in the local language (which islikely), the master should ask him toexplain what was said in a commonlanguage (probably English).– When the voyage under pilotagetakes the vessel through narrow waters,

one should mark “wheel-over” pointseither on the chart or at the radarscreen in order to know when “pointso no return” are reached. This helpsthe pilot, master, and/or OOW to havebetter situational awareness.– The ship’s crew is normally themost knowledgeable regarding themanoeuvring capabilities o the ship.Detailed descriptions o the ship’s

manoeuvring characteristics shouldbe communicated during the voyageplanning stage. In addition, the masterand/or OOW should communicatemanoeuvring capabilities during thevoyage, as necessary. The master andOOW should never hesitate to discussthese matters with the pilot i they eel

it necessary to do so.– One should ensure that the vessel isequipped with the necessary updatedcharts or the intended voyage. It is notsuicient to rely on the pilot to providethis inormation.– The OOW should always closelymonitor the activities o the pilot. Manytimes the pilot will not communicatewith the OOW regarding the vesseland/or voyage as necessary. The OOWshould not hesitate to communicatewith the pilot on any relevant mattersregarding the vessel or the voyage.– The OOW should not only be diligent

with regard to his duties to ensure thatthe pilot’s orders are properly ollowed,but should also monitor the pilot’sactivities. I the OOW has concernsregarding the pilot’s activities, heshould contact the master immediately.– The vessel should have clearprocedures and instructions to mastersand OOWs on what to do with a piloton board. These should be included aspart o the ship’s saety managementsystem (SMS).– Bridge resource management (BRM)is important to ensure saety. AnyBRM training should include how to

handle the change in communication,command, and control when a pilottakes over navigation o the ship.

Who is to blame?Who is then to blame? In practice, both,master and pilot, but it is important tokeep in mind that as the master is incommand o the ship, he is the one whogets the blame!




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– Lack o training – “human-technology” interace.

The graph shows that 3 per cent (innumber) o all P&I claims in the period1992 to 2002 were related to collisions.

The graph shows that 12 per cent (invalue) o all P&I claims in the period1992 to 2002 were related to collisions.

Case studies have indicated that

equipment ailure (such as but notlimited to engine and/or steeringailure) was ound to be the underlyingcause o at least 20 per cent o allcollisions. However, recent reports ona number o collisions and casualtiessuggest that computerisation o bridges(integrated bridges, GPS, ECDIS, etc.)may have been one o the contributingunderlying causes o collisions.

There are numerous recent exampleswhereby mariners have made expensiveand even tragic mistakes despite havingbeen provided with all this technology.

Investigations indicated that the“human-technology” interace revealedmany shortcomings.

Collisions - Why do theyoccur?

IntroductionWhen ships collide, the cost o repairing damage to two (or more)sophisticated and valuable ships and o damage and/or loss o their cargoes,bunkers, oil spills, etc., can run intomillions o dollars. When personalinjuries occur and/or lives are lost, theigures involved become even greater.We are perhaps not experiencing morecollision claims in number than beore;

however, costs or collision claims arebecoming higher, so the maritimeindustry needs to put greater eorts ininding the underlying causes.

Claims analysis or a ten-year period(1992/2002) indicates that only 3.1 percent o all P&I claims in number relatedto collisions. However, 12 per cent o total P&I claims in value or the sameten-year period (1992/2002) related tocollisions.

Common underlying causes ocollisions

One might assume that most collisionstake place in dense traic areas underdiicult circumstances, which couldinclude poor visibility, equipmentailure, etc. However, contrary togeneral belie, case studies haveindicated that most collisions happendue to negligence and ailure on parto the bridge team in carrying out basicnavigational duties. Recent reports ona number o major casualties suggestthat simple principles o bridge watch-keeping at sea were not being ollowedand that human error was ound to bethe main underlying cause o at least 68

per cent o all collisions. The commonunderlying causes were ound to be asollows:– Insuicient watch-keeping.– Lack o situational awareness.– Failure to set priorities – lack o positive action.– Preoccupation with administrativetasks.– Failure to communicate intentions(oicer/master/pilot).– Lack o assertiveness – ailure tochallenge incorrect decisions (oicer/master/pilot).– Failure to comply with standardprocedures and internationalregulations.– Failure to utilise available data andresources.


The common underlying shortcomingsin the human-technology interace wereound to be as ollows:– Failure to operate equipmentcorrectly.– Failure to understand limitations o systems or equipment.– Lack o awareness o the “distraction”actor.

Once again, ailure on the part o ship

management in bridging the human-technology interace was ound to bethe main underlying cause.

The graph shows that equipment ailureaccounts or 20 per cent o all collisionsand that human error accounts or 68per cent.

Collision Regulations1 disregardedA recent international survey2 wascarried out with 452 respondentsrepresenting a good cross-section o sea sta, training sta and examinersrom 31 countries to discover thenorms, problems and inluenceswhich aect decisions on the bridge.Respondents were invited to give their

opinion on a number o questions. Oneo the questions was the respondent’sopinion on reasons o manoeuvrescontrary to the Collision Regulations.The replies are summarised in the tablebelow. According to the late Captain FrançoisBaillod, the initiator o the UK MarineAccident Reporting Scheme (MARS),74 per cent o reported incidentsrelated to uncertainty, violations anddisregard or the Collision Regulations.As can be noted rom the table below,answers rom the 452 respondentsconirm current suspicions engenderedby MARS and other sources thatthe Collision Regulations are otenmisunderstood, misinterpreted or




53

just plain ignored and disregardedon requent occasions. Despiteimprovements in navigational aids andtechnology and o training throughvarious STCW3 conventions, collisionsstill occur. The general consensus is thatthe Collision Regulations are not beingadhered to and are disregarded all toorequently.

ConclusionInvestigations o recent casessuggest that despite improvementsin technology and o training throughvarious STCW conventions, ISM, etc., amajority o collisions continue to occurdue to a ailure o the bridge team inollowing simple principles o bridgewatch-keeping and violations o theCollision Regulations. The key to a sae

and eicient ship is a well-trained crew,teamwork and resource management.Most shipowners are taking steps toenhance bridge procedures by ensuringtheir oicers and crew receive on-goingtraining in the operation o their vesselsas well as other industry platormssuch as Teamwork & Bridge ResourceManagement courses. Training isa proactive approach to saety. Itrequires the identiication, analysisand mitigation o hazards beore theycan aect the sae operation o thevessel. In the years to come, maritimetechnology development will requirea blending o advanced computingand simulation-based technology,concepts o dynamic analysis, o riskand reliability and o human capabilitiesand behaviour.

1 International Regulations or PreventingCollisions at Sea 1972 (as amended).2 Survey carried out by Captain Roger Syms, o The Nautical Institute.3 Standards o training, certication and watch-keeping or seaarers.

Hydrodynamicinteraction betweenships

The United Kingdom Maritime and

Coastguard Agency Marine GuidanceNote No. 199 (M) contains advice onthe causes o hydrodynamic interactionbetween ships and the measures thatcan be taken to reduce its eect.

When two ships operate in closeproximity, like or instance whenperorming ship-to-ship re-uelling,cargo transer between moving ships,or when harbour tugs assist ships inport, they will be attracted to eachother and consequently collision mighthappen. Hydrodynamic interactionbetween ships continues to be a major

contributory actor in marine casualties

and hazardous incidents. An awarenesso the nature o the pressure ieldsround a vessel moving through thewater and an appreciation o the eecto speed and the importance o rudderaction should enable a vessel handler tooresee the possibility o an interactionsituation arising and to be in a betterposition to deal with it when it doesarise. During passage planning depthcontours and channel dimensionsshould be examined to identiy areaswhere interaction may be experienced.The United Kingdom Maritime andCoastguard Agency has issued the


extremely helpul Marine Guidance

Note No. 199 (M), which providesadvice on the causes o hydrodynamicinteraction and the measures that canbe taken to reduce its eect. Gardrecommends that owners bring thecontents o Marine Guidance NoteNo. 199 (M) to the attention o theirnavigators. The ull text o the note isavailable rom https://mcanet.mcga.gov.uk/public/c4/mld/section03/MGN199.pd.




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TRICOLOR - The collision,sinking and wreck

removalBy Ivar Brynildsen, Claims Manager, Wilhelmsen Insurance Services

In October 2004 the last remains o TRICOLOR were removed rom theseabed some 20 nautical miles northo Dunkirk. With that one signiicantchapter in the whole story ollowing theloss o TRICOLOR was brought to anend. This article contains an account o the ordeal rom the shipowners’ pointo view.

A dark December night

The story starts with the collisionbetween KARIBA and TRICOLOR in theearly hours o 14th December 2002. Theevening beore, TRICOLOR, a 49,792GT, 1987-built car-carrier laden witha cargo o 2,871 luxury cars, had letZeebrugge bound or Southampton,which was the last port in Europebeore the Atlantic crossing to the US.The crew had routinely made the vesselready or sea and gone to rest or thenight in their cabins, except or thoseon watch. The two things that seaarersprobably dread the most are collisionsand ire. Knowing, however, that

they had duly and properly preparedthe vessel or sea or the voyage toSouthampton and also trusting theirshipmates on watch to navigate thevessel saely through the night in thevery busy English Channel, they couldgo to sleep and rest beore arrival inthe morning and another busy port stay.Despite the crew’s eorts to prepare thevessel or sea and the oicers’ attentionto sae navigation in busy waters, thecrew’s worst nightmare would becomea reality that night and TRICOLOR wasnever to make it to the next port.

At about 0215 hrs everybody onboard TRICOLOR was shaken by asudden impact and a terriying noise.Immediately ollowing the impactthe general alarm was sounded andeveryone except those on the bridgehurried rom their cabins to themustering station. The third engineer inthe engine room miraculously managedto evacuate through the elevator shatand accompanied the others on deck asTRICOLOR took on a rapidly increasingport list. They managed to launch aninlatable lie rat and all managed toescape the sinking vessel saely.

On the bridge the Captain, the secondmate and the lookout had observed thevessel that they were about to overtake

on a parallel course on their port side.Suddenly they became aware o thesame vessel turning hard to starboardand witnessed the vessel abeamon their port side steaming right atTRICOLOR. The Captain immediatelyput the rudder hard to starboard butthere was no way to avoid the othervessel and KARIBA hit TRICOLORwith its bow on TRICOLOR’s port side

just at o the bridge. The men on the

bridge o TRICOLOR immediatelysounded the general alarm to alerttheir resting companions and they alsomanaged to send out distress signalson the radio beore the heavy list toport orced them o the bridge andinto the cold sea and the dark night.Luckily they were picked up by theKARIBA’s crew, who managed to launcha lie boat very quickly and initiate asearch or the TRICOLOR’s crew. Thecrew in the lie rat was picked up bythe tugboat BOXER that happenedto be in the vicinity. All 24 people onboard TRICOLOR were rescued without

any injuries other than the obviouslyhorriic experience o suddenly indingonesel in utter danger by being orcedto escape into the cold sea on a darkDecember night.

The emergency responseThe shipowners Wilh. Wilhelmsen’semergency response team (ERT) wasassembled two hours ater the collisionat their headquarters in Lysaker,Oslo, Norway. The owners’ insurancepartners, Norwegian Hull Club andGard P&I, were involved rom the verybeginning and supplemented the ERT

rom their locations. Their dedicatedassistance was o cardinal importancein that they have highly proessionalclaims handlers, local representativesand expert maritime lawyers who can

Basic acts about the collision:On 14th December 2002 TRICOLOR was overtaking KARIBA on a parallelcourse on KARIBA’s starboard side in the west-bound lane o the traicseparation scheme out o Antwerp and Zeebrugge. KARIBA turnedstarboard and her bow hit and penetrated TRICOLOR’s port side. Thecollision damage to TRICOLOR breached the watertight integrity o the

hull and caused looding o her holds to the extent that she rolled over torest port side down on the seabed at a depth o about 34 metres, aboutthe same depth as her breadth.

be activated and operative at veryshort notice. In a crisis like this it is alsoreassuring or a shipowner to receive apersonal phone call rom his P&I Club’stop management with a statement o ull dedication and attention as Wilh.Wilhelmsen did rom Gard in the veryearly hours o this case.

A very important task or the ERT wasto organise the landing and care o

the crew. Many people were engagedlocally in France and Belgium to receivethe crew and arrange or medical careand lodging. As they had lost all theirbelongings, there was a need to meetthe crew’s basic needs as well as toorganise provisional identiication andtravel documents or their repatriation.It was also necessary to shield the crewrom the media, make them availableor questioning by authorities andgiving statements to the shipowners’own lawyers.

Another very important task or the ERT

was to make sure that all relatives o thecrew members were properly inormedas soon as possible so that their irstknowledge o the disaster would not berom the media. This was immediatelyattended to by the crewing agent in thePhilippines.

Pollution prevention and saety onavigationThere were two major problems thatneeded the ERT’s immediate attention.Although there were no reports o pollution rom the sunken vessel, it wasconsidered that there was imminentdanger o pollution rom the 2,155 cbmo bunker oil within the vessel.

Regardless o whether there was apossibility o salving the vessel or





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repairs or whether she was a total lossbeyond repair, it was established thatthe bunker oil had to be removed toavert the danger o pollution.

A urther concern was the act thatthe position o the sunken vesseldid constitute a severe danger tonavigation in one o the world’s busiestshipping lanes. Smit Salvage, whohappened to have vessels in the vicinity,were contracted in the early hours o 14th December 2002 to start preparingor the oil removal immediately.They were also instructed to guardTRICOLOR temporarily, with specialregard to traic in the vicinity and anypossible escape o oil. The ERT alsoco-ordinated with the French authoritiesto have the position properly markedand issue navigational warnings. In spiteo that, the wreck was actually hit byother vessels on two occasions. Wilh.Wilhelmsen and Gard then contractedtwo especially dedicated guard shipsto protect and secure the position o TRICOLOR. This proved to be a wiseprecautionary measure as later therewere several near-collisions that wereaverted by the interception o the guardvessels.

The actual pumping o the oil romthe hull started on 23rd December2002 and was conducted under verydiicult conditions due to strong tidesand winter weather. The oil removaloperation was inished on 22ndFebruary 2003. Out o a total o 2,155cbm o bunkers, 1,455 cbm had thenbeen recovered and it was estimatedthat about 100 cbm remained insideas clingage in the tanks. It was also

estimated that about 50 cbm weretrapped in slots rom where pumpingwas not possible. Sixty cbm remained ininaccessible settling tanks in the engine

room. The integrity o these tanks was,however, not in danger.

Unortunately, the calculations showedthat about 490 cbm o heavy uel oilwere unaccounted or and thus mighthave escaped to sea. Out o these490 cbm, it is thought that about 210cbm escaped during one unortunateincident when a valve broke due torough weather during the oil removaloperation.

Clean-upClean-up operations at sea and on thebeaches were initiated as the oil startedto emerge at dierent locations innearby waters and beaches. Extensivesampling analysis later established toa certain extent what portion o the oilhad originated rom TRICOLOR andwhat had not. It is clear that part o thepollution originated rom unidentiiedsources and some rom the tanker

VICKY, which collided with the wreck on1st January 2003. Some oil pollution inthe area was also thought to be oil thathad drited rom the tanker PRESTIGE,which had sunk earlier o the coast o Spain.

There was urther speculation thatsome passing vessels may havetaken advantage o the situation anddischarged some o their slop in thevicinity o the wreck, but this has neverbeen proven to be true.

Media managementAnother task or Wilh. Wilhelmsen todeal with was the media attention thata spectacular case like this attracts. Theinormation department is a vital part

o the ERT and they had their handsull responding to calls and requestsrom media rom the very beginning.Wilh. Wilhelmsen consider it vital to

be transparent and open on acts andappreciate that good co-operationwith the media is an important way o communicating with the general public.As the case developed throughoutthe winter and spring o 2003, Wilh.Wilhelmsen, in co-operation with GardP&I, London Oshore Consultants andlater SMIT Salvage, arranged pressmeetings in Rotterdam, Antwerp,London and Dunkirk. In France, thepress meetings were co-ordinated withand included the French authorities.

Wreck removalShortly ater the collision and sinkingo TRICOLOR, it was agreed with thehull underwriters that the vessel wasdamaged beyond repair and should bedeclared a total loss. Soon thereater,the French authorities, through thePréecture maritime de l’Atlantique(Premar), issued an order addressedto the shipowners to have the wreckremoved. The shipowners and Gardimmediately went ahead with thenecessary arrangements. Ater issuinga tender and a thorough review o thebids received, on 11th April 2003 thewreck removal contract was signed witha consortium ormed by SMIT Salvage,Multraship, Scaldis and URS.

The consortium presented a easibleplan or cutting the wreck in sectionswhich could be lited and transportedto shore, a method with which theyhad previous experience. The planalso included a strategy to deal withthe cargo, environmental issuesand media-handling, which was o vital importance. The operation as awhole had to be conducted in strict

conormity with local and internationalenvironmental regulations. The salvorsalso had resources to deal directly withthe general public’s great interest inthe wreck removal operation.




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The contract was on a ixed price basisand had an estimated time rame orthe operation that seemed promising.Unortunately, that time rame laterproved to be too optimistic.

At this time there was considerableinterest rom the media, especially with

regard to the oil and wreck removaloperations. In order to provide promptand correct inormation, salvors andowners set up the website www.tricolorsalvage.com, which coveredevery aspect o the operation step bystep.

On 11th November 2003 the wreckremoval operation had to betemporarily halted due to the adversewinter weather. At this time all thenecessary cutting o the wreck hadbeen inished and roughly hal o thewreck had been removed and landed

at the reception and demolition plant inZeebrugge.

All security measures with regard toguarding the wreck were still in placeand astonishingly enough there werestill incidents o near-collisions thatwere averted by the two guard vessels.

The remaining parts o the wreck werenow deteriorating rapidly and it wasclear that the next phase o the wreckremoval, starting in the spring o 2004,would be more o a grabbing process.

The operation resumed in May 2004and inally completed in October2004, by which time the wreck site hadbeen thoroughly surveyed and oundto be clear o wreckage and debris.The French authorities then promptlydeclared that the wreck removal orderhad been complied with and could belited.

ClaimsConcluding the wreck removaloperation was o course a great relie to all involved, but this was, however,only one milestone in a long journeyto deal with all the issues arising in theatermath o a major disaster like this.There are still a variety o legal matters

to be dealt with that concern themonetary loss and liabilities resultingrom the incident. Proceedings arepresently pending in the commercialcourt o Antwerp and in New York.There are also legal actions going on inFrance and other jurisdictions may yetbecome involved, as there is still timeto ile suits.

Throughout the whole ordeal theshipowners have relied heavily on theexcellent assistance rom their insurancepartners Norwegian Hull Club andGard P&I, as well as technical experts

London Oshore Consultants, ITOPFand Scandinavian Underwriters Agency,Antwerp. The London oice o theNorwegian law irm Wikborg Rein hasbeen appointed as the main law irmand is assisted by local lawyers Fransenin Belgium, Holman Fenwick & Willanin France and Holland & Knight inNew York. Northern Shipping Logisticshas represented Wilh. Wilhelmsen inthe negotiations and settlement o the pollution claims in France. Theco-operation and relationship withPremar o France and authorities in theother coastal states involved (Belgium,

Holland and UK) have also been verygood and constructive.

The support and involvement o theP&I Club and the hull and machineryinsurers is o paramount importance ina case like this. There are a number o issues to be dealt with rom the verybeginning that a shipowner can not

take on alone. The shipowner needsto direct his attention to his businessand normally does not have resourcesthat can be ully dedicated to deal withall issues arising in the atermath o adisaster such as the one in question.So as soon as the Wilh. Wilhelmsenemergency response team could

be demobilised, a team consistingo representatives rom owners andunderwriters took over the urtherhandling o the case.

ConclusionThe TRICOLOR has demonstratedvery clearly to Wilh. Wilhelmsen theimportance o running and maintaininga high standard operation and havingreliable and competent partners bytheir side when disasters like this strike.It is worth noting that this also servesthe general public and those beingaected by such unortunate events.




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Wash damage

During the last ten years theAssociation has registered about 30claims per year resulting rom washdamage. Vessels are requently involvedin cases described as “wash damage”when they are sailing in rivers and othernarrow waters. The allegation is that avessel proceeded at too high speedand that the displacement o watercaused the waves to rise and all whichhad the eect o causing other vesselsstarted to move alongside the quay.I the eect is too strong or a vesselnot properly moored or i the mooringacilities ashore not suiciently strong,the mooring lines will break or bollardsmay be pulled out o their bases.Damage may also be caused to endersand to the quays when the vessel ispressed against the quay or dolphins.

Gangways connected to the vessel caneasily be damaged or pushed againstloading or discharging equipmentashore which, as a consequence, alsomay sustain damage. In a situationwhere a tanker connected to loading ordischarging hoses or chicksan arms is

aected by wash rom a passing vessel,the loading arms may be pulled out o position and break. The consequencescould be a claim or several hundred

thousand dollars o damage to theshore installation plus a claim or milliono dollars or pollution caused by thebroken hoses.

High speed vessels like liners anddeep drat vessels are oten involved inwash or surge-damage claims. When avessel is proceeding with high speed,serious wave eects could causedamage even i the vessel is relativelyar rom the vessels moored alongsideor other objects ashore which could bedamaged. Damage could be causedeven i the vessel is proceeding witha speed less than the prescribed limitwithin the river or port area. Thereare many actors which may aectthe creation o waves or the extento damage caused. There is oten anallegation that the vessel causing thedamage passed too close to the othervessel or vessels moored alongside. I the river is narrow and the vessel deepdrated the eect o the displacedwater will increase.

What is considered sae speed or

the vessel to steer and manoeuvrecan, under certain circumstances,be ound excessive when looking atthe consequences vis-à-vis the othervessels. It will be up to the master o

Gard News 142, July 1996

the vessel to prove that he proceededwith sae speed under the presentcircumstances and without the risk o causing damage to other vessels orproperty in the area. A surge eectbetween the vessels could also easilyhappen when vessels are passing innarrow waters. One o the vessels,usually the smallest, could be pushedaway by the bow-wave and aterwardssucked against the hull o the othervessels, or the other vessels could losesteering and collide with a third vesselor run aground.

When passing in waters where othervessels could be exposed to the waveeect it is always o importance tonotice whether the vessels alongsideare moving and whether their mooringlines were properly attended to or slack.It is also important to record the speedo one’s own vessel, as well as the timeand approximate distance to the objecti something unusual is observed ornotice o damage received rom othervessels. The wave eect o one’s ownvessel could also be inluenced by othervessels passing or one’s own vesselcould be held liable or wash caused byanother vessel.




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When our local correspondents arecalled in to assist they will ask or logextracts, speed and course recordertapes, report rom the vessel and otherinormation which may be o help toreconstruct the sailing at the time o thealleged incident. They will also try tointerview the pilot and get all possible

inormation rom local authorities whomay have taped VHF Communicationsand radar observations. When thereis an allegation o damage caused toa vessel it may also be o importanceto ind out whether other vessels inthe area did experience any problemsduring the passage o the suspectvessel.

Propeller wash claims also requentlyoccur. When approaching the berth andin an attempt to stop the vessel in time,excess propeller wash may be caused.This could easily damage mooringboats or tugs which will be aectedby the increased current and can bepushed against the quay or dolphins

or other vessels nearby. Small boatscan even be illed with water whichcould cause them to capsize and resultin personal injury or death. Propellerwash during mooring or unmooringcould also cause other vessels mooredalongside to start moving and collidewith a third vessel or damage shoreproperty. The current caused by the

Hull and Machineryincident - The innocentvictim (of an unsuccessfulberthing manouevre)

The situation arose when a Client’s

vessel (the irst vessel) was tied up,port side alongside, undertakingcargo operations. Two o the crane

jibs were protruding outside on theseaboard side, well lit and marked.The stevedores and crew were havinga meal break when another vessel (thesecond vessel) approached in order todock starboard side alongside behindthe stern o the irst vessel. However,something went terribly wrong and thewell-planned manoeuvre ended up intotal disaster. The approaching vesselhit the two jibs o the irst vessel’s cranein succession, leaving one o the cranesinoperative and the other in need o immediate repairs.

The two vessels endured theinescapable ater-eects o a majorclaim: surveyors and lawyers attended,statements and reports were to beprepared. Exchange o securities,choice o law and jurisdiction occupiedthe claims handlers on both sides.Investigations into possible repairsolutions were carried out. Eventually,owners o the irst vessel and theirinsurers elected to have the repairscarried out abroad. The decision wasbased on past experience and localknowledge. Hence, the crane mostbadly damaged was shipped orrepairs. The vessel continued trading,

but without the original crane capacity.

Once the crane was completed thevessel was deviated or reitting andrigging. Eventually the vessel was backin trade in the same condition as shewas beore the incident took place.

A simple matter to most, repairsare carried out and paid, and the“wrongdoer” indemniies the innocentparty or the loss and damage. But notso simple!

Although there was agreementbetween the parties as to the liabilityo the other vessel, a lengthy debate

took place about the decisiontaken regarding repairs and thereasonableness o the actions. In spiteo various joint surveys throughout therepair process, urther documentationwas requested.

Records had to be made availableregarding every decision, strategic andoperational, which had the slightestconnection with the decision to repairthe crane or run the vessel withoutthe crane temporarily, the company’sscrapping policy, the use o redundantcranes ater scrapping o other vesselsin the leet, chartering o substitutetonnage. Decisions taken on variouslevels in the organisation over a spano several years, or actions taken on a

propeller could also cause excavationo the ground under or in close vicinityto the berth. Passenger erries otenhave their landings close o the centreo cities where pleasure boat marinasusually are situated. Boats in thesecould easily be aected by the washcaused during manoeuvring to berth.

About 40 per cent o the wash claimsregistered over the last ew yearsoccurred in US waters and 35 per centin North European waters.

Gard News 162,

May/July 2001

detailed operational area throughout

the handling o the claim, had to bedocumented through memos, minuteso meetings, etc. Because the decisionsand actions in question were o thesort that are traditionally taken ratherinormally in shipping companies, itbecame quite diicult to documentthem.

Thus, the requests meant a lot o timeand eort had to be spent to search ordocuments or interview people in orderto recapitulate the relevant acts.

This incident shows that, even in whatappears to be the most straightorwardo cases, it is o paramount importanceto be able to document one’s actionsand decisions and to keep recordsaccessible.




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Hull and machineryincident - Consequences

o a blackout

There are many reasons or a blackout,one o them being human error.

Blaackouts are every mariner’snightmare, especially i they occur innarrow waters with lots o traic orduring canal passages or in harbour

entrances. Even in open waters,blackouts can be a problem duringperiods o heavy weather. Therehave been several cases during canalpassage or in harbour entrance wherea blackout could have led to seriousbreakdown.

The incident reported below wascaused by crew negligence on a vesselheading rom one o the rivers in theGul o Mexico leading to the PanamaCanal. The vessel was loaded withexplosive cargo bound or the Far East.

During normal sea trade on motorvessels the electric power is supplied

rom either shat generators or auxiliaryengines through the main switchboard.In case o a blackout, the vessel inquestion was also equipped with anemergency generator with a separateemergency switchboard in a separateroom. The emergency generator

delivered power to the steering gear,emergency lights, etc. Such emergencygenerators are normally designedwith a switch on a switchboard, whichindicates “automatic” or “manualmode”. During normal trade the switchwill be on automatic mode. The manualis only used or manual start andtesting.

The normal practice is that theemergency generator is tested once aweek by being started with the switch inmanual mode and then switched backto automatic, otherwise the emergencygenerator would not start in case o ablackout. A lot o vessels today have

Gard News 176,November 2004/January 2005

this particular design, which is verycommon.

All the engineers on board thisparticular vessel were quite sure thatthe emergency generator was in goodworking condition, as it was regularlytested. The problem was that duringthe last test they had orgotten toswitch back to automatic mode.

The pilot was on board and thevessel was outbound in a narrow river.Everything was normal until the vesselhad a problem with the uel supply orthe auxiliary engines which resulted ina blackout and again shutdown o themain engine and loss o all power (allthree auxiliary engines were running ondiesel oil). Since the emergency switchwas on manual mode, the generator didnot start, which again resulted in loss o steering gear power, and the situationsuddenly started to be critical.

Beore the blackout the vessel speed

was approximately ive knots. Themaster lost all steering power and thevessel turned to starboard and “luckily”ended on a sand bank.

The engineers managed to solvethe uel supply problem very quicklyand ound out why the emergencygenerator had not started. The vesselwas moved with the assistance o tugsand was taken to anchorage to carryout underwater hull inspections.

No damage to the hull was ound butthe vessel had to stay in anchorage or

24 hours because o the investigationsbeing carried out by the coast guard.

There are still a lot o vessels tradingwith this particular “design weakness”.

Vessels with this design should haveroutines to avoid incidents like the onedescribed above, which could lead tomajor breakdowns and unnecessarycosts. Needless to say, one should alsoensure that such routines are ollowedproperly.




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Reducing maritimecasualties through

awareness o nautical saetyBy Knut Svein Ording, Nautical Saety & Communications Systems, DNV,

A new interpretation o SOLASrequirements relating to saetyo navigation, which applies toships contracted or constructionon or ater 1st January 2005, mayenable a signiicant reduction o maritime accidents through detailedrequirements applicable to the totalbridge arrangement on board SOLASships.

Unied interpretationThe SOLAS Amendments 2000,Chapter V, Regulation 15 contain a seto principles relating to bridge design,design and arrangement o navigationalsystems and equipment and bridgeprocedures that have not previouslybeen explicitly covered by SOLAS. Thepresent international understandingand application o Regulation 15 isdiversiied and the handling o theRegulation is in many ways let to thesubjective interpretation o the dierentlag states.

The International Association o Classiication Societies (IACS)

has recently published a uniiedinterpretation o SOLAS Chapter

V Regulation 15. IACS UniiedInterpretation or Bridge Design,Equipment, Arrangement andProcedures (UI SC181) sets orth a set o requirements or compliance with theprinciples and aims o SOLAS Chapter VRegulation 15 relating to bridge design,design and arrangement o navigational

systems and equipment and bridgeprocedures when applying therequirements o Regulations 19, 22, 24,25, 27 and 28, and taking Regulations18 and 20 into consideration.1

The requirements o the above-mentioned Regulations are harmonisedwith IMO guidelines MSC/Circ. 982(Guidelines on Ergonomic Criteriaor Bridge Equipment and Layout)and relevant ISO (InternationalOrganization or Standardization) andIEC (International ElectrotechnicalCommission) standards or applicationo the Regulations with the aim o:– acilitating the tasks to be perormedby the bridge team and the pilot in

1 UI SC181 can be ound at www.iacs.org.uk/interpretations/UISC.pd on page 156.

Gard News 175,August/October 2004

making ull appraisal o the situationand in navigating the ship saely underall operational conditions;– promoting eective and sae bridgeresource management;– enabling the bridge team and thepilot to have convenient and continuousaccess to essential inormation which ispresented in a clear and unambiguousmanner, using standardised symbols

and coding systems or controls anddisplays;– indicating the operational status o automated unctions and integratedcomponents, systems and/or sub-systems;– allowing or expeditious, continuousand eective inormation processingand decision-making by the bridgeteam and the pilot;– preventing or minimising excessiveor unnecessary work and any conditionor distraction on the bridge whichmay cause atigue or interere with thevigilance o the bridge team and thepilot;– minimising the risk o human errorand detecting such error i it occurs




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through monitoring and alarm systems,in time or the bridge team and thepilot to take appropriate action.

Today, nearly two years ater theimplementation o the SOLAS 2000Amendments, most vessels built toSOLAS standards are still built without

ully implementing the aims o Chapter V Regulation 15. Hopeully, the uturewill change this based on the presentIACS interpretation o Chapter VRegulation 15. Nautical awareness gives positiveresultsSome o the IACS members oer toplevel voluntary nautical saety notationswhich exceed the saety level o theIACS Uniied Interpretation o Chapter

V Regulation 15. Focus on the totalbridge system, incorporating ourmain parts – the human operator, the

technical system, the man/machineinterace and the procedures – isimperative or sae navigation.

A general trend within the developmento navigational equipment is thatdierent types o equipment areincluded in more and more integratedsystems, and that the instrumentationis getting more sophisticated. In thisrespect the coniguration, interacingand inal tuning and testing o thesystems are o great importance. Aproper on-board testing o the bridgeequipment during sea trials ensures

that the bridge equipment is tuned andit or purpose.

For instance, a recent study concludedthat vessels classed by Det Norske

Veritas (DNV) with additional nauticalsaety class notations are involved inewer nautical accidents compared tovessels built to SOLAS only. The studywas carried out to compare the risk o nautical accidents in vessels built toone o DNV’s additional nautical saetyclass notations and vessels built tobasic SOLAS requirements. The studyincluded all DNV-classed vessels above

6,000 gross tonnage built ater 1990over the period rom 1990 to 2001.Nautical accidents were deined ascollisions between ships, groundingsand contact damage, which togetheraccount or more than 50 per cent o all marine accidents irrespective o criterion. The result o the study shows

that the accident rate was reducedby 50 per cent in vessels with theadditional nautical saety class notationscompared to vessels built to basicSOLAS, which can be characterised as asigniicant reduction.

Other studies also conirm therelevance o addressing the totalbridge system and the requirementsto bridge equipment. For instance, it isestimated by DNV that the appropriateuse o an approved Electronic ChartDisplay and Inormation System (ECDIS)may signiicantly reduce the number

o groundings and collisions, whilestatistics rom Canada (relating to shipsgreater than 1,500 gross tonnage)show that accidents have decreasedby about 75 per cent since the shipswere equipped with Dierential GlobalPositioning System (DGPS) and ECDIS.By using the ECDIS, the navigatorcan ocus his or her attention on one,“complete”, navigation system. This willreduce the chances o miscalculation,whilst giving the navigator more time tokeep a proper lookout. The opportunityo having the electronic chartsimplemented with the radar picture in

a chart radar will add beneits to theinormation obtained rom the ECDIS.Recent studies show a very positivesaety eect o this equipment bothin correlation to anti-grounding andanti-collision, as the relative and truepicture o the situation is presented onone screen with all essential inormationavailable to make qualiied and saedecisions.

ConclusionLessons learned rom studying nauticalcasualties are that the reliability o thetotal bridge system depends not only

on the reliability o each individualcomponent, but also on its itness oruse as an element in a larger system.It does not matter which part o thesystem ails i the consequences arethe same. When analysing “humanactor casualties” in detail, one willobserve an elementary or a series o

elementary events that in many casescould have been avoided by a welldesigned total bridge system. Theability to operate a ship in a sae andeicient way becomes increasinglysensitive to arrangements and technicalsolutions, in particular with respect tohuman capabilities and limitations. Thebridge is becoming more and morethe total control centre o the vessel,rom where all main unctions aremonitored and controlled. Thereore,when addressing overall saety andeiciency in bridge operations, it is veryimportant to ocus on the perormance

o the total bridge system. This requirescareul consideration o all actors whichinluence perormance and reliabilityo both the human operator and theequipment as parts o a total system.

Statistics show that DNV’s additionalnautical saety class notationssigniicantly increase saety or ships.There should also be good reasonsor believing that the new IACS UISC181 will do the same and secure theundamental aspects o a total bridgesystem.




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Ship simulators -Virtual reality without

P&I liability

Today’s advanced maritime simulators

can be more than just training tools.

IntroductionAs in the airline industry, simulatortraining oers an important contributionto the education and in-servicetraining o crew, with one o the mainadvantages being that a modernsimulator makes it possible to createand streamline realistic exercises whichwould be diicult, expensive andpotentially dangerous to carry out inreal lie. It is thereore reasonable toexpect that simulator equipment andtechnology should have the potential

to improve the competence o vesselcrews and thereby prevent accidentsrom happening. Whereas only alimited range o simulator trainingand assessment is mandatory underthe STCW-95,1 in recent years GardServices has seen ship operatorswho have made major investmentsin developing their own trainingacilities and simulators with a levelo sophistication high above theprescribed standards. In this issue GardNews visits two members o Gard P&Iwho are among those.

Evergreen Group - EvergreenMarine CorporationThe Evergreen Seaarer Training Centrein Taoyuan outside Taipei, occupies

5,000 square metres and oers a

wide range o crew training acilitiesoperated by a sta o 19 people,including 13 instructors. Captain LinTing-shyang, Junior Vice Presidento the Training Centre, explains thattheir main piece o equipment is aPolaris bridge simulator manuacturedby Kongsberg Maritime Ship Systemsin Norway, but that they also haveseveral other training tools, such as aGMDSS simulator room, smaller bridgesimulators, Nabco main engine controlsimulators and a propulsion planttraining room with real-size enginecomponents, to mention some. Thetraining centre was ISO-certiied in June2001. The main simulator is equippedwith a 360-degree projection screenand the simulator produces rollingand pitching eects as well as soundeects to increase the sense o beingon board a ship. The bridge has a ullrange o navigational and vessel controlequipment copied rom the varioustypes o vessels rom the Evergreenleet. The simulator sotware presentlycovers 16 ports in nine countries andtogether this gives the crew a chanceto amiliarise themselves with dierentvessel types under various portsituations. A system is also in place toevaluate the training perormance andto continuously improve the education.The training programmes oered are

tailor-made or the Evergreen leet and

also or vessels under development.The ollowing programmes are availableat the Training Centre:– Standard ship bridge simulatortraining or deck oicers;– Standard propulsion plant simulatortraining or engine oicers;– Hazardous cargo handling training;– GMDSS training station drills;– CBT training course modules;– Deck and engine oicer rereshertraining and updating;– Bridge resource management trainingcourses;– Basic Electric, Electronic andAutomation control training course.

Evergreen received the Lloyd’s ListCommitment to Training and Educationaward at the 2003 Lloyd’s List MaritimeExcellence Awards.

Star CruisesThe Star Cruises Ship Simulator (SCSS)is located in Port Klang, Malaysia. TheSCSS is the centre o a wide range o training activities such as ship handlingcourses, human actor and crewresource management and emergencymanagement. It is a ull mission bridgesimulator where the bridge is copiedrom Star Cruises’ twin mega-ships,SuperStar Leo and SuperStar Virgo.The simulator was delivered by STN





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Atlas and completed in 1998 at a costo USD 5 million. SCSS is managedunder a joint venture with the DanishMaritime Institute. The main bridgehas a ull range o instruments, displaysand manoeuvring systems and employsadvanced techniques or imagegeneration to provide a 210-degree

ield o view which can be rotated tocover 360 degrees. There is also asecondary bridge with a 135-degreeield o view. To recreate realisticberthing manoeuvres it is also possibleto change point o view, or examplerom the bridge wing. The centerconsole on the main bridge, togetherwith the visual system, can be turned90 degrees to simulate situations whenthe master is conning the vessel romeither bridge wing. Sound recordingsrom various ports provide an authenticbackground o VHF radio. A motionsystem together with recorded sounds

rom wind and weather is also added tocreate a realistic bridge environment.With all eatures combined thesimulator creates a virtual-realisticenvironment rom actual ports. Thereare presently 25 ports (including oneartiicial) rom 11 countries availablein the simulator database. From aseparate room the instructor controlsand monitors the events and assumesthe role o other ships, pilots, tugs, etc.,during the dierent scenarios that areplayed out. Both bridges have videoand audio recording equipment andthe various recordings are synchronised

and used in the debrieing process. Asregards vessel types, there are presentlymore than 200 simulations available.The simulator also interaces with theexisting voyage data recorders ittedon Star Cruises vessels so that actualevents can be recreated in detail andreplayed or training and investigationpurposes. This orms a part o StarCruises’ Nautical Learning Event Reportsystem or which Star Cruises won theSaety & Environment award at theLloyd’s List-SMM 2002 Awards.

Spare simulator capacity is made

available to a number o other shipoperators, organisations and researchinstitutes. The SCSS is also usedor perormance evaluation. As anexample, the Australia Marine PilotsAssociation uses the SCSS or theircompetency audits. The simulator canalso play a role in port studies, andhas been used in the development o new cargo terminals to develop saeoperation and calculate docking andundocking parameters or dierentvessel types under dierent weatherand current conditions. The simulatoris also regularly used by Star Cruises to

prepare sae calls to new ports.

Captain Gustav Gronberg, VicePresident o Star Cruises’ Nautical

Department, says: “It is an enormousadvantage or a shipping company todesign, own and operate a simulatorcentre. The simulator can be tailor-made with the same equipment ason the real ships, with this only aminimum o time needs to be spenton amiliarisation etc. when the oicers

come or training. They are also trainingin the same environment as in real lie,as the ports have been developed inthe simulator. It is also a very goodtool to oster teamwork and good co-operation between our bridge teamsand the local pilots in the various portsthat we are calling to.”

Gard Services’ viewGard Services sees simulator trainingas a very important tool to improve theskills o members’ and clients’ oicers.Simulator training is important notonly or navigation and manoeuvring

practice, but also or training o engineers and technicians. In additionto skills improvement, ocus may alsobe placed on increased attentivenessand correct attitude. Obviously vesselsimulators can not replace on-the-jobtraining and real lie experience, buthigh-quality simulator training willimprove equipment amiliarisationand enhance saety awareness in anindustry to which the human element iscrucial. A simulator does not necessarilyhave to be o the types described inthis article to be useul in a particulartraining situation, but the increased

sophistication o the equipment whichis available opens new areas wheresimulators can add considerablevalue. Simulator-based port studiesand incident analysis such as the onesmentioned in this article are exampleso activities which undoubtedly mustbe expected to improve saety andreduce accidents or those shipownerswho make these eorts. Gard Servicesthereore welcomes and encouragesthe continued commitment to this areao operation that has been shown bythe shipowners eatured in this articleand also by several other members

and clients, as well as the industry thatcontinuously develops and improvesthe equipment. Gard Services is alsosupporting a number o projects thatinvolve both simulator training anddevelopment o new training methods.One o the most recent projects isa joint venture between the RoyalNorwegian Naval Academy, KristianGerhard Jebsen Skipsrederi AS andGard Services. The project concentrateson pilot handling and developed aconcept or training o deck oicers inhow to organise their duties when apilot is embarked. Special attention was

given to attentiveness, crew resourcemanagement and bridge organisation.This concept is now available both asa laptop presentation or workshop or

crew conerences as well as a simulatortraining course. More inormationabout the pilot handling programmeis available rom Gard Services uponrequest.

1 Seaarer’s Training, Certication and

Watchkeeping Code, 1995. Training andassessment in state approved simulators ismandatory in respect o use o radar and ARPA(Automatic Radar Plotting Aids).




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Voyage Data Recorders- Black box technology

paves its way into shipping Voyage Data Recorders may play animportant role in maritime accidentsinvestigations.

Black boxes in aircratThe so-called “black box” carried byaircrat is in act not black, but orangeand has relective strips along its sides.The reason is to make it more easilyidentiiable to crash site investigators.There are two separate boxes inside

the box: a light data recorder and acockpit voice recorder. Aircrat havehad them or many years. The irstlight data recorder was used in 1958and the irst cockpit voice recorderwas used in 1965. Black boxes arestandard on both passenger andmilitary aircrat. For obvious reasons,they have to be extremely strongand capable o surviving extremes o shock, penetration, pressure, ire andwater. Normally, they are carried in theater end o the uselage, or the tail,as this area generally suers (relatively)less damage than the nose.

The light data recorder (FDR) andcockpit voice recorder (CVR) eachserves a dierent purpose. The FDRcan record hundreds o separatepieces o inormation about thetechnical perormance and conditiono the aircrat – the position o therudders or example. As its nameimplies, the CVR records everythingthat is said in the cockpit or a30-minute period beore a crash.

The impact on the shipping industry – EU and IMO requirements

Voyage Data Recorders (VDR) are nowhaving an impact more and more onthe shipping industry. Some ships,mainly passenger ships, have beenrequired to it a VDR as rom 1st July2002, the date on which changes tothe SOLAS Convention, approvedby IMO’s Maritime Saety Committee(MSC), came into eect. Also requiredto it a VDR are ships, other thanpassenger ships, o 3,000 GT andupwards built ater 1st July 2002. Soonthe majority o ships will be requiredto it them.

The European Union has alreadydecided on its requirements, which

are set out in Directive 2002/59/EC.1 IMO has agreed to adopt worldwidecarriage requirements which are in linewith those contained in this Directive.

The MSC has also endorsed theindings o a easibility studyundertaken by another IMO sub-committee, on Saety o Navigation,which looked into the need or themandatory carriage o VDRs on

existing cargo ships. Under a dratamendment to SOLAS Regulation V/20 agreed by IMO, all cargo shipso 3,000 GT and upwards built beore1st July 2002 must be retroitted witha VDR no later than 1st January 2008.Cargo ships o 20,000 GT and upwardsmust comply by 1st January 2007.

However, the EU Directive requires VDRs to comply with more stringentstandards than those proposedby IMO or the “simpliied” VDR.Whilst IMO has yet to inalise itsrequired standards, it is understood

that the ramework so ar in placerequires the VDR to collect and storeinormation concerning the position,movement, physical condition andcommand and control o a ship. IMOrequirements state that a VDR shouldbe installed in a protective capsulethat is brightly coloured and ittedwith an appropriate device to assistlocation. It should operate completelyautomatically.

The UK’s Marine AccidentInvestigation Branch (MAIB) hascommented that VDRs are playing

an increasing role in their eorts toestablish the cause(s) o accidents,but they said their investigations havebeen hampered by the act that noless than 13 dierent models o VDRshave been or are being developed.Each o the 13 uses slightly dierenttechnology to store and play backthe inormation. The MAIB is workingclosely with IMO in relation to theproposed standard model.

Practical considerationsNot everyone in the industry agreeswith the steps that have been taken.In a letter to a trade newspaper inJuly this year, a senior igure at a

1 See article “EU vessel trac monitoring and inormation system” in Gard News issue No. 171.

Gard News 172,November 2003/January 2004

shipowning and operating companysaid: “It is absolutely ridiculous thatthe regulations stipulate a type o black box that will sink with the vessel.Who will go down 2,000 metres to3,000 metres to pick the device upand i so, what will the cost be?” Thewriter o this letter goes on to suggestthat the answer is that the box shouldbe “ree-loating”, similar to an EPIRB(Emergency Position Indicating Radio

Beacon), but this will still have to beretrieved in some way. No doubt thelocation o the incident will dictate thetime and cost involved. Black boxescarried on aircrat are itted with anunderwater locator beacon.

The writer could perhaps have added:“and who will pay the cost?” Whoseproperty is it? As part o the ship’sequipment, paid or and provided bythe shipowner, it is presumably theshipowner’s property, at least until thehull insurers take over title to the ship.In turn, this perhaps brings us to the

question: “who will beneit rom theuse o a VDR?”

Space does not allow a ull discussiono this question, but in the widestpossible sense, one answer might be“the whole shipping industry”. In theairline industry, inormation learnedrom casualties, especially inormationwhich would not have been availablebut or the black box, is or shouldbe used to avoid a similar accidentin uture. This is not (yet) the case inthe maritime industry. Unortunately,however, the very large amounts

o money which are oten at stakein high-proile maritime casualties,coupled with the prevalence o the“blame culture” and the increasinguse o criminal proceedings againstboth individual crew membersand companies, mean that manyshipowners and their insurers are,understandably, reluctant to discloseinormation which may be usedagainst them, not only in civil, but alsoin criminal proceedings, later on.

Potential benets?Nevertheless, Gard Services sees apotential beneit to its members andclients in the itting, use and recovery




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o a black box. Many cases involvingsigniicant damage to property andthereore large sums o money do nothit the headlines.

The black box may be able to provideat least some o the quick and detailedinormation which property and

liability insurers need, especially inthe early stages o a claim, to evaluatetheir potential liability and to plantheir strategy or the weeks, monthsand years ahead. For example, in acollision action, it is not uncommonto discover that a vessel’s courserecorder was switched o or wasnot working. This may mean thatvital evidence covering the periodimmediately beore the collision hasbeen lost. Sometimes, the gap can be(partly) illed by the evidence obtainedrom the crew, but since humansare involved, there is, inevitably,

an element o subjectivity in suchevidence. The inormation provided bya unctioning course recorder or otherpiece o equipment can remove thatsubjectivity.

I a vessel is lost, or suers a seriouscasualty such as grounding, resultingin extensive damage to the ship andperhaps the cargo, there are likelyto be signiicant claims arising outo that incident. The cause o thecasualty may be diicult to pinpoint.From the perspective o the claimunder the hull insurance policy, both

the shipowner and the hull insurersare likely to be keen to ind outexactly what happened on boardimmediately beore the vessel waslost. The shipowners’ liability insurerswill also wish to secure access to suchinormation, as it will prove vital in theirinvestigation and decision-makingprocess.

Insoar as the inormation obtainedrom a black box may be speciic to atype or size or vessel, or to a particulartrade or cargo, it may also assist thoseresponsible or risk assessment and or

setting the premium or that risk.

ExamplesTwo examples may suice. Theirst incident in question, althoughserious, did not involve loss o lieor pollution. Further, immediatelyater the incident, it was possible ordetailed investigations to be made.The acts were that the MARIA H, asmall (1,300 GT) cargo vessel, struck arailway bridge over the River Trent inEngland. Both ship and bridge werebadly damaged. The master sueredan injury to his leg which, ortunately,was not serious. The incident wasinvestigated by the MAIB. It oundthat a manoeuvring plan had not beenproperly agreed and understood

beore the vessel was moved in alood tide. Among other comments,one o which was about possiblecommunication problems betweenthe six-man crew, consisting o threePoles, one Italian, one Brazilian andone Portuguese, the MAIB said that thelack o a VDR meant that the extent o

the agreed manoeuvring plan couldnot be veriied and they were unable tosay exactly what (i anything) had beenagreed.

In the second incident, thecross-channel erry PRIDE OFPORTSMOUTH caused severedamage to the rigate HMS ST.ALBANS. The warship was berthedat Portsmouth when the erry camein to berth in bad weather. Due toa wrong helm order given by themaster, the erry contacted andbadly damaged the nearly-new

warship. The erry hersel sustainedrelatively little damage, but, as withall vessels in the leet in question,she was itted with a VDR. Details o the circumstances leading up to theincident and in particular, the actionstaken and orders given on the bridgein the minutes beore contact werethus available to the MAIB when itcarried out its investigation into thecasualty. It is understood that the MAIBrelied “heavily” on the inormationobtained rom the vessel’s VDR.The MAIB report contains a numbero recommendations, especially

concerning the need to improve bridgecommunication.

Fortunately, neither vessel was insuredby Gard Services.

ConclusionBlack boxes are here to stay or mostships. The beneit o (retro-) ittingthese boxes may however be rathermore real and recognisable or owners(and their insurers) than the beneitwhich owners have seen rom otherEU and indeed IMO initiatives. Thesort o inormation which a black box

will collect is inormation which mightwell otherwise be lost in the evento a serious casualty. For the reasonsexplained above, shipowners and theirinsurers should be able to obtain, romthe black box, technical inormationthat could prove invaluable tothem in trying to reconstruct eventsimmediately beore the casualty.

I this inormation can be madeavailable to a wider audience than theshipowners and their insurers, withoutear o it being used against them,lessons can be learned and mistakesavoided. The industry as a wholeshould be made saer and the cost o carriage by sea may be reduced. The“new” inormation may even make

the resolution o disputes quicker andcheaper.

The Chie Inspector o the MAIB hasrecently said that he is ashamed o how the shipping industry compareswith the airline industry in how ithandles saety concerns. In the ields

o evidence recording, evidencerecovery and the opportunity andability to constructively use suchevidence to prevent a similar accidenthappening in uture, the shippingindustry may have much to learn romthe airline industry. It is a challenge toall concerned to learn that lesson.




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Computerisation obridges and engine rooms

- Progress or regression?Lead, log and lookoutThere was a time when sailorsnavigated around the world with lead,log and lookout. In principle, modernnavigators do much the same but theyare aided by extraordinary electronicsand granted a precision denied to theirpredecessors.

Inormation technology is having animpact on many industries and the

shipping industry is no exception.Bridge, engine room and cargooperations are awash with maritimetechnology. Every third new shipbuilt today and many more existingships are being outitted with thelatest Integrated Bridge System (IBS)and “total concept” engine roomautomation systems.

The basic bridge coniguration includesthin ilm transistor/liquid crystal displayscreen radar (TFT/LCD)/ARPA, voyagemanagement system (VMS), electronicchart display and inormation system

(ECDIS), duplicated GPS and DGPS,doppler log, gyrocompass, steeringconsole with adaptive autopilot,echo sounder with playback memory,magnetic compass, wind sensor, voyagedata recorder (VDR) and automaticidentiication system (AIS).

A typical voyage management systemincludes:- TFT electronic chart display with thechoice o radar overlay.- Conning inormation display(navigation, machinery and alarmstatus).

- Voyage planning (ECDIS chartcorrection, route planning, weatherrouting and voyage optimisation).- Navigation/ECDIS interace (ullyinteraced with autopilot and speedcontrol systems).- Hull monitoring system (warnings o excessive hull stress, acceleration andbottom slamming).

All ships built ater 1st July 2002 arerequired to be itted with VDR and AISand tankers will be required to havean AIS transponder itted no later thanthe irst saety equipment survey onor ater 1st July 2003. The VDR is ullyinteraced with the radars and mostother bridge equipment. Even though

it is not a requirement to do so, AIS arebeing interaced with the radar systems.Passenger ships are being itted witha duplicated system consisting o two independent IBS with all criticalcomponents duplicated.

On the other hand, engine roomsare being looded with tailor-made“total concept” state o the artautomation systems incorporating

Universal Monitoring & Control (UMS/UCS) with alarm and control panels inthe accommodation and the bridge,Diesel Manoeuvring System (DMS)as a complete bridge control systemoering ully automatic remote controlo the main engine rom the bridge andengine control room, Diesel ProtectionSystem (DPS), the stand-alone dieselengine slowdown and shutdown saetysystem or automatic power reductionto protect the propulsion systemagainst damage, Electronic GovernorSystem(EGS) or accurate control o speed in a uel eicient manner even

at low RPMs and automatic overspeedprevention in heavy seas, PropulsionControl System (PCS) as the answer toapplying integrated machinery controland monitoring in a simple and easy touse ashion.

Engines are being converted romthe standard camshat operation toelectronic control o uel injection andexhaust valve actuation. This makesengine adjustment possible throughelectronic control. The whole concepto electronic control is intended toensure better combustion eiciency in

its various maniestations across a ship’sull operating proile. Unlike a standardengine, uel injection characteristics canbe optimised at many dierent loadconditions, and maximum pressurecan be kept constant over a wider loadrange, oering improved consumptionand emissions perormance at part-load and light loads. The acility toswitch to low emission modes, to meetparticularly stringent local emissioncontrols, oten ar tougher thaninternational limits, is considered tobe very advantageous. The spreadingo marine emission and smoke controlregulations gives added signiicance tosuch arrangements. Electronic engineoperation is advantageous in tuning

the engine to the diering ignitionproperties o the uel oil bunkered bythe vessel at various points around theworld.

Given the worldwide trading pattern,many ships draw bunkers rom variouslocations. Even or uel o consistentviscosity, which is normally used,quality is said to vary considerably.While vessels are equipped with a

homogeniser, the electronic systemhas proved to be a useul tool or theship’s engineering sta in optimisingcombustion perormance with heavyuel oil (HFO) o varying properties.Signiicantly, HFO has been usedquay to quay with the engine set up inelectronic mode. It is probably too earlyto quantiy the impact o electronicoperation on overall uel consumption,or on maintenance costs, although theshipowning sector at large will havecertain expectations in this regard.

Continuous development o

marine technologyAs we look into the uture, it is likelythat there will continue to be changesin the way ships are designed and built.Twenty years ago, the assessment o the structural strength o a ship wasbased on static loads, semi- empiricalormulations and successul serviceexperience. Today naval architectsare able to accurately predict thedynamic loads impacting on a ship’sstructure as well as the dynamicresponse or resulting stresses in thatstructure. Using advanced theories o ship motions and hydrodynamics and

with urther advances in computertechnology, naval architects will be ableto apply and analyse ship motion andstructural response to a wide range o sea conditions.

It is unlikely that there will be a quantumchange in the way ships are designedand built. So what can be expectedrom the continuing developmento maritime technology? It is hopedthat the result will lead to maritimeoperations which are saer, morereliable, durable and cost eective.

Today’s mariners are provided withtechnology and precision that theirpredecessors would have envied. With





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all this technology, bridge watch-keeping and engine room operationsought to be saer. Are they? I not, whynot?

There are indications that hightechnology equipment is a contributingactor behind a number o collisions

and casualties. There are numerousrecent examples whereby marinershave made expensive and even tragicmistakes even when provided with allthis technology. The latest Saety Digesto the UK Marine Accident InvestigationBranch (MAIB) suggests a number o solutions to this problem, which hasalmost everything to do with the humanelement. The “human-technology”interace reveals many shortcomings.MAIB Chie Inspector Admiral JohnLang notes, under his human elementconcerns, that there are three issueswhich must be considered: an ability

to operate the system or equipmentcorrectly, an understanding o anylimitations and an awareness o the“distraction” actor. Standardisationo the layout o equipment could alsoplay an important role in assistingin the operation o high technologyequipment.

Furthermore, it goes without sayingthat such electronic equipment mayprovide a alse sense o security.The navigator dazzled by all thisnavigational waponry monitors his ownand other ships’ positions as bright

symbols with vectors, dots and targetdata menus on integrated radar screensand electronic charts may considerthis as precision navigation and anaccurate indication o other ships’intentions or collision avoidance andail to check his own ship’s positionby alternative conventional meansor ascertain the movement o othervessels in the vicinity by simply lookingout o the window. Similarly, theengineer hypnotised by all this engineroom automation may complacentlymonitor the various electronic enginecontrol and alarm panels and ail to

carry out regular checks and plannedmaintenance o critical enginemachinery.

TrainingSome owners may be lured bymanuacturers into buying sophisticatedshipboard equipment by highlightingthe additional saety as well as thelong-term savings in operational costswithout suicient attention being givento the training o those who are going

to have to use the equipment.

As anyone who has worked a computerknows, a little knowledge can be adangerous thing and the user let to hisor her own devices may get a result, butnot by the best method. Training is thekey and it must embrace both normaland abnormal situations.

Advances in shipboard technologyhave previously centred on making theequipment more reliable and robust;however, it is imperative that emphasisbe placed on the man-machine

interace.

Many maritime colleges have beenexpanding the amount o technologythey use, with emphasis on simulators,

VTS training and ensuring seaarerscomply with STCW 95, but is thistraining suicient in catching up withever-changing technology? The milliondollar question is: “are shipownersensuring that their crews are properlytrained in understanding and operatinghigh technology beore they arehanded the responsibility o operatingmodern vessels, or are they solely

relying upon the education that theircrews have received in the past - or arethey relying upon STCW 95 to do so?”

Training is a proactive approach tosaety. It requires the identiication,analysis and mitigation o hazardsbeore they can aect the saeoperation o the vessel. In the yearsto come, maritime technologydevelopment will require a blending o advanced computing and simulation-based technology, concepts o dynamicanalysis, o risk and reliability and o human capabilities and behaviour.

In conclusion, it is imperative thatshipowners ensure that the gap in the

human-technology interace is bridgedby providing competent comprehensivetraining in operating and understandingthe limitations o high technologyequipment and an awareness o the “distraction” actor, with specialemphasis on the alse sense o securitythat such high technology equipment

may provide.

“Man is the single greatest asset theshipowner has”, notes MAIB Chie Inspector Admiral John Lang. “Heis worth looking ater, and moneyspent training him to understand andoperate technology will pay handsomedividends.”




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The interace between hulland machinery insurance

and P&I rom the P&I claimshandler’s perspectiveGard News has a look at the coveror collision liability and liability orcontact damage to third party propertyunder the most common standard hullterms and the P&I Rules, and considershow the two types o cover interact inpractice.

IntroductionP&I insurance is primarily intended tocover a shipowner or operator’s liability

to others and it generally excludesdamage to the insured’s own property.1 Hull and machinery is basicallyinsurance or the client’s ship as itsprimary asset. Where the two typeso insurance interact is in the area o collision liability and liability or contactdamage to third party property.

Is it necessary or those handling P&Iclaims to understand the basics o hull and machinery terms? For thosehandling liability or property claims,the answer is a deinite “yes”. Hulland machinery and P&I are oten

complementary when it comes tocollision liability and liability or damageto piers, loading cranes and other thirdparty property. As a matter o act,the irst need o protection insurance(the “P” in P&I) arose because hullunderwriters in the mid-1800s werenot prepared to cover more thanthree-ourths o shipowners’ collisionliability. Mutual insurance associationso shipowners evolved to protect eachother in respect o losses arising outo bearing one-ourth liability as sel-insurance.

Liability arising out o Collision orStrikingCollision liability means the liabilityo the insured to third parties whosustain injury, damage or loss as aresult o the collision o the insuredvessel with another vessel. Such thirdparties can be the owner o the othervessel involved in the collision, owners

o cargo on board the other vessel,persons on board the other vesselwho may sustain injury, or other partiesaected by the consequences o thecollision, e.g., by the escape o bunkeroil rom the other vessel.

All standard hull conditions covercollision liability, but English termscover only three-ourths. Hence, underEnglish conditions it is envisaged that

the assured will place insurance or theremaining one-ourth liability elsewhere– typically added to the P&I insurance.Such addition must be explicit in theP&I terms o entry.

Under the Norwegian Marine InsurancePlan, a shipowner may insure his ull(our-ourths) collision liability with thehull underwriter, but even in such a casethere are certain liabilities arising out o a collision that would not be covered,e.g., liability in respect o death orpersonal injury sustained by persons onthe other vessel, or liability or pollution

arising out o a spill rom the othervessel.2

A limitation that applies to all standardhull conditions is that the owner isinsured or collision liability up tothe insured value o the vessel, butno urther. In certain circumstances,the collision liability may exceed thatinsured value, in which case the P&Iinsurance will respond. This is the so-called “excess collision liability cover”.

Another intriguing aspect is thatthere are variations in the standard

hull conditions in dierent marketson the extent and type o collisionliability cover. One example: i theother vessel sinks as a result o thecollision and a wreck removal is orderedby the authorities – would the hullcover respond to the collision liabilityproportion o the wreck removal costs?The answer will dier across conditions

1 Rule 63 o Assuranceoreningen Gard’s 2005 Rules or Ships excludes damage to the ship or anypart thereo unless it orms part o a claim or conscation under Rule 49. Rule 50, however, allowsrecovery where the member is the owner o the damaged property and would have been liable

had the property been owned by a third party.2 Liability or the cost o cleaning the other ship oiled in a collision, however, is covered by hullinsurance to the same extent hull insurance covers collision liability.3 For example, Norwegian and German hull conditions include removal o the wreck o the othervessel as a collision liability. English and Swedish conditions do not.


and markets,3 and since the P&Iinsurance will respond to the liabilitythat alls outside the hull insurance,the P&I underwriter must obtaininormation as soon as possible in orderto properly assess the exposure andprotect his interests.

Some shipowners have placed ull (our-ourths) collision liability under their P&Iinsurance. This collision liability cover

would be the most comprehensiveliability cover, because all third partyliability arising out o the collisionwould in principle be covered withoutrestrictions or monetary limitations.However, the shipowner would stillneed his hull and machinery insuranceto deal with the loss o or damage tohis own vessel.

Standard hull and machinery conditionsalso provide cover in respect o liabilityarising out o the striking by the insuredship o third party property other thana ship. The insurance covers the risk

o loss or damage caused by physicalcontact between the hull or the insuredvessel (or equipment permanentlyaixed to the vessel) and third partyproperty, or example a pier or buoy.Americans sometimes reer to suchincidents as “allision” but this is not auniversal term. FFO (damage to ixedand loating objects) is the shorthandor striking damage under the Englishterms.

Whereas collision liability is sometimesapportioned three-ourths/one-ourth between hull and P&I, the FFO

liability risk is very rarely split in thisway. Standard English hull conditionsexclude the FFO liability risk, whichthe shipowner would then add tothe P&I insurance. Under Norwegianconditions, the FFO liability risk isusually placed under the hull insurance.The same goes or German conditions,which also provide cover or damageto third party property caused by themovement o the insured vessel evenabsent any physical contact – e.g.,property damage caused by a wavecreated by the insured vessel passing atexcessive speed.




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Again, the cornerstone o the P&Iinsurance is that it responds to liabilitiesthat are not covered under the hullinsurance. Hence, the P&I insurancewould cover “wave damage” liabilitywhen the ship is insured on English hullconditions.

There are also variations in standardhull conditions across markets as to thescope o cover or liabilities not causedby collision or striking as deined above.Examples are property damage causedby the use o the ship’s equipment inthe course o operations, or instancethe dragging o a sub-sea ibre cableby the ship’s anchor or the damage toterminal equipment by the ship’s crane.Again, the P&I insurance will respond toliabilities that all outside the terms o the hull insurance.

Comparison o conditions

It is beyond the scope o this articleto set out all the variations in standardhull conditions around the world, butsome o the more important dierencesbetween English, German andNorwegian conditions are tabled below.

P&I cover or collision, striking andother property damageThe P&I insurance is designed as anamed risk cover, where only risks thatare positively mentioned in the termso entry and the Club’s Rules will be

covered. The member is covered orthe risks speciied in Parts II, III and IVo the Rules as are agreed between themember and the Association. P&I coveror collision, striking and damage toproperty begins only where standardhull terms leave o. This is madeexplicit in Rule 71.6

Rules 36, Collision with other ships,7 and 37, Damage to ixed or loatingobjects,8 cover the liability not coveredby the hull insurance. Further, Rule39, Loss or damage to property,9 willpick up liability or property damagethat is not customarily covered bystandard hull terms. For example,liability or damage to third partyproperty caused by the ship’s use o equipment is not covered by standardhull terms. Thus, damage to the dockcaused by the ship’s cargo gear whileengaged in cargo operations would

be a P&I liability. Because standard hullconditions dier, and because P&I isdesigned to pick up liability only wherestandard hull terms leave o, the P&Iclaims handler must know the acts o the incident and the terms o the hullpolicy beore deciding whether theparticular property claim alls within theP&I cover.

Claims handling considerationsWhat considerations drive a shipownerto place collision and striking (FFO)

English – ITC Hull 834 German – D.T.V.5 Norwegian Marine Insurance Plan(and other Scandinavian hull terms)

Running Down Clause (RDC):Three-ourths to be covered byhull and machinery terms,one-ourth to be covered by P&I.Fixed and Floating Objects (FFO):Four-ourths to be covered by P&I

Collision (RDC) and striking (FFO)covered by hull and machinery termsplus liability or damage causedby movements o the vessel ornavigational measures including wavedamage.

Collision (RDC) and striking (FFO)covered by hull and machinery terms.

Summary of conditions for collision and FFO cover under main hull and machinery terms available

4 The Institute Time Clauses, Hulls, 1.10.83 (ITCH 83) remain the most widely-used version o English conditions. Under their latest version(International Hull Clauses 2003) our-ourths RDC and FFO are optional.5 Deutschen Transportversicherungs Verband; DTV Hull Clauses 1978, revised in 1982, 1984,1992 and 1994.6 “Rule 71 Other insuranceThe Association shall not cover:Liabilities, losses, costs or expenses which are covered by the Hull Policies or would have been covered by the Hull Policies had the Ship been ullyinsured on standard terms (…)”.7 “Rule 36 Collision with other shipsThe Association shall cover liability to pay damages to any other person incurred as a result o a collision with another ship, i and to the extent thatsuch liability is not covered under the Hull policies on the Ship, including:– one ourth o the liability incurred by the member; or– our ourths o such liability; or– such other raction o such liability as may be applicable and have been agreed with the Association (…)”.8 “Rule 37 Damage to xed or foating objects

The Association shall cover:(a) liability or loss or damage to any xed or foating object by reason o contact between the Ship and such object, when not covered under the HullPolicies (…)”.9 “Rule 39 Loss or damage to propertyThe Association shall cover liability or loss o or damage to property not specied elsewhere in Part II o these Rules.”

risks with either hull and machineryor P&I? A vital actor will always beprice, but there are other importantactors as well. From a claims handlingstandpoint, there are certain beneitso placing the ull collision and FFOliabilities with one insurer that oughtnot to be overlooked.

In a serious collision or FFO incident,the interplay between the shipownerand aected underwriters is o vitalimportance. Several aspects must beconsidered and co-ordinated at anearly stage. One such aspect is securityor claims to third parties in order toprevent the arrest o the insured ship.Such an arrest may cause materiallosses as it will delay the inspectionand repair o the ship, which mayincrease the exposure or the hull andloss o hire underwriters. Hence, therewill usually be some pressure on the

underwriters to provide security. Themore “patchy” the conditions o cover,the more diicult this is likely to be.

Sometimes the P&I underwriter isrequested to provide a P&I Club lettero undertaking (LOU) to cover liabilitythat should properly all on the hullunderwriters, e.g., in a collision casewhere the hull underwriters coverthree-ourths o the liability. One reasonis that an LOU rom an InternationalGroup Club is more oten accepted




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than letters o undertaking rom thehull underwriters, and can be arrangedmore quickly and with less cost. Gard’spolicy in these circumstances is thata P&I Club LOU can be “injected” assecurity or liabilities covered by thehull underwriters i Gard Marine hasclaims lead on the hull policy. Gard P&I

will do so against a letter o counter-security rom Gard Marine covering allhull underwriters. No bail ee will becharged by Gard P&I rom Gard Marinein such a case, but Gard Marine willrequire adequate counter-security romeach o the other hull underwriters ortheir respective shares o the potentialliability and charge a bail ee rom eacho them.

I, on the other hand, the hull insuranceis placed elsewhere, Gard P&I may beprepared to issue an LOU as securityor any liability cover by hull, but only

against adequate counter-securityrom one provider (lead hull, bankor other inancial institution) with anacceptable credit rating. The collectiono a multitude o counter-securities romvarious underwriters who participateon the hull “slip” in sometimes very

dierent markets – all o which aresubject to varying credit ratings andenorceability terms – is not attractiveor Gard when attempting to assist ashipowner member in need.

In such cases, Gard P&I will charge abail ee o one per cent o the security

amount. An additional bail ee o oneper cent per annum will start to accruei the Gard LOU is pending one yearater it was issued.

ConclusionsEective claims handling in high valueproperty cases rests on the ability o theclaims handler to understand how theacts o the incident may interplay withdierent hull conditions. In essence,where should a loss all at the end o the day? When the interplay betweenhull terms and P&I is determined early,there will be more eective decision-

making regarding the roles o thevarious insurers. Beore deciding onplacing the RDC and FFO risks witha particular hull underwriter, ownersshould consider the service aspectsthat come with the insurance; i.e.,what will be the likely response to the

incident rom the underwriters involvedwhen the need or assistance arises?There is more to this equation thanthe insurance compensation at theend o the day. Immediate, attentiveand specialised casualty handling thatis well co-ordinated under insurancearrangements that are seamlessly

aligned will save money. Gard P&I andGard Marine are both in the position o being able to provide the ull range o insurance and service that shipownersneed to sleep easy when it comes tocollision and FFO risks.




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Gard AS

Kittelsbuktveien 31NO-4836 ArendalP.O. Box 789 StoaNO-4809 ArendalNorway

Tel: +47 37 01 91 00Fax: +47 37 02 48 10

Gard AS

SkipsbyggerhallenSolheimsgaten 11

NO-5058 BergenNorway

Tel: +47 37 01 91 00Fax: +47 55 17 40 01

Gard AS

Støperigt 2,Aker BryggeNO-0250 OsloNorway

Tel: +47 37 01 91 00Fax: +47 24 13 22 33 (Energy)Fax: +47 24 13 22 77 (Marine)

Gard (UK) Limited

85 Gracechurch StreetLondon EC3V 0AAUnited Kingdom

Tel: +44 (0)20 7444 7200Fax: +44 (0)20 7623 8657

Gard (Japan) K.K.

Kawade Building, 5F1-5-8 Nishi-ShinbashiMinato-kuTokyo 105-0003Japan

Tel: +81 (0)3 3503 9291Fax: +81 (0)3 3503 9655

Gard (Sweden) AB

Västra Hamngatan 5SE-41117 Gothenburg

Sweden

Tel: +46 (0)31 743 7130Fax: +46 (0)31 743 7150

Gard (HK) Ltd

Room 3505, 35FThe Centrium,60 Wyndham StreetCentralHong Kong

Tel: +852 2901 8688Fax: +852 2869 1645

Oy Gard (Baltic) Ab

Bulevardi 46FIN-00120 HelsinkiFinland

Tel: +358 9 6188 380Fax: +358 9 6121 000

Gard (North America) Inc.

30 Broad StreetNew York, NY 10004-2944USA

Tel: +1 (0)212 425 5100Fax: +1 (0)212 425 8147

Gard (Greece) Ltd.

2, A. Papanastasiou Avenue185 34 Kastella, PiraeusGreece

Tel: + 30 210 413 8750Fax: + 30 210 413 8751

Lingard Limited

17A Brunswick StreetHamilton HM NXBermuda

Tel: +1 441 292 6766Fax: +1 441 292 7120Web: www.lingard.bmEmail: [email protected]

www.gard.no

The Gard Group

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