abstract - · pdf [email protected] and [email protected] abstract this paper seeks...

1

Administrative Ironies in the Objectivism-Realism Crosshairs Richard J. Herzog and Cory Polk Stephen F. Austin State University [email protected] and [email protected]

Abstract

This paper seeks to build various administrative ironies that govern and dictate security policies and practices in the United States. To gain a foothold on these ironies, we pit schools of administrative thinking like bureaucratic rationality (objectivism) and anti-essentialism (realism) against each other as we lean on the philosophical works of Michael Pendlebury. We also find discourse (objectivism) with phrases like “war on drugs,” “war on terrorism,” “border security,” and “anti-terrorism” tend not to match the realities formulated by policy, management techniques, funding, and fences or walls. Part of the problem with these phrases is that they are propagated and measured prior to definition. After objectivism and realism are framed we provide a methods section where we use a recent Department of Homeland Security (DHS) report to review recursive practices to build the anti-objectivism case. This case is presented in our findings with a lens of realism that exposes and questions the reports that are void of the operationalization of key concepts, use percentage based measures without numeration, and provide performance measures lower than capabilities that may decrease national security. The reports, these findings, and the administrative ironies raise national security concerns not only for scholars, but for oversight bodies, managers and workers in DHS, the public, and ultimately to administrators in DHS.

Introduction

The depth of this paper seeks to thoroughly examine the misconceptions of national and border line securities and regulations. Implications of this study will expose that although security missions have been created to outcast potential threats to national security, in reality, documented practices, policies, and procedures, present ironic drawbacks that adversely expose these national concerns. This work illustrates the irony in which United States border governance invites many of the cancerous activities which we aim to deport. In this case, border security efforts have fallen short of reducing illegal immigration; but have merely redirected immigration with much success. These extreme measures of security only prompt these immigrants to become combative, formulating significantly more dangerous and innovative methods to cross border lines. Through detailed investigative research, this paper attacks theories of objectivism regarding the role that borders play in United States and perhaps other countries by revealing target objectives followed by perverse and counterproductive consequences. For example, the November 2011 ISAF/NATO cross-border attacks on Pakistani troops have not improved border security, but they have strained U.S. Pakistan relations. Accompanying this discussion of border regulations and practices is an examination of methodology error while placing theoretical perspectives into practice.

mailto:[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]

2

Objectivism and Realism

This paper maintains the distinctions between objectivism and realism while exploring their combinations. Pendlebury notes that these combinations can be “realism with objectivism, realism with anti-objectivism, anti-realism with objectivism, and anti-realism with anti-objectivism” (Pendlebury, 2011, p.2). If essentialism is close to objectivism and anti-essentialism is matched with realism, this paper will approach administrative ironies related to border security from realism with anti-objectivism perspective. Objectivism, as viewed in DHS reports, “is about affirmations of a given type as the view that they are subject to adequate, non-arbitrary standards of correctness, and that there are a significant number of nontrivial affirmations of this type that can be known to be correct” (Pendlebury, 2011, p.2). The administrative ironies uncovered in this study can become the standards that question correctness in DHS reports. “The hope of suspicion that objectivity is possible in a given domain does not entitle us to help ourselves to objectivity simply by embracing realism” (Pendlebury, 2008, p. 537). We believe we are only entitled to critical evaluation of objectivity with a method grounded in documented information. We would like to determine how close the DHS reports are to the genuine Truth about homeland security. We may make an argument for simulacra to state that at some level national security is replaced or dependent on symbolic reports and documents. The overwhelming desire for transparency has pushed reality to the side through enhancements in documented reports. These enhancements are buffeted by the use of statistics. Hummel (2006) was correct: “We live in a world of numbers, but numbers have become so dominant that we consider nothing to be real unless it can be measured and mathematized” (p. 58). We conclude and agree with Hummel (2006) that the information in the DHS reports may not be knowledge and may have little value at the managerial and worker levels of the department. Is Hummel correct: “Such a system of numbers and their relations among one another may be valued as superior by executives and administrators who deal with ideas and measures unsullied by reality” (2006, p. 62). If Hummel is correct there is a need to use the theoretical lens of realism to put a better face on the numbers. As it stands, objectivism has been able to overpower realism.

DHS openly admits that they “continue to face measurement challenges in gauging a mission focused on prevention and deterrence” (DHS 2012, p. 4). We believe DHS is following Pendlebury’s (2007) philosophy as they display “robust signs of objective commitment . . . an adequate account of the possibility of correctness and incorrectness” (p. 537)

The verification and validation of performance measure data is intended to increase the accuracy of the performance data. As such, DHS implemented a two-pronged approach to effectively mitigate risks and reinforce processes that enhance DHS’s ability to report complete and reliable data for performance measure reporting. This approach consists of: 1) the GPRA Performance Measure Checklist for Completeness and Reliability; and 2) independent assessment of the completeness and reliability of GPRA performance measures (DHS 2012, p. 5)

3

DHS reporting has a heavy emphasis on numbers and the utilization which should lead the

readers of reports to a sense of national security. These readers may be members of Congress,

interest groups, scholars, the public, and executives within DHS. The key element in this study is

whether or not national security can be measured with numbers or whether the phased out

color-coded terrorism threat advisory with levels of alert (red, orange, yellow, blue, and

green)1 can be based on numbers and the evaluation of policies, programs, and practices or is

there some other more meaningful form of human knowledge.

We contrast the DHS efforts with those of the Texas Model of border security. In an article

discussing the model Operation Border Star, contracted and operated by Abrams Learning &

Information Systems (ALIS), notes that there is not “substantial documentation to back their

claims about the success of the Texas model of border security” (Simon, 2012, p. 10). The Texas

Department of Public Safety (DPS) has repeatedly rejected requests by the Center for

International Policy for various strategy statements, operations plans, and performance reports

that ALIS was contracted to produce, arguing that the information was “law enforcement

sensitive.” We argue that documentation and independent review and legislative oversight are

essential. It is not acceptable that public monies are spent without performance reporting. It is

ironic to think that performance reporting would jeopardize national or state security: when if

designed properly it should enhance state or national security. If performance is high or low in

relation to targets, suggestions can be made that the mission is being accomplished (high) or

that additional resources are needed (low) or if the performance is too low perhaps that

operations should cease to exist and the resources redeployed. Without documentation and

proper performance measures we believe Operation Border Star has been exposed to a

“legitimacy crisis.” Knowledgeable citizens and legislators should question the efficacy of the

project and the resultant interactions between federal and local national security officials.

We use realism to uncover standards labeled “administrative ironies.” These standards “of

what we could call the robust truth—which could be cashed out as descriptive adequacy, fact

fitting, of something of that ilk” (Pendlebury, 2011, p. 2). We argue that realism plays a crucial

part in explaining objectivism (Pendlebury, 2007, p. 538). At some level realism relies on values

pluralism and attempts to sort out the trivial from the nontrivial standards or administrative

ironies. We accept errors in our judgment. “Realism is a vital and useful theory of International

Relations” (Spiro, 2010, p. 2). Anti-realists would deny that the standards can “be understood

realistically as a robust factual belief” (Pendlebury 2011, p. 3). Realism is the attempt to bring

administrative ironies to the attention of executives, top administrators, and oversight bodies

1 On January 27, 2011 Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano made the announcement that color-coded

system often presented little practical information to the public and homeland security partners and that a new two level National Terrorism Advisory System will provide alerts “specific to the threat” and that “they will have a specific end date” (Mathes, 2011).

4

in hopes that knowledge analytics and systems can be matched with managerial and worker

levels of knowledge.

The initial work in this paper attempts to investigate Hansen’s (2009) claim that the “rationality

project of homeland security has thus far been ineffective” (p. 351). This project must view

documented rationality along with policies, practices, and events. Perhaps building ironies from

the documented rationality will provide a framework to better understand policies, practices

and events designed to promote national security.

Garrett and Storbeck (2011) would agree that the border fence or wall along the Rio Grande

Valley, viewed as a policy and event, is seen as a failure on semiotic, space, and subjectivity

grounds. This failure would be in agreement with Carlson’s (2009) interpretation of Derrida that

“a democratic cultural politics that deconstructed national and linguistic borders [the impact of

the fence or wall] to show how they have been implicated in the construction of binary

oppositional identities, with those on one side of the border privileged and those on the other

subordinated one treated as “normal” and the other “abnormal” and deficient” (p. 260). Should

we expect states to even act as unitary rational actors? (Spiro, 2010, p. 4). States can accept

what are claimed to be rational actions that appear irrational when viewed from antiessentialist

and constructivism perspectives. At its base, realism will assume “an arational reflex, a process

that has roughly the epistemological status of digestion” (Braver, 2007, p. 3). We anticipate that

the digestion of the DHS reports combined with selected interviews will uncover a multitude of

administrative ironies. The interviews conducted by Garrett (2010) provide the need to develop

knowledge analytics at the worker level in DHS.

A Turn to Immanuel Kant

This study may rely on Immanuel Kant’s work on transcendental idealism and epistemological

grounding for the objectivism findings to make any sense. The aim of this method is to use

unobservable explanations to explain documented observances. These explanations are

created by the unbounded power of minds that view the bounded nature of reality that is

enhanced by experiences. “The core of the Critique of Pure Reason and the linchpin of its

rationalist-empiricist synthesis: namely, the idea that the mind actively organizes experience”

(Braver, 2007, p. 5) is used in this study. The emphasis in this paper is on the “construction of

knowledge rather than passively reflecting an independent reality” (Braver, 2007, p. 3).

As Hume would maintain, “causality is a habit of the mind.” A variety of performance measures

will create national security. However, the administrative ironies that surface bring into

question that our ability to measure performance would or could cause anything including

national security; especially, if performance measures are deemed less than accurately

employed due to confliction within DHS personnel. The application of the designed hierarchical

5

structure is outlined so that “managers attempt to fulfill organizational orders from above by

directing the employees of the organization as to how to do the work to meet executive

demands” (Garrett, 2010, p. 349).

A priori lenses will suggest the explanations of interest. These interests could include

humanitarian, bureaucratic, political, economic and sociological and each could be viewed as a

different lens. Ontological pluralism would recognize that each lens can only provide a portion

of the truth. If parts of the reports appear valid or we can find non trivial affirmations, this will

rule out total skepticism (Pendlebury, 2011, p. 4).

Methods

This investigation uses an anti-objectivism approach by viewing the recursive practices of the

United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS). (Caution is taken against using a realism

approach that is overly pessimistic.) A combination of analytical and continental philosophies

may be beneficial to this inquiry. However, what if practices of measuring performance occur

again, and again, and do not ensure success? These practices cover the structural morass

associated with DHS and will fall short as processes, practices, and even policies will exist

outside documented rationality. Imagination may be required to move from objectivism to

realism. The foundation or burden of proof for this movement will come from objectivism.

The methodology associated with identifying DHS objectivism and realism was to extract

empirical data through a documented 2010-2012 and 2011-2013 comparison, specifically

performance measures from the department’s annual performance reports. Objectivism may

be recognized as the departmental efforts to strategically approach a specific area of

vulnerability within national security and implement a tactical line of attack or terminate any

unsuccessful efforts, in hopes of increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of border security

measures. Realism may be illustrated by the potential outcomes of these adjusted measures;

realism sheds light on whether or not these DHS policy implementations are meeting their

intended objectives and if these objectives and results are properly documented for agency,

oversight, and public view. Realism essentially promotes the concept of outcome monitoring or

the deconstruction of the reports to determine whether or not national security has been

enhanced. Realism exposes the reality of border security measures, while acknowledging a

possible margin of error, undocumented occurrences or slight misrepresentation, and forces

government to adopt or consider theoretical perspectives in targeting robust objectivity.

Discussion on Findings

The findings in Table 1 can be questioned and the yellow highlighted new measures are

specifically discussed. In Table 1, the percent of inbound air cargo screened on international

passenger flights originating from outside the United States and Territories is being screened in

6

fiscal year (FY) 2012 at 85 percent. It is a concern that 15 percent of those flights are not being

screened and DHS plans to move this measure to 100 percent in FY 2013. This type of

performance measure tells us about the workload at screening centers, but it does not tell us

about the outcomes or impacts of such screening. Does the screening turn back any cargo that

would be a threat? Does the screening prevent dangerous cargo from being transported on

international passenger flights? These are important questions that need to be addressed from

the information in Table 1 to properly assess national security.

Table 1: Review of New Measures to DHS Annual Performance Report Fiscal Years 2011-2013

Mission DHS 2012-2013 New Measures

Planned Targets 2012-2013

Mission 1: Prevent Terrorism and Enhancing Security

Percent of inbound air cargo screened on international passenger flights originating from outside the United States and Territories (Transportation Security Administration).

85% / 100%

Mission 2: Securing and Managing Our Borders

Percent of inbound high-risk cargo transported by air, land, or sea that has been screened and entry status is resolved prior to or during processing at a United States port of entry (Customs and Border Protection)

For Official Use Only FOUO / FOUO


Percent of significant high-risk transnational criminal investigations that result in a disruption or dismantlement (Immigration and Customs Enforcement)

16% / 16%

Mission 3: Enforcing and Administering Our Immigration Laws

Accuracy rate of USCIS's processing of manual verifications for Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) referrals (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services)

98% / 98%


Percent of Citizenship and Integration Grant Program grantees that meet annual performance plan goals (US Citizenship and Immigration Services)

90 % / 90%

Mission 4: Safeguarding and Securing Cyberspace

Percent of external traffic monitored for cyber intrusions in civilian Federal Executive Branch agencies (National Protection and Programs Directorate)

55% / 70%

Source: Department of Homeland Security, 2012

The percent of significant high-risk transnational criminal investigations that result in a

disruption or dismantlement is targeted at 16 percent for Fiscal Year 2012 and Fiscal Year 2013

leads the reader to believe that 84 percent of these investigations are nonproductive. If this is

to become an important measure for securing and managing our borders (Mission 2) then the

productivity needs to be questioned or perhaps investigation needs to be better defined. This

7

definition of investigation would operationalize high risk, criminal, disruption, and

dismantlement.

The number of significant citizenship outreach events complied by the U.S. Citizen Immigration

Services (USCIS) is being retired (see Table 2), even though the 85 event target was surpassed

by 89 events in FY 2011. The measure of significant and nonsignificant events is not detailed.

There is no explanation for this retirement other than instituting the new measure that does

not appear to be related to outreach events. This performance measure will document the

“percent of Citizenship and Integration Grant Program grantees that meet annual performance

goal plans” (DHS, 2012, p. 21).

How could a measure be retired when it exceeded its target by 4,258 or 646 percent? Case in

point, is the number of visa application requests denied due to recommendations from the Visa

Security Program (Immigration and Customs Enforcement) with a Fiscal Year 2011 target of 780

and with results of 5,038 (see Table 2). This raises the question of whether Immigration and

Customs Enforcement (ICE) is abandoning the practice or the measure; we hope it is just the

latter.

Table 2: Review of Retired Measures in DHS Annual Performance Report Fiscal Years 2011-2013

Mission DHS 2012-2013 Retired Measures


Number of significant citizenship outreach events (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services).


Number of visa application requests denied due to recommendations from the Visa Security Program (Immigration and Customs Enforcement)

Mission 4: Safeguarding and Securing Cyberspace

Percent of young adults with sufficient level of cybersecurity awareness (National Protection and Programs Directorate)

Mission 5: Ensuring Resilience to Disasters

Percent of Federal Departments and Agencies that have viable continuity programs to maintain essential functions in the case of disaster (Federal Emergency Management Agency)


The performance measure on the percent of young adults with a sufficient level of

cybersecurity awareness to be measured by the National Protection & Programs Directorate

(NPPD) in Table 2 is being retired. The collection of data for this measure was dependent on a

survey question used by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the National Cyber Security

Alliance that was discontinued (DHS, 2012, p.26). If the measure was important to NPPD the

8

dependence of the measure on two other agencies becomes questionable. Now the NPPD

claims to be “working to establish an implementation plan and measurement strategy to gauge

awareness in the future” (DHS, 2012, p. 26)

The performance measures in Table 3 produce questions of error and common misconceptions

of departmental security effectiveness. Percentages are used for the four yellow highlighted

performance measures Table 3 that have planned targets for 2012-2013. The associated

performance measures signify percentages, average customer satisfaction, call completion

rates the total number of owner operators, facilities, customers, or calls are not offered in this

report.

Table 3: Review of Changes to DHS Annual Performance Report Fiscal Years 2011-2013

Mission DHS 2011-2013 Performance Measures

Planned Targets 2012-2013


Percent of owner/operators of critical infrastructure and key resources who report that the products provided by Infrastructure Protection enhance their understanding of the greatest risks to their infrastructure (National Programs and Programs Directorate)

75% / 80%


Percent of facilities that have implemented at least one security enhancement that raises the facility’s protective measure index score after receiving an Infrastructure Protection vulnerability assessment or survey (National Programs and Programs Directorate)

50% / 55%


Number of apprehensions on the Southwest Border between ports of entry (U.S. Customs and Border Protection)

≤ 371,000 / ≤ 352,000


Number of weapons seized on exit from the United States (CBP) 2,100 / 2,000


Average customer satisfaction rating with information provided about legal immigration pathways from USCIS call centers (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service)

80 % / 80%


Number of employees arrested or sanctioned for criminally hiring illegal labor (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement)

478 / 501

Mission 5: Ensuring Resilience to Disasters

Government Emergency Telecommunications Service call completion rate during emergency communication periods (National Programs and Programs Directorate)

90 % / 90 %


9

There is a 5 percent target goal increase of owner/operators of critical infrastructure and key

resources for FY 2013 (yellow highlighted in Table 3). Yet, there is no representative value for

the total number of owner/operators, which this performance measure seeks to assess. This

raises the question of significance; how significant is 80 percent when an informational gap

exists regarding where this percent originated. A performance target of 80 percent of

owner/operators means very little when you are not aware of how many owner/operators

were measured. For example, 80 percent of ten significantly differs from 80 percent of one

thousand. This lack of information creates a concern that an insufficient amount of

owners/operators are being measured, this lack of substance offers a possible lack of security.

We are more comfortable with the number of apprehensions on the Southwest Border

between ports of entry, the number of weapons seized on exit from the United States and the

number of employees arrested or sanctioned for criminally hiring illegal labor listed in Table 3.

Table 4: Review of Changes to DHS Annual Performance Report Fiscal Years 2011-2013

Performance Measure

DHS: FY 2011-2012 Target / Results

Planned Targets 2012 / 2013

Percent of facilities that have implemented at least one security enhancement that raises the facility’s protective measure index score after receiving an Infrastructure Protection vulnerability assessment or survey (National Programs and Programs Directorate)

15% / 61% 50% / 50%

Average customer satisfaction rating with information provided about legal immigration pathways from USCIS call centers (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service)

70% / 84% 80% / 80%

Number of employers arrested or sanctioned for criminally hiring illegal labor (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement)

455 / 624 478 / 501

Government Emergency Telecommunications Service call completion rate during emergency communication periods (National Protection and Programs Directorate)

90% / 97.8% 90% / 90%


Year to year, DHS adjusts their security targets for each performance measure. Unfortunately,

many of these adjustments are inconsistent with higher performance and targets, and perhaps

bigger budgets and mission accomplishment. Concerns arise regarding why specific security

measures would lower their target goal when the prior year exemplified greater security

10

potential and capabilities. For instance, the target goal for the number of employers arrested or

sanctioned for criminally hiring illegal labor was 445 during FY 2011 (yellow highlighted in Table

4). Surprisingly, the target goal was vastly exceeded and resulted in 624 employers arrested or

sanctioned. With quantitative evidence of the capabilities of this security measure, DHS lowers

the FY 2012 and FY 2013 target goals for the same performance measures. It is a concern that a

lack of security and accountability is in place. Why lessen the target goal of a security measure

when it is evident that security tactics have the capability to excel further? However, the

heightened awareness of this program may lessen the need to arrest or sanction employers?

Grounded Research

“It would be a mistake to take the statements of government officials at face value when they

argue that policies regarding our borders are motivated by the national interest. The character

of our borders, the enforcement of our borders, and the social construction of our borders are

heavily invested with a history or overt racism and xenophobia” (Spiro, 2010, pp. 24-25). In

addition, we are aware that our national security is heavily invested in performance reporting.

Statements found in the DHS reports claim competence and should not be taken at face value

and they are not universals. The reports are discursive practices as they cover all five missions:

preventing terrorism and enhancing security, securing and managing our borders, enforcing

and administering our immigration laws, safeguarding and securing cyberspace, and ensuring

resilience to disasters. Although we may not find overt racism and xenophobia, we do question

the methodologies used to collect the data, data entry practices, failures to collect information,

and statistical analysis behind the reports. The reports do contain discussions of methodological

rigor. The book How to Lie with Statistics needs to be reviewed.

“Security agencies [like DHS] do not simply respond to threats; they take part in creating them

by objectifying them in their routine work, in the way they put their statistics together, in the

hierarchy given to different dangers, in the priorities they set, in the technical solutions

available, in the know-how they think they possess” (Bigo, 1994, p. 165). With grounded

research in this study the administrative ironies are based on the information in DHS

documents or what could be considered the data. Since the ironies are generated from the

documents they will be considered to be grounded.

Do the measures address threats to homeland security? For example, how does the number of

weapons seized exiting the United States relate to homeland security? If the weapons are

leaving the country would that not make the country more secure (see Table 3)? It is

documented that the number of apprehensions by the Border Patrol has decreased on the

Southwest Border between ports of entry from 705,022 in FY 2008 to 327,577 in FY 2011—a

53.5 percent decline (see Table 3). How can this decrease be explained? We find both

bureaucratic and political explanations. The DHS report notes this result due to “unprecedented

11

deployments of personnel, technology, and infrastructure, historic partnerships with law

enforcement partners on both sides of the border, and increasing consequences for repeat

offenders” (DHS, 2012, p. 14). President Obama, in his 2012 State of the Union Message, notes

“That’s why my Administration has put more boots on the border than ever before. That’s why

there are fewer illegal crossings than when I took office” (Obama, 2012). The president

provides an interesting take on causality and militarization of the Southwest border. The

reports and the president are suggesting a security surplus. When is the goal for border

apprehensions going to be obtained, is there a number? What if the number of illegal

immigrants coming into the country is actually going up? If the answer to this question is

affirmative, than we would have a security deficit. Are policy responses advocated by the

president based on objectivism and DHS reporting? Both the president and DHS appear to be

promoting a hard Southwestern border. How does this promotion match the knowledge

analytics at managerial and workers levels in DHS (Garrett, 2010)? This paper attempts to

move the discussion to a constructed nature of the border that combines the cultural, social,

economic, and political features to uncover administrative ironies related to security.

Security is a subjective not objective dynamic. Security is argued to be a “speech act” (Buzan, 1998, pp. 23-24). As a speech act, the perceptions, feelings, and beliefs about security can “change-on-a-dime” with one terrorist attack. Without a changing/crisis event, like 9/11, change in U.S. security policy and procedures tends to follow the normal political procedures that are heavily influenced by electoral cycles of the presidency. Policy change needs to look ahead to implementation and evaluation and bureaucratic structures may or may not be supportive/capable of the change. “Security is constructed through language; the way an issue is framed determines the structure of the discourse, which potentially can affect reality” (Bigo, 1994, p. 165). Security is heavily dependent on the concept of “border.”

Border Construction a Governable Space Borders are determined by social construction and may only hold objective or neutral facts in geographic (e.g. boundary lines) and statistical senses. The construction of borders changes with time and perspective such as cultural, social, economic, and national security. These constructions can be top-down (Berger & Luckmann, 1966) or bottom-up (Fox & Miller, 1996). The type of construction has impacts on administrative practices. In this study we view the identity of the border and its impact on national security (Robertson, 2008). Top-down approaches will influence laws and policies where as bottom-up approaches will influence practices and techniques. Different sets of values are associated with different types of construction. Egalitarian values are associated with bottom-up approaches.

12

What is an Irony? An irony occurs when there is an incongruity or discordance between what is said and what is done. It can be similar to the disconnect between espoused theories and theories-in-use when administrators may say, “Do as say, not as I act.” An administrative irony occurs when a practice, technique, policy, or action is opposed to the

mission. Or a particular situation makes it difficult to reach a mission. It becomes a situational

irony: “when you are up to your ass in alligators; it is difficult to remember that your initial

objective was to drain the swamp.” A situational irony provides a strong hint of goal

displacement.

In order to have national security must produce reports that suggest we have national security.

These reports are required by the Government Performance Results Modernization Act of

2010, signed into law by President Obama on January 4, 2011. This law requires the

Department of Homeland Security to set performance goals that can be accurately measured

and publically reported in a transparent way. After 9/11, “border arrest and seizures also

provided border enforcers with ready-made (if highly imperfect and misleading) visible

indicators of government progress and commitment to creating a more orderly border. This

helped win votes for politicians and secure higher budgets for enforcement bureaucracies”

(Andreas, 2003, p. 4).

There will be a bias to report that security measures have been met. If DHS produced reports

where objectives were not met, we would need to question national security and this may

enhance attempts to disrupt national security. The irony occurs if the reports state the country

is secure when in fact it is not.

Administrative Ironies within Border Securities Each of the ironies bulleted below deserve further discussion. Some of the ironies are supported in the findings section of this paper.

Many border security measures are operating at 100 percent, yet the Obama administration continues to put “more boots on the borders than ever” (Why the need for more border security personnel and hiring peaks?)

It is ironic that FY 2011 results are greater than targets for certain performance measures in FY 2012 and FY 2013. This brings into question the value of the performance measures in helping to provide additional national security.

The border ports and walls of entry are designed to keep illegal immigrants out yet they actually shelter and constrain illegal immigrants within the U.S., in which makes it difficult for them to leave.

13

Border security is designed to protect the U.S and keep foes and potential threats out yet DHS takes a great interest in deadly firearms leaving the country rather than interdicting or disrupting the flow of weapons into the country.

An objective of all agencies within DHS is to ensure effective and efficient border security measures are carried out to defend national security yet specific agency policies and procedures conflict with other agencies making their practices ineffective and inefficient.

For example, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has no authority to

handle situations at the airports dealing with firearms that are undeclared or stored

improperly. Due to jurisdiction and TSA rules that only agents can detain a suspect and

must call upon the local law enforcement to take further action. This is very ineffective

and time consuming; a federal agency may not take action against a security breach and

is required to wait on local law enforcement. Problematic discourse by DHS as a

bureaucratic institution with “local government agencies, nonprofits, businesses, and

private citizens” has been researched and discussed with other security issues like wall

construction (Garrett & Storbeck, 2011, p. 544).

Texas officials, including Governor Perry, Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) Chief,

attorney general, and agricultural commissioner frequently charge the federal

government with the inability to control the Texas-Mexico border, but fail to

acknowledge that state operations are dependent on federal funding.

Texas officials claim that they can maintain border security without federal intervention

when half of the Texas Department of Public Safety budget is from federal funding.

“One of the most striking central ironies of border control (as of many other security

and police measures) is that they may have the greatest impact there where they are

needed least” (Shutt and Deflem, 2008, p.101).

Macroculture versus Internal Order

This investigation may reveal a documented trend to minimize efforts to address macrocultural

and “globalization” issues with policies, structures, and management techniques that favor the

internal order of bureaucratic agencies and the territoriality treatment of borders. Realism will

suggest that internalization efforts may fall short on a variety of fronts which include national

security, humane treatment, and bureaucratic rationality. Applications of theory cannot use the

state as the unit of analysis and must view the macroculture to better understand

administrative ironies. The way the borders are constructed becomes important where we

could have top-down and bottom-up approaches. This study uses a top-down approach as

recursive practices are discovered and knowledge analytics are discussed at the executive level.

14

A performance measure in the DHS 2011-2013 report shows the retiring of a joint operation

along the Southwest Border by Border Patrol Agents and Mexican law enforcement partners as

being terminated. Even though there were only 12 operations in FY 2011, this measure is now

going to be maintained internally with no indication of the number of continued operations, or

their outcome or impact (DHS, 2012, p.15)

Conclusions

This research has questioned objectivism: statistics, the use to mathematics, and performance

measures found in recent DHS reports. Other documented research has assisted in authors in

the development of a set of preliminary administrative ironies based in part on realism. These

ironies do not bode well for a sense of national security in the U.S. To enhance credibility and

confidence in national security, DHS reports should operationalize performance measures and

provide actual numbers when reporting percentages. This operationalization would follow the

advice of Hummel (2006): that we must continually put defining before counting (p. 74). These

minor changes would enhance the sense of national security in the U.S. Major changes are

needed to document the outcomes and impacts of performance measures. In addition, these

changes may have some impact at the managerial and worker levels of DHS, as they would

begin to coordinate activities under the same knowledge systems.

References

Andreas, P. (2003). A tale of two borders: The U.S.-Mexico and U.S.-Canada lines after 9-11. CA: The Center for Comparative Immigration Studies. The University of California.

Berger, P. L., & Luckmann, T. (1966). The Social Construction of Reality. Garden City, NY,

Doubleday. Bigo, Didier. (1994). “The European Internal Security Field: Stakes and Rivalries in a Newly

Developing Area of Police Intervention,” in Malcolm Anderson and Monica den Boer, ed., Policing Across National Boundaries. London: Pinter, 165.

Braver, Lee. (2007). A thing of this world: A History of Continental Anti-Realism. Northwestern

University Press. Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever, &, Jaap de Wilde. (1998). Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Carlson, Dennis. (2009). The Border Crossed US: Education, Hospitality Politics, and the Social

Construction of the “Illegal Immigrant. Educational Theory, 59(3), 259-277.

15

Department of Homeland Security. (2012). U.S. Department of Homeland Security Annual Performance Report: Fiscal Years 2011-2013.

Fox , C., & Miller H. (1996). Postmodern public administration. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Garrett, Terence M., & James Storbeck. (2011). The DHS Border Fence in the Rio Grande Valley: Semiotics, Space, and Subjectivity. Administrative Theory & Praxis, 33(4), 530-548. Garrett, Terence M. (2010). Interorganizational Collaboration and the Transition to the

Department of Homeland Security: A Knowledge Analytic Interpretation. Administration & Society 42(3),343-360.

Hansen, Kenneth N. (2009). Postmodern Border Insecurity: Rationality, Discourse, and Antiessentialism, Administrative Theory & Praxis, 31(3), 340-359. Hummel, Ralph P. (2006). The Triumph of Numbers: Knowledge and the Mismeasure of Management. Administration and Society, 38(1), 58-78. Kant, I. (1781/1787) Critique of Pure Reason (trans. P. Guyer and A. Wood). Cambridge and New

York: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Mathes, Michael (January 27, 2011). "New US terror alert system replaces color code".

Google News. Retrieved April 23, 2012.

Obama, Barack (2012). State of the Union Address. Pendlebury, Michael. (2007). “Objective Reasoning”, The Southern Journal of Philosophy. Vol.

XLV. 533-563 Pendlebury, Michael. (2011 forthcoming). “Objectivism versus Realism”, The Philosophical Forum. Robertson, Craig. (2008). Locating the border. Social Identities: Vol. 14, No. 4. Taylor and

Francis. 447-456. Simon, Miranda. (2010). The irony of tightening border security. Retrieved on April 4, 2012.

Http://www.salon.com/2010/06/10/border_patrol_kill/. Shut, J. E., & Deflem, Mathieu. (2005). Whose face at the border? Homeland security and

border policing since 9/11. Journal of Social and Ecological Boundaries. 81-105. Spiro, David E. (2010). Criminalizing Immigration: The Social Construction of Borders and

National Security. Paper presented at the International Studies Association Convention.

http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5j4jVmMvd0grzQ2cm5yMrHggs8EgQ?docId=CNG.b27ce982d5a2c46fdde0c964ca0fcea9.f51

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_News

abstract - · pdf [email protected] and [email protected] abstract this paper seeks...

Documents