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RIGHT-WING ATTITUDES AND MORAL COGNITION 1

Abstract

The present study investigated whether and to what extent ideological attitudes relate

to moral reasoning. Specifically, in three studies we tested if Right-Wing Authoritarianism

(RWA) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) are associated with a general tendency to

make either utilitarian (outcome-based) or deontological (principle-based) decisions in classic

trolley-type moral dilemmas. The first study uncovered that both high RWA and high SDO

individuals made more utilitarian versus deontological judgments in trolley dilemmas. A

second study, using a process dissociation approach, revealed that this increased relative

proportion of utilitarian judgments among high RWA and SDO scorers was guided by a

decreased preference for the deontological option, rather than an increased preference for the

utilitarian option. Finally, a third study using the RWA3D scale showed that especially the

‘Authoritarian Aggression’ facet scale is related to the decreased preference for the

deontological option in high RWA individuals. Overall, these studies provide convergent

evidence for substantial differences in moral reasoning tendencies based on ideological

attitudes.

Keywords: Right-Wing Authoritarianism; Social Dominance Orientation; Moral psychology;

Trolley dilemmas; Utilitarian reasoning; Deontological reasoning

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Right-wing Attitudes and Moral Cognition: Are Right-Wing Authoritarianism and

Social Dominance Orientation Related to Utilitarian Judgment?

The chasm dividing the political left and right is not merely motivated by a quarrel

about specific policy options or economic doctrines, but it also reflects different ethical

concerns and divergent value systems (Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012; Koleva,

Graham, Ditto, Iyer, & Haidt, 2012). On a wide variety of morally relevant topics liberal and

conservative ideologies clash. In the US, for instance, conservatives tend to oppose equal

rights for homosexuals, stem-cell research, and abortion, whereas liberals are generally

supportive of these issues. Interestingly, both groups use a value based rhetoric to justify their

stance (Clifford, & Jerit, 2013). Indeed, psychological research suggests that many of these

ideological differences between conservatives and liberals can be explained in terms of

underlying differences in moral cognition. In particular, Graham, Haidt, and Nosek (2009)

asserted that the moral domain is divided in a number of well-defined subdomains that

determine what specific types of content are moralized. Graham et al. further argued that an

individual’s position on the general left-right dimension is associated with different domains

that are considered most relevant for moral judgment. According to this 'Moral Foundation

theory' liberals almost exclusively try to minimize ‘Harm’ and maximize ‘Fairness’, whereas

conservatives also consider (the often competing) domains of ‘Loyalty’ to the ingroup,

submission to ‘Authority’ and metaphorical ‘Purity’, as highly relevant in morality.

Deontological versus Utilitarian Moral Reasoning

Although the moral foundations research program has uncovered interesting

differences between conservatives and liberals with respect to the domains they consider

relevant for morality, potential differences between conservatives and liberals in other aspects

of moral reasoning remain largely unexplored. For instance, a longstanding debate in

philosophy pertains to whether normative ethics should be based in deontological or

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utilitarian moral theory. Whereas the former tries to determine an action’s moral worth by

looking at its inherent moral quality through a general system of duties and rights, and uses

moral principles to guide reasoning, the latter determines the moral worth of an action solely

through its outcome; that is, actions that lead to a net profit in wellbeing are deemed moral

whereas those that decrease overall wellness are considered to be immoral. Hence,

deontologists argue that some actions are morally right while others are wrong, and that this

distinction is based on all-encompassing moral rules (such as ‘thou shalt not kill’). Utilitarians

on the other hand, argue that whether a specific course of action is right or wrong depends on

its consequences. Therefore, to the utilitarian, some actions that might typically be considered

wrong can nevertheless be morally appropriate if in that specific context the positive

consequences outweigh the negatives.

Utilitarian and deontological thinking have traditionally been considered as two

mutually exclusive and opposing perspectives on ethical philosophy. However, a recent

psychological model claims that these two perspectives are not incompatible but are

simultaneously activated in ordinary moral cognition. According to Greene, Nystrom, Engell,

Darley, and Cohen (2004), moral cognition is the result of two independent processes, each

contending for control: one that leads to utilitarian judgment and one that leads to

deontological judgment. When confronted with a moral dilemma our brain will analyze the

dilemma both from a deontological and a utilitarian perspective and whichever process

happens to be stronger at that moment will determine what type of moral judgment a person

will make (Koenigs et al., 2007; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001).

Research within this moral reasoning domain is typically conducted by examining

subjects’ responses to a specific class of moral dilemmas: trolley dilemmas (Thomson, 1976).

In the archetypal example of these dilemmas a runaway trolley is headed on a collision course

with five oblivious workmen. The only way to save these workmen from their imminent

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demise is to hit a switch that will divert the trolley to another track where it will hit (and kill)

only a single worker, effectively sacrificing the one man to save the other five workers. The

fundamental idea behind these dilemmas is that according to utilitarian theory you should

sacrifice the one man (because this leads to fewer deaths) whilst deontological theory would

prohibit you from infringing on the rights of the individual for the sake of the larger

collective. A choice to sacrifice the individual is then operationalized as a utilitarian judgment

and the choice not to intervene as a deontological judgment. The current research aims to

study to what extent differences in ideology are associated with a differential preference for

either deontological or utilitarian moral judgment.

Dimensions of Ideological Attitudes

Research that investigated the relations between ideology and morality within the

moral foundation theory framework (e.g., Graham et al., 2009) has generally considered

socio-political attitudes to exist on a single one-dimensional left-right measure (i.e., only

contrasting between liberals and conservatives). However, many political psychology studies

have indicated that this left-right dimension is a simplification of the full spectrum of political

thought. According to Duckitt’s (2001) seminal framework of ideological attitudes, citizens’

representation of ideology is better captured by two dimensions of socio-ideological attitudes,

each connected with a specific worldview and motivational goals triggered by these world-

views. On the one hand, viewing the world as a dangerous place (Altemeyer, 1988) instigates

a motivational goal of social control and security at the expense of personal freedom and

rights, which gives rise to the adoption of authoritarianism, a construct typically measured

through the dispositional Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale (RWA, Altemeyer, 1981). On the

other hand, viewing the world as a competitive jungle or a dog-eat-dog world (Duckitt, &

Sibley, 2010) elicits the motivational goal of social power and superiority at the expense of

altruistic concern and equality. This dimension is typically measured with a dispositional

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measure of Social Dominance Orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994).

Duckitt’s dual process model has been verified on numerous accounts (for an overview, see

Duckitt, & Sibley, 2009). The relationship between RWA and SDO differs across political

contexts (i.e., countries, see Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 2002; Mirisola, Sibley,

Boca, & Duckitt, 2007), but they are both unique predictors of a wide variety of political and

ideological phenomena. Among other things, RWA is highly associated with religiosity

(Altemeyer, & Hunsberger, 1992), and having conservative values (Stangor, & Leary, 2006;

Duriez, & Van Hiel, 2002), while SDO is particularly associated with cultural elitism (Pratto

et al., 1994), decreased support for equal opportunity and ameliorative policies (Sidanius,

Devereux, & Pratto, 1992) or even increased support for the use of cognitive ability tests as

part of college admission procedure (Kim, & Berry, 2015). Additionally, both RWA and SDO

are strong predictors for ethnocentrism, sexism, generalized prejudice, and conservatism

(Duckitt, & Sibley, 2010; Van Hiel, & Mervielde, 2002; Roets, Van Hiel, & Cornelis; 2006;

Roets, Van Hiel, & Dhont, 2012).

Interestingly, SDO and RWA have also been related to the differential appreciation of

each of the moral foundations. Two independent studies have revealed that increased SDO

appears to be associated with decreased support for the (liberal) Harm and Fairness

foundations, while increased RWA appears to be associated with increased support for the

(conservative) Loyalty, Authority and Purity foundations (Federico, Weber, Ergun, & Hunt,

2013; Kugler, Jost, & Noorbaloochi, 2014). This pattern of associations corroborates Graham

et al.’s (2009) hypothesis that political differences are rooted in differential moral cognition,

but also suggests that it might be worthwhile to study the relationship between moral

cognition and political ideology within Duckitt’s dual process model for political ideology.

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Relationships between Ideological Dimensions and Deontological versus Utilitarian

Moral Judgment

We are not aware of any prior research that suggests how ideological dimensions and

deontological/utilitarian judgment might relate to one another. However, Greene’s (2007)

model for moral cognition provides a basis to derive hypotheses on how they may be

connected. In particular, Greene argues that utilitarian judgment requires that the utilitarian

process overcomes the competing deontological process. Importantly, the deontological

process is largely driven by a prepotent, negative emotional response to harming others.

Hence, when this emotional response is subdued, utilitarian judgment becomes more likely

(Greene, 2007). Relevant to the present research question, according to Duckitt’s (2001)

framework, SDO is characterized by tough-mindedness, a dog-eat-dog world view, and low

altruistic concern. Indeed, various studies have empirically corroborated a positive link

between SDO and Machiavellianism (Hodson, Hogg, & MacInnis, 2009), lower empathy

(Sidanius, Kteily, Sheehy-Skeffington, Ho, Sibley, & Duriez, 2013), lower importance of the

Harm foundation (Federico et al., 2013), and increased aggression (Thomsen, Green, &

Sidanius, 2008; Swami, Neofytou, Jablonska, Thirlwell, Taylor, & McCreary, 2013). All of

these are likely to suppress the emotional restraints against harming others and are hence

likely to impact moral cognition. Indeed, in addition to their demonstrated link with SDO,

these traits have also been linked to utilitarian judgments (see Bartels, & Pizzaro, 2011;

Conway, & Gawronski, 2013; Gao, & Tang, 2013). Hence, relying on Greene’s (2007)

theorizing and combining the previous empirical findings, the prediction for SDO is

reasonably straightforward: we hypothesize that high (vs. low) SDO individuals will be more

likely to make utilitarian judgments (Hypothesis 1).

In contrast, the link of RWA with moral reasoning seems more ambiguous and the

potential effects are less straightforward to predict. In particular, RWA captures the

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covariation of Conventionalism, Authoritarian Submission, and Authoritarian Aggression (see

Altemeyer 1981), which may not have a uniform influence on moral judgment. On the one

hand, high RWA individuals typically show higher regard for conventions and traditional

values, they are more religious, and they are more prone to dogmatism (Altemeyer, 1988;

1996). The intuitive prediction would thus be that they are more readily swayed by duty and

rule-based moral concerns such as ‘thou shall not kill’, increasing their tendencies to choose

deontological options over utilitarian ones (Hypothesis 2a). On the other hand, RWA is also

characterized by Authoritarian Aggression and disregard of personal freedom and rights in

favor of the group (Altemeyer, 1981; Duckitt, 2001, see also Kessler, & Cohrs, 2008). Hence,

the prepotent, negative emotional response to harming another human that is central to the

deontological process may also be lowered in high RWA individuals, especially when

confronted with ‘individual versus group’ situations. This is most relevant in trolley

dilemmas, which typically reflect exactly this kind of conflict between the rights of an

individual versus the benefits to the larger group. This line of reasoning therefore predicts that

authoritarians may actually be more willing to make the utilitarian choice to sacrifice the

individual in trolley-type moral dilemmas (Hypothesis 2b). In sum, how exactly RWA is

associated with moral cognition cannot be straightforwardly predicted and will most likely be

determined by what aspect of RWA drives the association: Conventionalism and the

inclination toward dogmatism, or Authoritarian Aggression and disregard for individual

rights.

We explore these issues in a series of three studies. In our first study we examine the

basic pattern of associations between SDO, RWA, and subjects’ proportion of utilitarian

versus deontological judgments on trolley dilemmas. In our second study, we further explore

these associations by testing whether high SDO and high RWA individuals have an increased

or decreased preference for either of the two options in the dilemma, using Conway and

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Gawronski’s (2013) process dissociation approach. Finally, in our third study, we specifically

examine RWA in greater detail by probing into its attitudinal clusters (Submission,

Conventionalism, or Authoritarian Aggression).

Study 1

Method

Participants. Participants were 160 Dutch speaking undergraduate students (32 men,

128 women, Mage = 18.9, SDage = 2.88) participating in a mass-testing session for course

credit.

Procedure. Participants were invited to enter the lab in groups of up to 45 students

and seated at individual computer terminals. Participants completed all measures in the order

in which they are discussed below.

Measures. First, participants’ ideological attitudes were assessed through

computerized versions of the 24-item RWA scale (Altemeyer, 1981) and the 16-item SDO

scale (Pratto et al., 1994). For both measures, participants were asked to indicate their

agreement with a series of statements on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from ‘totally disagree’

(1) to ‘totally agree’ (7). A sample item of the RWA scale reads as follows: ‘Obedience and

respect for authority are the most important values children should learn’. A sample item of

the SDO scale reads as follows: ‘Some groups are simply not the equals of others’.

Subsequently, participants received a booklet containing four trolley-type moral

dilemmas and were asked for each dilemma whether or not they judged the presented

utilitarian alternative morally appropriate. Participants indicated their answers by writing

down a ‘Yes’ or a ‘No’ underneath each dilemma, thus making a binary choice between the

deontological and utilitarian alternative for each dilemma. The dilemmas were administered in

Dutch and adapted from earlier research (Greene et al., 2004). English versions of all

dilemmas are displayed in the supplementary materials.

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Data Analysis. After data-collection, one dilemma, which was related to terrorism,

was assessed to be overly ‘politicized’ in nature. Although inclusion of this dilemma actually

strengthened the obtained effects,1 we deemed it prudent to exclude this dilemma from the

analyses to minimize the potential content-specific influence of political stance on the

responses (see general discussion). Given the binary nature of our response variable we

calculated Spearman’s rank correlations to assess the relationship of SDO and RWA with the

proportion of utilitarian (vs. deontological) answers. The association of SDO and RWA was

assessed through a regular Pearson correlation.

Results

RWA (Cronbach α = .81, M = 3.14, SD = 0.63) and SDO (Cronbach α = .87, M = 5.06,

SD = 0.86) correlated significantly with each other; r = .53, p < .001. More importantly,

Spearman’s rank correlations of SDO with the proportion of utilitarian answers (Cronbach α =

0.56, M = 0.50, SD = 0.29) revealed a significant positive correlation; r = .20, p = .013.

Likewise, RWA was also positively associated with the proportion of utilitarian responses; r =

.16, p = .044.

Discussion

The results of the first study confirm that higher levels of SDO are indeed associated

with more utilitarian moral decisions (Hypothesis 1). Moreover, this first study also provides

evidence in favor of one of the competing hypotheses regarding the role of RWA. In

particular, we found that high levels of RWA are associated with a higher inclination to choose

the utilitarian option over the deontological option (Hypothesis 2b).

This initial study, however, has two notable limitations. First, the restricted set of

dilemmas used in this study limits its external validity. Secondly, a mere proportion-score of

utilitarian answers (i.e., relative to the number of deontological answers) is an imperfect

1 Analyses with all four dilemmas included, yielded significant correlations of the response variable with SDO (r = .26, p < .001) and RWA (r = .23, p = .003).

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measure of moral reasoning, given that this result may be caused by either an increased

preference for the utilitarian option or by a decreased preference for the deontological option.

As such, this first study only suggests that in relative terms, individuals high in SDO and

RWA prefer utilitarian over deontological judgment to a greater extent than individuals low in

SDO and RWA do. Yet, whether this is caused by the former viewing the utilitarian option as

more favorable or the deontological option as less favorable cannot be answered. To address

these issues we conducted a second study.

Study 2

The main aim of our second study was to investigate whether SDO and RWA were

related to an increased preference for the utilitarian option or whether these variables were

related to a lowered preference for the deontological option (or both). In order to be able to

discern preference for the utilitarian and the deontological option, we used a process

dissociation approach (Jacoby, 1991), which was first used in a moral dilemma paradigm by

Conway and Gawronski (2013). These authors developed two sets of dilemmas, with each

dilemma in the second set being a variation of a dilemma in the first set. Similar to the

traditional trolley dilemma procedure, each dilemma offered participants a choice to harm an

innocent other in order to procure a certain outcome beneficial to the larger group. In the

‘incongruent’ versions of these dilemmas, this outcome would be worth pursuing from a

utilitarian perspective, but would require the violation of some deontological rule, much like a

traditional trolley dilemma. For example: should you trigger an allergic attack in someone that

will hospitalize him for several days, but will also thwart his plans to infect innocent others

with HIV? Contrastingly, in the ‘congruent’ versions of the dilemmas, the outcome, while

somewhat beneficial, would not be worth pursuing on utilitarian grounds whilst still requiring

the same deontological violation. For example: should you trigger an allergic attack that will

hospitalize that person to thwart his plans to vandalize a bus stop with graffiti? While there is

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a reasonable utilitarian argument to be made to trigger the allergic attack in the incongruent

scenario, the same cannot be upheld when confronted with the congruent scenario. By

contrasting the responses on dilemmas in which both moral reasoning processes pull in the

same direction to those in which they pull in opposite directions, Conway and Gawronski

reasoned that it should be possible to delineate and separately quantify the preference for the

utilitarian option and the preference for the deontological option through a multinomial

processing tree model (for a more in depth explanation of the logic and technical aspects of

this procedure, see Conway & Gawronski, 2013). Although this process dissociation

technique has the obvious benefit of adding further nuance to moral dilemma research, it is

still fairly new and for now, few studies have taken advantage of the new empirical

possibilities it has to offer. Crucially, this procedure allows us to obtain individual measures

for both preferences and allows us to investigate how exactly SDO and RWA are associated

with moral reasoning (i.e. decreased preference for the deontological option or an increased

preference for the utilitarian option).

As outlined before, Greene’s (Greene et al., 2004; Greene, 2007) model for moral

cognition argues that for utilitarian judgment to prevail, it has to overcome the competing

deontological process driven by a negative emotional response to harming others.

Interestingly, in their initial study, Conway and Gawronski (2013) found that empathic

concern, which is lower in high RWA and SDO individuals (see Bӓckstrӧm & Bjӧrklund,

2007; Sidanius et al, 2013), affected preference for the deontological option in trolley

dilemmas, but was unrelated to preference for the utilitarian option. We therefore hypothesize

that our findings from Study 1, showing that high levels of RWA and SDO tip the scale in

favor of utilitarian decisions, may be due to a decrease in the deontological preference, rather

than an increase in preference for the utilitarian option.

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Method

Participants. One-hundred-thirty-two Dutch-speaking Belgian participants (34 men,

Mage = 35.2, SDage = 15.9) were recruited through snowball sampling as part of a graduate

research project.

Procedure. Participants were invited through e-mail to participate on a voluntary basis

in an online study on morality. Using the lab’s custom-made software, participants completed

the ideological measures first and the moral judgement measures secondly.

Measures. Before starting the moral dilemma tasks, participants completed online

forms of the 14-item version of the SDO scale (Pratto et al., 1994; Van Hiel & Duriez, 2002),

and a 10-item version of Altemeyer’s (1981) RWA scale (see Onraet, Van Hiel, Roets, &

Cornelis, 2011), both rated on 5-point Likert scales ranging from ‘totally disagree’ (1) to

‘totally agree’ (5). The moral dilemma task consisted of 20 moral dilemmas of which 10 were

congruent and 10 incongruent. We translated the full set of dilemmas of Conway and

Gawronski (2013) in Dutch. However, some dilemmas were inappropriate for the current

sample. For example, one of Conway and Gawronksi’s original dilemmas is about a teenage

girl faced with the choice whether or not to abort an unwanted pregnancy. This dilemma is not

nearly as controversial in a Belgian context as it is in the United States, and pre-testing

revealed a unanimous response to this specific dilemma. We therefore created twelve new

dilemma pairs and pre-tested the congruent versions of these along with Conway and

Gawronski’s original dilemmas (N = 40). Based on this pre-test, we selected those dilemmas

that displayed the least amount of inter-subject consensus (i.e., most variability in responses).

Translated versions of the final set of dilemmas used in Study 2 are presented in the

supplementary materials. The order in which the dilemmas were displayed was randomized

between participants.

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Data Analysis. Consistent with Study 1, we excluded one dilemma that referred to

terrorism from the analyses, given that it was considered too ‘politicized’. Again, this did not

substantially affect the results.2 The exact procedure used to obtain the moral preference

scores (as per Conway and Gawronski, 2013) is presented in the supplementary materials.

For one participant we were unable to calculate a deontological preference score

(because it required dividing by zero). This participant was included for the analyses on

utilitarian preference but excluded for the analyses for the analyses on deontological

preference. Pearson correlation tests were conducted to investigate the relationships between

ideology dimensions and the deontological and utilitarian processes.

Results

SDO (Cronbach α = .84, M = 3.72, SD = 0.62) and RWA (Cronbach α = .84, M = 2.58,

SD = 0.69) were positively associated with each other; r = .46, p < .001, and preference for

the utilitarian option (M = 0.43, SD = 0.24) was negatively associated with preference for the

deontological option (M = 0.77, SD = 0.29); r = -.26, p = .003. Importantly, the analyses

revealed that SDO was not significantly associated with preference for the utilitarian option; r

= .02, p = .782, but it was negatively associated with preference for the deontological option;

r = -.34, p < .001. Furthermore, a similar pattern of associations arose for RWA. That is, RWA

was not significantly associated with preference for the utilitarian option; r = .12, p = .153,

but it was negatively associated with a preference for the deontological option; r = -.29, p

< .001.

Discussion

The results from the second study confirm the general association of right-wing

political attitudes with moral reasoning found in Study 1. Furthermore, this more intricate

2 Analysis on the full dilemma set was qualitatively the same as the results reported here. More specifically: we did not find any association of preference for the utilitarian option with SDO or RWA; r = .05, p = .587, and r = .16, p = .073, respectively, but did find a significant (negative) association with preference for the deontological option; r = -.36, p < .001 and r = -.32, p < .001.

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procedure showed that the increased proportion of utilitarian responses associated with both

dimensions of right-wing ideology is not caused by an increased preference for the utilitarian

option, but in fact by a decreased preference for the deontological option. People high in

right-wing ideologies thus feel less compelled by the principled moral concerns prohibiting

action in trolley-dilemmas. As such, the results of this second study provide additional

evidence for our hypothesis regarding the effect of SDO (Hypothesis 1) and again also clearly

favored one of the two competing hypotheses for RWA. That is, people high in RWA showed

a decreased preference for the deontological option, resulting in an increased tendency to

make utilitarian judgments (Hypothesis 2b).

The latter finding demonstrates that high RWA individuals are less reluctant to hurt an

individual if it serves the larger collective and suggests that ‘Authoritarian Aggression’ may

lie at the basis of their choices in moral dilemmas. Unfortunately, although the original RWA

scale is conceptually based on three sub-constructs, one of which is Authoritarian Aggression,

the scale itself does not measure each of these constructs separately (see Altemeyer, 1981). In

particular, most items of the traditional RWA scale are multi-barreled and tap into two or even

all three of these sub-constructs at once. Funke (2005) gives the following RWA example item

to more clearly illustrate this point: ‘Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our

forefathers [Conventionalism], do what the authorities tell us to do [Submission], and get rid

of the 'rotten apples' who are ruining everything [Aggression]’. Therefore, neither Study 1 nor

Study 2 allows for a direct test of the more specific hypothesis that specifically the

Authoritarian Aggression aspect drives the association between RWA and the decreased

preference for the deontological option. Accordingly, in a third study, we administered a

recently developed authoritarianism scale by Funke (2005) that explicitly aims to differentiate

among the Conventionalism, Authoritarian Submission, and Authoritarian Aggression facet

scales.

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Study 3

The main aim of the third study was to confirm whether the association of RWA with a

decreased preference for the deontological option can be attributed to one of the facets of the

construct, namely Authoritarian Aggression.3 The current study differed from the previous

studies in several ways. First, we used the RWA3D scale (Funke, 2005), a variant of the RWA

scale that has been explicitly constructed to measure each of RWA’s sub-constructs separately.

Secondly, rather than using the process dissociation approach to delineate deontological and

utilitarian preferences, we opted for the more straightforward and parsimonious approach of

giving subjects a series of moral dilemmas and asking them for each dilemma to rate the

moral appropriateness of both the utilitarian option and the deontological option separately

(i.e. to what extent they find each option morally appropriate).

Building on the results of the previous studies, we hypothesized that RWA’s

Authoritarian Aggression facet would be negatively associated with preference for the

deontological option while the other two facets would not be meaningfully related to

deontological preference. We did not have a priori hypotheses about the manner in which each

of RWA’s facets would be related to preference for the utilitarian option. Given that we did not

find any effect of RWA on the utilitarian process in the previous study, the effects of the

RWA3D facets could be either insignificant or antagonistic, cancelling out each other.

Method

Participants. Two-hundred-twenty-eight North-American participants (128 male, 100

female, Mage = 35.1, SDage = 11.5) were recruited through the online labor platform Amazon's

mechanical Turk and paid US$0.75. Participation was limited to Mturk users with an AMT

approval rating higher than 95% that had completed at least 100 tasks on Mturk in the past.

3 As this study was explicitly construed as a further investigation into the associations between RWA and moral judgment, SDO was not included.

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Procedure. All participants were redirected to an online questionnaire running on the

lab’s custom software. After providing demographic information they completed an online

version of the RWA3D scale first, and the moral dilemma task subsequently.

Measures. The RWA3D scale consists of 12 statements; four for each of the scales

three facets. Participants expressed their agreement on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from

‘strongly disagree’ (1) to ‘strongly agree’ (5). A sample item for the Conventionalism facet

reads as follows: ‘The withdrawal from tradition will turn out to be a fatal fault one day’. A

sample item of the Submission facet reads as follows: ‘Obedience and respect for authority

are the most important values children should learn’. Finally, a (reverse scored) sample item

of the Authoritarian Aggression facet reads as follows: ‘There is no such crime to justify

capital punishment’.

After completing the RWA3D scale participants rated the moral appropriateness of

both the deontological option and the utilitarian option of six moral dilemmas on a 7 point

scale going from ‘absolutely inappropriate’ (1) to ‘absolutely appropriate’ (7).

Appropriateness ratings for the deontological and utilitarian options were averaged across

dilemmas. To ensure all participants had read the dilemmas correctly, they were asked a single

true or false question about each of the dilemmas immediately after supplying their

appropriateness ratings. All dilemmas and comprehension questions are presented in the

supplementary materials.

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Data Analysis. Before running any analyses we removed participants that had

responded incorrectly on any of the comprehensions questions. This was the case for exactly

30 participants, thus reducing our total sample to 198 participants. Although this procedure

lowers our overall sample size, it actually increases statistical power by removing distracted

or confused participants (see Oppenheimer, Meyvis & Davidenko, 2009). We calculated a

Pearson correlation for each of the RWA3D’s components with the moral preference scores,4

as well as difference between paired correlation tests to compare the strength of the

relationships.

Results

4 The results of an alternative analysis using multiple regression generally confirmed the pattern of results from the bivariate analyses. However, the multiple regression model on preference for the utilitarian option violated several assumptions of linear regression and thus required us to model the relation through non-parametric means. Because the conclusions from both analyses were the same, we report the more complex analyses only in the supplementary materials.

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All three subcomponents of RWA3D were positively associated with each other; all r

> .61, all p < .001. As was the case in Study 2, preference for the utilitarian option (Cronbach

α = .79, M = 3.70, SD = 1.27) was negatively related to preference for the deontological

option (Cronbach α = .70, M = 4.04, SD = 1.11); r = -.62, p < .001. More importantly, the

results showed that preference for the utilitarian option did not significantly correlate with any

of the authoritarianism components: Authoritarian Aggression (Cronbach α = .68, M = 2.65,

SD = 0.91), r = .09, p = .192 and Authoritarian Submission (Cronbach α = .72, M = 2.43, SD

= 0.82), r = -.04, p = .555, although it was marginally significantly associated with

Conventionalism (Cronbach α = .79, M = 2.39, SD = 1.04), r = -.13, p = .059. Furthermore,

we found that preference for the deontological option did not significantly correlate with

Authoritarian Submission, r = -.06, p = .378, nor with Conventionalism, r = .03, p = .718.

Most importantly, however, a statistically significant association of Authoritarian Aggression

with lower preference for the deontological option emerged, r = -.16, p = .024. Furthermore, a

difference between paired correlations test revealed that the association of Authoritarian

Aggression with preference for the deontological option was marginally different from that of

Authoritarian Submission, t(197) = 1.91, p = 0.061 and significantly different from that of

Conventionalism, t(197) = -3.03, p = .002. As such, these results confirm our hypothesis that

the negative association of authoritarianism with preference for the deontological option can

be explained through the subcomponent of Authoritarian Aggression.

Discussion

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The results of this third study corroborate the results from Study 1 and Study 2, and

allow us to clarify the nature of the association of RWA with moral preference. In particular,

the results of Study 3 indicate that the previously uncovered negative association of RWA

with preference for the deontological option can indeed be explained by the Aggression

subcomponent, as neither of the other two components seemed to be associated with the

outcome. Moreover, this study also helps explain why we failed to find an association of RWA

with preference for the utilitarian option. The overall effects of the different facets were not

only smaller (with only Conventionalism showing a marginally significant effect), they were

also more balanced, with the different effects cancelling out each other.

General Discussion

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Across three studies and in three different populations (Belgian students, Belgian

adults, and US adults) we obtained a robust association between right-wing attitudes and

response patterns on trolley-type moral dilemmas. Both SDO and RWA were associated with

a higher proportion of utilitarian responses on these types of dilemmas (Study 1), which can

be explained by a reduced preference for the deontological option, while preference for the

utilitarian option was not affected (Study 2). Given that SDO is characterized by tough-

mindedness, a dog-eat-dog worldview, and low altruistic concern (see Duckitt, 2001), the

results we predicted and obtained for SDO are fairly intuitive; individuals high in SDO are

less concerned about harming another person than those low in SDO, and in these dilemmas

the end justifies the means. For RWA, however, we advanced two competing hypotheses. On

the one hand, RWA is characterized by adherence to traditional values and dogmatism

(Altemeyer, 1988), which may lead people to adhere more to duty- and rule-based moral

concerns (i.e., more deontological choices). On the other hand, RWA is characterized by

disregard of individual rights and increased aggression, especially if security of the group is at

stake, which may render authoritarians less concerned about the individual in situations where

a ‘greater good’ can be achieved. The results of Studies 1 and 2 clearly aligned better with the

latter hypothesis and in order to further clarify the results from these first two studies, in

Study 3 we untangled RWA’s three subcomponents. As predicted, we found that the

aggression subcomponent of RWA was the key in explaining the decreased preference for the

deontological option in trolley dilemmas.

Towards a Better Understanding of Moral Cognition and its Relationship with Ideology

From a purely moral cognition perspective, the contribution of the present research is

primarily of a theoretical and methodological nature. It is worth reiterating that the current

study not only studied subject’s moral judgments (i.e., choices; Study 1) but measured

preference for each of the two options in a trolley dilemma separately (Study 2 and Study 3).

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Although this distinction may seem of minor importance, it is quite crucial for a nuanced

interpretation of the results of this type of research. Indeed, the current study demonstrates

that an increased proportion of utilitarian choices does not necessarily reflect increased

support for utilitarian concerns, and should therefore not be interpreted as such. Instead, as

demonstrated in the present study, a relative increase in utilitarian choices can be driven by a

decrease in deontological concerns. This is especially relevant in light of a recent wave of

research that has uncovered that utilitarian choices are also associated with some personality

traits that seem distinctly ‘un-utilitarian’ (i.e., not aimed at the largest net profit in overall

wellbeing). In particular, recent studies have shown that utilitarian choices are associated with

egocentric attitudes and decreased charitable giving (Kahane, Everett, Earp, Farias, &

Savulescu, 2015), anti-social personality traits (Bartels, & Pizarro, 2011), and a desire to

obtain power over others (Suessenbach, & Moore, 2015). As such, these findings have been

used to argue that utilitarian judgment does not necessarily reflect a concern for the greater

good and therefore, that judgments in trolley dilemmas are a suboptimal way to measure

commitment to any kind of ethical theory (Kahane et al., 2015). However, while this

perspective is definitely thought-provoking, it might be somewhat premature in its

conclusions. Our results point to a possible alternative explanation for this pattern of

associations: as was the case in our study, it seems quite likely that at least some of these

earlier effects are driven by decreased preference for the deontological option and not by

increased preference for the utilitarian option. Taken at face value, it is indeed quite surprising

that an increase in utilitarian judgment can be associated with these un-utilitarian traits.

However, if it turns out that these associations are driven by a decreased preference for the

deontological option, these findings are not as surprising. We hope the current study may

serve as a call to the moral cognition research field to move away from binary judgment

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measures, and instead move towards ‘double preference’ measurement methods that can

provide a more refined view of moral cognition.

In the field of political psychology, the current study provides novel insights in the

associations between ideology and morality in terms of the classic deontological versus

utilitarian reasoning opposition. Our results suggest that people holding a more right-wing

ideology tend to be more outcome focused in their morality, and feel less morally restricted by

the rights of each individual when these conflict with the benefit of the larger group. As such,

these results converge with and extend on the findings from Moral Foundations research

which showed that liberal morality focuses more on the individualizing ‘Harm’ and ‘Fairness’

foundations, whereas conservative morality is built around the more group based ‘Binding’

foundations (Graham, et al., 2009). Furthermore, the current results might help to better

understand differences in moralization of concrete (policy) issues between liberals and

conservatives as they clearly suggest that liberals and conservatives might have different

moral sensibilities (see below).

Understanding Morality through Trolley Dilemmas: Limitations and Opportunities

While we feel the current research offers up a new and intriguing perspective into the

relation between ideology and moral cognition, there are also some limitations and challenges

associated with this type of research. Perhaps the biggest limitation of the current work is that

one could argue that moral dilemmas are never fully context free and that some dilemmas

may even tap directly into constructs that are deeply associated with ideological or political

positions. Hence, what drives peoples’ responses to these dilemmas may be specific

convictions about the topic of the particular dilemma at hand, rather than an overarching way

of ethical reasoning. For instance, one well known trolley-type dilemma confronts the subject

with the choice to torture the son of a terrorist to locate a bomb hidden somewhere in a busy

city center. One could argue that responses to this dilemma are more likely to reflect the

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subjects’ views on torture as a counter-terrorism tactic than their inclination towards either

utilitarian or deontological thinking. For this reason, in both Study 1 and Study 2, we dropped

a dilemma that directly referred to terrorism (although this made no substantial difference to

our findings). While some of the remaining dilemmas might still refer to ideology to a lesser

extent, we have reason to believe that the robust effects that we obtained across a variety of

moral dilemmas are nevertheless indicative of differences in moral reasoning rather than

being directly determined by political position. A most telling example is the ‘life-insurance’

dilemma used in Study 3, which asks participants to rate the moral appropriateness of

euthanizing a dying man so that his poor family can cash a life-insurance check before the

policy runs out a few hours later. It is well-known that high authoritarians tend to oppose

euthanasia more strongly than their low authoritarian counterparts (Kemmelmeier, Burnstein,

& Peng, 1999). However, for this particular dilemma, the data showed that especially

respondents high in Authoritarian Aggression showed lower approval of the option not to

euthanize the man to help his family, as demonstrated by the significant negative correlation

with approval of the deontological option, r = -.26, p < .001. Hence, it seems that participants

did not base their judgment on their general view of euthanasia, but instead used the specific

context of the dilemma to reach a moral judgment. We are therefore confident that the robust

pattern of results we obtained across various sets of dilemmas does reflect participants’ moral

attitudes in terms of general preference towards utilitarian versus deontological reasoning.

The use of trolley dilemmas itself may also have limitations, especially in terms of

ecological validity. Indeed, although this type of dilemma has proven to be very valuable for

the field of moral cognition (see Cushman & Greene, 2012 for an overview), it is still

somewhat unclear to what extent response patterns on moral dilemmas translate to actual

behavior in real life. Bloom (2011) argues that trolley dilemmas, while interesting from a

philosophical perspective, may be too far removed from everyday moral behavior to be of

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much (predictive) value. While there is undoubtedly some truth to that argument, a case can

be made for the relevance of trolley dilemma research in the context of political ideology.

Although most people may rarely experience dramatic trolley-like dilemmas in their lives, the

policy makers and politicians they elect are more likely to be confronted with such problems.

Politicians do have to weigh competing moral principles quite often. Indeed, many policy

decisions revolve around weighing the rights of each individual versus those of a larger group.

Therefore, we believe it is meaningful to get a better understanding of how left-wing and

right-wing voters, and the politicians that represent them, may address these issues from

different moral angles.

Finally, as we described before, the opposition between deontological versus

utilitarian morality, as well as its established procedure of measurement in the form of trolley

dilemmas, typically present situations that involve physically harming other people. Future

research may seek to develop and test other types of dilemmas that also tap into deontological

versus utilitarian morality, but focus less on physical harm (e.g., white lie dilemmas, Kahane,

Wiech, Shackel, Farias, Savulescu, & Tracey, 2012). Such dilemmas could be useful to

investigate whether the relationship between ideology and deontological/utilitiarian reasoning

found in the present studies, extends beyond the core domain of harm.

Conclusion

In three studies, the present research demonstrated that ideology plays a substantial

role in the way people approach moral (i.e., “trolley”) dilemmas. In particular, high levels of

Social Dominance Orientation as well as high levels of Right-Wing Authoritarianism are

associated with a relative preference for utilitarian solutions over deontological solutions in

these dilemmas. This effect is due to a decrease in deontological concerns, rather than an

increase in utilitarian reasoning in people who hold right-wing attitudes. Of particular interest,

when confronted with these dilemmas where the rights of the individual are at odds with the

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benefits of the larger group, the negative impact of Authoritarian Aggression overcomes the

weaker positive influence of Conventionalism on deontological concerns.

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