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ABOUT THE MILITARY COMMITTEE (MC)

The Military Committee (MC) is the senior military authority in NATO and the oldest

permanent body in NATO after the North Atlantic Council, both having been formed

months after the Alliance came into being. It is the primary source of military advice to

NATO’s civilian decision-making bodies – the North Atlantic Council and the Nuclear

Planning Group.Its advice is sought prior to any authorization for military action and,

consequently represents an essential link between the political decision-making process

and the military structure of NATO.

TOPIC A: HYBRID WARFARE

Briefing for Delegates

Traditionally, military theorists have defined two broad categories of armed force: conventional and unconventional. Conventional forces generally refer to national militaries whose organization tactics, weapons and equipment conform to some standard of capabilities, and which nominally behave in accordance with the laws of war. In the classic understanding of conventional conflicts, belligerents contest control over a physical battlespace which may be achieved through the defeat one of military by another. Contrarily, unconventional forces may not conform to accepted standards in their organization, capabilities and conduct, and the objective of a belligerent fighting an unconventional conflict is often to have its adversaries capitulate or acquiesce to its strategic goals (meaning military victory on the battlefield is unnecessary for the

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unconventional actor). Unconventional conflict also unfolds outside the traditional battlespace and may include such areas as psychological warfare, cyber operations, and the political realm.

Whiles its precise meaning continues to be the subject of debate (including within NATO), analysts generally consider hybrid forces or warfare to be those which involve both conventional and unconventional aspects. Hybrid actors therefore have to potential to bring both unconventional capabilities and traditional military force to bear to defeat or force the capitulation or acquiescence of their conventional adversaries. With this in mind, we encourage delegates to consider the following definition of hybrid warfare as the point of departure for discussion:

The use of both conventional and unconventional tactics, operations and capabilities in order to counter the conventional military superiority of the opposing force.

Implications for NATO

One advantage that hybrid warfare confers to actual or potential NATO adversaries is that it may be used to threaten or impose costs against Allies that fall short of a threshold that may prompt an Article V response. In this way hybrid actors can challenge NATO, while undermining a key source of its strength, namely the deterrent power of a collective response

From late 2013 to early 2014 Moscow viewed the political turmoil in Ukraine and its potential to integrate Kiev further with the European Union as an unacceptable strategic challenge. In February, 2014 in Crimea military units with unmarked, Russian equipment barricaded Ukrainian military and police facilities and overran political building. Simultaneously, well-organized, -disciplined, and sometimes armed demonstrators in civilian clothes took over less-defended public administration buildings, media stations and civilian infrastructure. The overall effect was to paralyze local political decision-making, deny Ukrainian access to the media, and place Ukrainian forces in position of having to escalate the situation further in order to leave their bases. These kinetic (but largely bloodless) operations were supported an aggressive information campaign aimed at intimidating decision makers and crushing the morale of Ukrainian forces. Prior to the invasion non-military actions (such as building a strong media position, and establishing strong political organizations loyal to Russia) both pressured Kiev and facilitated future military action. These anti-Ukraine actors consistently claimed they were local protestors and were referred to as such by Russian officials and media. Even though it quickly became obvious these units had arrived from Russia, the ambiguity of their affiliation allowed Moscow to deny involvement even as it proceeded to orchestrate events that eventually led to the annexation of Crimea.

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It is conceivable that Moscow could employ a similar approach to destabilize or otherwise interfere in the internal affairs of NATO members (particularly those bordering Russia). In this way Russia could pursue strategic objectives at the detriment of NATO, while attempting to avoid the Article V threshold.

Questions for Discussion

Is hybrid warfare a novel new threat for NATO members, or just a new iteration of past threats that had both conventional and unconventional elements?

How have hybrid threats changed since the invasion of Ukraine in 2014?

Have efforts to date by NATO, and its members, been adequate in responding to hybrid threats?

How should the lessons from the last two years inform NATO’s ability to anticipate future threats?

Do NATO members need to reconsider future force structure planning to better address hybrid threats?

In light of the current threat environment, are there non-military elements and capabilities that must be integrated into NATO’s strategic posture?

Further Reading

Timothy McCulloh and Richard Johnson, Hybrid Warfare (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2013), http://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications/JSOU%2013-4_McCulloh,Johnson_Hybrid%20Warfare_final.pdf.

Neil Chuka and Jean Francois Born, Hybrid Warfare: Implications for CAF force development (Ottawa: Defence Research and Development Canada, 2015), http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2015/rddc-drdc/D68-2-43-2014-eng.pdf.

Julio Miranda Calha, Hybrid Warfare: NATO’s New Strategic Challenge? (Brussels: NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2015), https://www.google.ca/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwia9aTOpq_KAhVCdz4KHUcrDHUQFgghMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nato-pa.int%2Fdefault.asp%3FSHORTCUT%3D3778&usg=AFQjCNEjDb697EkYgnZdrkD6tzQcAuUlfg&sig2=5-gBxBrXx4Bu5wUdTbOFYg.

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Andras Racz, Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine: Breaking the Enemy’s Ability to Resist (Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2015), http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lang=en&id=191590.

TOPIC B: ARCTIC SECURITY

Briefing for Delegates

The Arctic is growing in its long-term strategic importance. As global environmental change proceeds, retreating sea ice is opening new year-round sea-lines of communication (SLOC) in the far north, namely the Northwest Passage (NWP) north of Canada and the Northern Sea Route (NSR), along Russia’s northern coast. These routes have the potential to reduce the duration of journeys between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans for global maritime operators which has both commercial and strategic implications. As well, the seabed hydrocarbon resource below the Arctic Ocean have also renewed territorial interests from circumpolar nations. In this context, Russia has territorial disputes with several NATO members, namely Canada and Denmark (over the limits of the continental shelf) and Norway (over the longstanding issue of the status of Svalbard). Russia also shares a northern border with Norway, and has ample capabilities to project power against circumpolar NATO partners Finland and Sweden.

Russian Arctic policy is primarily focused on the development of natural resources and maritime shipping. This is in part because the revenues of economic activity in the Russian north are very significant contributors to Russia’s financial capability to sustain its military power and pursue its foreign policy objectives. In this context Russia has submitted the most extensive maritime territorial claims in the Arctic of any circumpolar nation, and has claimed jurisdiction over the entirety of the NSR. Despite this, Moscow has also depended upon cooperation with more sophisticated Western resource operators to develop offshore petroleum in its Arctic waters, meaning Russia’s ambitions have suffered from sanctions imposed in response to its aggression in Ukraine.

Even though Russian Arctic policy also considers the region to be a “zone of peace and cooperation,” Russia has escalated its harassment of its northern neighbours since 2014, for instance by increasing its aerial patrols off the coast of Norway and through an incident where a possible Russian submarine was spotted outside Stockholm. As well, the Arctic is of fundamental importance for Moscow’s strategic military capabilities. In the event of a confrontation with NATO, control of the Barents Sea will be necessary for the Northern Fleet (NF, the largest component of the Russian Navy) to deploy to the Atlantic Ocean. As well, the Arctic Ocean has long underpinned Russian nuclear capabilities: the sea-based component of Moscow’s nuclear deterrent is headquartered on the Kola Peninsula, which enables the deployment of nuclear submarines on the

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polar ice cap where they are extremely difficult to locate and track. In this context, Russia has launched very ambitious modernization efforts with respect to its military capabilities in the Arctic. Moscow’s plans in this regard include the commissioning of forty new vessels into the Northern Fleet (including new nuclear ballistic missile submarines), reconstructing bases along the Arctic coast, and relocating personnel and assets to increase force strength in the North. Russia has also created a new Arctic Joint Strategic Command (with the same status as the country’s other four military districts) and has increased the scale and frequency of its military exercises in the region.

Notwithstanding the preceding points, it is important for delegates to also consider that a central requirement of Russian military modernization in the Arctic is to rehabilitate or replace decrepit, Cold War-era infrastructure and assets. As well, Moscow has so far demonstrated its willingness to pursue its interests and resolve disputes through international governance structures such as the Arctic Council and United Nations. Despite this, the strategic capabilities located in the Russian north, together with its increased assertiveness in NATO’s northern periphery (and moral globally) should remain of concern to NATO.

Questions for Discussion

What are the range of most likely threats to the Alliance emanating from the Russian capabilities in the Arctic? What should be the range of possible Allied responses to these threats?

Does Russia’s Arctic military modernization program require a response from Allied nations?

How can Russian strategic capabilities be contained in the event of escalated tensions or a confrontation with NATO?

Further Reading

Pavel Baev, Russia’s Arctic Policy and the Northern Fleet Modernization (Paris: IFRI, 2012), www.ifri.org/downloads/ifribaevarctiqueengaugust2012.pdf

Marta Carlsson and Niklas Granholm, Russia and the Arctic: Analysis and Discussion of Russian Strategies (Stockholm: Swedish Ministry of Defence, 2013), http://www.foi.se/ReportFiles/foir_3596.pdf

Justin Chan and Erik Bjornson, Russia’s Activities in the Arctic, (Ottawa: National Defence Canada, 2011), http://www.casr.ca/as-arctic-russian-risk-assessment.htm

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Thomas Frear, List of Close Military Encounters Between Russia and the West, March 2014 – March 2015 (European Leadership Network, 2015), http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/medialibrary/2015/03/11/4264a5a6/ELN%20Russia%20-%20West%20Full%20List%20of%20Incidents.pdf.

Jakub M. Godzimirski, The Arctic: What does Russia see? What does Russia want? (Helsinki: Finnish Ministry of Defence, 2012), http://www.defmin.fi/files/2451/The_Arctic.pdf

Andrew Higgins, “Norway Reverts to Cold War Mode as Russian Air Patrols Spike,” The New York Times (April 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/02/world/europe/a-newly-assertive-russia-jolts-norways-air-defenses-into-action.html?_r=0.

Ekaterina Klimenko, Russia’s Evolving Arctic Strategy: Drivers, Challenges and New Opportunities, SIPRI Policy Paper No. 42 (Stockholm: September, 2014), http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP42.pdf

Charles M. Perry and Bobby Andersen, New Strategic Dynamics in the Arctic Region: Implications for National Security and International Collaboration (Washington, DC: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 2012), http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/StrategicDynamicsArcticRegion.pdf

STRATFOR, “Russia in the Arctic: A Different Kind of Military Presence,” (November 11, 2015), https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/russia-arctic-different-kind-military-presence.

―”Sweden and Finland Consider NATO Membership,” (September 16, 2015), https://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical-diary/sweden-and-finland-consider-nato-membership.

Carol Williams, “Sweden rethinking neutrality amid fear of Russian aggression,” Los Angeles Times (September 2, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-sweden-russia-nato-neutrality-20150902-story.html.

TOPIC C: Russian Military Doctrine Evaluation and Response

Briefing for Delegates

Nuclear weapons have the potential to end life on Earth as we have come to know it. To many their mere existence causes the world to be far less safe than if they were gotten rid of all together. Such is their power and the implications of using them, all but the most belligerent of pariah states justify their possession of nuclear arms as a means of deterrence against would be enemies seeking to destroy or conquer them. Difficulties arise, however when one has to determine what the threshold of threat the nuclear

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states have whether it be real or perceived before they feel compelled to deploy their nuclear weapons. This is why the evaluation and response of states’ nuclear doctrines is so vitally important.

Certainly one of the defining features of the Cold War was the nuclear brinkmanship between the United States with NATO and the Soviet Union. With the stakes so high and the level of trust between the two sides so low the world was always dangerously close to disaster, as was highlighted in 1962 with the Cuban Missile Crisis, when we were brought just about as close as possible to the point of no return. With the breakup of the Soviet Union the danger of nuclear confrontation greatly dissipated. As the ideological divide between the two sides had greatly narrowed and Russia was forced to look more inward in order to rebuild the state nuclear conflict seemed far less likely.

Nuclear weapons did not completely disappear from the Russian Military Doctrine; in fact it was quite the opposite. While never formalized Russia debated an expanded role for tactical nuclear weapons as a deterrent in conventional conflicts because Russian forces were outdated and inadequate to deal with them otherwise. In 2000 Russia released a formal military doctrine, spurred on by what it saw as NATO’s threatening expansion, and especially its involvement in Kosovo. Russia outlined dangers (issues that it is concerned about going forward) and threats (more immediate issues), as well as an outline for its use of nuclear weapons. One of the more interesting points of the 2000 military doctrine was notion of using targeted nuclear strikes as means of “de-escalation” in conflicts where deterrence had failed.

Over the 2000s Russia and NATO relations warmed up somewhat as Russia grew stronger in terms of its economy, state apparatus, and military as it embarked on a large-scale modernization of its conventional forces. This led to an updated military doctrine that brought its nuclear policy more in line with other nuclear states as it removed the idea of using nuclear weapons as a tool for de-escalation. Relations between The West and Russia have taken a turn for the worse in the past few years however. This would include blocking intervention in Syria, and culminated in Russia annexing Crimea in early 2014.

This has led to the latest published Russian Military doctrine in December 2014 (which is technically 6 years early given that the one released in 2010 was meant to last until 2020). What is interesting about the latest doctrine is not specifically the nuclear portion, as that has remained unchanged, but the dangers and threats that Russia feels are looming largest. The language has changed from alluding to NATO and EU as dangers to the country and has even started naming specific NATO weapon systems. In 2015 Russia staged massive military maneuvers that took place from the Baltic region all the way to its Pacific coast. During these exercises Russia stationed state of the art nuclear

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capable missiles with a range of 500Km in the Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad in between NATO members Poland and Lithuania.

The military doctrine also highlights Russian fears of outside influence of its population resulting in upheaval such as that seen in Ukraine in 2014 as well as the other so-called colour revolutions. Russia sees these as the result of Western influence as a means to diminish Russian influence and power in the region. This is what makes the situation different in terms of nuclear doctrine in 2014 from 2010. While the threshold to use nuclear weapons has not necessarily changed, it is possible what constitutes a threat to Russia may well have. This as well as the slowing of Russia’s military modernization due to sanctions and falling energy prices makes things even more unpredictable.

Questions for Discussion

Has the threat of nuclear conflict with Russia increased? If so, how does it avoid escalation while maintaining a satisfactory level of deterrence?

What can be done to reassure NATO members that are within striking distance of the missiles in Kaliningrad?

How much of Russian posturing is for the domestic audience due to economic difficulties?

Further Reading

Vladimir Isachenkov “Russia is putting state-of-the-art missiles it its westernmost Baltic enclave” Business Insider (2015/02/18) http://www.businessinsider.com/russia-placing-state-of-the-art-missiles-in-kaliningrad-2015-3

Nuclear Threat Initiative, Russia profile page (April 2015) http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/russia/nuclear/

Olga Oliker, “Russia’s new military doctrine: Same as the old doctrine, mostly” The Washington Post (2015/01/15) https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/01/15/russias-new-military-doctrine-same-as-the-old-doctrine-mostly/

Pavel Podvig, (2011) “Instrumental Influences” Russia and the 2010 nuclear posture review” The Nonproliferation Review, 18:1 pp. 39-50

Russian Federation, Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, (2014/12/25) http://malaysia.mid.ru/web/embassy-of-the-russian-federation-in-malaysia/press-release/-/asset_publisher/rAwX0ikSv3ua/content/29-06-2015-the-military-doctrine-of-the-russian-federation

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Alexander Yakovenko The truth about Russia’s new military doctrine (RT.com: 2015) https://www.rt.com/op-edge/236175-president-putin-military-doctrine-document/