abhinava aesthetics larson
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AbhinavaguptaTRANSCRIPT
The Aesthetic (Rasāsvadā) and the Religious (Brahmāsvāda) in Abhinavagupta's Kashmir ŚaivismAuthor(s): Gerald James LarsonReviewed work(s):Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Oct., 1976), pp. 371-387Published by: University of Hawai'i PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1398282 .
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Gerald James
Larson The aesthetic
(rasasvada)
and
the
religious
(brahmdsvada)
in
Abhinavagupta's
Kashmir
Saivism
INTRODUCTION
In
recent
years
a
significant
number
of
publications
have
appeared
analyzing
the work of the well-known
tenth and
early eleventh-century
Kashmir
Saiva
thinker,
Abhinavagupta.
In these
publications
there
has
been
a
noticeable
division
in focus. On one
side,
such
Indologists
and
Sanskritists
as S.
K.
De,
E.
Gerow,
A.
Aklujkar,
R.
Gnoli,
S.
Iyer,
J.
L.
Masson,
M. V.
Patwardhan,
V.
Raghavan,
D.
S.
Ruegg,
G. Sastri
and
others have
addressed themselves
to
problems
of
language
and
aesthetics
in
Abhinavagupta's
work and
have
shown
that
Abhinavagupta
made
important
contributions
in these
areas.'
On the other
side,
researchers like
Gopinath
Kaviraj,
K. C.
Pandey,
Andre
Padoux,
Lilian
Silburn,
and others have
focused that attention on
Abhinava-
gupta's
work in
mystical
theology,
monistic
philosophy,
and
the Hindu
tantra
and have shown
that
Abhinavagupta
made
equally important
contributions
in these
areas.2 Both
groups
of
scholars,
of
course,
have
made reference
to
both sides of
Abhinavagupta's
work and
have
referred,
at least in
passing,
to
possible
connections between
these two
seemingly disparate
dimensions in
the
corpus
of
Abhinavagupta.
Thus
far,
however,
few
attempts
have
been
made
systematically
to
develop
an overall
theoretical clarification of
Abhina-
vagupta's
intellectual
contribution.
Partly,
to
be
sure,
this reticence has
been
due to
the
lack of
scholarly
editions and
translations of the
vast and
difficult
corpus
of
Abhinavagupta,
and,
as
a
result,
even
now,
though
many
primary
and
secondary
works are
becoming
available,
one
must exercise
caution in
attempting
to raise the issue of
theoretical
clarification,
recognizing
that
corrections and
amplifications
will
undoubtedly
be
necessary
as further
textual
research
proceeds.
Nevertheless,
one of
the
primary
tasks
of
the historian
of
religious thought
is
precisely
to
raise
issues of overall
theoretical
clarification,
for
only
a
broadly
based,
interdisciplinary approach
(making
use of
Indology,
philosophy, history,
philology,
and
theology)
is
able
to
provide
access to
the historian of
religious thought
must
understand-namely,
the
religious
significance
of
what
he
studies,
or in this
case,
the
religious
significance
of
Abhinavagupta.
Thus,
this
article is a
tentative
and
exploratory
attempt
to
raise the
issue of
theoretical
clarification with
respect
to
the work
of
Abhina-
vagupta,
an
attempt
which
hopefully
will
prove
useful,
at
least
heuristically,
not
only
to
historians
of
religious
thought
but to
researchers
working
in
highly specialized
aspects
of
the
corpus
of
Abhinavagupta
as
well.
THE
CONTEXT
Unlike
most
ancient
cultural
traditions
of India
about
which we
know
very
GeraldJames Larson
is
Professor
and
Chairman
of
the
Departmentof
Religious
Studies,
University
of
California,
Santa
Barbara. AUTHOR'S
OTE:
This
paper
was
first presented
at the
meeting of
the
International
Association
for
the
History
of
Religions
in
Lancaster,
England,
in
August
of
1975.
Philosophy
East and West
26,
no.
4,
October
1976.
?
by
The
University
Press
of Hawaii.
All
rights
reserved.
372
Larson
little,
the
culture and
history
of
Kashmir
is not
completely opaque
to
the
intellectual
historian.
Especially
in Kalhana's
Rajatarahgint,
written
in
the
twelfth
century
A.D.,
we
have an
important quasi-history
or
near-history
of the
Kashmir area which
provides
a
valuable
and
reasonably
accurate
picture
of
the social-cultural
life of
the
region
from
the
eighth
or ninth centuries onward.3
Prior to the
eighth
century,
we know that Kashmir
was a
center
for
Buddhist
studies.4
Already
in the
reign
of
Asoka
in
the third
century
B.C.,
some Buddhist
traditions had
spread
to
the Kashmir
region.5
Moreover,
from the
first
few
centuries
A.D.,
beginning
with the
reign
of
Kaniska and
thereafter,
Kashmir
became
an
important
center for northern
Buddhist
developments
including
traditions
of
Sarvastivada,
the
Graeco-Buddhist
art
of
Gandhara,
and
early
Mahayana
both
in its
popular
manifestations
and
in
its
more intellectual
formulations
of
Madhyamika
and
Yogacara. Running parallel through
these
Buddhist
centuries
in
the Kashmir
area there
were also
developing
traditions
of
an archaic
Naga
cult
together
with the
emergence
of
the
early
texts
of
Saivagama, although
very
little
is known about these latter traditions
prior
to the
eighth
or
the
ninth
century.6
At
any
rate,
there
is
enough
evidence,
even
for
these
earlier
centuries,
to
suggest
that,
in
spite
of
the
geographical
isolation
of the
Kashmir
valley,
the
region
was
unusually cosmopolitan,
wherein
tradi-
tions
of
Hindu,
Buddhist, Jain,
Central Asian
and even Mediterranean culture
freely intermingled
and cross-fertilized
one another.
It
was,
however,
the
political
expansion
under
the
powerful
king, Lalitaditya,
in the
eighth
and the
cultural consolidation
under
King
Avantivarman
in
the
ninth
century
that
presumably
provided
the
social
reality
requisite
for
the
emergence
of
what we
now call Kashmir Saivism.7 Hindu culture
in all
of
its
dimensions was
patronized
and
encouraged, including poetry,
drama,
music, dance,
dars'ana,
vydkarana,
temple
building,
smrti,
purdna,
and tantra.
Well-known
br5hmana-panditas
were
brought
from elsewhere in north India
to
Kashmir,
and
Abhinavagupta,
in a later
text,
comments that
his
ancestor,
Atrigupta,
came to Kashmir
by
invitation
of
King
Lalitaditya
in this
period.8
It
should be
noted, moreover,
that
even in this time of Hindu
ascendancy,
Buddhist
studies were also
encouraged,
and one can
only
wonder
about
and
perhaps
envy
the
vigorous
debates
and
intellectual
exchange
that must
surely
have taken
place
in the
period.
It
should
also be
noted
that
this was
probably
the era
of
the
great
Sanikaracarya,
and one is
strongly
tempted
to
believe
the
tradition
which asserts
that
Safikara
visited Kashmir
during
his career both
to
carry
on his
polemic against
the
Buddhists
as well
as to
help
reshape
the
older dualistic Saiva
traditions
in
the
region.9
In
any
case,
a
reshaping
of the older
Saiva
traditions
was
precisely
what
took
and the
reshaping
moved
primarily
in two distinct directions.
Vasugupta
and
Kallata
are
credited
with
the
founding
of
spanda-sistra,
a
collection
of
religious
speculations
focusing
around
the idea
of
consciousness
as
"vibration;"
and
Somananda
and
Utpaladeva
are
generally
credited
with
373
establishing pratyabhijhii-sstra,
a
collection
of
philosophical
writings dealing
mainly
with the
notion
of
"re-cognition."10
Both traditions
apparently
grew
out
of
the
older
Saivagama
and
undoubtedly represent
efforts
to
construct
more
sophisticated
interpretations
of
Saivite
religion
and
philosophy.ll
These
religiophilosophical
traditions taken
together
are
referred to as the Trika-
that
is,
triple,
threefold
or a
triad,"
usually
construed to mean
the
triad
siva, sakti,
and
anu,
or
the
triad
pati,
pasa,
and
pasu
(that
is,
the
lord,
the
fetters,
the
souls,
respectively).
The Sanskrit literature of the
movement
is
extensive
as can
be
seen in the
numerous
volumes of the Kashmir Series of
Texts
and
Studies,
and
the
active
intellectual
life of
the
movement runs
from
the
late-eighth
or
early-ninth
centuries
through
the twelfth or thirteenth
centuries
or
roughly
until
the
period
that
Kashmir
came
under the control
of
invading
Muslims.
Key figures
in
the
movement,
in
addition
to
Vasugupta,
Kallata, Somananda,
and
Utpaladeva,
included
Laksmana,
Ramakantha,
Abhinavagupta,
Ksemaraja, Yogaraja,
and
Jayaratha.12
It was
primarily,
however,
in the
latter
part
of
the
tenth
century
and the
early
eleventh-and
interestingly
in the
reign
of the infamous
Queen
Didda13-that
the school
reached its
highest
point
under the influence of
one
of the most remarkable
minds that India has
produced, Abhinavagupta.14
Coming
from a famous
brihamana
family, Abhinavagupta
was
trained,
according
to
tradition,
in
Saiva
philosophy,
the Kula
and
Krama
systems
of the Hindu
tantra,
Jain
thought,
and
Mahayana
Buddhist
philosophy
(primarily
Yogacara).15
In
addition,
his numerous
writings
indicate a careful
training
in
traditions
of
the
philosophy
of
language
as
represented
in
Mimamsaka
and
Naiyayika
thought
as well as the
linguistic speculations
of
the famed
Bhartrhari,
together
with
a
careful
training
in
alamkara-sastra
or Sanskrit
poetics
as
represented
in the works
of
Bharata, Anandavardhana,
Bhattanayaka,
and
Bhattatauta.16
He
composed
numerous
works
touching
on
many
of
these
subjects
and,
according
to
all
accounts,
made distinctive
contributions
primarily
in three
areas:
first,
in the area of
pratyabhijhii-sastra,
n which his
Isvarapratyabhijha-
vivrtivimarsin,
his
LaghvTvrtti,
nd his
Paramirthasara
became
perhaps
most
well
known; second,
in the
area
of
alamkara-sastra,
in
which his
Dhvanya-
lokalocana and his
AbhinavabharatT
ecame
famous;
and
finally
in
the area of
tantra,
in
which he set
forth
a
massive twelve-volume
synthesis
of
the
mystical
Saiva
philosophy
and
tantra,
known as
Tantrdloka.17
As
just
indicated,
his
corpus
is
so
vast and
difficult
that
there has
been
a
tendency
to focus on one or
another
aspect
of
his
work,
thereby
creating
the
impression
that these various
areas of
his interest
were
really quite separate.
As
translations and
studies
have
emerged,
however,
and as
one
begins
to
get
a
picture
of
Abhinavagupta's
technical
terminology,
which
clearly
carries over
into all
the areas
of
his
interests
(namely,
philosophy
of
language,
philosophy
of
religion,
tantra
and
poetics),
one
begins
to
get
a sense of
an
overall
integrity
and
intellectual
pro-
gram
that,
in
many
ways,
is
one of
the most
remarkable
legacies
of
classical
or
374 Larson
medieval
Indian
culture,
as
valuable
as
and in
many
ways
more
impressive
than
that
of
Kalidasa,
Nagarjuna,
Vasubandhu,
Saiikara,
or
Ramanuja.
Subsequent development
in
Indian
poetics,
even
down to
our
own
time,
is
inconceivable
apart
from
Abhinavagupta,
and
many
of
the later
poetic-
theologies
of
the
Vaisnava Goswamins in north
India as well as
the
later
systematic interpretations
of theistic
Vai.nava
and
Saiva
thought
in south
India
undoubtedly
owe much to his contribution.18
THE PROBLEMOF RASASVADA AND BRAHMASVADA
In
order to
get
at this overall
integrity
or
unified
intellectual
program
of
Abhinavagupta,
I
propose
to focus
my
comments
around the issue of the
relationship
between rasasvdda
(the
enjoyment
of
aesthetic
tasting)
and
brahmisvada
(the
enjoyment
of
spiritual
realization)
in
Abhinavagupta's
thought.
In
terms of what we
presently
know of
the
Abhinavagupta corpus,
this
appears
to
be
a
crucial
issue for
understanding Abhinavagupta's unique
theosophy
or
"metaphilosophy"
together
with
his
philosophy
of
language,
his aesthetics
or
poetics,
and his
appropriation
and
reinterpretation
of earlier
traditions
of Indian
philosophy.19
Using
this issue as
a
focus,
I
wish to
suggest
the
following:
(1)
Abhinavagupta
but
clearly goes beyond
the
older
grammarian-philosophers,
including
Bhartrhari,
by redefining
the
role and function of
language;
(2)
that
he assimilates but
beyond any
view that would reduce
the
religious experience
to
the aesthetic
experience;
and
(3)
that
he
assimilates but
goes beyond
the
position
of Advaita
as a
philoso-
phical
treatment
of
the
monistic
position.
His overall intellectual
vision,
moreover,
is not
the
negation
of
language,
art,
and
philosophy,
but
rather a
vigorous
defense of
their
integrity
and
reality-an
integrity
and
reality
dialecti-
cally
construed
vis-a-vis
brahmisvida.
In the introduction
of
this article
I
referred to
a
split
or
divorce
in
research
publications
on
Abhinavagupta
with
some
focusing
on
his
poetics
and
other
focusing
on his
religious
and
philosophical
speculations.
That
split
or
divorce,
as
I
indicated
at
the
beginning,
is
partly
due to the
extent and
difficulty
of
Abhinavagupta's
work,
but one
might
also
argue
that it
is,
to some
extent,
symptomatic
of a more
general
division
in
many
cultures
between those
interested in what
might
be
called the
immediate,
undifferentiated aesthetic
dimension
of
experience
and those interested
in the more
theoretical,
discursive
problems
of
logic, epistemology,
and
philosophy
in
general.20
In
India
this
more
general
division is evidenced
in the
polarity,
which can be traced over
many
centuries,
between
kavya
and sistra. Most learned
men
were
trained
in
both,
but
it is not unusual to
find thinkers
working
in either
one or the other.
Moreover,
one
frequently
senses
a certain
hostility
or
indifference
in each
toward the other.
Masson and Patwardhan
rather
nicely
capture,
albeit
in a
somewhat
anachronistic
manner,
what must
surely
have been
in
the
minds of
numerous
poets
when
they
comment,
375
One's
mind is
irreverently
invaded
by
an
image
of
Kalidasa
politely
bored,
listening
to
explain
to him the
deeper
significance
of his
plays,
his ears
really
attuned
to the
joyous
shouts
of the
spring
festival
taking place
outside.21
At
the same
time, however,
in
many
cultures there
are at least a few
seminal
minds who
attempt
to
bridge
or assimilate divisions like this. In the
history
of
European
thought,
for
example,
one
thinks
of
Aristotle, Kant,
Hegel, Heideg-
ger,
and so forth. In the intellectual
history
of
India,
unfortunately,
one finds
very
few
such
minds,
partly,
I
suppose,
because
patterns
of
education tended
to limit the
scope
of a
pandita
to a rather
narrow
cultural
focus;
partly
because
caste
restrictions
limited
learning largely
to an elite
priestly group,
whose
preoccupations
were
primarily
religious;
and
partly
also
because
of
what
Edgerton
once called the
"extraordinary
norm"
of moksa
in Indian
culture,
which
encouraged
a kind of
religious imperialism
that
devoured
all
other
aspects
of culture
in
a
way
unmatched
in
any
but the most archaic
of
social
environments.22
Whatever the
reasons,
India
has
produced
few
minds that have
attempted
to
interpret
the
significance
of the various
aspects
of culture in a
balanced
manner,
and, hence,
one is
rather amazed to find
Abhinavagupta
and
others
in the
Kashmir
region
in
this
period
not
only
speaking
about
possible
analogies
or
homologies
between the aesthetic and
the
religious,
but even more
than
that,
writing
extensive treatises on
drama,
poetry,
music,
language, religion,
and
philosophy.
Regarding
the
specific problem
of
rasavada
and
brahmasvada,
t was
evidently
Bhattanayaka,
toward the
end of the ninth
century,
who
first called attention
to
the
issue.23
In an
eleventh-century
work of
Mahimabhatta,
Bhattanayaka
is
quoted
as follows:
Dramatic
performances
and the music
accompanying
them feed the Rasa
in all its
fulness;
hence the
spectator,
absorbed
in the
tasting
of
this,
turning
inward,
feels
pleasure through
the whole
performance.
Sunk into
his
own
being,
he
forgets everything
(pertaining
to
practical
life).
There is
manifested
in him
that
flow of
inborn
pleasure,
from
which the
yogins
draw their satis-
faction.24
Abhinavagupta
himself refers to the issue in
his
AbhinavabharatL,
commentary
on
Bharata's
Nf.tya-sastra.
Abhinavagupta
in
the context of
citing
various
views
about the nature of the
aesthetic
experience
discusses with
approval
a
view which he
characterizes
as
follows:
Therefore ... Rasa is
revealed
(bhivyamana)
by
a
special
power
assumed
by
words in
poetry
and
drama,
the
power
of revelation
(bhavani)-to
be distin-
guished
from
the
power
of
denotation-consisting
of
the
action of
generalizing
the
determinants,
etc.
(i.e.,
vibhavas,
anubhavas,
etc.)
This
power
has the
faculty
of
suppressing
the thick
layer
of
mental
stupor
(moha)
occupying
our own
consciousness.
...
376 Larson
Rasa,
revealed
by
this
power,
is
then
enjoyed (bhuj)
with a
kind of
enjoyment
(bhoga),
different from
direct
experience, memory,
etc. This
enjoyment, by
virtue
of
the
different
forms
of
contact
between sattva and
rajah
and tamah
...
is
characterized
by
a
resting
(visranti)
on
one's own
consciousness
(samvit),
which due
to
the
emergent
state of
sattva,
is
pervaded by
beatitude
(ananda)
and
light (prakisa),
and is similar
to
the
tasting (asvida)
of
the
supreme
brahman.
(...
parabrahmisvadasavidhena
bhogena
param
bhujyata
iti.)25
Clearly
in
this
passage Abhinavagupta
is
only stressing
a
similarity
(savidha)
between
rasdsvida and
brahmasvada,
and
one sees even
more
clearly
in
other
passages
that
whatever
homology
Abhinavagupta
points
to
between the
two
experiences
is often in the direction
of
allowing
the
fundamental
and
final
dissimilarity
between
the two
to
emerge.26
For
example,
Abhinavagupta
in
another
passage
of
AbhinavabhdratT
omments,
Therefore,
the
tasting
of
Rasa
(which
consists in
a
camatkira
different from
any
other kind of
ordinary cognition)
differs from
memory,
inference
and
any
form of
ordinary
self-consciousness ...
This
tasting
is
distinguished
(a)
from
perception
of
the
ordinary
sentiments
(delight,
etc.)
aroused
by
the
ordinary
means of
cognition
(perception,
infer-
ence
...
etc.);
(b)
from
cognition
without active
participation
of
the
thoughts
of
others
(namely,
yogi-pratyaksa);
and
(c)
from
the
compact
(ekaghana)
experience
of one's own
beatitude,
which is
proper
to
yogins
of
higher
orders
(presumably
brahmasvdda)
..
Indeed,
these
three forms of
congition
are
deprived
of
beauty
(saundarya-
virahat).27
Thus,
although
there
is a
striking family similarity
between
rasisvdda
and
brahmdsvdda,
here
appears
to
be
no
doubt
in
Abhinavagupta's
mind
that
they
cannot be
reduced to
one another.
Visvanatha,
a later
fourteenth-century
poetics
writer,
calls attention to this
striking family
likeness
by commenting,
Rasa is tasted
by qualified persons.
It is
tasted
by
virtue
of
the
emergence
of
sattva.
It is made
up
of
full
Intelligence,
Beatitude
and
Self-Luminosity.
It is
void of
contact with
any
other knowable
thing,
twin brother to the
tasting
of
brahman. It
is
animated
by
a
camatkdra
of
a
non-ordinary
nature.
It is tasted
as if it were our
very
being,
in
indivisibility.28
In
attempting
to
unpack
the
significance
of
this issue
of
rasisvada
and
brahmaisvdda
n
Abhinavagupta's
work,
it is useful
to
look, first,
at his
general
views
regarding language
and
poetics; secondly,
at his
theosophical
or
"meta-
philosophical"
views;
and,
finally,
at
possible
interrelations between
the two
together
with
possible
interrelations
and contrasts with
the
Advaita
position.
Such
a
breakdown
is not
simply
for the
sake of ease of
exposition
but
reflects
to
some extent
Abhinavagupta's
own
approach.29
Abhinavagupta's approach.29
(1)
Language andpoetics.
Both Anandavardhana and
Abhinavagupta
were
familiar
with older discussions
among
Naiyayikas,
Mimamsakas,
and
gram-
marians
regarding
the
nature of
words
(sabda)
and their
meanings
(artha).
Prabhakara and some
other Mimamsakas had
argued
for
the
theory
of
377
anvitibhidhina,
or
the
doctrine that
meaning
resides in words
alone and
that
the relations between
these words
in
a sentence
provide
the basis
for a
verbal
judgment.30
Kumarila
and
other
Mimamsakas
had
argued
for
the
theory
of
abhihitinvaya
or the doctrine that verbal
meanings
are more
important
than
the words themselves and that these verbal
meanings
come
to be related to
one
another
in
a
verbal
judgment by
means of
a
secondary
denotation
or
laksani.31
Various
Naiyayikas
had maintained a
position, combining
to some extent
the
views
of
both
Prabhakara
and
Kumarila,
and
added
evidently yet
a
third
capacity
of
language
known as
titparyasakti
or an
"extradenotative function"
which
provides
the
"motive-power"
of
the verbal
judgment.32
In
all of
these
discussions,
therefore,
three
primary
functions
of
language
were
gradually
being
isolated: a
primary
denotative
function
(abhidha);
a
secondary
or
meta-
phorical
function
(laksa.na);
and
an
extra-denotative function
or
motive-power
(tatparyasakti).
Moreover,
Anandavardhana and
Abhinavagupta
were also
familiar
with
the work of
Bhartrhari and other
grammarian
philosophers
who
had
argued
for
the
theory
of
akhan.da-vikya-sphota
or
the
doctrine that the
primary
vehicle
of
meaning
is
the
sentence
as a whole
(vikya);
that the
meaning
of words has to do
with
revealing
the
"integral linguistic symbol"
or
semantic
significance
(sphota),
which
exists
quite apart
from
but
is related to the ideal
or
actual
pronunciation
of
the
words;
and
that this
meaning
is
grasped
in the
mind
by
an "immediate intuitive realization"
(pratibhi).33
Also,
Abhinavagupta
was familiar
with Bhartrhari's
notion of
sabda-brahmanand the
related
theory
that creation
emerges
from sabda-brahmanvia
the
pasyanti,
the
madhyama,
and
the
vaikhari
(that
is,
the
pure potency
of
all
possible
meaning,
the
pasyantT;
the
intermediate
phase
of
imagining
specific
meanings
that
might
be
uttered,
the
madhyamii;
and the
actual
utterance
in
natural
speech,
the
vaikharT).34
Older
theorists
in
poetics
and drama had
worked,
to a
large
extent,
within
the
boundaries
of
these older discussions
of the
function
of
language,
and,
as
a
result,
it
is
probably
no
accident
that
discussions of
poetry
were
largely
limited to such
issues as
figures
of
speech (alamkara)-that
is
to
say,
issues of
secondary
denotation,
various kinds of
metaphor,
and
so on.
Anandavardhana
and
Abhinavagupta,
however,
argue
persuasively
for
another
function of
language,
namely, vyahjani
or
"suggestion."35
This
"suggestion"
is
referred
to as
dhvani
(which
means,
literally,
"sound" or
"resonance")
and refers to
an
evocative level of
meaning
which
transcends the
level
of
primary
denotation
as well
as
the level of
metaphor.
It
emerges
in
the
context of
primary
and
secondary
denotation,
but
it
expresses
an
idea or a
figure
of
speech
or
an
emotion
over and
above the
over and
above the
actually expressed
or
secondary
utterance.
Dhvani,
manifested
primarily
in a
medium such
as
poetry,
is that
dimension of
meaning
responsible
for and
inextricably
allied with
the realization of
rasa or
aesthetic
tasting.
For
Anandavardhana
and
Abhinavagupta
the
realization
of
rasa
is
not the
experience
of an
emotion
(either sthiyi-bhava,
vibhiva,
anubhava,
or
vyabhicdribhiva),
although
it
occurs in these
emotional
environments.
Rasa,
378
Larson
rather,
is
a sui
generis
realization of
"tasting,"
evoked
by
dhvani
(or
vyahjana)
in the
cultivated
spectator
or reader
(sahrdaya),
sparked
by
pratibha
or
bhivani,
correlated with the
spectator's
or reader's
deepest impulses
(samskiras
or
visanas),
and
accompanied
by
(a)
a
sense
of distance from one's
ordinary
awareness
in
terms of
time,
space,
inference,
ordinary
emotional
involvements,
and so forth
(that
is,
it is
alaukika),
and,
hence,
an
experience
of
"generaliza-
tion"
(sadhiaran-karana)
as if one
has been
lifted
out
of one's
particular
condition;
(b)
a sense of elevated
joy
or
bliss
(ananda);
(c)
a
sense of
surprise
or charm or wonder
(camatkira);
(d)
a
sense
of
profound harmony
or
appro-
priateness
(aucitya);
and
(e)
a
sense
of relaxed
tranquility
(visranti).36
Crucial
to
understand, however,
is that this realization
of
rasa
is evoked
by
one of
the
functions
of
language-namely,
language
in its function
of
vyahjana
or
"suggestion."
Hence,
it is
clearly
savikalpa
and can endure
only
so
long
as
the
vikalpa-medium
endures,
through
which
it is
evoked.
The ultimate
experi-
ence of the
yogin,
however,
according
to
classical
Yoga
traditions
of India and
according
to
Abhinavagupta
(and,
of
course,
to the Buddhists
as
well),
is
always
nirvikalpa;
and,
hence,
the
realization
of
rasa is an
important yet
finally
rather
pale
foretaste
of
that
final
"tasting"
of brahman.37One
might say
that
rasa-dhvani
brings
one to the
boundary
between
savikalpa
and
nirvikalpa
and
as such becomes
an
important
discovery
or
perspective
for those
attempting
to
express
symbolically
the
inexpressible.
Nevertheless,
rasa-dhvani
clearly
operates
in a
linguistic
environment
and thus
can never
be
more than
a
foretaste
of that
which
is
nirvikalpa.
This fundamental
distinction
between
nirvikalpa
and
savikalpa
is one of
the basic reasons
why
in
the
recent debate between
Masson and
Patwardhan,
on
one
side,
and
Gerow
and
Aklujkar,
on the
other,
the latter
two
are
probably
correct
in their
suggestion
that the
problem
of
santa-rasa
must
have been
something
of
an
embarrassment
to
Abhinavagupta;38
for to
admit the
possi-
bility
of
sinta-rasa
is
precisely
to break
down
the distinction between
savikalpa-
experience
and
nirvikalpa-experience
which
would
surely
have been
unaccept-
able
to
Abhinavagupta.
As a
result,
Abhinavagupta
reinterprets
santa-rasa,
making
it
into the
rasa
of rasas or the
ground
rasas and
suggesting
that its
sthayibhava
is
not nirveda
but
rather
tattva-jhiana-in
other
words,
lifting
isnta-rasa
out
of its
context
qua
rasa and
transmuting
it
to the
level of
brahmisvida.39
The fundamental
distinction
between
nirvikalpa
and
savikalpa
is
probably
also a
basic
reason
for
Abhinavagupta's
need to
reinterpret
Bhartrhari.
Whether
for this
shift or
con-
Abhinavagupta
himself
is
responsible
for this
shift or
perhaps
simply
con-
solidates
what other
Kashmir
Saivas
had been
suggesting
makes little difference.
Bhartrhariasserts
that
sabda-brahman
s
equivalent
to the
level
ofpasyant7,
and
this
by
implication
suggests
the
well-known
view of the
grammarians
that
experience
is
always
savikalpa
and cannot
be
nirvikalpa.40
Abhinavagupta
takes
over
many
of Bhartrhari's
views,
but
on this issue
makes
an
important
379
addition.
He
suggests
a
category beyond
the level of
pasyanti,
which he calls
para-vik, equating
it with the level
of
pure
sakti
or
svatantryasakti
n the
scheme
of
thirty-six
tattvas,
thus
preserving
a
place
for
nirvikalpa-experience
and
at
the same time still
providing
an
important
place
for
Bhartrhari's
linguistic
philosophy.
In
the
area
of
language
and
aesthetics,
therefore,
Abhinavagupta
works out
an
interesting
synthesis
of older traditions.41
Anvitibhidhina,
abhihitinvaya,
sphota,
and
pratibhi
are
utilized
in
bringing
forth a new
aesthetic
vision-the
theory
of
rasa-dhvani-which
aesthetic
vision
is linked in a
pro-
vocative
or evocative manner
in
the
homology
with
brahmisvada,
the
latter
being
preserved
in
its essence as
nirvikalpa,
while
allowing
the
savikalpa
dimensions
to
stand
very
much in the
way
construed
by
Bhartrhari
in
his
analysis
of
pasyanti,
madhyami,
and
vaikhar.
In
this
synthesis
Abhinavagupta
accomplishes
two
exceedingly
important
results.
First,
he
succeeds
in
consoli-
dating
a new
interpretation
of the
function of
language
(namely,
rasa-dhvani
or
vyahjana),
thereby greatly
expanding
the
expressive power
of
words and
sentences.
Second,
he succeeds in
preserving
the
transcendence of
brahmanor
parama-siva
as
nirvikalpa
or
visvottlrna,
while
at the same time
homologizing
the
"tasting"
of
the transcendent with the
"tasting"
of
the
aesthetic,
thereby
opening up
the
possibility
of
an
interesting
dialectic between
spiritual
experience
and other kinds of
experience.
(2)
Theosophy
or
"metaphilosophy."
As was
true
in
the
preceding
discus-
sion of
language
and
aesthetics,
so also
on the level of his
theosophy
or
"meta-
philosophy," Abhinavagupta
is
working
in
a
framework
that
presupposes
older traditions
of
Indian
philosophy.
In one
passage
of
his
Isvarapraty-
abhijhivivrtivimarsinT,
or
example,
he
explicitly
indicates that
his own
views
represent
an assimilation and
correction
of
Samkhya
and
other
dualisms,
Advaita Vedanta
and
Vijinanavada
Buddhist
thought.
The
truth would
be
established
and all could
agree,
says
Abhinavagupta,
in
that
manner of
special
pleading
so
typical
of an Indian
pandita
and
at
the same
time
so
irritating
to
opponents,
if
only
the
Agamikas
would
give
up
their
dualism,
if
the
Advaita
Vedantins
would
finally
admit that
miya
is an
inherent and
active
power
in
the
ultimate,
and if
the
Yogacarins
would
concede
that their
momentary
consciousness-only requires
an
ultimate source
in
brahman or
parama-siva.42
Abhinavagupta
knows full
well,
of
course,
that his
opponents
will
not
concede
these
points,
but the
passage
is
interesting
in
terms of
revealing
the
direction
of
Abhinavagupta's
own
thinking
and in
calling
attention to
the
sources he
was
using
and
appropriating
for his own
philosophical
reflection.
For
the
ultimate
or
is
in
its
essence
For
Abhinavagupta
the
ultimate
or
parama-siva
is
in
its
deepest
essence
totally
transcendent-that
is to
say,
visvottTrna
nd anuttara.
It is
finally
an
unfathomable
mystery.43
Yet
this
mysterious
ultimate shines in
its
clarity,
and in
that
shining
is the
presupposition
or
ground
for all
manifestation.
Hence,
the
totally
transcendent
(visvottirna)
is
also
the
totally
immanent
(visvamaya)
as universal consciousness
(samvid,
cit),
as
universal
joy
(ananda),
and as
380
Larson
prakdsavimarsamaya-that
is
to
say,
made
up
of
"pure
undifferentiated
light
or
clarity" (prakasa)
and
"pure
unhindered
awareness"
(vimarsa).
Prakasa
or
pure
clarity
implies
perfect
knowledge
and
is the
ground
or
source for all
knowing
or
jhana-sakti.
Vimarsa
or
pure
unhindered
awareness
implies
com-
plete
spontaneity
or
freedom
(svitantryasakti)
and
is
the
ground
or
source
for all
activity
or
kriya-sakti. Moreover,
vimarsa
as
unhindered
awareness
is
pure
intuitive
illumination,
a
kind of
ultimate
pratibha,
which is
the
ground
or
source for
the
creative
urge
(iccha-sakti,
para-vak)
and
which is
the
ground
or
source for
bringing
into
being
(bhavand)
all
levels of
meaning.
Such
pure
clarity
and
pure
unhindered
awareness
presuppose,
on
the
one
hand,
a
com-
plete
subjectivity
(ahantd)
and a
continuing,
exhilarating
wonder or
surprise
(camatkira)
at the
very
being-ness
of
one's
own
being
so
to
speak.
This same
realization,
however,
on
the
other
hand,
also
presupposes
a
depth
or
fullness
in
awareness,
a
complete
objectivity
(idanta).
Pure
consciousness
encompasses
and
sublimates,
in
other
words,
both
pure
subjectivity
and
pure
objectivity;
not,
however,
by
the
absolute
negation
of
the two
modes
but rather
by
a
brdadening
or a
sublimation of
the
modes.
This
"final"
broadening
or
sublimation is
nirvikalpa
and
hence
goes
beyond
what
language
is
capable
of
denoting,
implying,
or
suggesting.
Yet
this
inexpressible
and
ineffable
ultimate is the
very ground
or
presupposition
for
all
language,
and
more than
that,
the
very ground
or
presupposition
for all
manifestation.
Abhinavagupta
subsumes all of
these
analyses
under
what he
symbolically
calls
the
"pure"
creation,
including
the tattvas of
siva, sakti,
sadisiva,
isvara,
and
suddha-vidyd.
He also
symbolically
relates this
"pure"
creation to
the
Saivite theism of
Mahesvara and
Sakti and
correlates the
various
levels of
emergence
with
various
mantras and
worlds.
Clearly,
however,
his
analysis
is
not theistic in
the sense
of
the usual Vaisnava and
Saiva
theologies,
and
hence
my preference
for
characterizing
Abhinavagupta's
vision
as a
Theosophy
or
perhaps
a
"meta-
philosophy."44
Apart
from
the
structures or
possibilities
of the
"pure"
creation,
Abhina-
vagupta goes
on to
characterize the
"impure"
or,
perhaps
better,
the
realized
or
expressed
creation,
which he
breaks down for
the sake of
exposition
into
the
miay-realm,
the
prakrti-realm,
and the
prthivT-realm.45
The
maya-realm
has for
its structures what
Abhinavagupta
and
the Kashmir
Saivas
call
the
pahca-kahcukas
or
five
coverings
of
determinate
becoming
(kala);
determinate
of
limited
knowing (vidya);
determinate
enjoyment (raga);
determinate time
of
past, present,
and
future
(kala);
and
determinate location in
space (niyati).
In
other
words,
the
miay-realm
is
the structure of
finitude or
finite
existence,
and
provides
the
presupposition
for
the
purusa (the
finite
self
or
anu).46
The
prakrti-realm
includes
buddhi,
ahamkira, manas,
the
five
sense-capacities,
the
five
action-capacities
and the
five subtle
elements,
and is
the
sphere
of
the three
gunas (sattva,
rajas
and
tamas)-the
whole
realm
functioning
precisely
as
in
the
analysis
of classical
Samkhya,
with the
important exception
that
prakrti
381
is
construed
pluralistically.47
The
prthivT-realm
s,
of
course,
the
explicit, gross
reality
of the
mahabhitas.
The
"impure"
creation-that
is to
say,
the
maiyi-
realm,
the
prakrti-realm
and
the
prthivi-realm-is
characterized
respectively
by
the defilement of
finitude
(.nava-mala),
the
defilement of the
subject-object
dichotomy
(miyTya-mala),
and
the defilement
of
ordinary
existential
action
having
samsaric
(or
the
karma-mala).48
Finally,
it should
be
noted that
these three
realms-namely,
maya,
prakrti,
and
prthiv--are sym-
bolically
correlated with
various
mantras,
deities
and worlds
as was true
for
the
higher
or
"pure"
creation.
All of these levels of
emergence,
according
to
Abhinavagupta
and
the
Kashmir Saivas
(ranging
from the
highest, "pure"
sakti-level
all the
way
through
the
lower
"impure"
myii,
prakrti,
and
prthivT-levels)
re
manifesta-
tions or reflections
(tbhasa)
of
universal
consciousness,
either in its mode
as
subjectivity
(ahanta
or
jTvibhisa)
or
in its
mode as
objectivity
(idanta
or
ja.dibhasa).49
All
of
manifested
or reflected
reality,
therefore,
is of
the
nature
of
consciousness-only,
and these
objective
and
subjective
modes
or s'aktis
of
consciousness
are construed as
being
momentary
reflections
of
the
highest
level of
pure,
unhindered awareness
(that
is,
of
vimarsa,
svdtantrya.akti,
or
pari-vdik)
and of
pure,
radiant
light
(that
is,
prakisa,
samtmid).
n terms of
metaphors
or similes this manifest
world of reflections
on
all
levels is
compared
to the realm
of
remembrance,
or the realm
of
pure
imagination,
or the realm
of
yogic
creation.
Also,
the manifest world
as reflection
is
compared
to the
images
in a
mirror,
or the
images
on a
bhitti,
that
is to
say,
the screen
or wall
on
which
images
are
cast
in a
theatrical
production.50
These reflections
or
ibhiisas
spontaneously
shine
forth,
remain
for a
moment,
and then subside.
They
are
symbolically
described
as
the threefold
process
of
creating
(srsti),
standing
forth
(sthiti),
and
withdrawing
(samhara),
and
though
these three
processes
reside
ontologically
in universal
consciousness
(samvid),
they
are
epistemologically
arranged
or
construed
according
to the
karmic
transactions that
take
place
on the
level of the
"impure"
creation.
According
to
Abhinavagupta
and the
Kashmir
Saivas, however,
there are
two additional
processes
or
powers
that are to
ordinary
karmic
transactions,
but
are
due
rather to the
unhindered awareness
or
will,
the
svdtantryasakti
of
universal
consciousness. These two additional
and
are the
tirodhana-
sakti
(the
veiling
or
concealing
capacity
of
universal
consciousness)S1
and
the
anugraha-sakti
the
gracious
or
welcoming
capacity
of
universal
consciousness).
Usually
these
capacities
are
interpreted
theologically
in terms
of
the
veiling
I and
the Kashmir
and the
grace
of
the
Lord,
but
I
suspect
that
Abhinavagupta
and
the Kashmir
Saivas
are
interested in more at
this
point
than a
theological interpretation.
I
think,
rather,
that
they
are
attempting
to
say something
about
the nature
of
universal
consciousness
and the related
problem
of
epistemology.
Universal
consciousness as
svatantryasakti,
as
I have
already pointed
out,
in
its
very
nature
is the
intuitive
urge
to
express
as indicated
in the notions
of
iccha-sakti,
382
Larson
pratibhd,
bhdvana,
and
pari-vik.
No
intelligible
account
is
given
for
this
inherent
urge
or
desire. The
Kashmir Saivas
here
simply
follow older
traditions
and
speak
about the
play
or
sport
of
brahman.Unlike
Advaitins,
however,
the
Kashmir Saivas do
not
finally
strip
brahmanof all
predication
and
account
for
multiplicity solely
on the
basis
of an
unintelligible
(anirvacaniya) avidyd
and
maya.
The Kashmir
Saivas,
to
be
sure,
make use of the terms
mayai
and
avidya,
but
they
offer an
interpretation
of
these
notions,
which
attempts
to maintain
a
relation between the
one and
the
many, unity
and
or
the absolute
and
relative.
Insofar as universal consciousness
encompasses
subjectivity,
it is
pure,
self-awareness
and
wonder or
surprise
(camatkara)
at
its own creative illumination
(aham-vimarsa);
and insofar
as consciousness
encompasses
objectivity,
it is sheer
presence
or fullness to itself
(idam-
vimarsa).52
Any
expression
of
this awareness or
fullness, however,
presupposes
or
requires
vikalpa-in
other
words,
it
requires
limitation, differentiation,
the
isolation of
subject
and
object
in a
verbal
judgment
or
statement.
Any
expres-
sion,
in other
words,
is
by
definition
tirodhana-sakti,
a
veiling
or
concealing
in the sense that relata and relations
are
established
which
isolate,
or differentiate
what,
in
fact,
cannot be
isolated or differentiated.
As
a
result,
ignorance
and
error
are
basically privations
or
lacks.
Universal consciousness
appears
as
what it is not-that
is to
say,
the
Self
appears
in the
not-self,
and not-self
appears
the Self.
Miya,
then,
is not
unintelligible
(anirvacanlya)
but,
rather,
the
nonbeing
of the not-self.
Tirodhdna-sakti,
n
other
words,
is
apohana-sakti
(a
or or
an
unavoidable
result
in
the
very
act of
expression
or
vikalpa,
an
act
which
leads,
respectively,
to
the
mdyi,
prakrti
and
prthiv7
realms.53
At
the
same
time, however,
this
very
act
of
expression
as differentiation
suggests
a
negation
of the first
negation.
This
second
negation
cannot itself be
expressed
(for
obviously
that would be further
vikalpa
or
infinite
regress),
but
it is
always suggested,
or it hovers
or
it
haunts
any expression.
Thus,
expression
always
points
beyond
itself to
that
which can
only
be
suggested
or evoked but
never
articulated.
This
second
negation,
then,
sparks
a
nirvikalpa-experience
and is
what,
I
would
suggest, Abhinavagupta
and the Kashmir
Saivas
mean
by
anugraha-sakti.
Moreover,
this
"suggested"
but
inexpressible overcoming
of differentiation
is
what
is
meant
by
the
Kashmir
Saiva
notion
of
pratyabhijhi
or
"re-cognition,"
wherein I
come
to
recognize
what has
always
been
true-namely,
to
use
Hegelian
terminology,
that sub-
stance
finally
is
subject
and that
subject
is
finally
the sublimated
fullness
(idam)
and awareness
(aham)
of universal consciousness.
Ordinarily
I
do not so
"re-cognize" my
true
nature,
for
I
am involved
and,
indeed,
choose to be
involved
in
seemingly
endless
differentiation
or
vikalpa-distinctions.
At
any
point,
however,
the
anugraha-sakti
s
present
if I would but
see
it.
It is
for
this
reason,
I
would
suggest,
that
Abhinavagupta
and the
pratyabhijhi-school
of
Kashmir
Saivism talk about
"instantaneous
grace,"
for
they
are not
at
all
383
concerned
about the
arbitrary
will
of
some
deity,
but rather with
the
very
nature
of universal consciousness
itself.54
(3)
Interrelations
between
the
linguistic-aesthetic
and
the
theosophical
and a
comparison
with Advaita.
If
my exposition
of
Abhinavagupta's thought
is
in
any
sense
correct,
it can be
argued
that
Abhinavagupta's
Kashmir
Saivism
differs
from
Advaita
monism in
interesting
and
important ways. Although
both traditions are monistic
and
although
the
Kashmir
Saivas
have
been
clearly
influenced
by
Advaita
thought,
both traditions
move
finally
in
almost
opposite
ways.
Whereas
Advaita
characterizes the relation between
brahman
and the manifest world as vivartavada
(the
theory
of
appearance),
Abhinava-
gupta
and the Kashmir
Saivas
speak
rather
of
abhasavada
(the
theory
of
reflection).
Whereas
Advaita
suggests
that
miiy
and
avidya
are
finally
anir-
vacaniya,
Abhinavagupta
and
the Kashmir Saivas
speak
rather about
apohana
or
tirodhana-sakti
(differentiation
as
negation).
Whereas Advaita
suggests
that error is
finally
anirvacanlyakhyati,
Abhinavagupta
and the
Kashmir
Saivas
speak
rather about
akhyati
or
svarupakhyiti
(the
nonrecognition
of
nondistinction).
Whereas Advaita characterizes the
absolute in
terms of
sat,
cit, ananda,
Abhinavagupta
and
the Kashmir
Saivas
refuse to
exclude the
dimensions of
vimarsa,
svatantryasakti,
or
iccha
in the
very being
of
the absolute.
Most
important,
however,
is a difference
regarding
the
role and function of
language
in the two
systems,
and
this difference can
be
clarified
by bringing
together
the
linguistic-aesthetic
dimension of
Abhinavagupta's thought
with
the
theosophical.
For
Abhinavagupta
what
appears
to be
important
is
the
fullness or one
might
even
say
the "concretion" of
the ultimate or
absolute,
which
sublimates
subjectivity
and
objectivity,
is
nirvikalpa
and is
actively
present throughout
the manifested
or
reflected world on all
levels. Such an
ultimate
or
absolute can
only
be
suggested
or
evoked,
and
hence it was
probably
no accident that
Abhinavagupta
was
preoccupied
with
that dimension of the
vikalpa-realm
which comes
closest
to
evoking
or
manifesting
the
ultimate-
namely,
the
aesthetic
or
suggestive
use of
language
as
found in
poetry
and
drama. With the
rasa-dhvani
theory
Abhinavagupta
was
able
to
point
to
a
function of
language
which
opens,
enriches and
expands
our
awareness,
not in
the
direction of
abstraction but rather in the
direction of a
resonant fullness
wherein
ordinary
differentiations of
time,
space, ego,
and
so
on,
are
sublimated.
For
Advaitins,
on the
other
hand,
what
appears
to
be
important
is
the
vacuity,
emptiness,
or sheer
abstraction of
the ultimate or
absolute,
which is
nirvikalpa
but
radically
discontinous with the
manifest world.
Advaita
appears
to move
in a
direction of
rigid,
numerical
oneness
purged
or
purified
of all
distinctions.55
It was
probably
not an
accident, therefore,
that
Advaitins
generally rejected
the
theory
of dhvani or
vyahjana
as a
function of
language
and
were
rather
pre-
occupied
with the
problem
of
identity-propositions.
Advaitins,
for
example,
as
Kunjunni
Raja points
out,
were
quite
interested in
the
variety
of
metaphor
384 Larson
known as
jahadajahallaksanai
or
bhdgatyagalaksanag,
wherein a
portion
of
primary
denotation can be
preserved
in a
verbal
judgment
while other
portions
can
be
rejected.56
This
enabled
the
Advaitin
to
interpret
such
mahavakyini
as
"tat
tvam
asi"
as
identity-propositions-that
is
to
say,
the
pure
consciousness
in the
individual soul
is identified
with the
pure
consciousness
in
the Universal
Soul.57
Finally,
of
course,
both
the
Kashmir Saivas
and the
Advaitins have to
admit
that
the ultimate
or
the absolute
transcends
conceptualization
and
expression,
and as such the two
systems
are
closely
allied.
When
one
begins
to
resonate
to or
intuit
the
"symptoms"
of the absolute which the two
systems
evoke or
point
to, however,
the
resulting
intuitive realizations
appear
to
be
interestingly
different.
CONCLUSION
I
have tried
to show in this article that
(1)
Abhinavagupta
not
only appropriates
but reworks
the
views
of
the
older
grammarian philosophers
and alamkirikas
in terms
of
developing
the notion of
vyanjana
and rasa-dhvani and
that
this
notion
has
important
implications
for his overall theoretical
position;
(2)
that
he makes use
of the
homology
between rasivada
and
brahmisvdda
while
carefully refusing
to reduce
one to the
other,
thereby maintaining
an
interesting
dialectic
between
spiritual
experience
and other kinds
of
experience;
and
(3)
that
he
develops
monistic,
theosophical perspective
that
appropriates
and trans-
mutes
the Advaitin
position
in an
important
way.
Let me conclude
by suggesting
that the
force of his overall theoretical
appears
to
be
that
language,
art,
and
philosophy
are
important components
in
any adequate religious
anthropology.
Each
operates
in a
separate
sphere
and at the
same
time
provides
valuable
input
into the fullness
of
what
a
person
is and into
the
fullness of what
the ultimate
is.
A
kind of conversation
appears
to take
place
in
his intellectual
vision between
the various
aspects
of
culture,
and the
result
of
that conversation
is a
vigorous
affirmation
of the value
of man's total cultural
life.
It
is
appropriate,
I
think,
to
close
with the words of
Abhinavagupta
himself.
The
person
who comes
thus to realize
that
knowledge (jhdna)
and
activity
(kriyd)
are
solely
manifestations
of
the
svatantrya
and
that
these manifestations
are
inseparable
from
oneself
and from the
very
essence
of the
ultimate,
whose
form
is
the
Lord
(Isvararupa)-a person
in such a fashion
(iti
parimrsan),
not
partially
(but
completely),
and who
has come to see that
knowledge
and
activity
are
really
one-whatever
such
a
person
desires,
just
that
he or
she comes to show
person
is
solely given
over
to
the
practice
of "total
abiding"
(samavesa),
even
though
still
accompanied
by
a
To be
sure,
such a
while
still in the
body,
is
ajivanmukta;
but
such
body.
To be
sure,
such a
person,
while
still in the
body,
is
ajivanmukta;
but
a
person
is
even
more than
that;
for when the ultimate realization
has
come,
there
is
only paramesvara
58
385
NOTES
1. S. K.
De,
History
of
Sanskrit
Poetics
(Calcutta,
1960;
2d rev.
ed.),
vol.
2,
pp.
139-212;
E. Gerow
and A.
Aklujkar,
"On
Santa
Rasa
in Sanskrit
Poetics,"
Journal
of
the American
Oriental
Society
92,
no.
1
(Jan.-Mar.,
1972):
80-87;
R.
Gnoli,
trans.,
The Aesthetic
Experience
according
to
Abhinavagupta
(Varanasi,
1968;
2d rev.
ed. Chowkhamba Sanskrit
Series,
vol.
47),
passim;
Subramania
Iyer,
Bhartrhari
Poona,
1969;
Silver Jubilee
Series,
68),
pp.
106ff., 128ff., 142ff.,
147ff.;
J.
L. Masson
and M. V.
Patwardhan,
Santarasa
and
Abhinavagupta's
Philosophy of
Aesthetics
(Poona,
1969;
Bhandarkar Oriental
Series,
no.
9),
passim;
V.
Raghavan,
The
Number
of
Rasas
(Adyar,
1940),
passim;
D.
S.
Ruegg,
Contributions
&
'histoire
de la
philosophie
linquistique
ndienne
(Paris,
1959;
Publications
de l'Institut de Civilisation Indienne
(hereafter
PICI),
fas.
7),
passim;
and Gaurinath
Sastri,
The
Philosophy of
Word and
Meaning
(Calcutta,
1959;
Calcutta
Sanskrit
College
Research
Series,
no.
V),
see
especially pp.
1-82.
2.
Gopinath
Kaviraj,
"TheDoctrine of
Pratibha"
in
Aspects
of
Indian
Thought
Burdwan,
1966),
pp.
1-44;
K. C.
Pandey, Abhinavagupta.
An Historical and
Philosophical
Study
(Varanasi,
1963;
2d rev. ed. Chowkhamba Sanskrit
Series,
vol.
1),
pp.
289-460,
461ff.;
Andre
Padoux,
Recherches
sur la
symbolique
et
l'energie
de
la
parole
dans certains
textes
tantriques
Paris,
1963; PICI,
fas.
21),
passim;
and Lilian
Silburn,
trans.,
Le
Paramarthasdra
Paris, 1957;
PICI,
fas.
5),
pp.
5-56.
3.
M. A.
Stein,
ed. and
trans.,
Kalhana's
RajatarahginT
1900;
reprint
ed.;
Delhi,
1961),
and
see
in addition
to
the text itself the useful
collateral
material
provided
by
Stein
in vol.
1,
pp.
1-145;
and volume
2,
pp.
273-494.
4.
For useful
surveys
of the
history
of
the various
religious
traditions in
Kashmir,
see the
following
(in
alphabetical
order):
P. N.
K.
Bamzai,
A
History of
Kashmir
Delhi,
1962),
pp.
84-107,
226-279;
S. C. Cultural
Heritage of
Kashmir
(Calcutta,
1965),
pp.
106ff.;
Edward
Conze,
A
Short
History of
Buddhism
Bombay,
1960),
pp.
41ff.,
64ff.,
and
87ff.;
and S. C.
Ray, Early
History
and Culture
of
Kashmir,
2d ed.
(New
Delhi,
1970),
pp.
168-174.
5.
Conze,
op.
cit.,
p.
42.
6. J. C.
Chatterji,
Kashmir Shaivism
(Srinagar, 1962),
pp.
1-14.
7.
Bamzai,
op.
cit.,
pp.
108-136.
8. K.
C.
Pandey,
op.
cit.,
pp.
5-6.
9.
Ibid.,
pp.
151ff.
10.
Chatterji,
op.
cit.,
pp.
15-42;
K. C.
Pandey, op.
cit.,
pp.
154ff.;
and
Silburn,
Le Para-
marthasira,
op.
cit.,
pp.
6ff.
11.
For useful
treatments
of
the
Saiva traditions
generally,
see the
following
(in
alphabetical
order):
R.
G.
Bhandarkar,
Vaisnavism,
Saivism
and Minor
Religious Systems
(reprint;
Varanasi,
1965),
pp.
102ff.;
Arabinda
Basu,
"Kashmir
Saivism"
in The
Cultural
Heritage of
India
(Calcutta,
1956),
vol.
4,
pp.
79ff.;
J. C.
Chatterji,
Kashmir
Shaivism,
op.
cit.,
pp.
15ff.;
J.
N.
Farquhar,
An
Outline
of
the
Religious
Literature
of
India
(reprint;
Delhi,
1967),
passim;
J.
Gonda,
Visnuismand
Sivaism
(Oxford,
1970),
passim;
S.
Kumaraswamiji,
"Virasaivism"
in
Cul.
Heritage of
India,
op.
cit.,
vol.
4,
pp.
98ff.;
K. A. Nilakanta
Sastri,
"An
Historical
Sketch of
Saivism" in
The
Cultural
Heritage
of
India,
vol.
4,
pp.
63ff.;
L.
N.
Sharma,
Kashmir Saivism
(Varanasi,
1972);
and K.
Siva-
raman,
Saivism
in
Philosophical Perspective (Delhi,
1973).
12.
Chatterji, op.
cit.,
pp.
15ff.
13. For a
useful
summary
of
Kalhana's
description
of
political
events
from
Avantivarman to
Queen
Didda,
see
Bamzai,
op.
cit.,
pp.
109-136. For
Kalhana's own
account,
see
Stein,
op.
cit.,
vol.
1,
pp.
186ff.
14. K. C.
Pandey,
op.
cit.,
pp.
3-26.
15.
Ibid.
16. P. V.
Kane,
History of
Sanskrit Poetics
4th
ed.
(Delhi,
1971
;),
pp.
236-243.
17.
K. C.
Pandey, op.
cit.,
pp.
27-77;
and
for a
good
summary
of
Pandey's longer
discussion,
see Lilian
Silburn,
Le
Paramirthasira,
op.
cit.,
pp.
9-19.
Editions of
primary
sources
consulted
for
this
paper
are
the
following: (1)
philosophical:
Abhinavagupta's
Isvarapratyabhijhavivrtivimar-
sin (Bombay,
1938-1943;
Kashmir
Series
of
Texts
and
Studies
(hereafter
KSTS),
nos.
60, 62,
and
65);
Abhinava's
Isvarapratyabhijnavimarsini
r
LaghvTvrtti
Bombay,
1918 and
1921;
KSTS,
nos.
22
and
33);
Abhinava's
Paramirthasara in
Lilian
Silburn's
edition,
op.
cit.;
and
in L.
D.
Barnett,
386
Larson
trans.,
"The Paramarthasara
of
Abhinavagupta,"
Journal
of
the Asiatic
Society of
Great Britain
and
Ireland,
parts
3-4
(1910):
707-747;
(2)
aesthetic:
portions
of
Abhinavagupta's
Dhvanyaloka-
locana and
AbhinavabhiratT
s
found
in Masson
and
Patwardhan,
op.
cit.,
passim,
and in R.
Gnoli,
op.
cit.,
pp.
3-114;
(3)
philosophical
tantra:
Abhinavagupta's
Tantralokawith the
commentary
of
Jayaratha
called the
Viveka
(Bombay
and
Srinagar,
1918-1938;
KSTS nos.
3, 28, 30,
36, 35, 39,
41,
47, 59, 57,
and
58).
In
addition
to the works
of
Abhinavagupta,
the
following
works of the Kashmir Saiva tradition
have also been
consulted:
Ksemaraja's
Pratyabhijiihrdaya
in K.
F.
Leidecker,
trans.,
Pratyabhij-
iihrdayam:
The Secret
of Recognition
(Adyar,
1938),
and
in
J.
Singh,
trans.,
Pratyabhijhihrdayam
(Delhi, 1963);
Ksemaraja's
Pardpravesika
(Bombay,
1918;
KSTS,
no.
15);
and the
following
translations
and studies
of Lilian
Silburn:
Vatulandtha-sutra,
Le
Vijhana
Bhairava,
La Bhakti
dans
le
Sivaisme
du Kashmir
(Stavacintdmani),
La
Mahdrthamanjart
Paris,
1959, 1961,
1964
and
1968
respectively;
PICI,
fas.,
8,
15, 19,
29).
mention must be made
of K. C.
Pandey's copious
textual notices
in
Appendix
A of his
Abhinavagupta,op.
cit.,
pp.
733-907. The latter are invaluable
and essential
for
any
serious
study
of the
vast
corpus
of
Abhinavagupta.
18. E.
C.
Dimock, Jr.,
et
al.,
The Literatures
of
India. An Introduction
Chicago:
The
University
of
Chicago
Press;
1974),
pp.
136-143.
19.
Kashmir
Saivism
combines
a
strong
emphasis
on
philosophy
with an
equally
strong emphasis
on
mystical
insight
and
tantric
ritual.
It, thus,
transcends
the usual notion of
philosophy
in India
(for
example,
Samkhya, Yoga,
Vedanta,
etc.)
as
well as
the
usual notion
of
theology
(a
la
Ramanuja,
et
al.).
Insofar
as
it
provides
a foundation
or structure
for
dealing
with most of the traditional
issues
in Indian
philosophy,
it
can
be
called
a
"metaphilosophy."
Insofar
as its notions are
finally
inseparable
from
elaborate rituals
and
mystical
intuitions,
it
can
be
called a
"theosophy."
20.
For
a
useful
discussion
about the
relation between worldviews
and
aesthetic
vision,
see
Eliot
Deutsch,
Studies
in
Comparative
Aesthetics
(Honolulu:
The
University
Press of
Hawaii,
1975),
preface,
pp.
1-19,
39-74.
21.
Masson
and
op.
p.
xvii.
22.
F.
Edgerton,
"Dominant Ideas
in
the
Formation
of
Indian
Culture,"
Journal
of
the American
Oriental
Society
62,
pp.
151ff.
23.
Masson
and
Patwardhan,
op.
cit.,
pp.
1-24;
and
Gnoli,
op.
cit.,
pp.
xx-xxvi.
24.
Gnoli,
op.
cit.,
p.
xxvi,
and for
Sanskrit,
see
p.
48.
25.
Ibid.,
pp.
45-48,
and for
Sanskrit,
see
p.
10.
26.
See Masson
and Patwardhan's
excellent
collection
of
passages
on the
issue,
op.
cit.,
pp.
60ff.
27.
Gnoli,
op.
cit.,
p.
82.
28.
Ibid.,
p.
47.
29.
It
appears
to
be
the
case that
Abhinavagupta
passed
through
three
phases
in his career:
a
tantric
phase,
an aesthetic
phase
and a
philosophical
phase.
See K. C.
Pandey,
op.
cit.,
pp.
41ff.;
and
Silburn,
Le
Paramarthasara,
op.
cit.,
pp.
9-19.
30. G.
Sastri,
The
Philosophy
of
Word and
Meaning, op.
cit.,
pp.
172ff.;
K.
Kunjunni
Raja,
Indian
Theories
of
Meaning,
2d ed.
(Adyar,
1969),
pp.
191ff.
31.
Ibid.
32.
G.
Sastri,
op.
cit.,
pp.
224ff.
33.
Kunjunni
Raja,
op.
cit.,
pp.
95-148;
Subramania
Iyer,
op.
cit.,
pp.
86ff.;
and
John
Brough,
"Theories
of
General
Linguistics
in the Sanskrit
Grammarians"
and "Some
Indian Theories
of
Meaning,"
both
of which
are in J.
F.
Staal, ed.,
A
Reader on
the Sanskrit Grammarians
Cambridge,
Mass.,
1972),
pp.
402-414,
and
414-423. For a useful
survey
of the
philosophy
of
language
in
India,
see J.
F.
Staal,
"Sanskrit
Philosophy
of
Language"
in T. A.
Sebeok, ed.,
Current
Trends n
Linguistics
5
(Mouton,
1969),
pp.
499-531.
34.
Gopinath
Kaviraj,
op.
cit.,
pp.
1-44.
35.
Kunjunni
Raja, op.
cit.,
pp.
275-315;
and
for
an
excellent
discussion of the
theory
of rasa-
dhvani,
see
Dimock,
et
al.,
The
Literatures
of
India,
op.
cit.,
pp.
136-143,
216-227.
36. Masson and
Patwardhan,
op.
cit,,
passim,
and
summarized,
pp.
161-164;
Gnoli,
op.
cit.,
pp.
xiv-lii.
37.
Ibid.
38. Gerow
and
Aklujkar,
op.
cit.,
p.
82.
39. Ibid.
387
40.
Kunjunni Raja, op.
cit.,
p.
80.
41.
Gopinath
Kaviraj,
op.
cit.,
pp.
1-44;
and K. C.
Pandey,
op.
cit.,
pp.
47-51. It
should be
noted here that
Abhinavagupta's
contribution with
respect
to issues in the
philosophy
of
language
and aesthetics
appears
to
be
mainly systematization
and
synthetic
exposition.
In
almost
every
instance the seminal notions-for
example,
sphota,
rasa-dhvani,
etc.-come from
elsewhere,
namely,
Bhartrhari, Anandavardhana,
et al. It was
Abhinavagupta's
genius
to relate
these notions
to one another
and
to think
holistically
about overall
theoretical
presentation.
42.
IsvarapratyabhijiivivrtivimarsinT,
ol.
3,
p.
405,
cited
in
K. C.
Pandey,
op.
cit.,
p.
386.
43.
Jayaratha's
comment on
Tantriloka
1,
65,
op.
cit.,
vol.
1,
p.
105
(sarvikrtih
visvamayah
nirakrtih
visvottirnah),
cited
in
K.
C.
Pandey,
op.
cit.,
p.
799.
44. The ultimate
experience
is described
by
Abhinavagupta
in
Tantriloka, 1,
41
as follows:
ksine
tu
pasusamskare
pumsah pripta-parasthiteh
/
vikasvaram
tadvijiina.m
paurusam nirvikalpakam
/
op.
cit.,
p.
78.
45. For a
summary
exposition
of these levels of
emergence
(namely,
sakti,
miyd,
prakrti
and
prthvT),
ee
Paramarthasara,
vss.
4-22,
either in the Barnett or Silburn editions
already
cited
(see
note
17).
46.
Paramirthasdra,
vs. 17.
47.
Ibid.,
vss. 19-22.
48. See the
quote
in
Jayaratha's
commentary
on
Tantraloka
VI, 61,
op.
cit.,
p.
56:
devdilndm
ca
sarvesiim
bhavinaim
rividham
malam
/
tatra
api
kirmam
eva
ekam
mukhyam
samsirakaranam
//
and cited in K. C.
Pandey, p.
816.
49.
For a useful discussion of the
theory
of
abhasa
in
Abhinavagupta,
see
chapter
4 of
K.
C.
Pandey, op.
cit.,
pp.
382-427.
50. K.
C.
Pandey, op.
cit.,
p.
326.
51.
Ibid.,
pp.
440ff.
52. See
notes
44
and 49.
53. In
ITvarapratyabhijhC-vimarsinm
1.37),
Abhinavagupta
describesjhiina-sakti,
smrti-sakti,
and
apohana-sakti. Abhinavagupta
concludes:
anena
saktitrayena
visve
vyavaharaih
tac ca
bhagavata
eva
saktitraya
m-yat
tathabhitinubhavitr-smartr-vikalpayitr-svabhava-caitramaitrddyavabhasanam
/
sa
eva
hi
tena tena
vapusa anati,
smarati
vikalpayati
ca
/,
op.
cit.,
vol.
1,
pp.
110-111.
54.
For a useful discussion of
anugraha
and
the various means for
liberation,
see
Silburn,
Le
Paramirthasara,
op.
cit.,
pp.
41-56.
55.
For a
helpful
discussion of
Advaita
monism
vis-a-vis Saiva
monism,
see K.
Sivaraman,
op.
cit.,
pp.
127-152.
56.
Kunjunni Raja, op.
cit.,
pp.
251-254.
57.
Ibid.
58.
Isvarapratyabhijhi-vimarsin7
V.1.15,
op.
cit.,
p.
269. The
Sanskrit
of
the
kiriki or
verse
together
with
Abhinavagupta's
comment is as follows:
evam
adhikiracatustayoktam
yad
vastu
tatphalam
aha
evam
atmdnam
etasya
atmdnam
etasya
samyagjiinakriye
tathi
/
janan yatha Ipsitin
pasyan
jniiti
ca
karoti
ca
//15//
evam
iti,
ivararupam
itmanam
tasya
ca
svavyatirikte
svitantryamiitraripejhiinakriye inan
evam-
bhuto
'yam
dtmd na tu
kniid
adidarsitah,
ittham ca
jiinakriye
na tu
tasya vyatirikte
kecana,-iti
pardmrsan yad
yad
icchati tat
taj
janati
karoti
ca
samdvessaparo
'nena eva
sarTrena;
tatparas
tu
sati dehe
jivanmuktas
tatpite paramesvara
eva
iti
//15 //
Lilian
Silburn renders
Abhinavagupta's
comment in a less
literal and more
elegant way
as
follows:
"L'homme
qui
a
longuement
pratiqu
1'ensevelissement n
Siva
(samivesa)
et
a
la
pleine
reconnaissance
de
ses
energies
de
connaissance et
d'activite
comme
etant
la
pure
autonomie du
Seigneur, peut
alors
connaitre et
faire
tout
ce
qu'il
desire
bien
qu'il
soit encore
associe
a
un
corps.
II
est
non
seulement
un
jivanmukta,
libere
vivant au sens
ordinaire
du
mot,
mais
il
est
foncierement
libre car
il utilise a
son
gre
les
pouvoirs
divins
propres
a Paramesvara et
vit dans une
liberte eternelle."
See
Silburn,
Le
Paramarthasara,
op.
cit.,
pp.
54-55.