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STATECRAFT ESSAY Willy Brandt and Ostpolitik

Eric A. Kunsman #381

Seminar GNational War College September 8, 1989

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Statecraft Essay. Willy Brandt and Ostpolitik

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Summary: West German Chancellor Willie Brandt was a leader of

vision and perseverance whose skills at statecraft engagedand began

to alterthe fundamental power alignments in postwar Central Europe.

His policy of Ostpolitik (the FRG's opening to the East) had its origins in

the deep recesses of German history and psyche. Ostpolitik's

immediate objective was to ameliorate the hardships caused by the

division of Germany and Berlin; Ostpolitik's long term goal was to carve

out maneuver room for FRG diplomacy in Central Europe. Brandt's

approach to statecraft was formed in the wake of the Berlin Wall crisis

and evolved through a process of trial and error in his various

incarnations as mayor of West Berlin, Foreign Minister and Chancellor.

Success eluded Brandt until he properly understood the

fundamental interest/power relationships among the key state actors

and based his diplomatic initiatives on a firm foundation in the Western

Alliance. Brandt realized his immediate objective only after Ostpolitik

was married to Kissinger's more subtle, expansive and powerful detente

statecraft. Ostpolitik's limited initial objective was achieved by

balancing asymmetrical power and interests, and by creating complex

linkages among key states' competing objectives. Brandt's lasting

legacy was to propel FRG statecraft onto center stage in the European

power balance and begin the long, continuing process of reconciliation,

renewal and peaceful change in Central Europe.

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

LIBRARY SPECIAL COLLECTIONS

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Background: One cannot begin to appreciate either the rationale for or

modus operandi of Brandt's Ostpolitik without first understanding the

contemporary historical context of the German question. History weighs

heavily on the German soul, and no where more so than in Berlin. Bismark's

brilliant creation, the German nation statethat Central European col/bsus

which by the turn of the century had become the fulcrum of the European power

balancewas shattered by world War II. Unconditionally defeated, Germany's

fate was sealed at Yalta and Potsdam when the victorious powers agreed

temporarily to divide Germany into four administrative zones of occupation:

U.S., British, French and Soviet. Berlin was similarly divided for temporary post-war administration.

Dividing Germany proved easier by far than agreeing on its ultimate status.

Stalin's expansive designs for a Central European security glacis for the Soviet

Union coupled with his use of communist subversion to obtain his post-war

foreign policy goals ushered in the Cold War. The inner-German and inner-

Berlin demarcation lines separating the Soviet zones of occupation from the

combined Western zones became frozen in timeslowly turning into de facto,

although not de jure,

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borders between two German entitites, one democratic, free market and Western,

the other a communist rump state existing uneasily in the shadow of its larger

and more powerful sibling.

West Berlin (and its Western protectors) experienced a succession of major

and minor crises over a decade and a half either resulting directly from Soviet

attempts unilaterally to alter Berlin's status (the 1948 airlift and 1958 ultimatum)

or caused by instability in East Berlin (the 1952 riot and 1961 exodus resulting in

the Wall). During the 1960s as the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) gained instrength (domestic self-assurance, economic power in the EC and military power

through integration of the new Bundeswehr in NATO) and the German Democratic

Republic (GDR) became a functioning state (the most stable and economically

advanced member of the Warsaw Pact), the situation in and around Berlin

gradually calmed.

Objectively, therefore, by the late 1960s sufficient stability existed along the

inner-German and Berlin borders to permit diplomatic initiatives to clarify West

Berlin's anomalous Dwnpe an status. The issues, however, given Germany's

geographic location and latent power potential cut to the heart of the post-war

East-West confrontation in Europe and were infused with major symbolic and

emotional significance.

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Only statecraft of the highest order could achieve Brandt's goals,

Domestic Context; From its founding in 1949 until Brandt became Chancellor

twenty years later, the FRG's primary foreign policy objective was clear: anchor

the FRG firmly in the West. Adenauer, the FRG's first, and greatest, Chancellor

(leader of the Christian Democrats -CDU) established the FRG's foreign policy

priorities as : rapprochement with France (the key to establishing stability in

Western Europe and eventual formation of the EC) and participation in NATO

(critically important to ensure the U.S. security guarantee vis-a-vis the USSR).

Questions of possible eventual German reunification and clarification of Berlin's

status were secondary concerns for Adenauer, a Catholic Rhinelander, and couldonly be addressed in the context of a firm Western orientation for the FRG.

Indeed, Adenauer's unwaivering adherence to the fundamental objective of

reorienting the center of German political gravity to the West and establishing

the FRG's democratic and West European bona fides were major

accomplishments of statecraft. Adenauer and his immediate successors carried

out their policy in an emotionally charged domestic environment and only paid

symbolic lip service to calls for reunification. Their success, albeit at the cost of a

continuing harsh division of the German nation, delimited the policy options

eventually

Hanya tataurus perintah yang tertinggi boleh mencapai matlamat Brandt,

Konteks domestik; Dari penubuhannya pada tahun 1949 sehingga Brandt menjadi Canselor

dua puluh tahun kemudian, objektif dasar luar utama FRG adalah jelas: anchor FRG tegas diBarat. Adenauer, itu yang FRG pertama, dan yang paling besar, Canselor (pemimpin KristianDemokrat-CDU) yang ditubuhkan keutamaan dasar luar FRG sebagai: persesuaian dengan

Perancis (kunci untuk mewujudkan kestabilan di Eropah Barat dan pembentukan akhirnya

SPR) dan penyertaan dalam NATO (amat penting untuk memastikan jaminan keselamatanAS berbanding dengan negara-negara USSR). Soalan-soalan yang mungkin penyatuan

semula Jerman dan akhirnya penjelasan status Berlin kebimbangan menengah untukAdenauer, seorang Rhinelander Katolik, dan hanya boleh ditangani dalam konteks orientasi

Barat yang kukuh untuk FRG.

Malah, unwaivering pematuhan Adenauer untuk matlamat asas reorienting pusat gravitipolitik Jerman ke Barat dan mewujudkan demokrasi dan Barat bona fide Eropah FRG ini

adalah pencapaian utama tataurus negara. Adenauer dan pengganti terdekat dijalankan dasarmereka dalam persekitaran yang emosi dalam negeri dan hanya dibayar perkhidmatan bibir

simbolik panggilan untuk penyatuan semula. Kejayaan mereka, walaupun pada kos bahagianberterusan keras negara Jerman, dihalang pilihan dasar akhirnya

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available to Brandt in pursuing his policy of normalization with the East. By

the time Brandt became Chancellor, reunification of Germany (at the price

of a Soviet-dictated variant of neutrality) was no longer a realistic option for

consideration.

Brandt, a Social Democrat (SPD), entered government in 1966 as ForeignMinister in the CDU/SPD "Grand Coalition", before becoming Chancellor in 1969.

Brandt had previously been governing major of West Berlin, including during the

1961 Wall crisis. Brandt's temperment and socialist background we ire radically

diEfcEcnfc than Adenauer's conservative patrician manner.

Brandt's concept of Germany's position in Europe--and his need to

articulate German interests and expand the FRG's maneuver room in what for

him was an all-too-encompassing

bipolar worldinevitably pushed him in the direction of Ostpolitik. The

concepts behind Ostpolitik were the brainchild of Egon Bahr, Brandt's foreign

policy advisor. Bahr's schooling was a curious German blend of geo-politics and

19th century German Romanticism. Germany's historic position was "Middle

Europe", and Brandt/Bahr ultimately desired to re-establish as much of

Germany's "Middle Europe" identity as possible within the tight parameters

dictated by the Cold War

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\ Brandt kedudukan Jerman di Eropah - dan keperluan untukmenyuarakan kepentingan Jerman dan meluaskan ruang gerakan FRG

dalam apa yang bagi beliau adalah semua-terlalu-galanya

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Ministerial Conference was explicit in allowing use of GDR personnel at checkpoints

for access to West Berlin) . The very measured U.S. reaction in 1961 to the

building of the Wall and assumption of GDR control of East Berlin, while prudent

and consistent from our perspective, shattered Brandt's illusions and reduced his

perception of U.S. power and credibility. No longer would he automatically rely on

Western assistance in establishing the FRG's claim to West Berlin, much less

Western support for eventual reunification. Instead, Brandt determined the FRG

would have to safeguard its own interests through diplomatic initiatives with theEast.

International Context; Ostpolitik developed gradually through trial and error when

Brandt became Foreign Minister in 1966. In an effort to ease relations with the East, the

Grand Coalition offered to exchange renunciation-of-force declarations with the Soviet

Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia. However^ the FRG's efforts to ostracize the GDR

continued. (The fR.G's Hallstein Doctrine threatened to sever relations with any state

recognizing the GDR, a potent threat in the mid-60s for Third World states seeking FRG

economic assistance, but a policy of diminishing half-life since it could not practicably

be extended to Eastern Europe if Ostpolitik were to be successful.)

These early attempts at openings to the East met with limited success at best:

establishment of diplomatic relations

Persidangan Menteri-Menteri adalah jelas dalam membenarkan penggunaan kakitangan GDR dipusat pemeriksaan untuk kemasukan ke Berlin Barat). Yang diukur reaksi Amerika Syarikat pada

tahun 1961 untuk pembinaan Tembok dan andaian GDR kawalan Berlin Timur, manakala berhematdan konsisten dari perspektif kami, berkecai ilusi Brandt dan mengurangkan persepsi terhadap kuasa

Amerika Syarikat dan kredibiliti. Tiada lagi dia akan secara automatik bergantung kepada bantuan

Barat dalam mewujudkan tuntutan FRG untuk West Berlin, sokongan lebih kurang Barat untukpenyatuan semula akhirnya. Sebaliknya, Brandt menentukan FRG perlu melindungi kepentingan

sendiri melalui inisiatif diplomatik dengan Timur.International Konteks; Ostpolitik dibangunkan secara beransur-ansur melalui percubaan dan

kesilapan apabila Brandt menjadi Menteri Luar Negeri pada tahun 1966. Dalam usaha untuk

memudahkan hubungan dengan Timur, Gabungan Grand ditawarkan untuk menukar pengisytiharanpenolakan-of-kuasa dengan Kesatuan Soviet, Poland dan Czechoslovakia. Walau bagaimanapun ^

usaha FRG untuk memulaukan GDR diteruskan. (The fR.G 's Hallstein Doktrin mengancam untukmemutuskan hubungan dengan mana-mana negeri mengiktiraf GDR, ancaman yang kuat pada

pertengahan tahun 60-an bagi negara Dunia Ketiga yang meminta bantuan ekonomi FRG, tetapi

dasar mengurangkan separuh hayat kerana ia tidak boleh practicably dilanjutkan ke Eropah Timurjika Ostpolitik adalah untuk berjaya.)

Ini percubaan awal di lubang ke Timur bertemu dengan kejayaan yang terhad pada tahap terbaik:penubuhan hubungan diplomatik

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with Bucharest in 1967, Belgrade in 1968, and trade/consular relations with

Prague in 1967. Still, the breakthrough on Berlin that Brandt desired eluded

him for several reasons:

* the FRG underestimated the GDR's influence on Soviet policy vis-a-vis

the FRG;

* the FRG conceived its approach to the East as a "zero sum game" with

the GDR, rather than devising a "win-win" strategy of negotiations

seeking practical accomodations to improve West Berlin's tenuous

status.

* With the exception of the carrot of economic enticements (trade) for

East European countries, the FRG lacked power leverage with the Soviet

Unionleverage only obtainable through concert of policy initiatives with

the U.S.

.Fortunately,

/Brandt's Ostpolitik fit into the mosaic of Kissinger's

detente grand strategy and, consequently, received the infusion

of power, focused direction, and support Ostpolitik previously

had lacked. Kissinger simultaneously sought to strengthen

Brandt's negotiating hand with the Soviets and alsoimbed Ostpolitik in the larger matrix of East-West relations in order to discipline

the FRG's Berlin objectives to Allied ' concensus (both with regard to initiatives

taken and, equally important, the timing of those initiatives).

Kissinger^ means of asymmetrical leverage on the Soviets regarding Berlin

were both specific and general. He arranged to have the U.S., Britain and

France offer their own set of proposals to Moscow on Berlin access matters which

dovetailed with practical FRG objectives; and he held open the pospect of

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dengan Bucharest pada tahun 1967, Belgrade pada tahun 1968,

dan perdagangan / konsular hubungan dengan Prague pada tahun

1967. Namun, penemuan di Berlin bahawa Brandt dikehendaki

mengelak dia kerana beberapa sebab:

- Yang FRG dipandang ringan pengaruh GDR pada dasar Soviet

vis-a-vis FRG;

- Yang FRG mengandung pendekatan ke Timur sebagai "permainan

jumlah sifar" dengan GDR, bukannya merangka "menang-menang"Strategi rundingan mencari accomodations praktikal untuk

meningkatkan status lemah West Berlin.

- Dengan pengecualian daripada lobak enticements ekonomi

(perdagangan) bagi negara-negara Eropah Timur, FRG kekurangan

memanfaatkan kuasa dengan Soviet Union-memanfaatkan hanya

diperolehi melalui konsert inisiatif dasar dengan Amerika

Syarikat

. Mujurlah,/ Ostpolitik Brandt muat ke dalam mozek ini Kissinger

strategi besar ketegangan dan, akibatnya, menerima infusi

kuasa, arahan fokus, dan menyokong Ostpolitik sebelum

telah kekurangan. Kissinger pada masa yang sama berusaha untuk

mengukuhkan

Tangan Brandt berunding dengan Soviet dan juga

menanamkan Ostpolitik dalam matriks yang lebih besar daripada

hubungan Timur-Barat untuk mendisiplinkan objektif Berlin FRG

untuk concensus Bersekutu '(kedua-duanya dengan mengambil kira

inisiatif yang diambil dan yang sama penting, masa mereka

inisiatif).

Kissinger ^ cara memanfaatkan simetri di Soviet mengenai

Berlin kedua-duanya am dan tertentu. Beliau telah merancang

untuk mempunyai AS, Britain dan Perancis menawarkan set mereka

sendiri cadangan untuk Moscow mengenai perkara-perkara akses

Berlin yang dovetailed dengan praktikal objektif FRG dan

beliau memegang membuka pospect daripadaconvening a European

Security Conference which Moscow proposed and hoped to use to ratify theexisting borders in Eastern Europe. As an ultimate inducement to Moscow,implicit in the idea of a European Security Conference was the prospect of U.S.,

British and French diplomatic recognition of the GDR-a key Soviet objective.As both the Kissinger detente strategy and Brandt's Ostpolitik gained

momentum in late 1969 and 1970, and the Soviets began to engage, all parties

increasingly understood that their efforts were giving recognition to the post-war

status quo in Europe, preserving and codifying existing rights, lowering tension

and thereby opening the prospect over time for practical improvements in inner-

German relations. In short, Brandt's Ostpolitik, as focussed by Kissinger,

produced a "win-win" strategy in inner-German relations while postponing

tougher "theological" sovereignty and reunification issues.. The FRG gained in

self respect and ability to articulate and defend its own interests (key Brandt

goals) and found it could only do so from a basis of concensus positions in

alliance with the U.S. (key U.S. objective).

State Interests and power; Understanding the complex interplay in Central

Europe of multiple state interests and the power to safeguard those interests,

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particularly regarding Berlin (and by implication resolution of the German

question) was critical

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mengadakan Persidangan Keselamatan Eropah yang dicadangkan

Moscow dan berharap untuk menggunakan untuk mengesahkan

sempadan yang sedia ada di Eropah Timur. Sebagai dorongan utama

untuk Moscow, tersirat dalam idea Persidangan KeselamatanEropah adalah prospek AS, pengiktirafan diplomatik British dan

Perancis GDR-objektif Soviet utama.Seperti kedua-dua strategi detente Kissinger dan Ostpolitik

Brandt yang mendapat momentum pada akhir tahun 1969 dan 1970,

dan Soviet mula terlibat, semua pihak semakin difahami bahawa

usaha mereka telah memberi pengiktirafan kepada status quo

selepas perang di Eropah, memelihara dan mengkod hak yang ada,

mengurangkan ketegangan dan dengan itu membuka prospek dari

masa ke masa untuk penambahbaikan praktikal dalam hubungan

tengah Jerman. Pendek kata, Ostpolitik Brandt, kerana tertumpu

oleh Kissinger, menghasilkan "menang-menang" Strategi dalam

hubungan dalaman-Jerman manakala menangguhkan sukar "teologi"

kedaulatan dan isu-isu penyatuan .. The FRG mendapat berkenaandiri dan keupayaan untuk menyuarakan dan membela kepentingan

sendiri (matlamat Brandt utama) dan mendapati ia hanya boleh

berbuat demikian dari asas jawatan concensus dalam pakatan

dengan Amerika Syarikat (objektif utama AS).

Minat Negeri dan kuasa; Memahami interaksi kompleks di Eropah

Tengah kepentingan negeri dan pelbagai kuasa untuk melindungi

kepentingan mereka, khususnya mengenai Berlin (dan oleh

resolusi implikasi soalan Jerman) adalah kritikalto devising a

successful strategy for Ostpolitik. Until Brandt successfully perceived thediffering levels of interest and power among the various players he was unable todevise a workable strategy. State interests in 1970 regarding the Berlin anomalymay be listed as follows:

* FRG: Vital interest in obtaining greater legitimacy to FRG-West Berlin

ties, improving humanitarian issues, achieving greater autonomy over

inner-German affairs and over the FRG's relations with Central andEastern Europe, and preserving options for ultimate reunification of the

German nation

* GDR: Survival interest in establishing sovereignty over East Berlin and

obtaining international recognition of separate statehood; vital interest in

minimizing FRG claims to West Berlin and circumscribing Allied rights in

Berlin*

* USSR: Vital interest in preventing FRG ties to West Berlin, preventing

German reunification within a Western framework; vital interest in

establishing GDR legitimacy and obtaining recognition of East European

post-war boundaries*

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* U.S.: Vital interest in maintaining Allied access rights to Berlin (an issue of

symbolism and credibility vis-a-vis Bonn and Moscow}; vital interest in

being seen to support the FRG's ties to West Berlin (a key means by

which to keep the FRG firmly anchored in the West); peripheral interest inimproving access conditions for residents of West Berlin, but a vital

interest in seeking to establish a workable modus vivendi which would end

the cycle of periodic Berlin Crises, and a vital interest in engaging the

Soviet Union in seeking diplomatic solutions to other pressing problems

(Vietnam, Middle East, arms control) .

* Britain: Major interest in maintaining Allied access rights to Berlin (a

means of asserting British interests in Central Europe) .

* France: Major interest in maintaining Allied access rights to Berlin, and a

vital interest in preventing German reunification (this latter interest has

frequently found expression in juridical positions on Berlin status issues

contrary to FRG desiresthe Bonn Group frequently is an interesting case

study in inter-Alliance diplomacy).

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The elements of power available to each state actor to achieve primary

interests were radically different. The disparity in conventional military power on

the scene overwhelmingly favored the Soviet Union (as Eisenhower knew so well

during the 1958 crisis). The, U.S., Britain and France relied on indirect deterrent

capability (nuclear and the threat of horizontal escalation); the Allies' primary

tools were diplomatictrading recognition of the GDR for improved access

arrangements to West Berlin.

The GDR's power was negative (denial of access) but was offset by its

critical need for recognition and legitimacy. The FRG could provide economicincentives to Eastern Europe and hold open the prospect of recognition of the

post-war order in Eastern Europe, but lacked direct leverage.

Brandt miscalculated the interest/power equation in 1961 when mayor of

West Berlin and also to a lesser extent when

r

Foreign Minister in 1966. When he better appreciated these r relationships, a

natural strategy for Ostpolitik evolved which took advantage of the opening for

creative diplomacy provided by Kissinger's detente grand strategy.

Objectives and Strategy; As Brandt's thinking adapted to the realization that

politics is the art of the possible, the specific objectives for Ostpolitik crystalized

into an effort: First, to improve the quality of life for West Berliners and

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Unsur-unsur kuasa yang ada kepada setiap pelakon negeri

untuk mencapai kepentingan utama adalah berbeza.

Perbezaan dalam kuasa tentera konvensional di tempat

kejadian overwhelmingly digemari Kesatuan Soviet

(sebagai Eisenhower tahu begitu baik semasa krisis

1958). Ini, Amerika Syarikat, Britain dan Perancis

bergantung kepada keupayaan pencegahan tidak langsung

(nuklear dan ancaman peningkatan mendatar); alat utama

Berikat 'adalah pengiktirafan diplomatik-perdagangan GDRbagi urusan peningkatan akses kepada West Berlin.

Kuasa GDR adalah negatif (penafian akses) tetapi telah

diimbangi oleh keperluan kritikal untuk pengiktirafan

dan kesahihan. The FRG boleh menyediakan insentif

ekonomi ke Eropah Timur dan memegang terbuka prospek

pengiktirafan perintah selepas perang di Eropah Timur,

tetapi tidak mempunyai pengaruh langsung.Brandt salah mengira persamaan faedah / kuasa pada

tahun 1961 apabila Datuk Bandar Berlin Barat dan juga

sedikit sebanyak apabila

r

Menteri Luar Negeri pada tahun 1966. Apabila dia lebih

dihargai r hubungan ini, strategi semula jadi untuk

Ostpolitik Evolved yang mengambil kesempatan daripada

pembukaan untuk diplomasi kreatif yang disediakan oleh

ketegangan strategi besar Kissinger.Objektif dan Strategi; Sebagai pemikiran Brandt

disesuaikan dengan kesedaran bahawa politik adalah seni

yang mungkin, objektif khusus untuk Ostpolitik

crystalized ke dalam usaha: Pertama, untuk meningkatkan

kualiti hidup Berliners Barat dandivided German families;second, to secure greater legal ties between the FRG and WestBerlin; third, to make inner-German relations more stable andpredictable; and fourth, to keep open the idea of a German"cultural" nation, if not a reunified single German stateatleast for the foreseeable future.. In order to achieve theseobjectives Brandt jettisoned the FRG's diplomatic campaign toisolate the GDR and he combined his efforts with U.S. diplomacy(a force multiplier, if you will) to enhance the prospects forsuccess of both Ostpolitik and detente policy. The veryprocess of Ostpolitik provided the maneuver room for FRGdiplomacy which Brandt also desired.

The strategy adopted was complex and asymmetrical, and

involved orchestrating diplomatic moves on several levels to

the Soviet Union and the GDR; Kissinger's beloved linkages

became the watchword for Ostpolitik's success. Four Powertalks on Berlin opened in March 19 70. In August 1970, FRG-

Soviet talks began on the Moscow Treaty (bilateral relations).

Simultaneously,

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dibahagikan keluarga di Jerman, kedua, untuk mendapatkan

hubungan undang-undang yang lebih erat antara FRG dan Barat

Berlin; ketiga, untuk membuat hubungan dalaman-Jerman yang

lebih stabil dan boleh diramalkan, dan keempat, untuk

menjaga terbuka idea Jerman "budaya" negara, jika tidak

reunified tunggal German negeri sekurang-kurangnya untuk

masa akan datang .. Dalam usaha untuk mencapai objektif iniBrandt dibuang kempen diplomatik FRG untuk mengasingkan GDR

dan dia digabungkan dengan usaha diplomasi Amerika Syarikat

(pengganda kuasa, jika anda akan) untuk meningkatkan prospek

kejayaan kedua-dua Ostpolitik dan dasar ketegangan. Proses

ini pada Ostpolitik disediakan di dalam bilik gerakan untuk

diplomasi yang FRG Brandt juga dikehendaki.

Strategi yang diguna pakai adalah kompleks dan tidaksimetri, dan terlibat mendalangi bergerak diplomatik kepada

beberapa peringkat untuk Kesatuan Soviet dan GDR; hubungan

tercinta Kissinger menjadi semboyan untuk kejayaan

Ostpolitik ini. Empat ceramah Kuasa di Berlin dibuka pada 19

Mac 70. Pada bulan Ogos 1970, perbincangan FRG-Soviet

bermula pada Perjanjian Moscow (hubungan dua hala). Pada

masa yang sama,FRG-GDR talks opened on Berlin transit and trafficissues. The three levels of talks were linked, substantively andprocedurally. Sufficient incentives in this multi-tiered negotiationexisted for Moscow that when Ulbricht raised objections, Brezhnevarranged the doctrinaire GDR leader's replacement with Honecker (aspecial gift for BrandtUlbricht was responsible for the Wall; hisouster was sweet revenge for the former mayor of West Berlin). In1971 the Quadripartite Agreement was signed, but the final

implementing protocol was delayed for several months pendingcompletion of the inner-German agreements (1971) and the FRG-Soviet bilateral treaty (1972).

Importantly, the parties' differing legal positions regarding

Berlin's ultimate status were not affected by any of the agreements

the legal status quo remained. Practical accommodation was

possible in inner-German relations and Berlin access, at the cost of

recognizing political reality in Central and Eastern Europe. But even

in gaining its coveted European Security Conference, Moscow

unwittingly opened the way for Western penetration of its East

European glacis through CSCE Basket 3 human rights provisions.

The edifice of the post-war order remained intact, but Kissinger's

(and Kennan's) asymmetrical containment strategy began the slow

process

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Ceramah FRG-GDR dibuka pada Berlin transit dan isu-isu

lalu lintas. Tiga peringkat ceramah berkaitan, substan

keduanya dan procedurally. Insentif yang mencukupi dalam

rundingan pelbagai peringkat ini wujud untuk Moscow

bahawa apabila Ulbricht bantahan, Brezhnev diaturpenggantian pemimpin doktrin GDR dengan Honecker (hadiah

khas untuk Brandt-Ulbricht bertanggungjawab bagi Wall;

penyingkiran beliau membalas dendam manis untuk Datuk

Bandar bekas West Berlin). Pada tahun 1971 Perjanjian

Quadripartite telah ditandatangani, tetapi protokol

akhir melaksanakan ditangguhkan selama beberapa bulan

sementara menunggu penyelesaian perjanjian dalaman-

Jerman (1971) dan FRG-Soviet perjanjian dua hala (1972).

Yang penting, berbeza kedudukan pihak-pihak 'undang-

undang mengenai status muktamad Berlin tidak dipengaruhi

oleh mana-mana perjanjian - status quo undang-undangkekal. Penginapan praktikal adalah mustahil dalam

hubungan dalaman-Jerman dan akses Berlin, pada kos yang

mengiktiraf realiti politik di Tengah dan Eropah Timur.

Tetapi dalam mendapatkan Persidangan Keselamatan Eropah

didambakan, Moscow sengaja membuka jalan bagi penembusan

Barat glacis Eropah Timur melalui Bakul CSCE 3

peruntukan hak asasi manusia. The bangunan perintah

selepas perang tidak terjejas, tetapi ini Kissinger (dan

ini Kennan) strategi membendung simetri memulakan proses

yang perlahanof reforming the European political order from the

inside out.Oh, yes, the FRG also obtained Brandt's other goal of

greater maneuver room for FRG statecraft in inner-German and

Central European affairs. That process, so critical today for the

future of Europe, continues.

pembaharuan untuk politik Eropah dari luar dalam.

Oh, ya, FRG juga diperoleh matlamat lain Brandt bilik gerakan yang lebih besar

untuk FRG tataurus dalam hal ehwal Eropah tengah Jerman dan Central. Proses itu,begitu kritikal hari ini untuk masa depan Eropah, berterusan.

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SOURCES; I have relied on the assigned and supplemental readings for topic

14 in preparing this paper (Brandt's People and Politics, Kissinger's White House

Years, Brown's Faces of Power, plus Gaddis' Strategies of Containment and

Chaliand and Rageau's Strategic Atlas. In addition, the conclusions drawn

largely reflect perspectives I developed while Ambassador's Aide and Political

Officer at Embassy Bonn (1980-1982) . During that assignment, especially when I

was the U.S. Bonn Group representative, I had the opportunity to become familiar

both with the complex history of "Berlin theology" and the key personalities who

have shaped contemporary Germany.