a watershed in global governance?

A c k n o w l e d g m e n t s

Independent Assessment of the World Commission on Dams i

A Watershed in Global Governance?AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE WORLD COMMISSION ON DAMS

Navroz K. Dubash

Mairi Dupar

Smitu Kothari

Tundu Lissu


i i A Watershed in Global Governance?

Copyright © 2001 World Resources Institute, Lokayan, andLawyers’ Environmental Action Team. All rights reserved.

ISBN: 1-56973-494-1

Printed in the United States of America on chlorine-free paper withrecycled content of 50%, 20% of which is post consumer.

Cover Photo Credits:

Left: Commissioners at the South Asian regional consultation,Colombo, December 1999. Courtesy of the World Commissionon Dams.

Center: Protest. Courtesy of Samfoto.

Right: WCD meeting in Tucurui, Brazil. Courtesy of the WorldCommission on Dams.

CAROL ROSENPUBLICATIONS DIRECTOR

HYACINTH BILLINGSPRODUCTION MANAGER

MAGGIE POWELLDESIGN AND LAYOUT

CAROLLYNE HUTTEREDITOR


Independent Assessment of the World Commission on Dams iii

Table of Contents

Chapter 1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 1An Experiment in Global Public Policymaking 1The World Commission on Dams in Historical Context 2Analytical Framework, Methods, and Outline 3

Chapter 2 Multilateral Processes, Global Commissions, and Global Governance .... 9From State-Centred Multilateralism to Multi-stakeholder Processes 10The Growth of Transboundary Alliances 17The Rise of Multi-Stakeholder Processes and the Challenge of Compliance 20The WCD in Historical Context 21

Chapter 3 The Origins of the World Commission on Dams..................................... 27Seeds of Dissent 27The Operations Evaluation Department Review 29Birth of the World Commission on Dams 31Conclusions 35

Chapter 4 From Gland to Cape Town: The Making of the WCD .............................. 37Representation of Viewpoints on the Commission 37The Significance of the Secretariat’s Role 44Establishment of the Forum 46Conclusions 49

Chapter 5 Implementing the Work Programme: The Commissioned Studies ........ 53An Inclusive Approach to Knowledge Gathering 53Participation in the Framing Process 56The Commissioned Studies: Case Studies 57The Commissioned Studies: Cross-check Survey of 150 Large Dams 62The Commissioned Studies: Thematic Reviews 64Cross-cutting Issues 68Conclusions 70

Chapter 6 Implementing the Work Programme: Consultations and Outreach ...... 75A Listening Commission: The Regional Consultations 75The Public Face of the WCD: The Media Strategy 82Conclusions 83


iv A Watershed in Global Governance?

Chapter 7 Commission Dynamics: Narrow versus Broad Consensus...................... 87Toward Commissioner Consensus 87The WCD Forum: Promise Unfulfilled? 91From Workplan to Final Report 93Conclusions 95

Chapter 8 The Commission’s Final Report: The International Response................ 99Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-making 99Responses to the Final Report 101The Third Forum Meeting and Institutional Follow-up to the WCD 112Conclusions 113

Chapter 9 Conclusion................................................................................................ 119Establishing a Credible Process 120The Legacy of the WCD 126

Appendix 1 The World Commission on Dams and its Origins: A Brief Chronology of Events ............................................................... 129

Appendix 2 WCD Forum Members ............................................................................ 130

Appendix 3 Thematic Reviews .................................................................................... 131

Appendix 4 Strategic Priorities of the Dams and Development Report ................... 132

Appendix 5 Events Attended by the Assessment Team .............................................. 134


Independent Assessment of the World Commission on Dams v

Acknowledgements

throughout this process, and was instrumental inhelping us clear bureaucratic, financial, and otherobstacles. She challenged us to strive for highstandards of research and analysis, even whileallowing us full independence to reach our ownconclusions. Elena Petkova contributed ongoingadvice, detailed review, and attended key WCDmeetings on behalf of the assessment team. Thanksalso to Nathan Badenoch, Don Doering, and JanetRanganathan, who took time out of their busyschedules at short notice to provide helpfulcomments as part of WRI’s internal review. TonyJanetos and Grace Bermudez steered the documentthrough the review process. Danilo Pelletiere ofGeorge Mason University and George Faradaycontributed greatly to the assessment by reviewingthe global governance literature. Two internsperformed well above and beyond the call of duty.Ray Wan of the Yale School of Forestry undertookextensive research on the WCD’s media strategyand coverage of the WCD in the popular media,and Luna Ranjit, a recent graduate of GrinnellCollege, provided research assistance on the WCD’sthematic reviews. To all these, and other colleagueswho helped through encouragement, support, andfilling in the gaps in our workload, we are mostgrateful.

Lokayan wishes to acknowledge several contribu-tors and colleagues. Anil Bhattarai, a Nepaleseaction researcher spending a year at Lokayan, andGopal Siwakoti “Chintan,” director of INHUREDInternational, Kathmandu, joined the Lokayanteam at the inception of the assessment. Anilwithdrew six months later to pursue advancedstudies. He was replaced by RamanandaWangkheirakpam, Jawaharlal Nehru University,whose diligence and consistency contributedsignificantly to our report. Lakshmi Rao,Jawaharlal Nehru University, joined the team forthree months, primarily to assess the entire processof a WCD thematic study and help organise theIndia workshop on the WCD report. BiploveChaudhary also contributed to the organising of

The authors are extremely grateful to the Commis-sioners, Secretariat staff, and Forum members forthe time and assistance they generously providedin the course of this assessment. We also wish tothank our reviewers for their time and efforts.While they bear no responsibility for the finalproduct, their comments have led to substantialimprovements in the document. Our formalreviewers were: Hope Chigudu, The Global Fundfor Women; Ken Conca, University of Maryland;Anthony Dorcey, University of British Columbia;M. Gopalakrishnan, Government of India;Shalmali Guttal, Focus on the Global South; MinuHemmati, consultant to the UNED Forum; AndresLiebenthal, World Bank Operations EvaluationDepartment; Patrick McCully, International RiversNetwork; Andreas Seiter, Novartis Corporation;Chaiyuth Sukhrsi, Mekong River Commission; andRichard Taylor, International Hydropower Associa-tion. Joji Cariño and Thayer Scudder, formerCommissioners of the WCD, and Achim Steiner,Jeremy Bird and an anonymous reviewer of theWCD Secretariat provided informal review com-ments.

We are also grateful to several others who contrib-uted knowledge and insights at key moments.Manuel Pulgar-Vidal of the Peruvian Society forEnvironmental Law attended and provided feed-back on the WCD regional consultation in SãoPaolo in August 1999. Flávia Braga Vieira of theFederal University of Rio de Janeiro prepared apaper on the interaction of Brazil’s Movement ofDam-Affected People (MAB) with the WCD,during a two-month research fellowship at WRI.

WRI thanks several colleagues, within WRI andacross the world, whose contributions have en-riched this report. This report would not have beencompleted without Fritz Kahrl, who co-ordinatedresearch and production, provided editing andresearch support, and maintained enthusiasm forthe process throughout. Frances Seymour, WRI’srepresentative on the WCD Forum, encouraged us


vi A Watershed in Global Governance?

this workshop. A special word of gratitude toMinar Pimple and Dilip Bhadarge of YUVA,Mumbai for their trust and support. Finally,without the sustained administrative and logisticalsupport provided by P.T. George, the India processand the publishing of the final report would havedefinitely suffered. We are immensely grateful to allof them as well as to the other colleagues, SteeringCommittee members, and staff of Lokayan whopatiently endured the onslaught in their midst.

LEAT acknowledges the invaluable contributionsfrom the following: Melchisedeck Lutema, a LEATstaff attorney who was part of the original studyteam until July 2000 when he moved to the US forhis graduate studies. Lutema rejoined the team asan intern from American University in WashingtonDC between January and April 2001. SusanMlangwa-Nangwala, a sociologist from Uganda,prepared the Ugandan case study; JosephatAyamunda, a Kenyan lawyer, did the Kenyan study,and John Langas Mughwai and Marcel Sawa Muroundertook the Tanzanian case study. Various LEATcolleagues gave ideas and comments at variousstages of the study and to them all we are grateful.

All the authors would like to acknowledge andthank their families and loved ones who now,

involuntarily, know more about the WCD thananyone could reasonably choose to. Mairi Duparand Smitu Kothari would particularly like to thanktheir daughters, Heather and Emma. By acceptinglong workdays, enduring long absences, andtolerating distracted parents, our families sup-ported us with great, and sometimes less, amountsof patience. It is now time to pay back the debt, atask we all commit ourselves to in the comingmonths.

We would like to thank Lokayan for its voluntaryinstitutional partnership. We would also like tothank the New York and New Delhi offices of theFord Foundation for providing major fundingfor the research. We would particularly like tothank Srilatha Batliwala, Lisa Jordan and UjjwalPradhan for their enthusiasm and support. YouthUnity for Voluntary Action (YUVA), Mumbai co-ordinated support for work in South Asia. WRI isalso grateful for funds it received from the RoyalDutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the SwedishInternational Development Cooperation Agency,the U.S. Agency for International Development,and the MacArthur Foundation that were used inthe start-up phase of this assessment. We wouldlike to thank the WCD for providing funds fortranslation and dissemination of the assessment’sfindings, separate from research and preparationof the report.

N.D.M.D.

S.K.T.L.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

An Independent Assessment of the World Commission on Dams 1

Chapter 1

Introduction

effectiveness and to develop criteria and guide-lines to advise future decision-making on dams.(See Box 1.1.)

The WCD was an extraordinary process in severalregards. The Commission included voices that hadpreviously been excluded from global commis-sions. It demonstrated both the feasibility and thechallenges of consulting widely with the publicand striving for transparency in a workprogramme. In spite of the challenges of broadrepresentation, the Commission managed toproduce a consensus report, Dams and Develop-ment (see Box 1.2), which held considerablelegitimacy because it was the joint work of Com-missioners from diverse backgrounds.

Indeed, because of its efforts at representing arange of views, its emphasis on broad consultation,and its commitment to transparency, the WCDdescribed itself as, and was proclaimed by others tobe, a unique experiment in global public

An Experiment in Global PublicPolicymaking

In mid-2000, Medha Patkar, a leader of one ofthe best-known social movements in India,and Göran Lindahl, the Chief ExecutiveOfficer of one of the world’s largest engineer-

ing firms, participated in a meeting together inCape Town. The two came from different worlds.Ms. Patkar was weak from undertaking a hungerstrike to protest a dam on the Narmada River inwestern India. Mr. Lindahl arrived at the lastminute on his private jet. Before the meeting, Ms.Patkar animatedly described the recent protests,showed Mr. Lindahl pictures of the villagers, andnarrated their experiences.

So began a typical meeting of the World Commis-sion on Dams (WCD). Ms. Patkar, Mr. Lindahl,and their 10 colleagues from government minis-tries, the private sector, and civil society were allCommissioners on the WCD. Their common taskwas to address the conflicting viewpoints that havemade large dams a flashpoint in the arena ofenvironment, development, and justice.

The WCD was formed following a meeting ofdiverse dam-related stakeholders in early 1997 todiscuss the past and future of large dams. TheWorld Bank and the World Conservation Union(IUCN) initiated the process in response togrowing protests at dam sites around the world.Although originally focussing on a study of theWorld Bank’s dam-building record, the processgrew into an independent review that consumedthe time of 12 Commissioners, a full-timeprofessional Secretariat, a 68-member advisoryForum, and thousands of contributors. TheWCD’s goals were to build a comprehensiveknowledge base of large dams’ development

Box 1.1

Key objectives of the WCD

� A global review of the development effec-tiveness of large dams and assessments ofalternatives.

� A framework for options assessment anddecision-making processes for waterresource and energy services and develop-ment.

� Internationally acceptable criteria andguidelines for planning, designing, construc-tion, operation, monitoring, and decommis-sioning of dams.

Source: World Commission on Dams, Interim Report,July 1999.

C h a p t e r 1

2 A Watershed in Global Governance?

policymaking.1 During the life of the Commission,multilateral institutions, governments, non-govern-mental organisations (NGOs), and corporationsdebated whether it was a model for global publicpolicymaking in other arenas. Since then, discus-sions about the replicability of the WCD havecascaded into areas as diverse as extractive indus-tries, trade and environment, food security andgenetically modified organisms, and debt relief.

The final chapter on the WCD—concerning itsimpact on dam-related planning and practice and,therefore, its long-term effectiveness—will bewritten long after the report’s release. Thousandsof dam-related stakeholders around the world arealready reaching for the Commission’s findings,poring over them, and debating them publicly. Theprocess outlined above was sufficiently robust thatit engaged a variety of governments, internationalagencies, NGOs, people’s movements, and privatefirms. Widespread engagement during the processled these diverse groups to take the report seriouslyand to recognise that the Commission spoke with acertain moral authority, even if its recommenda-tions were not binding in the legal sense.

A Watershed in Global Governance? tells the storyof the WCD experiment and assesses its implica-tions for future global public policymaking. Weexamine how the WCD came about and how thecommitment to good governance was infused in itswork. We look at the practical challenges ofimplementing independence, transparency, andinclusiveness, and how the experience affected theWCD’s legitimacy with stakeholders. Finally, weconsider the different strategies for influenceavailable to an advisory commission, such as theWCD, that has no binding mechanisms for compli-ance. We seek to locate the diverse reactions to thefinal report in the context of evolving norms ofdevelopment practice.

The World Commission on Dams inHistorical Context

The WCD emerged from several strands in therecent history of global policymaking. First, theWCD built upon a history of global commissionsthat have sought either to reconcile economicgrowth and environmental sustainability (such asthe Brundtland Commission and the Stockholmand Rio Conferences) or to address North-Southinequalities and questions of justice (such as theBrandt and South Commissions). Indeed, the WCDmarked a step forward by incorporating at once thethemes of social justice, human rights, ecologicalsustainability, and development in its work.

Second, the dams arena illustrates the growingability of transnational civil society networks tocontribute to global public policy agendas. TheWCD was formed as a result of national andinternational civil society protest against largedams, which was often directed at such multilateralagencies as the World Bank.2 The high transactioncosts created by civil society dissent persuaded theWorld Bank and selected allies in internationalfinance and industry that a new approach wasrequired to move the dams debate forward.

Third, the WCD stood out from previous commis-sions in its diversity—including pro-dam lobbyistsand anti-dam protesters—rather than limitingitself to participants from a broad middle ground.By the standards of global commissions generally,it also marked a notable departure from the“eminent persons” model of distinguished publicservants. It comprised, instead, active practitionerswhose personal legitimacy derived from theirprominence in international stakeholder networks.

Fourth, the WCD was one of many government,private sector, and civil society dialogues ondevelopment policy that have proliferated since thelandmark UN Conference on Environment andDevelopment in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. By includ-ing a broad range of stakeholders, the WCD was aleading example of a “multi-stakeholder process.”By including multiple perspectives, integratingdiverse viewpoints early in a policy process, andbuilding constituencies for implementation, multi-stakeholder processes are intended to provide amore inclusive and pragmatic form of policyformulation.3 Some consultative processes involv-ing civil society, business, and governmental actorshave a direct input into policymaking.4 However,

The Commissiondemonstrated the

feasibility and challengesof broad consultation

and transparency.



many multi-stakeholder processes lack formalauthority for decision-making and result indeclarations, policy recommendations, and codesof conduct that are not legally binding. The WCDreport joined a recent profusion of normativeinstruments and processes in international devel-opment that have no legal stature in themselvesbut are intended to be considered by legislatorsand to influence development practice.5

Finally, the WCD’s structure and functioningresponded to a broader call by civil society fortransparency and inclusiveness in global gover-nance. Before and since the WCD’s formation,numerous protests and advocacy efforts by NGOsand social movements have sought to open upglobal decision-making about trade and investmentrules, and associated labour, human rights, andenvironmental standards—decisions that are madebehind closed doors and in the hands of the few, butaffect the lives of millions. As a multi-stakeholderprocess whose objective was to address the source ofpast conflicts, the WCD committed explicitly tobeing transparent and open in its work.

The debate over large dams was ripe for the WCD’sapproach. Dams issues provide a microcosm of thechanging political roles of the state, civil society,and the private sector in the rush toward aglobalised world. Private financing is playing anincreasing role, expanding the number of actorswho hold leverage in dams planning and decision-making. Decisions about dams often involvegovernments, private firms, and internationalfinanciers—including bilateral aid agencies,multilateral development banks, export creditagencies, and commercial banks. Social move-ments and NGOs have criticised these actors’ lackof transparency and have vocally resisted theirdecisions. The increase in number and scope ofphysical protests has brought added urgency to thedams debate. At the same time, the number ofdams under planning and construction has rapidly

fallen, as cost-effective alternatives to large damshave become increasingly available, especially inproviding energy services. The controversy gener-ated by large dams and the changing face of thedams industry provided compelling reason forboth supporters and opponents of large dams,although wary, to come to the table. This is thecontext in which discussion began over the forma-tion of an independent commission to address thedams debate.

Analytical Framework, Methods, andOutline

Analytical Framework

The ability to convene diverse actors and keepthem constructively engaged is a core principle ofmulti-stakeholder processes such as the WCD. Forsuch processes to be successful, stakeholders mustfeel that they have access to the process, that theirvoices are fully heard, and that their participationin the deliberations is meaningful. The potentialbenefits of these conditions are twofold: first, suchprocesses are better informed, integrate diversesubjective viewpoints, and result in better out-comes. Second, inclusion builds constituencies forimplementation.

In this report, we look at the efforts of the WCDand its initiators to create political space fordiverse access to the process through

• full representation of relevant stakeholdergroups on the Commission,

• independence from external influence,

• transparency to ensure the Commission’saccountability to stakeholders’ concerns, and

• inclusiveness of a range of views in compilingthe knowledge base.

We assess how the WCD put these principles intopractice and the effect of this experience onstakeholder perceptions of the WCD’s legitimacyas the process unfolded. This approach was madepossible by the time frame of our assessment,which was concurrent with the WCD.

We pay close attention to the political and practicaltrade-offs that the WCD faced in its efforts tocreate a representative, independent, transparent,and inclusive process. Because the WCD brought

The WCD stood out fromprevious commissionsin the diversity of its

composition.

C h a p t e r 1


Box 1.2

The WCD’s findings and recommendations

Key message of the WCD

� “Dams have made an important and significantcontribution to human development, and thebenefits derived from them have been consider-able.

� In too many cases an unacceptable and oftenunnecessary price has been paid to secure thosebenefits, especially in social and environmentalterms, by people displaced, by communitiesdownstream, by taxpayers and by the naturalenvironment.

� Lack of equity in the distribution of benefits hascalled into question the value of many dams inmeeting water and energy development needswhen compared with the alternatives.

� By bringing to the table all those whose rightsare involved and who bear the risks associatedwith different options for water and energyresources development, the conditions for apositive resolution of competing interests andconflicts are created.

� Negotiating outcomes will greatly improve thedevelopment effectiveness of water and energyprojects by eliminating unfavourable projects atan early stage, and by offering as a choice onlythose options that key stakeholders agreerepresent the best ones to meet the needs inquestion.” (p. xxviii)

Findings of the WCD

� “Large dams display a high degree of variabilityin delivering predicted water and electricityservices—and related social benefits—with aconsiderable portion falling short of physical andeconomic targets, while others continue generat-

ing benefits after 30 to 40 years.� Large dams have demonstrated a marked

tendency towards schedule delays and signifi-cant cost overruns.

� Large dams designed to deliver irrigationservices have typically fallen short of physicaltargets, did not recover their costs and havebeen less profitable in economic terms thanexpected.

� Large hydropower dams tend to perform closerto, but still below, targets for power generation,generally meet their financial targets butdemonstrate variable economic performancerelative to targets, with a number of notableunder- and over-performers.

� Large dams generally have a range of extensiveimpacts on rivers, watersheds and aquaticecosystems—these impacts are more negativethan positive and, in many cases, have led toirreversible loss of species and ecosystems.

� Efforts to date to counter the ecosystem impactsof large dams have met with limited successowing to the lack of attention to anticipatingand avoiding impacts, the poor quality anduncertainty of predictions, the difficulty ofcoping with all impacts, and the only partialimplementation and success of mitigationmeasures.

� Pervasive and systematic failure to assess therange of potential negative impacts andimplement adequate mitigation, resettlementand development programmes for the dis-placed, and the failure to account for theconsequences of large dams for downstreamlivelihoods have led to the impoverishment and

together opponents in the dams debate as well as abroad political middle, including one group orperspective risked alienating another. In addition,the work of a commission is inevitably shaped bypractical trade-offs. Funds, time, and the patienceand perseverance of commissioners, staff, andstakeholders are real constraints on any suchprocess, no matter how high the aspirations togood governance. The real measure of the WCD’ssuccess was whether it managed these trade-offswell enough to create space for engagement by arange of stakeholders that was sufficiently broad topromote its results.

Representation and good process are ultimatelyonly means to influence policy and practice.Impact can be difficult to measure, because multi-stakeholder processes often do not have formalauthority as decision-making bodies, but seek toshape outcomes through their influence as anadvisory voice. In this study, we deploy multiplecriteria for assessment of the Commission’s likelyimpact. First, we examine whether and how theCommission achieved consensus. Without consen-sus, a commission will be seen to have reproduceddivisions among stakeholders, rather than tran-scending them. Second, we ask whether and howthe narrow consensus among the Commissioners



suffering of millions, giving rise to growingopposition to dams by affected communitiesworldwide.

� Since the environmental and social costs oflarge dams have been poorly accounted for ineconomic terms, the true profitability of theseschemes remains elusive.”(p. xxxi)

� “Global estimates of the magnitude of impactsinclude some 40-80 million people displacedby dams while 60 percent of the world’s rivershave been affected by dams and diversions.”(p. xxx)

Recommendations of the WCD

� “Clarifying the rights context for a proposedproject is an essential step in identifying thoselegitimate claims and entitlements that mightbe affected by the proposed project—orindeed its alternatives.” (p. 207)

� “Those whose rights are most affected, orwhose entitlements are most threatened, havethe greatest stake in the decisions that aretaken. The same applies to risk: those groupsfacing the greatest risk from the developmenthave the greatest stake in the decisions and,therefore, must have a corresponding place atthe negotiating table.” (p. 209)

� “Effective implementation of free, prior andinformed consent marks a significant stepforward in recognising the rights of indig-enous and tribal peoples.” (p. 219)

� “An early focus on options assessment willexclude most questionable projects. Those thatemerge will enjoy wider public support andlegitimacy. It can reduce delays and additional

costs and conflicts, benefiting all those affectedby a project.” (p. 222)

� “A range of measures is available to enhanceand restore ecosystems from their man-modified state, and many are already in useworldwide. Locally driven processes to estab-lish the objectives of environmental flows willlead to improved and sustainable outcomes forrivers, ecosystems and the riverine communi-ties that depend on them.” (pp. 231, 239)

� “Regaining lost livelihood requires adequatelead time and preparation and thereforepeople must be fully compensated beforerelocation from their land, house or livelihoodbase. An overarching Compliance Plan is thebest way to ensure that compliance activitiesand measures are effectively pursued andimplemented, and should be developed foreach project.” (pp. 242, 247)

� “In many…cases retrofitting existing damswith more efficient, modern equipment andcontrol systems has achieved significantimprovements in benefits, extending facilitiesand optimising operations. While new supplyoptions may be needed in many countries,restoring or extending the life of existing damsand, where feasible, expanding and improvingservices from existing dams provide majoropportunities to address development needs.”(pp. 226-7)

Excerpted directly from World Commission on Dams,Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-Making (London: Earthscan, 2000).

Box 1.2 continued

can eventually be translated into a broader consen-sus among stakeholders. In particular, we explorethe role of good process in constructing broaderstakeholder buy-in to a commission’s recommen-dations and reflect on the implications of stake-holder support for adoption of recommendations.

Finally, this assessment looks at historical prece-dent through a detailed survey of past commis-sions, civil society advocacy efforts, global confer-ences, and multi-stakeholder processes. All of thesearenas represent important influences in theformation of the WCD. This rich past recordprovides a useful context for the assessment as it

reflects the many strands that shaped the WCD. Itprovides a lens on the practical feasibility ofdifferent forms of stakeholder consultation andrepresentation by demonstrating what has beenaccomplished before.

Approach and Methods

Three non-governmental organisations—theWorld Resources Institute (United States), Lawyers’Environmental Action Team (Tanzania), andLokayan (India)—undertook this assessment. Ourassessment team was structured to incorporate adiversity of Northern and Southern perspectives.

C h a p t e r 1


The ability to engagediverse actors

constructively isa core principle of multi-

stakeholder processes.

Within each organisation, there were one or twoprimary authors, supported by research assistantsand field-based research fellows from Brazil,Kenya, Nepal, Peru, Tanzania, and Uganda.

The assessment maintained editorial independencefrom the WCD, although we had the WCD’s co-operation. The work was funded almost entirelyfrom private foundation sources, which are detailedin the acknowledgements section of this report.

The World Resources Institute was a member ofthe WCD Forum, in which it was classified as a“Research Institute.” The Institute’s participationin the Forum was kept separate, in terms ofpersonnel and funding, from the work of thisassessment in order to maintain an independentperspective on the WCD process.

Research for the assessment comprised semi-structured interviews, observation at WCD meet-ings, and analysis of WCD documents. We reliedon interviews to reconstruct events, to capturevarying perspectives on WCD proceedings, and tosolicit reactions to the process and the final report.Over a two-year period, the research team inter-viewed 10 Commissioners, all Senior Advisors atthe Secretariat, representatives of almost all 68member organisations of the Forum, and severalconsultants and financial donors to the WCD. Wealso sought the views of dam-related stakeholderswho were not formally involved in the WCDprocess. For example, we interviewed displacedpeople in Egypt and India to understand theirperspectives on large dams and determine theaccessibility and relevance of the WCD to them.Following the launch of the WCD report, weinterviewed stakeholders from government andmultilateral agencies, industry trade groups, andcivil society organisations to document responsesto the recommendations. In India, the teamorganised a large multi-stakeholder consultation

for feedback on the report that included membersof the Secretariat and former Commission. In EastAfrica, the team conducted small focus groups andinterviews with stakeholders in Kenya, Tanzania,and Uganda.

Because participants in the process were highlysensitive to the WCD’s charged politics, we decidedto conduct interviews on a not-for-attributionbasis to encourage candour from interviewees. Toensure accuracy, information gathered throughinterviews was checked against documentationwhere possible and against information providedin other interviews. In addition, we were attentiveto the context and stakeholder location of theinterviewee. Summaries of interviews, includingrelevant quotes, were circulated among teammembers in order to cross-check information.

The assessment team was allowed to participate inWCD Forum meetings, case study meetings, andregional consultations as observers. Appendix 5lists meetings attended by members of the team.Although we requested permission to attendCommissioner meetings, the Commissionersdeclined this request in order to maintain theconfidentiality of their deliberations. We were,however, granted access to the Secretariat’s minutesof the Commissioners’ meetings on the basis thatthe minutes be used as background informationand not for citation.6 During the meetings, inaddition to conducting individual interviews, wenoted how the meeting was structured, the infor-mation available, the role of the Commissioners,Secretariat, Forum members, and participants, theissues deliberated, and the tone and content ofdebates. This information provided valuablecontent, particularly for our assessment of inclu-siveness and transparency. To complement ourscrutiny of the WCD process from the inside, weanalysed media coverage of the WCD.

To assess the voluminous work programme, westudied a sample of the Commission’s case studiesand thematic reviews. In examining the thematicstudies, we drew on documentary records, includ-ing reviewers’ comments, to assess how the scopeof the study was shaped. We also interviewedSecretariat staff, consultants, and reviewers abouttheir role in the thematic review process.

In early 2001, toward the end of our researchprocess, we presented our preliminary findings tothe WCD Forum members at their final meeting in



Spier Estates, outside Cape Town, South Africa.Their questions and comments were important inshaping our draft report. We subsequently postedthe preliminary findings on our website,www.wcdassessment.org, and invited commentsfrom concerned readers. We met three times as afull assessment team, and on several other occa-sions at WCD meetings to analyse the findings anddraft chapters.

In the course of conducting the research, werefined and adapted our questions to react toinformation we received over this period. Ouroriginal research framework aimed to assess theeffect of the WCD’s work on strengthening orundermining emerging norms of global gover-nance—such as the principles of openness, partici-pation, and transparency to which the WCD wascommitted. Over time, we came to appreciate theimportance of the composition of the Commis-sion, Secretariat, and Forum to perceptions of theCommission’s legitimacy. In addition, although wefocussed on the process by which the WCDconducted its work, we also placed additionalemphasis on the links between process and stake-holder reactions to the final report. We looked atthe extent to which these stakeholder reactionsinvoked the WCD’s process, to help test ourhypothesis that good process builds constituenciesfor implementation.

We submitted drafts of this report to two roundsof peer review. Colleagues in each of ourorganisations conducted the first round of review.We then submitted the manuscript to 10 externalreviewers. These included five persons with centralroles in the WCD process, and another five withexperience in global governance processes, or whowere working in issue areas at the intersection ofenvironment, development, and justice. In addi-tion, we submitted the draft informally to fivereviewers drawn from the Commission andSecretariat. These comments are available on theassessment team’s website. Based upon thesecomments, we revised the report again before finalpublication.

As an effort to assess the WCD as a model for globalgovernance, this study has potential implications for

the WCD’s broader legacy. This legacy is of consid-erable interest to stakeholder groups whose interestsare affected by the Commission’s perceived legiti-macy. As a result, this study has come under thesame kind of scrutiny and lobbying pressure bydifferent interest groups as did the WCD’s processitself, albeit not with the same intensity. We havebeen well aware of this dynamic during our researchand the threats to independence that close engage-ment with stakeholders can bring. However, we areconvinced that immersion in the process bringsrichness to the analysis, and when combined withawareness and critical self-reflection, the benefits ofthis approach outweigh the costs.

Outline

This report adopts a broadly chronologicalorganisation of the formation and history of theWCD. Chapter 2 locates the WCD in the evolutionof global governance efforts, and in multi-stake-holder processes in particular. Chapter 3 examinesthe WCD’s origins to chart the unique aspects ofthe Commission’s formation, including the reasonswhy different stakeholders in the dams debate wereready to sit down at the table together.

Chapters 4 to 7 are dedicated to an analysis of theCommission’s structure and functioning. Chapter4 examines how the WCD’s creators tried torepresent the full range of interests in the damsdebate on the Commission, Secretariat, andForum. Chapters 5 and 6 explore how the WCD’sorganisation and work programme were designedto promote inclusiveness, transparency, andindependence and how these designs worked outin practice. Chapter 7 reconstructs dynamicswithin the Commission, and among the variousorgans of the Commission in exploring thetrajectory toward a consensus. Chapter 8 reviewsstakeholder reactions to the WCD final report andhighlights factors that contribute to stakeholderadoption of the Commission’s recommendations.

In Chapter 9, we return to the analytical frame-work described above. We assess the degree towhich the WCD’s track record in good governancecontributed to stakeholders’ willingness to engagewith and act upon the Commission’s final report.

C h a p t e r 1


Endnotes

1. See, for example, WCD Newsletter No. 3, June 1999.Online at: www.dams.org/newsletters/newsletter3.htm(23 August 2001). External audiences have echoed thisframing of the WCD. See Jörg Baur and Jochen Rudolph,“A Breakthrough in the Evolution of Large Dams? Back tothe Negotiating Table,” D+C Development Cooperation,No. 2, March/April 2001, pp. 9-12. Online at: www.dse.de/zeitschr/de201-3.htm (28 September 2001); David Secklerand Achim Steiner, “More Crop per Drop and Dams onDemand? Implications for the 21st Century.” Report givenat the ODI-SOAS Meeting Series, 9 February 2000. Onlineat: www.oneworld.org/odi/speeches/water3.html (28September 2001).

2. See Jonathan Fox and L. David Brown, eds. The Strugglefor Accountability: The World Bank, NGOs and GrassrootsMovements (Boston: MIT Press, 1998); Robert Wade,“Greening the Bank: The Struggle over the Environment,1970-1995,” in The World Bank: Its First Half-Century.Devesh Kapur, John P. Lewis, and Richard Webb, eds.(Washington: Brookings Institution, 1997).

3. Minu Hemmati et al., Multi-Stakeholder Processes forGovernance and Sustainability Beyond Deadlock andConflict (London: Earthscan, 2001). Online at:www.earthsummit2002.org/msp/ (28 September 2001).

4. For instance, at the meetings of the United NationsCommission on Sustainable Development (CSD) theresults of the multi-stakeholder dialogues at the beginningof the sessions are summarised by the CSD Chairperson.These summaries are presented to negotiators thefollowing week and assume the status of an officialdocument. The delegates choose paragraphs from thesummaries in formulating the formal decision. Personalcommunication with UNED Forum, 30 July 2001.

5. See A. Florini, ed. The Third Force: The Rise ofTransnational Civil Society (Washington, DC: CarnegieEndowment for International Peace, 2000); DinahShelton, ed. Commitment and Compliance: The Role ofNon-binding Norms in the International Legal System(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

6. In a few limited cases, sections of the minutes had beenobscured by the Secretariat to preserve confidentiality.

M u l t i l a t e r a l P r o c e s s e s , G l o b a l C o m m i s s i o n s , a n d G l o b a l G o v e r n a n c e


Chapter 2

Multilateral Processes, GlobalCommissions, and Global Governance

and the accountability of international institu-tions. Often, debate over these issues has led to thecreation of regional or global fora, which havetaken the form of commissions, tribunals, andworking groups.

In reaction to the increasing number of actorsactive in shaping public policymaking, nationalgovernmental agencies and intergovernmentalbodies have become more open to including non-state actors in a more structured manner. Apopular approach has been to establish “multi-stakeholder processes,” or “MSPs,” that providespace for dialogue among a range of actors fromvarious sectors of society, as part of a decision-making or advisory process.

The formation of the World Commission on Dams(WCD) draws from a history of global commis-sions in the last quarter of the 20th century, fromthe expanding role of civil society actors as agentsof change at the global level, and from the emer-gence of MSPs. In this sense, it is a step forward inthe history of multilateral policymaking. In thischapter, we briefly review the contemporaryhistory of global governance to illustrate both theexclusiveness of state-led international governanceand the inroads made by civil society. Next, wetrace the impact of transnational civil societyorganisations on setting agendas at the interna-tional level. We then discuss emergent forms of

For much of the past century, the history ofglobal governance has been the history ofintergovernmental processes. Theseprocesses have been organised around

exclusive deliberations of officials and politicianswith similar backgrounds—whether initiated byclusters of governments, intergovernmentalagencies, or distinguished individuals. The out-comes were targeted at governments and interna-tional agencies, which were considered the onlylegitimate actors on the global stage.

At the same time, over the past two decades therehas been an unprecedented growth of actors incivil society extending and building alliances andcoalitions that transcend national boundaries. Inthe countries of the less industrialised world, civilsociety mobilisation grew as the post-colonialnation-building euphoria gave way to disillusion-ment with the capacity of state regimes to vigor-ously pursue policies of social transformation infavour of historically less privileged andmarginalised peoples. Some of this mobilisationextended across national boundaries in response toadverse social, economic, and ecological impacts ofthe policies of multilateral financial institutionsand the economic, political, and military activitiesof governments.

The emergence of civil society at the global levelhas both been facilitated by the telecommunica-tions revolution that accompanied globalisation,and been spurred by the challenge of effectivegovernance in a globalising world.1 These alliancesand coalitions have spawned on a diverse bed ofissues—from land mines to nuclear weapons, fromthe global trade in animal skins to the control andownership of genetic resources. Of particularrelevance to this assessment, civil society allianceshave also formed around development projects

Over time, the internationalsystem has been compelled to

recognise emergent voices fromcivil society.

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governance, MSPs, and the implications of theseforms for effective compliance with norms ofinternational governance. Finally, we locate theWCD process within these diverse strands.

From State-Centred Multilateralism toMulti-stakeholder Processes

Eminent figures dominate the history of globalgovernance through the second half of the 20th

century. In most cases, these people drew theircredibility from positions of political power withinnational governments and international bureau-cracies or their national or global moral stature.Based on their credibility and often backed by theauthority of intergovernmental bodies, statesmenand stateswomen established a series of commis-sions to deliberate on the weighty issues of the day.

In this section, we describe the gradual opening ofglobal discussions to embrace the views andparticipation of a broader set of actors. In tellingthis story, we also trace the shifting scope ofconcerns around global governance. In particular,we trace the emergence of concerns aroundenvironmental issues, and the progressive inter-weaving of environment with development andjustice concerns.

Formation of the United Nations and EarlyPatterns of Public Participation

The architecture for current forms of globalgovernance was established in the World War IIyears through a series of conferences and conversa-tions among leaders of the Allies.2 In the post-warperiod, the United Nations (UN), the InternationalBank for Reconstruction and Development (WorldBank), and the International Monetary Fund(IMF) were established.3 In addition, agreementsand institutions in the areas of food, culture, andeducation were also discussed, leading to thecreation of such influential agencies as the WorldHealth Organization (WHO) and the UnitedNations Educational, Scientific, and CulturalOrganization (UNESCO). This period also saw thethe fledgling United Nations General Assemblyformulate and adopt the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights.

Although the UN was conceived as, and remains,predominantly a forum for inter-governmentalengagement, it also provided space from itsinception for consultation with non-state actors.

Article 71 of the UN Charter allows the UNEconomic and Social Council (ECOSOC) toestablish “suitable arrangements for consultation,”but only with “international” NGOs.4 TheECOSOC created a three-part categorisation forNGOs in 1950, subsequently refined in 1968, basedon the perceived degree of expertise of the NGOwith the issues on the ECOSOC agenda. Theserules applied progressively more stringent criterionfor participation, from the “general” to the “spe-cial” to the “roster” category of ECOSOC consulta-tive status,5 and governed participation in UNmeetings for the first half-century of the UN. Itwas only after the considerable NGO interest in,and engagement with, the series of UN-sponsoredconferences in the 1990s that these rules weremodified in 1996 to allow national NGOs to beeligible for consultative status with ECOSOC.6

Among post-World War II institutions, the Inter-national Union for the Conservation of Nature(IUCN—now called the World ConservationUnion) was significant both for its focus onenvironmental concerns and for its broad mem-bership. IUCN was established by Julian Huxley,the first director of UNESCO. A joint initiative ofUNESCO, the government of France, and the SwissLeague for Nature Protection, IUCN is one of thefew international institutions that formally bringtogether stakeholders from within and outsidegovernment. From its inception when it startedwith 80 members, IUCN now brings together 78states, 112 government agencies, 735 NGOs, 35affiliates, and some 10,000 scientists and expertsfrom 181 countries in a unique worldwide partner-ship. IUCN members rejected a proposal in 1994to include a membership category for “industrygroups.”7 IUCN’s historical focus has been onconservation of species and ecosystems, which hasrecently expanded to include related humandevelopment issues. It has had considerablesuccess in promoting conservation, spearheadingseveral key international agreements in the 1970sand 1980s. Of central relevance to this study,IUCN was also one of the two convenors—theWorld Bank was the other—of the WCD process.

Currents of Change: Economic Injustice andthe Limits and Use of Nature

The 1960s and early 1970s saw two separatecurrents of change that developed from nationalcontexts to become global phenomena. Severalcountries had emerged from colonialism in the



1950s and 1960s, with high aspirations for theirpeople. Yet, many countries remained mired inpoverty, spurring the UN to declare the 1960s a“Decade of Development.” At the same time,Western Europe, the United States, and Japan wereenjoying a period of unprecedented prosperity.The 1969 Pearson Commission, established by theWorld Bank to investigate Third World poverty,noted an “atmosphere of decreasing interest fordevelopment assistance” in the industrialisedworld and “signs of dejection and growing impa-tience” in the developing world. The Commissioncalled for trade measures that favoured developingcountries, promotion of foreign direct investmentto those countries, and an increase in developmentassistance to 0.7 percent of donor country GNP.8

Increasingly impatient, in 1974 the developingcountries in the UN—the Group of 77 (G77)—called for a New International Economic Order(NIEO) based on a rise in raw material prices, debtreduction, and more favourable conditions for thetransfer of technology.9 Questions of economicjustice and development were firmly on the agendaby the early 1970s.

In the 1960s, the ecological limits and costs of thesingular pursuit of economic growth were becom-ing increasingly apparent in the North, while theSouth was beginning to recognise the integral rolethat the environment played in the subsistence of

its peoples. The publication of Silent Spring10 in1962, which carefully and eloquently documentedthe effects of pesticide pollution, is considered afounding event of American environmentalism.11

In both Germany and the UK, this period wit-nessed the formation of Green Parties.12 The early1970s also saw the publication of the Club ofRome’s (COR)13 path-breaking report, Limits toGrowth,14 and The Ecologist’s “Blueprint for Sur-vival.”15 Based on computer simulations, thesereports warned of dire effects from continuedexponential growth in five interconnected trendsof global concern—industrialisation, populationgrowth, widespread malnutrition, depletion ofrenewable resources, and ecological damage.

Although the industrialised world focussed onconcerns from pesticide pollution to the finitenessof natural resources, in the less industrialisedworld, there was growing concern over the inequityin access to and control over productive naturalresources.16 In a burgeoning “environmentalism ofthe poor”, these concerns were perhaps bestillustrated by the Chipko movement againstlogging in India and the rubber tappers’mobilisation in the Brazilian Amazon in the earlyto mid-1970s.17

Both economic and ecological concerns werebrought into stark relief by the Arab nations’ 1973

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C h a p t e r 2


oil embargo. Within a year, the price of crude oiltripled, causing an increase in the prices of otherraw materials and goods and services. The reces-sion and inflation that followed fuelled wideningrecognition of the vulnerability of industrialisedand less industrialised country economies both intheir sources of energy and in the finiteness oftheir non-renewable resources. By demonstratingthe destabilising effects of sharp shifts in naturalresource prices and the importance of control overnatural resources, the embargo also focussed andpolarised debates over North-South economicjustice. The stage was set for a series of chargedglobal deliberations on the twin, but as yet rarelyconnected, issues of economic justice and environ-mental concerns.

Change from Above?

Based on its dismal findings, the Pearson Commis-sion concluded with a call for a second, moreeffective UN-led “Decade of Development.” Inresponse, in the early 1970s, the UN organised aseries of conferences: on environment in 1972; onpopulation and food in 1974; and on women in1975.18

The Stockholm Conference on the Human Envi-ronment (1972) marked the international coming ofage of environmental concerns, but also was suf-fused with the North-South conflicts of the time.19

The agenda primarily reflected Northern concernsof scarcity and pollution. Southern countries weredeeply suspicious that the environmental agendawould force them to slow down their processes ofindustrialisation and economic development. In thememorable, if misguided, words of the IndianPrime Minister, Indira Gandhi, the Southerncountries argued that “poverty is the greatestpolluter.” In echoes of the concurrent debates overthe international economic system, they argued thatthe economic order did not grant them economicindependence to complement the political indepen-dence won through hard-fought anti-colonialstruggles. Despite these tensions, the StockholmConference not only placed an important set ofissues at the intersection of environment, develop-ment, and justice on the international agenda, butalso established the United Nations EnvironmentProgramme (UNEP) to carry the environmentalagenda forward.

In addition, the Conference was notable for thehigh level of non-governmental participation and

interest. A total of 255 NGOs were accredited tothe Conference.20 Many of these had no priorconnection to the UN and used their access toprovide immediate and often critical commentaryon the process to the outside world, establishing atradition that has been carried on by environmen-tal organisations at international meetings eversince.21 Yet, during this period, most NGO partici-pants were from the North; Southern NGOsaccounted for only 10 percent of the NGOspresent.22

The tension between environment and develop-ment continued to occupy a prominent place onthe global agenda, fuelled by the StockholmConference and promoted by the newly createdUNEP. In 1974, UNEP and the UN Conference onTrade and Development (UNCTAD) jointlysponsored a symposium in Cocoyoc, Mexico onthe “Pattern of Resource Use, Environment, andDevelopment.” The symposium’s Declarationhighlighted the need for greater self-reliance bypoor countries and called for changes in theinternational order to enable this. The Declarationfurther stated that “Human beings have basicneeds… Any process of growth that does not leadto their fulfilment—or even worse, disruptsthem—is a travesty of the idea of development.” 23

As with Stockholm, the environment and develop-ment debate was suffused with North-Southconcerns over economic justice.

Not all the international fora organised at this timewere characterised by the same degree of opennessas Stockholm. At the same time as United Nationsorganisations were initiating several processes,other more closed and elite-led efforts at global co-ordination were also evident. A brief detourthrough the formation of the Trilateral Commis-sion indicates the tenor of parallel efforts atshaping global trends. The Trilateral Commissionwas the brainchild of David Rockefeller, who hadin mind “a private organisation, whose primaryobjective…would be to bring the best brains in theworld to bear on the problems of the future.” Thisgroup of leading private citizens from Europe, the

Eminent figures dominateglobal governance through

the 20th century.



United States, and Japan came together in 1973 todeliberate on leading issues of the day, includinginternational trade and investment, environmentalproblems, crime and drugs, population control,and assistance to developing countries.24 Theinfluence of the Commission was based on itsability to assemble the “highest level unofficialgroup possible.”25 In this it was successful, withsuccessive Commissions (which continue to beconvened on a triennial basis) consisting of seniorgovernment officials and corporate leaders, allacting in their personal capacities. The model forchange implicit in the Trilateral Commission isthat it provides a vehicle to directly shape theopinions, and hence the actions, of those withpolitical power.26

By contrast, the Independent Commission onInternational Development Issues, established in1977 and headed by former German ChancellorWilly Brandt, was firmly rooted in the formalsystem of international governance embodied inthe United Nations. At the same time, it conformedto past practice in its dependence on participationof eminent persons for both legitimacy andcontent. Although the Commission was establishedon the recommendation of World Bank PresidentRobert McNamara, the Secretary-General of theUN expressed support for the work of the Com-mission. In terms of its scope, the Brandt Commis-sion was the direct descendant of the PearsonCommission and the NIEO discussed at the UN in1974. The Commission’s mandate was “to studythe grave global issues arising from the economicand social disparities of the world community”and “to suggest ways of promoting adequatesolutions to the problems involved in developmentand in attacking absolute poverty.”27

The Commission’s 19 members were carefullybalanced between North (9) and South (10) by theChairperson, who was “anxious that the ThirdWorld members…not be in a minority position.”28

Its ranks were filled with dignitaries, includingthree former prime ministers, one former presi-dent, seven former ministers, and other ambassa-dors and senior members of national and interna-tional governmental bodies. In keeping withcommon practice for such commissions, eachcommissioner acted in his or her individualcapacity. Aside from one Commissioner withmedia experience and a few with some backgroundin the private sector, the Commission lackedrepresentation from non-governmental actors. Thework of the Brandt Commission was organisedaround a roster of eminent persons—statesmen ornoted intellectuals—who were invited to testify orsubmit their views for consideration to the Com-mission. In addition, members travelled to capitalcities to meet with presidents, prime ministers, andheads of regional and international organisations.

The Commission published two reports, North–South: A Program for Survival and Common Crisis,in which it made comprehensive proposals. TheCommission’s recommendations are startling intheir scope. They include: a World DevelopmentFund to which communist nations would haveaccess; a tax on trade, minerals from the sea, andweapons sales, with proceeds going to poorercountries; an agreement on the production,pricing, supply, and conservation of oil; and atransfer of resources to the South by increasingdevelopment aid to 1 percent of GNP of donorcountries by 2000 and by expanding the capitalflowing through the World Bank and the IMF.29

Despite the breadth and comprehensiveness of itsexercise, most governments remained indifferentto the Commission’s recommendations. Nonethe-less, the Commission marked a change in theinternational community’s response to globalissues. It gave space to such ideas as human needs,self reliance, respect for local cultures, and theextension of participation and representation tocommunities. Ecological issues were only mini-mally acknowledged.

Perhaps the most significant legacy of the BrandtCommission is that its composition was based onone criterion of representation—equal representa-tion of industrialised and less industrialisedgovernments in global policymaking processes. Bysome reports, this resulted in a stormy internalNorth-South dialogue, which was resolved onlywhen a spokesperson from each side assumedresponsibility for negotiating a final report.30

The Stockholm Conference onthe Human Environmentmarked the international

coming of age of environmentalconcerns but was suffused with

North-South conflicts.

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By the 1980s, several UN agencies collaborated tobring governments on board and open policyprocesses to civil society and communityorganisations. In 1980, UNEP launched the WorldConservation Strategy jointly with IUCN, theWorld Wildlife Fund, the Food and AgricultureOrganisation of the United Nations (FAO) andUNESCO and developed a Global Framework forEnvironmental Education and a Global Environ-mental Monitoring System (GEMS). The prepara-tion and publication of the World ConservationStrategy popularised the term “sustainable use.”31

After a two-year Independent Commission onSecurity and Disarmament led by Olaf Palmebetween 1980 and 1982, 32 the focus shiftedsquarely back to environmental concerns. In 1983,the UN General Assembly established the WorldCommission on Environment and Development(WCED) with former Norwegian Prime MinisterGro Harlem Brundtland as the Chairperson. The23 Commissioners were drawn from senior levelsof national government, internationalorganisations, and academia. This time, there wasno representation from the private sector or civilsociety. This absence was striking, since themandate of the WCED included raising the level ofunderstanding and commitment to action ofvarious sectors of society, including business andvoluntary organisations.33

However, the WCED distinguished itself fromprior commissions with a commitment to an“open, visible, and participatory” process. It putthis commitment into practice through a series ofpublic hearings in eight countries involvingconsultations with hundreds of representativesfrom governments, scientific research institutes,companies, and NGOs, as well as with the generalpublic.34 The body of documents studied by theCommission—more than 10,000 pages—wasbrought together in a Collection of the Archives ofSustainable Development. Copies of this collectionwere placed in six academic centres throughout theworld.35

The WCED’s report, Our Common Future,legitimised the concept of sustainable development

as “a form of development that meets the needs ofthe present without compromising the ability offuture generations to meet their own needs,” andtried to make the links between environment,development, and poverty.36 The Commissionforcefully acknowledged that the interface ofenvironment and development needed the engage-ment of a wide cross-section of actors—individu-als, NGOs, governments, and internationalorganisations. However, the Commission was alsocriticised for failing to probe the processes thatgenerated poverty in the first place, and for ne-glecting the fundamental relationship betweensocial equity and sustainable development.37

Although the WCED perpetuated the model ofglobal governance from above, dominated byeminent persons, it did acknowledge and put intopractice a substantial consultative role for thebroader community of stakeholders. In addition tohaving bequeathed the concept of sustainabledevelopment, the WCED’s procedural legacy is itscomprehensive system of public hearings.

The North-South tensions so apparent in theBrandt Commission and echoed in the BrundtlandCommission continued to fester. These tensionsincluded growing disparities among and withinnations, the predominance of unequal models ofdevelopment, and the increasing fragility ofnatural resources. In 1986, the Non-AlignedMovement announced the formation of a SouthCommission, which was established in 1987 underthe chairpersonship of former Tanzanian PresidentJulius Nyerere. This Commission, consistingexclusively of industrialising countries, startedwith the belief that eloquent agreements on thecommon heritage of humankind were not going tochange a situation primarily caused by the power-ful nations and vested interests. The Commissionsought to make a “case for self-reliant, people-centred development strategies.”38

The South Commission followed the establishedpractice of selecting “distinguished individuals” asCommissioners.39 However, among these were asprinkling of individuals from churches, academia,and NGOs. The South Commission also followedthe established route for its work programme,creating working groups on topics such as debt,the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, andNorth-South relations; forming groups of outsideexperts to complement its studies; and holdingmeetings with officials and intellectuals in various

The Rio Summit was inclusivecompared to past UN events.



regions. In its report, The Challenge to the South,released in 1990, the Commission established avision for development as a “process that enableshuman beings to realise their potential, build self-confidence, and lead lives of dignity andfulfilment.” To achieve this vision, the SouthCommission called for concerted national effortsto harness the potential of citizens, and for greaterpolitical and economic co-operation in the form ofenlarged South-South co-operation.40 In addition,the Commission noted that international arrange-ments for trade, finance, and technology couldhandicap the South and argued for a cogentSouthern stance in North-South deliberations toreform these arrangements. The South Commis-sion stood out from past commissions largelybecause it was an initiative of, and by, Southernnations. In its structure and functioning, apartfrom a somewhat greater representation of civilsociety, it followed the model of commissionsbefore it.

It took a second major conference on environmentand development to establish a significantlyexpanded space for non-state actors in globalgovernance. In its final chapter, the Brundtlandreport called for an international conference toreview progress in sustainable development andcreate a follow-up structure. Based on a formalresolution by the UN General Assembly, theUnited Nations Conference on Environment andDevelopment (UNCED), or Earth Summit, washeld in June 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

The Rio Summit was, compared to past UN events,the most inclusive ever. It created new legitimacyand political space for NGOs and peoples’ repre-sentatives. More than 1,400 NGOs registered forthe summit, with more than a third from theSouth, making it the largest ever face-to-facegathering of Northern and Southern NGOs.41 TheUN created an unprecedented accreditationprocess that gave NGOs significant access to theformal events.42 Moreover, several governmentshad NGO representatives as part of their delega-tions, although some were sceptical of the “repre-sentativeness” of the individuals present.43 Theparallel Global Forum attracted 9,000 groups.Many participated in the International NGOForum, which drafted 39 “Alternative Treaties” asexercises in direct citizens’ diplomacy. The goal wasto produce agreements on actions that citizens’groups themselves would undertake.44 Those whocould not physically participate contributed

through Econet, a new electronic medium.45

Arguably even more significant than participationby civil society and the private sector in themeeting was the role these non-governmentalactors played in the two-year preparatory processand in shaping the agenda leading up to the EarthSummit.46

NGOs enjoyed only limited access to the formaldeliberations. Moreover, because the main channelfor influence was through participation in nationaldelegations, relatively mainstream organisationsthat were more likely to be invited on to delega-tions were at a comparative advantage. Moreexplicitly, political NGOs found fewer opportuni-ties for expression in the technocratic nature of theproceedings, as did “consciousness-raising” NGOswho sought social change through education andempowerment.47 NGOs mirrored North-Southtensions that ran through official governmentpositions.

At the Earth Summit, more than 100 heads of statemet to address urgent problems of environmentalprotection and socio-economic development. Theassembled leaders signed the Framework Conven-tion on Climate Change and the Convention onBiological Diversity, endorsed the Rio Declarationand the Forest Principles, and adopted Agenda 21,a 300-page plan for achieving sustainable develop-ment in the 21st century. The Commission onSustainable Development (CSD) was created afterUNCED to monitor and report on implementationof these agreements.48 In addition to these signifi-cant outcomes, the Earth Summit marked animportant milestone in the inclusion of civilsociety voices in multilateral processes.

In 1992, there was an explicit attempt to pulltogether the strands of the various commissions ofthe previous 20 years in the form of the Commis-sion on Global Governance. Initiated by WillyBrandt, the origins of this Commission were in ameeting attended by former commissioners fromthe Brandt, Brundtland, Palme, and South Com-missions. The decision to set up a Commission onGlobal Governance, co-chaired by Ingvar Carlsson,former Prime Minister of Sweden, and SridathRamphal, former Secretary-General of the Com-monwealth, was endorsed by the UN Secretary-General. As with all its predecessors, the Commis-sion was composed of eminent individuals, withonly 1 individual among the 26 whose backgroundwas not dominated by government service.49 The

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scope of the Commission broadly embraced that ofall the commissions before it and included secu-rity, democracy and the role of civil society, co-ordination in economic policy, poverty alleviation,and environment. The goal was to “develop acommon vision of the way forward for the worldin making the transition from the Cold War and inmanaging humanity’s journey into the twenty-firstcentury.”50

In addition to organising working groups andrequesting research institutes to organise seminars,the Commission held four briefing meetings forNGOs in Geneva. In addition, it set aside time formeetings with NGOs as part of Commissionmeetings held in New York, Mexico City, Tokyo,and Delhi. These minimal efforts did not signal asignificant attempt at inclusion; the Commissionon Global Governance remained a closed group ofworld leaders.

In its 1995 report, Our Global Neighbourhood, theCommissioners wrote that they were convincedthat the world is ready to accept “a set of corevalues that can unite people of all cultural, politi-cal, religious, or philosophical backgrounds. It isfundamentally important that governance shouldbe underpinned by democracy at all levels andultimately by the rule of enforceable law”. UNagencies, such as UNCTAD and the UN IndustrialDevelopment Organization (UNIDO), as well ascivil society, criticised the report as being Northernin orientation and weak in its analysis of the social,economic, and ecological costs of the presentprocess of economic development.

From 1995-2000, three sector-specific commis-sions—on forests, oceans, and water—wereestablished and ran their course, in some casesexplicitly following in the footsteps of past com-missions. Of these, the World Commission onForests and Sustainable Development located itselfmost directly in the tradition of past debates overenvironmental concerns. The Commission,established in 1993 out of debates at the EarthSummit,51 focussed on the political rather thantechnical issues from those discussions. In addi-tion, it held a series of five regional hearingsmodelled after the Brundtland Commission. Its 24members were largely eminent persons. At theconclusion of its work in 1998, the Commissionleft a legacy of a four-part Forest Trust, composedof a Forest Watch, a Management Council, anOmbudsman, and a Forest Award.52

The Independent World Commission on Oceans,established in 1995 by Mario Soares, formerPresident of Portugal, released its report in 1998,timed to coincide with the UN-declared Interna-tional Year of the Ocean. The Commission’s originswere firmly rooted in the UN system. The daunt-ingly large 43-member Commission included thefamiliar range of ministers, parliamentarians, andambassadors, with a sprinkling of academics andtechnical specialists, and relied largely for itsfindings on study groups led by experts.53

The World Commission on Water (described infurther detail in Chapter 6) was established in 1998by the World Water Council, and ran concurrentlywith the WCD. Its 28 members included someNGOs and research organisations, in addition toprofessional associations, government representa-tives, and international organisations.54 In thissense, the Commission’s composition was arguablyless centred on international eminence than pastprocesses and more guided by practitioners, albeitwith a heavy representation of international aid andwater bureaucracies. The Commission was tied to aconcurrent World Water Vision process aimed atdeveloping a vision for addressing global waterscarcity. The vision was developed through a multi-stakeholder consultative process organised aroundregions and sectors. NGOs critical of the processcharged that this process tended toward expertparticipation with little inclusion of civil society,and that aid agencies controlled the effort.55

What emerges from this review of focal points ofglobal governance during the last third of thecentury? First, the structure of commissions leftlittle space for engagement with non-governmentalactors. The space that did exist was far larger andmore genuinely consultative in discussions aroundenvironment and development issues than aroundeconomic justice. By the late 1990s, the structure ofregional hearings, first established by theBrundtland Commission, had become acceptedpractice, as illustrated by the commissions onforests and water. Second, although debates over

The environment arenahas increasingly been influenced

by debates over developmentand justice.



international economic justice have remainedunconcerned with environmental questions, theenvironment arena has increasingly been influ-enced by debates over development and economicjustice. Third, the global fora described above—with the exception of the Trilateral Commission—were designed to affect the actions of worldinstitutions and structures.

Yet, the impact of most global commissions hasbeen slight. The Brandt and South Commissionscame out with concrete recommendations thatwere not implemented. The Brundtland Commis-sion succeeded in popularising the term “sustain-able development” and raising popular awarenessof issues at the environment and developmentinterface, but resulted in few concrete changes. TheStockholm and Rio Conferences were moresuccessful. The first resulted in a new and impor-tant UN agency, and the second served as a catalystfor a series of important global environmentalnegotiations, whose future is still not assured. Thethree recently concluded sectoral commissions, onforests, oceans, and water, have yet to demonstrateany lasting effects.

Finally, distinguished individuals have dominatedglobal commissions, with eminence being almostsynonymous with high-level experience in govern-ment and intergovernmental bodies. Indeed, thesame individuals have served on many of thesecommissions, as a few examples illustrate. WillyBrandt chaired his own commission and establishedthe Commission on Global Governance. MauriceStrong was Secretary-General of the Stockholm andRio Conferences, first Secretary-General of the UNEnvironment Programme, and served on theBrundtland Commission and the Commission onGlobal Governance. Sridath Ramphal was Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, a member of theBrandt, Palme, Brundtland, and South Commis-sions, and co-chaired the Commission on GlobalGovernance. The focus on eminent individuals fromgovernment and the predominance of the sameindividuals across commissions calls into questionwhether “freshness and innovation in global gover-nance,” one of the aims of the Commission onGlobal Governance, can be achieved with the modeldescribed here.

The Growth of Transboundary Alliances

Even as these global commissions were beingestablished, attempts to resolve contentious issues

were increasingly shifting from state-centredefforts to those involving non-governmentalactors, with civil society organisations as well ascorporate and other market actors helping tocreate private or semi-public regulation.“Multilateralism,” understood as relations amongstates, was increasingly being re-constituted tobecome “multi-stakeholder.”56 Although earlierefforts were among representatives of govern-ments, a shift was taking place in the plurality ofactors engaged in the process of influencing boththe global and the national policy process. In thissection, we describe how non-governmental actorshave gained growing representation in interna-tional meetings and institutions and have evenbecome instrumental in establishing internationalregimes that provide regulation or norm settingwhere governments were either unwilling orabsent.57

Over the past decade and a half, the range, diversity,and awareness of issues that transcend nationalborders and disciplinary boundaries have expanded:the polarisation of wealth and the increasingdisparities within and between nations; socialinequities; the adverse impacts of the presenttrading regimes; debt; and the politics of naturalresource use and defence spending. Not surpris-ingly, this complexity has led to moretransboundary networks, national and local move-ments, and international organisations. Thesenetworks have pushed the boundaries of theconventional agendas of international interventionfrom those minimal processes of consultation totransnational networks playing a role in agendasetting, influencing official discourse and specificpolicies, and changing the behaviour of govern-ments.58 In the process, transnational alliances haveplayed a growing role in redefining who should sitat the table and what the agenda should be.

Of considerable relevance to the WCD is thehistory of civil society organising to increasemultilateral development banks’ (MDBs) account-ability to civil society in both borrower and donorcountries.59 From the early 1980s, this “MDB

Civil society organisationsbecame adept at influencing

official agendas.

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Campaign” has deployed a range of tools, includ-ing media education, protests in donor andborrower countries, lobbying key officials (seniorpoliticians, administrators, and World BankExecutive Directors), and hearings in Europeanparliaments and the U.S. Congress. Instrumental tothe successes achieved by the campaign have beenthe links between NGOs in donor and borrowercountries. Northern NGOs used their leverage andadvocacy with donor governments to push forreform at the MDBs. Advocacy for this reform wasbased on local project information from SouthernNGOs and the political legitimacy their participa-tion provided.60 The resultant reforms wereintended to encourage borrower governments torespond to social and environmental concerns andcreate political space for Southern NGOs to engagetheir own governments.61

A central moment in this campaign was the WorldBank’s establishment of an independent review ofthe Sardar Sarovar Dam Project on the NarmadaRiver in India.62 Faced with extreme pressure fromthe anti-dam movement in India and their part-ners in Washington, considerable scrutiny from themedia and the U.S. Congress, and fading interna-tional credibility, the World Bank appointedBradford Morse, who had recently stepped downas head of the UN Development Programme, toassess the project with particular attention toresettlement and amelioration of environmentalaspects.63 The Morse Commission legitimisedcentral elements of the NGO coalition’s critique ofthe project, which lent the campaign greatermomentum and credibility. The Morse Commis-sion was a precursor of the World Commission onDams, in terms of its origins in the struggle bycitizens’ groups and the fact that it was appointedby the World Bank to provide an independent viewon a dams-related conflict.

Over the 1980s and 1990s, the MDB Campaign lefta considerable imprint on the structure and

functioning of the World Bank.64 The institutionadopted policies on involuntary resettlement,indigenous peoples, and environmental assess-ments. In addition, the World Bank established anew information disclosure policy and institutedan Inspection Panel as an appeals mechanismagainst World Bank projects in direct response tocampaign efforts. Few would argue that practice onthe ground has measured up to the promise or thatthe underlying mission and mandate of MDBshave been transformed. Yet few would also disputethat the campaign has led to better mechanisms ofaccountability over MDBs.

In addition to propelling reform at existinginstitutions, civil society organisations havebecome increasingly adept at participating in andshaping the formation of new internationalregimes. In the environmental arena, the 1987negotiation of the Montreal Protocol on Sub-stances that Deplete the Ozone Layer marked thebeginning of NGO influence.65 A dozen or moreindustry groups represented the private sector.Although obstructionist at first, a shift toward co-operation by some companies was critical tosuccess. Only two or three NGO groups followedthese highly technical and somewhat esoteric, ifcritical, negotiations. However, these NGOs playedimportant roles in educating the public, buildingconsumer pressure through threat of boycotts, andlobbying governments during negotiations. By theconclusion of the process, according to the chiefU.S. negotiators, proposals were not only discussedamong country negotiators, but also with industryand environmental groups.66

It was in the subsequent, and more visible, nego-tiations on a global climate treaty in the run-up tothe Earth Summit that NGOs moved from “out ofthe hallways” to “around the table.”67 NGOs servedon delegations, were sometimes allowed intomeeting rooms, and played a major role in defin-ing the negotiating strategy of the delegations fromsome small island nations under threat fromclimate change. It was NGOs who put the issue onthe international agenda, began the process offorging a scientific consensus on the need toaddress the problem, proposed a structure for thetreaty, and mobilised public pressure for action.68

In the build-up to the Earth Summit, NGOs fromNorth and South were organised under the um-brella of the Climate Action Network. TheNetwork’s immediate goal—a treaty to be signed atRio in 1992—tended to overshadow and pre-empt

The independent reviewof the Sardar Sarovar Damwas central to civil society’s

campaign against multilateraldevelopment banks.



discussion of the broader socio-economic context ofthe climate issue, to the frustration of some South-ern NGOs.69 There was much debate within theNetwork on the relative merits of a focussed, ifnarrow, strategy versus one that addressed the largerpolitical issues that shaped the climate debate.Indeed, as Keck and Sikkink (1998) have suggested,this transnational advocacy network, which involvedpeople in structurally unequal positions, became asite “for negotiation over which goals, strategies andethical understandings are compatible.”70 Thus, theNetwork not only formed the basis for sharinginformation and co-ordinating strategy, but alsoprovided a framework for negotiating disputesacross North-South lines in a foreshadowing ofsimilar debates within governments. In sum, theclimate negotiations comprehensively demonstratedthe deep engagement and influence of NGOs insetting agendas and shaping processes that establishglobal regimes.

As with the ozone negotiations, the private sectorwas also active in the climate negotiations and atthe national level through an umbrella GlobalClimate Coalition. Industry groups actively soughtto undermine the scientific consensus on climatechange, influence public opinion on both thescience and economic costs of mitigation policies,and engage with delegations of countries sympa-thetic to their views.71

Increasingly, the private sector has also organiseditself into broader, less issue-specific networksbased on dialogue, rather than advocacy. One suchexample, the Business Council for SustainableDevelopment (later to become the World BusinessCouncil on Sustainable Development—WBCSD),formed in preparation for the Earth Summit. 72

The WBCSD is a coalition of 50 internationalcompanies united by a shared commitment tosustainable development.73 The organisationpursues this goal via the three pillars of economicgrowth, environmental protection, and socialequity. Members are drawn from more than 30countries and 20 major industrial sectors.74 TheWBCSD represents an evolution from the morepartisan and narrowly-focussed issue networks thatcharacterised the ozone and climate negotiations.

Another significant recent mobilisation, aroundthe issues of trade and investment, comes from thesame source as the NIEO and the Brandt andSouth Commissions—a concern with economicjustice. However, although governments drove the

economic justice commissions of the 1970s and1980s, the more recent expressions of concern withNorth-South issues have been raised by socialmovements. Economic justice campaigns differfrom advocacy around global environmentaltreaties, which have been dominated by techno-cratic NGOs. The breadth of organising aroundissues of trade and economic justice has beenconsiderable. Negotiations around the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) stimu-lated civil society networks in the United Statesand Mexico on a large scale. The efforts at politicalorganising, the corresponding political cloutgenerated, and the associated research on labourand environmental effects of a free trade agree-ment contributed to the preparation of side-agreements to NAFTA on environment andlabour.75

Through rapid mobilisation and advances intelecommunications, civil society groups were ableto halt in 1998 the “Multilateral Agreement onInvestment” (MAI), which was being negotiatedbehind closed doors at the Organisation forEconomic Co-operation and Development(OECD).76 A broad and deep movement wasmobilised around the proposed increase in therights of corporations, and an absence ofcountervailing obligations. In addition, civilsociety objected vehemently to the lack of scopefor input by public interest groups and the lack ofinformation about the process available to thepublic. The MAI campaign not only demonstratedthe capability of civil society to mobilise rapidly,but also that processes of global governancewithout public input and participation had littlelegitimacy and even less chance of success.

In short, although the phenomenal growth ofcommunications and movement across nationalboundaries has undoubtedly stimulatedtransnational finance and trade resulting in themarginalisation of entire countries, cultures, andcommunities,77 the communications revolutionhas also created new possibilities for regional and

The private sector hasincreasingly organised intobroad networks based on

dialogue rather than advocacy.

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global networking—a parallel globalisation ofmobilisation, aimed at expanding the participationof hitherto excluded voices in the centre of politi-cal decision-making. New transnational communi-ties are evolving a globalisation from below. Inmany cases, we are witnessing the emergence ofglobal advocacy networks and what some haveeven called “transnational social movements.”78

The rise in transnational networks brings with it ahost of questions about the future of internationalpolitics and the role of civil society.79 Some see thisvast outpouring of institutional and politicalinnovation represented by transboundary alliancesas messy, chaotic, and fragmented. Those sympa-thetic to the overall objectives argue for greatercentral co-ordination, more coherent, if inter-related, strategies and a clearer set of institutionsguiding transboundary civil society processes. Inresponse, an important body of analysis examinesthe internal dynamics of transboundary networks,with particular emphasis on the significant differ-ences between Northern and Southern partici-pants. Indeed, the representativeness and account-ability of NGOs themselves is a concern. Moresceptical voices offer the possibility that civilsociety mobilisation will lead to excessive interna-tional pluralism, creating a logjam of interests andrendering political systems unworkable.80 Whilethese are valid concerns, the examples discussedhere suggest that networks of civil societyorganisations have, at a minimum, acted as“tugboats in international channels.” 81 They areincreasingly capable of influencing, or even setting,agendas. Civil society actors are not simply bring-ing critical concerns from the grassroots to thetable, but are actively participating in the processof governing.

The Rise of Multi-Stakeholder Processesand the Challenge of Compliance

The emergent forms of conflict and dialoguedescribed above among governments and interna-tional organisations, social movements, NGOs,and the private sector is beginning to redefine theform and content of global governance. At theinternational level, the consent of other govern-ments is no longer enough for governments tosecure legitimacy and act unhindered. In the era ofeconomic globalisation, governments have becomeweaker in controlling capital flows and corporateinvestment, with a consequent loss of sovereigntyover decisions and processes from outside their

boundaries that impact the lives of the citizenrywithin.82 Meanwhile, governments are provinginadequate in ensuring governance that facilitatesand respects the deepening of democracy andjustice.83 In fact, governments can be causes ofcontinuing social, cultural, and ecological costs,leading to disillusionment with their performanceand role.84 How can diverse actors creativelyexplore the complex process of governance with-out government? And what kinds of organisationsor organisational arrangements are necessary tomanage and administer diverse social, economic,and ecological systems? Can transboundarynetworks, then, creatively occupy this vacuum andparticipate in the definition of new norms ofglobal governance?85

For their part, the private sector has long beenperceived as an influential and even essential voicein policy formulation, perhaps because of statedependence on private sector profitability for jobsand taxes, and, therefore, for domestic and interna-tional stability.86 As the examples above suggest,civil society voices are also increasingly indispens-able to legitimate process and are well placed to fillthe space occupied by retreating governments. Andyet, there are few models of global governance thatprovide channels for direct participation of allthese groups.87

In this transformed global context of multipleplayers, there has been increasing attention to andinterest in structuring international governanceprocesses around the participation of multipleactors—multi-stakeholder processes. Much of theprior experience with MSPs has been at thenational level. For example, in Canada MSPs havebeen organised at the river basin level and on theintersections between the environment and theeconomy at the provincial and national levels.88

A recent effort at deriving a systematic frameworkfor MSPs focussed at the global level suggests thatthey have the potential to promote better decision-making and to increase the chances of implemen-

States have become weaker incontrolling capital flows andcorporate investment,with a

consequent loss of sovereignty.



tation.89 In this view, MSPs convene actors with abreadth of perspectives, many of whom are oftenleft out of state-centred decision-making process.Moreover, MSPs help integrate these diversesubjective viewpoints, resulting in better decisions.Finally, since inclusion in decision-making pro-cesses helps build constituencies for implementa-tion, decisions are more likely to be carried out.Thus, MSPs, when well designed and implemented,provide for inclusion of previously excluded views,enrich decision-making, and increase the probabil-ity of implementation.

It is important to recognise that the term “MSP”allows for considerable heterogeneity. Thus, theseprocesses may vary in the objectives they promote,which include informing decision-making, provid-ing an opportunity for dialogue, and monitoringimplementation. MSPs can also range widely intheir definition and categorisation of stakeholders.Although some processes use a simple trilateralformulation of civil society, private sector, andgovernment, others have more fine-grainedcategories, such as the nine categories developedfor Agenda 21 of the 1992 Earth Summit. More-over, the scope and timeline of MSPs must betailored to the issue at hand.

Although there is growing enthusiasm for suchprocesses, the underlying assumptions about whatand how they contribute to policymaking alsodiffer widely. In a study of global public policynetworks, a concept not dissimilar to MSPs,Reinicke and his colleagues suggest that theseprocesses can bridge both a “participatory gap”that precludes effective participation in decision-making and an “operational gap” in information,knowledge, and tools in a world of economic andpolitical liberalisation.90

Even if these gaps are bridged, however, a criticaldeterminant of MSPs’ effectiveness is how theoutcomes of such dialogues link to decision-making. MSPs often lack formal authority orlinkage to decision-making and, other than seekingto build stakeholder buy-in to a process, have fewtools with which to implement their results. By

contrast, governments still retain various mecha-nisms for policy enforcement and there are veryfew transnational social movements that signifi-cantly influence state behaviour or corporate orfinancial capital. Indeed, the lack of ability toensure compliance is one reason why some civilsociety groups mistrust MSPs.

Despite the lack of formal mechanisms of compli-ance, non-governmental actors can play a usefulrole in forging good governance through thepromotion of norms. Indeed, there is a longhistory of effective social change brought about asnorms emerge, gain mainstream currency, andcascade through society, in part as nations andsocieties re-fashion political identities aroundthese norms. Over time, norms may be internalisedin political and institutional systems through lawsand bureaucratic regulations.91 This process is wellillustrated by the progressive adoption of women’ssuffrage and, more recently, the anti-personnelland mine ban. In the case of the latter, a workingpartnership between the Canadian governmentand a coalition of over 350 humanitarian andarms-control NGOs from 23 countries acted as“norm entrepreneurs.”92 Over time, social pres-sures of identity have brought about an emulationor a cascade effect.93 Norm creation and promo-tion offers a complementary approach to tradi-tional forms of compliance through legal sanction.

The WCD in Historical Context

The concerns, emergence, structure, and function-ing of the WCD draws from diverse strands in thehistory of global governance—global commissions,growing civil society influence, and the growingacceptance of multi-stakeholder processes. Interms of the concerns that motivated it, the WCDis located at the intersection of the debates overenvironment and development, on the one hand,and economic justice on the other, that motivatedthe series of UN-sponsored commissions of the1970s and 1980s. Built as engineering marvels toprovide water and electricity and to control floods,dams have come under increasing criticism fortheir destruction of the environment and commu-nities and for their contribution to unfair develop-ment. These competing images of boon and blightplace the debate at the locus of concerns of pastcommissions. The WCD was designed to illumi-nate the intersection of environment, develop-ment, and justice by shining a spotlight on the veryprocess of planning, design, and implementation

Multi-stakeholderprocesses help integrate

diverse viewpoints.

C h a p t e r 2


in the formation of the WCD. In the move towardbringing diverse actors to the table, the WCD wasemblematic of the growing interest in MSPs, withthe potential for dialogue, development of constitu-encies for implementation, and norm creation thatthese new vehicles promise. In its operation, theWCD was firmly in the tradition of past commis-sions and processes in seeking to forge an indepen-dent path. Moreover, in its attempts at establishingan inclusive process, it took its cue from theBrundtland Commission’s efforts to solicit a broadrange of views, as Chapters 5 and 6 describe.However, it went further than past processes in itsexplicit commitment to transparency as a means ofsupporting its claims to legitimacy.

In bringing all these elements together and inapplying them to a focussed issue area that hadbeen the subject of contention, the WCD had nodirect comparators. Although rooted in historicalcontext, it was an experiment that sought to takesignificant steps beyond the collective past ofglobal governance. The remaining chapters tell thestory of how far the experiment succeeded inmeeting the expectations it generated.

of large projects, to ask whether and how eco-nomic, social, cultural, and economic costs werethe likely result of the existing framework.

That the WCD came into existence is due to a longhistory of struggle in many countries and by manycommunity groups and NGOs.94 The mobilisationaround large dams suggests that local actors arethinking and acting at both local and global levels.While working for change in their own contexts,these actors have built political pressure for aprocess of change at the global level. The WCD is,then, firmly rooted in the growing strength oftransnational networking and, in particular, in thecampaign to reform the MDBs.

With regard to structure and functioning, theWCD marked a departure from past commissionsbased on eminent persons and exclusive processes.As Chapters 3 and 4 will make clear, the WCD wasbased on representation of stakeholders ratherthan on eminence, usually defined as a distin-guished career in government. Moreover, this shiftin emphasis toward representation was due to theforceful role that civil society organisations played



Endnotes

14. Donella H. Meadows et al., The Limits to Growth (NewYork: Universe Books, 1972).

15. The Ecologist. 1972. “Blueprint for Survival,” TheEcologist 2(1): 1-43.

16. Ramchandra Guha and Juan Martinez-Alier, Varieties ofEnvironmentalism. Essays North and South (New Delhi:Oxford University Press, 1997).

17. Guha, 2000.

18. “Official Aid—A Brief History,” New Internationalist(November 1996). Online at: www.oneworld.org/ni/issue285/history.html (28 September 2001).

19. Ken Conca. September 1995. “Greening the UnitedNations: Environmental Organizations and the UNSystem,” Third World Quarterly 16(3): 441-57.

20. Tanja Brühl and Udo E. Simonis. 2001. “World Ecologyand Global Environmental Governance,” Berlin: WZBpaper (FS II 01-402). Online at: http://skylla.wz-berlin.de/pdf/2001/ii01-402.pdf (28 September 2001).

21. Rice and Ritchie, 1995.

22. Conca, 1995.

23. United Nations Environment Programme, In Defence ofthe Earth: The Basic Texts on Environment: Founex •Stockholm • Coycoyoc, Executive Series 1 (Nairobi: UnitedNations Environment Programme, 1981).

24. David Rockefeller, credited with the idea of the TrilateralCommission, quoting from his own remarks in March1972 during a speech on the occasion of the TrilateralCommission U.S. Group’s 25th anniversary, 1 December1998. Online at: www.trilateral.org/nagp/regmtgs/98/1201rockflr.htm (28 September 2001).

25. Trilateral Commission website, www.trilateral.org/about.htm (28 September 2001).

26. In recent times, the Commission’s composition hasbroadened geographically to embrace the Asia-Pacificregion, Mexico, and various European countries with theexpansion of the EU. Its composition has also broadenedto include media, academia, labour unions, and NGOs.Trilateral Commission website, www.trilateral.org/about.htm (28 September 2001).

27. Independent Commission on International DevelopmentIssues, North-South: A Program for Survival. The Report ofthe Independent Commission on International DevelopmentIssues under the Chairmanship of Willy Brandt (Cam-bridge, MA: MIT Press, 1980).

28. Independent Commission on International Develop-ment, North-South: A Program for Survival. The Report ofthe Independent Commission on International DevelopmentIssues under the Chairmanship of Willy Brandt (Cam-bridge, MA: MIT Press, 1980).

29. Leonard Downie Jr., “New Ideas on Global Co-operationUnveiled,” The Washington Post (19 December 1979); and“The Brandt Commission’s Proposals for Survival,” TheEconomist (22 December 1977).

30. Downie Jr., 1979.

31. Sustainable use is defined as “…the integration ofconservation and development to ensure that modifica-tions to the planet do indeed secure the survival andwell-being of all people.” IUCN/UNEP/WWF/FAO/UNESCO, World Conservation Strategy: Living Resource

1. The literature on the current phase of economicglobalisation is vast. The following books provide a usefulintroduction to its depth and complexity and are relevantfor the discussions here: Ulrich Beck, What isGlobalisation? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000); J.Mittelman, The Globalization Syndrome. Transformationand Resistance (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,2000); P. Hirst and G. Thompson, Globalisation inQuestion: The International Economy and the Possibilitiesof Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999);Globalisation and the Welfare State (Cheltenham, UK:Edward Elgar, 1999); and Thomas L. Friedman, TheLexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999).

2. This architecture was pre-dated by the formation of theLeague of Nations after World War I. The League ofNations set the stage for global governance on which thepost World War II institutions were built.

3. The United Nations and associated organisations wereconceptualised and given a firm identity duringconversations at Bretton Woods in July 1944 andDumbarton Oaks in August 1944.

4. Andrew E. Rice and Cyril Ritchie. 1995. “Relationshipsbetween International Non-governmental Organizationsand the United Nations.” Originally published inTransnational Associations 47(5): 254-265. Online at:www.uia.org/uiadocs/unngos.htm (28 September, 2001).

5. United Nations. 21 December 1984. Document ST/SGB/209, Secretary-General’s Bulletin. Online at:www.un.org/partners/civil_society/document/sgb_209.htm (28 September 2001).

6. Global Policy Forum. “NGO Review – November 1996.An Analysis by NGLS – the UN’s Non-GovernmentalLiaison Service.” Online at: www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/analysis/nglsnv96.htm (28 September 2001).

7. E-mail communication with IUCN staff, October 2001.

8. Global Policy Forum. 1998. “The Coffers are Not Empty:Financing for Sustainable Development and the Role ofthe United Nations.” Online at: www.igc.org/globalpolicy/socecon/global/paul.htm (28 September2001).

9. Samir Amin, ed. Maldevelopment: Anatomy of a GlobalFailure (United Nations University Press, 1990). Onlineat: www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu32me/uu32me06.htm (28 September 2001).

10. Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,1962).

11. Ramachandra Guha, Environmentalism: A Global History(New York: Longman, 2000).

12. Dick Richardson and Chris Rootes, The Green Challenge:The Development of Green Parties in Europe (London &New York: Routledge, 1995).

13. The Club of Rome is a global think tank and researchcentre. It brings together scientists, economists,businesspersons, international civil servants, and presentand former heads of state from across the world who areconvinced that a humane future can be shaped by boldcollective research and action. Club of Rome website,www.clubofrome.org/ (28 September 2001).

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Conservation for Sustainable Development (Gland,Switzerland: IUCN, 1980).

32. In between the Brandt and Brundtland Commissions,the Palme Commission, or the Independent Commissionon Disarmament and Security Issues, was establishedunder UN auspices to chart a course toward disarma-ment. The Palme Commission completed its workbetween 1980 and 1982, and, as with past commissionsbefore it, was composed of statesmen and women chosenfor their “broad political experience.” While the Commis-sion did rely heavily on submissions by experts, it didalso attempt to maintain contact with NGOs, anddedicated one secretariat staff member to this task(Rockefeller Brothers Fund website, www.rbf.org/pws/palme1.html, 25 June 2001). Since the Palme Commis-sion focussed on security issues, and not on eithereconomic or environmental themes, the focus of thisreview, we do not address it further here.

33. World Commission on Environment and Development,Our Common Future: The World Commission on Environ-ment and Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1987).

34. World Commission on Environment and Development,1987.

35. Pascale D. Morand Francis, Geneva at the InternationalCrossroads of Environment and Development (Geneva:Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 1998).Online at: http://geneva-international.org/GVA3/WelcomeKit/Environnement/chap_5.E.html (28September 2001).

36. D. Reid, Sustainable Development: An Introductory Guide(London: Earthscan, 1995). For a history, see RichardSandbrook, “From Stockholm to Rio - Earth Summit1992,” The United Nations Conference on Environment andDevelopment. J. Quarrie, ed. (London: Regency Press,1992). For a historical critique of the term “sustainabledevelopment” and the Rio Summit, see Wolfgang Sachs,Planet Dialectics (London: Zed Books, 1999).

37. J. Gardner and M. Roseland. 1989. “Thinking Globally:The Role of Social Equity in Sustainable Development,”Alternatives 16(3): 26-34.

38. South Centre website, www.southcentre.org (28September 2001).

39. South Commission, The Challenge to the South: TheReport of the South Commission (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1990).

40. South Commission, 1990.

41. Brühl and Simonis, 2001.

42. Peter Haas, Marc Levy and Edward Parson. October1992. “Appraising the Earth Summit: How Should weJudge UNCED’s Success?” Environment, 34(8): 6-11, 26-33.

43. Mark Valentine, “Twelve Days of UNCED,” U.S. CitizensNetwork, Tides Foundation, July 2, 1992.

44. Lamont C. Hempel, Environmental Governance: TheGlobal Challenge (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1996).

45. However, inequitable access to the electronic worldremained an outstanding issue. Many groups andmovements who were not linked into these networkssought to moderate claims that communicationtechnology is “emboldening people in ways that have

profound implications for the process ofdemocratisation.” See Sheldon Annis, “Giving Voice tothe Poor,” Foreign Policy, vol. 84 (Fall 1991): 93-106.

46. For a critical and exhaustive review of the Earth Summit,see Pratap Chatterjee and Matthais Finger, The EarthBrokers: Power, Politics and World Development (NewYork: Routledge, 1994).

47. Matthias Finger, “Environmental NGOs in the UNCEDProcess,” in Environmental NGOs in World Politics. Fingerand Princen, eds. (New York: Routledge, 1994).

48. UNCSD website, http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/csdgen.htm (28 September 2001).

49. Commission on Global Governance, Our GlobalNeighbourhood: The Report of the Commission on GlobalGovernance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).Online at: www.cgg.ch/ (28 September 2001).

50. Commission on Global Governance, 1995.

51. Although established in 1993, the World Commission onForests and Sustainable Development was formallylaunched in 1995.

52. WCFSD website, http://iisd1.iisd.ca/wcfsd (28 September2001).

53. Independent World Commission on the Oceans, TheOcean, Our Future (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1998).

54. World Water Council, World Water Vision: Making WaterEverybody’s Business (London: Earthscan, 2000). Onlineat: www.worldwatervision.org/reports.htm (28 Septem-ber 2001).

55. “Old Water in a New Bottle: World Water Vision isChronically Short-sighted.” Written by InternationalRivers Network (USA), International Committee onDams, Rivers, and People, and Both Ends (Netherlands),and endorsed by 16 non-governmental groups fromBrazil, England, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Slovakia, SouthAfrica, Switzerland, and Thailand, 17 March 2000.

56. Ruggie describes conventional multilateralism as “aninstitutional form that co-ordinates relations amongthree or more states on the basis of generalized principlesof conduct.” J.G. Ruggie. 1992. “Multilateralism: TheAnatomy of an Institution.” International Organization46(3): 561-598.

57. While non-state actors have gained growing relevance onthe international scene, there is also a long history ofsignificant past international interventions by NGOs.Charnovitz traces international activity by NGOs back to1775. Since then, NGOs have played a significant role inthe abolition of slavery, free trade, human rights,women’s rights, and a host of other issues. SteveCharnovitz. Winter 1997. “Two Centuries of Participa-tion: NGOs and International Governance,” MichiganJournal of International Law 18(2): 183-286. Also seeUNRISD, Civil Society, NGOs, and Social Development:Changing the Rules of the Game, Occasional Paper No. 1,January 2000.

58. For a useful analytical framework along these lines toassess the impact of transnational networks, see M. Keckand K. Sikkink, Activists across Borders: Advocacy Networksin International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,1998).



59. This struggle has spawned a voluminous commentary.For a small but insightful selection, see Barbara Brambleand Gareth Porter, “Non-Governmental Organizationsand the Making of US International EnvironmentalPolicy,” in The International Politics of the Environment. A.Hurrell and B. Kinsbury, eds. (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1992); Bruce Rich, Mortgaging the Earth: The World Bank,Environmental Impoverishment, and the Crisis of Develop-ment (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994); Jonathan Fox and L.David Brown, eds. The Struggle for Accountability: TheWorld Bank, NGOs and Grassroots Movements (Boston:MIT Press, 1998); Robert Wade, “Greening the Bank: TheStruggle over the Environment, 1970-1995,” in The WorldBank: Its First Half-Century. Devesh Kapur, John P. Lewis,and Richard Webb, eds. (Washington: BrookingsInstitution, 1997); Paul J. Nelson, The World Bank andNon-Governmental Organizations: The Limits of ApoliticalDevelopment (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995).

60. As Fox and Brown, 1998, note, using the leverage of theBank for reformist ends did arouse sovereignty concernsamong Southern groups. Moreover, whether Southerngroups were equal partners with a voice in strategicdecisions, or whether their role was limited to projectinformation and political cover was an open questionduring the early years of the campaign. See Navroz K.Dubash, “The Birth of an Environmental Movement: TheNarmada Valley as Seed-Bed for Civil Society in India.”A.B. Thesis, Woodrow Wilson School of Public andInternational Affairs, Princeton University, April 1990.

61. Fox and Brown, 1998, pp. 6-7.

62. For the World Bank’s role in the Narmada dam projects,see William Fisher, ed. Toward Sustainable Development?Struggling over India’s Narmada River (ME Sharpe, 1995).

63. Bradford Morse and Thomas Berger, Sardar Sarovar: TheReport of the Independent Review (Ottawa: ResourceFutures International, 1992). Also see Smitu Kothari,“The Narmada Movement, Transnational Alliances, andDemocracy,” in Transnational Civil Society. KathrynSikkink, Sanjeev Khagram, and James Riker, eds.(Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, forthcoming2001).

64. Fox and Brown, 1998.

65. Discussion of the Montreal Protocol is drawn fromRichard Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions inSafeguarding the Planet (Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1991).

66. Benedick, 1991, p. 204.

67. Jessica T. Mathews, “Power Shift,” Foreign Affairs(January/February 1997): 50-51.

68. In addition, during negotiations, NGOs lubricateddialogue by providing back channels for communicationand produced a daily newspaper, ECO, which was usedby negotiators as a credible information source and a wayof testing ideas to break deadlocks. Mathews, 1997.

69. Navroz Dubash and Michael Oppenheimer, “Modifyingthe Mandates of Existing Institutions: NGOs,” inConfronting Climate Change: Risks, Implications andResponses. Irving Mintzer, ed. (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1992).

70. Keck and Sikkink, 1998.

71. David L. Levy and Daniel Egan. 1998. “Capital Contests:National and Transnational Channels of Corporate

Influence on the Climate Change Negotiations,” Politicsand Society 26(3): 335-359.

72. As Errol Meidinger has usefully observed about environ-mental regulation, “Private organizations have recentlyestablished numerous programs aimed at improving theenvironmental performance of industry. Many of thenew programs seek to define and enforce standards forenvironmental management, and to make it difficult forproducers not to participate in them. They claim,explicitly and implicitly, to promote the public interest.They take on functions generally performed by govern-ment regulatory programs, and may change or evendisplace such programs. Private environmental regula-tory programs thus have the potential to significantlyreshape domestic and international policy institutions bychanging the locus, dynamics, and substance of policymaking.” E.E. Meidinger. 2000. “‘Private’ EnvironmentalRegulation, Human Rights and Community,” BuffaloEnvironmental Law Journal 7(1).

73. The WBCSD was formed in January 1995 through amerger between the Business Council for SustainableDevelopment (BCSD) in Geneva and the World IndustryCouncil for the Environment (WICE), an initiative of theInternational Chamber of Commerce (ICC), in Paris.Those two parent bodies had been active in evolvingbusiness’s response to the challenges arising from theEarth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.

74. For full list of members and details of policy orientedactivities, as well as a full profile, see World BusinessCouncil for Sustainable Development website,www.wbcsd.ch (28 September 2001).

75. Raul Hiojosa-Ojeda, “Institution Building within theNAFTA Context: An Evaluation of Policy Initiations fromthe Transnational Grassroots,” Berkeley Roundtable onthe International Economy, Working Paper 95, July 1999.Also see Mathews, 1997.

76. See UNCTAD, “Lessons from the MAI”, UNCTAD Serieson Issues in International Investment Agreements (NewYork and Geneva: UNCTAD, 1999); D. Henderson, TheMAI Affair: A Story and its Lessons (London: RoyalInstitute for International Affairs, 1999); LokayanBulletin, Special Issue on the MAI, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1998.

77. Manuel Castells has called those who are marginalised bydominant processes of economic development (particu-larly in this age of globalisation) as “structurallyirrelevant.” Manuel Castells, The Information Age:Economy, Society and Culture. Vol. 1: The Rise of theNetwork Society (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell,1996).

78. Donatella Della Porta, Hanspeter Kriesi and DieterRucht, eds. Transnational Social Movements (London:Macmillan, 1999). Also see Jackie Smith, CharlesChatfield, and Ron Pagnucco, eds. Transnational SocialMovements in Global Politics (Syracuse: SyracuseUniversity Press, 1997).

79. The discussion in this chapter is drawn from a range ofrecent articles on the role of civil society in globalenvironmental politics: Keck and Sikkink, 1997; LisaJordan and Peter van Tujl. 2000. “Political Responsibilityin Transnational NGO Advocacy,” World Development28(12): 2051-2065; Michael Edwards, Future Positive:International Co-operation in the 21st Century (London:Earthscan, 2000); Michael Edwards, “NGO Rights and

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Responsibilities.” New York Times op ed piece, 2001.Online at: www.futurepositive.org/NYT.doc (28September 2001); Robert O’Brien et al., Contesting GlobalGovernance: Multilateral Economic Institutions and GlobalSocial Movements (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 2000).

80. Mathews, 1997. Yet others go further to argue that manyNGOs are politically naïve, as well as unaccountable andnon-representative, and are manipulated by dominantpowers into accepting marginal changes as progress. See,for example, Hugo Slim, “To the Rescue: Radicals orPoodles?” The World Today, vol. 53 (Aug/Sept 1997): 209-212.

81. Ann Marie Clark. Winter 1995. “Non-governmentalOrganisations and their Influence on InternationalSociety.” Journal of International Affairs 48(2): 507-525.

82. P. Hirst and G. Thompson, Globalisation in Question: TheInternational Economy and the Possibilities of Governance(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999).

83. S. Strange, The Retreat of the State (Cambridge: Cam-bridge University Press, 1996).

84. For discussions of the role of governments, see IanShapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordon, Democracy’s Edges(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); RobertA. Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 1998); and Rajni Kothari, Poverty, HumanConsciousness and the Amnesia of Development (London:Zed Books, 1993).

85. For a more detailed analysis of the processes of “gover-nance without government,” see James Rosenau andErnst-Otto Czempiel, eds. Governance Without Govern-ment: Order and Change in World Politics (New York:Cambridge University Press, 1992).

86. Levy and Egan, 1998.

87. An exception is the International Labour Organization,which gives voting rights to labour unions and theprivate sector, in addition to governments. See P.J.

Simmons, “Learning to Live with NGOs”, Foreign Policy(Fall 1998): 82-96.

88. The Canadian experience is particularly relevant to theWCD because the primary facilitator for the WCDprocess, Prof. Anthony Dorcey, drew much of hisexperience from practice in Canada. See, for example,A.H.J. Dorcey, “Collaborating Towards SustainabilityTogether: The Fraser Basin Management Board andProgram,” in Practising Sustainable Water Management:Canadian and International Experiences. D. Shrubsole andB. Mitchell, eds. (Cambridge, Ontario: Canadian WaterResources Association, 1997); and A.H.J. Dorcey, L.Doney and H. Rueggeberg, “Public Involvement inGovernment Decision-Making: Choosing the RightModel.” B.C. Round Table on the Environment and theEconomy (Victoria, 1994).

89. Minu Hemmati et al., Multi-Stakeholder Processes forGovernance and Sustainability Beyond Deadlock andConflict (London: Earthscan, 2001). Online at:www.earthsummit2002.org/msp/ (28 September 2001).

90. Wolfgang Reinicke, Francis Deng et al., Critical Choices:The United Nations, Networks and the Future of GlobalGovernance (Ottawa: International DevelopmentResearch Centre, 2000).

91. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink. Autumn 1998.“International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.”International Organization 52 (4): 887-917.

92. Simmons, 1998.

93. Richard Price. Summer 1998 “Reversing the Gun Sights:Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines.”International Organization 52(3): 613-644.

94. See Sanjeev Khagram, “Toward Democratic Governancefor Sustainable Development: Transnational Civil SocietyOrganizing around Big Dams,” in The Third Force: TheRise of Transnational Civil Society. Ann Florini, ed.(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for Interna-tional Peace, 2000).

T h e O r i g i n s o f t h e W o r l d C o m m i s s i o n o n D a m s


Chapter 3

The Origins of theWorld Commission on Dams

in Lesotho. In the case of proposed dams, such asthe Arun III in Nepal, national mobilisation andintensive global campaigns have led to the cancel-lation of these projects. On the Koel-Karo and theSuvarnarekha Rivers in India, projects have beenshelved after ground had been broken and signifi-cant infrastructure work had been completed. Evenin the industrialised world—whether in the UnitedStates, Europe, or Japan—public opposition andthe growing evidence of the adverse economic andecological impacts have led to a rethinking of largedams as an option for irrigation and energy.2

Additionally, social movements and their support-ers have criticised the role of multilateral fundingagencies such as the World Bank in the legitima-tion and construction of large dams.

A prominent example of this history of protest isthe movement against dams on India’s NarmadaRiver. Domestic dissent to this project caused theWorld Bank to appoint an independent commis-sion to assess these dams and subsequently anindependent Inspection Panel to assess conten-tious projects.3 The struggle against the SardarSarovar Project (SSP) in the Narmada Valleyachieved several other global landmarks. It nudgedthe World Bank to review its central commitmentto large dams, and its policies related to indigenouspeoples and resettlement. It marked the first timethat the Japanese government withdrew its directand indirect support to a development project forenvironmental and human rights reasons.4 It wasthe catalyst for formation of a remarkable nationaland transnational network of dam-affected peopleand their supporters.

In June 1994, on the 50th anniversary of theformation of the Bretton Woods institutions, acoalition of 326 social movements and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) from 44

In this chapter, we detail the immediateorigins of the World Commission on Dams.We locate it both in the growth of localstruggles against the adverse social, eco-

nomic, and ecological impacts of dams and in thegrowing pressure to define global norms forharnessing and managing water. These develop-ments compelled the World Conservation Union(IUCN) and the World Bank to organise a meetingof representatives from different sides of the damsdebate, where participants decided to set up theCommission. We trace the many difficult stepsnecessary to create a body and a process thatwould satisfy all the stakeholders. This narrativeillustrates the process and the challenges ofconstituting a multi-stakeholder institutionalresponse to a highly contentious national andinternational issue.

Seeds of Dissent

It is difficult to pinpoint a single defining momentthat led to the birth of the WCD. Over the pastthree decades, with increasing frequency andintensity, questions have been raised about theeconomic viability and the social, cultural, andenvironmental costs of large dams. It is importantto note that, most often, in the absence of localmobilisation and social movements, informationabout planned dams is hard to come by and manypoorly planned and implemented projects escapescrutiny.1 But based on growing evidence of dams’negative impacts, protests and mobilisations havemultiplied the world over. These protests havematured into sustained social movements thathave effectively slowed down or stalled furtherwork on proposed or ongoing dams. Among themore notable examples are the Bakun Dam inMalaysia, the Maan, Tehri, and Maheshwar Damsin India, and the Lesotho Highland Stage II Dam

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countries around the world endorsed a statementcalling for a moratorium on the World Bank’sfunding of large dams. This statement was namedthe Manibeli Declaration (see Box 3.1) in recogni-tion of one of the first tribal villages that theSardar Sarovar Dam on the Narmada River wouldsubmerge and one of the sites of sustained resis-tance to the dam. Crucially, one of the conditionsfor lifting the proposed moratorium was that the

World Bank would set up an “independent com-prehensive review of Bank-funded large damsprojects to establish the actual costs, including thedirect and indirect, economic, environmental, andsocial costs, and the actual realised benefits of eachproject.” The Declaration went on to state that itwas crucial that, “The review should evaluate thedegree to which project appraisals erred in estimat-ing costs and benefits, identify specific violations

Box 3.1

The Manibeli Declaration (excerpted)Calling for a Moratorium on World Bank Funding of Large DamsSeptember 1994

THEREFORE, the undersigned organisations:CONCLUDE that the World Bank has to date beenunwilling and incapable of reforming its lending forlarge dams; and CALL for an immediate moratorium onall World Bank funding of large dams including allprojects currently in the funding pipeline, until:

1. The World Bank establishes a fund to providereparations to the people forcibly evicted fromtheir homes and lands by Bank-funded large damswithout adequate compensation and rehabilitation.The fund should be administered by a transparentand accountable institution completely indepen-dent of the Bank and should provide funds tocommunities affected by Bank-funded large damsto prepare reparations claims.

2. The World Bank strengthens its policies andoperational practices to guarantee that no largedam projects that require forced resettlement willbe funded in countries that do not have policiesand legal frameworks in place to assure restorationof the living standards of displaced peoples.Furthermore, communities to be displaced must beinvolved throughout the identification, design,implementation and monitoring of the projects,and give their informed consent before the projectcan be implemented.

3. The World Bank commissions, reviews, andimplements the recommendations of an indepen-dent comprehensive review of all Bank-fundedlarge dam projects to establish the actual costs,including direct and indirect economic, environ-mental and social costs, and the actually realisedbenefits of each project. The review must beconducted by individuals completely independentof the Bank without any stake in the outcome ofthe review.

WHEREAS: 1. The World Bank is the greatest single source of funds

for large dam construction, having provided morethan US$50 billion (1992 dollars) for construction ofmore than 500 large dams in 92 countries. Despitethis enormous investment, no independent analysisor evidence exists to demonstrate that the financial,social and environmental costs were justified by thebenefits realised.

2. Since 1948, the World Bank has financed large damprojects that have forcibly displaced on the order of10 million people from their homes and lands. TheBank has consistently failed to implement andenforce its own policy on forced resettlement, firstestablished in 1980.

5. The environmental and social costs of World Bank-funded large dams, in terms of people forced fromtheir homes, destruction of forests and fisheries, andspread of waterborne diseases, have fallen dispro-portionately on women, indigenous communities,tribal peoples and the poorest and mostmarginalised sectors of the population. This is indirect contradiction to the World Bank’s often-stated“overarching objective of alleviating poverty.”

9. The Bank has even convinced governments toaccept loans for large dams when more cost-effective and less destructive alternative plansexisted.

10. The economic analyses on which the World Bankbases its decisions to fund large dams fail to applythe lessons learned from the poor record of pastBank-funded dams, underestimating the potentialfor delays and cost over-runs. Project appraisalstypically are based on unrealistically optimisticassumptions about project performance, and fail toaccount for the direct and indirect costs of negativeenvironmental and social impacts.

Source: “Manibeli Declaration, Calling for a Moratorium on World Bank Funding of Large Dams,” September 1994.Online at: www.irn.org/programs/finance/manibeli.shtml (28 September 2001).



of Bank policies and staff members responsible,and address opportunity costs of not supportingproject alternatives. The review must be conductedby individuals completely independent of the Bankwithout any stake in the outcome of the review.”

The Operations Evaluation DepartmentReview

Six months after the Manibeli Declaration, partlyin response to criticisms of large dams and partlyto deflect growing anger at the continuing involve-ment of the World Bank in these projects, theOperations Evaluation Department (OED) of theWorld Bank announced that it was “undertaking areview of World Bank-funded large dams in orderto determine their development effectiveness.”5 Asa senior official in OED noted, the World Bank’sinvolvement in large dams had been “attracting alot of controversy.” Senior management felt pressedto address the question: “What is it about damsthat causes so much concern and what should theBank do about it?”6

The World Bank had originally envisaged the OEDundertaking a two-phase study. Phase I was to be adesk review of experience with selected dams andPhase II was to be a more comprehensive study,involving field evaluations. The entire review wasto be the World Bank’s answer to its critics.

The first phase of the OED Review analysed theperformance of 50 World Bank-funded dams. Itsfinal report was sent to the World Bank Presidentin mid-1996. The study stated that dams havecontributed to economic development, includingelectricity generation capacity, flood control, andirrigation.7 Based on an assessment against thestandards in place at the time the project wasimplemented, the study found that resettlementwas inadequate in half the dams funded, but thatperformance has improved over time. Performanceon environmental grounds was deemed to be“mixed.” The study further noted that while underprior social and environmental policies only 10percent of the sample was unacceptable, had allprojects been assessed under the new policies, 26percent would have been unacceptable and 48percent would have been judged “potentiallyacceptable.” The report concluded that because thelarge majority of dams are yielding benefits thatoutweigh their costs, the World Bank shouldcontinue funding large dam projects with height-ened attention to environmental and social poli-

cies. According to OED sources, the report was aninternal, “relatively minor…desk study,” consid-ered inappropriate for public release.8 NGOscriticised the report by arguing that the précisexaggerated the benefits of dams and that the fullstudy was quoted selectively to justify the Bank’scontinued funding for more dams.

Although agreeing with OED’s “positive conclu-sions,” the Committee on Development Effective-ness of the Bank’s Board of Executive Directorsnevertheless, “…urged OED to ensure that Phase IIreflects the views of civil society, including those ofprivate investors and non-governmentalorganisations.” 9 Although this recommendationdid not call for wider participation in the secondphase of the study, it is evident that the WorldBank was aware of the potential lack of legitimacyand limited use of a study that reflected only itsviews on the contentious debate around largedams.

Aftermath of the OED Review

At the same time, the World Bank leadership wasseeking a specific issue area for collaboration withthe World Conservation Union (IUCN), withwhich it had cemented a partnership in 1994. “Wehad a partnership with IUCN but no substance,”noted a World Bank official. “This [dams evalua-tion] showed up as something promising to focuson.”10 In this framework, the World Bank invitedIUCN to co-organise a multi-stakeholder work-shop to discuss the findings of the OED study andthe goals and process for a more comprehensivesecond phase.11 The meeting was proposed forGland, Switzerland, in April 1997.

The run-up to the workshop illustrated only toowell the urgent need for more constructive dia-logue between the World Bank and its critics.Copies of the OED Review were leaked outside theWorld Bank and by September 1996 hadgalvanised anti-dam organisations and theirsupporters into action. On the eve of the Glandmeeting, the International Rivers Network(IRN)—the California-based group at the fore-front of research and co-ordination of individualsand organisations from around the world opposedto dams—published a lengthy and detailed cri-tique of the OED Review. The response criticisedthe OED not only for underplaying the signifi-cance of the World Bank’s own findings but alsofor its methodology and process.12 IRN charged

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that a careful reading of the Review, which usedthree criteria—economic, social, and environmen-tal—to evaluate the dams, clearly showed theextent to which the World Bank was trying tocover-up or minimise the implications of its ownfindings. Given that remedial action is rarely takenonce a project is implemented, the Review showedthat only 13 out of 50 dams funded by the WorldBank were “acceptable.” The IRN critique asserted

that the World Bank believed, without justification,that remedial action was possible, that most damswere “potentially acceptable,” and that they wouldbe more acceptable than before, given increasedsafeguards on dam-related lending.

Based on the IRN critique, 49 NGOs from 21countries wrote a collective letter to World BankPresident James D. Wolfensohn demanding that

Box 3.2

The Curitiba Declaration (excerpted)Curitiba, Brazil, 14 March 1997 d. Territorial rights of indigenous, tribal, semi-tribal

and traditional populations affected by dams arefully respected through providing them withterritories which allow them to regain theirprevious cultural and economic conditions - thisagain may require the removal of the dams.

e. An international independent commission isestablished to conduct a comprehensive reviewof all large dams financed or otherwise sup-ported by international aid and credit agencies,and its policy conclusions implemented. Theestablishment and procedures of the reviewmust be subject to the approval and monitoringof representatives of the international move-ment of people affected by dams.

f. Each national and regional agency which hasfinanced or otherwise supported the building oflarge dams have commissioned independentcomprehensive reviews of each large damproject they have funded and implemented thepolicy conclusions of the reviews. The reviewsmust be carried out with the participation ofrepresentatives of the affected people’sorganisations.

g. Policies on energy and freshwater are imple-mented which encourage the use of sustainableand appropriate technologies and managementpractices, using the contributions of bothmodern science and traditional knowledge.These policies need also to discourage waste andover consumption and guarantee equitableaccess to these basic needs.

4. The process of privatisation which is being imposedon countries in many parts of the world by multilat-eral institutions is increasing social, economic andpolitical exclusion and injustice. We do not acceptthe claims that this process is a solution to corrup-tion, inefficiency and other problems in the powerand water sectors where these are under the controlof the state. Our priority is democratic and effectivepublic control and regulation of entities whichprovide electricity and water in a way whichguarantees the needs and desires of people.

We, the people from 20 countries gathered inCuritiba, Brazil, representing organisations of dam-affected people and of opponents of destructivedams, have shared our experiences of the losses wehave suffered and the threats we face because ofdams. Although our experiences reflect our diversecultural, social, political and environmental realities,our struggles are one. Our struggles are onebecause everywhere the people who suffer mostfrom dams are excluded from decision-making.Decisions are instead taken by technocrats,politicians and business elites who increase theirown power and wealth through building dams.Our shared experiences have led us to agree thefollowing:1. We recognise and endorse the principles of the

1992 ‘NGO and Social Movements Declaration ofRio de Janeiro’ and the 1994 ‘Manibeli Declara-tion’ on World Bank funding of large dams.

2. We will oppose the construction of any damwhich has not been approved by the affectedpeople after an informed and participativedecision-making process.

3. We demand that governments, internationalagencies and investors implement an immedi-ate moratorium on the building of large damsuntil:

a. There is a halt to all forms of violence andintimidation against people affected by damsand organisations opposing dams.

b. Reparations, including the provision ofadequate land, housing and social infrastruc-ture, be negotiated with the millions ofpeople whose livelihoods have alreadysuffered because of dams.

c. Actions are taken to restore environmentsdamaged by dams - even when this requiresthe removal of the dams.

Source: “Declaration of Curitiba: Affirming the Right to Life and Livelihood of People Affected by Dams,” 14 March 1997.Online at: www.irn.org/programs/curitiba.html (28 September 2001)



the World Bank reject the conclusions of the OEDReview: “Given the huge expense of large dams, thecontroversy over whether or not they are aneffective means of achieving the benefits whichtheir proponents claim for them, and the hugescale of their social and environmental impacts, acomprehensive, unbiased, and authoritative reviewof past World Bank lending for large dams isessential.” Moreover, they argued that the review beundertaken by “a commission of eminent personsindependent of the World Bank,” which “must beable to command respect and confidence from allparties involved in the large dams debate.”13

The NGO letter to the World Bank President builton prior civil society mobilisation against largedams. In March 1997, the First InternationalMeeting of the People Affected by Large Dams, washeld in Curitiba, Brazil. It was attended by activistsand dam-affected people from more than 20countries who shared the long history of the social,cultural, economic, and environmental problemsassociated with large dams, along with the undemo-cratic processes associated with dam planning. TheCuritiba Declaration (see Box 3.2) went beyond theManibeli Declaration’s almost exclusive focus on theWorld Bank. It was broader in scope and moreconfident in its tone. While endorsing the ManibeliDeclaration and acknowledging the proposedmeeting in Gland, the Curitiba Declaration alsocalled for an independent review of large dams.

Both the Manibeli and Curitiba Declarationsreflect the growth and sophistication oftransnational alliances. Critics of these develop-ments who argued that participants intransnational alliances came from non-representa-tive processes or that their protests must bearticulated only within national boundaries werebeginning to acknowledge that these alliancesbrought substantial research, mobilisation, andunderstanding to their protests. They representedsignificant voices, possibly of silent majorities, andcould contribute to the definition of global norms.Inevitably, they were also contributing to theprocess of what constituted multilateralism andhow multilateral stakeholder processes should bedefined.14

Birth of the World Commission on Dams

The role of IUCN as a co-convenor of the Glandworkshop proved critical in defining the range ofstakeholders who would be represented at the table

and subsequently, the legitimacy of the globalCommission in the eyes of the anti-dam move-ment.15 IUCN staff members were active propo-nents of diverse participation at Gland. Accordingto a former senior official, IUCN had two basicconditions for getting involved in the workshop.16

The first was that the Gland meeting would not beabout how to build better dams, but that it wouldbe about the planning process for assessing optionsin water resources and energy management. Thesecond condition was that all parties should beinvolved “from the most radical activist groups tothe most conservative business groups.”17

IUCN lacked extensive expertise in large damsissues, and its track record in environment anddevelopment was not a perfect match, since thethorniest dam struggles related to comprehensivehuman rights violations: lack of participation,developmental displacement, rehabilitation, andresettlement. However, IUCN’s independent statusprovided the credibility required to bring commu-nity-based activists and advocacy NGOs intodialogue with corporate and multilateral represen-tatives. “In order to bring in the most activeopponents of dams we needed to have a partnerwho had their confidence,” noted one World Bankofficial. “The Bank couldn’t imagine a seriouspartnership with IRN.”18

Meanwhile, the reputation of the World Bank andits continuing importance as an underwriter ofprivate sector investments in developing countriesprovided the weight required for private sectorparticipation at Gland.19 Furthermore, the issueshighlighted in the OED Review provided sufficientresonance with a subset of businesspeople to bringthem to the table. As one representative from themore liberal segment of industry would later note,“Industry wants to learn. The past experience withdams has not always been positive, we had under-estimated the technical, economic, environmentaland social risks.”20 The overall response to work-shop invitations was “extremely positively surpris-ing,”21 in the words of one organiser.

The Path to Gland

By the mid 1990s, private companies involved inthe dams business had begun paying heed toenvironmental issues to varying degrees—whethermotivated by civil society pressure, governmentregulations, or a larger sense of corporate responsi-bility. For instance, the International Commission

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on Large Dams (ICOLD) developed a PositionPaper on Dams and the Environment in 1997.22

ICOLD is a professional association of dambuilders from private sector and government andthe owner of the largest repository of technicaldam-related data in the world. The content of theposition paper was fairly general in nature. (SeeBox 3.4.) Members considered it to be a major stepfor the association.23

Meanwhile, a smaller group of private companiesand state utilities were beginning to explore waysin which they could improve their environmentalperformance under the auspices of the Interna-tional Energy Agency (IEA) Hydropower Agree-

ment, established in 1995.24 This group sought aclearer standard for accountability that coulddecrease uncertainty in investments and boost thecompetitiveness of hydropower vis-à-vis otherenergy sources. The IEA model acknowledged theneed for sound decision-making process, optionsassessment, and community relations in hydro-power development.25

An industry representative would later attributethese voluntary initiatives to companies’ recogni-tion of the new importance of private sectoractors: “Dams used to be government projects. Butsince the 1990s, the role of the private sector hasbeen expanding. This means new rules of thegame, new responsibilities.”26 A subset of progres-sive executives were beginning to realise that theyrequired a license to operate that went far beyondthe requirements of bureaucratic licensing toinclude broader credibility and consent.

The financial and legal costs of civil society dissentalso burdened private sector operations, the waythey did the World Bank’s. “The whole process ofdam development was grinding to a halt, that hadjust become increasingly evident,” noted oneobserver.27 Therefore, seeking a consensus withdam opponents on a way forward was central tocompanies’ self interest.

At Gland

It was against this background and the continuingstruggles against dams across the world that theGland meeting took place in April 1997. Convenedby the World Bank and the IUCN, the two-dayworkshop brought together 39 participants repre-senting the diverse interests in the large dams’debate. The workshop’s objectives were to reviewPhase I of the OED study, develop a methodologi-cal framework for Phase II, and propose a rigorousand transparent process for defining the scope,objectives, organisation, and financing of follow-up work. The objectives were also to more clearlydefine the scope of the Phase II study, includingbasic guidelines for involvement by governments,private sector, and non-governmentalorganisations as well as public participation,information disclosure, and subsequent dissemina-tion of results. Another objective was to identifyfollow-up actions necessary, including generallyaccepted standards for assessing, planning, build-ing, operating, and financing large dams thatwould reflect lessons learned from experience.

Box 3.3

ICOLD Position Paper on Dams and theEnvironment (excerpted)

Attention to the social and environmental aspects ofdams and reservoirs must be a dominating concernpervading all our activities in the same way as theconcern for safety. We now aim at balancing theneed for the development of water resources withthe conservation of the environment in a way whichwill not compromise future generations…

In search of this balance, ICOLD members shouldbe guided by the following aspects of environmen-tal policy:• The larger the project, the greater the effects on

the natural and social environment to beexpected, and the wider the scope of themultidisciplinary, holistic studies which theyrequire. Large-scale development demandsintegrated planning for an entire river basinbefore the implementation of the first individualproject(s). Where river basins are part of morethan one country, such planning presupposesinternational cooperation.

• Projects must be judged everywhere and withoutexception by the state-of-the-art of the technolo-gies involved and by current standards ofenvironmental care. The scope for reducing anydetrimental impacts on the environmentthrough alternative solutions, project modifica-tions in response to particular needs, or mitigat-ing measures should be thoroughly investigated,evaluated and implemented.

A comprehensive Environmental ImpactAssessment, since 1971 mandatory in a growingnumber of ICOLD member countries, ought tobecome standard procedure everywhere as part ofproject conceptualisation, that is well before finaldesign and the start of construction.

Source: International Commission on Large Dams, “PositionPaper on Dams and Environment,” May 1997.



The 39 participants at the workshop came from arange of interest groups involved in the planning,construction, management, and opposition tolarge dams: professional associations, such as theInternational Commission on Large Dams; compa-nies, such as Asea Brown Boveri and Harza Engi-neering; think tanks, such as Tata Energy ResearchInstitute; international non-governmentalorganisations, such as International Rivers Net-work; and affected people’s movements andgroups, such as Narmada Bachao Andolan(Struggle to Save the Narmada River) in India.Senior officials attended from the World Bank andIUCN. Invitations were issued to institutions,which nominated their own representatives toattend.28 In addition, a few people were invited intheir individual capacity.

During the Gland proceedings, the authors of theOED Review acknowledged its limitations.29

According to a report of the workshop proceed-ings, “there was widespread recognition thatfurther work was essential and that it would needto be comprehensive in scope, transparent inconduct and defensible in its analyses.” 30 NGOrepresentatives at Gland also noted, “World Bankrepresentatives seemed rather self-critical andappeared to respect the strength and the argu-ments of dam opponents… Some World Bankrepresentatives were also openly critical of theBank’s record on dams, of their poor record ofimplementing their policies, and of the weaknessof these policies.” 31

The explicit participation of national governmentsin the Gland meeting was relatively modest. Therewas only one ministry official there: from China,which was undertaking possibly the largest mod-ern engineering feat in the Three Gorges Dam—planned for an estimated capacity of 18.2 millionkilowatts, a height of 575 feet, and the displace-ment of up to 1.9 million people.32 However,various proxies and quasi-governmental appoin-tees represented government viewpoints. TheWorld Bank’s senior staff members were familiarwith the views of client governments andindustrialised country donors on their board. TheGland meeting included representatives of twostate-owned utilities33 and two river basin authori-ties.34 The ability of the WCD to attract thepolitical support of governments would become aserious issue in its later process and would inhibita more enthusiastic engagement by governmentagencies and officials with the proceedings and the

eventual report. NGOs active in the formativeprocesses felt strongly that while the compositionof the Commission had to have senior people withhigh credibility with governments, integrallyinvolving governments from the inception wouldhave compromised the Commission’s ability toproduce an unbiased report.35 These politicaltrade-offs became part of the many lessons that theWCD process has subsequently highlighted.

The gender profile of the Gland meeting partici-pants was predominantly male; this was partially aproduct of the overwhelmingly male dominance inthe dams business, although not characteristic ofcivil society organisations as a whole. Of the 39participants (excluding media and observers), only2 were women: a senior social scientist at theWorld Bank and a Chinese scientist. Althoughsuccessful efforts were later made to achieve genderbalance on the Commission itself (5 of the 12Commissioners were women),36 the Gland meet-ing foreshadowed the difficulty of integratingwomen’s perspectives in all aspects of the subse-quent WCD process.

The agenda for discussion at Gland indicated thedistance that the dam-building establishment hadagreed to travel to address the controversy aroundlarge dams. Included in the agenda was a compre-hensive review of large dams around the world andthe decision to define comprehensive standards forthe building of large dams. A senior water expertof the World Bank reflected this changed moodwhen he acknowledged that Bank-funded damshad caused serious adverse impacts on land andpeople. He said that the independent assessmentwas an idea whose time had come because theWorld Bank “didn’t have the moral authority tomake these judgements.”37 Although the statedintent of the Gland meeting was to work toward asecond phase of the OED study, NGOs’ calls for anindependent review prevailed.

The workshop was the result of exhaustive prepa-ration by the convening organisations. Mindful ofthe tremendous opportunity the gathering posed,

Very few womenparticipated in the

Gland meeting.

C h a p t e r 3


they were determined not to let it slip away. “Mymajor concern was not to have a conflagration,”said the facilitator, “but to establish and maintain aconversation among participants.”38 Theconvenors entered the meeting with a comprehen-sive set of contingency plans on how to react todebates and a set of scenarios, ranging fromminimalist goals of getting people to agree to meetagain to a much weightier scope of future co-operation.39

The World Commission on Dams Takes Shape

A spirit of constructive debate prevailed in thediscussions. The meeting unanimously stressed theurgent need for the second phase of the OEDReview to include all large dams and not just thosefunded by the World Bank. Discussions alsounderscored the need for a representative team ofeminent people to carry out the review indepen-dently. Consequently, the participants at Glandagreed to proceed with an independent commis-sion to review the performance of large dams anddevelop guidelines for the future. It was a break-through in civil society’s relationship with plan-ners, dam builders, and financiers that the pro-posed commission’s mandate emphasised both thereview of the “development effectiveness of largedams” and an assessment of the alternatives. Whatwas remarkable was that an independent processhad been agreed upon by a group of stakeholderswho had seemingly irreconcilable differences aboutthe value of large dams—differences that hadgenerated some of the most acrimonious conflictsin post-war development history.

Participants at the Gland meeting articulated theterms of reference of the World Commission onDams as follows:

• “To assess the experience with existing, new, andproposed large dam projects so as to improveexisting practices and social and environmentalconditions;

• To develop decision-making criteria and policyand regulatory frameworks for assessing alter-natives for energy and water resources develop-ment;

• To evaluate the development effectiveness oflarge dams;

• To develop and promote internationally accept-able standards for the planning, assessment,design, construction, operation, and monitoring

of large dam projects and, if dams are built,ensure affected peoples are better off;

• To identify the implications for institutional,policy, and financial arrangements so thatbenefits, costs, and risks are equitably shared atthe global, national, and local levels; and,

• To recommend interim modifications—wherenecessary—of existing policies and guidelines,and promote “best practices.”40

Participants agreed on the outlines of the institu-tional structure that the World Commission onDams would take. The Commission would com-prise between five and eight Commissioners,including an “internationally recognised” chairper-son. The Commissioners would have “appropriate”expertise and experience and would be widelyregarded as having integrity and representing thediversity of perspectives, including affected re-gions, communities, and private and publicsectors. This criterion would prove highly conten-tious when the time came for the actual selectionof Commissioners. Most of them would serve part-time while up to three would serve full-time. TheCommissioners would serve in their personalcapacities.

The workshop agreed on a tripartite institutionalstructure for the WCD. Apart from the Commis-sion, there would be a consultative group com-posed of participants who attended the workshop,plus others invited by the Commission fromNGOs, multilateral institutions, governments, andthe private sector. This Forum would ensureeffective and balanced representation of all stake-holders and key actors. The group would be usedas a sounding board for ideas. A third element inthe proposed institutional structure was a Secre-tariat of full-time professionals who would providesupport for the Commissioners.

Another important element of the Gland agree-ment was an outline of the Commission’s opera-tional mandate. Its modus operandi would consistof study groups, public hearings, commissionedstudies, and task forces. Agreement was alsoreached on an implementation strategy to takeeffect immediately after the workshop. IUCN’sDirector General agreed to set up an InterimWorking Group (IWG) composed of IUCN andWorld Bank staff. The IWG would draw on partici-pants in the workshop for advice and support inestablishing the Commission. By the end ofOctober, the IWG would establish full terms of



reference for the Commission and its advisoryForum, membership of the Commission and theForum, capabilities and location of the Secretariat,an outline program and budget for the Commis-sion and Secretariat, and a funding strategy for thetwo-year life of the Commission.

In the weeks that followed the Gland Workshop,the IWG was formed with six representatives fromthe World Bank and five from the IUCN. Indeference to NGO participants in Gland who wereuneasy working with the World Bank, it was agreedthat IUCN would take the primary managing role.The IWG was given six months to decide on thecomposition and procedures of the WCD inconsultation with members of the gathering atGland—called the Reference Group (RG).

Conclusions

The conditions for the genesis of the WCD lay inthe global and national maturity of the damsdebate. A critical mass of local, national, andtransnational civil society organisations hademerged to challenge not just the social andcultural injustices and environmental degradationand damage caused by some of the worst largedam projects but also the conceptualisation,planning, and implementation of dam-buildingprojects. Civil society groups, who most desired achange in the status quo, were the primary propo-nents of an independent commission. Growingevidence of the adverse impacts of large dams aswell as the high transaction costs of enduring civilsociety opposition led the World Bank to questionthe extent of its future role in supporting thebuilding of these dams. Certain private investors inlarge dams also sought clearer ground rules fortheir engagement with host governments andcommunities in order to free them of damagingcharges and smooth their operations. Additionally,environmental issues were also beginning to havegreater resonance within the professional damscommunity. These complex realities and concernsamong diverse stakeholders, and the WCD’s ownevolving commitment to be a democratic multi-stakeholder forum, convinced stakeholders toparticipate—if they had an equal place at the table.

The acrimony of the dams debate meant that therisks of multi-stakeholder engagement were high,including for those in the World Bank who wereattempting to pursue greater participation andopenness. All the participants in the Gland meet-ing had a sense of entering truly untested territory.

The addition of IUCN as a convening body, alongwith the World Bank, was critical to opening theGland meeting to participation from other stake-holders. IUCN also helped to make NGOs moreconfident to attend the meeting. Sustained pres-sure from civil society organisations and socialmovements compelled the convenors to bothwiden participation and influence the content andprocess of the Gland meeting.

Participants unanimously identified the need for anindependent and comprehensive review of thedevelopment effectiveness of large dam projects—above and beyond the World Bank’s own projects—and the generation of guidelines for future waterand energy resources development. The suggestionfor a WCD emerged as a promising response for allparticipants.

The setting up of the Commission was a major stepforward for multi-stakeholder processes. It was astep with the potential to influence and perhapseven define global norms for the building andfunctioning of large infrastructure projects andother development processes. The number andnature of variables that led to the formation of theWCD will not be the same for other contentiousissue areas. The principle of using transparent andinclusive multi-stakeholder consultations to define acommission is a relevant pre-condition, but theprecise process and outcome may vary. The forma-tion of such processes calls for continuing innova-tion and creativity on the part of all those seeking todemocratise global and national policy arenas.

IUCN’s role as a convenorwas critical to broad

stakeholder participation.

C h a p t e r 3


Endnotes

20. Interview with industry representative on the Forum,April 2000.

21. Interview with Gland workshop organiser, 1 February2001.

22. For the full text of the Position Paper, see: http://genepi.louis-jean.com/cigb/chartean.html.

23. Interview with former ICOLD president, December 1999.

24. IEA Hydropower Agreement website, www.ieahydro.org(28 September 2000). The ten member countries of theIEA Hydropower Agreement referenced are Canada,China, Finland, France, Japan, Norway, Spain, Sweden,the United Kingdom, and the United States.

25. Interview with IEA co-founder, April 2000.

26. Comments of an industry representative during anindustry presentation to World Commission on DamsForum members, 4 April 2000.



29. World Bank/IUCN, 1997, p. 9.


31. P. McCully, P. Bosshard, and S. Dharmadhikary, An NGOReport on the April 1997 World Bank-IUCN DamsWorkshop and on the Proposal for an Independent Interna-tional Dam Review Commission, 29 May 1997 (mimeo).

32. These widely publicised figures are confirmed in theWCD’s country review of China’s dams. R. Fuggle; W.T.Smith; Hydroconsult Canada Inc.; and Agrodev CanadaInc. 2000. “Large Dams in Water and Energy ResourceDevelopment in the People’s Republic of China (PRC),”country review paper prepared as an input to the WorldCommission on Dams, Cape Town. Estimates for thenumber of people to be displaced by the Three GorgesProject vary. The figure of 1.9 million is cited onInternational Rivers Network’s website, http://irn.org/programs/threeg/.

33. Electricité de France and ISAGEN-Colombia.

34. Volta River Authority and Lesotho Highlands Develop-ment Project.

35. Interviews with Forum member, September andNovember 2000; e-mail communication with Forummember, January 2001.

36. This was, unfortunately, not the experience with theSecretariat, which had few women.

37. Interview with World Bank Senior Advisor, June 2000.




1. One of the many examples is the Almatti Dam in India.

2. For instance, P. McCully, Silenced Rivers (London: ZedBooks, 1996); E. Goldsmith and N. Hildyard, The Socialand Environmental Effects of Large Dams (San Francisco:Sierra Club Books, 1984). See also the website of theInternational Rivers Network, www.irn.org, for dams inEurope and the U.S. slated for decommissioning.

3. Interview with former member of the World BankInspection Panel, 16 November 2000. See SanjeevKhagram, “Toward Democratic Governance forSustainable Development: Transnational Civil SocietyOrganizing around Big Dams,” in The Third Force: TheRise of Transnational Civil Society. Ann Florini, ed.(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for Interna-tional Peace, 2000); Lori Udall “The InternationalNarmada Campaign: A Case of Sustained Advocacy,” inTowards Sustainable Development? Struggling Over India’sNarmada River. William F. Fisher, ed. (New York: MESharpe, 1995).

4. McCully, 1996, p. 302.

5. Patrick McCully, “A Critique of ‘The World Bank’sExperience With Large Dams: A Preliminary Review ofImpacts,’” April 1997. Online at: www.irn.org/programs/finance/critique.shtml (28 September 2001).

6. Interview with OED official, 7 September 2000.

7. World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, WorldBank Lending for Large Dams: A Preliminary Review ofImpacts, OED Précis, September 1996.


9. World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, 1996.

10. Interview with World Bank official, April 2000.

11. World Bank/IUCN, Large Dams: Learning from the Past,Looking to the Future (Gland: IUCN, 1997).

12. McCully, 1997.

13. IRN press release, “World Bank Dam Evaluation‘Seriously Deficient’: NGOs Demand IndependentReview and Moratorium on World Bank Support ofLarge Dams,” 7 April 1997. Online at: www.irn.org/programs/finance/pr970407.html (28 September 2001)

14. See Chapter 2 for a more detailed assessment ofmultilateralism and multi-stakeholder processes.

15. Interviews with involved IUCN and World Bank staff,April and July 2000.

16. Interview with former senior official of IUCN, 5September 2000.

17. Interview with senior IUCN official, 5 September 2000.


19. A senior Bank official speculated that “without the Banka lot of these guys wouldn’t be in… Part of it is financing,part is reputational.” Interview with senior World Bankofficial, June 2000.

F r o m G l a n d t o C a p e T o w n : T h e M a k i n g o f t h e W C D


Chapter 4

From Gland to Cape Town:The Making of the WCD

tion to ensure that participation by variousstakeholders strengthened, rather than diluted, thelegitimacy of the process. Although the primaryfocus in this chapter is on the selection of Com-missioners, we also examine how the formation ofthe Secretariat and the Forum are relevant to issuesof representation.

A Protracted Struggle over CommissionerSelection

In the months immediately following the Glandworkshop, the institutional apparatus of theCommission was not yet in place. During thistime, stakeholder groups pressed the World Bankand IUCN for a role in forming the Commission.An influential report on institutional designpenned by the facilitator at Gland, ProfessorAnthony Dorcey, noted the importance of expand-ing the legitimacy of the Commission beyond thatprovided by the authority of the two conveningorganisations, the World Bank and IUCN. (See Box4.1.) At stake was the perceived independence ofthe Commission. The selection of Commissionersrapidly became a flashpoint for dispute.

The implementation strategy agreed in Glandcalled for the Interim Working Group (IWG),composed of a handful of senior World Bank andIUCN staff, to devise the terms of reference for theCommission and select Commissioners. It was todraw on the Gland participants (Reference Group)for “advice and support.”2 This vague formulationquickly led to an argument over the degree towhich Reference Group members would have a sayin the Commission’s structure and composition.As one participant in the Gland meeting suggested,“…people left the meeting with a different sense ofwhat had been agreed to! In some ways theywanted to leave before it all fell apart.”3 Hence, the

The question of who participates and howis at the heart of any multi-stakeholderprocess. The WCD’s ability to create andmaintain legitimacy depended on

whether different stakeholder groups felt ad-equately represented in its process. In this chapter,we examine the role of the Commission, Secre-tariat, and advisory Forum and how they came toincorporate a range of interests. The acceptabilityof the Commission, Secretariat, and Forum todifferent groups holds implications for the designof future commissions. In addition to analysingrepresentation, we examine the funding base of theWCD and the design of the workplan, whichreflect concerns about independence and inclu-siveness in the design of the WCD.

Representation of Viewpoints on theCommission

Multi-stakeholder processes (MSPs) raise complexquestions of representation, and the WCD was noexception. Within the established framework ofdemocratic government, the ballot box is theaccepted test of representation. For MSPs, however,representation is a far more murky construct.Members are not elected and their constituenciesare not clearly defined. In the case of the WCD,where Commissioners served in their personalcapacities, there were no commonly acceptedmechanisms by which they were held accountableto stakeholder groups. Yet, ensuring that differentstakeholder views are represented is central toMSPs, particularly those created to provide adviceon contentious issues, such as large dams. Thus, akey ingredient in the recipe proposed by the Glandworkshop was appointment of Commissionerswho were “representative of the diversity ofperspectives.”1 In this section, we explore how theWCD sought to tackle the question of representa-

C h a p t e r 4


stage was set early for a tussle over authoritybetween the IWG and the Reference Group.

The mandate from Gland was to select a slate ofCommissioners with “appropriate expertise andexperience…widely regarded as having integrityand being objective, independent, and representa-tive of the diversity of perspectives includingaffected regions, communities, and private andpublic sectors.”4 The challenge lay in determining

the appropriate range and mix of perspectives ondams, and most importantly, deciding who wouldmake this determination. The ensuing process ofCommissioner selection, summarised below, wasprotracted, bitter, and partisan.

Selection of the Chairperson indicated the lensesthrough which different groups would view thebattles ahead. The IWG selected Professor KaderAsmal, then the Minister of Water Affairs and

Box 4.1

Foreshadowing challenges and pitfalls: recommendations of the Dorcey Report

11: Issue a statement of the commission’s adoptedmandate, strategy, workplan and expectedproducts as soon as possible after it is established.

12: Make clear that while the immediate goal of thecommission focuses on building consensus amongthe commissioners on conclusions and recommen-dations, the longer term goal is to provide afoundation for building consensus in large damdecision making processes.

13: Exploit new computer-based technologies and theworld wide web to their fullest advantage. But takegreat care to ensure that they are used as comple-ments to the range of other well-proven communi-cations techniques and that steps are taken tominimise the extent to which stakeholders aredisadvantaged by their lack of access to newtechnologies.

14: Utilise case study assessments of experience with arepresentative set of large dam projects and,wherever possible, include multi-stakeholderprocesses.

Personnel15: Agree on a final set of criteria and the weightings

for each of them before proceeding to select fromamong the nominations for the chair.

16: Agree on a recommendation for appointment tothe position of chairperson that would go to thechief executives of the formally sponsoringorganisations.

17: All commissioners should be able to commit acomparable amount of time – at least 40 days peryear.

18: All commissioners should agree to serve in theirpersonal capacity.

19: Agree on recommendations to the chairperson onthe criteria to be used in selecting commissioners.

20: Make recommendations to the chairperson oncriteria to be considered in selecting the secretary-general and assist in the search for potentialcandidates to facilitate an early decision.

Professor Anthony Dorcey, the facilitator at the Glandmeeting, addressed design questions in a report writtenat the request of the Interim Working Group. The Dorceyreport was influential in shaping key dimensions of theCommission, and prescient in pointing out potentialchallenges and pitfalls along the road.

Structure1: Consult chairpersons and secretaries-general of

selected previous international commissions.

2: Use the term “commission” and add appropriatequalifiers.

3: Make clear the commission’s nature and purpose inthe terms of reference and adopted mandate.

4: Be explicit about how the Commission’s design willcontribute to immediate and longer term improve-ments in decision making on large dams.

5: Commission design should reflect criteria ofinclusiveness, transparency, consensus, effective-ness and fairness, while minimising the trade-offsnecessitated by constraints of time and resources.

Initiation and Midwife Organisations6: Be explicit about the intended independence of the

commission and its implementation.

7: Discussions on the terms of reference and theirimplementation should precede their formaladoption and appointment of the chair.

8: Increase the perceived legitimacy of the commis-sion and facilitate its access to information andresources by going beyond the World Bank andIUCN to obtain formal endorsement from otherorganisations.

9: Discuss the proposed commission with representa-tives of the key stakeholder organisations whoseinterests have been identified as not beingadequately reflected in the Reference Group.

Characteristics10: Make clear that it is an “advisory” rather than an

“investigatory” commission.

Source: Anthony Dorcey, Institutional Design and Operational Modalities for the Proposed Large Dams Commission,Stockholm Draft, 6 August 1997 (mimeo).



Forestry in South Africa, to chair the WCD. Eachside in the debate saw signs of hope in his selec-tion. As a government minister from the South,Prof. Asmal could reasonably be seen as credible bygovernments, particularly in Southern dam-building nations. Moreover, the legitimacy con-ferred on him as an elected politician was of greatimportance, particularly to governments.5 Privatesector interests supported his candidacy based onhis status as a minister in a Southern country witha track record of concern for economic develop-ment. They noted his past approval of a large damin the Lesotho Highlands Water Project complex inSouth Africa. As one Forum member from theprivate sector noted, a minister could be countedon to uphold sovereign rights to decision-makingover national resources, and not to abdicateauthority to non-elected stakeholders.6 Indeed,Prof. Asmal’s personal credibility was the basis onwhich this observer persuaded his board of direc-tors to participate in the WCD.

Civil society groups were initially wary of Prof.Asmal’s selection. In particular, they were concernedabout his past support for the Lesotho water project,but were heartened by his distinguished backgroundas a human rights and anti-apartheid activist.Ultimately, they decided to support him as Chair-person, but subject to a tacit understanding that theposition of Vice Chairperson would be filled bysomeone who had their complete trust.7 The resultwas a Chairperson who was endorsed by all thestakeholders, albeit with different degrees of confi-dence. Subsequent events were to bear out theimportance of a strong and credible Chairperson tothe ultimate success of the Commission.

Selection of the Chairperson was as far as theunanimity of the selection process extended. Inparticular, the process was marked by contentionbetween the IWG and NGO stakeholders on theReference Group. NGO and social movementparticipants rejected the IWG’s first list of 10candidate Commissioners as “an insult.” In theireyes, the list lacked direct representatives ofaffected communities and active anti-dam cam-paigners. By contrast, they argued that severalrepresentatives of the dam construction industry,dam promotion organisations, and technicalexperts, all of whom could be seen as dam sup-porters, were nominated to the Commission.8

The back-and-forth over proposed lists betweenOctober 1997 and January 1998 was characterised

by considerable ill-will and hostile exchanges.NGO and social movement representatives on theReference Group threatened more than once towithdraw from the process entirely. They suggestedthat the attempt by the IWG and the Chairpersonto retain complete authority over the Commis-sioner selection process would “flagrantly breachthe consensus spirit of Gland.”9 In response, theIWG and Prof. Asmal, who was now part of theprocess, threatened to pursue the process even if itwas “without the complete consensus we hadhoped for in Gland.”10 In hindsight, the IWGfound that the Reference Group wanted moreongoing input than they at first realised. They wereoperating on the assumption that they had amandate to move forward and were surprised to bechallenged.11

A compromise was reached only after ProfessorAsmal threatened to resign if the group could notreach consensus. The compromise provided for an“expanded IWG” with a small number of interestgroup representatives from the Gland meeting, inaddition to the World Bank and IUCN representa-tives. Thus, after much contention, a wider rangeof stakeholders won a say in Commissionerselection. In late January 1998, some 3 months late,this body was able to reach consensus on a list of12 Commissioners. (See Box 4.2.) The main changefrom earlier lists was the addition of Medha Patkar,a founder of the Narmada Bachao Andolan(Struggle to Save the Narmada River).

A Commission Based on Stakeholder Interests

As a result of the difficult negotiations between theWorld Bank/IUCN Interim Working Group andparticipants from the Gland meeting, the Commis-sion turned out to be characterised by representa-tion of stakeholder interests, rather than purely bythe eminence of its members. In this regard, theWCD was a significant departure from pastcommissions. The Commissioners of the WCDwere active practitioners in international networks,which included NGO, social movement, andbusiness networks, as well as government agencies.

Commissioners wereto represent a diversity

of perspectives.

C h a p t e r 4


The emphasis on representation went hand inhand with greater stakeholder involvement inCommissioner selection, because only stakehold-ers, not the IWG, could determine who wasrepresentative of their interests.

This is not to suggest that it was easy to definestakeholder groups and establish who couldrepresent them. The stakeholders who selected theCommissioners were an ad hoc group of partici-pants from Gland chosen for their diverse political

views and prominence in the dams debate. Theysought balance on the Commission between theNorth and South and diversity of experience ingovernment, private sector, community organising,environmental management, academic disciplines,and other related issues.12 The greatest benefitfrom their participation was that the stakeholderscould determine the political acceptability of theCommission as a whole. The WCD could laterclaim legitimacy based on its incorporation of theentire spectrum of views and perspectives in thedams debate. (See Box 4.3 for one example.)

The emphasis on representation, rather thaneminence, would have far-reaching implicationsfor Commissioners’ relationships with interestgroups in the debate and on stakeholders’ subse-quent support for the Commission’s work.13 Onthe one hand, Commissioners were explicitlyinvited to join the Commission as individuals andnot as formal representatives of an organisation.“When I was invited to participate, my chiefcriterion was independence,” said one Commis-sioner. “If you’re beholden, you’re stuck.”14 Suchindependence was essential if Commissioners wereto develop shared understanding with each otherand move toward a consensus.

On the other hand, Commissioners’ individuallegitimacy stemmed from their prominence ininternational networks and their unspoken claim torepresent certain viewpoints. As a result, they faceda perpetual tension between forging consensusamong themselves, which required flexibility, andmaintaining the trust of constituents, which re-quired a measure of rigidity. When asked whethershe was a representative of any group, one Commis-sioner responded: “Yes and no. It’s very complex. Ihave a responsibility to represent a point of view ofa particular constituency. It was in the mandate thatwe do not represent our organisations for the reasonthat I don’t go back to them on everything I have tosay. They have expressed faith in my nomination.”15

We return to the subject of representation and howCommissioners balanced competing pressures inChapter 7.

The struggle by NGOs for participation in deci-sion-making, rather than consultation alone, set abenchmark for stakeholder engagement through-out the process, but only after it had created aninitial climate of distrust.16 In order to rebuildtrust, the IWG wrote to Reference Group memberspromising to implement the Gland commitment

Box 4.2

The Commissioners

Kader AsmalWCD ChairpersonMinistry of Water Affairs and Forestry, South Africa

Lakshmi Chand JainWCD Vice-ChairpersonHigh Commissioner to South Africa, India

Judy HendersonOxfam International, Australia

Göran LindahlAsea Brown Boveri Ltd., Sweden

Thayer ScudderCalifornia Institute of Technology, United States

Joji CariñoTebtebba Foundation, Philippines

Donald BlackmoreMurray-Darling Basin Commission, Australia

Medha PatkarStruggle to Save the Narmada River, India

José GoldembergUniversity of São Paolo, Brazil

Deborah MooreEnvironmental Defense, United States

Shen Guoyia

Ministry of Water Resources, China

Jan Veltropb

Honorary President, International Commission onLarge Dams, United States

Achim Steinerc

WCD Secretary-GeneralGermany

a Resigned, early 2000

b Joined Commission in September 1998 to replaceWolfgang Pircher, the original nominee

c Initially an ex-officio Commissioner

Note: Affiliations as of May 1998Source: World Commission on Dams, Interim Report, July1999.



to a fair and transparent process not only in thepreparation phase but also throughout the life ofthe Commission.17

At least two lessons about developing a multi-stakeholder process emerge from this brief tour ofthe WCD’s early history. First, decision-makingauthority over commissioner selection must beclear. The ambiguous authority given to the IWG,tempered by the Reference Group’s consultingmandate and Prof. Dorcey’s calls for greaterstakeholder engagement, led to strains on theemerging dialogue between stakeholders. Second,

if the legitimacy of a commission is based in partupon perceptions of commissioners as representa-tive of broader interests, as is the case with theWCD, then the process of selection must takestakeholder groups into confidence. The participa-tion of a small group of stakeholders from Glandhelped gauge the legitimacy of individual Com-missioners in professional and interest-basednetworks, and the political acceptability of theCommission as a whole.

Reflections on the Composition of theCommission

One consequence of the Commission’s composi-tion along sectoral and disciplinary lines was thatregional and country representation were notperfectly balanced. The Commission includednationals from the world’s four largest dam-building countries: China, India, Brazil, and theUnited States. It was equally balanced betweenNorth and South, with both the Chairperson andVice-Chairperson coming from the South, wherethe majority of future dams were forecast to bebuilt. Both of these aspects boded well for theCommission’s success. However, the fact that theCommissioners came from a total of seven coun-tries and included two Indians, three Americans,and two Australians perplexed stakeholders inother major dam-building regions, such as LatinAmerica, East and West Africa, and the MiddleEast.18 Although multi-stakeholder processes arecomposed to reflect diverse political and sectoralviews, the WCD experience suggests that regionalrepresentation still matters.

Secondly, the selection process sought to balancegender diversity and was quite successful in doingso. Of the 13 original Commissioners (includingthe Secretary-General), 5 were women. This levelof participation by women was quite notable byhistorical standards. The caveat is that all but oneof these five women came from civil societybackgrounds. With the exception of Shen Guoyifrom the Government of China, the private sectorand government participants were all male. This

Box 4.3

Defining allies-the perspective of theMovimento dos Antingidos porBarragens(Movement of Dam-affected People, Brazil)

The views of the Movement of Dam-affected People(MAB), Brazil, on the composition of the WCDillustrate how stakeholders saw their perspectivesrepresented on the Commission. MAB’s leadershipbelieved that the majority of WCD Commissionerswere pro-dam in orientation. The Commissionerfrom Brazil was a former government official whomthey considered to be a historical enemy of theirmovement.

Nonetheless, MAB’s view of the Commission wastempered by the inclusion of Medha Patkar, the anti-dam activist, and the broader involvement of theStruggle to Save the Narmada River in the process.MAB saw Ms. Patkar as highly qualified and capableof playing a significant role in the process.

“During the choice of Commissioners, MABalmost left the process. We had manyproblems. But the inclusion of Medha Patkarmade us continue, because if the Save theNarmada was participating we had toparticipate too.”a

“I am sure that there were more pro-damrepresentatives than anti-dam ones. But Ithink that our Commissioners were so wellqualified that despite the minority innumbers we could easily present our ideasand convictions.”b

aInterview with NGO activist, MAB’s IV NationalCongress, November 1999.

bInterview with a leader from MAB, MAB’s IV NationalCongress, November 1999.

Source: Based on Flávia Braga Vieira, “Brazil’s Dam-AffectedPeople Movement and the World Commission on Dams.”Background paper for the WCD assessment, January 2001.

The Commissioners wereactive practitioners in

international networks.

C h a p t e r 4


formulation was to affect, in subtle ways, thedynamics within the Commission as, by and large,the male participants came from positions ofsignificantly greater power than did the femaleparticipants.19

The Effect of Stakeholder Mobilisation onRepresentation

The degree to which stakeholder groups approvedof the Commission’s composition—and felt theirviews were represented—depended partly on howorganised they were to participate in the earlyprocess. They were not all equally engaged inadvocacy.

NGOs and social movements were extremelyorganised and, to an external audience, appearedunited in their engagement in the Commissionerselection process.20 As a result, they nominatedCommissioners who enjoyed wide credibilitywithin civil society—with backgrounds thatspanned the interests of development, environ-ment, indigenous peoples, and resettled popula-tions. Although civil society groups continued tohave reservations about other Commissioners andthere was some internal dissension, most groupsagreed to continued participation and engagementin the WCD.

Private sector engagement with the IWG lacks apaper trail and so is harder to reconstruct than thatof the NGOs and movement groups. An officialfrom the Harza Engineering Company and a pastpresident of the International Commission onLarge Dams (ICOLD) provided a dams industryperspective to the Commissioner selection processas part of the expanded Interim Working Group.However, there is little evidence of broad privatesector interest in and engagement with the WCD atthis early stage. Certainly, the dams industry didnot have networks in place to co-ordinate commoninterests the way that anti-dam and social justicegroups did. Many companies that had a stake inthe WCD were either unaware of the Commission,or did not appreciate its potential significance fortheir operations. For example, a large utility sent arepresentative to the Gland workshop, but thenplayed no role in Commissioner selection or,indeed, in any aspect of the WCD until very late inthe process.21 Even among companies that appreci-ated the relevance of the WCD, private sectorparticipants suggested that competition amongfirms placed barriers to working in coalitions.22 As

a result, private companies, utilities, and industryassociations were less enthusiastic about theCommissioners from industry backgrounds,compared to NGOs and social movements’ sup-port for Commissioners from their backgrounds.

Furthermore, when the IWG proposed to includean office-bearer from ICOLD on the Commission,there was considerable contention over whichperson was most suitable. The original nominee, aformer president of ICOLD, attended the firstmeeting of the Commission then withdrew.23

Eventually, Dr. Jan Veltrop, another former presi-dent, was nominated and accepted. ICOLD mem-bers noted that there was vigorous debate behindclosed doors at ICOLD on the suitability of Dr.Veltrop’s nomination, implying that he did notenjoy the full trust of the membership.24 In short,the private sector was complacent in the early daysof the process, did not sufficiently appreciate thepossible impacts of the WCD, and was relativelyunprepared and fractious in its demands forrepresentation.

Governments were perhaps the hardest group toaccommodate within a representational model.Although governments certainly jostle for positionand representation when it comes to inter-govern-mental bodies, multi-stakeholder processes havenot, as yet, commanded that same attention. TheWCD was no exception. It was up to the WorldBank and IUCN and other members of the ex-panded Interim Working Group to reach out togovernments and inform them about the newopportunity for dialogue and shared learning.Standing as they did outside the United Nations orother formal inter-governmental bodies, the onuswas on the convenors to ensure that the WCDwould be credible to governments.

Ultimately, the Commission departed from themodel of past global commissions that have almostentirely comprised eminent retirees from govern-ment; however, its members’ collective governmentexperience was significant. Three Commissioners

There was littleprivate sector interest

in the WCD in theearly stages.



were active in government service during theirtime on the Commission: Professor Asmal ofSouth Africa; L.C. Jain of India; and Shen Guoyi ofChina. A former government official of anotherhuge dam-building nation, José Goldemburg ofBrazil, was appointed to the Commission. Severalother Commissioners were either former govern-ment officials, or officials of parastatalorganisations, such as Don Blackmore, the chiefexecutive of the world’s largest river basin author-ity. The Chairperson frequently pointed out that heand the Vice-Chairperson were from the South, toenhance the Commission’s legitimacy with South-ern governments.

This profile of governmental experience, whilesatisfactory to many stakeholders from the broadmiddle of the dams debate, proved unsatisfactoryto some governments. The Commissioner fromChina’s Ministry of Water Resources withdrewmidway through the process, apparently becauseher government was becoming uneasy with therange of views on the Commission. (See Chapter7.) This loss undoubtedly bruised the overallCommission’s credibility.

Meanwhile, the Government of India’s CentralWater Committee perceived both Commissionersfrom India as being anti-dam and complained thatit should have had a greater role in the selectionprocess. 25 Two Indian nationals sat on the Com-mission: L.C. Jain and Medha Patkar. Ms. Patkarwas the leader of the Struggle to Save the NarmadaRiver and National Convenor of the NationalAlliance of People’s Movements. Dr. Jain wasIndia’s High Commissioner to South Africa and aformer member of India’s National PlanningCommission and a special committee to reviewaspects of the Sardar Sarovar Project. Both werecritical of dams, Patkar famously so. Although theoverall Commission included engineers, investors,and pro-dam planners, it was difficult for officialsin India’s Central Water Committee to see beyondthe apparent bias of the two Indian members. TheIndian case illustrates the juggling act that isrequired to make sure that balance is achievedacross a range of parameters. It also highlights thatfor a global commission a global balance is neces-sary, but from the viewpoint of nation states, themore important lens is a national one.

The Indian government’s preference for greatergovernmental participation in the WCD selectionprocess and subsequent events illustrates a politi-

cal trade-off faced by the WCD’s convenors. Indianwater officials’ disapproval of the unfolding WCDprocess and eventual outcome was partly becauseof their lack of involvement in the formativeprocess. However, had governments been moreinvolved in the preparatory and subsequent phasesof the WCD, the direction of the process wouldhave been different and the political space forinclusion of NGOs and social movements wouldhave been destroyed. An influential NGO activisthas stated that the anti-dam movement’s involve-ment was contingent upon weak governmentalinvolvement, because it was governments’ waterand energy policies that protest movementsfundamentally opposed.26

Similarly, the options for greater World Bankinfluence over the Commission posed a politicaltrade-off. The IWG never considered nominatingan official of the World Bank to serve on theCommission because the WCD was rooted in thecall by civil society for a truly independent reviewof large dams. Had a World Bank official served onthe Commission (or had the process been tied tothe World Bank in other ways), the major anti-dam NGOs and social movements would have leftthe process and barraged it with negative publicity.They considered the World Bank to be too deeplyinvested in large dams technology to be capable ofproviding an independent assessment of dams’benefits and costs.

In future multi-stakeholder processes, questionswill inevitably arise about whether powerful actors,such as the World Bank, should have a direct voicein the negotiations, given the tenuous yet possibleeventuality that such involvement could increasethe institution’s buy-in to the results. As withgovernment officials, it is unclear whether and howa World Bank representative could comfortablymanage the ambiguous representation—as anindividual but also as an implied institutionalspokesperson—required to participate in theCommission. Just as with governments, theindividual chosen to serve from the World Bank—and his or her clout within the institution—would

The Government of Indiaperceived both Commissionersfrom India as being anti-dam.

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make a tremendous difference to the outcome ofthe multi-stakeholder process and institutionalacceptance of the results.

In sum, Commissioner selection was a highlycomplex balancing act. In the case of the WCD,NGOs were the most vigorous in representingtheir interests. In many respects, the creation ofpolitical space for their inclusion depended uponpro-dam interests being less organised and NGOsbeing able to claim the space for negotiation. Inother words, the convenors of future processesmust be aware that for contentious developmentissues such as dams, inclusion of diverse voices ispossible but political trade-offs inevitably arise.The WCD experience suggests that future multi-stakeholder commissions should respond to thechallenges of preparation and formation withcomprehensive mapping exercises of concernedstakeholders and connected selection processesamong stakeholder groups, rather than exclusionof any relevant constituency.

The Significance of the Secretariat’s Role

As Commissioners were the public and politicalface of the WCD, the process and outcome ofCommissioner selection were critical to represen-tation and, therefore, to the legitimacy of theWCD. By contrast, it is not immediately obviouswhy the composition of the Secretariat, designed asan administrative body, should also have played apart in stakeholder perceptions of the WCD’slegitimacy. And yet, it clearly did. Private sectoractors and NGOs concluded that the Secretariatwas a critical element of the Commission’s struc-ture, and that the composition of the Secretariatshaped outcomes. As we will discuss in Chapter 5,in operationalising the WCD’s work plan, theSecretariat’s role extended into framing decisionsfor the Commission in important, if understated,ways. As a result, concerns over the representationof interests became an issue within the Secretariat,just as much as within the Commission.

In processes of this nature, the importance of theSecretariat depends heavily on how Commission-ers choose to structure their work. In the early daysof the WCD, some Commissioners proposed thateach of them conduct an independent workprogramme using WCD resources, and conveneoccasionally to knit these disparate elements into acogent final report. This model would have re-quired only a minimal Secretariat, one which

would have had less influence in shaping outcomesand, therefore, fewer implications for the WCD’soverall legitimacy.27 However, this model wasabandoned as the Chairperson argued that onlythrough a collective, unified approach would theCommission have sufficient legitimacy to tran-scend the partisanship of the dams debate. TheCommissioners adopted a single plan that theywould supervise together. One significant outcomeof this decision was the need for a substantialSecretariat staff to undertake a more comprehen-sive work programme sanctioned by the WCD.However, this decision put much of the burden ofmaintaining credibility on to the Secretariat.

Achim Steiner, Secretary-General, in consultationwith the Chairperson, shouldered much of thisburden. As a Deputy Director with IUCN, Mr.Steiner had been centrally involved in organisingthe Gland meeting. Further, for several months heguided the early establishment phase of the IWG asits Interim Co-ordinator, until he left to take upanother position. When the time came to select afull-time Secretary-General, Mr. Steiner wassummoned back to the WCD. His appointmentapparently owed much to the relationship heenjoyed with Prof. Asmal, whose trust and confi-dence he had gained during the initial establish-ment phase. Indeed, during the course of theWCD, the close working relationship between Prof.Asmal and Mr. Steiner was repeatedly mentionedas an important glue for the process as a whole.28

The Selection of Secretariat Staff

Given the Secretariat’s important role in runningthe work programme, stakeholders watchedclosely to see whether their interests were re-flected in the its make-up. Recognising thesignificance of the Secretariat’s composition ingaining stakeholder groups’ confidence, theChairperson and Secretary-General sought staffwith wide-ranging views in the dams debate anda diversity of sectoral expertise. As with the

Stakeholders concludedthat the Secretariat's

composition shaped theoutputs of the Commission.



Commission, the effort was to ensure that theSecretariat, as a whole, demonstrated balance.Thus, some staff brought a history of engagementwith civil society groups, while others had workedon electricity and irrigation infrastructureprojects. To a limited extent, this compositionhelped pair Commissioners with particular staffwith whom they shared a perspective and back-ground, and facilitated communication betweenthe Commission and the Secretariat.

As with Commissioner selection, NGOs and socialmovements (including Commissioners from thosebackgrounds) were most active in identifyingcandidates for the Secretariat and encouragingthem to apply. These efforts helped ensure thatcivil society viewpoints were represented withinthe Secretariat. Private sector actors and damsassociations also played some role in proposingcandidates, but did not do so until quite late in theselection process.

Stakeholder groups on the Forum remaineduncomfortable with the Secretariat’s compositionfor much of the process, although the issue did notlead any of them to withdraw. Civil society groupscharged that the Secretariat staff tended to bedrawn from a mainstream perspective associatedwith international development institutions, suchas the World Bank.29 Critics argued that develop-ment agency experience fosters a mind-set thatemphasises technocratic approaches over the morepolitical views put forward by peoples’ movementsand some NGOs. Meanwhile, industry stakehold-ers noted that several Secretariat staff had previ-ously worked at IUCN, one of the WCD’s conven-ing institutions.

Charges of mainstream bias and IUCN tilt hadsome factual basis: four staff members broughtconsiderable experience working in bilateral ormultilateral development agencies. Three hadconsiderable work experience with IUCN. Threemore were drawn from academic or researchorganisations, two of whom had some experienceconsulting for development agencies. Two broughtconsiderable media experience to the WCD.

Although it is a relatively simple matter to look atpatterns in experience, it is much harder to assesswhat these patterns mean. Some of the effects ofpast experience, such as the ways in which prob-lems are framed, are difficult to analyse empiri-cally. It is easier to study the extent to which past

experience determined the networks that Secre-tariat members brought to their jobs. Thesenetworks were significant to the work of the WCD.Interviews suggest that Secretariat staff reliedheavily on their past contacts to identify consult-ants to carry out the work programme and partici-pants in the consultations organised by theWCD.30 For example, the case study consultants inPakistan were selected based on past work con-ducted by three senior advisors in Pakistan. Thisevidence of the importance of social networkssuggests that explicit attention to the breadth ofpast experience within the Secretariat might havemade for a more inclusive process.

If we accept that the personal experience ofSecretariat staff inevitably affects the work of theCommission in explicit and subtle ways, then it isalso relevant to examine the composition of theSecretariat along other parameters. Examined forgender balance, the Secretariat was unbalanced,with only two women (one of whom left duringthe process) among ten senior advisers. However,the Secretariat did also rely heavily on highlyqualified interns, of which three-fourths werewomen.31 Thus, women were well represented atjunior levels, but under-represented at seniorlevels.

The geographic balance across regions was alsouneven. Of the ten senior advisors, three were fromEurope, three from North America, two fromSouth Asia, and one each from Latin America andAfrica. Admittedly, these categorisations are crude,since most of the Secretariat staff had variedbackgrounds and experience in several regions. Inparticular, all of the Europeans and North Ameri-cans also had considerable experience in Southerncountries. In addition, the Secretariat staff explic-itly sought out interns from various areas, particu-larly from those regions where the WCD wouldhost regional consultations.32

In sum, the composition of the Secretariat reflectedthe existing bias in development circles towarddevelopment agency experience, a preponderanceof men over women, and of Northern rather thanSouthern origins. Some argue that the demo-graphic characteristics of the Secretariat onlyreflected the constraints of global society in termsof the requisite skills, training, experience, andavailability of personnel. However, the legitimacyof a body explicitly committed to inclusiveness, asthe WCD Secretariat was, would have been more

C h a p t e r 4


easily defended had it successfully found ways toovercome these limitations.

Establishment of the Forum

The participants at the Gland workshop called forroles for diverse stakeholders in the Commission’sstructure. In addition to the Commission andSecretariat, they envisioned a consultative group ofstakeholders comprised of their own number,supplemented by others, to be used as a soundingboard for the Commission’s ideas.33 This visionwas realised in the WCD Forum. The intent was byno means for the Commission to be accountable tothe Forum on an ongoing basis. Instead, the Forumwas an institutionalised means for the Commis-sioners, assisted by the Secretariat, to receivefeedback on their ongoing work. The Forum wouldensure that the wider body of stakeholders re-mained engaged in the process throughout its lifeand that the Commission did not drift too far fromthe wider range of opinions in the debate. Finally,the Forum, as the group of stakeholders mostclosely concerned with the outcome of the WCD,was intended to publicise the work of the WCDand build ownership for the final product. In theeloquent words of Kader Asmal, if the World Bankand IUCN were the midwives, the Forum was thefamily into whose hands the fledgling WCD reportwould be delivered.34

The participants in the Gland workshop formedthe core of the Forum. It was subsequentlyexpanded to its final size of 68organisations.35 As with the otherorgans of the WCD, the initiatorssought a balanced representationacross various stakeholder groups.Participation in the Forum was byinvitation only. The Commissiondecided upon new members withthe help of the Secretariat. Partici-

pation was divided into 10 different group types(see Figure 4.1)—a classification that brought abalance of views to the Forum as a whole and thatprovides a possible model for future processes.

The definition of stakeholder groups had consider-able implications for the relative representation ofthe Forum. For example, had the WCD beenexplicitly conceived of as a “trilateral network”—asimplistic formulation that has gained popularityin recent years—there would potentially have beenconsiderable pressure to allocate Forum represen-tation equally among governments, civil societyorganisations, and the private sector. Instead, theWCD chose to adopt a more fine-grained approachbased on a close examination of the dams arena. Forexample, it included separate categories for NGOsand dam-affected peoples to reflect the differentperspectives, approaches, and concerns of these twogroups. In another example, it divided industrygroups into river basin authorities, utilities, andprivate sector firms. This was entirely appropriateand continued the more sophisticated mapping ofstakeholder categories evidenced in Agenda 21 andits follow-up processes. As one commentator wroteof the approach in Agenda 21, “How can you puttogether NGOs, women, trade unions, scientists,and local government, to mention a few, in onegrouping called civil society?”36

Figure 4.1 Forum composition

Source: WCD website,www.dams.orgabout/forum_list.htm(28 September 2001).

MultilaMultilatterial Aerial Agenciesgencies10%10%

BilaBilattereral Aal Agencies /gencies /ExporExport Crt Creditedit

GuarGuaranantteeee AAgenciesgencies8%8%

GoGovvernmenernmenttAAgenciesgencies

8%8%

InIntternaernationaltionalAssociaAssociationstions

7%7%

AAffecffecttededPPeopleseoples' Gr' Groupsoups

10%10%NGOsNGOs19%19%

ResearResearchchInstitutInstituteses

15%15%

PPrivrivaatte Se SececttororFFirmsirms10%10%

RRiviver Ber Basin Aasin Authoritiesuthorities6%6%

UtilitiesUtilities7%7%



Inclusiveness was but one concern in designing theForum; the other was balance. The differentinterest groups on the Forum, interestingly, allconsidered it unbalanced in some way. Industryrepresentatives found the Forum biased towardsNGOs and felt that they would not “get their way”until the balance shifted.37 When communitygroups and anti-dam NGOs tallied up numbers,they counted many more Forum members fromthe development establishment, which theyconsidered pro-dam, than from project-affectedcommunities. In the politically charged atmo-sphere around dams, no single formulation couldsatisfy all constituencies. The Commission made abroad effort to include multiple voices in approxi-mately level proportions. Its ability to hold theForum together through the process suggests thatthe general balance of the WCD’s Forum was right.

The Participation of Women

One shortcoming of the WCD’s stakeholder formu-lation is that participants who brought a genderperspective were not explicitly included as a sepa-rate stakeholder group. The Commission didacknowledge that there should be a slot for women’sissues. The international women’s network DAWN(Development Alternatives for Women in a NewEra), which has a rotating secretariat among South-ern countries, filled this slot.

Otherwise, gender concerns were captured onlyincidentally by individuals nominated to the otherstakeholder categories. In most cases, the institu-tions chosen for Forum membership nominatedmale representatives. (The same phenomenonoccurred at the Gland meeting, when IUCN andthe World Bank invited institutions, not individu-als, to participate and the overwhelming majorityof representatives were men.) Although it is truethat women seldom form a significant politicalconstituency in dams debates, they do form one ofthe most important stakeholder groups in overallwater use and management. Indeed, the DublinPrinciples, agreed by governmental representativesin 1992 in the run-up to the United Nations

Conference on Environment and Development,recognised, as one of four overarching principles,that “[the] pivotal role of women as providers andusers of water and guardians of the living environ-ment has seldom been reflected in institutionalarrangements for the development and manage-ment of water.”38 The call for women’s integralinvolvement in water management was one of fourpillars in the final conference declaration.

The space given to women’s voices on the Com-mission itself was extremely important—and tosome degree corrected for the Forum’s male bias—in terms of women’s influences on the process’outcome and overall public perceptions of genderbias. However, the Forum’s tilt nonetheless estab-lished it as a place where women had a hard timemaking themselves heard. Women participants—who were overwhelmingly from NGOs—reportedhow facilitators and rapporteurs of the Forummeetings disregarded their comments. A memberof the sole women’s group on the Forum wasvisibly distressed by the lack of acknowledgementof women’s issues in the discussion. An observingfemale journalist from India wrote an articlefollowing the final Forum meeting that highlightedthe preponderance of men at WCD meetings.39

For a global process that was committed to goodgovernance, there is enough evidence to suggestthat gender bias in the WCD Forum led women tobelieve it was not a legitimate space for equaldialogue. Future multi-stakeholder processes willhave to grapple with issues of organisational versusindividual representation, if they follow theadvisory forum model. There is a strong case forpromoting more equitable women’s and men’sparticipation in such a design.

The Funding Challenge: EnsuringAdequacy and Independence

The WCD’s fundraising approach raises threequestions. First, from a pragmatic point of view,did the WCD raise adequate funds to sustain itselfeffectively? Second, did the process of fundraisingsupport or undermine the commitment to inde-

The WCD chose a fine-grainedapproach to stakeholder

representation on the Forum.

The Forum lacked the voices ofwomen and gender advocates.

C h a p t e r 4


pendence, broad participation, and transparencythat characterised the WCD’s work? Third, did thefunding sources constrain or inhibit the workingof the WCD?

From a pragmatic perspective, the WCD success-fully met an ambitious budget, which allowed it toaccomplish a significant amount of work over itstwo-year duration. This was a commendableaccomplishment. At the same time, the WCDlaboured under considerable uncertainty, particu-larly in its early months, over whether it would meetits fundraising targets. This uncertainty hamperedits early work. Greater certainty of funds in theplanning phase would undoubtedly have facilitatedsmoother implementation of the work plan.40

The fundraising strategy was designed to ensurethe WCD’s independence from possible sources ofinfluence over its product and to mirror the multi-stakeholder nature of the Commission itself.Independence was sought by adopting a “no

strings attached” fundraising policy. To ensureparticipation from a spectrum of actors, the WCDsought funds from the public sector, the privatesector, and civil society institutions. The intent wasto avoid undue reliance on any single funder andpromote buy-in by all interest groups in thedebate.41 The total projected budget for the WCDwas just under US$10 million.

One indication of the fundraising strategy’ssuccess was that the sources of funds and themeans of raising funds did not provoke anydebates during what was a highly scrutinisedprocess. Multiple sources of funds allowed theWCD to claim that there was broad belief in thework of the Commission, as evidenced by therange of funders it attracted, including govern-ments, industry, multilateral organisations, NGOs,and private philanthropic foundations. In examin-ing the funding strategy in more depth, however,two caveats emerge.

Figure 4.2 Income sourcesSource: World Commission on Dams Project and Financial Report, May 1998 – April 2001.

IndustrIndustry ($917,078)y ($917,078)

TThehe WWorld Borld Bank ($1,100,000)ank ($1,100,000)

Asian DAsian DevevelopmenelopmenttBBank ($100,000)ank ($100,000)

SSwwedish Inedish Intternaernational Dtional DevevelopmenelopmenttAAgencgency ($943,651)y ($943,651)

SSwiss Dwiss DevevelopmenelopmenttCCorpororporaation ($995,044)tion ($995,044)

DDenmark Ministrenmark Ministry ofy ofFFororeign Aeign Affairsffairs ($100,000)($100,000)

Non-goNon-govvernmenernment ($46,228)t ($46,228)FFoundaoundation ($174,988)tion ($174,988)

OOther Incther Income ($80,416)ome ($80,416)

FFinland Ministrinland Ministry ofy ofFFororeign Aeign Affairsffairs ($178,161)($178,161)

NorNorwwaay Ministry Ministry ofy ofFFororeign Aeign Affairsffairs

($726,114)($726,114)

Republic of IrRepublic of Ireland ($100,000)eland ($100,000)

German AGerman Agencgency fory forTTechnical Cechnical Cooperooperaation ($747,459)tion ($747,459)

UnitUnited Naed Nations Entions Envirvironmenonment Pt Prrogrogram meam me($1,384,937)($1,384,937)

Japan MinistrJapan Ministry ofy ofFFinancinance ($500,000)e ($500,000)

AAustrustralian Aalian Agencgency for Iny for IntternaernationaltionalDDevevelopmenelopment ($309,452)t ($309,452)

CCanadian Inanadian IntternaernationaltionalDDevevelopmenelopmentt AAgencgency ($65,738)y ($65,738)

DDeparepartmentment for Int for IntternaernationaltionalDDevevelopmenelopmentt,, U.K.U.K. ($922,734)($922,734)



First, although a wide range of funders from avariety of sectors did contribute, the bulk of thecontributions came from the public sector. AsFigure 4.2 shows, governments and multilateralagencies accounted for 88 percent of total financ-ing for the WCD. Bilateral donor agencies fromOECD countries, who funnelled their contribu-tions through a trust fund set up by the WorldBank, were a particularly important source offinancing. This suggests that other stakeholdergroups cannot or will not pick up the tab forcommissions of this nature.

Second, the process of fundraising, at least in part,drove expansion of the Forum. Several Forummembers, including a multilateral organisation, agovernment agency, and a private sector firmreported that they joined the Forum after beingapproached for a financial contribution to theWCD. 42 Did this compromise the independence ofthe Forum? The answer is likely negative, becausethere is no evidence that funding was a require-ment for membership on the Forum for thesegroups. Indeed, in one case, the organisation,citing its internal constraints, refused to fund theWCD but was nonetheless invited to participate onthe Forum. However, the fact that some Forummembers did perceive a linkage between Forummembership and funds suggests that the Secre-tariat did have trouble maintaining absoluteindependence.43 This process does illustrate thepotential for fundraising imperatives to compro-mise the independence of a commission, or, almostas serious, to create perceptions of compromisedindependence, which could damage the integrity ofthe process.

Second, the WCD made some compromises on its“no strings attached” clause. Specifically, in somecases donors made requests regarding how theirfunds would be used, or provided in-kind infor-mation or expertise. Normally, this had no discern-ible impact on the functioning of the WCD. Forinstance, the U.K. Department for InternationalDevelopment (DFID) sought to support Britishinput to the WCD. The WCD was able to meet thisrequirement through internal accounting thatshowed DFID funds were used to support Britishcitizens on the Secretariat.44 The Asian Develop-ment Bank provided funds earmarked for theWCD’s consultations in Asia. Such geographicallybounded provisions are not uncommon forbilateral and multilateral agencies.

Occasionally, funder preferences did influence thework programme in small ways. For example, theInter-American Development Bank (IDB) chose toprovide an in-kind contribution to the surveyportion of the work programme from a Norwegiantrust fund under its control. From the perspectiveof WCD staff, this led to considerable IDB controlover the process, as the IDB, not the WCD, chose aNorwegian consulting firm to conduct the workand added questions to the survey. For its part, theIDB suggested that they were forced into more of amanagement role by the WCD than they desired.45

In another case, a potential funder was rejectedbecause the institution wanted to tie its funds. Itsubsequently dropped the restrictions andjoined.46

In summary, the WCD faced a trade-off betweenindependence and obtaining sufficient funds topromote inclusion in the process. The evidencedoes not suggest that these incidents substantiallyaltered the trajectory or outcomes of the WCD, norwere they significant in undermining perceptionsof the WCD’s independence. However, they dosuggest that the WCD faced continuous pressuresin maintaining independence, and that the WCDhad to make judgement calls as to what degree ofinterference was acceptable.

Conclusions

A commission built in part around the representa-tion of stakeholders provides a promising alterna-tive to a commission based on eminent persons. Ifkey stakeholder groups perceive commissioners aslegitimate representatives of their interests, thensuch a structure increases the likelihood thatstakeholders will endorse the final outcome of theprocess. In order for this model to work, however,stakeholder groups must have a voice in theprocess of selecting Commissioners, and this voiceshould be recognised early in the process. This wasthe case in the WCD’s formation, when a small butdiverse group of stakeholders from the Glandmeeting participated in Commissioner selection.

The fundraising strategywas designed to ensure theWCD's independence from

sources of influence.

C h a p t e r 4


A model designed around representation alsobrings with it complexities of implementation.Representation of large, unbounded groups ofstakeholders with no formal structures of co-ordination or accountability cannot be based onformal representation. Instead, representation isbased on the loose accountability of commission-ers and on their reputation as individuals. Thishybrid model requires that each stakeholder groupis able to build consensus around legitimaterepresentatives. Advocacy NGOs and socialmovements felt well represented on the WCDbecause their high level of organisation led tocoherent demands for representation. Industry

groups, by contrast, were poorly organised toparticipate at first, and did not feel well repre-sented. Finally, the WCD experience shows thatrepresentation along the lines of interest groupshas to be integrated with representation of experi-ence, regional diversity, and gender diversity.

The secretariat that administers the day-to-dayfunctioning of a commission has a key role increating the political space for diverse participa-tion. If it is perceived as broadly representative ofstakeholder interests, it will have the trust of thesegroups. In the case of the WCD, the Secretariatmirrored the make-up of the professional develop-ment bureaucracy. The availability of qualifiedstaff can pose a challenge to achieving sufficientdiversity across interests, expertise, and gender andin regional balance. However, diversity in a secre-tariat, no less than in a commission, is worthstriving for.

A fundraising strategy that draws upon a widevariety of contributors and that explicitly seeksindependence from funders is an appropriateapproach for a multi-stakeholder commission suchas the WCD. The fact that the WCD’s funding wasnot a contentious issue and did not cause anyinterest groups to leave the process suggests thatsecuring funding from diverse sources was animportant part of the platform for broad stake-holder engagement. Not only did this strategyensure the direct buy-in of many actors, it alsobuilt the trust and co-operation of others (forinstance, had the WCD been only corporate-funded, it would have eroded the trust of civilsociety). Diversifying sources is an appropriatestrategy to minimise dependence and possiblecontrol imposed by a narrow donor base.

STRATEGIES FOR BUILDING CREDIBLE MULTI-STAKEHOLDER PROCESSES

• Base representation on broad constituencies andskills-based categories, rather than on eminencealone, to create the political space for a largerange of stakeholders to get involved.

• Undertake an assessment to determine majorcategories of stakeholders who must be broughtto the table.

• Engage the full range of stakeholders early in theprocess of selection to gauge the politicalacceptability of commission composition,particularly if the commission is based on therepresentation of interest groups.

• Ensure that the composition of the Secretariatembraces disciplinary breadth and is seen toreflect broader stakeholder interests.

• Ensure that a gender perspective is representedin all of a commission’s bodies.

• Seek diverse funding based on untied funds.



Endnotes

27. Interview with Secretariat staff, 6 November 2000.

28. Interview with advisor to Kader Asmal, April 2000.

29. They argued that the short time frame within which theCommission was set up and the requirement to move toCape Town limited the choice to development consult-ants whose experience drew largely from the interna-tional development bureaucracy. Interview with NGOrepresentative on the Forum, 5 April 2000.

30. Interviews with Secretariat staff, 8 April 2000 and 26February 2001.




34. Statement by Kader Asmal at WCD second Forummeeting, Cape Town, April 2000.

35. WCD website, www.dams.org/about/forum_list.htm (28September 2001).

36. Felix Dodds, “Multi-Stakeholder Processes in the Contextof Global Governance,” in Multi-Stakeholder Processes forGovernance and Sustainability Beyond Deadlock andConflict. Minu Hemmati, ed. (London: Earthscan, 2001).Thanks to Dr. Hemmati for her insightful comments onthis issue. Personal communication, 29 July 2001.

37. Personal communication with industry representativeson the WCD Forum, 26-27 February 2001.

38. Principle Three of The Dublin Statement, InternationalConference on Water and the Environment: Develop-ment Issues for the 21st Century, 26-31 January 1992,Dublin, Ireland. “Women play a central part in theprovision, management and safeguarding of water: Thispivotal role of women as providers and users of waterand guardians of the living environment has seldombeen reflected in institutional arrangements for thedevelopment and management of water resources.Acceptance and implementation of this principlerequires positive policies to address women’s specificneeds and to equip and empower women to participateat all levels in water resources programmes, includingdecision-making and implementation, in ways defined bythem.”

39. Kalpana Sharma, “Lack of Rancour Marks WCDProceedings,” The Hindu (13 December 1998). Online at:www.dams.org/media/mediaitem.php?item=10 (28September 2001).

40. Interview with Secretariat staff, 13 December 2000.

41. WCD website, www.dams.org/about/funding.htm (28September 2001).

42. Interviews with Forum members, 1 December 2000, 27February 2001, and 7 March 2000.

43. Interview with Forum member, 27 February 2001.

44. Interviews with Secretariat staff, 3 November 2000.

45. Interview with IDB official, 1 December 2000.

46. Personal communication with former Secretariat staff,August 2001.

1. World Bank/IUCN, Large Dams: Learning from the Past,Looking to the Future (Gland: IUCN, 1997).


3. Interview with participant at Gland meeting, 1 February2001.

4. World Bank/IUCN, 1997.

5. Interview with Forum member, June 2000.

6. Interview with industry representative on the Forum, 27February 2001.

7. Patrick McCully, “How to Use a Trilateral Network: AnActivist’s Perspective on the World Commission onDams.” Paper presented at Agrarian Studies ProgramColloquium, Yale University, 19 January 2001.

8. “NGO Letter on the Draft Final List” sent by e-mail toIUCN/World Bank Co-Chairs of IWG, Senior Advisor toIWG, and Chair, WCD, 28 October 1997.

9. “NGO Letter on the Draft Final List” sent by e-mail toIUCN/World Bank Co-Chairs of IWG, Senior Advisor toIWG and Chairperson, WCD, 28 October 1997.

10. Letter by Kader Asmal, John Briscoe, and George Greeneto the Reference Group, 21 November 1997.

11. Interview with former IWG member, 16 November 2000.

12. Interview with former IWG member, 16 November 2000.

13. Interview with Commissioner, 27 February 2000.

14. Interview with Commissioner, 8 December 1999.


16. Letter from John Briscoe and George Greene to theReference Group, 23 December 1997. The Co-Chairsproposed the final date for the launch of the Commissionto be late January 1998.

17. Letter from John Briscoe and George Greene to theReference Group, 23 December 1997.

18. Based upon interviews with government and agencyofficials at the WCD consultation in Egypt, December1999, and focus groups and interviews in Tanzania,Kenya, and Uganda in November 2000.


20. Interview with Gland participant, April 2000.


22. Interviews with industry representatives on the Forum,17 November 2000 and 26 February 2001.

23. Wolfgang Pircher stated his reason for withdrawal asfinancial: Commissioners were not provided withconsultancy fees.

24. However, this view was volunteered in an interview latein the process, after Dr. Veltrop had shown himself to beremarkably open to a wide range of views. Interview withForum member, 17 February 2001.

25. Interview with official of India’s Central Water Commis-sion, speaking in his personal (non-official) capacity, 6December 2000.

26. McCully, 2001.

I m p l e m e n t i n g t h e W o r k P r o g r a m m e : T h e C o m m i s s i o n e d S t u d i e s


Chapter 5

Implementing the Work Programme:The Commissioned Studies

Commission had been less heterogeneous and lessclosely tied to the interests in the dams debate.

The Commissioners wisely decided on a flexiblework programme that created the political spacefor diverse views on dam planning and practice toemerge. They used the creation of a global “knowl-edge base,” a central part of their mandate, as anopportunity to engage most major interest groups.The next section of this chapter details aspects ofthe work programme’s design that were intendedto capture these diverse views and engage a broadcross section of stakeholders in the knowledge-gathering exercise.

Defining the specific tasks and scope of theknowledge base was a daunting task. Given thehuge number of large dams—45,000 in all—theCommission realised it would not be possible toanalyse a statistically representative sample. Rather,according to early work documents, the Commis-sion would foster “a structured, transparent, andinclusive dialogue around key issues and majorcontroversies that have proved to be so divisive.”4

The dialogue would be accomplished through fouractivities, which became known as the “fourpillars” of the Commission’s knowledge base andare detailed in Box 5.1.5 First, in-depth case studieswould illuminate large dams’ performance. Second,a survey of 150 large dams would capture trends inperformance. Third, cross-cutting issues papers(“thematic reviews”) would highlight best prac-tices and recurring problems from around theworld, as well as alternatives to large dams inproviding water supply, energy, and flood controlservices.6 Fourth, public consultations would beheld in all major world regions to provide stake-holders with the opportunity to share their viewsdirectly, and the public would be able to make

As with other multi-stakeholder processes,the success of the World Commission onDams rested on its legitimacy with thestakeholders whose actions brought it

into being, and to whom it would turn over itsfindings. Indeed, the final product’s authoritydepended upon a good process that enableddiverse stakeholders to contribute. The implicitbenefits of diverse engagement were two-fold: first,such a process would be better informed byintegrating diverse subjective viewpoints. Second,inclusion would build constituencies for imple-mentation.

In order to “get the process right to ensure legiti-macy,” 1 the Commission committed to a set ofguiding principles for its work programme. Theseincluded transparency, inclusiveness, indepen-dence, and accessibility. This chapter and thefollowing chapter ask: How did the WCD put theseprinciples of good governance into practice? Whatwas the effect of these efforts on stakeholder buy-in to the Commission’s work? We also consider theimplications of this experience for the design offuture processes.

An Inclusive Approach to KnowledgeGathering

Participants at the Gland workshop articulatedwhat the Commission should do, and how to do it.They called for a Commission that would makedecision-making on dams more transparent andaccountable2 and that would model these values inits own practice.3 The challenge of operationalis-ing this mandate rested with a group of verydiverse Commissioners, brought together throughan acrimonious process. Forging a workprogramme to the mutual satisfaction of such agroup brought greater challenges than if the

C h a p t e r 5


Box 5.1 The four pillars of the knowledge baseSource: WCD website, www.dams.org/about/workprog.htm (28 September 2001).

FFococalalCase SCase Studiestudies

Dam/BasinDam/Basin 150 L150 Large Damsarge DamsCCross-Cross-Check Sheck Sururvveeyy

ThemaThematicticReRevieviewwss

SSubmissions andubmissions andCConsultaonsultationstions

FFococalal DamDam

Pilot SPilot Studytudy::

TTarbelaarbelaCCaribaariba

PPak Munak MunCrCrand Cand CouleeouleeTTucuruiucuruiAsianAsiantastasGGiomma-Lageniomma-Lagen

Gariep/VGariep/Vanderkloof Damsanderkloof DamsSouth ASouth Africafrica

CCountrountryyPPakistanakistanZZambia/Zimbabwambia/ZimbabweeTThailandhailandUSAUSABrBrazilazilTTurkurkeyeyNorNorwwaayy

150+ lar150+ large damsge damspapatttterns and trerns and trendsendsperperformancformance and decision-makinge and decision-makingdams frdams from case studiesom case studiesdams frdams from other daom other databases and sourtabases and sourcceses

Social impacSocial impacts of larts of large dams:ge dams: equitequity and distributional issuesy and distributional issuesDamsDams,, indigenous people and ethnic minoritiesindigenous people and ethnic minoritiesDisplacDisplacemenementt,, rresettlemenesettlementt,, rrehabilitaehabilitation,tion, rrepareparaation and devtion and developmenelopmenttDamsDams,, ececosystosystem funcem functions and entions and envirvironmenonmental rtal restestororaationtionDams and global changeDams and global changeEEcconomiconomic,, financial and distributional analysisfinancial and distributional analysisInIntternaernational trtional trends in prends in projecoject financingt financingAssessmenAssessment of elect of electricittricity supply and demand managemeny supply and demand management optionst optionsAssessmenAssessment of irrigat of irrigation optionstion optionsAssessmenAssessment of wt of waatter supply optionser supply optionsAssessmenAssessment of food ct of food conontrtrol and managemenol and management optionst optionsOperOperaation,tion, rrefurbishmenefurbishmentt,, rrelicelicensing and decensing and decommissioning of damsommissioning of damsPlanning apprPlanning approachesoachesEnEnvirvironmenonmental and Social assessmental and Social assessment for lart for large damsge damsRRiviver basins—institutional frer basins—institutional framewameworks and managemenorks and management optionst optionsRegulaRegulation,tion, ccompliancompliance and implemene and implementatattion optionsion optionsCConsultaonsultation and partion and participaticipattorory decision makingy decision making

Global ReGlobal Revieview ofw ofDeDevvelopmentelopmentEffEffecectivtivenesseness

Options AOptions Assessment Framessessment Framewworkorkand Decision-making Process fand Decision-making Process foror

WWaatter and Energy Resourceser and Energy Resources

IntInternaernationallytionallyAAcceptccepted Ced Critriteriaeria

and Guidelinesand Guidelines

TThe studies abohe studies abovve will form thee will form the WWCDCD’’ss

frfrom which will be derivom which will be derived the folloed the following rwing reporeports:ts:KNOWLEDGE BASEKNOWLEDGE BASE

WWCCDD FFiinnaall RReeppoorrtt



general submissions to the Secretariat, by mail, inperson, or through the Commission’s website. Thisframework emerged out of considerable discussionand after several alternative frameworks wereconsidered.

The Commissioners did not review past damsexperience with a specific yardstick for “develop-ment effectiveness” (indeed, it would likely havebeen impossible for the diverse Commissioners toagree on such a yardstick at the start). Instead, theyencouraged stakeholders to air their own views onwhat constitutes development effectiveness, andthey promised to weigh convergent and divergentviews.7 Kader Asmal’s injunction for people tohave their “day in court” in the context of onecomponent of the work programme, the regionalconsultations, was therefore a suitable allegory forthe WCD’s work as a whole. Normative judgementsabout the justice of dam building and distributionof benefits were as welcome as technical cost-benefitcalculations when it came to stakeholder consulta-tions and general submissions.

Significantly, this approach gave many groups thehope that their views might prevail. If, by contrast,the Commission had tried to come up with a singleyardstick for assessing dams, they might havealienated certain interest groups from the start. TheCommission side-stepped the flaw in the WorldBank Operations Evaluation Department (OED)study that had ignited NGO criticism. The OEDReview had rated World Bank-funded dams on ascale of unacceptable to acceptable but had run intotrouble because NGOs criticised the World Bank’sevidence and OED’s notion of “acceptable.”8

“In many other areas, people feel excluded,” saidone Commissioner from government. “Here wehave a unique opportunity, people feel included.”9

A community-based Commissioner rallied anNGO meeting with a similar statement: “I think wecan reassure the communities that the WCD isdemanded by the people themselves. You can tellthem it’s up to us, the civil society, as to how weuse this process effectively.”10

In spite of these benefits, it is important to note adiscrepancy among stakeholders of what theknowledge base was meant to achieve. Accordingto the Commission and Secretariat, the knowledgebase was intended to both contribute to theCommission’s learning from the past and tohighlight current and future good practice in dambuilding, operations, and decommissioning. Butgovernment and industry actors, on the one hand,and NGO and movement groups, on the other, hadfundamental differences about the appropriateorientation of the workplan. Government andindustry actors thought the exercise should focusas much as possible on good practice in recentdams history. They were looking for changes thatcould be adopted relatively easily within givendevelopment frameworks. Non-governmentalactors were looking for full documentation of baddams practice that would support their campaignsfor compensation for displaced people and theirdesire for large dams technology to be condemnedin the future. This ongoing contestation wouldcolour the next two years’ work.11

The knowledge generation process for the WCDcould have taken different paths. Early on, Com-missioners discussed whether they could individu-ally supervise independent reviews of damsexperience in their regions12 with light co-ordina-tion by the Chairperson and Secretary-General,but the Commissioners rejected this model on thebasis that their credibility rested on a uniformityof approach across case studies. This could only beachieved by having a substantial body of senioradvisors in Cape Town to co-ordinate the studies.13

Considering that individual Commissionerstended to raise suspicion when they appearedalone in the WCD context, it is also possible thatsuch a decentralised model would have alienatedkey interest groups in the regions. Althoughrejection of this model implied hiring a largerSecretariat, it probably increased the inclusivenessof the process.

Some development practitioners and Secretariatmembers favoured a second model that involvedundertaking a full-blown assessment of thedevelopment effectiveness of energy alternatives to

The flexible work programmecreated political space fordiverse stakeholder views.

The regional consultationsgave people their “day in court.”

C h a p t e r 5


hydropower.14 This approach would have placedthe future of dams within the framework of globalenergy forecasts (as well as freshwater needs), andwould have illuminated the comparative advan-tages and disadvantages of dams over other meansof obtaining these services. Many industry andgovernmental participants remain displeased, tothis day, that such a comprehensive optionsassessment was not undertaken. The Commissionrejected this model on the basis that global fore-casting was a niche occupied by existing thinktanks.15 Moreover, a technocratic approach of thisnature would not have supported the commitmentto inclusion and participation demanded by theReference Group at Gland.

Participation in the Framing Process

The earliest expressions of the Commission’smandate called for a body that would undertake itswork in a participatory fashion.16 Yet, theconvenors of any multi-stakeholder process mustask: When should we invite stakeholders to partici-pate? Should the process be open to public com-ment at every step of the way, or does this makethe transaction costs too high? This questionapplied at every stage in the WCD process: fromthe call for a World Commission on Dams,through the drafting of the final report. As shownin Chapter 3, an open dialogue among corestakeholders on the composition of the Commis-sion proved essential to obtaining their groups’support for the two-year process. In the followingprocess to shape and define the work programme,the newly formed Commission erred towardproviding frequent opportunities for publiccomment.

The catch with the WCD’s initial efforts to inviteparticipation is that they were not sufficientlypublicised to garner significant input. Because offunding constraints and a small staff in the earlydays, the WCD’s invitations for public commenton the emerging work programme were largelydisseminated on its website in 1998. However, thisvirtual forum was barely used and was conse-quently removed from the site.17 Instead, commentcame predominantly from networks of NGOs andprofessional associations who learned of the WCDfrom colleagues on the Commission and Secre-tariat and used these contacts as pressure points.18

It was not until the first meeting of the WCD’sadvisory Forum in April 1999 that a broader range

of stakeholder inputs—through the Forum mem-bers and their networks—developed. During thismeeting, the diverse members of the Forumbecame fully informed about the scope andelements of the work programme. By then, thewindow of opportunity was closing for commenton the framing of Commission studies. Of thisconsultation period, one senior Secretariat mem-ber noted, “One lesson is, don’t assume that if youdon’t have comments on the work programme thatthey’re happy with it!”19

One Forum member from a development banknoted that the process of consolidating the workprogramme had happened too fast for his col-leagues to absorb and respond to the information.“[The WCD] needed time for proper outreach onthe methodology, for country studies and findingsupport from all corners,” he said.20

In fairness to the WCD, its budget was extremelytight for the first two-thirds of its history, withscarce funds for elaborate outreach. TheSecretariat’s outreach efforts were challenged bythe amount of time that the Commissioners tookto settle on the precise elements of the workplan (ittook until December 1998 to establish the maincases and questions). Outreach was also slowed byfundraising. Difficulties in fundraising distractedSecretariat staff from their other work and delayedportions of the work programme.21

The WCD’s experience highlights the importanceof publicising the nature and aims of a commis-sion at the outset, extending beyond electronicmeans as much as possible. The WCD madereasonable efforts to reach out in person. Futurecommissions should try to do even more to ensurethey are reaching those without Internet access,and to ensure they win relevant stakeholders’attention early.

The Commissioned Studies: Case Studies

The Choice of Case Studies: A PoliticalBalancing Act

The WCD’s case studies were a key component inthe Commission’s Global Review of Large Dams.They were intended to give “the first integratedlook at dams from the perspective of all interestgroups, be it from the point of view of governmentagencies, local economists, the riparian habitat, orimpacts on the diets of indigenous peoples.”22



The main question facing the Commission in itschoice of studies was: How would it access anadequate breadth of experience about large damsand their impacts? It was not simply a question ofhow to assemble a representative picture of theexperience with large dams, but also of how toensure that the Commission appeared neutral tooutside audiences. The Commission did not wishto alienate any major groups with its choice of casestudies.

Dam proponents feared the Commission wouldchoose only “failed” dams as a way of tarnishingthe whole industry.23 Dam opponents wanted tomake sure that the WCD recognised some of thegrossest human rights abuses, dam-relatedcorruption, and questions of ecological andeconomic viability around which they hadmobilised in the first place. Would the Commis-sion demonstrate its neutrality by choosing abalanced set of case studies of “good” and “bad”dams?

The WCD appeared to satisfy most major stake-holder groups who were then monitoring theprocess—the advocacy NGOs and dams interestgroups—by selecting a set of case studies thatencompassed diversity in geography, function, age,size, and catchment area.24 The case studies arelisted in Box 5.2.

An additional criterion for case study selection wasdiversity in political regimes, so that the Commis-sion could study the differences in decision-making around large dams. (See Box 5.3.) However,in the pursuit of such political diversity, theCommission also wanted to avoid regimes sooppressive that it would be unable to consult withcommunities or raise transparency and account-ability issues in the course of its assessment.25 TheWCD case studies did demonstrate politicaldiversity, but restrictions on civil society participa-tion in three of the countries (Turkey, Pakistan,and China) limited the vitality of discussions lateron. The Commission faced a trade-off betweenanalysing the diverse political conditions under

which dams are built and its desire for a thoroughstudy in each case.

The only major upset about the choice of casestudies occurred when ICOLD, the main damindustry association, learned from an internalWCD document that Turkey’s Ataturk Dam wason the shortlist.26 Ataturk was a primary exampleof a “problematic” dam that the association fearedthe WCD would use to cast doubt on the profes-sion as a whole. As some ICOLD members werealready suspicious of the Commission, choosingthe Ataturk Dam may have caused a serious breachwith this group. The Secretariat hurriedly removedthe dam from consideration.

Community-based organisations put pressure onthe Commission to intervene in the decision-

Box 5.2

The WCD case studiesa

Focal Dams and River Basins:

Brazil Tucurui Dam and Amazon/Tocantins RiverNorway Glomma and Lågen River BasinPakistan Tarbela Dam and Indus River BasinThailand Pak Mun Dam and Mekong/Mun River BasinsTurkey Aslantas Dam and Ceyhan River BasinUnited States Grand Coulee Dam and Columbia River BasinZambia and Zimbabwe Kariba Dam and Zambezi River Basin

Country Reviews:

ChinaIndiaRussia

Pilot Study:

South Africa Gariep and Van der Kloof Dams andOrange River Basin

a The Commission intended for the case study dams to be

set in a basin-wide context, as explained in the WCD’s Work

Programme of February 1999, so that they might illustrate

the cumulative effects of a cascade of dams or the effects

of dams far downstream beyond the project site. This

proved difficult to accomplish in practice, and the study of

the Glomma and Lågen Basins in Norway was the only

study that demonstrated cumulative impacts and decision-

making across an entire river basin. (Interviews with senior

Secretariat staff, 6 November 2000 and 28 February 2001.)

Source: World Commission on Dams, Dams and Development:A New Framework for Decision-Making (London: Earthscan,2000), p. 31.Dam proponents feared

the Commission wouldlook only at failed dams.

C h a p t e r 5


making related to controversial dams underplanning or construction. This tension firstemerged during case study selection but resurfacedmany times during the process.

The Controversy over Assessing CurrentDam Projects

Two community-based organisations pleaded withthe WCD to look at their cases, in the hope that itwould have a positive influence on their cam-paigns. The WCD declined to get involved becausethe projects were ongoing and the Commissionjudged their intervention to be politically infea-sible. This wise decision enhanced theCommission’s wider legitimacy.

The Brazilian Movement of Dam-affected People(MAB) encouraged the Commission to choose aparticular dam where intensive civil societyengagement had changed the features of theproject.27 They wanted to demonstrate what couldbe accomplished when decision-making processeswere democratised. Meanwhile, the Cree Nation, anative people in Canada, asked the Commission toconsider the Churchill Falls Dam in Newfound-land, which was being planned in the face of nativepeople’s dissent.

Many Commissioners feared it would be difficultto appear balanced and that they would riskalienating stakeholder groups. “The whole politicalspace of the Commission would have been de-stroyed” if stakeholders had understood it to beadjudicating on current dam controversies, notedone senior advisor.28 “One of the spaces the

Commission has is to look at the range of experi-ence of dams worldwide” without judging specificones. Furthermore, most Commissioners believedthat for the purposes of assessing developmenteffectiveness in the case studies, it was necessary tostudy completed dam projects from which thebenefits and costs already flowed, with all theirforeseen and unforeseen impacts.29

In the case of the Brazilian social movement’s andthe Cree Nation’s interventions, failure of the WCDto pick their choice of case study did not makethese actors leave the process. However, the overallissue of whether the WCD would study currentdam projects in depth continued to irk commu-nity-based and NGO stakeholders. Their dissatis-faction was understandable. Several groups withrepresentatives on the Commission or WCDForum were active in current struggles to blocklarge dams or seek reparations from past projects.These groups justified their involvement in theWCD process with the hope that their commit-ments in scarce human and financial resourceswould bring progress in their specific campaigns.30

To satisfy these groups, the Commission had toseek less confrontational ways of allowing them toexpress concerns about current dam projects. Forinstance, stakeholders could make submissions tothe Secretariat about current dam concerns and, inmost cases, had the opportunity to present currentissues at regional consultations (although thisprocess was not entirely “free,” as described inChapter 6).

Stakeholders on the pro-dams side complainedthat the dams studied by the Commission were tooold and did not adequately reflect the advances inenvironmental mitigation technology and com-pensation practices made in recent years. However,most of these complaints did not surface untilafter the WCD report was released. Ironically,NGOs’ and peoples’ movements also wanted theWCD to look at dams under construction in orderto demonstrate what they perceived as the inad-equacy of current decision-making processes andmitigation measures.

Later events supported the WCD’s decision todistance itself from current dam projects. Asdocumented in Chapter 6 (see Box 6.3), the Indiangovernment perceived the WCD to be meddling inthe Narmada Valley Dams dispute when theCommission planned a field trip to the Valley. This

Box 5.3

Guiding questions for the case studies

1. What were the projected versus actual benefits,costs, and impacts of the dam?

2. What were the unexpected benefits, costs, andimpacts?

3. What was the distribution of costs and benefits -who gained and who lost?

4. How were decisions made?

5. Did the project comply with the criteria andguidelines of the day?

6. What were the lessons learned?

Source: World Commission on Dams, Dams and Develop-ment: A New Framework for Decision-Making (London:Earthscan, 2000), p. 30.



conflict damaged relations between the WCD andthe Government of India almost irreparably. TheChinese government was initially involved in theWCD but later withdrew from the process. One ofthe reasons for withdrawal, according to the WCD,was that officials of China’s Ministry of WaterResources mistakenly understood the WCD to bepassing judgement on the Three Gorges Project.31

Future commissions and multi-stakeholderprocesses are likely to encounter similar tensionsaround the discussion of controversial currentprojects. They would do well to learn from theWCD’s wisdom and refrain from intervening, orbeing seen to arbitrate in, specific disputes.

The Country Studies: A Second Best Option

The Commission sought to be as comprehensive inits knowledge base as resources would allow. Insome cases, lack of government co-operationlimited available data. According to theCommission’s final report, the WCD sponsoredcountry-level studies of large dams in India andChina because these governments would not agreeto in-depth studies of individual dams and riverbasins.32 This alternative approach was borne ofthe political tensions described above. In the caseof Russia, another major dam-builder, the Com-mission could not raise the funds for a case studyand settled for a more modest briefing paper.

Almost nobody was satisfied with the results of theChina and India country studies.** The Indiangovernment’s Central Water Committee wasextremely critical of the study, because it felt itsofficials were inadequately consulted during theprocess. Civil society groups criticised the studyfor its lack of thoroughness and its slim treatmentof options to large dams. Those in the interna-tional community who were knowledgeable aboutChina’s society and environment found little of usein the China study, which failed to address politicaleconomy issues in a significant way.33

The Commission’s difficulty in maintaining thetrust of the Indian and Chinese governments, astory in which the country studies play just onepart, was to vex the Commission throughout itshistory. China’s and India’s distancing from theprocess held implications for the WCD’s inclusive-ness and demonstrated the hard reality of thepolitical trade-offs the process faced. We revisitthese questions in Chapters 8 and 9, where we

explore broad stakeholder reactions to the WCD’sfinal report, and the relation between the processand stakeholder willingness to promote and adoptthe recommendations.

The Role of Case Study Teams in Creatingan Inclusive Knowledge Base

The Commission instructed its case study consult-ants to seek quantitative and qualitative informa-tion to “assess and illustrate stakeholders’ views.”34

To accomplish this, consultants’ ability to seek outdiverse views and garner the respect of differentstakeholders was critical.

According to the WCD’s final report, the Com-mission decided to employ “national teams ofexperts rather than using internationalconsultants…while creating greater challengesin terms of independence and neutrality itprovided the Commission with a deeper insightinto the political, historical and cultural con-texts for water and energy resources manage-ment.”35 Forum members welcomed the choiceof national teams, for many members (especiallyNGOs) suspected that international consultantswould treat local problems superficially. How-ever, as the Commission acknowledged, therewere significant practical challenges to assem-bling study teams that were politically accept-able to most stakeholders.36

The Secretariat sought study teams with multi-disciplinary expertise and from a range of institu-tions in the relevant country to provide a multi-stakeholder profile. Most of all, the Secretariatsought consultants who were open-minded andhad experience working in different sectors, suchas government, NGO, and business.37 Thisstrategy had mixed success in soliciting informa-tion from the broader community of stakehold-ers. But the strategy was successful enough tosuggest that the model is worth trying in futurecommissions.

Difficulty in engagingthe Indian and Chinesegovernments would vex

the Commissionthroughout its history.

Guest

Click the ** in the text for information added after the release of the study, or see the end of the chapter (p. 71).

C h a p t e r 5


Box 5.4

The World Commission on Dams and China

Commission lacked official sanction, its outreach toChinese institutions was cautious and limited. China’srepresentation at the WCD’s East Asia regional hearingin Vietnam was extremely modest. In China, mediareports came to be dominated by resoundingapproval of the Three Gorges Project provided byICOLD engineers during their September 2000Congress in Beijing. WCD Commissioner JudyHenderson’s presentation to the ICOLD Congress atthe time received scant attention.

The Chinese government’s withdrawal from theprocess, although difficult to corroborate from directsources, may be analysed within the complex frame-work of China’s current political situation. There isgrowing awareness in China that more is at stake inthe Three Gorges Project than isolated technical andsocial issues. Consequently, internal tension over thefeasibility and possible impacts of Three Gorges hasinfluenced the Chinese government’s approachtoward dams issues, both domestically andinternationally.h

a Meaning that the Chinese government provided an in-kind

donation of officials’ time to the data gathering process. E-

mail correspondence from former WCD Secretariat

member, “China and the WCD,” 17 April 2001.

b Interview with Commissioner, 19 March 2001; WCD

website, www.dams.org/about/wp_ov_anx1.htm (28

September 2001).

c Zhu Dangsheng, “Daba yu huanjing wenti” (Dams and

Environmental Issues), Ministry of Water Resources

document. Online at: www.dppr.com/txt/a02.htm (28

September 2001).

d E-mail correspondence from former WCD Secretariat staff,

“China and the WCD,” 17 April 2001.

e E-mail correspondence from former WCD Secretariat staff,

“China and the WCD,” 17 April 2001. Also, interview with

senior Secretariat staff, 6 November 2000; World Bank,

internal document.

f Interview with senior Secretariat staff, 6 November 2000.

g Interview with senior Secretariat staff, 6 November 2000.

h See, for example, “Three Gorges Dam Project,” Trade and

Environment Database (TED) Case Study no. 264, American

University. Online at www.american.edu/ted/

THREEDAM.htm (28 September 2000). “Dam politics: How

Three Gorges plays in Beijing,” Asia Times Online, 5 May

2000. Online at: www.atimes.com/china/BE05Ad01.html

(28 September 2001).

Initial efforts by the WCD and its convening institutionsto court the Chinese government reflected China’sdam-building status. The only ministry-level represen-tative at the Gland meeting came from China. Arepresentative of the country’s Ministry of WaterResources was offered a place on the Commission, andShen Guoyi accepted. The government agreed tosponsor the WCD.a Initial discussions took placebetween the Commission and the Chinese governmentabout the possibility of undertaking a case study of theDanjiangkou Dam.b

It is difficult to find public sources of informationabout the Chinese government’s view of the WCD.However, early articles by Chinese officials indicate thatthey welcomed these opportunities to summarise pastexperiences and study the dam-building practices ofother countries. A working group of Chinese expertswas established to provide opinion on the WCD’sstudies, write a report on China’s position on dams andsustainable development, and prepare materials formembers of the Chinese National Committee on LargeDams (CHINCOLD), who intended to participate in WCDactivities.c

In time, China’s engagement with the WCD taperedoff. As the WCD’s requests for technical data becamemore detailed, the government became less respon-sive. Almost one year into the process, China declinedpermission for the WCD to undertake a full case studyof the Danjiangkou Dam.d Around the same time, arestructuring occurred in the Ministry of WaterResources that coincided with decreasing politicalsupport for WCD activities, including a suspicion thatthe WCD was against dams and that its discourse wasincompatible with Chinese interests.e Ms. Shenresigned from the Commission, citing health reasons.The Commission downgraded its assessment of China’sdams experience from a case study to a country study,and then to an external review undertaken by foreignconsultants.

In the final analysis, of more than 180 consultantshired by the WCD in its work programme, only 3 wereChinese. There was no Chinese national on theCommission, Secretariat, or Forum following Ms. Shen’sresignation. The government refused to release basictechnical data on its 22,000 large dams, which repre-sent almost half of the global population.f China’sinvolvement in the WCD had effectively ended.

According to a senior Secretariat staff member, theWCD continued to send materials to their “manycontacts in the [Chinese] system.”g However, once the

Source: Literature review drawn from Fredrich Kahrl, “Under the Shadow of the Three Gorges Dam: The World Commission onDams and China.” Background paper prepared for the WCD Assessment, January 2001.



An American team was the most successful studyteam in eliciting diverse views from the local andnational experience and producing a report withsubstantially new information. The team leaderswere civil engineers from two well known universi-ties who were considered politically neutral bystakeholders at the study site. They sought a rangeof complementary expertise in economic, ecologi-cal, and social issues among colleagues in otheruniversity departments. Under criticism from atleast one Commissioner for not having someonewith practical experience on the team, they lateradded a consultant from Harza EngineeringCorporation. The team also took care to surveylocal communities, including Native Americanpeoples, for data on the demonstrated costs andbenefits of the Grand Coulee Dam. Their reportrepresented convergent and divergent areas ofstakeholder opinion. A wide range of concernedlocal parties praised the report.38

An ambitious effort to involve a diverse collectionof scholars and practitioners in co-authoring thecase study in Thailand, including a radical aca-demic, consulting engineers, and governmentfisheries staff, was difficult to manage in practicalterms, perhaps because of the sheer range ofperspectives.39 The team nonetheless succeeded inproducing a path-breaking report that docu-mented how the Pak Mun Dam had affectedfishing communities’ livelihoods on an unforeseenscale and had failed to pay for itself. The WorldBank and the Electricity Generating Authority ofThailand (EGAT)—the Pak Mun Dam’s backers—rejected the findings on the basis that the authorsdid not use an appropriate model to forecast thedam’s rate of return. The Bank and EGAT nevershared the relevant models with the WCD or itsconsultants as proof.40

In the Pakistan study, the study team camepredominantly from one developmentconsultancy, but local stakeholders disputed theteam’s political neutrality. Team members fromAsianics Agro-Dev International had a variety ofexpertise, including irrigation, agriculturaleconomics, sociology, and environmental science.One of the chief criteria for choosing the firmwas its apparent independence from govern-ment.41 However, civil society groups consideredthe team to be strongly biased toward the damsestablishment.42 To redress the balance, the WCDinvited one of the main critics, a non-governmen-tal advocacy group called the Pakistan Network

on Dams, Rivers and People (PNDRP), to con-tribute staff toward the effort. They declined tojoin the analysis, but were instrumental inmobilising affected people and others to take partin the review meeting, which had a significanteffect on the content of the final draft.

Based on this diverse implementation experience,was there a winning combination of characteristicsin a case study team to ensure broad stakeholderacceptance and, hence, credibility for the Commis-sion? The most accepted combination appears tohave been an academic/research team that com-bined interdisciplinary expertise with overallpolitical neutrality. Having some practical experi-ence on the team in managing large dams or theirimpacts was necessary to gain the trust of practi-tioners, and having experience with, and apprecia-tion for, project-affected peoples was necessary togain the confidence of NGOs and social move-ments.

Review Meetings as a Means to BroadenParticipation

A principal design feature for inclusiveness andtransparency in the case studies were the multi-stakeholder review meetings. The first stakeholdermeeting was intended to gather feedback on theterms of reference prepared by the Secretariat. Thesecond multi-stakeholder meeting was intended tosolicit comments on the consultants’ draft of thecase study and gather participants’ oral andwritten views on the development effectiveness ofthe dam.

According to a senior Secretariat staff member,the case study meetings were the Commission’schance to get close to dam-affected and otherlocal people. For example, the WCD arranged forTonga chiefs from Zambia to make a long journeyto attend a stakeholder meeting for the KaribaDam study,43 and it mobilised tribespeople on theZimbabwean side and various NGO supporters.44

The study teams who managed to mobilisecredible community participation in thesemeetings earned the approval of internationalNGOs and agency personnel who were monitor-ing the process—and provided good publicity forthe Commission. Many Forum members appreci-ated the WCD’s efforts to go beyond the relativelyelitist consultations of most regional and interna-tional policy processes. (See, for comparison,Chapter 6, Box 6.1.)

C h a p t e r 5


The inclusiveness of the dialogue at these reviewmeetings depended on several factors outside theCommission’s immediate control. It depended onthe co-operation of the government and the overallenabling environment for civil societymobilisation and expression. Where the politicalconditions for NGO mobilisation were con-strained, the Commission was unable to elicit abroad range of stakeholder viewpoints. For in-stance, the case study of the Aslantas Dam andCeyhan River Basin in Turkey did not probe socialand environmental issues in depth and failed toinvestigate the development benefits or losses tothe displaced population. The country meeting todiscuss the draft paper was dominated by the StateHydrological Works Department (DSI), whoseofficials refused to discuss resettlement and ethnicminority issues. Environmental and advocacyNGOs were entirely absent from the meeting,perhaps because of the weakness of the NGOsector in Turkey.45

Meanwhile, Pakistan’s change from a nominaldemocracy to a military dictatorship while theWCD was undertaking the Tarbela Dam case studyworried Commissioners. “In Pakistan, because ofthe military regime and the removal of the carpetof democracy and the denial of a healthy socialand political process, we were very concernedabout the lack of democratic participation in theKarachi [first stakeholder] WCD meeting,” saidone Commissioner. “Despite that, we decided to goahead. While some serious problems prevailed, wewere able to generate some open debate on ahighly secretive and undemocratic process. Eventhe government and the army conceded that therewas need for debate on large water managementprojects.”46 Similar concerns about participationunder authoritarian regimes pervaded someregional hearings as well. These are described inChapter 6.

The Commissioned Studies:Cross-check Survey of 150 Large Dams47

Transparency and Inclusiveness in theCross-check Survey

The Commission complemented the in-depth casestudies with a cross-check survey of the technical,social, environmental, and decision-makingcharacteristics of 150 large dams around the world.The cross-check survey, as it was known, presentedan opportunity to “expand on the case study damsand at the same time, to make [the data set]regionally reflective.”48 Although it could not claimto be statistically representative, the sample would“seek to generate broader patterns and trends”than was otherwise possible with the case stud-ies.49 Survey dams were chosen from theCommission’s focal river basins as well as fromexisting databases (such as the World Bank’s).Other dams were added to increase the sample’sdiversity. Through much of the two-year process,the survey was something of a poor cousin to otherelements of the work programme: it had a lowpublic profile and was slow to show results giventhe tremendous logistical challenges of gatheringcompleted questionnaires.

The survey was an important source of indepen-dent data for the WCD’s Global Review of LargeDams, as is evident in the Commission’s finalreport. The primary method was a survey aboutthe dam’s technical, economic, social, environmen-tal, and decision-making history distributed todam operators, consultants, and research institutes.The survey did not have multi-stakeholder inputbuilt into its design, as with the case studies(resources did not stretch that far), but in the laterstages of the work programme, the Secretariatconducted a limited review process to validate dataand solicit wider input. The review process pleasedNGOs that were monitoring the process, as it gavethem a role. The Secretariat chose participants,mostly from local NGOs, to review 17 randomlychosen and 18 controversial dam projects in thetotal sample.50 An activist NGO in Cape Towneven became involved in contacting local NGOs invarious countries and drumming up support foralternative contributions.51

Comprehensive responses to the survey were onlyachieved through an immense logistical effort bythe Secretariat—a challenge that holds implica-tions for future processes. Staff created software tohelp respondents complete the form. However,

Multi-stakeholderreview meetings allowed

communities toprovide feedbackon case studies.



many of the respondents had difficulty download-ing attachments or were simply too worried aboutcomputer viruses to use the programme. In theend, the Secretariat faxed and phoned extensivelyto gather the data they sought. Language problemsalso posed a challenge, as few respondents hadEnglish as a first language and translation waslimited to a Spanish version of the survey. Damoperators’ sheer lack of information about theselected dams also challenged the breadth andexcellence of the sample. As the Secretariat noted,they could have chosen the “largest most contro-versial dams, and got a lot of data. (But) the fact isthat most large dams are less than 30 meters inheight. The interesting thing…was to see theimpact of all these smaller dams.”52 Some govern-ments did not even know the co-ordinates of thelarge dams selected for the Commission’s survey.53

This large push to gather responses was worth theeffort because of the data on trends it generated forthe final report. Certainly, no smaller global surveywould have passed the credibility test with stake-holders. Reactions to the WCD’s final report, givenin Chapter 8, include criticisms that the survey wastoo small. Stakeholders from government, inparticular, hoped such a survey could encompasstheir country’s best practices. Such arguments hadless to do with the success of the WCD’s stake-holder engagement—the focus of this assess-ment—than with the technical merits of theWCD’s methodology, which were in this caseconstrained by time and funding. The Commis-sion surveyed as many large dams as it had timeand money for, given the Gland mandate for atime-limited process, the Commissioners’ need tobring closure to the knowledge-gathering exercise,and the fundraising challenges. Future commis-sions might face similar trade-offs between com-prehensiveness and time and funding pressures,depending on whether the issue at hand requiresdata to be gathered for the first time from diverseoriginal sources. It is not clear that critical stake-holders would have been any happier with theresults if the WCD had been more comprehensivein its cross-check survey.

Conflicts over Knowledge

Even if data management had not been an issue,the WCD would have been challenged to nurturerelations with the development agencies, profes-sional associations, and technical and researchinstitutes that hold the fragmented and (for themost part) poorly organised data concerning theperformance of large dams. Negotiations for datacan take time under the most open political andinstitutional regimes. In the WCD’s case, staff andconsultants also had to overcome potential con-tributors’ scepticism or disinterest in theCommission’s work and persuade them that theWCD was a worthwhile enterprise for the future ofthe industry.

Among the most important repositories of infor-mation about dams and dam-related developmentwere the professional associations: the Interna-tional Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD) andthe International Committee for Irrigation andDrainage (ICID). Although these organisationseventually shared their data with the WCD,members remained sceptical that the WCD hadany value to add beyond the professional datasetsand standards their organisations had alreadydeveloped. The contention over validity of datasetsand analytic methods was captured by a seniorICID official’s remark toward the end of theWCD’s knowledge generation process: “We havethe best databases on irrigation in the world. TheWCD is not helpful, we are only in it [the Forum]for damage control.”54 Dam proponents unhappywith the WCD’s findings would later use the issueof data validity and representativeness as a reasonto dismiss the final report.

Governments also proved to be wary about theWCD’s access to and use of material. Although theWCD emphasised that it was seeking to establishtrends for the entire 150-dam sample, governmentsand utilities opposed public disclosure of raw dataon individual dams. “Governments and utilitieswere worried that opponents would use [the data]against them,” said the Secretariat member incharge.55 In all, the WCD received permission to

A cross-check survey oflarge dams sought to revealbroad patterns and trends.

Governments were wary aboutthe WCD’s access to and use of

dam-related data.

C h a p t e r 5


make public the individual raw data on only 50dams out of the eventual 125 in the full survey.These constraints, while representative of thepolitical realities of data disclosure in many coun-tries, nonetheless undermined the Secretariat’scommitment to greater transparency.56 The sheerdifficulty of extracting geographically diverse dataon large dams suggests that future commissions andmulti-stakeholder processes must plan for a time-consuming effort if they are to consolidate evenexisting data on a sector.

The Commissioned Studies:Thematic Reviews

The Commission’s Terms of Reference, as articu-lated in Gland, said the Commission must respondto a changing global context where there aremultiple criteria for decision-making. In addition,the WCD was born of the growing appreciationthat past decision-making has emphasised thebenefits of dams and ignored or underestimatedthe costs of dam building. The WCD, then, was tofocus on “those key issues around which there isgreatest disagreement.”57

To look at issues of disagreement while satisfyingall stakeholders of their impartiality was a consid-erable challenge. The Commission, based on draftsprepared by the Secretariat, agreed to pursue 17thematic reviews on a range of controversial issuesaround dams. These reviews were grouped intofive clusters of issues: social, environmental,economic and financial, and institutional andgovernance issues, and options for water andenergy generation. In the Secretariat’s view,technical organisations, such as ICOLD, hadalready covered more technical issues related todams, and focussing on areas of controversy wouldallow the WCD to pursue its comparative advan-tage. However, this approach quickly rang alarmbells with some stakeholders. Industry groupsactive in the WCD process felt that the thematicreviews’ focus on controversial issues would beunlikely to capture adequately the full benefits ofdams. From their perspective, case studies of

individual dams would better allow for a balancedassessment of costs and benefits.58 For their part,civil society groups were convinced that a trulyindependent and objective review of experiencewith large dams—whether on a sectoral or casestudy basis—would vindicate their views. Hence,the WCD’s credibility as a fair and neutral bodywas at stake in how the thematic reviews werecarried out. What quickly became apparent,however, was that a research process of this naturecould not be entirely free of negotiation withstakeholder groups. The Commission was testedon how it managed the stakeholder debates thatinevitably arose over framing and content of thethematic papers.

Stakeholders’ Jostling for Position

The thematic review process was designed toincorporate a substantial measure of transparencyand openness. The Secretariat circulated terms ofreference to reviewers for comment and placedthem on the WCD’s website. Drafts of the thematicpapers were circulated to Commissioners andexternal reviewers, including Forum members. Theshifting scope and definitions of thematic reviewstudies somewhat hampered these efforts attransparency. For example, the review of Regula-tion, Compliance, and Implementation wasnarrowed from a comprehensive review of existingcriteria, guidelines, standards, and legal, policy,and institutional frameworks for dams, to a morelimited subset of these issues based on discussionswithin the Secretariat.59 Reviewers lacked clear andtimely signals about the status of the studiesbecause of uncertain budget allocation for the-matic review studies.

In addition, achieving agreement on the basicresearch question for several thematics proved tobe a politically charged task. For example, theEconomic, Financial, and Distributional Analysisthematic was hamstrung by a debate over therelative merits of a focus on theory, practice, or areview of past performance. (See Box 5.5.) Stake-holder groups clashed over the basic methodologyof comparing ecosystem impacts of dams against abase scenario of no dam on the same site in theEcosystems thematic review, with industry repre-sentatives rejecting this notion.60 In one of the mostintensive thematic review processes, debate over theappropriate scope and framing question for theSocial Impact of Large Dams review continued wellinto the drafting stage. (See Box 5.6.)

The thematic reviews focussedon issues around which there

was greatest disagreement.



Resolution of suspicions of this sort requiredimplicit negotiation, which operated throughsubmissions and comments to the Secretariat onthe draft review papers. In the case of the socialimpact paper (see Box 5.6), a special workshopprovided the setting for explicit negotiation. To theSecretariat’s credit, there was considerable scopefor commenting on the papers overall. A core set ofstakeholders from industry and civil society tookadvantage of these opportunities and were ex-tremely active in scrutinising and commenting ondraft papers. The engagement of these core actorsenhanced the Commission’s continued legitimacywith broader networks.

Not all stakeholders were equally well equipped totake advantage of this mechanism for feedback.The Secretariat perceived civil society groups andacademics as being better able to network andreact quickly than were stakeholders used tofunctioning in a more bureaucratic manner, suchas dam-builders’ associations.61 Governmentsparticipated in the review process via individualsfrom various government departments. They didnot establish a collective, organised effort toinfluence the framing of issues as did civil societyand industry groups. As a result, governmentrepresentatives had a less sustained and influentialvoice in shaping the thematic papers.

Commissioners reviewed the terms of reference forthe studies, but the Secretariat was largely on thefrontline and in control of the negotiating process.As a result, the credibility of the Commission as awhole was under-utilised. Had negotiation oc-curred through the Commissioners, the resultantterms of reference would have had greater credibil-ity and been less subject to question later in theprocess. In the early stages of the WCD, theCommission intended to organise ProgrammaticCommittees that would have allocated specificreviews to specific Commissioners. Under pressureof time and workload, this evolved into a looserstructure in which Commissioners expressed an

interest in particular thematics, but without acorresponding, defined set of responsibilities fortheir chosen areas. In hindsight, a more structuredapproach might have provided a better vehicle forCommissioner inputs.

Some stakeholders fromindustry and civil societywere extremely active in

scrutinising papers.

Box 5.5

What is the “right” question? Economic,Financial, and Distributional Analysis

The experience of the Economic, Financial, andDistributional Analysis thematic review points to theimportance of the research question in framing thefinal output. It also illustrates the negotiation thatoccurred over some thematic reviews.

The initial terms of reference called for a reviewof the capacities and limitations of cost-benefitmethodologies. Even at this early stage, there wereindications of discontent, mostly from civil societygroups, with the phrasing of the question. The firstdraft of the review paper stuck narrowly to thislimited scope. The Commissioners received it poorly,calling for more discussion of actual practice. Civilsociety reviewers argued for empirical evidence ofthe accuracy of cost-benefit analyses on dams.Consequently, a practitioner of cost-benefit analysiswas asked to prepare a second draft with morediscussion of practice. This paper, too, did not meetwith the approval of the Commissioners, one ofwhom dismissed it as “half-naked!”a Academicreviewers declared this version a step back from thestate of knowledge on the topic, and civil societygroups argued it lacked a comparison of perfor-mance and projections. Finally, a Secretariat staffmember prepared a third paper, drawing on earlierdrafts and on submissions to provide empiricaldetail.

The reviewers’ reactions were only in partdictated by the quality of the various drafts. Also atstake was the emphasis of the review and itsimplications for the various stakeholder positions.Thus, a narrow theoretical analysis of cost-benefitanalysis would have illustrated the potential of thetechnique, but would have failed to reveal flaws inimplementation. An assessment of practice alonewould have highlighted procedural flaws, but wouldnot have provided details on how past dams haveperformed. An exclusive focus on empirical experi-ence would have allowed an assessment of pastexperience, but not shed light on whether theproblem lies in flawed implementation or deeperproblems with the approach. These alternativeswere preferred to different extents by the variousstakeholders, each of whom tried to advance theirinterests in the design of the thematic review.

a Interview with Commissioner, April 2000.

Source: Based on a review of the Secretariat’s archivalmaterial by Luna Ranjit, WRI.

C h a p t e r 5


Public Submissions: A Participation Channelthat Needs Resources

The 970 submissions made to the WCD by a rangeof stakeholders from around the world were argu-ably the most significant casualties of the timepressure the WCD faced. The submissions weresolicited both through the regional consultationsand independently, and were intended to be ameans of opening up the knowledge generationprocess. However, the mechanism for ensuring thatsubmissions were incorporated into the thematicreviews was inadequate for two reasons. First, thetiming of submissions and thematic reviews wasnot synchronised. The Commission was stillreceiving submissions long after drafts of thethematic reviews were completed.62 Second, con-sultants were not always amenable to incorporatingsubmissions into their work. Although Secretariatinterns were allotted the task of processing thesubmissions for easy inclusion into thematics, it isnot clear this effort met with success. Indeed, noneof the consultants contacted in the course of thisassessment acknowledged the receipt of submis-sions to incorporate into their work.

In addition, the perspective of at least some of thesubmission writers and the consultants illustrateda clash in perspectives over the scientific nature ofknowledge. The authors of the Ecosystem the-matic, for example, sought quantitative knowledgerather than anecdotal inputs.63 Thus, theCommission’s efforts at democratisation ofknowledge were affected not only by time pres-sures but also by opinions in the Secretariat andconsultant body over the credibility of differentforms of knowledge.

The Power of the Pen: Selection of theResearch Team

As in the case studies, the mix of consultantschosen to implement the thematic reviews affectedthe WCD’s ability to engage a wide range ofstakeholders. The Secretariat recognised theimportance of consultant selection from an earlystage and called for a range of disciplinary ap-

Box 5.6

Negotiation over content:the Social Impact thematic reviewThe thematic review on Social Impact of Large Dams:Equity and Distributional Issues required explicitnegotiation among stakeholders. This thematic wasone of three in the social issues category; the othertwo focussed on indigenous peoples and displace-ment. From the start, a problem of scope plagued thisthematic. Initially, the paper was designed by theSecretariat to fill gaps left by the other thematics,notably downstream social impacts and genderimpacts of dams. However, the Commissionersexpressed their dissatisfaction with the patchyframework for the paper and sought an expandedpaper that would address two concerns. First, someCommissioners argued that there was inadequateattention to the benefits of dams. Second, otherssuggested that the issue was not simply one ofaggregate costs and benefits, but their distribution.Hence, they sought to locate social impacts within aframework of equity analysis.

Reviewers picked up these themes in a morepartisan manner. Industry groups and irrigationspecialists charged that the Social Impacts thematicpaper did not address the social benefits of largedams at all and was flagrantly biased. This view hadat least some support on the Commission; oneCommissioner bluntly stated that the report’sauthors were “too far to the left.”a

Resolution was sought in a special meetingconvened by the Secretariat in London for reviewersto work through the outstanding issues. By allaccounts, this was a spirited, but productive,meeting. Much of the discussion focussed on aneffort to elaborate a framework for an equityanalysis of the social impacts of dams. At this point,the scope of the paper had expanded considerablyand posed a challenge of synthesis. As a result, thefinal document was segmented into sections onequity, downstream impacts, and gender impacts.The framework on equity incorporated into thepaper was perceived to be a step forward by thosewho had espoused this argument. Proponents ofmore attention to the benefits of dams were,however, less satisfied, and this issue continued tobe contentious through the life of the Commission.

How do we view such a process? As we haveseen, reviews of controversial topics as part of amulti-stakeholder process will invariably entail ameasure of negotiation. Indeed, the strength of theprocess lies in the opportunities for all sides to putforward their views and strive for common ground.As with other thematic reviews, the scope of theinitial framing question proved to be central to theproduct’s acceptability to stakeholders.

a Interview with Commissioner, April 2000.

Source: Based on Secretariat documentation andcommunication on the Social Impacts thematic; Interviewswith Commissioner, 26 February 2001; Secretariat staff, 26February 2001; and consultant, 2 March 2001.

Public submissions were inad-equately incorporated into the

Commission’s work.



proaches, institutional backgrounds, and politicalperspectives among consultants. In addition, theselection process placed a premium on geographic,racial, and gender balance. In general, the Secre-tariat strove for impartial writers. Where thematicstudies were the outcome of a panel or task force,the Secretariat attempted a balance of perspec-tives.64 As one Secretariat member put it, theconsultant selection process mirrored the efforts toestablish balance in the Secretariat itself. Puttingtogether a consultant team was like establishing“mini-secretariats.”65

There proved to be a number of barriers in trans-lating policy into practice. First, the shorttimeframe of the Commission’s work placed limitson whom the Commission could call upon. Forexample, researchers with full-time positions wereunable to commit to the deadlines demanded bythe Commission’s workplan. The result was asmaller available pool of contributors, limited toshort-term consultants, which potentially compro-mised the quality of the knowledge base. Moreover,in the eyes of some civil society Forum members,short-term consultants tend to operate within amainstream development framework associatedwith large development bureaucracies, because thebulk of their work is for these bureaucracies.66

Civil society members felt this perspective wascarried over to consultants’ work for the WCD andsystematically skewed it toward a mainstreamorientation.67

An analysis of consultants’ backgrounds partiallysupports the view that they had a mainstreamorientation. (See Figure 5.1.) The single largestcategory of thematic review writers was academic/research (36 percent), and the second largest wasconsulting (34 percent). However, these areslippery categories and only imperfectly reflect theissue at hand—a perception of mainstreammindset.68 Moreover, some Secretariat membersfound that consultants gravitated toward standardresearch models based on their work for interna-tional agencies, and that it was a challenge to forceconsultants “out of their own little world.”69 In

summary, the consultants dissatisfied civil societygroups engaged in the process and, at the time,tempered many groups’ support for the process.Consultants’ lack of familiarity with a broad,multi-stakeholder approach imposed an additionalsupervisory burden on Secretariat staff. Althoughthe WCD’s aspirations for consultant use provide agood standard for future processes, its experiencedemonstrates the practical hurdles involved.

Second, with the Chairperson and Vice-Chairper-son of the WCD both from the South, the Com-mission was finely attuned to the need for ad-equate representation from Southern countries onthe research teams. Yet, this proved difficult to putinto practice in the selection process. Researchersfrom the South were often national or regionalexperts who would have been hard pressed toconduct a global review. The requirement thatwork be conducted in English posed a furtherchallenge to recruitment. Thus, 56 percent of theconsultants used for the thematic review were fromNorth America and Europe.70 (See Figure 5.2.)Moreover, Commissioners were concerned thatlead writers were disproportionately chosen fromthe North, and particularly from the English-speaking countries.71

Women were similarly under-represented in theconsultant pool and hence in weaving their

Given the short time frame,the pool of available consultants

was small.

AAccademic/Researchademic/Research38%38%

CConsultingonsulting34%34%

GoGovvernmenternment8%8%

IndustrIndustryy3%3%

NGONGO17%17%

Figure 5.1 Consultant background(thematic review)Based on information available from 84% of 120 totalthematic review consultants.

Source: Data provided by the Secretariat.

C h a p t e r 5


perspectives into the WCD’s formal knowledgebase. A cross-cutting analysis of the Commission’sconsultants shows the low percentage of womenconsultants—only 25 percent of the total.72 This issurprising given the Commission’s relative empha-sis on understanding the environmental and socialproblems associated with dams, rather than on thetechnical aspects of dam engineering, a moreheavily male-dominated field. The Commissionmay have been stymied by discrimination (includ-ing lack of qualified female analysts) in the par-ticular countries where it chose to work.73

Cross-cutting Issues

Assistant, Professor, Editor, and Referee:The Roles of the Secretariat

The work of the WCD, opined a Commissioner, islike cooking vegetables. In this process, the Secre-tariat and the Commissioners have distinct roles.“Once the vegetables are bought, cleaned, and cutinto the necessary pieces, the role of the cookbegins. The Secretariat is not the cook. We [theCommission] will decide the taste, the flavour, thearoma and the temperature … ”74 This metaphorappropriately captures the expected division oflabour between the Commissioners and the Secre-

tariat. It also, however, captures the ambiguity of theSecretariat’s role. The Secretariat was a helper, but inits choice and preparation of the raw materials hadconsiderable influence over the final dish.

In the design of the WCD, Secretariat staff mem-bers were the first to phrase the questions andthemes that the Commissioners discussed. Secre-tariat staff wrote overarching background papers,and terms of reference for consultant papers. TheSecretariat’s work was not accepted unquestion-ingly. On several occasions, such as the socialthematic and the financial thematic, the Commis-sion exercised its right to send the draft back withinstructions for a complete re-write. Although theCommissioners were highly dedicated, most alsohad other ongoing commitments and were unableto devote all their time to the Commission. In thecontext of limited Commissioner time and atten-tion, the role of the Secretariat in framing issuesgave them, as one Commissioner put it, the “powerof the professor.”75

In addition to framing debates, the Secretariat alsoexercised the power of the editor. The Secretariatbore the enormous burden of synthesising largeamounts of carefully worded, and, in some cases,negotiated, text into brief summaries for theCommissioners’ consumption. This is not to suggestthat Secretariat staff consciously filtered informa-tion for the Commissioners’ consumption; however,the summarising process inevitably requiredSecretariat staff to exercise their judgement of therelative weight of arguments and issues raised inthematic papers. Commissioners were acutely awareof the Secretariat’s filtering role, and in some cases,sought to read unedited documents.76

The Secretariat was also a referee. In the negotia-tion process through which case studies andthematic reviews were defined, written, andrevised, the Secretariat was the gatekeeper of theCommission’s neutrality. This was a challengingtask. Secretariat members had to ensure that allsides were represented in the review process andhad to establish and defend the line between inputand undue influence.

Finally, the Secretariat’s influence was amplified bytheir pre-eminent role in consultant selection. Asone might reasonably expect, the primary sources ofcandidate consultants were the staff members’ ownprofessional networks.77 Commissioners and Forummembers’ suggestions supplemented Secretariat

AfricAfricaa14%14%

AAsiasia22%22%

EuropeEurope37%37%

NorNorth Americth Americaa19%19%

SSouthouthAmericAmericaa

8%8%

Figure 5.2 Consultant nationality(thematic review)Based on information available from 61% of 120 totalthematic review consultants.

Source: Data provided by the Secretariat.



selections, but primary control rested with theSecretariat. Indeed, some Commissioners made itclear that consultant selection was not their job andeven viewed the active role of their colleagues asinterference in the work of the Secretariat.78

The Importance of Accessibility:Language and the Internet

Although the country meetings provided commu-nities with an opportunity for direct participationin the WCD process, these meetings also revealedone of the greatest stumbling blocks to grassrootsparticipation: inadequate translation of documentsfrom English. Language problems mounted acommon challenge to full stakeholder participa-tion in all case studies (except the United States)and limited the scope for meaningful local input.These problems were of sufficient magnitude toundermine the Commission’s legitimacy with civilsociety groups in some case study countries. Forexample, an Urdu language summary of the draftTarbela case study only became available toparticipants on the morning of the second stake-holder meeting, causing discomfort among localcivil society participants.79

The almost exclusive use of English to conductCommission business, including negotiating termsof reference for thematic papers, discussingmeeting agendas, and so forth, left some non-English speakers feeling that their participationwas compromised.

“Communication between MAB [Brazil’sMovement of Dam-affected People] and theWCD’s Commissioners and Secretariat wasmainly through e-mail and postal mail becausethese are mediums in which one can think,prepare, and ask someone else to translatebefore sending the final message. This longprocess ensured that MAB’s participationfrequently lagged behind. MAB tried as bestthey could to keep up with the WCD’s timing,but it was nearly impossible.

[There was] another problem characterised bythe movement’s leaders as ‘second handinformation.’ They were continuously readingdocuments translated by different people thatcould be excellent partners, such as NGOactivists and academics, but were not dam-affected themselves. ‘We were constantlylimited in the process because we always hadto analyse information from someone else’spoint of view.’”80

The Secretariat argued that these difficulties wereboth a function of time and budget. To keep theirtimeline on track, they were not willing to translatelong case study drafts into national languages.81

However, it could be argued that translationsshould be built in as an integral part of the timeline and scope of work from the start. Given thebroader historical tendency for global publicpolicymaking processes to be elitist in nature andthe thrust of the WCD toward greater inclusion,the problems posed by language issues partlyundermined the Commission’s larger effort.

For the process as a whole, language barriers,compounded with reliance on the Internet forcommunications, posed a double bind for partici-pants in the South. On the one hand, electronicmail (e-mail) technology contributed greatly to theparticipation of certain groups and individualsfrom Southern countries in the Commission’swork. The Southern members of the Commissionitself were able to communicate quickly andefficiently with the Secretariat and fellow Commis-sioners by e-mail. Secretariat members attributedmuch of their responsiveness to Commissionerand Forum members’ concerns—spontaneouslyand across multiple time zones—to their e-mailconnectivity.82 The technology also helped theSecretariat supervise consultants and elicit resultswithin the ambitious timeframe mandated. On theother hand, the Internet sped up the process somuch that, as the Brazilian example above illus-trates, groups in the South were challenged to keepup. This experience joins a body of analyticmaterial on multi-stakeholder processes docu-menting the dangers of relying too much—orexclusively—on Internet communication becauseof disparities in access.83

Conclusions

The investigative process inevitably affects publicperceptions of legitimacy in multi-stakeholder

Language problems poseda challenge to full

stakeholder participation.

C h a p t e r 5


processes that study past practice as the basis forforward-looking recommendations. Stakeholders askwhether the process is balanced, inclusive, transpar-ent, and fair; and their reception of the recommenda-tions depends on the answer being “yes.”

Several major aspects of the WCD’s workprogramme affected its credibility. First, theexplicit effort to design good governance principlesinto all components of the work programmeearned stakeholder trust. This commitment helpedto engage interest groups in negotiation over theframing and composition of the work programme.In other words, the WCD’s efforts to cast itself asan honest broker and open listener in gatheringknowledge about large dams provided the precon-ditions for the broader stakeholder involvementthat followed.

Second, having established that political space, thework programme became a platform for heatedcontention among interest groups, which vied forinfluence in shaping the way issues were framed.Did a dam damage an ecosystem irreparably? Didit create new, viable ecosystems of its own? It wasover the phrasing and emphasis of such questionsthat interest groups pressured the WCD—andprimarily the Secretariat as mediators—in thecourse of knowledge gathering.

This ability to influence the work programme wasempowering for interest groups that had access tothe WCD’s work through their networks (contactswith either Secretariat or Commission members),their English language ability, and their access totelecommunications technology. For concernedstakeholders with more limited access to theInternet or English language, events moved too fastfor their meaningful participation and they werereliant on information filtered through secondarysources. The process was disempowering for them.Even stakeholders who wanted to participate in theshaping of the work programme and had easyaccess to Commission publications found the timefor digesting material and providing input tooshort. Their complaints led to time-consumingnegotiations later.

The lesson for future processes is that ample timemust be budgeted for informing stakeholdergroups of the process’ aims. For political accept-ability, a core group of stakeholders (such as, in theWCD’s case, the advisory Forum members) musthave the chance to comment on the direction ofthe work programme. This accomplishes twobenefits: groups can then mobilise their ownresources to contribute to the work programme;and they can negotiate contested concepts early on,which reduces the need for expensive coursecorrections later.

Another lesson, arising from the overall negotia-tion of the work programme as well as the indi-vidual country and river basin meetings, is theneed for more document translation. Althoughexpensive, time and money for translations andinterpretations should form an integral part ofbudgets and workplans in future processes of thiskind. Because it was not practical to translatemultiple drafts of working papers for stakeholderdissemination, a reasonable standard may be totranslate essential framing documents and interimproducts into major world languages.

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MULMULMULMULMULTITITITITI-----STSTSTSTSTAKEHOLDERAKEHOLDERAKEHOLDERAKEHOLDERAKEHOLDER PRPRPRPRPROOOOOCESSESCESSESCESSESCESSESCESSES

• Adopt an explicit commitment to good gover-nance in order to create the political space forengagement of diverse voices—this diversity iswhat demonstrates the value-added of the multi-stakeholder process.

• Adopt a work programme that allows stakehold-ers to propose diverse approaches and measuresin order to foster inclusion.

• Budget sufficient time for concerned interestgroups to become informed about the workprogramme and participate in its shaping.

• Choose local consultants rather than interna-tional consultants to engage in fact-findingwherever possible, but check their politicalacceptability with a range of local stakeholders toavoid disenfranchisement.

• Recognise that perceptions of the relative roles ofthe commission and secretariat in directing theprocess can affect stakeholders’ trust. Thecommission should identify and take clear controlover decisions that are controversial in stakehold-ers’ eyes.

• Budget sufficient time and money to translateframing documents and synthesis outputs intoother languages, especially for countries wheresignificant consultation and data gathering istaking place.

• Do not allow the speed of Internet communica-tion to speed up the pace of the workprogramme beyond the ability of non-connected,non-English speakers to participate.



A third major area for consideration in futuremulti-stakeholder processes relates to the difficultinterface of global forums with individual countrypolitics. Future processes will face the same trade-offs as the WCD did, whereby the WCD sought tocreate the space for multi-stakeholder dialogue ineach of its case studies. However, this aspirationlimited the choice of countries where it couldwork. In the semi-authoritarian countries wherethe WCD chose to work (based on the damspopulation), civil society input was curtailed.Participants in future processes will have to choosebetween promoting dialogue and gathering data incountries with open political systems whereinclusiveness will not be a challenge versus push-ing the envelope on inclusivity in less open politi-cal regimes.

Debates over which kinds of data belong in theknowledge base will play a prominent role in anyfuture multi-stakeholder process with a seriousfact-finding component. The knowledge gatheringprocess often requires several contributors fromone place to provide a range of perspectives and,

therefore, ensure credibility. Political tensionsaround access to and privilege over scientific dataposed major problems to both the comprehensive-ness of the WCD’s knowledge base and its accept-ability to various stakeholders. In some cases,project owners were simply unwilling to share databecause of security and other concerns. In othercases, the WCD chose local consultants who hadaccess to official data but such consultants typi-cally alienated civil society groups by neglectingqualitative and experiential forms of knowledge.

Finally, future processes will need a carefullynegotiated division of labour between the commis-sion and secretariat that takes fully into accountinterest group sensibilities about bias and dissi-pates tension with the fullest transparency pos-sible. It may be possible for future commissions toidentify the management issues that are especiallysensitive to stakeholders and to have a greater sayin them. In terms of the WCD, the workprogramme was so ambitious that the Commis-sion had to delegate most of the direct fact-findingto the Secretariat and consultants, while it took therole of weighing the evidence and reaching finalconclusions. Given the contested history of theCommission’s formation, based on negotiation byinterest groups, this delegation to the Secretariatand consultants (who were not chosen throughsuch a shared process) concerned stakeholders whofeared the introduction of bias. The neutrality ofthe Secretariat and consultant body remained a hotissue throughout the process, especially for NGOadvocates.

The explicit effort to buildgood governance in the

work programme earnedstakeholder trust.

Guest

This paragraph updates and corrects important information on p. 59 (Chapter 5) brought to our attention after the release of “A Watershed in Global Governance?”

Guest

Various sources expressed some criticism of the India country study, the nature of which reveals the political nature of the Commission’s knowledge generation process. The Indian government’s criticism of the study, in particular that it felt its views had not been incorporated adequately into the study, reinforces the perception of an ongoing contentious relationship between the Indian government and the WCD.* This history of contention illustrates the considerable challenge the WCD faced in maintaining a sufficiently open political space that allowed for all stakeholders to continue participation in the process. The government’s view did not go unchallenged, however. In a systematic response, one of the authors of the India country study reacts to these criticisms, explores the context for the government’s reaction to the report, and calls on the government to enter into an honest dialogue on the issues.** Representatives of civil society groups expressed some reservations about the draft version of the India country study, on which a public consultation was held.*** That some members of civil society chose to voice some concerns is best read, in our opinion, as an effort to ensure that these concerns were as fully addressed as possible in the final study. When the final study was released, an umbrella organization of civil society groups in India active on dams issued a press release approvingly quoting the findings of the India country study.**** Once again, this sequence of events suggests that the knowledge creation process of the WCD was a challenging one, and had to of necessity balance strong viewpoints of contending stakeholders.

Guest

* Discussions at the Stakeholders meeting organized to discuss the India Country Study. The meeting was held at the Indian Institute for Public Administration on March 3, 2000. Also interviews with government officials December 5-6, 2000 and January 12, 2001. See also, Response to the Final Report: Government of India, Ministry of Water Resources. 1 February 2001. Available at http://www.dams.org/report/reaction/reaction_india.htm. ** Ramaswamy R. Iyer, “World Commission on Dams and India: Analysis of a Relationship.” Economic and Political Weekly, June 23, 2001. *** Discussions at the Stakeholders meeting organized to discuss the India Country Study. The meeting was held at the Indian Institute for Public Administration on March 3, 2000. Also, interviews with civil society activists, March 3, 2000. **** South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers and People, “India Country Study for World Commission on Dams Exposes India's Poor Track Record on Large Dams.” Press release. 20 September 2000. Available at http://www.dams.org/news_events/media.php?article=75.

C h a p t e r 5


Endnotes

Tigris and Euphrates rivers due to water rights contro-versies in the region.

27. Personal communication with Flávia Braga Vieira,January 2001; also Flávia Braga Vieira, “Brazil’s DamAffected People’s Movement and the World Commissionon Dams.” Background paper prepared for the WCDAssessment, January 2001, p. 10.

28. Comments by Secretariat staff during focus groupsession, 3 November 2000.

29. Comments of senior Secretariat staff to the WCD Forum,5 April 2000.

30. For example, public plea by dam opponent at April 2000Forum meeting for Commission to scrutinise NarmadaValley dams more closely. See also Braga Vieira, 2001, p.8.

31. Public correspondence of Achim Steiner, WCD SecretaryGeneral to Jacques LeCornu, ICOLD Secretary-General,18 April 2000. Online at: http://genepi.louis-jean.com/cigb/steiner.htm (28 September 2001). Steiner wrote:“We particularly regret the misinformation that has ledthe Ministry of Water Resources to assume that the WCDwas going to produce a final report about the ThreeGorges project. The WCD is neither a Commission aboutthe Three Gorges Project nor is it a Commission aboutChinese dams. Our work programme is intended toassemble as much information as possible about damsthat would enable the Commission to develop its own,independent understanding of the key issues and lessonslearnt. In that context we attach great value to learningabout China’s approach to dams in the context of waterand energy resources management.”

32. World Commission on Dams, 2000, p. 351.

33. E-mail correpondence with staff of China human rightsorganisation, 30 March 2001. Interviews with partici-pants of East and Southeast Asia consultation, Hanoi,25–27 February 2000.

34. Work Programme of the World Commission on Dams,February 1999.



37. WCD Secretariat, “WCD Criteria for Selection ofConsultants,” draft, 14 October 1998.

38. Tundu Lissu, attendance at the second stakeholdermeeting for the Grand Coulee Case Study, January 2000.

39. Interview with senior Secretariat staff, 6 November 2000;interview with Secretariat staff, 12 February 2001.

40. See Pak Mun Dam case study on www.dams.org/studies/th/ (28 September 2001).


42. Interview with private sector representative, 26 February2001.

43. Interview with senior Secretariat staff, 6 November 2000.

44. They also organised the Tucurui stakeholder meeting toensure the participation of affected people, according toa senior Secretariat staff member in a November 2000interview. Melchisedeck Lutema, attendance at thesecond stakeholder meeting for the Kariba Dam casestudy, 21-22 February 2000.

1. WCD Secretariat, “Draft Briefing Note 3: Some Thoughtson WCD Secretariat Organisation and Structure.”Prepared for the first Commission meeting, May 1997.

2. World Bank/IUCN, Large Dams: Learning from the Past,Looking to the Future (Gland: IUCN, 1997), p. 11.


4. Sourced from internal Secretariat documents, “DraftBriefing Note 2, Some Considerations in Developing theFramework for the World Commission on Dams’ WorkProgramme,” May 1998.

5. Secretariat presentation to the WCD Forum, 5-6 April2000, Cape Town.

6. Sourced from internal Secretariat documents, “DraftBriefing Note 2, Some Considerations in Developing theFramework for the World Commission on Dams’ WorkProgramme,” May 1998; “World Commission on DamsStrategy and Objectives June 1998-June 2000,” August1998.

7. Work Programme of the World Commission on Dams,February 1999.

8. Patrick McCully, “A Critique of ‘The World Bank’sExperience With Large Dams: A Preliminary Review ofImpacts,’” April 1997. Online at: www.irn.org/programs/finance/critique.shtml (28 September 2001).

9. Interview with Commissioner, April 2000.

10. Medha Patkar, speech to NGOs, December 1999.

11. Personal communication from Secretariat staff, 3 July2001.

12. Interview with senior Secretariat staff, April 2000.

13. Interview with senior Secretariat staff, April 2000.

14. Early iteration of the workplan, thematic reviews,internal Secretariat document, August 1998.

15. Interviews with senior Secretariat staff, 6 November2000.

16. World Bank/IUCN, 1997.

17. Interview with WCD webmaster, November 2000.

18. Interview with World Bank official, 22 January 2000.



21. Interviews with Secretariat staff, December 1999 andApril 2000.

22. WCD website, www.dams.org/studies/ (28 September2001). A comprehensive official version of the case studymethodology is given on pages 350-352 of the WCD’sfinal report.

23. Interview with senior Secretariat staff, November 2000.

24. World Commission on Dams, Dams and Development: ANew Framework for Decision-Making (London: Earthscan,2000), p. 351. Also, interview with and internal docu-mentation from senior Secretariat staff, 6 November2000.


26. Interview with senior Secretariat staff, 6 November 2000.The Ataturk dam on the Euphrates River has been thesource of tension between Turkey and its neighbours.The World Bank refused to fund Turkey’s dams on the



45. Elena Petkova, attendance at the second stakeholdermeeting for the Aslantas Dam case study, January 2000.The Secretariat briefed Turkish environmental NGOs onthe Aslantas case study in the scoping stage, but theNGOs were stretched thin by other commitments anddeclined to get involved, according to a personalcommunication from Secretariat staff, August 2001.

46. Interview with Commissioner, 6 April 2000.

47. Eventually, the survey covered only 125 dams because ofincomplete survey forms.




51. E-mail correspondence from South African NGO toWorld Resources Institute, May-June 2000.



54. Interview with senior ICID official, 6 April 2000.



57. World Commission on Dams, “Strategy and Objectives:June 1998-June 2000,” Cape Town.

58. Interview with industry representative on the Forum, 6April 2000.

59. Ramananda Wangkheirakpam, “Assessment of the WCDProcesses on Thematic V.4.” Background Paper preparedfor the WCD Assessment.

60. Interview with Secretariat staff, 17 August 2000.


62. The exception that proves the case is the “Financial andDistributional Analysis,” which did manage to incorpo-rate submissions only because the thematic review wassubstantially delayed. Interview with Secretariat staff, 8April 2000.

63. Interviews with Secretariat staff, 3 November 2000 and 6November, 2000.

64. WCD Secretariat, “WCD Criteria for Selection ofConsultants,” draft, 14 October 1998.


66. This is a difficult charge to fully substantiate since thecategories of consultant and researcher are blurred inpractice. Thus, 43 percent of WCD consultants wereidentified by the Secretariat with academic/research,while 28 percent were termed consultants.

67. Interview with civil society representative on the Forum.

68. This was based on a categorisation of WCD consultantsby Secretariat staff rather than on a self-reporting basis.These numbers should be read only as a rough indicationsince categories such as “consulting” and “academic/research” shade into each other at the margins.


70. The Secretariat maintained records for consultants basedon nationality and “place of work.” Of the 65 percentwho reported their nationality, 56 percent were Euro-pean and North American. Of the 91 percent thatreported place of work, 63 percent were European orNorth American.

71. Interview with Commissioner, December, 1998.

72. Based on an analysis of consultant data provided to theassessment team by the Secretariat.

73. Interview with Secretariat staff, April 2000.

74. Interview with Commissioner, August 2000.


76. Interviews with Commissioners, 7 April 2000, November2000.

77. Interviews with Secretariat staff members, 17 August2000, April 2000, 7 April 2000.


79. Gopal Siwakoti, attendance at the second stakeholdermeeting of the Tarbela case study, January 2000;interview with Commissioner, April 2000.

80. Braga Vieira, 2001, p. 19.



83. Anthony Dorcey, Institutional Design and OperationalModalities for the Proposed Large Dams Commission,Stockholm Draft, 6 August 1997 (mimeo): Personalcommunication with UNED Forum, 3 August 2001.

I m p l e m e n t i n g t h e W o r k P r o g r a m m e : C o n s u l t a t i o n s a n d O u t r e a c h


Chapter 6

Implementing the Work Programme:Consultations and Outreach

A Listening Commission:The Regional Consultations

The Commission undertook four regional consul-tations: in South Asia, Latin America, Africa andthe Middle East, and East and Southeast Asia. (SeeBox 6.1.) In total, 1,400 individuals from 59countries took part in the regional consultations.1

The Commission also held 20 country and riverbasin-level consultations to discuss its case studies.

Public consultations have increasinglybecome a norm for development policyprocesses at the regional and global levels.Because the Brundtland Commission

gave public consultations higher visibility, deci-sion-makers have viewed them as ways of raisingawareness of forthcoming policies, providing asounding board for policies’ acceptability, andstrengthening their content. In the recent historyof global commissions, public consultations haveplayed an important role in helping commission-ers to define their problem statement and sustainwider public engagement. Multilateral develop-ment banks have increasingly built public consul-tations into policy processes.

For the World Commission on Dams, the regionalconsultations served both a fact-finding purposeand a way of raising the profile of the Commissionand its work around the world. In a symbolicsense, the regional consultations were intended toportray the WCD as an open, listening commissionand to make Commissioners more accessible topeople. In this way, the decision to hold regionalconsultations grew directly from the Commission’scommitment to inclusiveness and transparencyand its commitment to project an appropriatelyunbiased image. However, raising the publicprofile also brought the Commission under greaterscrutiny and increased the risk of alienatinginterest groups, if consultations went wrong.

This chapter examines the Commission’s success infulfilling the multiple objectives of the publicconsultations: Did the Commission gather diverseviewpoints from its consultations? Did it raise theprofile of its work with concerned stakeholders?And most important, what aspects of the consulta-tions strengthened or undermined theCommission’s broader legitimacy?

Box 6.1

WCD regional consultations

• South Asia—Colombo, Sri Lanka, 10–11 Decem-ber 1998

• Latin America—São Paulo, Brazil, 12–13 August1999

• Africa / Middle East—Cairo, Egypt, 8–9 December1999

• East and Southeast Asia—Hanoi, Vietnam, 26–27February 2000

Source: WCD website, www.dams.org/consultations/ (28September 2001).

Given limited funds and time, the Commissiondecided to focus on listening to stakeholders inworld regions where dam building was high on theagenda for future development, i.e., in developingcountries.2 By 1998, Europe and North Americahad some of the longest experience in dam build-ing, but they had largely exploited their hydropotential. Stakeholders widely accepted the empha-sis on Southern regions: Not only did thoseregions face the greatest challenges in water andenergy supply, but their citizens also had thegreatest difficulty in accessing international policyfora. It was fitting that the Commission shouldcome to them.3

C h a p t e r 6


The consultations providedlegitimacy for the Commission’s

final report.

The WCD’s proposed fieldtrip to the Narmada Valley

concerned Indiangovernment officials.

When it came to marketing the Commission’s finalreport, the consultations served as a strong publicrelations tool for legitimising the product. Giventhe historical precedent of and increasing expecta-tion for consultation in local, national, and inter-national development processes, the absence ofconsultations would likely have undermined theCommission’s credibility, particularly with civilsociety groups. Such mechanisms were incorpo-rated in concurrent environment and developmentprocesses, such as the World Water Vision process.(See Box 6.2.)

The Sensitive Interface of Global Process andLocal Politics

The WCD’s first consultation, planned for theSouth Asia region and to be held in India, ranheadlong into the complexities of domesticpolitics. Instead of an opportunity for the WCD tomodel how it would listen to different sides of thedams story, the event turned into a lesson on theperils of national and local politics for the per-ceived independence of a global commission.

The Commission chose Bhopal, in the Indian stateof Madhya Pradesh, as its meeting site. Theneighbouring state of Gujarat is intended to be theprime beneficiary of water and power from thehuge and controversial Sardar Sarovar Project onthe Narmada River. The Narmada River, for whichmore than 3,000 dams have been proposed, runsthrough both states. Over time, the social move-ment opposing the project has built up a remark-able national and global alliance of supportgroups. Major donors have withdrawn from theproject in light of its serious social, environmental,and economic impacts, including the World Bankwhose Morse Commission sounded the alarmfollowing a thorough inquiry. This history andcontext made the Gujarat government particularlysensitive to international intervention.

The WCD’s field trip to the Narmada Valleyconstruction and protest sites, planned by theactivist Indian Commissioner Medha Patkar,caused great concern to Gujarati officials. The

Government of India already suspected the WCDof an anti-dam bias, as recounted in Chapter 4,simply because Ms. Patkar was on the Commis-sion. When news of the proposed siting of theconsultation in Bhopal and the Commissioners’field trip to the Valley filtered out, the officials felttheir worst fears about international interventionhad been confirmed. The Gujarat assembly pres-sured the national government to withdraw itspermission for the WCD meeting. The nationalgovernment did so, only four days before thescheduled meeting date. The state governmentcalled the proposed WCD visit “an invasion bydeveloped nations on under-developed countries.”4

The Indian press carried negative reports of theWCD. Of the many columns that appeared, onewent so far as to dub the WCD a “fraud commis-sion.”5 Another characterised the Commission as“conceived last year by a group of about 40 peoplefrom various countries to launch a campaignagainst large dams.”6

This difficult beginning tarnished theCommission’s reputation with external audiencesand led to much soul-searching within. It taughtthe Commissioners and Secretariat a lesson theywould never forget: the consultations of a globalbody can be highly sensitive in certain local andnational contexts. The Commission’s substituteregional consultation for South Asia was held inColombo, Sri Lanka, in December 1998. Commis-sioners and Secretariat staff lauded the event for itssuccess in bringing opposing sides of the debate tothe table for constructive exchange. “I neverimagined seeing such democracy at work,” saidMedha Patkar of the diverse participation at theColombo meeting.7 The Commission continuedits regional consultation events in São Paulo, Cairo,and Hanoi.

Meeting Participation under RestrictivePolitical Regimes

The Commission chose country venues for itsregional consultations based primarily on practical



Box 6.2

The World Water Vision process

The WCD process took place at the same time as anevaluation of water management at the global level: the“Long Term Vision for Water, Life and Environment in the21st Century,” or World Water Vision process (WWV, 1997-2000). The objective of WWV was to formulate a sharedvision for how to mitigate the forthcoming globalchallenge of water scarcity. The exercise was based onregional and sectoral visions produced by stakeholdersthrough a series of consultations. A complementaryWorld Commission on Water was formed in July 1998chaired by Ismail Serageldin, then a Vice President atthe World Bank, to issue an independent report basedon the visioning exercise.a

According to the Vision report, the WWV’s consulta-tive process involved “authorities and ordinary people,water experts and environmentalists, governmentofficials and private sector participants, academics andNGOs.” The organisers estimate that at least 15,000people were directly involved in drafting Visiondocuments for specific regions and sectors throughthese consultations.b Although the WWV reached agreater number of people through its consultativeprocess than the WCD did, the WWV provided aplatform for a narrower range of stakeholders toexpress their views than did the WCD.

The sectoral consultations were organised around fourprincipal themes: Water for People; Water for Food andRural Development; Water and Nature; and Water in Rivers.Major water experts and water-related interest groups,such as the International Committee for Irrigation andDrainage (ICID) and members of the Consultative Groupfor International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) system,organised these consultations and wrote the resulting“Vision” documents.

The regional consultations were initiated by theregional committees of the Global Water Partnership, apre-existing network representing “eminent expertisewithin each region on water resources management.”c

They took place in all major continents, as well as in majorriver basins or riverine systems, such as the Nile and AralSea Basins. Notably, the World Water Vision’s regionalconsultations were decentralised: “A key part of the“contract” with the groups doing the consultations wasthat they would be free to identify the issues of concern tothem and draw their own conclusions.”d This structure wasnearly opposite to the WCD’s, in which consultations tookthe form of hearings and were tightly organised under thecentral control of the Secretariat staff. The promise of theWWV model was that stakeholders might achieve a morecollaborative interaction and greater ownership throughdirect participation. The risk of the model was thatconsultations might be dominated by the actors withgreatest power and authority, the water “establishment.”

Widespread accounts of the consultations, includingaccounts by the WWV Secretariat itself, indicate thatgovernmental and quasi-governmental water agenciesdid play a dominant role.e There was a greater effort toincorporate women’s groups and NGOs during the latterhalf of the process after these groups complained that

they felt excluded.f And the sectoral consultation on Waterfor People, co-ordinated by the Collaborative Council onWater Supply and Sanitation, was notable for its attempt ata “bottom-up approach.”g But the Vision’s organisersconcede that overall, the process was not as inclusive ofgrassroots and civil society inputs as they had hoped.h

The WWV process resulted in a global report thatpainted future scenarios for water use and water scarcityin broad brushstrokes and provided general recommen-dations for averting an acute crisis. The sheer number oflarge and influential water agencies involved in theprocess ensured that it captured headlines when theVision report was released in March 2000 in The Hague.This event, the Second World Water Forum, involved aministerial meeting that was well attended by interna-tional agencies and NGOs.

Advocacy NGOs were highly critical of the WWVprocess, to the point that they issued an alternativevision for management of the world’s water.i One NGOpress release called the WWV consultations a “sham.” Itcharged, “The process has been controlled from the startby a small group of aid agency and water multinationalofficials, mainly from the Global Water Partnership, WorldWater Council, World Bank and Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux.The key conclusions of the WCW [World Commission onWater] report that there is a global water shortage crisiswhich can only be solved with a massive increase inprivate funding for water projects in developingcountries, backed up with guarantees from the WorldBank and other aid agencies was predetermined.” j

a. World Water Council, World Water Vision: Making WaterEverybody’s Business (London: Earthscan, 2000). Online at:

www.worldwatervision.org/reports.htm (28 September 2001).

b. World Water Council, World Water Vision: Making WaterEverybody’s Business (London: Earthscan, 2000). Online at:

www.worldwatervision.org/reports.htm (28 September 2001).

c. Global Water Partnership website, www.gwpforum.org (28

September 2001).

d. W.J. Cosgrove and F.R. Rijsberman “The Making of the World

Water Vision,” March 2000, p. 5.

e. see list of consultations for the World Water Vision process, in

the appendix of World Water Council, 2000. Online at:

www.worldwatervision.org/Vision/Documents/Appendix.pdf

(28 September 2001).

f. W.J. Cosgrove and F.R. Rijsberman “The Making of the World


g. W.J. Cosgrove and F.R. Rijsberman “The Making of the World


h. Personal communication with World Water Vision Manage-

ment Unit staff, 10 May 2001.

i. Both Ends, People-Oriented River Basin Management: An NGOVision (Netherlands, 2000).

j. Excerpted from the statement “Old Water in a New Bottle: World

Water Vision is Chronically Short-sighted.” Written by International

Rivers Network (USA), International Committee on Dams, Rivers and

People, and Both Ends (Netherlands) and endorsed by 16 non-

governmental groups from Brazil, England, India, Nepal, Pakistan,

Slovakia, South Africa, Switzerland, and Thailand, 17 March 2000.

C h a p t e r 6


considerations: which governments were willing togrant permission, which locations were wellsituated geographically, and so on. For instance,Egypt was a natural crossroads between Africa andthe Middle East.8 Vietnam provided a goodopportunity to influence dam decision-making asit had so many dams on the drawing board.9

The Commission also had to consider how a hostcountry’s political regime affected participants’ability to express themselves. For a Commissionseeking to promote a new consensus on dams andto operate in an inclusive way, the choice ofcountry venue posed important trade-offs. Coun-tries with open democratic systems would facilitateparticipation of diverse stakeholder interests.Those with less of a democratic tradition wouldpotentially constrain it. The Commission facedchoices between mobilising diverse stakeholderparticipation in countries with open politicalregimes, and advancing norms of multi-stake-holder participation in countries that traditionallyallowed less political space for dialogue. Yet, asWCD Chairperson Kader Asmal noted, closeddecision-making processes were the very reason forthe WCD’s formation, and were the practices theWCD most sought to change. This observationargued for holding consultations where democraticprocess was weak, with the intent of advancingnorms of public participation.10

Among the WCD’s choices, the political environ-ments in Sri Lanka and Brazil allowed for expres-sion of diverse viewpoints in the dams debate. Bycontrast, in Egypt and Vietnam the number ofindependent civil society groups was limited.

In Egypt, the government had passed a law in 1998requiring governmental intervention in themanagement decisions of non-governmentalorganisations.11 Environmental NGOs, whileregional and global in their vision for environmen-tal protection, dared not question the equity andbenefits-sharing aspects of large water projects12

and this was reflected in the limited nature of the

Egyptian presentations at the WCD event. (See Box6.3.) In Vietnam, the government has long discour-aged independent civil society organising. Theonly independent Vietnamese voices at the Hanoiconsultation, as opposed to ministry views, camefrom staff of an international NGO.13

At the same time, both the Egyptian and Vietnam-ese consultations, particularly the Hanoi meeting,illustrated the WCD’s ability to be a catalyst forgreater openness. The WCD consultation tookplace at a time of opening in Vietnam, only twomonths after the national government passed adecree recognising non-governmental entities(“foundations”) for the first time. The Commis-sion required freedom from restrictions on travelby participants from around the region as acondition for holding the meeting in Hanoi, and

Box 6.3

The missing voice of Egyptian Nubians

The Aswan High Dam, completed in 1972, is a hugemonument to centralised development. The damwas built to reduce Egypt's vulnerability to floodand drought and expand its irrigated agriculture. Atotal of 120,000 ethnic minority Nubians weredisplaced from their homelands in Egypt and Sudanduring the dam’s construction.a The displacedNubian population on the Egyptian side of theborder reached 50,000. The government neverrecognised some families’ claims for compensation.b

At the World Commission on Dams’ regionalconsultation in Cairo on 8-9 December 1999, amorning was dedicated to hearings about Egypt'slarge dams experience. These presentations showedonly the official history. They covered the develop-ment benefits to Egypt of the Aswan High Dam and,to a limited degree, contentions over environmentalimpacts. In spite of outstanding issues aroundcompensation to the affected Nubian communityand long-term impacts of loss of cultural heritage,social justice and distributional issues around waterin Egypt were not part of the agenda.c The missingvoices of the Egyptian Nubians from the regionalconsultation demonstrate the compromises to fulland frank dialogue that occur when a globalCommission, seeking to establish democraticprocess and norms, chooses to operate in anauthoritarian context.

a Personal communication with Commissioner, August 2001.

b Interview with Egyptian Nubians, 11 December 1999.

The assistance of Yomna Kamel in interpreting from the

Arabic is gratefully acknowledged.

c Interviews with Egyptian Nubians, Cairo, 7-10 December

1999.

The host country’s politicalregime affected stakeholder

participation in Commissionevents.



there were, indeed, no reported restrictions. In someways, the government’s hosting of the WCD meetingdemonstrated willingness to experiment with amore open development dialogue. In the words of aVietnamese social science researcher: “The Viet-namese government has created favourable condi-tions for NGOs in Vietnam now and democracy isincreasing quickly.”14 Likewise, some Egyptiangovernment officials were impressed to hear an“unusually” diverse range of views at the WCDregional meeting in Cairo.15 Although these consul-tations were constrained, they may well havepromoted the value of multi-stakeholder consulta-tion in policy formulation. Future commissions willhave to weigh carefully the choice of country—ifthey are to ensure rich, productive dialogue—andclearly negotiate the terms of the consultation withthe host country in order to advance norms ofparticipation in closed societies.

Challenges of Outreach to a Broad Range ofStakeholders

The WCD’s modes of outreach for its regionalmeetings relied heavily upon the personal andprofessional networks of Commission, Secretariat,and Forum members. The Secretariat issuedannouncements and calls for submissions for theregional meetings, which were disseminatedpredominantly through the Forum’s networks.16

For instance, the World Bank, IUCN, InternationalRivers Network, and the International Commis-sion on Large Dams (ICOLD) formed majoroutreach nodes. The Secretariat also sent an-nouncements to contacts in government and in theSecretariat staff ’s own professional networks.17

Typically, the announcements were translated intothe host country language (Hindi, Portuguese,Arabic, Vietnamese) to raise local awareness. TheWCD announced forthcoming events in its Englishlanguage quarterly newsletter Dams (circulation2000), and it posted news of forthcoming eventson its website.

Civil society organisations on the WCD Forumand their networks made extraordinary efforts tosolicit community inputs to the process. NGO andsocial movement representatives phoned, faxed, e-mailed, and met with dozens of communityorganisations, particularly in Africa, South Asia,and Brazil, to encourage them to make submis-sions to the WCD and participate in regionalmeetings. In addition, they organised and pro-duced reports of regional hearings in South Africa

and Western Europe, to which Commissioners andSecretariat members were invited. The hearingswere intended as formal inputs to theCommission’s process. (See Box 6.4.)

The mobilisation by the Brazilian Movement ofDam-affected People (MAB) was particularlyeffective.18 MAB saw the Latin America RegionalConsultation as a key opportunity for dam-affected people without easy access to phone, fax,and e-mail to contact the Commission directly andto demonstrate the strength of their movement.The leadership anticipated that this event would betremendously meaningful for grassroots participa-tion and that it could be “the time for MAB toprint its own stamp on the WCD process.”19 As aresult of their efforts, 600 Brazilian dam-affectedpeople attended the regional consultation in SãoPaulo. Limits on space precluded all the partici-pants from filling the conference hall at once, andparticipants were disappointed at the lack of anopen forum for exchanging views. However, theyreported being moved by the experiences fromneighbouring countries and heartened by theirsuccess in opening up the event beyond govern-ment, business, and academic participation. In all,40 percent of the presentations at the São Pauloconsultation came from MAB and its NGO allies.

However, civil society resources were limited, andthe WCD did not compensate civil society effortsat outreach. Moreover, as with the Commissionand Secretariat, civil society networks were notcomprehensive either. For instance, the groups inSouthern Africa that mobilised significant commu-nity input for the African regional event (see Box6.4) had few contacts in East Africa, where contro-versial dam-planning and building are underway.In this case, adding another Forum member fromthe under-represented region may have boostedthe WCD’s ability to mobilise participation.

In a successful effort to broaden participation, theWCD did provide funding for developing countryparticipants to attend regional meetings, based

Civil society groups madeextraordinary efforts to solicit

community input for the process.

C h a p t e r 6


upon a selection process. This effort levelled theplaying field for different actors. However, observ-ers (as opposed to presenters) at the regionalconsultations had to pay their own way; therefore,issues of economic inequality affected participa-tion in the meetings. Civil society groups couldnot afford to stay at some of the more expensivemeeting venues. This experience, combined withconcerns around communications media and

language discussed in Chapter 5, raises accessibil-ity concerns for multi-stakeholder processes thatseek credibility through broad inclusiveness.20

Political Balance in the Consultations

Consultations constituted, above all, a public facefor the Commission. Most Commissioners at-tended the regional consultations. Importantly, the

Box 6.4

NGO-oNGO-oNGO-oNGO-oNGO-orrrrrggggganiseaniseaniseaniseanised Rd Rd Rd Rd Reeeeegggggioioioioional Cnal Cnal Cnal Cnal Cooooonsnsnsnsnsultatultatultatultatultatioioioioions and Mns and Mns and Mns and Mns and Mooooobilisatbilisatbilisatbilisatbilisatioioioioion En En En En Effffffffffooooorrrrrtststststs

the event, which was taken as a slight to theorganisers.

Participants presented case studies of Europeandams and overseas dams involving European financingand construction. They raised various concerns aboutthe WCD process and produced a letter to ChairpersonKader Asmal requesting that a long list of NGOconcerns about dams performance be addressed inthe remainder of the WCD’s work programme.d

Mobilisation in IndiaIn India, the Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA), themovement with which Commissioner Medha Patkar isassociated, and several other NGOs held four publichearings on large dams. As a national convenor of thelarger National Alliance of People’s Movements inIndia, Ms. Patkar was connected to a formidablenetwork of community organisers, grassroots develop-ment workers, dam-affected people, and NGOs.

The network organised hearings in the states ofMaharashtra, West Bengal, and Uttar Pradesh thatcovered a range of issues around flood managementand irrigation dams and their impacts.e The eventsgenerated submissions that were sent directly to theWCD. NGOs and peoples’ movements in India alsotranslated the WCD newsletter, Dams, into Hindi anddisseminated it. The NBA also sent out a regular e-mailupdate to a wide cross-section of people in India andabroad. Additionally, the South Asian Network of Dams,Rivers and People (SANDRP), based in Delhi, main-tained regular communication with different stake-holders and facilitated the participation of civil societygroups in the WCD process.

a. “Once There Was a Community: Southern African Hearing for

Communities Affected by Large Dams: Final Report.” Compiled

and edited by Noel Stott, Karen Sack, and Liane Greef,

Environmental Monitoring Group, March 2000. b. Interview

with dam-affected community representative presenting at

the Cairo consultation, December 1999. c. Summarised from

Elena Petkova, World Resources Institute, trip report on

attendance at “Dammed at Home, Damming Abroad.” d. The

letter is reproduced publicly on the European Rivers Network

website, www.rivernet.org/nconf99.htm (28 September 2001).

e. E-mail communication by Commissioner to the WCD

assessment team, 15 February 2001

Mobilisation in AfricaIn Southern Africa, the Environmental Monitoring Group(EMG) along with the Group for Environmental Monitor-ing and the Botswana office of the International RiversNetwork organised the “Southern African Hearings forCommunities Affected by Large Dams.” The hearing wasnot an official WCD event, but it was directed explicitlyat the Commission. The event was intended to provideaffected communities with an opportunity to presenttheir experiences, which these NGOs felt had not beenadequately covered in the Commission’s work. TheSecretariat staff, Chairman, Secretary-General, and oneCommissioner attended.a

Participants produced a “Final Declaration: Voices ofAffected Communities” that decried the social, cultural,economic, and ecological dislocations caused by largedams in the region and called for authorities to addressoutstanding historical injustices.

Based on contacts made in this process, EMG encour-aged community groups to make formal submissions tothe Commission. In addition, EMG staff e-mailed, faxed,and phoned all their contacts in community groups andNGOs throughout Africa to encourage submissions to theWCD. This outreach bore fruit: as a result of their efforts,EMG mobilised about 35 submissions to the WCD. TheCommission selected seven of those authors to presenttheir views in person and gave the authors grants totravel to the Africa and Middle East regional consultationin Cairo. According to a displaced man from Kwa-ZuluNatal, the information and moral support provided byEMG made his journey possible.b

Given that the WCD Secretariat’s outreach for theAfrica and Middle East consultation was limited largelyto contacts in their staff’s professional networks, such asthe World Bank, IUCN, and governmental communities,along with stakeholders who had e-mail access, EMG’sefforts to undertake a broader mobilisation provedinvaluable in diversifying participation.

Mobilisation in Europec

In Europe, NGOs led by Friends of the Earth–Slovakiaorganised a hearing entitled “Dammed at Home,Damming Abroad” in January 2000. The hearing wassupported by private foundations and was closely co-ordinated with the Commission’s schedule. Only oneCommissioner and two Secretariat members attended



appearance of the Commission as a group pro-moted the image of political balance, thusstrengthening broad legitimacy.21

By contrast, it was impossible for all the Commis-sioners to attend the various additional countryconsultations. Only one or two Commissionersand Secretariat members attended each of these.This situation increased the risk that stakeholderswould receive a biased impression of theCommission’s political bent.22 At country meet-ings, Commissioners had to make a greater effortto explain the diversity of views and experience intheir larger group.

In terms of content, at the regional hearings theSecretariat made efforts to project a neutral imageby selecting a range of political views and topicsfor presentation. Each event lasted only two daysso it was not possible to be exhaustive; instead, theCommission sought to hear a balance of experi-ences from the region as a whole.

A core group of Forum members, mostly fromadvocacy NGOs, monitored political balance onthe agenda and were quick to chide the Secretariatwhen they felt diversity had been sacrificed. Forinstance, the Secretariat initially passed over aprominent domestic critic to choose a Chinesegovernment speaker and foreign consultant topresent information about China’s dams experi-ence at the East Asia meeting. Civil society groupsstaged an uproar.23 In this case, although theSecretariat had sought political balance in itspresentations from the region as a whole, Chinawas such a large and significant dam-buildingcountry that to allow only pro-dam voices fromthat country to speak appeared overly biased. Thisissue was later resolved by allowing the domesticcritic to address a closed-door session of theCommissioners. Aside from this example, in mostcases the WCD assembled a sufficiently diverse setof presentations to satisfy Forum members moni-toring the process.

The effort to create balanced presentations at theregional meetings was important for both Com-

missioners and participants. The Secretariatprocessed most of the numerous papers, studies,and submissions sent to the Commission. ForCommissioners, the consultations provided a rareopportunity to receive information directly.Presentations by representatives of dam-affectedcommunities about their experiences appear tohave had a more profound effect on Commission-ers than technical studies on the same topics. Forexample, during the closed-door meetings of theCommission that followed regional consultations,Commissioners would frequently invoke theprevious day’s stakeholder evidence in theirdiscussions.24

For many observers, balance was importantbecause regional consultations were their onlydirect experience with the Commission’s work.They not only obtained their primary impressionof the Commission’s independence from the two-day meeting, but it was possible they would learnmore from the meeting than from theCommission’s final report. For example, interviewswith government officials at the Egypt and Viet-nam meetings revealed that they attended the two-day meeting to gather information about state-of-the-art dam-building or alternatives. Few wereconscious of, or looking forward to, the WCD’sfinal guidelines. Moreover, language interpretationat the meetings made the content accessible to alocal audience, whereas ongoing news of theCommission’s activities posted in English on theWCD’s website was less accessible.

Participation versus Consultation

The WCD followed emergent international normsby undertaking a consultative process. At the sametime, the Commission determined that the conten-tious nature of the topic and the history of strugglerequired strict rules of participation. Far fromallowing free-flowing public dialogue at its consul-tations, the Commission carefully handpickedpresenters for the regional consultations and timedthe speeches strictly. The result was a consultationthat was structured around a series of testimonies,lending the Commissioners the air of judges whowould weigh the evidence in an independentmanner.

This somewhat rigid approach did vary accordingto who held the chair. For example, in all casesonly Commissioners were permitted to questionthe speakers. However, at some consultations,

Achieving political balance inthe consultations was important

for many reasons.

C h a p t e r 6


observers were allowed to comment from the floor.Personal access to Commissioners during lunchesand coffee breaks varied widely from meeting tomeeting. Indeed, as one Commissioner noted, thestyle of the hearings changed in a kind of “action-reaction” process of learning.25 After the enthusias-tic participation of hundreds of displaced peopletook the Commission by surprise in São Paulo anddrew criticism from members of the dam estab-lishment, the following regional consultation inCairo was managed on a much tighter rein.Observers in Cairo had no chance to comment inthe public proceeding but were, instead, urged toprovide submissions in writing.26 In retrospect, theCommission could have done a better job ofclarifying the scope for participation before themeetings, in order to manage expectations.

The highly structured meetings surprised manyparticipants who had hoped for a more openexchange of views on large dams. Early WCDpublicity materials that called for a consensus-building approach raised expectations of a free-flowing exchange at meetings and lively dialoguewith Commissioners.27 The assessment teamfound this expectation to be particularly strong atthe São Paulo meeting.28 The emphasis on testi-mony rather than debate was a potent example ofhow the process was weighted more towardCommissioner findings and less toward promotinga broad debate among stakeholders.

By contrast, the country meetings, which weredesigned to provide focussed feedback to the WCDon thematic and case study papers, had less theflavour of hearings. These events provided greateropportunity for spontaneous debate than did thetightly organised regional consultations, but theirgeographic scope was also narrower.

Overall, the WCD’s decision to manage the large,regional hearings tightly was a reasonable decisionbecause it prevented partisan voices from domi-nating. However, the consultative process alsohighlights the trade-offs faced by the organisers ofthese and future events. There is not necessarily

one correct way of facilitating public meetings fordiverse participation. On the one hand, facilitatingdirect dialogue between broader stakeholdergroups offers the possibility of advancing mutualunderstanding; the WCD accomplished this onlyin a modest sense. On the other hand, structuringstakeholder meetings so that they deny moresubstantive debate among participants helps keepthe events politically balanced; this was the WCD’schoice.

The Public Face of the WCD:The Media Strategy

The Commission’s media strategy focussed ongaining coverage for meetings after they occurredand for the overall work of the Commission. TheCommission may have missed an opportunity byfailing to integrate its media strategy with itsstrategy for mobilising submissions and atten-dance at the consultations.

The primary tools deployed by the WCD to fosterinclusion were its newsletters and website. Theeffectiveness of these vehicles for information wasenhanced by arrangements with specialisedpublications and institutions to amplify the WCD’scall for input. For example, the WCD insertedinformation on its process in industry publica-tions, such as Hydro Review Worldwide and Inter-national Water, Power and Dam Construction, toreach industry groups. Similarly, various civilsociety groups and networks circulated informa-tion about the WCD through their own electronicnetworks. As with efforts to broaden participationat the regional consultations, the willingness ofoutside actors to play a constructive role was ofconsiderable benefit to the WCD process.

Local media was not a central element of theWCD’s outreach strategy, particularly in its earlydays. Although media packets were put together atthe time of regional consultations, these wereassembled by local consultants who adapted andtranslated WCD information, without much WCDcontrol over the final outcome.29

By the time of the East and Southeast Asia consul-tation in Hanoi in February 2000, the last regionalmeeting, the WCD had refined its outreach modelsomewhat. In this case, the Secretariat hired amember of IUCN-Hanoi to work full-time onVietnamese language outreach for the six monthsleading up to the event. This model solicited

Consultations were structuredas opportunities for publictestimonies, rather than for

stakeholder dialogue.



The media strategy wasonly partly successful in

shaping the WCD’s image.

substantial input from a cross-section of Vietnam-ese stakeholders (within the framework of a smallNGO sector), and generated some media an-nouncements about the meeting before it hap-pened.30 This model of an integrated outreachstrategy that incorporates both presswork and acall for submissions to general stakeholders wouldhave applied well to the entire WCD process andprovides a lesson for future processes.

For the most part, the central goal of the mediastrategy was to achieve a high profile with nationaland international media. This was particularly truein the early days when media attention was per-ceived as a useful way to attract financing for theWCD’s process. However, because of the absence ofconsistently interesting newsworthy events duringthe life of the WCD, sustaining high profile mediaattention proved to be an uphill battle. Other thanthe launch event itself, the most newsworthystories during the WCD’s tenure proved to becontroversies surrounding the regional consulta-tions, in particular the cancellation of the Indianconsultation.

The media strategy was only partly successful atshaping the Commission’s public image. Themedia’s filters significantly influenced its portray-als of the WCD. The Secretariat tried to focusmedia attention on the uniqueness of the processitself, but this theme did not get off the ground.31

Press releases prominently noted the Commission’sadherence to principles of good governance,32 butthe media did not pick up on the importance ofgood process to good outcomes. Similarly, only 3percent of WCD press releases focussed on nega-tive stories about dam-related displacement andenvironmental problems, but a substantial 32percent of media reports sampled for this studyfocussed on such negative stories.

The voices of stakeholder groups were also impor-tant in shaping media coverage and, by extension,the WCD’s public image. Twenty-nine percent ofquotes in the media were attributed to Commis-sioners or Secretariat staff, but NGOs also ac-counted for a sizeable 21 percent of WCD-related

Sustaining high profilemedia attention proved to be

an uphill battle.

quotes—more than either governments (12percent) or the private sector (6 percent). Thesefigures suggest that NGOs were more effective ingetting their messages heard in the media thanwere other stakeholders.

During the latter half of the WCD’s tenure, at-tempts to attract media attention focussed onsustaining interest in the WCD as a source ofcredible information on dams. Specifically, theWCD sought to raise media and public interest byputting out issue-specific and geographically-focussed press releases. However, this strategy ranthe risk of alienating stakeholder groups who feltthat the WCD was prematurely declaring conclu-sions and violating its self-imposed strictureagainst arbitrating ongoing controversies. In thewords of a Secretariat member, “The distinctionbetween [the WCD’s] input and output wasblurred.”33 For example, some groups interpreted apress release on the Pak Mun Dam (Thailand) as ajudgement by the WCD on the dam, while therelease was intended to raise the relevance of theWCD for Thailand. In another example, industrygroups questioned the credibility of a press releasethat estimated the number of people displaced bydams and deemed the release premature.34

These examples suggest a more general problemfaced by the WCD in attracting and sustainingmedia attention—media attention and mainte-nance of stakeholder trust in the process wereoften at odds. To attract media attention, the WCDhad to release newsworthy information, which, forexample, shed new light on a heated debate oraddressed an ongoing controversy. However, thesharper and more newsworthy the release, themore likely it was to alienate stakeholders, andthereby undermine attempts at sustaining themulti-stakeholder dialogue.

Conclusions

Public consultations are an emerging norm fordevelopment decision-making, especially interna-tional multi-stakeholder processes. As with the

C h a p t e r 6


WCD, they can provide an important opportu-nity for otherwise disenfranchised voices to havetheir say. Moreover, in-person presentations atconsultations provide a directness and immediacyto commission deliberations that cannot besubstituted for by other forms of knowledgegathering. Finally, consultations can contributegreatly to the reality and perception of inclusive-ness, which buttresses the legitimacy of a com-mission. However, consultations can also becounter-productive, if the tremendous politicalweight of a global commission comes to bearinappropriately on a local or national controversyand the commission is seen as unbalanced ortaking sides.

To ensure that consultations are inclusive andbalanced, commissions will have to shoulder

considerable logistical costs. As was the case withthe WCD, the use of organisational nodes todisseminate information and mobilise participa-tion can help ease this burden. However, in thefuture, a conscious strategy of collaboration withstakeholder groups may require that a commissionbuild in more funds to assist stakeholders—particularly under-resourced NGOs—in outreach.Such a strategy also has its limits and can at best bea complement to, and not substitute for, asecretariat’s outreach.

Much of the credibility fostered by public consul-tation derives from providing equal opportunity toall major stakeholder groups to participate. TheWCD did this well: by pre-selecting speakers for itsregional meetings for political, geographical, andtopical balance. The WCD levelled the playing fieldfor participation by offering travel stipends to allspeakers to attend the regional event. Such en-abling mechanisms for less affluent stakeholderswill be essential to the credibility of future pro-cesses. The disadvantage of the carefully con-structed and controlled meetings was that they lostthe Commission some credibility as a forum forexchange. Participants were not able to debatedirectly in the WCD consultations; this confusedthose who thought the objective of the process wasa broader consensus-building. As the meetingsprogressed, the Commission became increasinglyexplicit about the scope of participation it allowed.Such clarity about the way people can participate,and how their contributions will be used, isessential to the legitimacy of any multi-stakeholderor broader policy process.

The WCD may have raised greater popular aware-ness of its work and increased meeting attendancehad it tied its media strategy more explicitly to thepublicity for consultations. It accomplished thisonly late in its process. This experience suggeststhe importance of multi-pronged outreach strate-gies that use country- and region-specific net-works and the mass media to promote diverseparticipation.

LESSONS FOR BUILDING CREDIBLE MULTI-STAKE-HOLDER PROCESSES

• Hold public hearings to foster inclusion of diverseviewpoints.

• Establish early the objectives of public consulta-tion and make sure to communicate these clearlyto participants, including how their contributionswill be used.

• Consider providing modest financial resources toselected local groups to reach out to communi-ties and other relevant groups who would nototherwise hear about the process.

• Provide financial support to community represen-tatives and other less-resourced groups to enablethem to travel to meetings, so that the scope oftheir participation is equivalent to that ofgovernment, business, and better-resourcedgroups.

• Use international networks to disseminateinformation about events, but also exploitcountry and regional networks and the massmedia, where possible, to reach popular audi-ences.

• Integrate media and general outreach strategiesfully.



Endnotes

20. In Cairo, however, the meeting took place at a deluxehotel. According to NGO participants who sought moremodest alternatives, the hotel was not located near other,lower priced accommodation. International NGOobservers were able to muster the funds to share roomsand attend the proceedings, but the cost of roomsremained contentious. The second stakeholder meetingfor the Tarbela case study in Pakistan was held in a five-star hotel, at which local NGO representatives refused tomeet. Similar constraints forced community or NGOstakeholders to turn away from the Oregon (U.S.) andOslo (Norway) meetings.

21. Exceptions were the Commissioners from internationalbusiness and government backgrounds, who attendedrelatively fewer consultations. As a result, their sectorsmay have appeared partly under-represented to observ-ers.

22. Interview with Commissioner, 20 January 2000.

23. International Rivers Network wrote to the Secretary-General to protest the exclusion of Dai Qing, the ThreeGorges Dam’s most outspoken critic, from the agenda.The only Chinese presenter scheduled to speak camefrom the Institute of Agricultural Economics in China,and his paper was solidly pro-government and pro-dam.The other presenter on Chinese dams was the WCD’sown foreign consultant, who had written a stockoverview based on government statistics.


25. Interview with Commissioner, December 1999.

26. Attendance at the Cairo consultation, December 1999.

27. Manuel Pulgar-Vidal, background paper to the WCDassessment on the Latin America regional consultation,August 1999; Braga Vieira, 2001.

28. Braga Vieira, 2001; Pulgar, 1999.

29. The result was some tragi-comic lapses. For example, theearly publicity materials for the WCD in Egyptianreferred to the World Commission on Cisterns, an errorthat was fortunately captured and corrected before theCairo consultation.

30. Such as an announcement on Vietnamese state televi-sion.

31. Interview with WCD media staff, 7 April 2000.

32. Independence, openness and transparency, knowledge-driven, accessible, representing a spectrum of views, andinformed on issues and alternatives. All six of theseprinciples were highlighted in 60 percent of WCD pressreleases.


34. Interview with industry representative, 17 November2000.

1. Dams: Official Newsletter of the World Commission onDams, No. 6, April 2000.

2. Interview with senior Secretariat staff, December 1999.

3. The Commission was forced to cut back on some of itsoriginal plans in developing regions; for instance, theCommission had to drop the idea of a South Africanregional hearing. In that particular case, NGOs arrangeda hearing with private foundation funding as a directinput to the Commission’s work instead. The history isdocumented in the Environmental Monitoring Group’srecord of the proceedings.

4. Based on a comprehensive survey of Indian press articleson the WCD, 1997-2000, by RamanandaWangkheirakpam.

5. Virendra Kumar reporting for the Indian Express,Ahmedabad, 9 September 1998.

6. Special correspondent reporting in The Hindu, 5September 1998.


8. Interview with senior Secretariat staff, December 1999.

9. Commissioners’ contextual remarks to the meetingparticipants in Hanoi, February 2000. Vietnam isexpected to install a further 11,000MW in hydropowercapacity in the period 2001-2020.

10. Interview with Commissioner, 19 November 2000.

11. Interview with staff of Egyptian human rights group, 8December 1999.

12. For example, the Egyptian NGO presentation to theWCD at the regional consultation concerned this NGO’sefforts to help the government rehabilitate irrigationinfrastructure. Also, interview with independentEgyptian academic and environmental consultant, 10December 1999; interview with director of Egyptianenvironmental NGO, 11 December 1999.

13. One local government official, whose participation wassupported by the NGO, was also present.

14. Interview with presenter at the regional consultation,February 2000.

15. Interview with official from the Egyptian Department ofIrrigation, 8 December 1999.

16. WCD Secretariat, “Call for Submissions,” announcementsto WCD Forum members, July 1999-January 2000.

17. Interview with senior Secretariat staff, February 2000.

18. Information drawn from Flávia Braga Vieira, “Brazil’sDam-Affected People’s Movement and the WorldCommission on Dams.” Background paper prepared forthe WCD Assessment, January 2001.

19. Interview with NGO activist, MAB’s IV NationalCongress, November 1999.

C o m m i s s i o n D y n a m i c s : N a r r o w v e r s u s B r o a d C o n s e n s u s


Chapter 7

Commission Dynamics:Narrow versus Broad Consensus

Commissioners brought very different perspectivesand histories, and in some cases considerablewariness of the process and of each other. In thiscontext, Commissioners have emphasised thecentral role of a balanced and strong Chairpersonin steering Commission deliberations.

As a government minister and an academic with ahistory of political struggle, Chairperson KaderAsmal brought considerable authority to hisstewardship of the WCD. In chairing the Commis-sion, he drew on the idea of “sufficient consensus,”an approach used by the African National Con-gress during anti-apartheid days to bind coalitionsin the party and to build relations with otherparties. He encouraged Commission members tofocus first on issues around which they could forgerough consensus and to table difficult issues forlater discussion.1 The exercise of veto by onemember over the entire process was not an option.This approach was meant to decrease the likeli-hood of dissenting reports and cultivate a sense ofindividual and shared investment in the finalprinciples. By persuading Commissioners to investincrementally in the process of mutual learningand relationship-building, Professor Asmal in-tended to make it ever more difficult for a Com-missioner to walk away from the process. He toldCommissioners that their enemies were no longereach other, but the sceptics who said they couldnot finish their work.2

Two key features of the WCD that weexplore in the previous chapters—breadth of representation on the Com-mission and a work programme based

upon good governance principles—enabled theCommission to produce its report. TheCommission’s diversity enhanced the legitimacy ofits deliberations, even as it made producing aconsensus report particularly challenging. At thesame time, an open and inclusive workprogramme was necessary to build and maintaintrust among Commissioners and to allow eachCommissioner and the Commission as a whole tomaintain connections with stakeholders.

This chapter examines the dynamics within theCommission that led to consensus, and the degreeto which these interactions can be planned for andstructured into future multi-stakeholder processes.This chapter also foreshadows internationalreactions to the final report, which are discussed inChapter 8. The broad representation on theCommission and its attempts to achieve goodprocess were intended to build constituencies foradoption and implementation of its final report inthe greater stakeholder community. However, theCommission’s choices about where to seek consen-sus led it toward consensus-finding among its ownmembers, rather than consensus-building or eventhe evolution of shared understandings amongForum members and larger networks. We look atthe choices that led the WCD in this direction, as aprecursor to the discussion about adoption andcompliance in Chapter 8.

Toward Commissioner Consensus

For the Commission to be successful, the diverseCommissioners had to develop a shared interest inachieving consensus. This was not a small task.

Commissioners putaside difficult issuesfor discussion later.

C h a p t e r 7


The first meeting of the Commission was report-edly fraught with tension. Each member of theCommission introduced him or herself to theothers, laying out his or her professional andpersonal experiences. A Commissioner whoworked with displaced people showed pictures ofterrible resettlement conditions to the Commis-sioner whose corporation was supplying engineer-ing equipment to that dam.3 Although this begin-ning did not augur well for conciliation, oneCommissioner noted that it was necessary to “getthis out of the way.”4 Once these introductionswere made, the Commissioners could shift theirfocus to the mandate and the work ahead. Overtime, there developed within the Commission whatCommissioners describe as a remarkable climate ofmutual respect on a personal level,5 and a growingwillingness to listen to the others.6

Dr. Jan Veltrop, a former President of the Interna-tional Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD), wascommended by all of his colleagues for wedding alifetime of experience in dam building with anextraordinary willingness to listen to differentviewpoints and seek out new information. He wasalso tireless in his work during the life of theCommission and attended almost every field visitand consultation. Dr. Veltrop was a replacementfor another former president of ICOLD who hadoriginally been appointed to the Commission.7

Whether the original Commissioner from this keyconstituency would have played an equally positiverole can only be a matter of speculation. However,at least some Commissioners suggested that had hestayed on, the Commission as a whole would nothave progressed toward the final framework. Theseobservations highlight the importance of individu-als and, to some extent, serendipity in the successof the Commission.8

At the other end of the political spectrum, MedhaPatkar, the social movement activist from India, iscredited with retaining her convictions whilemaintaining enough flexibility to allow the Com-mission to move forward. Some of theCommission’s early difficulties with the Indiaconsultation have been attributed to Ms. Patkar’spushing her interests too strongly.9 However, hersubsequent willingness to negotiate in the frame-work of the overall Commission’s goals enabled thebody to accomplish more than many thoughtpossible.10 Ms. Patkar did append a “comment” tocomplement her signature on the final report, inwhich she argued that the report’s scope was

inadequate and did not address the broaderstructural problems with associated development,of which dams were but one symptom. However,her “comment” was couched in the context ofendorsing the process and its outcomes.

The most significant change in the Commissionitself occurred halfway through the process whenCommissioner Shen Guoyi, of China’s Ministryof Water Resources, abruptly resigned.11 Ms.Shen’s departure certainly held implications forthe Commission’s external image, for she was atonce a senior government official, a Southernvoice, and the only woman who was not from anNGO or community background. Her presenceon the Commission had also signified co-opera-tion from the world’s most prolific dam-buildingnation. Although the WCD Chairperson re-quested a replacement Commissioner, the Chi-nese government did not respond. Ms. Shen’sabsence would later amplify criticisms that theCommission received after the launch of itsreport—that it was biased toward the North andthat it had failed to consult Southern govern-ments adequately.

Although one can only guess the effect of Ms.Shen’s departure on Commission negotiations(after all, the Commission had not even begun toprepare the final report when she left), it is likelythat her resignation influenced the Commission-ers’ ability to reach consensus—as well as thenature of the final report. While the Chinesegovernment did not make any formal statement ofdisagreement regarding the substance of theCommission’s work at the time of Ms. Shen’sdeparture, a later memo from the Chinese govern-ment to the World Bank indicated that it disagreedwith the positions of most Commission mem-bers.12 (See Chapter 5, Box 5.4.)

Toward Consensus: The Process of SharedLearning

The Commission’s success in completing a consen-sus report was largely a result of a two-year sharedlearning process. Had the Commissioners soughtto establish common ground early, their debateswould have been based on prior experience ratherthan shared evidence. Hence, they decided to castthe net wide and avoid discussion of developmenteffectiveness criteria up front. A focus on gatheringdifferent views enabled the Commissioners, quitesimply, to get on with each other.13



“I think the decision not to dive into the workprogramme was a smart one,” said one Commis-sioner. “A joint fact-finding, with a commonknowledge base…allowed us to build trust. It’sbeen very collegial, congenial.”14 TheCommission’s focus on listening and learning wasintended to bring the members toward a consensusof the highest common denominator.15

As we documented in Chapter 5, the process ofnegotiating the Commission’s work programmedemocratised, or opened up, knowledge creation togo beyond scientific sources and provide a spacefor grassroots voices. This would not have beenpossible without the presence of community andindigenous peoples’ activists on the Commissionitself. Meanwhile, the presence of practitionerCommissioners with extensive fieldwork experi-ence also broadened the whole Commission’s view.Joji Cariño is often cited as having made a notablecontribution to the Commission’s collectiveaccomplishment in addressing indigenous andtribal peoples’ issues. Deborah Moore’s back-ground in environmental flows, Thayer Scudder’sin resettlement issues, and José Goldemberg’s inthe energy sector are cited as having compelledand advanced collective thinking.16 Commission-ers prepared special briefing papers on their areasof expertise and presented these at Commissionmeetings. They took special responsibility forcommenting, on an ongoing basis, on parts of thework programme in which they had a particularinterest. Later in the process, they formed sub-committees to consider focal issues in depth.

The unfolding work programme provided theopportunity for Commissioners to absorb anddebate new material together, via common read-ings, public consultations, and shared experienceswith engineers, activists, communities, and deci-sion-makers. At times, Commissioners had first-hand experiences that broadened their perspec-tives. For instance, the engineer on the Commis-sion who had not been exposed to the conditionsof resettled communities was reportedly muchmoved by observing and hearing from these

affected communities.17 This gradual process oflearning, organised around grappling with thesame set of material and processing the sameexperiences, equipped the Commissioners toconfront difficult decisions in the last few monthsof their work.

“Why did I sign off?” said one Commissioner, onthe eve of the report’s launch. “Because of an earlydesire on my part, and I know on the part of othersas well, to succeed. Later, among all of us there wasa determination to complete our mandate. Surelythe final report represents some measure ofcompromise for many of the Commissioners, ifindeed not for all of them. We realised what wouldbe at stake if no agreement would be reached.”18

Commissioner Consensus versus StakeholderConsensus

A “consensus driven approach” was one of theWCD’s guiding principles and indeed, part of theGland mandate. But the Commissioners inter-preted consensus-building as focussing on interac-tions with each other. Building consensus in thebroader stakeholder community was a longer-termobjective for which the Commission’s work wouldlay the foundation. As principal advisor AnthonyDorcey had observed in the early days of theCommission’s formation:

“It is proposed in the Gland report that frominception to conclusion the full diversity ofstakeholders should be involved in a processthat is transparent and designed to reachconsensus to the greatest extent possible. Whilethis reflects a growing trend in new collabora-tive models of governance for sustainability,putting those principles into practice raisesimmense challenges for the commission.Practical considerations of time and resourceswill generally make it impossible to go muchbeyond achieving goals of transparency to buildconsensus in its multi-stakeholder consultationprocesses.

Recommendation: The terms of referencedocument should make clear that while theimmediate goal of the commission focuses onbuilding consensus among the commissionerson conclusions and recommendations, thelonger term goal is to provide a foundation forbuilding consensus in large dam decision-making processes.”19

The process of shared learningmade Commissionersmore determined to

complete their mandate.

C h a p t e r 7


The Commission’s work programme reflected thisemphasis. For instance, as we described in Chapter6, the public consultations were designed andpresented as information-gathering opportunitiesfor the Commission, not occasions for exchange,dialogue, or consensus-building among stakehold-ers in the broader community.

Because there were few opportunities for directexchange among a broader number of interestgroups under WCD auspices (Forum meetingsprovided one such opportunity), many interestgroup efforts were directed toward influencing theCommissioners themselves or lobbying membersof the Secretariat who were involved in the day-to-day management of the work programme. Thus,for those stakeholders who were actively engagedin monitoring and providing input to the workprogramme, the Secretariat and Commission actedas mediators. Because it was involved in the day-to-day implementation of the work programme,the Secretariat felt much more of this pressurethan the Commission did.

Constituency Ties, Constituency Drift20

As explored in Chapter 4, the Commission’slegitimacy derived from the range of networks,views, and positions collectively represented on theCommission. Individually, for many Commission-ers, credibility rested on continued ties with andsupport from networks. At the same time, each wasempowered to act in his or her personal capacity,to negotiate freely toward consensus. This simulta-neous need for connection and freedom estab-lished a tension for many Commissioners.

In some cases, the ties to constituents were par-ticularly strong and were reinforced throughoutthe life of the Commission. This was especiallyevident in the case of Commissioners from non-governmental backgrounds, who consulted withinternational NGOs and dam-affected peoples’representatives before each Commission meeting.These informal consultations allowed them “to

keep in touch,” and ensure that they didn’t “signoff on things people aren’t comfortable with,” inthe words of one Commissioner.21 “I have aresponsibility to represent the point of view of aparticular constituency,” said another, who notedthat peoples’ movements had “expressed faith” inher nomination and provided much support.22

Other Commissioners maintained loose networksof associates and advisors whom they used assounding boards for issues raised in the Commis-sion. Jan Veltrop, the past President of ICOLD,turned to colleagues in the ICOLD network. GöranLindahl, the CEO of a large private company,formed a loose network with the industry repre-sentatives on the WCD Forum. This industrygroup held a meeting to analyse the WCD’sthematic papers in-depth prior to channellinginput to Lindahl. However, this effort at co-ordination developed late in the process, long afterNGOs and social movements had established wellfunctioning mechanisms of co-ordination andfeedback. This difference in mobilisation indicatedthe private sector’s general slowness to engage withthe WCD.

Some members of the Commission, perhapsbecause of their academic or multi-sectoralbackgrounds, did not consider themselves to havea defined or mobilised constituency. At least onesuch Commissioner constituted a “kitchen cabi-net” of advisors, “all of whom have a totallydifferent viewpoint” to act as a sounding board forWCD issues.23

Despite various efforts at communication and co-ordination between Commissioners and constitu-encies, the two-year process of shared learning andmoving toward consensus inevitably requiredsome flexibility in Commissioners’ thinking. If theCommission were to produce a consensus finalreport at all, they had to give some ground. This

Commissioners had tomaintain ties with their

networks while maintainingenough flexibility to

achieve consensus withother Commissioners.

The Commissioners focussedon building consensus

among themselves, not amongstakeholders at large.



raised the danger of Commissioners drifting awayfrom their interest group networks.

For example, once the Commission had released itsreport, a dedicated anti-dam activist opined that“some of the WCD Commissioners were not asstrong [‘anti-dam’] as we thought them to be.”24 AWorld Bank official expressed his disappointmentthat a Commissioner from government agreed on areport that, in his opinion, was so far-reaching inits call for reform that it circumscribed the role ofgovernments.25 In the case of the representativefrom the private sector, Göran Lindahl, this driftwas particularly strong, but largely because of hiscompany’s withdrawal from the dams business,rather than because of shifts in his position toaccommodate consensus. (See Box 7.1.)

Commissioners’ Varying Involvement

Having a commission composed of active andengaged individuals, such as the WCD, presents ahost of benefits, although some commissionersface the pressures of competing responsibilities.In the WCD’s case, Commissioners differed in theamount of time they were able to dedicate toCommission work. Where Commissions of thepast had been stacked with eminent retirees, thisCommission had only one retired person: Dr. JanVeltrop. Although retired, he maintained an activeinterest in ICOLD affairs and attended almost allICOLD meetings.26 Some Commissioners fromNGOs and community-based organisations wereable to scale back other commitments so that theycould devote more time to the WCD.27 Others,such as Göran Lindahl, the CEO of a multina-tional corporation; Donald Blackmore, the CEOof a major river basin authority; and KaderAsmal, a sitting government minister, werelimited in how much time they could make forWCD affairs.

According to Secretariat members, the varyinglevels of engagement of the Commissioners didnot materially affect the outcome of the finalreport. The Secretariat members who drafted thetext, as well as the other Commissioners, werehighly attuned to each person’s bottom line. “It’snot necessarily the length of time or number ofCommissioners that matters,” said one senioradvisor. “As long as you have the range of viewsthere, you’ll get essentially the same product. Youcan’t move forward with something, if one majorgroup doesn’t agree.”28

The WCD Forum: Promise Unfulfilled?

The role of the WCD Forum was to act as asounding board for the Commission’s work and toperform an outreach function for the final report.The Commissioners intended to use the Forum toensure that their discussions did not drift too farfrom the concerns and positions of stakeholdersand to sustain the interest and engagement of

Box 7.1

Industry representation on the Com-mission: the case of ABB

Asea Brown Boveri (ABB), a Swiss-based interna-tional engineering company, had been closelyinvolved in the WCD process from the days of theGland meeting. When Commissioners were selected,the CEO of ABB, Göran Lindahl, was given a slot.

Over the life of the Commission, ABB’s stake inhydropower diminished considerably. For example,ABB was a major contractor for Malaysia’s controver-sial Bakun Dam. For a variety of reasons, includingmounting NGO pressure, the company withdrewfrom the project.a Following this episode, ABBannounced it would shift its focus away fromtraditional large-scale power plants and increaseinvestments in alternative energy, such as windpower.b

By late 1999, much of ABB’s stake in hydropowerwas gone. Other industry representatives on theWCD Forum began to feel that Mr. Lindahl was nolonger the best spokesman for their interests. Mr.Lindahl offered to resign in favour of anotherindustry representative, such as a senior representa-tive of the Canadian company Hydro-Quebec.c

However, given the late stage of the Commission,the Chairperson and the other Commissioners wereunwilling to consider a replacement, keeping inmind the dynamic of interpersonal relations andshared learning that had evolved among theCommissioners by then.

Mr. Lindahl remained on the Commission, butwith limited involvement. Indeed, the head of ABB’senvironment division took his place at the lastCommission meeting, to sign off on the final report.In an indication of ABB’s detachment from theprocess, no representative of the company attendedthe final Forum meeting, where stakeholders sharedplans for charting a course forward.

a See “High Risk, Low Return,” an NGO report on ABB’s

Hydropower Strategy by Nicholas Hildyard, February

1998.

b ABB website, www.abb.com; also Network for Alternative

Technology and Technology Assessment, Open

University, Renew newsletter, September-October 2000.c Interview with hydropower industry representatives on

the Forum, 17 November 2000.

C h a p t e r 7


stakeholders throughout the process. In reality,realising the full potential of the Forum proved tobe a challenge, one that often foundered againstthe practicalities of meaningful engagement withlarge numbers of stakeholders in a time-boundprocess.

Forum Members’ Varying Involvement

Forum members’ involvement in the workprogramme depended much upon their owninitiative and perseverance. Some Forum memberswere deeply involved in developing the WCD’sknowledge base. They generated comments onterms of reference and drafts of papers, served onformal review panels, and disseminated andpromoted information on the WCD to theirprofessional networks and constituents.29 Otherswere far less engaged.

A network of NGOs and social movement groupsacted as constant critics and monitors of the WCDwork programme. Later in the process, a damsindustry group forged a similar network, which,over time, substantially increased its scrutiny ofand its voice in the process. These three broadcategories of stakeholders tended to be motivatedby strategic concerns. Social movements andNGOs were partly driven by a concern to preventindustry from dominating the agenda. Somemembers of the dams establishment openlyadmitted that their motivation for involvementwas to “limit the damage” by the WCD to industryinterests.30

By contrast, other Forum members, such as theInter-American Development Bank, did notattend any Forum meetings, but were activebehind the scenes and between meetings inarranging consultant input to the WCD’s workprogramme.31 Many of the policy research andacademic institutions on the Forum largelylimited their engagement to participation inForum meetings. As a general observation, thoseForum members who had a direct stake in theoutcome of the Commission—public and privateindustry engaged in dam building and operation,and social movements of affected communitiesand their allies—tended to put the most effortinto the process.

Forum members’ inputs into the work programmeoccupied countless hours of Secretariat time.Secretariat staff members were required to respond

to requests while remaining completely even-handed toward the diverse groups on the Forum.Initially, the Secretariat arranged a system bywhich staff members were tasked with contactingForum members on a regular basis. This systemdid not work, because the Secretariat was too busy“to engage them on issues they didn’t bring up.”32

Instead, the Secretariat designed review processesfor thematic and case study papers for multi-stakeholder input and responded to specific Forumrequests as they came up.

Secretariat staff found active Forum members tobe helpful, because such members knew the workprogramme well. They provided “very targeted”comments to the Secretariat’s work, thus acting asan effective sounding board.33 At the same time,the staff ’s role as mediators between the variousinterest groups was a high-pressure vocation thatgave staff “the feeling of living in a fishbowl.”34 Asthey recall, it was hard for outsiders to appreciatethe degree of consultation that took place withinthe Secretariat and between the Secretariat and keyopinion-shapers on the Forum before decisionswere made about activities that would influencepublic perceptions.35

“All they see is a letter of invitation, a meetingagenda and assume it’s top-down. They never seethe discussions we have about who should beinvited, and in what order. To get to a letter ofinvitation and an agenda is often the result of fiveor six meetings, informal phone conversationswith key people… In the back of our mindsthere’s always: What will the Commissionersthink? What will the stakeholders think? We’revery aware of the boundaries.”36 The intensepressure upon the Secretariat holds lessons forfuture multi-stakeholder processes that seek togather new data on contentious issues. TheWCD’s experience suggests that the personalqualities of Secretariat members, such as diplo-macy, tact, and fairness, are critical to the legiti-macy of such processes.

Communicating withthe Forum occupiedcountless hours ofSecretariat time.



The Commission’s Use of the Forum

The composition of the WCD Forum well illus-trated the Commission’s efforts at inclusiveness.The Forum included organisations that had beenengaged in pitch battles over the preceding yearsabout specific dam projects. Dam financiers,builders, opponents, and affected communities allhad a seat at the Forum’s table. Bringing thesegroups together over a sustained two and a halfyear period was a notable accomplishment.

Yet, although this gathering was unique, the scopefor stakeholder dialogue during structured Forummeetings was limited. The Forum only met threetimes, including one meeting after the release ofthe WCD report. Of the three meetings, only thesecond provided an opportunity for Forummembers to review the expanding knowledge basetogether and use these discussions to furthercollective understanding. As described earlier, thefocus of the Commission’s design was to promoteconsensus in the Commission itself, as the firsthurdle for a legitimate report. To serve thisoverarching objective, practical considerations ofSecretariat time and resources required that Forummeetings be limited. Although this choice isunderstandable, the opportunity for more directdialogue within the Forum was lost.

Commissioners and Secretariat staff both praisedForum meetings for providing valuable realitychecks to the Commission’s evolving views onlarge dams and alternatives.37 Commission mem-bers emphasised the Forum’s helpfulness inproviding feedback on the Commission’s ideas as itprepared to debate the final report. However, theutility of the Forum was not as evident to Forummembers as it was to the Commissioners andSecretariat. Both in confidential interviews and inopen meetings after the launch of the WCD report,Forum members complained that the opportunityfor feedback presented by Forum meetings waslargely wasted. They criticised the Commission fornot producing and sharing a set of interim synthe-

sis findings with the Forum, which could haveserved as a concrete basis for soliciting theirfeedback. Given the WCD’s focus on a Commis-sioner consensus, rather than a stakeholder con-sensus, sharing interim findings raised severalthorny issues for the process. We turn to theseissues next.

From Workplan to Final Report

Transparency in Preparation of theCommission’s Report

In pulling together the many and disparate strandsof the knowledge base, the Secretariat was underenormous time pressure. The Commission’soriginal plan was for the Secretariat to producesynthesis outputs from the knowledge base corre-sponding to the three objectives of the WCD: areview of development effectiveness; a frameworkfor options assessment; and a framework forcriteria and guidelines around dams. The intentwas that the Commission would use these toformulate its final assessment of dams’ perfor-mance and forward-looking guidelines.

In the end, it took longer than the Secretariat andCommission expected to finalise the knowledgebase studies. In fact, some commissioned paperswere not available in final form for use in theCommission’s deliberations. Moreover, althoughavailable on request, relevant submissions from thepublic were still being appended to thematicpapers as the Commission’s final report wasreleased, suggesting that they were not readilyaccessible to the Commissioners. As a result ofthese time delays, synthesis outputs were notcirculated to the Forum. Instead, much of thematerial that would have gone into these outputswas wrapped into the final report.

There was much confusion as to whether theCommission’s failure to circulate synthesis outputsrepresented a breach of faith. Some industrystakeholders and World Bank staff, in interviewsconducted after the report was released, said theyhad expected that the synthesis product would beopen to public review and comment.38 The Secre-tariat noted that their work programme neverstated that the outputs would be circulated, merelythat they would be produced. However, given theCommission’s commitment to transparency andthe willingness to circulate drafts of commissionedpapers, it was reasonable for Forum members to

Forum memberscomplained that they were

not given sufficient opportunityto comment on the

Commission’s work.

C h a p t e r 7


expect that synthesis outputs would be shared withthem. The trade-offs involved in additional consul-tation are reflected in WCD participants’ com-ments in Box 7.2.

The value of producing and disseminating aninterim report would have been to show stakehold-ers, particularly Forum members with their abilityto influence public opinion, the direction of theCommission’s thinking, and would have presentedan opportunity to make constructive criticisms toincrease the acceptability of the final product. Forexample, industry stakeholders insist that reviewof synthesis outputs would have enhanced thetechnical quality of the final report.

Ultimately, the Commission’s choice not to devotetime to preparing and soliciting feedback onsynthesis outputs was a choice to prioritise Com-missioner consensus over stakeholder consensus.To defend the integrity of the Commissioners’deliberations, the Commissioners chose to pay theprice of reduced Forum engagement becauseseveral members of the Commission and Secre-tariat feared sharing even interim products withthe Forum would stall the Commissioners’ nego-tiation process.39 This option carried a price. Thedecision diminished the Forum within the process,cost the Commission a measure of goodwill andcredibility, and lost some potential ambassadorsfor its message.

Some Forum members raised similar argumentsabout preparation of the final report, as distinctfrom the interim synthesis outputs. Indeed, therewas intense secrecy around the Commission’s finalreport once it was completed, with no opportunityfor review outside of Secretariat staff and Commis-sion members. Faced with this lack of access, someForum members charged that in the interests oftransparency the Commissioners should haveshared a draft of the report with Forum membersfor comment prior to finalising it.

The case for opening the final report to broaderstakeholder negotiation is weak. In a multi-stakeholder advisory commission, such as the

WCD, it is entirely appropriate for a commissionto close the doors at some point. The Commission-ers had to reach and formulate their own finalconclusions, based on their best judgement and onthe trust placed in them during the process. Hadthey held the final report open to review andcomment, it is likely that they would never havecompleted it.

Indeed, the pressure on Commissioners and theSecretariat was considerable, even without consid-ering additional last minute views from Forummembers. Given the volume of material, fewCommissioners were able to read and digest theentire compilation. Instead, late in the process,Commissioners signed up for issues on which theyhad to concentrate to draw implications andrecommendations. In the final meeting of theCommission, members “formed groups to go over,revise, then reject whole chapters.”40

Box 7.2

Participation and transparency versustime

“If you open up the planning too much so everyonehas a say in every point of the process, it’s all goingto bog down. It’s a better idea to get everyone toagree on who should undertake the process, andmake sure it’s transparent, etc.…”

—a Commissioner, commenting onwhether the WCD should have put out

an interim report for public reviewa

“I’m a big fan of time-limited processes, they forceyou to grapple. They are massive challenges toprocesses that want to be participatory. Participa-tion is where it falls out.”

—a Commissioner, commenting on theoverall time frame of the WCD processb

“They were supposed to bring together threesynthesis reports. We never saw some of the mostimportant knowledge base products for peer review.I believe the Secretariat could have had a peerreview or hearings. Couldn’t a synthesis step havehelped a bit? It would’ve been a shorter, much moreconcise report. Two years was a break-your-neckkind of exercise.”

—a Forum member, commenting on the finalsynthesis and report-writing processc

a Interview with Commissioner, 19 March 2001.

b Interview with Commissioner, 10 April 2000.c Interview with Forum member, 22 January 2001.

An interim report would haverevealed the direction of the

Commission’s thinking.



Commissioners also relied heavily on the Secre-tariat for support and preparation of drafts. Incontrast to former Commission reports that havebeen authored primarily by a Secretary-General,many people wrote this report. “Drafts wentaround about 30 times, marked up by everyone,”noted one senior advisor.41 According to staff, theyre-created debates among themselves that mirroredthe debates on the Commission itself.42 BecauseSecretariat members were together in one locationand were responsible for day-to-day handling ofmaterial, they had discussed more material to-gether than the Commissioners had. The Secre-tariat did much of the writing, and it was helpfulthat Secretariat members represented sectoraldiversity when they took on this task. This practi-cal contribution toward forging commissionerconsensus reinforces the importance of a diverseSecretariat in building a commission’s legitimacyin the eyes of stakeholders. (See Chapter 4.)

Cultivation and Undermining of StakeholderSupport

Once the report was completed, Secretariat andCommissioners stepped up their outreach effortsto constituents who appeared particularly scepticalof the WCD process. In the four months before thereport’s release, Commission members madepresentations at major congresses of ICOLD,43 theInternational Hydropower Association (IHA),44

the International Commission on Irrigation andDrainage (ICID),45 and the World ConservationUnion (IUCN).46

Despite these efforts, stakeholder buy-in to thereport was compromised during the lead-up to thelaunch by leaks of the final report. It is standardpractice for agencies to release official documents tothe media ahead of the official launch date. In thiscase, some members of the Forum, particularlythose from industry, were distressed to receive callsfrom the press requesting comment before they hadseen the report themselves.47 This frustration wasenhanced by the tenor of the media’s questions,which focussed on a perceived negative tone in thereport with regard to large dams. By contrast, theNGO advocacy community was well prepared forthe launch and had managed to obtain a copy of thereport through a leak, much to the displeasure ofindustry groups. Industry groups grumbled publiclyabout what they perceived as a breach of faith,although some also privately said they had simplybeen out-flanked by the more media-savvy NGOs.48

LESSONS FOR BUILDING CREDIBLE MULTI-STAKE-HOLDER PROCESSES

• Build a process around shared learning andrelationship building among commissioners toenable them to transcend initial differences inperspective and experience.

• Use advisory forums to create structuredopportunities for multi-stakeholder input to theprocess. If forum members are to be used asambassadors, they must be briefed regularly onthe substance of the developing product to gaintheir support.

• Respect stakeholder expectations to comment onwork products, given current norms of transpar-ency. Weigh stakeholder expectations forcomment against the risks of disrupting a fragileconsensus.

Conclusions

Organising the work of a commission around aprocess of shared learning helps build the basis forcommissioner consensus. Shared learning allowsindividuals to develop personal relationships andinvest collectively in a process, thereby raising thepersonal and professional costs of withdrawal.Skilful management within the Commission alongthese lines was an important contribution to theWCD process. At the same time, this approach byno means guarantees that all commissioners willstay with the process. The withdrawal of a WCDCommissioner from China, under circumstancesthat remain ambiguous, illustrates the politicaltrade-offs that global commissions must manage.

Efforts toward consensus can place considerablestrain on commissioners’ time and on their tieswith their constituents. To invest sufficiently in theshared learning process, commissioners must beable to devote time to digest materials and workwith colleagues on the commission. An effectiveand engaged secretariat can mitigate some de-mands on commissioners’ time. Commissionersalso face the challenge of retaining their flexibilityto compromise in the interests of a consensus, evenwhile maintaining their credibility with theirnetworks and constituents.

Establishing an advisory board, such as the WCD’sForum, is an idea with great potential. In the WCD,this potential was only partially realised. Thelimited opportunity for dialogue between Com-missioners and the Forum and among Forum

C h a p t e r 7


members constrained the Forum’s ability to actboth as a sounding board and as a mechanism forbuilding stakeholder consensus. At the same time,given the trade-offs between investing time andresources in developing a Commissioner consen-sus and making incremental progress toward aconsensus among all stakeholders, the WCD likelymade the right choice in focussing on Commis-sioners.

Commissions and other policy processes facequestions about when is the best time to consultthe public. The Commission did not release aninterim document that revealed the direction of its

thinking and likely emphasis of its final report.Many Forum members saw this as a lack oftransparency and openness. Significantly, thisdecision prevented the Commission from advanc-ing the debate over key issues further within theForum. This decision was to have ramifications forreception of the final report—which was morehostile than it might have been had an interimproduct been shared and debated in the Forum.The experience suggests that future multi-stake-holder processes, while respecting the importanceof commissioners as final arbiters, should considerthe value of circulating interim, not final, findingsto an advisory forum for comment.49



Endnotes

1. Interview with advisor to Professor Asmal, April 2000.


3. Interview with senior Secretariat staff, 8 December 1999.

4. Interview with senior Secretariat staff, 8 December 1999.


6. E-mail interview with Commissioner, 12 November2000.

7. The reasons given for the resignation of the originalCommissioner had to do with questions of compensa-tion.

8. Interview with Commissioner, 19 March 2001.

9. Interview with former Secretariat staff, 13 December2000.

10. Interview with former Secretariat staff, 13 December2000. Also, Professor Asmal singled out both Dr. Veltropand Ms. Patkar for special praise and gratitude at theclosure of the WCD process at the third Forum meetingin February 2001.

11. Ms. Shen became less engaged in Commission businessin the latter half of 1999 according to an interview with asenior Secretariat member in December 1999. Herresignation was not official until early 2000.

12. World Bank, “Talking points from Government of Chinadiscussion with World Bank,” internal document, 15January 2001.”

13. Interview with Commissioners, December 1999 andJanuary 2000.


15. Interview with Commissioner, 19 November 2000.



18. E-mail communication with Commissioner, 12 Novem-ber 2000.

19. Anthony Dorcey, “Institutional Design and OperationalModalities for the Proposed Large Dams Commission,”Stockholm Draft, 6 August 1997 (mimeo).

20. Dr. Minu Hemmati helpfully suggested the term“constituency drift” in personal communication to theauthors as part of the review process.




24. Interview with anti-dam activist, January 2001.

25. Interview with World Bank official, 8 March 2001.

26. Interview with Commissioner, December 1999.

27. An exception was Medha Patkar. She was often highlyengaged, but at one point took eight months off WCDbusiness to concentrate on the ongoing struggle in theNarmada Valley. This included a brief spell in jail.


29. International Rivers Network is one such example.

30. Interview with industry representative on the Forum, 6April 2000.

31. Interview with IADB official, 1 December 2000.


33. Interview with IADB official, 1 December 2000.


35. Telephone interview with senior Secretariat staff, 17August 2000.

36. Telephone interview with senior Secretariat staff, 17August 2000.

37. For example, interviews with Commissioners, 10 April2000 and 19 March 2001.


39. Interview with former Commissioner, 19 March 2001.

40. Interview with former Commissioner, 19 March 2001.

41. Interview with former Secretariat staff, 28 February2001.


43. Beijing, China, September 2000.

44. Berne, Switzerland, 2 October 2000.

45. Cape Town, South Africa, 24 October 2000.

46. Amman, Jordan, 4-11 October 2000.

47. Interview with Forum member, 15 November 2000.


T h e C o m m i s s i o n ’ s F i n a l R e p o r t : T h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e s p o n s e


Chapter 8

The Commission’s Final Report:The International Response

the required outputs of the Commission: a globalreview of the development effectiveness of largedams; a framework for water resources planning;and guidelines for options assessment and dambuilding, maintenance, and decommissioning.

The Commission’s findings were much more thanjust a review of dams. Rather, they were judge-ments on the very governance and societal rela-tions that underpin any major developmentproject. The bulk of the Commission’s GlobalReview of Large Dams was dedicated to analysingthe performance of dams based on the questions inits case studies and survey: What were the pro-jected versus actual benefits, costs, and impacts oflarge dams? To what degree had dams delivered ondevelopers’ promises or fallen short? The Commis-sion concluded that large dams vary greatly indelivering predicted water and electricity servicesand related social benefits. Irrigation dams havetended to fall short of physical and economictargets. Hydropower dams “tend to perform closerto, but still below, targets for power generation,generally meet their financial targets but demon-strate variable economic performance relative totargets.”2 The history of large dams reveals a“pervasive and systematic failure” by governmentsand developers to assess the range of potentialnegative impacts and to put adequate mitigationand compensation measures in place.3

In analysing the causes of these failures, theCommission pinpointed inequitable powerrelations within and among nations and closeddecision-making processes. By normative stan-dards, the positive contribution of dams—toirrigation, domestic and industrial consumption,electricity generation, and flood control—hadbeen “marred in many cases by significant envi-ronmental and social impacts which when viewed

The previous chapters looked at how creating aCommission based on broad representation and aprocess based on “good governance” principlesestablished credibility for the WCD among a cross-section of agencies, movements, and interestgroups internationally. We also looked at the trade-offs the Commission made between seekingconsensus among its 12-member body and seekingto evolve a broader consensus among Forummembers and networks of dam-related stakehold-ers. The question we address in this chapter iswhether broad representation and a credibleprocess were sufficient to ensure positive receptionof the Commission’s final product, a reportentitled Dams and Development: A New Frameworkfor Decision-making.

This chapter provides an overview of Dams andDevelopment, and documents how it broke newground in the international development dis-course. We ask: What were the responses of themain stakeholder groups to the report? To whatdegree were stakeholders’ responses based upontheir perceptions of representation on the Com-mission, and on their perceptions of the legitimacyof the knowledge-gathering process or the consen-sus-building process? Based on these responses, wereflect on the implications for dissemination,adoption, and implementation of the WCD’srecommendations.

Dams and Development:A New Framework for Decision-making

WCD Report Breaks New Ground

The Commission’s final report, Dams and Develop-ment, is a consensus report of 380 pages. All 12Commissioners1 signed it, and Medha Patkar wrotean additional “comment.” The report wraps together

C h a p t e r 8


from today’s values, are unacceptable” (authors’emphasis).4 Chairperson Kader Asmal’s preface tothe report further underscored the unacceptabilityof the decision-making processes behind muchdam construction. (See Box 8.1.)

The Commission proposed using three UnitedNations instruments, on human rights and theright to clean environment and development, as abridge between its evaluation of past mistakes andits prescription for the future. Specifically, theCommission evoked the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights (1948) and its subsequent elabora-tion in the Declaration on the Right to Develop-ment adopted by the UN General Assembly (1986),and the Rio Principles agreed at the UN Confer-ence on Environment and Development (1992).

The link to UN instruments was highly strategic.The Commission had been tasked with creating“internationally acceptable” guidelines for theplanning, construction, and maintenance of largedams. It turned to the values set forth by formalrepresentatives of the people—the member statesof the United Nations—to ground its recommen-dations.

As the product of a multi-stakeholder entity withno formal legal status, the Commission’s report

was destined to stand as an advisory, non-legaldocument in the international arena. Yet, byplacing the United Nations instruments at thecentre of the report, the Commission harnessedthe dams issue to a prominent body of interna-tional soft law.

Looking back at the evidence in its Global Review ofLarge Dams, the Commission found that: “Govern-ments, in constructing dams, have often foundthemselves in conflict with basic principles of goodgovernance that have been articulated in the threeinternational instruments [the United Nationscovenants]. This situation still prevails today.”5

Looking forward, the Commission proposedmechanisms to improve natural resources deci-sion-making and prevent breaches of basic humanrights from occurring in the context of dams again.The Commission presented a “Rights and Risks”framework to identify which stakeholders shouldbe involved or represented in decision-making.Stakeholders would be identified based on whetherthey had a legitimate claim and entitlement (underlaw, constitution, or custom) that might be affectedby a development project. No rights shouldautomatically be considered superior to others.When rights of various stakeholders might overlapor conflict, good faith negotiations would berequired to reconcile stakeholder interests.6

According to the report, the risks (or “loss ofrights”) of project affectees should be recognisedand addressed in an explicit, open, and transparentfashion. Historically, the notion of risks had beenapplied to investors who risked financial capital ona project. The Commission broke new ground byhighlighting the number of involuntary risk takersin both displaced and downstream communities asa result of dam building. Importantly, the Com-mission argued that the old-fashioned balancesheet approach that sought to trade off oneperson’s loss against another’s gain was unaccept-able.7 The Commission discussed some alterna-tives for providing water and energy services—

Box 8.1

The role of governance in dam-relatedconflict

“Some may feel this Report makes water usedecisions even more difficult by raising the barhigher as we do, a government must exercise moreenergy and creativity to reach a sustainable result.But in truth we make those decisions easier, for weshow clearly which, how, where and why decisionscan either work well or fail to deliver.

For that reason, I assert that we are much morethan a ‘Dams Commission.’ We are a Commission toheal the deep and self-inflicted wounds torn openwherever and whenever far too few determine forfar too many how best to develop or use water andenergy resources. That is often the nature of power,and the motivation of those who question it. Mostrecently governments, industry and aid agencieshave been challenged around the world for decidingthe destiny of millions including the poor, or evenpopular majorities of countries they believe to behelping.”

— Kader Asmal’s preface toDams and Development

The Commission’s findingsconcerned the governanceof development projects,

writ large.



options that stakeholders might consider insteadof large dams. However, the Commission’s treat-ment of alternatives was fairly general.

Based on the United Nations instruments, theCommission distilled a set of core values for waterand energy related decision-making, and sevenStrategic Priorities. (See Box 8.2.) The StrategicPriorities formed the basis for 26 guidelines foroptions assessment and the planning, financing,building, maintenance, and decommissioning oflarge dams. The recommendations caution thatconventional cost-benefit approaches to decision-making are insufficient but must be part of aricher, multi-criteria approach. They are a mixtureof “carrots” that reward good practice, such asperformance bonds, and “sticks” to punish poorpractice, such as the call for five-yearly evaluationsof dams’ performance.8

The WCD was ahead of previous global publicpolicy endeavours by siting human rights normsfront and centre in the debate over large-scaleinfrastructure projects. But the WCD was notradical in this accomplishment either. As acknowl-edged in its final report, the international develop-ment discourse was already moving toward sitinghuman rights at the centre of development moregenerally. The UNDP Human Development Report2000 shows how: “Human rights [constitute] thefundamental framework within which humandevelopment must be pursued.”9

The human rights and right to development prin-ciples at the heart of Dams and Development werehighlighted in the report’s launch, in November2001.10 The keynote speaker, former South AfricanPresident Nelson Mandela, addressed the role ofdams in alleviating hunger. A spokesperson for MaryRobinson, UN Commissioner on Human Rights,lauded the WCD for its attention to human rights.11

The Commission Passes the Baton

At the launch of the Commission’s report, Chairper-son Kader Asmal presented the main findings andrecommendations and declared the World Commis-

sion on Dams formally disbanded, its work com-plete. He turned the report over to the World Bankand IUCN and other concerned stakeholders forearnest consideration and adoption.

Professor Asmal and his fellow Commissioners sawthe WCD Forum members as among the mostimportant ambassadors for the WCD’s principlesand recommendations. Not only were theseinstitutions influential players in the dams indus-try and the broader dams debate themselves—whose actions could change the nature of the damsbusiness—but they were also opinion leaders. Theywere institutions and individuals with far-reachingnetworks whose views on Dams and Developmentcould influence the conventional wisdom aboutthe report.

Responses to the Final Report

The high stakes for diverse groups in the damsdebate and the high expectations for the WCDreport created a tense atmosphere for its launchand dissemination, and pressure for major indus-try and NGO players to respond. The tone of theinitial responses ranged from glowing to scathing,with the majority being cautiously receptive. Butone generalisation is possible about the report’sreception. Institutions and individuals around theworld were reading it closely and felt compelled torespond publicly. In the words of one Forummember, “People are poring over it.”12

In fact, it was not possible for most institutions toprovide official responses at once. The timing of

Box 8.2

The WCD’s values and priorities

The WCD’s Five Core Values:equity, sustainability, efficiency, participatorydecision-making, and accountability.

The WCD’s Seven Strategic Priorities:gaining public acceptance; comprehensive optionsassessment; addressing existing dams; sustainingrivers and livelihoods; recognising entitlements andsharing benefits; ensuring compliance; sharing riversfor peace, development, and security.

The full set of Strategic Priorities is summarised inAppendix 4.

Source: World Commission on Dams, Dams and Develop-ment: A New Framework for Decision-Making (London:Earthscan, 2000).

The Commission grounded itsrecommendations in three

United Nations instruments.

C h a p t e r 8


official reactions reflected the nature of consulta-tive procedures within institutions and networksand was also a function of the report’s accessibilitybecause of language and other factors. But eventhose organisations that did not make an immedi-ate statement registered their interest in the reportand their intention to form task forces to considerits implications.13

Because this assessment was completed only a fewmonths after the release of the WCD report, it hasbeen possible to capture only the first officialstatements and press coverage, and a sampling ofindividual comments.14 Precisely because of thechanges to business as usual required by the reportand the time taken for dissemination and adop-tion, it will require years for the report to be read,interpreted, operationalised, tested, and evaluatedaround the world, and its full impact measured.

Non-governmental Organisations

A majority of international NGOs welcomed theWCD’s final report and called for immediateaction by bilateral and multilateral institutions toimplement its recommendations. Their demandfor change in financial institutions reflected NGOs’interpretation of these institutions’ make-or-breakroles in the project cycle of most large dams. It alsoreflected Northern NGOs’ demand for account-ability for their tax monies that contribute towardthese public institutions. (See Box 8.3.)

NGOs generally supported the findings in theWCD’s Global Review, for they had obtained thenormative judgement on poorly conceived andplanned dam projects that they had sought. Theyvoiced approval for the strong emphasis onnegotiation, due process, and justice for dam-affected people in the WCD’s forward-lookingframework and recommendations.

In their advocacy efforts, international NGOstended to focus more on the content of the reporton its own terms than on the process of the WCD.Their approach tended to be: “The process was notperfect, but the product was surprisingly good.”15

However, they did refer to the importance of thediverse stakeholder representatives on the Com-mission having reached consensus on the findingsas a rationale for broader adoption and compli-ance.16 Regional groupings of NGOs and move-ment leaders who had access to the English lan-guage publication echo this initial NGO statement.

(Even several months after the WCD report’srelease, the summary had not been translated andfully disseminated and discussed at a grassrootslevel—see “Peoples’ Movements and Community-based Organisations,” below.)

A minority of advocacy NGOs and social move-ment leaders came out against the report. Anarticle in the British press by one anti-dam activistwas emblematic of this reaction. Philip Williams,the founder and former President of InternationalRivers Network, wrote that the WCD’s failure toreject large dams technology altogether, by focus-sing instead on the weakness of decision-makingprocesses, was “an unacceptable compromise forthe global anti-dam movement.”17

The report received an equally enthusiastic reac-tion from international environmentalorganisations, also among the first to respond.Such groups as IUCN and World Wide Fund forNature welcomed the report’s lengthy treatment ofecosystem management and recommendations forenvironmental flow releases. They supported thecall for comprehensive and meaningful optionsassessment in water and energy planning.

IUCN’s reaction bore a special significance, as itwas one of the original convenors of the WCD aswell as the world’s largest conservationorganisation. IUCN’s Council passed a resolutionat its Congress in early February 2001 to establish atask force to “define concrete avenues for imple-mentation.”18 Later that month, it announced thatits Water & Nature Initiative, a major follow-onfrom the World Water Vision process, was toincorporate the WCD’s framework for decision-making and selected recommendations. Thesignificance of IUCN’s role in promoting andimplementing the WCD recommendations wassealed when outgoing WCD Secretary-GeneralAchim Steiner was named as the incoming Direc-tor General of IUCN.19

Peoples’ Movements and Community-basedOrganisations

As of this writing, only a small number of state-ments have been issued from community anddam-affected peoples’ groups because of languageissues and logistical difficulties of diffusion.Translations of the WCD’s summary report intoSpanish, Portuguese, French, Japanese, Chinese,German, Russian, and Hindi had been released by



mid-2001. However, much of the process ofdiscussion and mobilisation at the communitylevel was just beginning.

The first statements, from dam-affected peoplein Brazil, Canada, Southern Africa, Nepal, andIndia, indicate that they found much in theWCD report to hearten them.20 (See Box 8.4.) Inparticular, the Commission’s recognition of theinjustices perpetrated upon many displaced andproject-affected people in the past was seen as a

vindication of their struggles. These dam-affected people seized upon the report’s call forreview of problem projects and also its call forobtaining the free, prior, and informed consentof indigenous and tribal communities before adam is built. If anything, dam-affected peoples’groups expressed disappointment that theCommission did not call for the free, prior, andinformed consent of all people to be displacedby a reservoir, but instead used the less precisenotion of “public acceptability.”21

Box 8.3

International NGO responses

A Call to Action• … Public financial institutions should immedi-

ately and comprehensively adopt the recom-mendations of the [WCD] and should integratethem into their relevant policies... In particular, asrecommended by the WCD, no project shouldproceed without the free, prior and informedconsent of indigenous peoples, and without thedemonstrable public acceptance of all those whowould be affected by the project.

• All public financial institutions should immedi-ately establish independent, transparent andparticipatory reviews of all their planned andongoing dam projects…

• All institutions which share in the responsibilityfor the unresolved negative impacts of damsshould immediately initiate a process to establishand fund mechanisms to provide reparations toaffected communities that have suffered social,cultural, and economic harm as a result of damprojects.

• All public financial institutions should place amoratorium on funding the planning or con-struction of new dams until they can demon-strate that they have complied with the abovemeasures. ”

—An International NGO Coalition a

“The following steps need to be taken:• That governments and the private sector apply

the criteria and good practice guidelines outlinedin the report and publicly commit to undertakecomprehensive options assessments beforeproceeding with the construction of any dam…

• That OECD countries publicly commit to notconstruct any further large dams at least for thenext two decades…

• That all interest groups pledge to not enter intoconstruction of mega-dams (i.e. those over 100metres in height…) as the social, ecological, andfinancial evidence necessitates a worldwidemoratorium on such dams.”

—WWF International Position Statement,February 2001

“The work of the Commission represents a fair andbalanced assessment of both benefits and costs, withinput from all constituencies through high-qualityreviews, public hearings and thorough informationgathering. The Commission has created a knowledgebase that goes beyond what any individual organisationcould possibly have compiled.

What the WCD has finally given to us is not a finalverdict on dams. But it has opened up a new path, anew approach to build upon. As such, the Report of theCommission forms a landmark in the history of thedevelopment and operations of dams.”

—IUCN Position Statement, February 2001

“The Commission, evading its main task of adjudicatingthe ‘development effectiveness’ of dams, emphasisesthat it is poor planning of past dams that has causedunnecessary harm. This contradicts critics’ charges thatit is the dams themselves, no matter how well planned,that inevitably create unmitigated social and ecologicalimpacts… The World Commission on Dams was no‘truth commission,’ but more of a ‘peace process.’”

—Philip Williams, anti-dam activistb

a Excerpted from “A Call to Action,” by International Rivers Network and the Berne Declaration, with 109 additional signatories

from around the world, 16 November 2000.

b Philip Williams, “Lies, Dam Lies,” The Guardian (22 November 2000).

C h a p t e r 8


At a more profound level, dam-affected people andtheir supporters had hoped that the spirit ofCommissioner Medha Patkar’s “comment” to theWCD report22 would have underpinned the entirereport. In her note, Ms. Patkar calls dams “asymptom of the larger failure of the unjust anddestructive dominant development model…Addressing these issues is essential in any attemptto reach an adequate analysis of the basic systemicchanges needed to achieve equitable and sustain-able development and to give a pointer towardschallenging the forces that lead to themarginalisation of a majority through the imposi-tion of unjust technologies like large dams.”23 Forexample, the Brazilian Movement of Dam-affected

People (MAB) lamented that the WCD had failedto go beyond the recognition of dams’ economic,social, and environmental problems “to unmaskthe private interests moving the dam industryaround the world.”24

In spite of these reservations, dam-affected andcommunity-based organisations have indicatedthat the WCD report is something they can workwith. In two of many such examples, MAB hascalled on Brazilian national stakeholders toconvene a national commission on dams—in thespirit of the WCD—to assess Brazilian damperformance and planning and address outstand-ing reparations issues. The WCD report hasinvigorated a range of community-basedorganisations and NGOs in Kenya, which havebegun pressing for its recommendations to beimplemented in current dam projects in theircountry, especially as regards stakeholder partici-pation in options assessment and project planning.(See Box 8.5.)

Multilateral Development Banks

The World Bank’s reaction to the WCD report wasintensely anticipated by a wide range of stakehold-ers, not least because it was a convenor of theCommission. By the time the WCD report wasreleased the World Bank was involved in only 1percent of large dam-building internationally25 butits agenda-setting power in development discourseand its continuing leverage with client govern-ments gave it considerable opportunity to influ-ence the “international acceptability” of the WCD’srecommendations.

The initial response from President JamesWolfensohn at the London launch of the WCDreport was warm and congratulatory. He was non-committal about the likelihood of the World Bank’sadopting the recommendations. He emphasised thatthe report must be debated by the World Bank’sBoard and client governments before defining a wayforward. But he nonetheless suggested that theWorld Bank would find many opportunities foradoption of the recommendations.

As months passed and the World Bank’s internalevaluation progressed, its position seemed toharden against taking major action. A “progressreport” delivered by Senior Water Advisor JohnBriscoe at the WCD’s third Forum meeting indi-cated that the prospects for significant change

Box 8.4

Peoples’ movements and communitygroups’ responses

“The era of large dams and its [sic] grievous socialand environmental impacts has come to an end. Theera of dams built against the will of dam-affectedpeople has come to an end. Brazil needs to moveforward to this era. No new dams should be built inBrazil without the ‘demonstrable public acceptance’of dam-affected people.”

—Brazilian Movement of Dam-Affected Peoplea

“As a direct result of the inequity between thosecommunities who pay the costs of large dams andthose who benefit from these same dams, westrongly urge for affected communities to be directbeneficiaries of existing dam projects.”

—South African communities andnon-governmental organisationsb

“As peoples who have been dispossessed anddevastated by the adverse biophysical, socio-economic and cultural effects of water and energyprojects, we call upon international financialinstitutions to refuse funding to all water and energyprojects for which the consent of the peoples orcommunities affected has not been obtained.”

—James Bay Cree Nation and thePimicikamak Cree Nationc

a Brazilian Movement of Dam-Affected People, “The

Brazilian Movement of Dam-affected People (MAB) and

the World Commission on Dams (WCD),” 9 February

2001.

b Southern African communities and non-governmental

organisations, “Southern African Call to Action,” 23

November 2000.c James Bay Cree Nation and the Pimicikamak Cree Nation,

“Statement of the on the occasion of the release of the

World Commission on Dams final report,” Undated.



within the Bank were fairly remote. The WorldBank evaluation team, led by Dr. Briscoe and asenior official of the division for Environmentallyand Socially Sustainable Development, had touredseven client countries to harvest official reactionsto the WCD report.26 As related in Dr. Briscoe’sstatement, World Bank contacts in Southerngovernments approved the core values of the WCDreport but balked at the specific recommendations,demanding no new conditionalities on dambuilding. (See “Governments Agencies,” below.)

Based on this feedback, the World Bank’s evalua-tion team proposed a modest suite of follow-upactivities. The World Bank said it would create aresource unit to gather information about gooddams practice in line with the WCD recommenda-tions and to “consider” how the WCD report might

inform the World Bank’s water resource sectorstrategy, then under development.27 The signifi-cance of these steps was difficult to assess at thetime, since each one had the potential to developinto a strong follow-up to the WCD or to witheraway. But the overall message was that the WorldBank would rely upon the interest of individualproject managers in the institution and clientgovernments to demand the skills and informationto pursue the WCD’s recommendations. Withoutthe political will of senior World Bank officials tooperationalise the recommendations, there is noreason to assume that, by themselves, these actorswould have the incentive to do so. The burden forpromoting compliance would fall once more to theWorld Bank’s civil society monitors.

There were several ironic twists in these develop-ments. The first lay in the World Bank’s use ofSouthern government reservations as a rationalefor its unenthusiastic response. When it convenedthe Gland meeting and supported the WCDprocess, the World Bank had focussed the stake-holder identification exercise on internationalinterest groups in the dams debate, rather thanfocussing on its client governments. In other words,the World Bank had gone to the internationalNGOs, academic experts, businesspeople, andquasi-governmental development authorities to seekways to break the deadlock in the dams debate.However, in the latter stages of the WCD’s processand in the post-launch evaluation, the World Bankstated that client governments’ responses to theWCD report would be the “acid test.”28

There was also, to the outside world, an opaquerelationship between the World Bank and itsclients regarding who set the agenda. The WorldBank sought guidance from client governments onhow it should move forward. It readily acceptedtheir proposals for no new conditionalities,although in the past it had not been shy aboutimposing multiple conditionalities. Simulta-neously, these governments emphasised theirappreciation of the World Bank as an honestbroker in dam-related dialogue, but only, appar-ently, if national sovereignty remained supreme.29

The decision to make few changes to business asusual apparently suited both sides.

The World Bank’s response initiated criticism froman international coalition of NGOs and socialmovements that stated in an open letter to Presi-dent Wolfensohn: “If the World Bank does now not

Box 8.5

Responses at a country level: Kenya

“Over the years the majority of Kenyan contendersin the dams debate were just whispering. Havingread the Commission’s report we are convinced thatthe Kenyan stakeholders had some things to tell theCommission regarding the experiences of dams inthe country. Fortunately the Commission listened.The Commission told its story. And that has made allthe difference. The various interest groups in Kenyaare more than whispering now; they are dashingfully into voice. For this [hope] to be realised there isurgent need to develop a clear policy framework onstakeholder participation and mechanisms that notonly facilitate but also ensure involvement ofstakeholders.

The success of the WCD report in Kenya alsolargely depends on whether the policymakers willgive the dams debate top priority; actively promotean enabling environment through adopting legal,political, economic, social, financial, and economicmeasures, etc. Besides, the country’s developmentpartners such as the donor agencies will have todemonstrate their commitment to the principlescaptured in the WCD report…

Due to the rising power of NGOs on the localscene, the influence and impact of Dams andDevelopment in the decision-making process has agreat impetus…The fact that the WCD has shiftedthe centre of gravity in the dams debate to focus onoptions assessment and participatory decision-making has had ripples in the implementation ofproposed dam projects in Kenya.”

Source: Excerpted from Josphat Ayamunda, “Dams andDevelopment, Kenyan Perspectives on the World Commis-sion on Dams.” Draft Research Report for the WCDAssessment, January 2001.

C h a p t e r 8


feel committed to this [the WCD’s] consensus, itindicates that the multi-stakeholder approach wasnot meant to effectively resolve the problemswhich brought about its creation, but to deflectopposition or to buy time. If the World Bank doesnot effectively adopt and implement the WCD’srecommendations, NGOs may be less inclined toengage in future multi-stakeholder dialogues withthe World Bank.”30 These developments coincidedwith the World Bank’s revision of its resettlementpolicy, a policy with obvious implications for thedams arena. The revised policy drew fire from aneven broader cross-section of international NGOsand social movements for lack of clarity, and forfailing to learn from lessons of the past decade.31

The World Bank’s response contrasted with that ofthe Asian Development Bank (ADB). The ADBheld a meeting in February 2001 with governmentrepresentatives from “countries with substantialhydro resources for water and energy uses” as wellas development consultants, NGOs, and regionalinstitutions to discuss the WCD report andimplementation issues.32 The ADB compared itsown internal review of large dams in SoutheastAsia with the WCD’s findings and found theeconomic, technical, social, and environmentalfailures of large dams to be largely similar. Al-though the ADB’s consultation with its clientgovernments showed there was a long way to gobefore governments would adopt the spirit of theWCD’s findings,33 the ADB nonetheless told WCDForum members how it intended to close the gapsbetween its existing guidelines and the WCD’srecommendations.34 At the final Forum meeting,the ADB called upon Forum members to enter intoa good faith dialogue about the responsibility ofmultilateral development banks to address com-pensation issues.35

The WCD report also received a spirited responsefrom the African Development Bank (AfDB),although the AfDB had not undertaken a consulta-tive process like the ADB’s as of this writing. TheAfDB’s President wrote to Professor Kader Asmalcongratulating him on the Commission’s achieve-ment and stating that the AfDB intended to

incorporate the WCD’s recommendations in itsown Integrated Water Resources ManagementGuidelines.36 (See Box 8.6.)

Export Credit Agencies and Bilateral AidAgencies

The Commission had foreseen a strategic role forinternational financial institutions, particularly forexport credit agencies (ECAs), as levers in thedam-building process. The WCD Secretary-General had made a special presentation to theOECD working group on ECAs, and the WCDreport was subsequently taken up for discussion atthat forum.

In the United States, the Export-Import Bank wasquick to scrutinise the WCD report and incorpo-The World Bank’s response

elicited widespread criticismfrom civil society.

Box 8.6

Multilateral development bankresponses

“Once we ‘get the elephant out of the room’ (no newconditionalities) then there are a host of ways inwhich countries are anxious to engage with themany good ideas in the WCD report, and to workwith the World Bank (and others) in improvingpractice.

How the Bank plans to build on the WCD Report?The Bank will use it as a valuable reference to informits decision-making process when consideringprojects that involve dams. The Bank will continue tosupport dams that are economically well justifiedand environmentally and socially sound.”

—John Briscoe, World Banka

“We feel that this report represents a majormilestone in the assessment of economic, technical,and environmental performance of large dams. Thereport has been based on an exhaustive reviewinvolving broad stakeholder participation resultingin sound conclusions and recommendations.”

—Oumar Aw, African Development Bankb

“The WCD Report provides a roadmap to move fromthe present, often-unsatisfactory process forplanning, design, construction, and operation ofdams, to a more equitable and sustainable one.”

—Preben Nielsen, Asian Development Bankc

a Statement at the third Forum meeting, 25–27 February

2001.

b Letter to Prof. Kader Asmal from Oumar Aw, African

Development Bank President, 26 January 2001.c Statement at the third Forum meeting, 25–27 February

2001.



rate elements of its recommendations into draftguidelines for environmental and social impactassessment.37 However, progress toward actualreform of the guidelines was somewhat dependenton ongoing discussions with other OECD exportcredit agencies, as the United States and its coun-terparts wished to keep their industries on an even,competitive keel.

Many bilateral agencies were actually representedon the WCD Forum or had made financial contri-butions to the WCD. Therefore, they demonstrateda sense of significant investment in the process andsubsequent interest in implementing the finalreport.38 Donor representatives from Switzerland,Sweden, the United Kingdom, Germany, andNorway attended the third WCD Forum meeting.At this meeting, they were uncharacteristicallyforthright in expressing their support of theCommission’s report and their views on appropri-ate follow-up mechanisms for dissemination,compared to their modest profile during the WCDprocess itself.

Bilateral aid donors received the WCD report withconcerns similar to Southern government officials:Would the WCD recommendations be compatiblewith their existing policies and regulatory frame-works? However, given that most new dams will bebuilt in the South, Northern officials tended toarticulate a more flexible view about how therecommendations would be used. (See Box 8.7.)They emphasised the complexity of their existingguidelines and typically voiced support for adapt-ing and adopting the WCD recommendations asappropriate.39 An official of Britain’s aid agencysaid: “The process is devalued if there is no discus-sion and debate. It goes back to the basis on whichwe were supporting the WCD (in the first place)—global public policy that supports national poli-cies.”40

United Nations Agencies

United Nations agencies provided a warm re-sponse to the WCD report (see Box 8.8), which issignificant given that the WCD report places a setof UN norms at the heart of its analysis andforward-looking framework. The UN agencies,many of which had partnerships of some kindwith the WCD during its process, expressedappreciation for the usefulness of the WCD’sframework to all types of development, not justdams. Overall, their approach was constructive and

indicated a willingness to promote the recommen-dations in their ongoing development work and intheir dialogues with governments. The head of theUnited Nations Environment Programme (UNEP),Dr. Klaus Töpfer, both welcomed the report’scontribution to development debates and offeredto host the WCD’s follow-up body—the Dams andDevelopment Unit—in UNEP offices, to facilitatedissemination to government stakeholders.41 TheWorld Health Organization (WHO) praised theWCD report for acknowledging the myriad andoften complex effects of dam-building on publichealth and recognised the rights-and-risk frame-work as a “leap forward in development planning”overall.42 The Food and Agriculture Organizationof the United Nations (FAO) faulted the WCD forunder-stating food security concerns but promisedto carry forward the recommendations in aforthcoming international multi-stakeholderdialogue on Water, Food, and the Environment.43

International Industry and Trade Associations

International industry, which had proved the mostorganised segment of the private sector in theirinvolvement with the WCD, provided a mixedresponse to the final report. (See Box 8.9.) Industryhad sought, above all, clearer rules of engagementfor its involvement in dam-related projects.

Box 8.7

Bilateral agency and export creditagency responses

“We plan to use elements of the report as guidancein our guidelines. We don’t advocate endorsing thereport completely or ditching it completely becauseof one flaw… It’ll be recognised for years to come.People will build on it.”

—Official of the U.S. Export-Import Bank,speaking in his personal capacitya

“The final report of the Commission contributes torational discourse on large dam projects.”

—Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, Minister forDevelopment Co-operation, Germanyb

a Interview with U.S. Export-Import Bank senior official, 7

March 2001.

b BMZ—Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche

Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, “Wieczorek-Zeul

begrüßt Bericht der Weltkommission

‘Staudammprojekte,’” Press release, Berlin, January 2001.

Authors’ translation from the German.

C h a p t e r 8


Moreover, it hoped these new rules could bequickly implemented, so as to provide minimalinterruption to projects—and not so rigorous as tohalt projects altogether. Industry’s main questionshad been: Under what circumstances would it havecarte blanche to proceed with dam projects? Underwhat conditions would proposed dam projectsraise significant social or environmental problemsthat were bound to elicit civil society protest?Industry’s colleagues in international financialinstitutions held similar priorities: they hoped the

WCD would provide straightforward criteria,compliance with which would usher projectsthrough the pipeline with minimal conflict.44

The majority of corporations and trade associa-tions expressed disappointment that the WCD hadnot provided such a straightforward solution. Theyperceived that the WCD report introduced uncer-tainty in timing and outcomes to the water re-sources development process. In particular, theysingled out the recommendations for stakeholderdialogue on options and full negotiation betweendam developers and project-affected people asintroducing risks and uncertainties for projectdevelopers.45 Kader Asmal vehemently contestedthis notion; he argued that the Commission’srecommendations were intended to reduce thehigh transaction costs that accompanied thecurrent conflicts over dam projects.46

But even beyond the project level, it was clear theWCD’s proposed measures in their entirety wouldrequire significant time to be taken up by theresponsible parties—especially national govern-ments—and translated into action. By identifyingbad governance as the root of poorly conceivedand implemented dam projects, the report cast tosocieties the ongoing challenge of reconsideringtheir decision-making procedures. Corporationshad clear roles to take, but they were also reliant onslow-moving political processes. The host societieswere to define in large part the appropriate modesof participation and negotiation. Given the rangeof stakes and responsibilities held by privatecompanies in dams projects, the degree of involve-ment of international companies and investors inidentifying and negotiating with other stakehold-ers, once dams were chosen as the preferredoption, was not entirely clear.47 This element ofuncertainty perplexed all but the most progressivecompanies.

Industry members on the Forum were also discon-tented with the final stages of the WCD’s process,for they felt the lack of consultation with Forummembers during the process of report preparationhad weakened the quality of the report.48 As ourdiscussion of the political and practical trade-offsof full transparency revealed (see Chapter 7), it ishighly unlikely that industry representatives wouldhave settled for small editorial changes in the latestages. They would likely have sought far-reachingchanges in the content of the report49 and even,further research to change the tenor of the find-

Box 8.8

United Nations agency responses

“The [WCD] report deserves a strong endorsementby the relevant UN specialised agencies… It has laidthe foundations for a new approach to developmentin the coming decade, taking the Rio principlesbeyond their original scope into a more comprehen-sive and more participatory framework. If the reportmeets with broad support from all developmentstakeholders, then the scene is set for truly sustain-able development in the 21st century.”

—World Health Organisationa

“Large dams are required in some cases. We cannotafford to disregard any option to increase foodsupply in food deficit countries. But decisions tobuild dams must be taken in a responsible manner.It is in this spirit that we welcome the report of theWCD. We understand it as a framework for respon-sible decision-making, not as a verdict on dams.”

—Food and Agriculture Organizationb

“Controversy centring around the construction andoperation of dams shows that, although the conceptof sustainable development aims at balancingsocio-economic development and environmentalmanagement, the international community is yet todevelop an appropriate policy framework forreaching the goals of sustainable development.Equity, governance, efficiency, transparency andaccountability based on open dialogue among allstakeholders can only be furthered by a seriousconsideration of the Commission’s findings by allpolicy-makers.”

—Klaus Töpfer, United Nations EnvironmentProgrammec

a World Health Organization, “Risks, Rights, and Negotiated

Agreements.” Response to the WCD’s final report, 30

November 2000.

b Statement at the WCD’s third Forum meeting, 25-27

February 2000.c United Nations Environment Programme, “UNEP chief

welcomes new report on impacts of dams as major

contribution to future energy and water resource policy-

making.” News Release No. 00/129, 17 November 2000.



ings. Industry representatives on the Forum werealso distressed by the handling of the launch andthe “leak” of the final report (as described inChapter 7). The leak had given NGOs an upperhand in the public relations stakes, while at thesame time, industry groups were at a disadvantagewhen asked to respond to journalists’ queries.

Industry representatives on the Forum also re-flected, behind the scenes, on opportunities theyhad missed for skilled engagement with the WCD.They noted that industry had been late to recognisethe significant impact the WCD could have on thedams business. Several companies were aware of theprocess at the time of the Gland meeting, but didnot devote attention or resources until much later.As a result, they felt that they had been out-ma-noeuvred by NGOs and peoples’ movements intheir engagement with the Commission. Moreover,some industry representatives noted that, as a block,industry had been slow to co-ordinate in presentingits interests to the Commission. Industry represen-tatives also regretted their misfortune in beingrepresented on the Commission by the CEO of acompany—Asea Brown Boveri (ABB)—thatwithdrew from the large dams business halfwaythrough the WCD process.50

Indeed, as with NGOs and other concernedgroups, the international dams industry was farfrom being a monolithic block with similarinterests and comparative advantages. The differ-ent stakes of the companies and trade groups inthe dams debate had provided a challenge to theirco-ordination throughout the process. Likewise,the potential impact of the final report on theirbottom lines, and their subsequent responses tothe report, were mixed.

Energy services companies that were sufficientlylarge and flexible to switch out of hydropower orcompanies with only a small portion of theirportfolio in dams tended to give a level reaction tothe WCD report. For instance, one project managerfor a global power company comprised of genera-tion, distribution, and retail supply businessesreflected this position when he said, “we don’t care ifwe do hydro or not, we just want to undertake goodenergy projects.”51 ABB was a model of such amulti-service transnational corporation. 52

Some companies even expressed support formeasures that rewarded efficiency, effectivenessand good performance, recognising an opportu-nity for them to claim the competitive edge. For

Box 8.9

International industry and tradeassociation responses

“The report itself is not balanced. The benefits ofdams are largely under-estimated or simply ignored,particularly as regards electricity supply. Concerningaffected people, the Report speaks of resettlement,but there is no mention of stabilisation of the livesof people by providing them with water and power.The authors make sweeping generalisations aboutdeficiencies of dams, based on a very small sampleof large dams.”

—Raymond LaFitte, President, InternationalHydropower Associationa

“We consider the WCD report simply as a usefuldocument to generate further discussion, butabsolutely inadequate, as it stands, to find therequired sustainable solutions. We do not accept theunbalanced judgement on the role of existing dams.The 26 WCD guidelines as they currently stand areconsidered unrealistic for application.”

—Felix Reinders, International Commission onIrrigation and Drainageb

“As Nelson Mandela stated in his London address,many people suffer from hunger, thirst, lack ofrunning water, sanitation, and electricity. ICOLDbelieve [sic] that the WCD recommendations willcreate an unacceptable level of uncertainty to thedevelopment process. ICOLD fear that public andprivate developers and financial institutions willview these delays as too time consuming and costly,and will stop water and energy developmententirely, thereby compounding the human sufferingreferred to by Mr Mandela… ICOLD favours abalanced approach to dam and project develop-ment, giving a stronger voice to affected people andcommunities… Each country should consider theWCD recommendations and the ICOLD guidelines.However, each country must also consider itsprevailing conditions, traditions, laws and needs.”

—C.V.J. Varma, President, InternationalCommission on Large Dams, ICOLDc

a Letter to the Editor, Hydropower and Dams, Issue Six,

2000.

b Statement at the third Forum meeting, 25 February

2001.c Open letter to Prof. Kader Asmal, 30 November 2000.

Industry had hoped forguidelines that would be

easy to implement.

C h a p t e r 8


instance, Sweden’s Skanska Corporation an-nounced at the WCD launch that it would endeav-our to follow the WCD’s recommendations. “Wefind the Commission’s work…represents a majorstride for sustainable development, with openand transparent processes in which all affectedparties can participate.”53 At least two corpora-tions, the Nam Theun II Consortium (construct-ing a hydropower dam in Laos) and AES Corpo-ration (constructing the Bujagali HydropowerProject in Uganda), evaluated their projects forWCD compliance after the report was launched.54

They publicised these mostly favourable findingsto Forum members and concerned NGOs. Bycontrast, engineering companies with vestedinterests in the production of dam-relatedtechnologies perceived the report’s criticism ofdams’ past performance and its call for criticaloptions assessment as fundamental threats totheir business.

Professional dam industry associations provided amixed, somewhat negative reaction to the WCDreport. This was not surprising given that theirinstitutional mandates called for the promotion ofdams technology. In a statement, three interna-tional trade associations (the International Com-mission on Large Dams, ICOLD; the InternationalHydropower Association, IHA; and the Interna-tional Committee on Irrigation and Drainage,ICID) expressed disappointment with the GlobalReview for failing to give adequate recognition tolarge dams’ contribution to water supply, foodsecurity, and global energy needs.55 Their maincriticism was that the WCD had failed to comparedams’ performance with the no-project option. Inother words, the Commission had not analysedwhich development benefits would have beenforegone without large dams. These critics werereluctant to cede conventional cost-benefit meth-odology to the normative framework adopted bythe Commission.56 It is worth noting that asignificant proportion of ICOLD’s membershipcomprises engineers and technocrats from dam-building government agencies in the South. In thisregard, there has been significant overlap betweenthe responses of ICOLD chapters to the WCDreport, and Southern governments’ separate officialresponses. (See “Government Agencies,” below).

Responses from Government Agencies57

The WCD’s recommendations anticipate a pivotalrole for national governments in implementation.

In the Commissioners’ view, the good faith of allactors is required for negotiating acceptableoutcomes. But above all, governments are requiredto create the enabling environment for suchmeaningful dialogues and interactions to occur.Furthermore, the consequences of adoption—ornon-adoption—of the WCD’s recommendationsare of greatest import for the direct beneficiaries ofwater and energy development: societies and theirgoverning institutions.

The WCD had been initiated by the providers ofinternational capital and their watchdogs undersustained pressure from transnational civil societyand local social movements. The WCD’s recom-mendations included a call for governments andtheir citizens to determine when and under whatterms big capital should be mobilised for largedam projects. For all of these reasons, the reactionof governments—and Southern governments inparticular—to the WCD was closely watched.

As with other sectors or interest groups, it isdifficult to generalise about the responses bySouthern governments to the WCD report. Butperhaps more critically, it is important to distin-guish the differences in response and motivationof the different ministries and interest groupswithin these governments and their bureaucracies.It would not be surprising, for instance, to learnthat there were differences in reaction betweenenvironment and water ministries, or betweendepartments for women’s or indigenous and tribalpeople’s affairs and finance ministries.58

Few official Southern government responses to theWCD report had been issued at the time of thiswriting. The sample size is small and it is biasedtoward water ministries whose comments havebeen the most widely disseminated. Often, theseministries are the agencies with a vested interest inthe construction of new dams. These initial officialcomments do not necessarily reflect the richness ofdebate possible in legislatures and within andamong political parties and congresses as the WCDreport is further disseminated in these countries.

Many governments claimedtheir laws already followed

the spirit of the WCD’srecommendations.



With these caveats in mind, the responses ofSouthern governments can be characterised aslargely defensive in nature. This defensivenessstemmed partially from a misreading of the WCD’srecommendations for governments. The consider-able length and occasional lack of clarity in thereport may have added to the confusion.

Several Southern governments, such as Brazil andNepal, praised the core values of the WCD—equity, efficiency, participatory decision-making,sustainability, and accountability—and noted thatthese norms were already making their way intonational policies and procedures.59 The WCD wasexplicit that governments should begin nationaldialogues and review legal, policy, and institutionalframeworks to establish opportunities formainstreaming the WCD’s recommendations.National governments nonetheless argued thatthey could not import the recommendationswholesale.60 Indeed, many governments said thattheir existing laws and policies—such as require-ments for environmental and social impactassessments—were already in line with theCommission’s recommendations. (See Box 8.10.)

Southern officials based their opposition to therecommendations partly on national sovereigntyissues and charges of Northern hypocrisy. Theyinterpreted the Commission’s highlighting ofunmitigated environmental and social problemsand dams’ economic underperformance as anargument against future dams—a contravention oftheir perceived national imperatives. They foundinadequate recognition in the report of dams’ rolein resolving food security, water, energy, and theoverall development needs of their countries. Theyalso suspected that the WCD had been an attemptby Northern governments and financing agenciesto impose standards upon developing regions thatthe North had not followed when they had com-pleted the majority of their dam building.61

Southern governments’ objections underscored thelong-time tensions over Southern dam buildingthat had provided the very raison d’etre of theWCD. The WCD’s objective had been to develop anew consensus around dam-related decision-making to break the costly deadlocks and bitterdebates of the past and set the stakeholder groupsoff on a more constructive footing. By assertingthat their policies were consistent with the WCD’srecommendations, these governments denied thegaps between policy and practice that had formed

a significant cause of friction in the first place.Furthermore, suspicions of the WCD’s beingdriven by a Northern agenda belied the spiritedcontribution that Southern dam-affected peoples’movements had provided to many aspects of theWCD’s process throughout its life, as well as the 50percent representation of Southern stakeholders onthe Commission itself and leadership of theCommission by a Southern government minister.

The governments of India, China, Nepal, andEthiopia based much of their criticism on com-plaints about the WCD’s process and methodology

Box 8.10

Government agencies’ responses

“In Nepal’s case, most of the procedures put forwardby WCD are already in place in the form of severalacts and rules. Adopting a new set of guidelines asmentioned in the WCD report, with its contradictorystatements and yet to be polished prescriptions,would create confusion and chaos.”

—Government of Nepala

“The Commission’s ‘data base’ is questionable, it ismisleading… Even while applying the concepts ofequity and participatory decision making, WCD hasrestricted its attention only to the groups which areadversely affected by a dam. It has failed to appreci-ate that there are much larger sections of society forwhom the dam and the water supply flowing fromthe dam are nothing short of a life line… WCD’sobsessive concern for preserving the rights ofaffected local people makes it distrust the entirepublic set up, even the legal framework of thecountry to which these people belong.”

—Government of Indiab

“Nowadays the need for proper compensation andthe rights of the people for development anddecision[making] are enshrined in the nationalconstitution and social and environmental impactassessments are a must in any small and largeproject implementation.”

—Government of Ethiopiac

a Government of Nepal, “Preliminary Official Comments on

the WCD Report.” Submitted to the World Bank, February

2000.

b Government of India, Central Water Commission, “Final

Report of the World Commission on Dams, Comments

by Mr Gopalakrishnan, WCD Forum Member,” February

2001.c Government of Ethiopia, “Comment on Dams and

Development… The report of the World Commission on

Dams, Country Comment: Ethiopia.” Submitted to the

World Bank, February 2001.

C h a p t e r 8


(the contours of which we have described inChapters 4 and 5). For instance, Ethiopia criticisedthe WCD for choosing too few dams for its sampleand for selecting case study dams that were too oldand did not incorporate new practices imple-mented in their regions in the 1980s and 1990s.62

Ethiopia charged that the picture provided by theWCD failed to reflect the dynamism of evolvingbest practices in large dam building of the past twodecades. The Government of India complainedthat official data on large dams provided to theWCD was not acknowledged in the WCD’s studiesor final report.63 The Indian government notedthat a global commission such as this should haveundertaken far more intensive negotiations withsuch dam-building “giants” as India, China, andthe United States in the early planning stages toavoid such missteps in the later process. In otherwords, early reactions from Southern governmentsexplicitly faulted the WCD for a lack of credibleprocess. The roots of this unease also lie in theinherent inability of a multi-stakeholder process,such as the WCD, to represent all viewpointswithin and among governments.

Based on their unease with the WCD’s process andproduct, some Southern government officials firsttook an “all or nothing” approach. They rejectedthe whole report on the basis of one statement orguideline that they considered incompatible withtheir circumstances. Such was the response ofChina, which called the WCD’s emphasis onnegotiated outcomes contrary to its established,and more democratic, decision-making proce-dures.64 A Forum member seemed to articulate theSouthern dilemma well when he said, “There’s afundamental tension between: Do we take theWCD report as is or do we move into dialogue,move toward better practice? There’s an issuearound going to the lowest common denominatorto get any dialogue.”65

However, this proclivity to reject the recommenda-tions outright was already tempered in discussionsamong Southern government and NGO partici-pants at the third Forum meeting of the WCD.66

Participants agreed that policy reviews at thenational level were necessary. Policy reviews wouldestablish where governments were in compliancewith WCD’s recommendations and where theywere not. They would provide an opportunity toidentify gaps and form the basis of discussions formoving forward. Hence, a slow progressionoccurred in the dialogue within just the first few

months of the report’s dissemination, indicatingthat the Southern governments initial responsesmight be moderated by time, reflection, and theslow evolution and adoption of the new norms bycountless other actors. In one example, the SouthAfrican Department of Water Affairs and Forestryco-operated in mid-2001 in a joint congress withIUCN, the South African Committee on LargeDams, and the Environmental Monitoring Group(an NGO) to put in place concrete measures forbringing forward the WCD’s recommendations inthe South African context.67

In the North, governments tended to respond tothe WCD report in the context of their develop-ment aid and export guarantee activities, not intheir roles as domestic dam-builders and opera-tors. Norway was an exception. The Governmentof Norway praised the WCD report but cautionedthat it may have “gone too far in the direction ofconsensus-based decision-making systems.” Itnoted that when weighing different developmentneeds, decision-making can often end in disagree-ment and that the “superior competent author-ity”—in the case of dams, the Norwegian legisla-ture—should make final decisions on behalf of thecommunity as a whole. As with other nationalgovernments, Norway noted how many of itsexisting policy and legal frameworks alreadyaccommodated the WCD’s recommendations forsocial and environmental impact assessment.Norway also referenced the body of internationallaw on indigenous peoples’ rights that it ob-serves.68

The Third Forum Meeting andInstitutional Follow-up to the WCD

A final meeting of the WCD Forum took placethree months after the report’s launch, for stake-holders to share their reactions to the report andplot a course for following up on the WCD. As theCommission had already disbanded, the Forumconvened in the role of a loose decision-makingbody, much as the original Reference Group haddone in Gland in 1997.

The meeting highlighted the divergent opinionsabout the WCD report in the stakeholder commu-nity. A minority of hard-line dam proponentsdeclined to discuss follow-up to the WCD at all,but the majority of Forum members expressedtheir organisations’ willingness to adopt therecommendations in some degree. The Forum



meeting made clear that although dams remain abitterly contested issue, the WCD had created aprecedent for opposing parties to begin a dialogueand had delivered a report that provided a plat-form for future discussion. The facilitator of theForum meeting69 remarked that the level ofdialogue that took place at this meeting wouldhave been unimaginable only three years earlier.70

With few exceptions, meeting participantsrecognised that some form of institutionalisedfollow-up to the WCD was required at a globallevel to facilitate dissemination of Dams andDevelopment. Members agreed that a small Damsand Development Unit (DDU) should be set up toreplace the WCD Secretariat and to operate for atleast one or two years. The future Unit would placea premium on reaching out to governments, and tosupport this goal it would be hosted by the UnitedNations Environment Programme.

Representatives from the World Bank, IUCN,International Rivers Network, the Lesotho High-lands Development Project, Struggle to Save theNarmada River, and Harza Engineering volun-teered to act as a steering group to oversee theestablishment of the DDU. They were voted in tothis role under considerable time pressure. Thishasty arrangement caused discomfort amongmembers of the larger Forum,71 who had differingviews on whether and how the WCD’s findingsshould be promoted. They saw the potentialinfluence of the WCD report as being tied to thepotency and mandate of the DDU, and henceunder the full control of the steering group.Members from the larger Forum argued stronglyfor greater Southern government involvement inthe WCD’s follow-up activities.72 In a concessionto this point, the steering group pledged to add aUNEP representative to better reflect governmentalinterests.

Several aspects of the follow-up activity to theWCD constituted tacit acknowledgement of theprocess’ strengths and weaknesses. The emphasison reaching out to governments and the explicitharnessing of the DDU to a UN agency wereacknowledgements that the WCD process hadnot involved governments as much as it shouldhave. The appointment of a steering committeethat broadly represented the political andsectoral categories on the Forum was a recogni-tion of the general acceptability of the Forum’scomposition.

Conclusions

In the short term, Commissioner consensus didnot translate into a broader stakeholder consensus.Indeed, initial reactions suggest a hardening of thepositions that existed before the WCD. However, acloser look at these reactions suggests stakeholderwillingness to grapple with the report, comparerecommendations to existing policies and situa-tions on the ground, and potentially put in placesome ideas embedded in the report. If broadconsensus lies in the future of the dams debate, itwill be forged through a longer-term processinitiated by, rather than concluded by, the WCD.As the WCD itself recognised, “…all concernedparties must stay together if we are to resolve theissues surrounding water and energy resourcesdevelopment. It is a process with multiple heirsand no clear arbiter.”73

Could an immediate consensus among all stake-holder groups feasibly have been forged? Thereactions to the report provide a basis for extrapo-lating what each group might have looked for insuch a consensus. Based on their reactions, NGOsand social movements would likely have sought amore direct indictment of broader developmentprocesses. Industry groups would likely haverejected any articulation of a rights and risksframework that empowered affected communitiesto negotiate with industry on a time-consumingcase-by-case basis. Various governments mightwell have focussed on issues of specific relevance totheir national circumstance. Had the governmentand industry views prevailed, NGOs and socialmovements might not have continued theirengagement with the process at all.

Hence, it is likely that an immediate, broad con-sensus among all stakeholders would not havebeen a viable goal. If anything, a process of stake-holder negotiation over the content of the WCDreport might well have produced a report that onlymoved incrementally beyond the status quo.Arguably, such a report would have had a greaterchance of being adopted wholesale by multilateralinstitutions, governments, and industry in the

In the short term, Commissionerconsensus did not translate into

broad stakeholder consensus.

C h a p t e r 8


short term. However, it would almost certainlyhave lacked the support of NGOs and the socialmovements, and might have inspired even greatercitizen protest. By focussing on forging a consen-sus among a smaller number of Commissioners,the WCD has produced a more aspirational text,but one at which dam-building nations and

industries have balked. The promise for implemen-tation depends largely upon ongoing constructiveengagement by civil society groups with govern-ments, international agencies, and the privatesector, and the growing democratisation of na-tional and global politics.



Endnotes

19. IUCN Press Release and website, www.iucn.org,February-March 2001.

20. For example, Narmada Bachao Andolan (Struggle to Savethe Narmada River), “World Commission on DamsReport vindicates unjustifiability of large dams,” 20November 2000. See also references in Box 8.4.

21. Personal communication with Brazilian academic andliaison with the Brazilian Movement of Dam-affectedPeople, 8 February 2001.

22. World Commission on Dams, 2000, pp. 321-2.


24. Brazilian Movement of Dam-Affected People, “TheBrazilian Movement of Dam-affected People (MAB) andthe World Commission on Dams (WCD),” 9 February2001.

25. Interview with World Bank Senior Advisor, 8 March2001. See also John Briscoe, “Responding to the WCDReport: A Progress Report from the World Bank.”Presentation to the WCD’s third Forum meeting, CapeTown, 25 February 2001. “Message #5: Great concern [bydeveloping country governments] about the apparentexit (prior to the WCD) of the World Bank from the dambusiness…” Online at: www.dams.org/events/f3_wb.pdf(28 September 2001).

26. Briscoe, 2001.

27. Briscoe, 2001.

28. According to a personal communication with a seniorWorld Bank official, 29 July 2001. The official stated thatPresident Wolfensohn made the terms of this “acid test”clear in his April 2000 meeting with the Chairperson andSecretary-General.

29. According to John Briscoe’s presentation; personalcommunication with a senior World Bank official, 29 July2001.

30. Berne Declaration and South Asian Network on Dams,Rivers, and People letter to James Wolfensohn of 19March 2001, signed by 85 additional groups.

31. See, for example, World Rainforest Movement, “NewWorld Bank Resettlement Policy Is Flawed.” Bulletin 43,February 2001. Online at: http://www.wrm.org.uy/bulletin/43/WB2.html (28 September 2001); Dana Clark,“World Bank Resettlement, The Legacy of Failure.” BankInformation Center Issue Briefing, August 2001. Onlineat: www.bicusa.org/ptoc/pdf/clark_reset.pdf (28September 2001).

32. ADB Regional Workshop: Dams and Development. ADBHeadquarters, Manila, Philippines, 19-20 February 2001.Summary of Proceedings, Draft of 2 March 2001.

33. Ramaswamy R. Iyer, public letter to Professor Asmal onthe proceedings of the ADB consultation with clientgovernments in Manila, 22 February 2001.

34. “ADB’s ongoing and planned responses to the WCD’sstrategic priorities, best practices, and institutionalresponses,” Internal ADB draft, February 2001.

35. Preben Nielsen, speech at the WCD third Forum meetingat Cape Town, 25-27 February 2001.

36. Letter to Prof. Kader Asmal from Oumar Aw, AfricanDevelopment Bank President, 26 January 2001.

1. There were originally twelve members on the WorldCommission on Dams, plus one non-voting member,Secretary-General Achim Steiner. Halfway through theprocess Commissioner Shen Guoyi of China withdrew,and her employer, the Chinese Ministry of WaterResources, declined to provide a replacement. Hence,there were only 11 voting members. Achim Steiner’sstatus on the Commission grew over time, and hesubsequently signed the final report with the status of fullCommissioner.

2. World Commission on Dams, Dams and Development: ANew Framework for Decision-making (London: Earthscan,2000), Executive Summary, xxxi.

3. World Commission on Dams, 2000, xxxi.

4. World Commission on Dams, 2000, Commissioners’Foreword, ix.


6. World Commission on Dams, 2000, pp. 205-6.

7. WCD press release, “World Commission on DamsLaunches ‘Landmark’ Final Report,” 16 November 2001.Online at: www.dams.org/press/ (28 September 2001).See also World Commission on Dams, 2000, pp. 208-9.



10. At London’s Canary Wharf, 16 November 2000.

11. Message to the Commission from Mary Robinson,United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.Delivered by Mr. Ahmed Fawzi, London, 16 November2000.


13. Such as the press statements by the InternationalHydropower Association and International Committeefor Irrigation and Drainage at the London launch event;general statements made by World Bank President JamesWolfensohn, who noted that the report had to besubmitted to the member countries of the World Bank’sBoard for consideration.

14. For detailed reactions to the final report, seewww.dams.org/report/followups.htm (28 September2001). This site is updated on an ongoing basis, andincludes new material that has been posted since theauthors completed this assessment in May 2001. All ofthe responses described in this chapter are posted onwww.dams.org/report/reaction.htm except as noted.

15. For instance, the headline to an article by HimanshuThakkar in Himal magazine refers to Dams and Develop-ment as “a surprisingly refreshing consensus report.”Himanshu Thakkar, “Large Dams under the Microscope,”Himal (1 April 2001). Online at www.himalmag.com/apr2001/report.html (28 September 2001).

16. Himanshu Thakkar, “Large Dams under the Microscope,”Himal (1 April 2001).

17. See Philip Williams, “Lies, Dam Lies,” The Guardian (22November 2000). Online at: http://society.guardian.co.uk/societyguardian/story/0,7843,400894,00.html (28 September 2001).

18. IUCN Position Statement, “Working with the WCDReport.” Released at the third Forum meeting, February2001.

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37. The WCD report launch coincided with the U.S. Export-Import Bank’s requirement to revise its guidelines. TheEnvironment Division, which had been represented onthe WCD Forum, took the lead in incorporating elementsof the WCD report. However, as of this writing, progresson the revisions was stalled by the Export-Import Bank’sBoard of Directors’ decision-making process and talkswith other OECD export credit agencies.

38. For example, interviews with British, Swiss, andNorwegian aid agency representatives, 28 February 2001.

39. For example, interview with U.S. Bureau of Reclamationofficial, January 2001.

40. Interview with aid official, 27 February 2001.

41. United Nations Environment Programme, “UNEP chiefwelcomes new report on impacts of dams as majorcontribution to future energy and water resource policy-making,” News Release No. 00/129, 17 November 2000.

42. World Health Organization, “Risks, Rights, and Negoti-ated Agreements.” Response to the WCD’s final report 30November 2000.

43. Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN. Statementat the third Forum meeting, 25-27 February 2000.

44. Interview with IFC officials, 27 September 1999.


46. Opening and closing remarks by Prof. Kader Asmal at theWCD’s third Forum meeting, Cape Town, 25 February2001.

47. That, at least, was the view of several corporate execu-tives, who said the Commission “has gone too far andalso not far enough” in defining corporate obligations.

48. See, for example, the response of the InternationalHydropower Association, February 2001. “However, theoverall tone of the report is undoubtedly negative asregards the role of reservoirs, which undermines theconstructive elements. The opportunity was not taken touse the Forum as a sounding board ahead of publicationof the final report, despite the claim in the overview thatthe Forum was consulted throughout the process, whichcould have helped set the right tone.”

49. Personal communication with former Secretariat staff,August 2001.

50. Interview with industry representatives on the WCDForum, 27 February 2001.

51. Interview with project manager of international energycorporation at the third Forum meeting, 26 February2001.

52. For instance, ABB plans to increase its share in alterna-tive energy technologies to US$1 billion in the next fiveyears. Announcement at ABB news conference, London,7 June 2001.

53. Public statement of Axel Wenblad, Vice President ofEnvironmental Affairs, Skanska.

54. AES Nile Power, “Appreciation of the WCD Report.”Presentation to the third Forum meeting, 25-27 February2001.

55. Letter and accompanying statement of ICOLD President,IHA President, and ICID President to World BankPresident James Wolfensohn, “Joint Major Comments ofICOLD, ICID, IHA on the Report of the World Commis-sion on Dams,” February 2001.

56. Such as Honorary ICOLD President Jan Veltrop, whoserved on the WCD. Also, the British Dams Society, amember of the International Hydropower Associationand ICOLD, was praised by the WCD Secretariat for itsserious commitment to dialogue throughout the WCDprocess.

57. We concentrate this section on governmental responsesfrom Southern governments, as the vast majority offuture dam building is planned for the countries of theSouth. Most reactions from Northern governments aregiven in the aid and export credit agency context, in thesection on international financial institutions, above.

58. For instance, the contrast between the negative anddismissive reaction to the WCD report provided by theMinister of Industry and Handicrafts of Lao PDR at theAsian Development Bank’s meeting to discuss the WCDreport, February 2001; and the positive response to thereport provided by staff of the Science, Technology, andEnvironment Agency of Lao PDR in consultations withthe authors in April 2001.

59. For example, the Nepalese government stated: “We areproud to note that we have been able to adopt thesestandards of international norms in our developmentprocess.” Government of Nepal, “Preliminary OfficialComments on the WCD Report.” Submitted to the WorldBank, February 2000.

60. Such was the response of the Chinese and Nepalesegovernments, Government of Nepal, 2000. The Commis-sion wrote that its guidelines were not intended to be a“blueprint,” but instead the basis for discussions andserious revision of current practices by all actors. WorldCommission on Dams, 2000, p. 313.

61. For example, Government of India, Central WaterCommission, “Final Report of the World Commission onDams, Comments by Mr Gopalakrishnan, WCD Forummember,” February 2001. Similar views were expressed byIndian government officials at the National Consultationon the World Commission on Dams Report, 24-25 May2001, and the WCD India Meeting, 26 May 2001, asdocumented by Ramananda Wangkheirakpam andLakshmi Rao in their background papers for the WCDAssessment.

62. Government of Ethiopia, “Comment on Dams andDevelopment…The report of the World Commission onDams, Country Comment: Ethiopia.” Submitted to theWorld Bank, February 2001.

63. Government of India, Central Water Commission,February 2001.

64. Government of China, Ministry of Finance, “Chinaposition on the WCD report.” Memo to the World Bank,9 February 2001.


66. Cape Town, South Africa, 25-27 February 2001.

67. WCD press release, “South African Symposium EndorsesWCD Recommendations,” 24 July 2001. Online at:www.dams.org/press/ (28 September 2001).

68. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Norway’sComments on the Report of the World Commission onDams,” June 2001.

69. Professor Anthony Dorcey, who had facilitated theoriginal meeting of the stakeholders at Gland. Prof.Dorcey’s “Facilitator’s Sense of the Meeting,” a useful



documentation of this last Forum meeting, is containedin a publication by the Secretariat entitled “Final WCDForum: Report, Responses, Discussions, and Outcomes,”May 2001.

70. Personal communication with Gland workshoporganiser, 28 February 2001.

71. Interviews with Forum members, 27-28 February 2001.

72. Plenary session of the third Forum meeting, 27 February2001.


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Chapter 9

Conclusion

wide range of perspectives to be represented andincorporated in the Commission’s work. TheCommission succeeded in persuading diversestakeholders to contribute to its knowledge base, sothat a broader than normal group of actors washeard. The Commission transcended, rather thanreproduced, fractures among interest groups in thedams debate by producing a consensus report.

The consensus among diverse Commissioners andthe emphasis on broad consultation and a trans-parent process gave moral authority to the finalreport and amplified the Commission’s advisoryvoice. Indeed, interest groups around the worldawaited the final report with expectation andreacted publicly to it, providing another tangiblemeasure of how the process engaged stakeholders.Because of these accomplishments, the WCD’sprocess set a new standard for multi-stakeholderprocesses.

However, the range of positive and negativereactions to the final report suggests that theconsensus among Commissioners did not translateimmediately to agreement among the broaderstakeholder constituencies. Whether it does so willdepend upon stakeholder willingness to continuedialogue on the Commission’s findings andrecommendations. Indeed, the WCD’s model forchange relies upon champions in financial institu-tions, industry, government, and civil societyworking to implement the recommendations.

The effectiveness of the WCD’s strategy for changemay be gauged only years after the report’s release,when changes in water and energy planning anddam building can be measured. The WCD pro-duced an aspirational document with challengesfor implementation whose promise for change liesin the medium- to long-term. The degree of

Was the WCD a watershed in globalgovernance? The WCD marked adeparture from previous globalcommissions and multi-stakeholder

processes in significant ways. Because of its originsin the international organising of dam-affectedpeople and their supporters, the Commissionincluded representatives of project-affected commu-nities and indigenous peoples for the first time.Commissioners came from all points on the politi-cal spectrum of the dams debate, rather than from abroad middle. For the most part, they were activepractitioners in international networks, rather thanthe eminent persons of past commissions. Not least,the Commission made an explicit commitment toincorporate good governance principles in its work,such as independence, inclusiveness, and transpar-ency, as a way of creating an effective platform fordialogue. These features added up to a Commissionstructure and process that were path-breaking byhistorical standards.

A commission with these elements of structureand good process—full representation of relevantstakeholder groups, independence from externalinfluence, transparency, and inclusiveness in thework programme—was meant to create opportu-nities for broad stakeholder participation and thus,a rich base of common knowledge. Good processwas also intended to build constituencies forimplementing the WCD’s recommendations.

Did the Commission succeed in implementing thegood process to which it aspired? If so, howimportant was good process to the commitment ofinterest groups to promote and implement theWCD’s recommendations?

This assessment shows that despite some flaws, theWCD process was essentially robust, allowing for a

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stakeholder engagement that we have documentedduring the WCD’s process and in the immediateaftermath suggests that the process is worthemulating—and improving upon.

Given that the WCD’s process was robust, thischapter reviews the major elements of successfulprocess that could be replicated in future commis-sions. Where the process was flawed and under-mined stakeholder confidence, we suggest correc-tions that could be designed into future efforts.The chapter concludes by considering the legacy ofthe WCD for future processes.

Establishing a Credible Process

Representation

As a result of the contentious selection process, theCommissioners chosen for the WCD were promi-nent individuals in NGO, social movement, andbusiness networks, as well as in governmentagencies. In many cases, Commissioners wereselected because they were perceived as beingaffiliated with distinct constituencies. Such acomposition set it apart from past commissionsthat were composed of eminent persons. This newmodel proved successful in engaging large interna-tional stakeholder constituencies in theCommission’s work.

The WCD’s initiators had no obvious benchmarkto use when departing from an eminent persons’model to compose a diverse multi-stakeholdercommission. Rather, the selection of Commission-ers was the result of political negotiation. TheWCD’s own process later generated a usefulframework for identifying stakeholders based onrights and voluntary and involuntary risks. Thisframework will be relevant to the formation offuture multi-stakeholder processes.

Involving stakeholders in the selection of Commis-sioners increased their confidence in the Commis-sion and their willingness to participate in thesubsequent process. It would have been impracticalfor all concerned stakeholders to learn about andparticipate in Commissioner selection. Instead, theWCD’s formation involved an ad hoc group ofparticipants from the 1997 Gland meeting—theWorld Bank-sponsored gathering that called for aninternational review of large dams. The involvementof this group helped gauge the political acceptabilityof the Commission and promote awareness of the

WCD in participants’ networks. This experiencedemonstrates the usefulness of broadening theselection process in future commissions.

The different levels of organisation and interestacross stakeholder groups at this time influencedtheir participation in the process. When the WCDwas formed, the anti-dam movement was relativelywell organised, which translated into coherentdemands for representation. Before and after theGland meeting, civil society groups refused to besubsumed in a single stakeholder category. Theyargued that “civil society” was sufficiently diversethat it merited several stakeholder categories:indigenous peoples, non-indigenous project-affected people, public interest advocacy groups,and environmental groups. In particular, civilsociety groups pressed for affected peoples’ repre-sentatives and indigenous peoples’ representativesto have their own seats at the table. This demand—which formed the basis for the Commission’spolitical acceptability to the anti-dam move-ment—marked a departure from previous consul-tative and multi-stakeholder processes in whichcivil society slots were typically taken by NGOsclose to the corridors of power in Washington,Nairobi, and Delhi.

By contrast, dam-building companies and utilitiesdid not take an active interest in the WCD processin its early days, largely because they disregarded itssignificance. As a result, when private companiesand utilities recognised the growing reputation ofthe WCD and became more active in the processlater on, some felt under-represented on the Com-mission. Circumstances exacerbated this discon-tent—the Commissioner best positioned to repre-sent corporate interests (Mr. Lindahl) slowly lost theconfidence of industry groups when his company,Asea Brown Boveri, progressively withdrew from thelarge hydropower business. This gradual loss ofrepresentation made industry groups feel that theywere losing ground in the debate and led them toestablish a more formal industry network towardthe end of the process. The contrasting experienceof stakeholder groups suggests that stakeholdersbear the considerable burden of defining constitu-encies and mobilising accordingly, if they are to feeladequately represented.

National governments were represented onlymodestly at the Gland meeting and in theCommission’s formation—an outcome withconsiderable significance for the subsequent

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process. The Indian government would later pointout that in its view, it and other major dam-building governments were excluded from theformative process. Despite the presence of a strongChairperson and Vice-Chairperson from Southerngovernments, the WCD’s ability to attract thepolitical support of governments would become aserious issue in its later process and would inhibittheir more enthusiastic engagement with theprocess and the final report.

The issue of government representation highlightsone of the trade-offs that the WCD could notavoid. The muted participation of governmentsduring the Commission’s formation helped createthe space for NGOs and social movements toparticipate. These groups believed that to involvegovernments integrally from the start would havedelayed, if not stalled, the formation process.1

Based on statements made by governments later inthe process, their own involvement at the forma-tion stage would likely have created a less broadlyconsultative process and a less aspirational out-come.2 Hence, greater inclusion of governmentswould likely have led to the loss of civil societyvoices.3 For example, the response of the Chinesegovernment to the unfolding process certainlysuggests that some governments were unwilling tosustain engagement with a broad spectrum ofstakeholders. China’s discomfort with the processtriggered its rejection of the final report, which wassignificant given that almost half of the globalpopulation of large dams is located in China.

The option of having a Commissioner from theWorld Bank was never explicitly considered giventhe history of the dams debate and the WCD’sgenesis in civil society calls for an independentreview. In the selection process, it was important toaffirm the principle of diverse stakeholder repre-sentation, rather than to seek specific representa-tives from particular institutions or agencies.Indeed, representation of the World Bank on theCommission may have alienated social movementsand NGOs. Such a development would havechanged the entire character of the process and,

likely, its results. In future processes, if the WorldBank is more centrally engaged, even representedon a commission, it may place greater pressure onthe institution to acknowledge ownership of thefindings and recommendations. The price, how-ever, would be diminished independence of thecommission. Such potential trade-offs betweenrepresentation and adoption of findings, on theone hand, and character of the process and results,on the other, are highly relevant to future pro-cesses.

Finally, the WCD experience suggests that ad-equate representation of stakeholders shouldextend beyond a commission to all the otherorgans of a process. As a sounding board, theWCD’s advisory Forum was intended to capturediverse perspectives from the dams debate, and didso successfully. Secretariat diversity was important,because Secretariat staff members were the filtersbetween the broad community of stakeholders andthe Commissioners, and deployed their networksin developing the work programme. NGOs faultedthe Secretariat for having no staff who had workeddirectly with displaced people. Industry groupscriticised it for lacking technical dams expertise.According to the Secretariat, it was difficult torecruit senior staff with diverse sectoral andregional backgrounds because of relocation issuesand the temporary nature of the assignment.Criticisms by Forum members suggest that quiteaside from the performance of the WCD Secre-tariat, in a partisan arena each interest grouphopes to see someone “like themselves” on asecretariat, and judges the legitimacy of a secre-tariat accordingly.

Women were well represented on the Commissionitself, comprising five of the twelve originalmembers. However, both the Secretariat andForum had disproportionately small numbers ofwomen or, perhaps more pertinent to issues ofrepresentation, they included few women or menwho were sensitive to the gender-differentiatedimpacts of water and energy development, alongwith best practice in gender and developmentwork. The discrepancy in numbers and the poorrepresentation of gender advocates led women tofeel marginalised in discussion forums. The WCD’sfinal report might have had a stronger genderperspective running through it had there beenmore women and gender advocates in its Secre-tariat and Forum.4 By not including more suchvoices, the WCD failed to meet its own standard

The Commissioner selectionprocess proved instrumental to

stakeholders’ willingness toengage in the WCD process.

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for inclusiveness and neglected an importantconstituency.

In summary, representation of the full range ofstakeholders, across government, business, andcivil society as well as regions and disciplines, canconsiderably enhance the legitimacy of a multi-stakeholder process. In the case of the WCD, thispotential was somewhat diminished by the lack offull industry confidence, largely because ofindustry’s failure to mobilise early in the processand by the wariness of some governments. Yet, thealternative of relying exclusively on a middleground, however eminent the representatives,would not have carried the same credibility withthe range of people involved, and particularly notwith civil society, whose calls for an independentreview of dams led to the formation of the WCD.Hence, despite the trade-offs that make it impos-sible to satisfy all sides and despite the challengesof balancing various forms of representation, thepotential legitimacy gains make the representativemulti-stakeholder model worth emulating.

Independence

The WCD was born out of calls by civil society foran independent review of the global experience withlarge dams, with a particular focus on the role ofinternational aid and credit agencies. Hence itsindependence—not only from funding agencies, butalso from influence by various stakeholder groups—was a critical element of its legitimacy. At the sametime, the success of the WCD relied on vigorousengagement by all stakeholders, so as to promotebuy-in to the process and the final outcome. Thesimultaneous pursuit of independence and engage-ment certainly posed a challenge. Rather thanseeking neutrality, the Commission sought balancein its engagement with stakeholders.

The Commission was independent from theconvening institutions—the World Bank andIUCN—insofar as it was not answerable to them,these institutions were not represented on theCommission itself, and they did not control itsoperations or decision-making process. The WCDmade a clear choice for independence over owner-ship by convening institutions, a choice that wascritical to the Commission’s legitimacy. The onlydebate in this regard concerned Secretariat staff ’slinks with the convening institutions. In the WCDprocess, some industry stakeholders were concernedthat the Secretary-General and three of ten senior

advisers had strong prior ties with IUCN and thatecological issues would be given undue weight ascompared to social or economic concerns. Althoughit is possible that the WCD’s creators underesti-mated the role of staff members’ backgrounds inbuilding confidence, this example suggests thatindependence might be considered in the selectionof secretariat members for future commissions.

Maintaining independence by diversifying fundingsources was a major accomplishment of the WCDthat enhanced its broader legitimacy. The Com-mission explicitly sought financial support fromgovernment and multilateral agencies, the privatesector, and civil society groups. This fundraisingeffort was time-consuming and overshadowedmuch of the work programme. However, the pay-off was worth the effort, for diverse fundingsources demonstrated that the WCD was notbeholden to any one set of interests. Indeed, it is anotable measure of success that Forum membersand the general media did not criticise the WCD’sfunding strategy.

Also in the interests of independence, the WCDadopted a policy of only seeking money that camewith no strings attached. This was more difficult toaccomplish. In order to raise sufficient funds, theWCD did compromise this principle. For instance,the Commission accepted major donations (prin-cipally from bilateral and multilateral agencies)that were tied to specific events or studies. How-ever, there is no evidence that these conditionsforced the WCD to do what it otherwise would nothave done, nor did they undermine the confidenceof Forum members or other concerned stakehold-ers in the integrity of the process. Future processeswill, similarly, have to handle such relationshipscautiously to avoid donor influence.

Transparency

Transparency was central to the WCD’s legitimacyfor several reasons. Non-transparent decision-making processes in multilateral institutions andin large-scale development generally have beenmajor causes of friction in the history of large

The WCD’s independence fromconvening institutions was

critical to its legitimacy.

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dams. To mobilise broad input for its workprogramme, and therefore build credibility as aplatform for dialogue, the WCD had to respond tostakeholder demands for transparency. Transpar-ency was especially important because there wereno formal accountability mechanisms betweenCommissioners and various constituencies. Hence,disclosing information about objectives, methods,and progress helped keep Commissioners honestto broader tides of opinion. Perhaps most impor-tant, the WCD had limited ability to facilitatebroad consensus among contending interestgroups during its lifetime. To leverage the WCD’sinfluence in the dams debate, the commitment totransparency was necessary to disseminate newways of thinking among these constituencies.5

The WCD did strive to, and substantially achieve,high standards of transparency. A widespreadstandard for transparency is that the convenors ofpolicy processes communicate their objectives torelevant stakeholders in a timely manner, tellstakeholders how they can participate and howtheir inputs will be used, and communicatedecisions in full.6 The WCD publicised opportuni-ties for participation in the work programmebroadly. It disseminated terms of reference for thecommissioned papers, and the draft and com-pleted thematic reviews and case studies to allinterested parties, and posted them on its award-winning website. In addition, stakeholder groupswere engaged in the process by serving as reviewersof terms of reference and studies and by occasion-ally participating in meetings organised aroundthe various studies.

The WCD’s efforts to reach out in person tostakeholders and go beyond reliance on theInternet were important to stakeholders withlimited Internet access. This included the majorityof Southern stakeholders, even in elite institutions.Personal contact—through seminars, workshops,and official consultations—helped engage stake-holders and solicit their input more effectively.

The Commission’s track record for transparencywas tarnished toward the end of the process,however, when it did not communicate clearlywhether the Forum would have an opportunity toreview a synthesis of work programme results. TheSecretariat was to compile a synthesis midwaythrough the process based upon the myriadbackground studies that had been commissioned.Such a synthesis would have provided a succinct

summary of the knowledge base that the Commis-sion would use to prepare its findings and recom-mendations. Because of time pressures, thisinterim step was abandoned. Following the releaseof the report, the World Bank and stakeholdersfrom the dams industry suggested that this lostopportunity for review compromised the technicalmerit of the report.

Although discussion of interim findings compiledby the Secretariat based on the knowledge basemay well have been constructive, disclosure of theCommissioners’ draft final report, as some Forumgroups desired, would have been counterproduc-tive. A premature effort to build a broad consensusamong stakeholders, via the Forum, might haverisked undermining progress toward the Commis-sioners’ consensus. Over two years, the Commis-sioners had developed a delicate internal dynamicbased upon mutual respect and shared learningthat did not exist among Forum members or thewider stakeholder community. Circulation of adraft for comment risked igniting politicallycharged debates among interest groups, whichcould have undermined Commissioner solidarity.The lesson is that the demand for transparencymust be balanced with the often delicate dynamicsof consensus among commissioners.

Another set of practical challenges to full transpar-ency pertain to consultation in a global settingwhere stakeholders’ use of information is limitedby language and their access to information islimited by Internet availability. The transparencyof the WCD’s process was diluted for those non-English speaking stakeholders who could notunderstand the information. The WCD’s record intranslating information about the workprogramme from English into other languages wasmixed. Although the final report itself was trans-lated in full into Spanish and the summary intonumerous languages, working documents were nottranslated. Because it is not practical to translatemultiple drafts of working papers for stakeholderdissemination, a reasonable standard may be to

To build credibility as a plat-form for dialogue, the WCD had

to respond to stakeholder demands for transparency.

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translate essential framing documents and interimproducts into major world languages. Althoughtranslation and interpretation requires significantamounts of time and money, it should be anintegral part of the time lines and budgets offuture processes.

Finally, the Commission’s efforts to disseminateinformation about opportunities for participa-tion were not matched by its managementcapability to acknowledge stakeholder inputsonce they were received. This is a problem thatfuture processes can correct. For almost the firsttwo years of the Commission’s life, the Commis-sion invited stakeholders to send written submis-sions on the development effectiveness of largedams. The process yielded a total of 970 submis-sions from institutions and individuals aroundthe world and helped the Commission achieve animage of openness. Managerial problems some-what undermined the mechanism’s legitimacy.Consultants failed to integrate submissions andonly in the late stages did the Secretariat have theresources to do so. Eventually, the submissionswere sorted by theme and appended to thematicreviews after the full report was complete. Theywere included on a CD-ROM of the knowledgebase that was mailed to stakeholders after thereport’s launch. However, the lack of earlyacknowledgement undermined the confidence ofcontributors that their submissions would betaken into account.

In summary, the Commission’s mixed record ontransparency demonstrates that it did not meetstakeholders’ high expectations for informationdisclosure, although much of this could not havebeen managed without unrealistic increases in thelength and cost of the process. However, theCommission also fell short in meeting some basicinternational norms of transparency, as in ac-knowledging stakeholder inputs or being com-pletely clear about the role of the Forum in consul-tation. These experiences provide lessons foroperational improvement that can be applied tofuture multi-stakeholder processes.

Inclusiveness

Given the diverse composition of the Commissionitself, the WCD’s knowledge-gathering process hadto be inclusive of diverse viewpoints. Without aninclusive approach in the work programme, theCommission would not have held together.

The WCD’s ability to create and maintain politicalspace for diverse engagement rested in large parton its open-ended approach to knowledge gather-ing. Rather than defining criteria up front for thedevelopment effectiveness of large dams, theCommission invited stakeholders to present theirown analytic and normative views of whether damprojects had advanced their society’s development.The multidisciplinary case studies were in theoryset up to elicit such converging and divergingviews. This approach assured stakeholders that theprocess did not prejudge outcomes, and thusencouraged broad participation.

The WCD’s regional consultations were importantvehicles for the Commission to demonstrate itsinclusive approach. These hearings, in South Asia,South America, Africa and the Middle East, andEast and Southeast Asia, brought almost the entireCommission and Secretariat to Southern regionsto reach out and listen to stakeholders. The Secre-tariat went to considerable lengths to includesocial, economic, and environmental topics, alongwith pro- and anti-dam perspectives on the panels.Payment for presenters’ travel ensured that a rangeof presenters could attend, from communityrepresentatives to environmental experts to damengineers to agency planners. Not only did theseevents raise awareness of the Commission’s workduring its process, but they were also a means oflegitimising the process’ outcome—the Commis-sion could rest its report upon consultations withthousands of people.

Two important lessons from the regional consulta-tions are relevant for future commissions andmulti-stakeholder processes. First, even whenmeetings are carefully designed for balance andinclusiveness, the failed India meeting (see Chapter6) serves as a reminder that the location andtiming of public meetings is a political decisionthat can alienate stakeholders. When such deci-sions appear heavily biased toward one side oranother, the commission risks destroying its abilityto act as a convenor for broad stakeholder dia-logue. In this case, the proposed meeting siteappeared to bear upon a local controversy.

The WCD Forumdemonstrated the inclusiveness

of the process.

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Second, the WCD succeeded in mobilisinggrassroots input for its hearings, which wasnotable for a global commission. WCD eventsoften marked the first time that governmentofficials had heard directly the voices of affectedpeople and the alternative viewpoints of NGOs.This mobilisation owed something to the efforts ofdiverse Commissioners, Secretariat staff, andForum members. But, in particular, grassrootsmobilisation resulted from the efforts of a fewhighly co-ordinated, dedicated civil society groupswho reached out to contacts at the communitylevel with their own resources. Future processeswill also rely heavily upon the networks of theirstaff, commissioners, and advisors to mobiliseparticipation. Where such networks are limited intheir reach, as they inevitably will be, it may bepractical to assign additional resources to civilsociety groups and local actors to increase appro-priate outreach. Vigorous outreach to local mediato mobilise input to consultations would also be acost-effective strategy in the future.

The WCD’s advisory Forum also demonstrated theinclusiveness of the process by includingorganisations that had engaged in bitter wars ofwords and even physical clashes in the past overthe legitimacy of dam projects. Export creditagencies that were backing controversial damprojects in the South joined the Forum alongsideindigenous peoples’ groups defending theirancestral lands from large dams. Large engineeringfirms that supplied dam equipment joined along-side civil society organisations that had arrangedprotests outside their corporate offices. SomeForum members refused to engage in directdialogue with others, but many agency officials,community representatives, and NGOs camewith—or developed—a listening ear. Although theeffects are hard to measure, gathering such actorsin the same room for three substantive Forummeetings was clearly an achievement.

While the act of convening such diverse partieswas worthwhile and quite unusual, the ongoingengagement of Forum members in the WCD’swork programme was sporadic and uneven.Structured opportunities for Forum members toprovide guidance on the work programme werefew. Commission and Secretariat members saythey were informed and empowered by their twoformal meetings with Forum members. However,the consultations fell far short of using the Forumas a “sounding board” for the direction of the

WCD’s final report as Forum members gainedlittle sense of the Commission’s internal delibera-tions. As a result, Forum members’ ownership inthe process and forthcoming product was quitetenuous. Between the second Forum meeting andthe launch of the report, an intense aura of secrecysurrounded the final report’s content, and thereport surprised many Forum members upon itsrelease. Many of these members were ill-preparedto receive and respond to the report.

The WCD experience suggests that advisory bodieshave considerable value in providing a platform forexchange among conflicting interest groups. Suchbodies can assist in furthering a commission’sshared learning and advances in its members’thinking. For participants to reap tangible benefitsfrom the experience, they not only need to beorganised and motivated to participate themselves,but they also require regular updates about theprogress of the work programme and the directionof a commission’s thinking. The WCD excelled inproviding Forum members with informationalupdates, but as our discussion about transparencyindicated, they fell short of their own high stan-dards in fully engaging the Forum.

In summary, the WCD accomplished a processthat was very inclusive by global standards. TheCommission’s insistence on welcoming all formsof evidence as a valid contribution to the knowl-edge base—the grassroots as well as the “offi-cial”—ensured that it was more democratic thantechnocratic. The effort to reach previouslyunheard voices also displeased some technicalexperts who were accustomed to being thedominant participants in such processes and thisreaction will have ripple effects on future pro-cesses. The WCD’s major achievement was that itdeveloped sufficient authority as a convenor thatit could create and strengthen the political spaceover two years of consultations to engage mostconcerned parties in the knowledge gatheringprocess. Such inclusiveness provided a strongbasis on which to rest the Commission’s finalreport and sets high expectations for futuremulti-stakeholder processes.

The WCD managed to openup the knowledge-gathering

process.

C h a p t e r 9


The Legacy of the WCD

The Promise of a Representative Commission

The WCD reveals both the promise and the pitfallsof an advisory multi-stakeholder process. Thepromise is that selection of active practitioners canprovide legitimacy with the full range of stake-holders engaged in a debate. The pitfalls are thatdetermining representation within amorphousconstituencies and expanding consensus amongrepresentative commissioners to a broad consensusremain challenges.

The WCD also provides lessons on how to supportand promote the legitimacy of advisory commis-sions. The WCD experience suggests that if amulti-stakeholder process is to truly move beyondthe divisive politics of an issue, representativesfrom the full spectrum of the debate must be at thetable. The WCD provides a model where voicesthat have long protested decisions made abouttheir lives in their absence can represent theirviews directly and share in developing a frameworkfor future decision-making.

Who is a stakeholder? Who should be at the table?The WCD’s report provides a framework foridentifying who is a legitimate stakeholder, basedupon rights and risks. This framework calls for fullidentification of the overlapping and intersectingrights of stakeholders in a country or river basin,combined with attention to who is taking volun-tary and involuntary risks if the developmentproject proceeds. The rights and risks approachcould be used to identify legitimate stakeholdersfor dialogues in many development arenas—fromthe global to the national to the local. Based onlegitimacy with a wide range of stakeholders, suchbodies are well poised to act as “norm entrepre-neurs,” who articulate genuinely new formulationsthat, over time, diffuse and are accepted as newnorms of conduct in the international arena.7

What Does Good Process Contribute?

In this assessment, we have examined the WCDprocess against the benchmarks of independence,transparency, and inclusiveness. Although theprocess did have flaws, we have concluded that itwas essentially robust. As the stakeholder reactionsabove suggest, however, good process cannot byitself transcend divisive politics. Indeed, it wouldbe naïve to suggest that it could. What, then, did

attention to process bring to the WCD, and whatdoes it promise for future processes?

The most significant contribution of good processis to support the legitimacy of a multi-stakeholderprocess. This is important because in contentiousarenas, such as dams, not all differences can bereconciled through new information and cognitiveadvances. Ultimately, some differences are irrecon-cilable and will require a framework to decidewhich interests prevail. A legitimate process is animportant defence against criticisms of thisapproach.

A good process can expand the range and varietyof information and perspectives that feed intodecision-making. The WCD’s efforts at inclusionbrought to the fore voices that have often beenmarginalised in the dams debate. The Commissioncast a wide net, capturing the views of the dis-placed, along with the reports of consultants andthe data banks of governments. This processenriched the knowledge base on which the WCDdeliberated.

An important promise of a multi-stakeholderprocess is its ability to create a broader space fordialogue among stakeholders. The WCD provedonly partially successful at this task. In theirfrequent face-to-face meetings, the Commissionerswere able to transcend pre-conceivedcharacterisations of other constituencies. Thebroader group of stakeholders had far feweropportunities for interaction. Moreover, theregional consultations and, in large part, theForum meetings were structured to inform theCommission, rather than as a two-way dialogue.Finally, the absence of an interim report that couldstimulate a directed discussion among Forummembers proved an obstacle to furthering stake-holder dialogue. Despite these design flaws, theWCD, nonetheless, did encourage far more com-munication across stakeholder groups than hadoccurred in the past years of the dams debate andadditionally stimulated the formation of networkswithin stakeholder groups.

The Challenge of Implementation

Multi-stakeholder processes typically have littleformal decision-making authority, and the WCDwas no exception. Instead, multi-stakeholderprocesses are designed to win consent for imple-mentation through a process of inclusion, with a

C o n c l u s i o n


particular focus on civil society and the privatesector. A process structured around representativestakeholders holds the potential for genuinely newand transformative formulations that can breakpolicy deadlocks—a contribution that is less likelyto be achieved through governmental processesalone.

Yet, as the tentative and defensive reactions ofSouthern governments to the WCD suggest, amulti-stakeholder approach co-exists uneasilywith the existing framework of international lawbased on the sovereignty of nation-states. As theIndian government’s negative reaction to theappointment of an activist as a Commissionerillustrates, governments question the legitimacyof non-elected individuals as representatives of abroad view. Moreover, as governments’ calls forno new conditionalities arising from the WCDshow, they are wary of non-governmental actors’ability to circumscribe states’ role throughinternational agencies and such processes as theWCD.

What then is the pathway to implementation—onethat captures the potential for creativity of multi-stakeholder processes, while recognising thelegitimate role of governments? The full answer tothis question must await the unfolding of reactionsto the WCD report over time. However, the initialsteps taken by various actors indicate a wayforward.

The WCD Forum established a Dams and Devel-opment Unit (DDU) to carry forward its work. Arange of Forum members—the World Bank,IUCN, an NGO, a river basin authority, a socialmovement, and a private sector actor—agreed toserve as the steering committee of this unit. Thecontinued participation of this range of stakehold-ers demonstrates the ongoing relevance of theCommission’s report.

Follow-up steps include efforts to reach out togovernments. The WCD couched its recommenda-tions within the context of the United Nationscovenants and declarations on human rights,development, and environment. By so doing, itfirmly located itself as within, rather than externalto, the frameworks of intergovernmental delibera-tions. Thus, it provided a way for governments toengage with its findings in a manner that recognisedthe legitimacy of intergovernmental deliberations.Moreover, the steering committee’s choice of anestablished intergovernmental body, the UnitedNations Environment Programme, as the host of theDDU, provides a further bridge to governments.

At the same time, rather than being backed byformal sanction mechanisms, widespread adoptionof the WCD’s recommendations depends onacceptance of norms of practice, supported by civilsociety scrutiny of the private sector, nationalgovernments, and international agencies. Ifsuccessful, a critical role for the WCD will havebeen to crystallise and provide an impetus tonorms of practice for infrastructure projects. Overthe longer term, the bridge back to formal govern-mental and intergovernmental processes will likelybe built incrementally, by incorporating practiceinto formal laws, in part through continuedpressure by non-governmental actors.

This discussion reinforces the message that al-though democratisation of decision-making at theglobal level can bring significant advantages,ultimately advances in principles and practicesmust be translated to and implemented at thenational level and below. However, as the experi-ence of the WCD suggests, efforts at global andnational democratisation are mutually reinforcing.In the WCD process, civil society organising at thenational level served as the catalyst for creating theCommission and the seedbed for a transnationalcivil society alliance on dams. Conversely, theWCD process provided an avenue for greaterexpression at the national level and stimulatedfurther dialogue across sectors at that level. Thefull potential of the World Commission onDams—and other multi-stakeholder processes—lies in this promise of democratisation, at both thenational and global levels.

Representatives of thefull spectrum of the debate

must be at the table.

C h a p t e r 9


Endnotes

1. Interviews with Forum members, September 2000 andNovember 2000. E-mail correspondence with Forummember, January 2001.

2. In interviews and public settings during the Forummeetings, government representatives expressedreservations about the extent of NGO and socialmovement participation in the WCD process. Alsointerview with government representative, April 2000.

3. Patrick McCully, “How to use a Trilateral Network: AnActivist’s Perspective on the World Commission onDams.” Paper presented at Agrarian Studies ProgramColloquium, Yale University, 19 January 2001.

4. For example, the Dublin Principles agreed upon bygovernmental representatives in 1992 in the run-up tothe United Nations Conference on Environment andDevelopment recognised that “[the] pivotal role ofwomen as providers and users of water and guardians ofthe living environment has seldom been reflected ininstitutional arrangements for the development andmanagement of water” as one of four overarching

principles. Principle Three of The Dublin Statement,International Conference on Water and the Environ-ment: Development issues for the 21st century, 26-31January 1992, Dublin, Ireland. The WCD’s final reportdocuments some of the effects of dam-related develop-ment and displacement on women, but its guidelines andrecommendations incorporate only a passing mention ofgender issues.

5. This recommendation is contained in the paper of anearly advisor to the Commission, Anthony Dorcey,Institutional Design and Operational Modalities for theProposed Large Dams Commission, Stockholm Draft, 6August 1997 (mimeo).

6. Derived from Corporación Participa, EnvironmentalManagement and Law Association, Thailand Environ-ment Institute, and World Resources Institute, “Frame-work for Assessing Public Access to EnvironmentalDecision-Making,” 2001.

7. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink. Autumn 1998.“International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.”International Organisation 52(4): 887-917.

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Independent Assessment of the World Commission on Dams 129

Appendix 1

The World Commission on Damsand its Origins:A Brief Chronology of Events

June 1994 ................. Anti-dam organisations sign the Manibeli Declaration, calling for a moratorium onWorld Bank funding of large dams

September 1996 ....... World Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department (OED) Phase I review, The WorldBank’s Experience With Large Dams: A Preliminary Review of Impacts, released

March 1997 .............. First International Meeting of People Affected by Dams, Curitiba Declaration signed

April 1997 ................ International Rivers Network press release critiquing the OED review

April 1997 ................ Gland, Switzerland meeting of World Bank, IUCN, and dam-related stakeholders

August 1997 ............. Interim Working Group (IWG) meeting, Stockholm, Sweden

September 1997 ....... Professor Kader Asmal chosen as WCD Chairperson

November 1997 ....... WCD launch delayed

January 1998 ............ “Expanded IWG” meeting in Cape Town, South Africa

April 1998 ................ Achim Steiner chosen as WCD Secretary-General

May 1998 .................. WCD established

May 1998 .................. First meeting of the WCD in Washington, D.C.

September 1998 ....... Jan Veltrop replaces Wolfgang Pircher as Commission’s ICOLD representative

September 1998 ....... India consultation cancelled

March 1999 .............. First Forum meeting in Prague, Czech Republic

January 2000 ............ Shen Guoyi formally resigns from the Commission

April 2000 ................ Second Forum meeting in Cape Town, South Africa

November 2000 ....... Release of Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-Making

February 2001 .......... Third Forum meeting in Cape Town, South Africa

July 2001 .................. WCD Secretariat officially closed, Dams and Development Unit established

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Appendix 2

WCD Forum MembersNGOsBerne Declaration, SwitzerlandDevelopment Alternatives with Women for a New Era

(DAWN), FijiEnvironmental Development Action (ENDA), SenegalHelp the Volga River, RussiaInternational Rivers Network (IRN), United StatesIntermediate Technology Development Group (ITDG),

United KingdomSobrevivencia-Friends of the Earth, ParaguaySwedish Society for Nature Conservation (SSNC), SwedenThe World Conservation Union (IUCN), SwitzerlandTransparency International (TI), GermanyWetlands International, JapanWorld Economy, Ecology & Development (WEED), GermanyWorld Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Switzerland

Private Sector FirmsAsea Brown Boveri (ABB), SwitzerlandElectric Power Development Corporation (EPDC), JapanEnron, United StatesHarza Engineering Firm, United StatesHopewell Holdings, Hong KongSaman Engineering Consultants, KoreaSiemens, Germany

Research Institutes/Resource PersonsCentro EULA, Ciudad Universitaria Concepcion, ChileFocus on the Global South, ThailandInstitute of Hydroelectric Studies and Design (ISPH),

RomaniaInternational Water Management Institute (IWMI), Sri LankaTropical Environmental Consultants, Ltd., SenegalWater Research Institute (WRI), Israel Institute of

TechnologyWinrock International, NepalWorld Resources Institute (WRI), United StatesWorldwatch Institute, United StatesWuppertal Institute, Germany

River Basin AuthoritiesConfederación Hidrográfica del Ebro (CHE), SpainJordan Valley Authority (JVA), JordanMekong River Commission (MRC), CambodiaVolta River Authority (VRA), Ghana

UtilitiesElectricité de France, FranceElectrobras, BrazilHydro-Québec, CanadaMini Hydro Division (MHD), PhilippinesNepal Electricity Authority (NEA), Nepal

Affected Peoples’ GroupsCoordination for the Senegal River Basin (CODESEN),

SenegalCordillera People’s Alliance (CPA), PhilippinesFederacíon de Indígenas del Estado Bolívar (COICA),

VenezuelaGrand Council of the Cree (GCCEI), CanadaMovimento dos Antigos por Barragens (MAB), BrazilNarmada Bachao Andolan (NBA), India

SUNGI Development Foundation, Pakistan

Bilateral Agencies / Export CreditGuarantee AgenciesFederal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and

Development (BMZ),GermanyJapan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), JapanNorwegian Agency for International Cooperation (NORAD),

NorwaySwedish International Development Agency (Sida), SwedenSwiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC),

SwitzerlandUnited States Export/Import Bank, United States

Government AgenciesBureau of Reclamation, United StatesLesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP), LesothoMinistry of Mahaweli Development, Sri LankaMinistry of Water Resources, ChinaMinistry of Water Resources, IndiaNational Water Commission, Mexico

International AssociationsInternational Association for Impact Assessments (IAIA)International Commission for Irrigation and Drainage (ICID)International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD)International Energy Agency (IEA)International Hydropower Association (IHA)

Multilateral AgenciesAfrican Development Bank (AfDB), AbidjanAsian Development Bank (ADB), ManilaInter-American Development Bank (IDB), WashingtonUnited Nations Development Programme (UNDP),

New YorkUnited Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), NairobiUnited Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO),

RomeWorld Bank (WB), Washington

Source: World Commission on Dams, Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-Making (London: Earthscan, 2000).

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Appendix 3

Thematic ReviewsSocial

I.1 Social impacts of large dams equity and distributional issues

I.2 Dams, indigenous people, and vulnerable ethnic minorities

I.3 Displacement, resettlement, rehabilitation, reparation, and development

Environment

II.1 Dams, ecosystem functions, and environmental restoration

II.2 Dams and global change

Economic

III.1 Economic, financial, and distributional analysis

III.2 International trends in project financing

Options Assessment

IV.1 Assessment of electricity supply and demand management options

IV.2 Assessment of irrigation options

IV.3 Assessment of water supply options

IV.4 Assessment of flood control and management options

IV.5 Operation, monitoring, and decommissioning of dams

Institutional Processes

V.1 Planning approaches

V.2 Environmental and social assessment for large dams

V.3 River basins-institutional frameworks and management options

V.4 Regulation, compliance, and implementation options

V.5 Consultation and decision-making processes

Source: World Commission on Dams, Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-Making (London: Earthscan, 2000).

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Appendix 4

Strategic Priorities of the Damsand Development Report

Strategic Priority 3 – Addressing ExistingDams

1.1 A comprehensive post-project monitoring andevaluation process, and a system of longer-termperiodic reviews of the performance, benefits, andimpacts for all existing large dams are introduced.

1.2 Programmes to restore, improve and optimisebenefits from existing large dams are identifiedand implemented. Options to consider includerehabilitate, modernise and upgrade equipmentand facilities, optimise reservoir operations andintroduce non-structural measures to improve theefficiency of delivery and use of services.

1.3 Outstanding social issues associated with existinglarge dams are identified and assessed; processesand mechanisms are developed with affectedcommunities to remedy them.

1.4 The effectiveness of existing environmentalmitigation measures is assessed and unanticipatedimpacts identified; opportunities for mitigation,restoration and enhancement are recognised,identified and acted on.

1.5 All large dams have formalised operating agree-ments with time-bound licence periods; where re-planning or relicensing processes indicate thatmajor physical changes to facilities or decommis-sioning may be advantageous, a full feasibilitystudy and environmental and social impactassessment is undertaken.

Strategic Priority 4 – Sustaining Riversand Livelihoods

1.1 A basin-wide understanding of the ecosystem’sfunctions, values and requirements, and howcommunity livelihoods depend on and influencethem, is required before decisions on develop-ment options are made.

1.2 Decisions value ecosystems, social and healthissues as an integral part of project and river basindevelopment and prioritise avoidance of impactsin accordance with a precautionary approach.

1.3 A national policy is developed for maintainingselected rivers with high ecosystem functions andvalues in their natural state. When reviewing

Strategic Priority 1 – Gaining PublicAcceptance

1.1 Recognition of rights and assessment of risks arethe basis for the identification and inclusion ofstakeholders in decision-making on energy andwater resources development.

1.2 Access to information, legal and other support isavailable to all stakeholders, particularly indig-enous and tribal peoples, women and othervulnerable groups, to enable their informedparticipation in decision-making processes.

1.3 Demonstrable public acceptance of all keydecisions is achieved through agreements negoti-ated in an open and transparent process con-ducted in good faith and with the informedparticipation of all stakeholders.

1.4 Decisions on projects affecting indigenous andtribal peoples are guided by their free, prior andinformed consent achieved through formal andinformal representative bodies.

Strategic Priority 2 – ComprehensiveOptions Assessment

1.1 Development needs and objectives are clearlyformulated through an open and participatoryprocess before the identification and assessmentof options for water and energy resource develop-ment.

1.2 Planning approaches that take into account thefull range of development objectives are used toassess all policy, institutional, management, andtechnical options before the decision is made toproceed with any programme or project.

1.3 Social and environmental aspects are given thesame significance as technical, economic andfinancial factors in assessing options.

1.4 Increasing the effectiveness and sustainability ofexisting water, irrigation, and energy systems aregiven priority in the options assessment process.

1.5 If a dam is selected through such a comprehensiveoptions assessment process, social and environ-mental principles are applied in the review andselection of options throughout the detailedplanning, design, construction, and operationphases.

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alternative locations for dams on undevelopedrivers, priority is given to locations on tributaries.

1.4 Project options are selected that avoid significantimpacts on threatened and endangered species.When impacts cannot be avoided viable compen-sation measures are put in place that will result ina net gain for the species within the region.

1.5 Large dams provide for releasing environmentalflows to help maintain downstream ecosystemintegrity and community livelihoods and aredesigned, modified and operated accordingly.

Strategic Priority 5 – RecognisingEntitlements and Sharing Benefits

1.1 Recognition of rights and assessment of risks isthe basis for identification and inclusion ofadversely affected stakeholders in joint negotia-tions on mitigation, resettlement and develop-ment related decision-making.

1.2 Impact assessment includes all people in thereservoir, upstream, downstream and in catch-ment areas whose properties, livelihoods andnon-material resources are affected. It alsoincludes those affected by dam related infrastruc-ture such as canals, transmission lines andresettlement developments.

1.3 All recognised adversely affected people negotiatemutually agreed, formal and legally enforceablemitigation, resettlement and developmententitlements.

1.4 Adversely affected people are recognised as firstamong the beneficiaries of the project. Mutuallyagreed and legally protected benefit sharingmechanisms are negotiated to ensure implemen-tation.

Strategic Priority 6 – Ensuring Compliance

1.1 A clear, consistent and common set of criteria andguidelines to ensure compliance is adopted bysponsoring, contracting and financing institutionsand compliance is subject to independent andtransparent review.

1.2 A Compliance Plan is prepared for each projectprior to commencement, spelling out howcompliance will be achieved with relevant criteriaand guidelines and specifying binding arrange-ments for project-specific technical, social andenvironmental commitments.

1.3 Costs for establishing compliance mechanismsand related institutional capacity, and theireffective application, are built into the projectbudget.

1.4 Corrupt practices are avoided through enforce-ment of legislation, voluntary integrity pacts,debarment and other instruments.

1.5 Incentives that reward project proponents forabiding by criteria and guidelines are developedby public and private financial institutions.

Strategic Priority 7 – Sharing Rivers forPeace, Development and Security

1.1 National water policies make specific provisionfor basin agreements in shared river basins.Agreements are negotiated on the basis of goodfaith among riparian States. They are based onprinciples of equitable and reasonable utilisation,no significant harm, prior information and theCommission’s strategic priorities.

1.2 Riparian States go beyond looking at water as afinite commodity to be divided and embrace anapproach that equitably allocates not the water,but the benefits that can be derived from it.Where appropriate, negotiations include benefitsoutside the river basin and other sectors ofmutual interest.

1.3 Dams on shared rivers are not built in cases whereriparian States raise an objection that is upheld byan independent panel. Intractable disputesbetween countries are resolved through variousmeans of dispute resolution including, in the lastinstance, the International Court of Justice.

1.4 For the development of projects on rivers sharedbetween political units within countries, thenecessary legislative provision is made at nationaland sub-national levels to embody theCommission’s strategic priorities of ‘gainingpublic acceptance’, ‘recognising entitlements’ and‘sustaining rivers and livelihoods’.

1.5 Where a government agency plans or facilitatesthe construction of a dam on a shared river incontravention of the principle of good faithnegotiations between riparians, external financingbodies withdraw their support for projects andprogrammes promoted by that agency.

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Appendix 5

Events Attended by theAssessment TeamWCD Events Date & Attendee(s)

Latin America consultation, Brazil 12-13 August 1999Manuel Pulgar-Vidal,a WRI

WCD presentation to World Bank, Washington 28 September 1999Mairi Dupar, WRI

Africa and Middle East consultation, Egypt 8-9 December 1999Mairi Dupar, WRI

USA stakeholder meeting 13 January 2000Tundu Lissu, LEAT

European NGO meeting, Slovakia 17-18 January 2000Elena Petkova, WRI

Pakistan stakeholder meeting 17-18 January 2000Gopal Siwakoti “Chintan,”b Lokayan

Turkey stakeholder meeting 20-21 January 2000Elena Petkova, WRI

Norway stakeholder meeting 14 February 2000Smitu Kothari, Lokayan

Zambia stakeholder meeting 21-22 February 2000Melchesideck Lutema , LEAT

India stakeholder meeting 21, 23 February 2000Smitu Kothari, LokayanAnil Bhattarai , Lokayan

East and Southeast Asia consultation, Vietnam 26-27 February 2000Mairi Dupar, WRIAnil Bhattarai , LokayanMelchesideck Lutema , LEAT

WCD second Forum meeting, South Africa 6-8 April 2000Mairi Dupar, WRINavroz Dubash, WRISmitu Kothari, LokayanAnil Bhattarai, LokayanGopal Siwakoti “Chintan,”b LokayanTundu Lissu, LEAT

WCD third Forum meeting, South Africa 25-27 February 2001Mairi Dupar, WRINavroz Dubash, WRI

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Events Related to Dams Date & Attendee(s)(not part of official WCD process)

Discussions with stakeholders, Thailand January 2000Gopal Siwakoti “Chintan,”b Lokayan

World Water Forum, Netherlands March 2000Gopal Siwakoti “Chintan,”b Lokayan

Meeting of dam-related stakeholders, Nepal June 2000Anil Bhattarai, LokayanGopal Siwakoti “Chintan,”b Lokayan

Conference on Mekong regional environmental April 2001governance, Laos Mairi Dupar, WRI

Meeting of dam-related stakeholders, India May 2001Smitu Kothari, LokayanRamananda Wangkheirakpam,c LokayanLakshmi Rao,d Lokayan

a Representing WRI, primary affiliation with the Peruvian Society of Environmental Lawb Representing Lokayan, primary affiliation with INHURED Internationalc Representing Lokayan, primary affiliation with Jawaharlal Nehru Universityd Representing Lokayan, primary affiliation with Jawaharlal Nehru University

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Who We Are

World Resources Institute

World Resources Institute provides—and helpsother institutions provide—information andpractical proposals for policy and institutionalchange that will foster environmentally sound,socially equitable development. WRI researchesand publicises policy options, encourages adoptionof innovative approaches, and provides strongtechnical support to governments, corporations,international institutions, and environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs). WRI’sInstitutions and Governance Program, a programthat focuses on the social and political dimensionsof environmental policymaking, houses the WCDassessment team.

World Resources Institute, 10 G Street, NE; Suite800; Washington, DC 20002, USA

Lokayan

Lokayan, a 20-year-old action-research centre inIndia, works with social movements, researchinstitutes, policy-makers and citizens at large tofoster the widening of justice, democracy, andecological sustainability. It does this throughparticipatory research, campaigns, advocacy,political mobilisation, dialogues, and publications.Lokayan won the Right Livelihood Award (“Alter-native Nobel Prize”) in 1986.

Lokayan, 13 Alipur Road, Exchange Building, CivilLines, Delhi 110 054, India

The Lawyers’ Environmental Action Team

The Lawyers’ Environmental Action Team (LEAT) isa public interest lawyers’ organisation based in Dares Salaam, Tanzania. Founded in 1994, LEATspecialises in public policy research and advocacyin the field of environment and natural resourcemanagement. It has undertaken applied policyresearch work on institutional and governanceissues for government departments and donoragencies. It also carries out public interest litiga-tion on selected cases on behalf of rural communi-ties.

LEAT, Kings Palace Hotel Building, First Floor,Sikukuu Street, Kariakoo Area, P.O. Box 12605, DarEs Salaam, Tanzania