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A View from FranceMichel Crozier aa Center for the Sociology of OrganizationsPublished online: 24 Feb 2007.

To cite this article: Michel Crozier (2005) A View from France, International Public ManagementJournal, 8:3, 379-381, DOI: 10.1080/10967490500439719

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A VIEW FROM FRANCE

MICHEL CROZIERCENTER FOR THE SOCIOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS

With the passage of time, The 9=11 Commission Report can be seen as both anextraordinary achievement and a mild disappointment. It is a thorough and brilliantfact finding report overstuffed with details, yet well organized and very readable. It isthe best possible work in a genre in which Americans have always excelled. Yet it isnot what one would have expected after such a traumatic and revolutionary event. Itlacks a deep and serious diagnosis of the dramatic change this event inaugurated inwarfare. It does not provide a real analysis of the enemy. While it is good at proposingmeasures of protection for the American public, it does not show well enough the partthe American people could and should play in these measures. It is excellent in present-ing the profile and whereabouts of the terrorists responsible for the unbelievable 9=11attack, but it does not analyze what lies behind and themuchmore complex enemy, partof an even more complex Islamic world. This world still seems terra incognito for theAmerican strategists. And finally, if it is excellent in discussing protective measures, itdoes not provide elements for thinking rationally about indispensable countermeasures.Such countermeasures have taken place, but they were completely divorced from thethinking behind the report. Let me detail the sources of my disappointment.

DESCRIPTION AND VIVID ANALYSIS OF THE EVENTS

A good presentation is made of the individual reactions of the people who were incharge in the field. Some of them reacted immediately and issued warnings. They cameclose to stopping some of the terrorists at checkpoints. Their behavior was almost takenfor granted. No research was done on their profiles, their capacities, and their place inthe community. Yet they were an active spontaneous resource on which one should relyin case of another attack. These people are to be found in the lower echelons of the FBI,the CIA, and airport authorities. They were in contact with the terrorists and had thecorrect, suspicious reactions, but they did not have enough professional knowledgeof this unheard of formof attack. Theirmessages furthermore were lost in the enormousamount of information that cannot be retrieved in a reasonable amount of time.Provisions could be made to accelerate the transmission and analysis process, but thiswill have little impact as long as the field people and community around them are not

InternationalPublicManagementJournal

International Public Management Journal, 8(3), pages 379381 Copyright # 2005 Taylor & FrancisAll rights of reproduction in any form reserved. ISSN: 1096-7494

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professionalized. They are a very important resource but they have been used onlyas instruments to provide bits of information, they must be trained to become co-producers of the crucial knowledge of active investigating. A major area of thinkingand experimenting should be opened right away.

THE REVOLUTION IN THE NATURE OF WARFARE

At the other extreme of the inquiries of the commission, I am disappointed at thelack of deep thinking about the revolution in traditional warfare. The capacity toutilize the talents of individuals who will sacrifice their own lives for the cause ischanging the traditional rules of the game. The morale of the unarmed mass ofthe population becomes much more important. The human factor of war is beingresuscitated just at a time when the primacy of technology seems to have made itan abstract game. New modern means of communication may in the end help theterrorists. One has forgotten the extraordinary hysteria that seized the Europeanestablishment at the turn of the century when groups of fanatic anarchists committednumerous acts of public violence including assassinations of Austrian EmpressElizabeth (1898), Italian King Umberto (1900), and several other important figures.They were contained but were not eliminated for twenty years. Only the tremendousupsurge of nationalists feelings at the beginning of World War I wiped them outuntil a new more regularized class warfare cycle slowly emerged.The key point is the capacity to sacrifice ones own life in a heroic mission, which

is different from the fighting mission. This capacity is alien to Western civilization. Itis to be found in the Islamic world at the two ends of the class spectrum: among edu-cated people close to western techniques, and among derelict jobless youngsters.Religious indoctrination is certainly the key dimension of the movement, but oneshould not overlook the motivation present in all warlike situations to become a heroin view of ones own people, which means that the support of the large mass of thepopulation is a key factor. The training of the young in the ideological madrassasprovides the indispensable fertile background of the mixture between communitarianfeelings and individual heroic motivations.The consequences of these new elements in warfare have become enormous. The

human factor which had declined so quickly in the overbearing technologicalenvironment comes back to become, at least for a while, dominant. It is even capableof using sophisticated techniques of the West in a simple but very inventive way andreversing them in a most unexpected way.

HOW TO RESPOND TO THESE CHANGES?

The basic philosophy of the reports recommendations revolves around this situ-ation. It is true that revamping the complexity of the chain of command is a must.But for a long time already management research has pointed out the limits of thiskind of reasoning. Structures as such are stupid; only people make them efficient.And as long as we return to the human factor, one should worry first about the

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location and training of the multiple actors who intervene in the protection business.As I have already pointed out, the report mentions a few examples of intuition andforesight among field officers of the FBI, CIA, and airport authorities, but these caseswere isolated. This human capital nevertheless does exist, and it could be developedand professionalized. Better structures are not enough. Research and training arenecessary, especially for the first line of people who may be in contact with terrorists.

POSITIVE MEASURES

Protective measures are never enough. Proactive measures are necessary. Theyought to be made in the view of a better knowledge of the enemy and its environ-ment. This is where the report is especially weak. This was not exactly its missionof course, but without a better consideration of this problem the recommendationsof the commission will not be successful.An extremely important effort should be made to increase and diffuse knowledge

of the Islamic world. One should remember that World War II was won to a largeextent because of the giant effort made by the scholarly community to reexamineknowledge of Germany and Japan, while the lack of knowledge of Vietnam explainspartially the disaster of that war. There is certainly a good deal of good research onthe Islamic world, but I was shocked that no mention was made of it in the report,and no provisions were suggested to reinforce and develop it, especially in view of theextraordinary turmoil and changes affecting this world.No war has ever been won only with defensive measures. This one, which is fought

basically over the human factor, especially demands new psychological thinkingabout people. A better knowledge of the enemy should not be limited to the inves-tigation of the Middle East tradition from the crusades and the memories of the earlyMiddle Ages to the Jihadic movements of the nineteenth century and to the presental Qaeda all-out war. Where do terrorists come from? It is not the Islamic communi-ties as such but a small portion of them; however, they are benefiting from the sup-port of the masses. How can the romantic minority that nurtures the terrorist heroesbe separated from these masses? This is one of the basic very difficult problems tosolve. The training in the madrassas is the basic ground on which this psychologicalstruggle must be fought. If one lets this kind of training indoctrinate the children andthe youth, this movement will again grow in strength. We must absolutely find a wayto promote a competitive new kind of education.The 9=11 Commission Report does not deal with these issues. One may hope that a

second commission as keen in analyzing the facts will provide us new clues to actseriously in view of the dangers that are threatening us.

Michel Crozier is the founder of Center For The Sociology Of Organizations at the Paris Insti-tute of Political Science. Not a sociologist by traininghis early studies were in business andlawhe published The Bureaucratic Phenomenon in 1964, which established the sociology oforganizations as a discipline in France and sketched out the bases of what would later onbecome the strategic analysis of organizations. Since then he has published numerous influen-tial works and has maintained a commitment to administrative and social reform.

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