a typology of terrorism - kaplan - 2003

7/28/2019 A Typology of Terrorism - Kaplan - 2003

1/38

A TYPOLOGY OF TERRORISM *

SHAWN KAPLAN , ADELPHI UNIVERSITY

I. The Problems of Defining Terrorism

The difficulties surrounding the project of defining terrorism are at

first glance classic problems of connotation and denotation. In itseveryday usage, terrorism is a value laden term often connoting cravenindifference to innocent life. In contemporary political rhetoric, terrorismis more of an accusation than a descriptive term. There may be no moreeffective rhetorical device today than to accuse ones opponent of being aterrorist. Not only do such accusations carry an explicit moral claim but

they seemingly can be cast in all directions. In the war of words, thequestion of who can fairly be referred to as a terrorist seems to devolveinto a debate over who is most deserving of moral condemnation. 1 Furthermore, the effect of charging another as a terrorist is to excuseoneself from any further debate concerning the justness of their claims ortheir legitimacy in either domestic or international politics.

Given the most publicized terrorists acts of recent years, it is notdifficult to understand why the common usage of terrorism carries suchextremely negative connotations. It is less than obvious, however, that adefinition of terrorism should embrace a universal moral prejudgment of terrorist actions and the agents who carry them out. Skepticism about suchan approach comes from both traditional philosophical concerns as well as


2/38

A Typology of Terrorism2

restrict the extension of the term in too severe a fashion. 2 Thus, byincluding within the definition of terrorism either that it always targetsinnocent persons or that it is always morally indefensible, one excludescertain actions that could and perhaps should be at least examined aspotential terrorist acts. Beyond these two general concerns, to incorporatea universal moral evaluation into the definition of terrorism may in fact

prove difficult due to the instrumental nature of terrorism .Like violence itself, terrorism is a means for obtaining any number of

possible ends. 3 Just as one can universally condemn all violent actions,one can analogously condemn terrorism as a means. However, the samesorts of challenges that the thorough going non-violentist faces indemonstrating the coherence of her position must similarly be confrontedby the person universally condemning terrorism. 4 Given the instrumentalcharacter of violence, cant we conceive of a noble end (e.g. savinginnocent persons from great harm or death) that could only be obtained byviolent means? As it is extremely difficult to rule out such a possibility,an absolute version of non-violentism is not easily defended. Why thenwould it be fair to assume that an absolute moral evaluation is possible forthe instrument of terror? Isnt it equally conceivable that terrorism could

serve a noble end when no other means could do so? That such a case isconceivable will be acknowledged by admitting terrorisms instrumentalcharacter. The likelihood of such a case existing will depend upon twofactors. The first factor concerns the nature of this instrumentality and Itake this to be the central concern of a definition of terrorism. A definitionof terrorism that focuses upon how it serves as a means to any number of

possible ends will be purposively broad so as to capture its current andfuture possible employments. The second factor will flow from an attemptto differentiate between the many types of terrorismwhat I call atypology of terrorism. The typology that I develop here does not keyprimarily upon the ends terrorism aims at. In the first place, the future


3/38

Shawn Kaplan 3

ends of terrorism may be beyond ready prediction. Secondly, the nobilityof a terrorists aim is not sufficient for justifying her actions. While I willconsider the typical and readily conceivable ends of terrorism, thetypology is primarily an analysis of the modes of terrorisms instrumentality.Thus, the broad phenomenon of terrorism is divided according to factorsof targets, the degree of force employed, agency, and the geographic

context of deployment. It is only by first drawing out the diverse types of terrorism that moral evaluation can take place in a concrete andmeaningful way.

Before I present a definition of terrorism, I will critically examinefour current approaches to defining terrorism so as to draw closer to anunderstanding of the phenomenon of terrorism. In addition to avoiding astrong moral prejudgment, I contend that a definition of terrorism ought to:a) distinguish terrorism from other forms of violence and coercion, b)allow for a diversity of state and non-state agents, and c) express somecore elements common to the overall phenomenon of terrorism that can bemore or less readily recognized in practice. It isnt my aim to provide thenecessary and sufficient conditions for identifying terrorism. Rather, I aminterested in uncovering those qualities that unite by family resemblance

a wide range of actions as terrorist. As a result, my approach will notmarginalize those instrumental uses of terror that fall outside the purviewof what is traditionally considered politics. While most people are rightlyconcerned with terrorism as a political reality, it is quite possible that thebroader applications can be instructive with regard to understanding theinstrumental quality of the basic phenomenon as well as perhaps proving

instructive in regard to the moral positions we take on terrorism. Afterdefending my proposed definition, I will provide a typological analysis of the broad range of phenomena that fit under my proposed definition andattempt to outline the potential utility of this typological framework whenmorally evaluating terrorist acts.


4/38


evaluation on a case by case basis. 5 Such a strategy for defining terrorismcould include anyone as a terrorists who resorts to guerilla warfare,assassination, rioting, or any revolt that does not use an established army.I say could because the notion of non-conventional tactics is a purelyconventional idea. Should the definition of terrorism shift as certaintactics become more and more popular or take on the semblance of

normality? Certainly assassination was a more conventional act of political violence in ancient Rome and one could argue that in an era of world super-power(s) guerilla warfare is becoming normalized. Moresignificantly, it is unclear how any of the non-conventional tactics listedabove fit our intuitions of terrorism. I am not suggesting this based uponthe common intuitions that morally prejudge terrorism in total. Rather, byusing unconventional tactics to either protect oneself, or produce a changein the political or social order, how has one necessarily used terror or fearas a means? If we hold that terrorism has a distinct meaning that involvesterror (broadly understood), then this focus upon unconventional tacticsappears to be misdirected.

My last criticism of equating terrorism with non-conventionalmethods of political violence is that such an approach ignores that much of

the work of terrorism is carried out through the direct threat of violence.The direct threat of violence elicits as much (if not more) terror, fear, andanxiety as actual violent attacks. Of course, threats unsubstantiated byactual attacks eventually lose their power to draw forth such responses.One could argue that those who live under the threat of terrorist attacksexperience a kind of psychological violence. However, in the case that

psychological violence is included, the idea of non-conventional tacticsbecomes extremely broad. Accordingly, one would have to embrace anidea of terrorism that includes most any kind of threat to the political oreconomic well-being of a people. Examples could include the use of propaganda during a conflict to dishearten the opposition, or threats of

i i lik h i d i I b i i i 1990


5/38

Shawn Kaplan 5

psychological violence and the terror or anxiety experienced by merely perceiving a threat. While in the last analysis terrorism may alwaysinvolve psychological violence insofar as it elicits terror, definingterrorism as political violence by non-conventional means does notprovide the precision needed to determine the role of psychologicalviolence in terrorism.

2. Terrorism as Indiscriminate Violence that Targetsthe Innocent

In a recent essay, Shannon French argues against the association of terrorism with non-conventional tactics. 6 While I agree with her general

assertion that there is little reason to identify an underdog who uses non-conventional tactics in an asymmetric battle as a terrorist, she makes thismove so as to distinguish between legitimate fighters in asymmetric battlesand terrorists who in her eyes are simply murderers. Terrorists aremurderers for French due to the innocence of their targets. While manydefinitions of terrorism include a clause that indicate such acts alwaystarget innocent people (i.e. non-combatants who pose no immediate threatto the terrorists), French makes this the central factor for defining terroristsalong with the agent being the underdog in an asymmetric fight. 7 Following Frenchs reasoning, nation-states cannot be terrorists whendirectly targeting innocent persons; rather, they are guilty of war crimes.French uses a modified version of The Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE),similar to Walzers, to build an analogy between war crimes and

terrorism.8

Just as military personnel or policy makers are war criminals

6 Shannon E. French, Murderers, Not Warriors: The Moral Distinction BetweenTerrorists and Legitimate Fighters in Asymmetric Conflicts in J. Sterba (ed.),Terrorism and International Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp.


6/38


when their actions fail to pass the DDE because they do not sufficientlyprotect non-combatants, for French asymmetric fighters whose actions failto pass the DDE are analogously terrorists. Leaving aside the controversiessurrounding the definition of innocent persons which underlies Frenchsapproach, her equating of terrorism with murder stands as the most explicitpossible moral prejudgment of terrorism. Her approach narrowly limits

terrorism not only under the category of immorality but even under themore restrictive heading of murder. Must terrorist acts always be acts of murder? Need an action be lethal to be considered terrorism? Mustterrorism target persons, let alone innocent ones?

In the hours after the 9-11 attacks upon The United States of America,security forces were rushed to The Liberty Bell in Philadelphia with theunderstanding that terrorists might likely target property with symbolicsignificance. In addition, with the increased awareness of The UnitedStates vulnerability to terrorist attacks, amplified concern was expressedfor the security of infrastructure such as power plants, pipelines, watertreatment plants, transportation hubs and communications centers. Thestock exchanges in New York were also considered likely targets for boththeir symbolic and economic significance. If these targets had been

attacked without the loss of innocent lives, would we refuse to considerthem as potential acts of terrorism? On the domestic front, organizationslike the Ku Klux Klan have long and ugly histories of targeting property(e.g. Black Churches) as well as persons to elicit terror. It is not at allclear that the burning of Black Churches in the South should be any less of a potential terrorist act than lynching. 9 In each of the above examples, apiece of property was either a reasonably anticipated direct target of terrorist attack or the actual target of what many take to be a terroristorganization. My suggestion is that by equating terrorists with asymmetricfighters who target innocent people one places severe and perhapsunreasonable restrictions upon how one conceives of terrorism.

E i i h dl i


7/38

Shawn Kaplan 7

targets, then we can ask why the members of al-Qaeda responsible for thisattack are not terrorists on this occasion as opposed to their otheractivities. When a traditional military force targets innocent individuals, itis not claimed that they are no longer engaged in making war. Instead, asFrench and others point out, they are guilty of war crimes. In analogousfashion, a terrorist organization that carries out attacks against innocent

individuals would seemingly be guilty of terror crimes.10

By identifyingterrorism according to its innocent targets, French and others hastilydismiss the possibility of terrorism that discriminates between legitimateand illegitimate targets. 11 From the standpoint of rhetoric, the assumptionthat terrorists are necessarily indiscriminate with regard to the legitimacyof its targets reinforces the popular notion that terrorists are irrational madmen who cannot be negotiated with and cannot be taken seriously. Whileit would be an unfair rush to judgment to claim that anyone engaged inwar is an irrational mad man, it is fair to propose from the perspective of

just war theory that the indiscriminate targeting of non-combatants in waris criminal and that some criminals may appear to be mad. To completethe analogy, perhaps a definition of terrorism shouldnt paint all terroristsas targeting the innocent and should allow for a distinction between

discriminate and indiscriminate acts of terrorism. At this point, I amsuggesting that those who equate terrorists with asymmetric fighters whotarget innocents non-combatants have assumed that terrorists cannot bediscriminating with regard to the legitimacy of their targets and, thus, haveleapt to the conclusion that all terrorism is a terror crime.

3. Terrorism as Having Coercive IntentAn alternative approach to defining terrorism first proposed by Carl

Wellman complicates the issue of targets by suggesting that terrorists havein fact two targets, one direct and the other is an indirect target. 12


8/38


According to this view, the direct target receives the harm but is secondaryto the target whom the terrorist intends to influence or coerce by the act.The focus here is not upon the dual targets alone but the ulterior motive of coercion that tends to cause this complication. Neither the direct norindirect targets need to be innocent within this conception of terrorism;although the direct target often is innocent. This approach to defining

terrorism is not restrictive with regard to the terror producing tacticsinvolved in coercing the indirect target, nor does it place restrictions uponthe agent of terrorism. That is, either a nation-state, or an non-state agent,or even an individual can inflict harm upon one target in order to terrorizeand coerce a response from another. To further broaden the possibilities,Wellman suggests that a single entity can serve as both direct and indirecttarget. Thus, torture can be a form of terrorism, if the intent of the personis to coerce her victim. However, if the intent is punitive, vengeful,sadistic, or merely hateful, the attack (or torture) cannot be terrorism. Tohis credit, Wellmans approach has a number of positive aspects: it doesntmorally prejudge all terrorism; the coercive intent could be served by athreat of harm; the secondary goals of terrorists could be quite diverse; itisnt specific to either international or domestic terrorism; and, the

secondary target could conceivably be a piece of property and not aperson. Wellmans account takes a surprising turn when he claimsviolence is not essential to terrorism and, in fact, most acts of terrorismare nonviolent. 13 However, given that Wellmans examples of nonviolentterrorism involve some threat of a significant psychological harm, heseems to be working with a narrow conception of violence that only allowsfor physical violence. Regardless, it seems to me that an additionaladvantage of Wellmans approach is that he acknowledges both thephysical and psychological harms of terrorism and thus his theory isamenable to a broader conception of violence which includespsychological violence in addition to physical violence.

Cl di C d f i i i f W ll


9/38

Shawn Kaplan 9

subservience. While many (although not all) instances of domesticviolence can readily be understood as intending intimidation and coercion,the intentions behind specific acts of rape may vary significantly. Inresponse, Card argues that the institution of rape is terroristic. That is,the unwritten rules of society that allow and excuse rape as well as oftentimes blame the victim for the crime underlie a series of institutionalized

practices perpetrated by men in order to coerce women. Beyond theprovocative characterization of rape as a terrorist institution, Cardsaccount implies two interesting possibilities for terrorism itself. The firstis that a series of institutional practices can function as a kind of terrorism.The second implication is that terrorism can be carried out not only byindividuals, non-state organizations, and nation-states but by an entiregender.

While some may be uncomfortable with Cards characterization of rape as a terrorist institution and the implications that it carries forterrorism, I believe that such reactions may in part be in response to somebroader problems associated with Wellmans account of terrorism thatCard takes as her starting point. If one acknowledges Wellmans claimthat the direct and indirect targets of terrorism can be united in one person,

then any number of actions with coercive intent will be categorized asterrorism. In addition to people guilty of domestic abuse and possiblyrape, one might have to include the mugger, the armed bank robber, thekidnapper, the blackmailer, the organized crime group, and the playgroundbully as terrorists. Wellman admits many of these as examples of terrorism and even includes himself as an occasional terrorist. I mustconfess that I often engage in nonviolent terrorism myself, for I oftenthreaten to flunk any student who hands in his paper after the due date. 15 In light of the magnitude of harmed threatened in his example, Wellmansdefinition of terrorism seems to make it indistinguishable from any act of coercion. After all, doesnt every use of force to control the actions of a

l l li i i d f h


10/38


of terrorism? If terrorism has an instrumental nature, it seems problematicto assume that terrorism is solely an instrument for coercion. 16 The mattercan be further pressed by asking whether the motives of terrorists can bemixed. This of course starts to push the criticisms into deeperphilosophical waters. Can I only know terrorism by knowing the intentionof the agent? Do I need to know the intention of the person carrying out

the attack, or those who planned it, or those who funded it? Can there be acollective intention for a terrorist organization or a terrorist state? Do Ihave to rely upon the stated intentions of the putative terrorists? Can Iever know the real intent of another, or even of myself? Suffice it to saythat I am skeptical that coercive intent is a productive avenue for definingterrorism. Given the opaque intentions of the members of al-Qaedaresponsible for the 9-11 attacks, Wellmans approach leaves us in theawkward position of not being able to identify these attacks as terrorism. 17

4. Composite Approaches to Defining Terrorism

I will now consider one last approach to defining terrorism whichtends to aggregate several aspect together into a composite definition. The

following attempt to define terrorism by J. Angello Corlett is in large partderived from the definition provided by Burleigh T. Wilkins and is athoughtful representative of this composite approach. 18

Terrorism is the attempt to achieve ( or prevent ) political, social, economic,or religious, change by the actual or threatened use of violence againstother persons or other persons property; the violence (or threat thereof)

employed therein is aimed partly at destabilizing (or maintaining) anexisting social or political order, but mainly at publicizing the goals orcauses espoused by the agents or by those on whose behalf the agents act ;often, though not always, terrorism is aimed at provoking extreme counter-


11/38

Shawn Kaplan 11

measures which will win public support for the terrorists and their goals orcause.

Corlett depicts terrorism as a diverse phenomenon which either usesor threatens violence to obtain a number of possible goals. There is muchto praise in Corletts definition. He has taken great care to: not morallyprejudge terrorism, allow for a wide range of terrorist agents, allow forpersons or property to be the target of terrorist attacks, and toacknowledgeat least to a limited degreethe instrumental character of terrorism. At the same time, however, Corletts composite definitionleaves one wondering what are the core elements that establish the familyresemblance between the various types of terrorisma problem commonto such composite approaches. His definition seems to concentrate on

excluding inessential attributes rather than highlighting how terrorism isdistinct from other forms of actual or threatened political violence. Corlettargues that both Wilkins and his own definition of terrorism best capturewhat is essential to terrorism insofar as terrorism need not be [actually]violentnor must it target the innocentnor must terrorism beunrestrained. 19 Even if these claims are stated in positive terms, it is notobvious that every threatened or actual act of violence that aims at eitherachieving or preventing change in the given order as well as possiblyaiming to publicize the agents cause is an act of terrorism.

Let us take a case where one party is apparently violating theconditions of a peace treaty. It may not be unreasonable for the offendedparty to threaten the accused violator with violence in the hope that theywill change their current policies and actions. Furthermore, those

threatening violence may hope that such threats will cause theinternational community to pay attention to their claims and hopefullyapply pressure to the offending party so as to avoid a crisis. Such a casefits neatly within Corletts definition of terrorism and yet is rather distantfrom our common intuitions of a terrorist act. After all, cant there be a


12/38


party necessarily a victim of terrorism? 20 Given Corletts definition, onemight even categorize every state that threatens any violence towards itscitizens in order to preserve lawfulness as a terrorist state. Unlike thetotalitarian state that uses and threatens violence on a grand scale and witha large degree of arbitrariness, the state that finds certain criminal offencespunishable by caning or capital punishment through fair legal procedures

fails to terrorize its general public.21

In all of the counter instances to Corletts definition of terrorismprovided above, there is one common complaint. Doesnt terrorismrequire the use of terror, extreme fear or anxiety in the attempt toaccomplish its ends? Using violence or the threat thereof in order topreserve a treaty, or as leverage in negotiation (especially for peace), or inmaintaining a lawful society needs to be distinguished, by in large, fromterrorism as distinct forms of actual or threatened political violence.While Corletts composite approach to defining terrorism may contributeto his failure to elucidate what core attributes differentiate terrorism fromother forms of political violence, the hesitancy to focus upon terrorismsinstrumental use of terror is relatively widespread.

III. The Instrument of Terror (Four Challenges)

1) The Intent to Terrorize

I believe that much of the resistance to including terror within thedefinition of terrorism comes from four concerns. On the one hand,theorists often reduce the issue to a matter of the terrorists intentions.Even if one brackets the general problem of knowing anothers intentions,it is difficult to determine whether the motives of terrorists are primarilyaimed at eliciting terror or at some other end. As my comments regardingWellmans definition indicate, I too am skeptical of basing a definition of


13/38

Shawn Kaplan 13

problematic. For example, it seems reasonable to assume that manysoldiers in active combat experience terror as a consequence of theiropponents violent or threatening actions. Would we have to categorize allwar as fundamentally terroristic? This absurdity results not fromexamining the consequences of violent or threatening actions but failing todistinguish between primary and secondary effects. While the soldier

experiences terror in combat, the other side is not necessarily using terrorin itself as the primary instrument for attaining victory or weakening itsopponent. Instead, more often, terror is a natural consequence of wartimeexperiences while functioning as a secondary consequence of the moreimmediate strategic aims. One should at the same time recognize that atypical military victory is not the result of an extermination of theopposition but their being weakened and intimidated to the extent that theysurrender. Accordingly, those who plan and carry out military strategymay wish to maximize both the direct physical harms inflicted as well asthe coercive secondary intimidation. So long as the terror produced is asecondary effect of the attack it shouldnt be viewed as terrorism.However, if the tactic only contributes indirectly to the military aims bythe terror it elicits, then the military personnel involved can be fairly

accused of terrorism. Examples that cross this line include the massmurder of captured combatants or the desecration of the oppositions dead.Such actions elicit terror as a primary consequence and thus can bedistinguished from the typical terror experienced by soldiers in wartime.While a debate can emerge as to what actual role or function terror isplaying (either as a primary or secondary consequence) in a particularcase, my initial point is that this is the more fruitful debate as opposed toconsidering the intention of the agent. 22

There are advantages to asking whether an act or threat of violenceproduces a terror which functions in an instrumental fashion, as opposed toasking whether the agents held terror as their primary intention. As Card

i i b h b d i f h


14/38


Afghanistan and Iraq, the passing of The Patriot Act, and a damagedpublic perception of the U.S. government in the international community(a tertiary effect). Whether these secondary and tertiary effects wereintended by the terrorists is not a central factor for categorizing the actionsas terrorism. One must initially ask whether terror was elicited by an actor threat of violence and whether this terror functioned as an instrument

for producing further effects (intended or not).23

3) The Failure to Elicit Terror

This leads directly to another of the complaints raised against adefinition of terrorism that focuses upon its instrumental use of terror.What if an attempted act of terrorism fails to elicit terror? Does suchfailure make the agent innocent of terrorism? There are two immediatereasons why a putative act of terrorism may not elicit terror. In the firstplace, the violent act could either be botched or thwarted by authorities. Insuch situations, a case for attempted terrorism or a conspiracy to committerrorism would need to be made in the courtsin analogous fashion tocharges of attempted murder or conspiracy to commit murder. Secondly,

what if a putative act or terrorism fails to draw public attention or is notsignificant enough in its destructive scope to elicit terror? A recentexample that took place in New York City can illustrate the vagueness of the situation. In the early morning hours of May 5, 2005, two crudehomemade explosives were detonated in front of a midtown officebuilding that houses the British Consulate. 24 The next day parliamentaryelections were being held in England. While there was property damageand shrapnel as far as a block away, no people were physically harmed.Were those responsible attempting to elicit fear so as to send a messageto voters in England? To make the case that this was an attempted act of terrorism is difficult due to its ineffectiveness in eliciting fear. Certainly,


15/38

Shawn Kaplan 15

instances of ineffective violence. The non-pharmacology student whoheavily drugs my coffee may be attempting to murder me but may nothave the knowledge or experience to be effective. In a legal context, onemay not be able to charge the student with attempted murder but it isentirely conceivable that this is what occurred. Likewise in the case of those who set off the explosives in front of the British Consulate, it is

conceivable that it was an attempted act of terrorism although it may provedifficult to bring such charges against them due to their ineffectiveness ineliciting terror. At bottom, a failure to elicit instrumental terror bringsabout the same sorts of problems of categorization as do other varieties of failed violence. Such difficulties are not reason alone for dismissing adefinition of terrorism that focuses upon its instrumental use of terror nordo these problems certainly make the intentions of terrorists a morereliable avenue for defining terrorism and properly identifying specificacts as terrorism.

4. What Kind of Terror Underlies Terrorism?

One last potential complaint against a definition of terrorism that

concentrates upon the instrumental use of terror, fear, or anxiety concernsthe type and or degree of terror, fear, or anxiety involved. To illustrate thecomplaint, lets take the example of the playground bully. Bullies use andthreaten violence to elicit fear from their targets as an instrument forgaining a desired end, e.g. lunch money or a sense of power over others.While the bully is a menace to the other children on the playground, thetitle of terrorist doesnt seem fitting. It is tempting to draw the linebetween a bully and a terrorist according to the degree or intensity of fearelicited. Due to the subjective variations in the experience of fear orterror, this is a temptation to be avoided. Differences in bravery (orfoolhardiness) between individuals makes such a standard less than useful.


16/38


which we would still not generally considered terrorism, e.g. the armedrobber who threatens your money or your life or the kidnapper. Whilethe armed robber or kidnapper threatens a great enough harm, it is a onetime threat to either adopt the undesired option of handing over property orsuffer the threatened harm, here and now. A terrorist act, on the otherhand, always carries with it either an explicit or implicit threat of a

separate act of future violence. The person who threatens your money oryour life uses terror or fear as an instrument but in an operationallydifferent way than the terrorist insofar as it is an immediate threat thatlacks a future orientation. Even though the kidnappers threat has somegreater future orientation, it remains a single act of coercion much like thearmed robbery that lacks the threat of a separate act of future violence.Whether one considers the systematic and repeated taking of hostages,suicide bombings, car bombings, or the disappearance of the opponentsto a terrorist state, each instance carries a future oriented threat. Eitherpresent and future demands are met or more hostages will be taken andkilled, or more bombings will occur, or more of the vocal opposition willdisappear in the future. 25 Even when demands are not explicitly made(as in the case of the 9-11 attacks), there is an implicit threat of additional

attacks in the future. Without a perceived threat of future violenceexisting, the 9-11 attacks would have been a horrendous act of massmurder but would not have been an act of terrorism. 26 In such an instance,terror or fear would not be cultivated as an instrumentthough horrorwould still be an expected response.

IV. Proposed Definition of TerrorismBased upon the critical examination of four current approaches to

defining terrorism carried out in this essay, I believe the followingdefinition has some strong advantages.


17/38

Shawn Kaplan 17

rights and that functions as an instrument to obtain further ends. Thisinstrumentality relies upon either an explicit or implicit threat of separateacts of future violence.

In the first place, my proposed definition of terrorism makes it distinctfrom other forms of political violence insofar as terrorism isnt linked tothe unconventional tactics of an underdog in an asymmetric battle. Thus,not every insurgency or group using guerilla warfare tactics will beconsidered terrorists. As a matter of fact, the proposed definition leavesboth the agency and the specific tactics of terrorism quite open. Theinstrument of terror can be employed by states, non-governmentorganizations, local or international collectives, as well as by individuals.The possible tactics used by terrorists are innumerable so long as they can

elicit terror regarding the security of peoples lives or their fundamentalrights.The proposed definition avoids a strong moral prejudgment of

terrorism and its agents by not limiting the targets of terrorism toinnocent non-combatants. As a result, two important advantages areassociated with this definition. First, attacks or threats to either propertyor military personnel are not automatically ruled out as putative terroristacts, e.g. the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in 2000. Second, the definitiondoes not beg the moral question of possible justification. Given theopenness of the definition on the morality of terrorism, arguments must beprovided for why any individual act of terrorism, or any general type of terrorism, is either justified or not.

By emphasizing within the definition the instrumental role of terror,

the magnitude of harm inflicted or threatened, as well as the futureorientation of terrorist violence and threats, the proposal provides a corethat is common to all acts of terrorism that composite definitions oftenlack. At the same time, terrorism as defined here remains distinct fromother coercive acts and threats of violence, e.g. armed robbery. By setting


18/38


the current order of things (e.g. the current social, political, economic, orreligious order), the instrument of terror could be aimed at such alternativeends as: publicizing the terrorists cause, punishing the targets of terrorism, expressing hatred towards the targets, or provoking an extreme(and perhaps unjust) response to the attacks. While some of these goalsare directly political in nature, terrorism as conceived in the proposed

definition is not limited to a strictly political notion of terrorism. Eventhough most people have political terrorism in mind when they speak of terrorism, recognizing the instrumental quality of terror in thephenomenon opens up a wider range of possible contexts for terroristactions and agentsboth political and nonpolitical. Herein lies anotheradvantage of the proposed definition regarding the question of terrorismseffectiveness. If the intended aim of terrorism is not fixed by thedefinition, then one cannot simply assume that terrorism is never effectivein obtaining its ends. Thus, those who dismissively claim that terrorismcan never be justified on consequentialist grounds must pause to conceiveof a wider range of possible goals for terrorism than is typically allowedit.27 However, any meaningful evaluation of terrorism (whether onconsequentialist or other grounds) can only occur if this broad

phenomenon is analyzed into more discreet types.

V. Typology

The proposed definitions breadth regarding terrorist agents, targets,goals, as well as the degrees of force employed and the harms inflicted by

terrorists provides the basis for a typological analysis carried out on manylevels. 28 There are several axes by which one could carry out a typological

27 Michael Walzer falls into this camp insofar as he seems to assume that terrorismmust be aiming at national liberation, if it is ever to be excusable. While he may


19/38

Shawn Kaplan 19

analysis of terrorism. For example, a typology could draw distinctionsthat would be relevant for considering the strategic success of terrorism, orfor considering the variety of political and non-political goals terroristsmay aim at, or for coming to an understanding of the various possiblecauses of terrorism, etc. As my concern from the beginning has been tolay the groundwork for more concrete and meaningful normative

evaluations of terrorist acts or types of terrorism, the divisions of mytypology will highlight what I take to be the most salient issues for suchevaluations. While the elucidation of principles whereby terrorism may benormatively evaluated is beyond the scope of this paper, I hope to bringforth a framework whereby we can recognize the key typological orformal variables of terrorism (as opposed to circumstantial variables) thatany concrete evaluation of terrorist acts would need to take underconsideration.

The first subsection of the typology is dedicated to the questions of whether terrorists can ever, or do actually, discriminate between legitimateand illegitimate targets. I will defend the possibility of discriminateterrorism insofar as it might either target military personnel, societalinfrastructure, symbolically valued property, or as it might consist mainly

as a threat of future violence. While the distinction between discriminateand indiscriminate types of terrorism is the basis for conceiving of terror crimes in analogy to war crimes, not ever indiscriminate act of terrorism isautomatically a terror crime nor is every discriminate act of terrorismsomehow justified or excusable. Still, indiscriminate acts of terrorism willnecessarily face greater challenges with regard to a normative justification.Similarly, when the focus shifts in the second subsection to whether or notlethal force is employed by a terrorist, the moral salience of the degree of force employed is quite evident. Regardless of what principle(s) of normative evaluation one adopts, the use of lethal force by terrorists will


20/38


raise the bar for justification. The last subsection of the typologyexamines two distinct divisions regarding the types of agents as well as thetypes of contexts for the deployment of terrorism. The normative salienceof whether the act of terrorism is carried out by a state or nonstate agent orwhether it is carried our domestically or internationally is only indirect .The generally recognized authority of a state has no direct bearing upon

whether its terrorist actions are justifiable or excusable. Rather, bycategorizing an act as either state or nonstate terrorism the analysis of thecircumstantial variables salient for a normative evaluation gains greaterfocus. For example, we tend to evaluate the legitimacy, rights, andresponsibilities of state and non-state agents differently. Likewise, thedivision between domestic and international terrorism has no direct

justificatory salience; however, a state has different responsibilities to itsown citizens than it does to other states, or to international collectives.

1. Targets

Where one makes the first division in a typology of terrorism issomewhat arbitrary. I will begin with the issue of targets, since this is

where my approach differs from many of the alternative accounts of terrorism. As I have already discussed, several theorists include withintheir definition of terrorism the criterion that innocent noncombatantsmust be the target of such attacks. 29 While it must be admitted that thevast majority of examples of terrorism do in fact target those who are not adirect threat to the terrorist agents, there are actual examples of terroristacts that are more discriminate in regard to targeting as well as a widerange of conceivable acts of discriminate terrorism.

More needs to be said first by what it means to be discriminating withregard to targets. First off, I am referring to the sense of discriminatingbetween legitimate and illegitimate targets and not the broader distinction


21/38

Shawn Kaplan 21

ordinary citizens of any nation because of their supposed support for theircorrupt or oppressive government is to make the attackers judge and juryof a moral court that never hears witnesses and is not in the leastconcerned with bringing the truth to light. Directly targeting ordinarycitizens in response to a perceived moral culpability never serves justice.There are citizens outside of the military who because of their role insociety pose some direct threat to the opposition, e.g. those citizensworking in munitions factories or politicians actively supporting anoppressive or belligerent policy, etc. While these may be legitimatetargets in any conflict, a discriminate attack doesnt only concern thosedirectly targeted but those who must be protected from collateraldamage. 30 In this, I agree with Walzers assessment that it is not sufficientfor the foreseeable, secondary harm to innocents to be merely unintendedbut there must be an active attempt to protect the lives of those who arenot a direct threat even at the risk to oneself or to ones own side of theconflict. 31 While one might argue over how much risk-taking is requiredto protect those who pose no direct threat to your side, it will be readilyacknowledged by most that the protection of noncombatants is a worthyend to be pursued.

What is less readily acknowledged is that terrorists ever do, or could,actively protect the lives of those who are not a direct threat to themselveswhile simultaneously eliciting terror as an instrument. In the first place,based upon the fact that terrorists do so often directly targetnoncombatants, it seems doubtful whether they view the protection of noncombatants as a valuable goal. Yet, this fact only affirms that the vastmajority of actual terrorist acts fall under the indiscriminate category.This can be partly explained by the apparent fact that violenceindiscriminately directed and threatened towards noncombatants producesa more widespread and heightened sense of terror or fear. After all, since


22/38


from the victims standpoint the targeting appears so random, everyindividual realizes that she could have been the victim. The morediscriminate the threat or use of violence is, the more circumscribed theterror elicited and the greater the chance that it will be ineffective ineliciting terror at all. To reinforce the existence of discriminate terrorism,I will examine examples where instrumental terror has been elicited fromthe use or threat of violence against human life and fundamental rights andthat targets either: military personnel, government facilities, societalinfrastructure, or symbolic property.

There have been notable examples of military personnel beingattacked in recent years by organizations widely held to be terrorist innature. I will use as examples the attack upon the USS Cole in 2000 andthe 1983 suicide bombing of the US marine barracks in Lebanon toillustrate some of the complexities of such cases. While the cases havemuch in common, there are some significant difference in the context of the attacks. The similarities are mainly related to the method of theattacks. In the first instance, reputed members of al Qaeda maneuvered asmall vessel next to the Cole while it was refueling in the Port of Aden,Yemen. The vessel was loaded with explosives which were set off in

close proximity to the Cole, killing 17 sailors and inflicting significantdamage to the ship. In 1983, two simultaneous attacks upon US andFrench military personnel took place in Beirut. Two trucks heavily armedwith explosives were driven by members of Islamic Jihad into the USmarine barracks and the French military post killing 241 US marines and58 French troops respectively. Both the US and French forces were inLebanon on a peacekeeping mission in the hope that negotiations wouldlead both Syria and Israel to withdraw their troops. In the context of theongoing war in Lebanon, Islamic Jihad (who claimed responsibility) aswell as the nations who reportedly supported their activities (Syria andIran) had a strong military interest in forcing the western troops to

i hd Th i id k b bi i l d k b


23/38

Shawn Kaplan 23

after the bombing can be interpreted as not being a direct response toterror elicited from the attack and the implicit threat of future violence butalong consequentialist reasoning. The increased casualties to US marinesmay have simply made the peacekeeping mission too costly and perhapsimpossible to carry out with the 1,200 marines deployed on the ground inLebanon. While President Reagan identified the attackers as terrorists, heprovides a similar consequentialist rationale for the US withdrawal. "Oncethe terrorist attacks started there was no way that we could reallycontribute to the original mission by staying there as a target justbunkering down and waiting for further attacks. 32 Reagans statementdoes not of course rule out the possibility that the bombing did elicit terroras an instrument for forcing the US out of Lebanon. My point is not todebate what the true reasons were for the US withdrawal so as to be ableto categorize the attacks in retrospect. Rather, it is important to recognizethat the more an attack using unconventional tactics fits within an ongoingmilitary struggle and contributes directly to the clearly defined objectivesof the struggle through the damage it inflicts (and not through the fear itelicits) the less likely it is an act of terrorism. 33 The key issue here iswhether the damage inflicted by unconventional tactics contribute directly

to the aim of military victory or whether such tactics contribute indirectly by eliciting terror.In contrast, the Cole was on normal patrol in the area and not part of

an ongoing military operation. The damage inflicted by the suicidebombers to the Cole and its sailors did not contribute in any direct way toclear-cut military objectives, e.g. the expulsion of US forces from theSaudi Peninsula. Given that the attackers discriminated in choosing amilitary target, it is likely that terror was not elicited on a wide scaleamong US citizens. However, following the seemingly unprovoked attack upon a naval vessel, fears and anxieties were no doubt heightened amongmilitary personnel and those people responsible for their deployment.E if i h i h l Q d k h C l f


24/38


an ongoing operation that included the previous bombings of the USembassies in Kenya and Tanzania as well as the subsequent 9-11 attacks, itis hard to conceive of the harms inflicted by these attacks as directlycontributing to an al Qaeda victory (military or other) without the use of terror as an instrument. Interestingly though, these three attacks carriedout by al Qaeda demonstrate three degrees of discrimination regardingtargets. While the Cole attack targeted only military personnel and the 9-11 attack upon The World Trade Center were completely indiscriminate,the bombing of embassies is a more vague issue. 34

Embassies are now a long standing target of terrorist groups forseveral reasons. As a government installation on foreign soil, embassiesare more vulnerable to attack; they symbolically and literally represent thatgovernment; they tend to hold military personnel; and they are known tobe the centers for intelligence agencies and their spies. Many of thesereasons help to support the view that embassies are a legitimate target.However, embassies also have civilian support staffs made up of citizensof both the host nation and the represented nation. In addition, most of theofficials within an embassy are there for diplomatic purposes and pose nodirect threat to those who carry out the attack. 35 Thus, to be categorized as

a discriminate attack, a case must be made that the activities of theembassy constitute a direct threat to the terrorist agents. Even if such acase were successfully made, the attack would still have to protect citizensof the embassys host nation. As a case in point, the fact that the bombingof the US embassy in Tanzania killed only citizens of the host nation is aclear indication that those who carried out the attack did not make anactive attempt to protect Tanzanian citizens who posed them no directthreat. In contrast, the putative terrorist attack upon the British consulatein New York referred to earlier took significant measures to protectinnocent US citizens by setting off the explosives at 3:00AM and usingshort fuses so as to lessen the possibility that anybody would unexpectedly

i f h l i Whil h h i f l i


25/38

Shawn Kaplan 25

increased the possibility of them being caught. This example illustrateshow the greater the efforts to be discriminate in an attack, the greaterlikelihood that it will fail to elicit a significant degree of terror.Regardless, this does not exclude the possibility of terrorists beingdiscriminate regarding targets; it only shows the challenges of being adiscriminate and effective terrorist at the same time.

This is not a challenge novel to terrorism however. Any traditionalmilitary operation faces significant challenges when attempting to carryingout discriminate attacks due to several factors, e.g., the prevalence of guerilla warfare tactics, the use of long-range weapons, the purposiveentrenchment of military targets near non-combatants, and thequestionable reliability of intelligence resources. Even while one canrecognize these challenges, it would be a leap to conclude that traditional

military operations are either incapable of being discriminate or that theyare excused from meeting such challenges due to the difficulties. Instead,it should be acknowledged that the failure to take measures to protectthose who are not a direct threat is to commit a war crime. 36 It is mycontention that to analogously elicit terror by either directly targetingordinary citizens or not taking active measures to protect those who are not

a direct threat is to commit a terror crime. By distinguishing betweenwar crimes and terror crimes, I am not suggesting a distinction in theseverity of the crimes. Rather, the severity of the crime should be linkedto the severity of the harms committed and the culpability involved. Todistinguish between these two types of criminal acts is to draw adistinction between two instrumental forms of violenceone whichattempts to gain its ends directly through the damage it inflicts and theother indirectly through the terror it elicits.

The analogy between war crimes and terror crimes relies upon ourability to draw a distinction between discriminate and indiscriminate actsof terrorism. While I will further address occasions that can be

i bl i d di i i f i I fi


26/38


exercised. This seems to simply be a fact of human psychology.37

Thus,in the case of terrorism, there is a strong impulse to put aside questions of legitimate targets in favor of effectively eliciting terror. In the case of traditional military force, there is a similar impulse to bracket questions of discrimination but this is usually based upon an analysis of consequences,e.g. in cases of supreme emergency, or under an ideology of victory atany cost, or from a desire to end the fighting sooner, etc. While a terroristcan come to a similar conclusion from comparing the consequences forthemselves of an indiscriminate attack (greater degree of terror produced)versus a discriminate attacked (increased risk to personal safety and tomission success), there is the additional factor related to the humanpsychology of fear that has no analog for traditional military force.

The second cautionary comment regarding the analogy has to do with

the place of jus in bellum considerations within just war theory as a whole.Discriminating between legitimate and illegitimate targets is a question of whether the general strategies and particular actions carried out within aconflict are just. In applying such a notion to terrorism, it should not beforgotten that traditionally such questions are secondary to whether theresort to military force is justified in the first place by some kind of just

cause. For example, in Aquinas original expression of the DDE, thesecondary and unintended effect of killing a person is not excusable unlessthe just cause of self-defense is already satisfied. 38 What might constitutea just cause for resorting to terrorism is far beyond the scope of thistypology. However, it would be misleading to believe that a discriminateterrorist attack is a justified one; it is simply a type of terrorism that has agreater chance of being justifiable. On the other hand, an indiscriminateterrorist attack is criminal in an analogous sense to a war crime and, thus,most probably can never be justified or excused. 39

37 See Yael Danieli, Brian Engdahl, and William E. Schlenger, The Psychosocial


27/38

Shawn Kaplan 27

At this point, I would like to explore the possibilities of discriminateterrorism beyond the cases where it targets military personnel orgovernment facilities. While many of the following proposed examples of discriminate terrorism are not actual historical cases, they both satisfy thedefinition of terrorism proposed earlier in this essay and have beenconsidered real threats by law enforcement agencies. Threats or acts of violence targeting property can elicit terror, fear, or anxiety regarding thesecurity of human life or fundamental rights and that functions as aninstrument to obtain further ends. Any terrorist attack upon propertywould be a discriminate one if the violence only damaged the property anddid not physically harm any person. Terrorist threats, by in large, also failto produce physical harms to persons and thus would also qualify asdiscriminate. It is important to remember in this context that even a

discriminate attack upon property doesnt imply that the victims deserve tohave their property destroyed and to experience fear and terror regardingtheir fundamental safety, nor does it imply that the terrorists are justified.To repeat the just offered warning, a discriminate use of terrorism does notentail the terrorists having a just cause.

Terrorist attacks upon property can roughly be divided between those

aimed at disrupting or destroying infrastructure and those aimed atproperty imbued with symbolic value; although, these may not bemutually exclusive. In the first instance, attacks that disrupt or destroyinfrastructure such as the power grid, communications networks, andtransportation networks can not only paralyze a society for a period of time but send the population into a panic without necessarily harminganyone physically. While destroying the property required for providing asocietys basic services without physically harming those persons whowork at such locations is a severe challenge, it is not an impossibility. Afocused use of destructive violence at times when few people are presentand with warning can still elicit terror both because of the direct effects as

ll h i li i h f f d h l di i i k


28/38


agencies.41

For example, in 1997 The National Security Agency (NSA)demonstrated that hackers could easily disrupt national security systemsusing only their wits and publicly available programming tools found onthe web. 42 The simple fact appears to be that the community of hackershas little desire to terrorize the general public by disrupting theinfrastructure of society and, at the same time, the population of terroristsseemingly have few hackers in their numbers. Either situation couldchange; however, given the history of terrorist networks having theresources and the will to technically train their members to carry outmissions, the second may be more likely.

A discriminate attack upon symbolically valued property is also apossibility. Whether a symbol of national strength or national identity, alandmark, a house of worship, or a religiously significant location is

targeted, it is possible to elicit fear and terror as an instrument withoutinflicting casualties or denying fundamental rights. The alleged terroristplot to destroy the Brooklyn Bridge is an example of a group targetingproperty largely for its symbolic value. 43 If carried out in the middle of thenight or with sufficient warning, an attack upon the Brooklyn Bridge couldstill elicit fear or terror because of its place as an image of New York, its

history, and its strength. In addition to the fear produced by the reasonablequestions of what if there was no warning? or what if it were duringrush hour?, etc., destruction of such a target can also inspire fears rootedin its symbolic relevance, e.g., if terrorists can destroy something so rock solid and part of the historical and daily fabric of the city, what is safe?.Accordingly, the targeting of symbolically valued property can greatlyamplify the sense of vulnerability and terror.

41 Many of the so-called cases of cyberterrorism appear more like acts of civildisobedience as people have bombarded the email or web servers of organizations


29/38

Shawn Kaplan 29

Lastly on the topic of discriminate terrorism, the definition putforward in the previous section begins by claiming that terrorism is eitheran act or threat of violence. Threats of violence by themselves aregenerally discriminate insofar as they actually inflict no physical harm.However, by themselves, threats of violence will eventually lose theircapacity to elicit terror unless they are backed up by either actual violenceor at least a show of force. A public show of force can carry with it animplicit threat or reinforce an explicit threat already made. If we take anarrow view of the ongoing conflict between India and Pakistan, thetesting of nuclear weapons by both sides constituted a show of force whichcarried a reciprocal threat to each nation. Threats of nuclear annihilation,even when backed by such a show of force, can only terrorize the targetednation and the broader global community so long as the threat is believed

to be a real and present danger. This is true of the implicit threat of futureviolence that all terrorism relies upon for it effectiveness. Thus, terroristthreats will tend to be followed by demonstrations of force and thewillingness to use it. Any prolonged use of terrorism appears to require anescalation from threats, to demonstrations of force, to acts of violence, toacts of greater and greater destruction and horror. Since a single act of

terrorist violence will eventually fade from the publics mind aftersufficient time, the effectiveness of a campaign of terrorism requiresrepetition. As the experience of repeated terrorist attacks becomesnormalized to a society, pressure is felt by terrorists to be less and lessdiscriminate in their attacks.

2. Degree of Force

Until this point in the typology, we have found that while thepossibility of discriminate terrorism exists and actual examples can befound, the prolonged use of terrorism tends to make these discriminate


30/38


fall the occasions when acts of violence are directed at either militarypersonnel or other citizens who pose a direct threat to the terrorists inorder to elicit an instrumental terror or fear. Furthermore, such attackswould have to protect those who are not a direct threat to the terrorists.When military personnel are targeted, the instrument of terror canconceivably aim at: undermining military effectiveness, evoking anextreme and transparently unjust response, publicizing the groupsmessage, creating a sense of empowerment for all who oppose thegovernment of that military organization, coercing a change in policy (e.g.withdrawal of troops), etc. However, the more the damage directlyinflicted by the attack to military personnel directly contributes to a clearlyrecognized military objective/victory, the less easily such attacks can becategorized as terrorism at all.

It is important to note a significant difference between the lethal andnon-lethal variants of discriminate terrorism. There is an additionalburden of proof when using lethal force to show that the target is somehowtruly a direct threat. When targeting infrastructure, or symbolic property,or using threats and demonstrations of force to elicit terror, there are nopeople who are the direct target and thus little need to demonstrate the

target to be a direct threat. Instead, the burden is to show that enoughactive care has been taken to protect those in proximity to the targetedproperty or to the show of force.

Indiscriminate terrorist attacks can also be divided according towhether lethal force is used or not. While the examples of lethal,indiscriminate terrorism abound, there are some possibilities that falloutside of what normally comes to mind and which deserve our attention.The standard image of such lethal terror crimes is of some explosivedevice being delivered to unsuspecting noncombatants or being set off in apublic space. However, sniper attacks upon abortion doctors, KKKlynchings, mass executions (e.g., as carried out by totalitarian regimes),

d i i ll b i d k h


31/38

Shawn Kaplan 31

On the side of non-lethal, indiscriminate terrorism, one can imaginethe use of non-lethal biological agents being used against a generalpopulation. However, in most cases, it is the fundamental rights of thevictims which are directly targetedalthough the threat of lethal force isoften present. The most common examples are various sorts of abductions, either the taking of hostages and hijackings by non-stategroups or the unlawful imprisonment of the opponents of a state. 45 While the rights to free movement and due process are directly attacked insuch abductions, in both contexts the threat of lethal force plays animportant role in generating and maintaining a sufficient degree of terrorto serve a terrorist. Closely related is the torture of those people abductedas another all too common non-lethal form of indiscriminate terrorism.While the terror elicited within the tortured person is often used to gain

information (reliable or not) or a signature upon a confession, the imagesof the tortured have proven useful in generating a more wide-spread senseof fear and terror.

Again however, there are several variants of this type of terrorism thatmay escape what normally comes to mind. Just as in the case of non-lethal, discriminate terrorism, property can be the direct target of non-

lethal, indiscriminate terrorism. In the first case, if an attack upon ansocietys infrastructure doesnt take sufficient care to protect ordinarycitizens, then such an attack would of course be indiscriminate and it isonly a question as to whether the force of the attack is lethal or not. Onecan easily conceive of non-lethal harms resulting from the environmentalfallout of attacks upon power plants, oil refineries, water treatmentfacilities, chemical plants, etc. Secondly, it is conceivable that a non-lethal attack upon symbolically valued property could so significantlyimpinge upon the fundamental rights of individuals that it would becategorized as indiscriminate. For example, the systematic burning of black churches in southern states could be interpreted as violating thef d l i h f hi d bli bl I ddi i


32/38


approaches of Carl Wellman and Claudia Card who insist that terrorismalways aims at coercion, the psychologically diverse and complicatedmotivations for domestic abuse (as well as for torture more generally)neednt rule out any cases as examples of terrorism so long as theinstrument of terror is elicited for some further ends.

3. Agents and Context of DeploymentThe brief survey of examples of lethal and non-lethal types of

terrorism presented in the previous section is not in any way intended to bean exhaustive list. Rather, the examples have been chosen to illustrate notonly these four types but the diversity within them regarding the agentswho commit these acts as well as the contexts in which their terrorism is

deployed (domestic vs. international). Thus, the last two divisions withinthis typology will be according to the agency and the context whereterrorist acts are deployed. As stated previously, the questions of agencyand contexts do not carry direct moral weight. It makes no immediatemoral difference whether terrorism is committed by an individual, a non-state collective, a state, or a collective of states. In contrast to the common

contention that only states have the authority to declare war, states do notenjoy a privileged authority to carry out acts of terrorism. Similarly, itmakes no direct moral difference whether terrorists deploy their efforts ata domestic target or one abroad. In contrast, it is of direct moral saliencewhether an act of terrorism is discriminate or not and whether the forceapplied is lethal or not. On these points, I will say more in the conclusion.

While I maintain the conventional terms of state and non-stateterrorism to distinguish between the two types of terrorist agents, I do so inan expanded sense of both terms. While non-state terrorists generally referto either international terrorist organizations or domestic revolutionarygroups, we have seen that collectives like the KKK and organized crime


33/38

Shawn Kaplan 33

attempting to terrorize one another (e.g. India and Pakistan) as well asstates terrorizing non-citizens (potential examples include the unlawfuldetention and torture of foreign nationals or some of Israels tactics usedagainst the Palestinians). State terrorism can also be expanded to includethose actions carried out, or threats offered, by a collection of states thatelicit the instrument of terror for their collective goals.

The existence of state sponsored terrorism potentially complicates thistypological division. Accusations of state sponsorship range from a nationstate providing a safe-haven for terrorists, or not actively supporting thewar on terror, to providing financial support for terrorists and even usingterrorist organizations to unofficially carry out foreign or domestic policy.In the case of the Talibans relationship to al Qaeda, one can argue that theterrorist organization actually sponsored the governments existence.

There is clearly a wide range in the degree of entanglement betweenterrorists and their state sponsors. It would be foolish to claim that aterrorist event must either have state or non-state agency by ignoring statesponsorship. At the same time, the typological distinction has merits fromthe standpoint of a concrete normative evaluation which would initiallyhave to deal with the terrorists and their state sponsors individually. It isfair to assume that the criteria for a terrorist groups justification will oftenbe distinct from a states sponsorship of their activities. For example, arevolutionary group that resorts to terrorism against its home governmentwould have to meet a burden of justification that would differ from thethird party state who sponsors their activities. The state sponsor must be

judged according to the rights and responsibilities of states and thesponsored must be judged according to the rights and responsibilities of non-state agents. I would contend that when terrorists and state sponsorsare so intertwined that the normative evaluation of each is based uponidentical criteria, we are really considering a case of state terrorism.

The fundamental difference between the expanded notions of stated i i h i h d ll i


34/38


being legitimate authority. While the presumed legitimacy of state agentsand illegitimacy of non-state agents is greatly a matter of perception, theseare significant perceptions that can be critically examined by including thedichotomy of state vs. non-state agency within the typology. Furthermore,as suggested in the previous discussion of state sponsored terrorism,different questions will need to be asked concerning the circumstantialvariables depending upon whether the agent is a state or not. For example,regarding cases of state terrorism, one would need to ask: Is the instrumentof terror being used domestically to suppress a portion of the population?Does this state maintain sufficient popular support at home to beconsidered legitimate? Is the instrument of terror being used by the stateto promote imperialist goals abroad or to thwart the terrorism carried outby others? In contrast, regarding cases of non-state terrorism, one would

need to ask: What is the group or individual attempting to either subvert orpreserve? Are they victims of grave human rights violations, or amongthose who inflict such harms, or both? If it is a revolutionary group, dothey enjoy popular support among their fellow citizens? I am notsuggesting that any of these questions can function as a litmus test for

justifying terrorism. Rather, given the different aims and methods of stateand non-state terrorists as well as the differences in the rights andresponsibilities of state and non-state agents, a concrete analysis of

justification will vary in its direction based upon the question of agency.Once again, this does not mean that either state or non-state terrorismholds any advantage with regard to possible justification, only that some of the variables that need to be considered for each type will differ.

By further dividing state and non-state types of terrorism according tothe contexts of domestic and international deployment, the typologyattains a set of descriptive categories that avoids the presumption that stateterrorism always aims to repress a smaller or weaker population or thatnon-state terrorism always aims to disrupt the status quo supported byh i P i l i h d d i d i


35/38

Shawn Kaplan 35

perhaps even stronger than themselves in power. Wilkinson and Schultzalso both divide non-state terrorism into revolutionary and sub-revolutionary terrorism. While these categories differ in the magnitude of the political and cultural changes the terrorist aim at, they both assume thatall terrorism not carried out by the state is carried out against the state orsome more established power. However, in the case of the householdterrorist who commits domestic abuse, the dynamic is far from a bottomup disruption or revolution but an oppression of the physically andsometimes economically weaker. In addition, competing revolutionarygroups can mutually resort to using the instrument of terror against eachother. Given the instrumental nature of terrorism that has been argued forhere, it is appropriate that the last two divisions of the typology avoidimposing specific sorts of ends upon the agents of terrorism.

VI. Concluding Comments

In all, the proposed typology has sixteen different categories. 49 Thefour divisions that produce the sixteen permutations parse the broadphenomenon of terrorism according to its: targets, degrees of force, agents,

and contexts of deployment. I have suggested from the beginning of thispaper that the above typological analysis of terrorism would lay thefoundation for a more concrete normative evaluation of specific acts andtypes of terrorism. While case by case evaluations fall beyond the scopeof this paper, I will briefly consider some trends regarding the possible

justification for the various types of terrorism.If we consider the first two sets of divisions examined in the typology,

we can see a gradation from the least readily justified to the most possible.For most people it is hard to imagine circumstances in whichindiscriminate terrorism could ever be justified or excused. However,when lethal force is used, it is even less likely that indiscriminate terrorism


36/38


Walzer suggests that the terror bombing of German cities by the Britishduring the early stages of World War II may have been an excusable act of terrorism given the imminent threat of defeat and the humanitarianatrocities that such a defeat would have brought with it. Walzers positionis controversial in general as well as regarding the specific example. Onceone allows the kind of moral calculus that underlies Walzers stance, itbecomes rather difficult to draw the line as to what sort of human rightsviolations would be great enough to outweigh the life and rights of thosewho are targeted by indiscriminate terrorism (lethal or non-lethal).Regarding the specific example of the British terror bombing of Germancities, it is less than clear whether during the early stages of the war thatthe British recognized The Third Reich as the evil everyone eventuallycame to know it to be. 51 Regardless of whether one believes the British

satisfied Walzers criteria for responding to a Supreme Emergency, recentevents force one to consider the likelihood of a party claiming they haveevidence of the imminent threat of humanitarian disaster that theiradversary poses to themselves and the rest of the world. Just as in otheranticipatory judgments, what is sufficient evidence to predict such animminent threat is less than obvious.

Even with these questions left unanswered, Walzer forces us toexamine the possibility of whether one may be excused for usingindiscriminate terrorism to save a people from genocide or humanitariandisasters of equal weight. What Walzer doesnt consider is whether thestandard would be lowered for excusing or justifying the use of non-lethal ,indiscriminate terrorism. From a strictly consequentialist perspective, thediminished harm inflicted by terrorists indiscriminately using non-lethal

force alters the moral calculation. Perhaps then the indiscriminate use of non-lethal force by terrorists could even be justified in the face of harmsfrom human rights violations which do not measure up to the severity of genocide. The same position could be supported by Virginia Helds non-

i li h i b j ifi d if h i


37/38

Shawn Kaplan 37

inflicting indiscriminate rights violations from terrorist activities that areequal in severity to what they suffer. While Helds approach cantheoretically justify a wider range of indiscriminate terrorist acts, the useof non-lethal force in fact would make the use of indiscriminate terrorismmore easily justified. The reason is simply that the severity of the rightsviolations carried out by non-lethal force will typically be less than thatbrought about through lethal force. There are of course problems with theoverall position that Held advocates as expressed in the followingquestions: When are there no other effective means besides terrorism foraddressing rights violations? How can we carry out fair and reasonablecomparisons of the severity of rights violation? When will indiscriminateterrorism have a chance to be effective in transitioning towards theeffective respect for the human rights of both sides? While Held leaves

these questions unanswered, her rights based argument agrees with theconsequentialist reasoning that there is a greater chance of justifying orexcusing indiscriminate terrorism when it uses non-lethal force.

The same sort of arguments apply when one considers discriminateacts of terrorism. Whether one uses the a consequentialist logic or a rightsbased analysis like Helds, there is a greater possibility that discriminateterrorism will be more readily justified than the indiscriminate type andthe non-lethal variety even more so than the lethal. When lethal force isapplied discriminately by terrorists, they must meet the burden of demonstrating that their targets are somehow a direct threat to themselves.If this burden of proof is met, then the right of non-combatant immunityhas been lost and an equitable distribution of rights violations more readilyobtained. Likewise, it is more probable that the harms committed upon

those who are a direct threat can be balanced against the harms committedor reasonably anticipated from these targets than in the case of anindiscriminate attack. In the case of eliciting terror by either threateningattacks, making a public show of force, or destroying symbolic property

d i f h i d d h h


38/38


APPENDIX A: TYPOLOGY DIAGRAM

ABBREVIATION KEY: DOM = DOMESTIC INT = INTERNATIONAL

TERRORISM

INDISCRIMINATE DISCRIMINATE

LETHAL NON-LETHA L LETHAL NON-LETHAL

STATE NON-STATE STATE NON-STATE STATE NON-STATE STATE NON-STATE

DOM INT

DOM INT

1 2

3 4

DOM INT

DOM INT

DOM INT

DOM INT

DOM INT

DOM INT

5 6

7 8

9 10

11 12

13 14

15 16

a typology of terrorism - kaplan - 2003

Documents