a study on russian power ministry influence - diva …630197/fulltext01.pdf · a study on russian...

Russian Power Projection and Power Ministries

A Study on Russian Power Ministry Influence

Author: Robert Granlund Supervisor: Lotta Wagnsson

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CONTENTS

1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 2

2. Aim .................................................................................................................................................. 3

3. Research questions ......................................................................................................................... 3

4. Study outline ................................................................................................................................... 4

5. Definitions ....................................................................................................................................... 4

6. Background ...................................................................................................................................... 7

7. Case descriptions ........................................................................................................................... 10

8. Theory ............................................................................................................................................ 16

9. Method .......................................................................................................................................... 22

10. Choice of Method ...................................................................................................................... 23

11. Operationalization ..................................................................................................................... 24

12. Sources ...................................................................................................................................... 28

13. Selection .................................................................................................................................... 32

14. Limitations ................................................................................................................................. 33

15. Assumptions .............................................................................................................................. 33

16. Previous research ...................................................................................................................... 34

17. Evidence .................................................................................................................................... 35

18. Summary for crisis score ........................................................................................................... 44

19. Actor activity ............................................................................................................................. 45

20. Analysis ...................................................................................................................................... 50

21. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 54

References ............................................................................................................................................. 56

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1. Introduction

Russian foreign policy has had a large effect on societies throughout much of modern history. During

the Superpower era of the 20th century, Russia, as the dominant region within the Soviet Union,

wielded huge influence around the world. This influence came in the form of military, political,

cultural, and economic power. At its height, the Soviet Union would control governments in many

countries. The 1970’s, however, saw increasing stagnation in the Soviet economy, and by the end of

the 80’s it had started to lose control over its former zone of influence. As the Soviet Union

collapsed, Russia lost much of its former glory. What followed where ten years of economic chaos

and mismanagement, civil war in its northern Caucasus republics, and overall decay.

In 2000, the incumbent Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, became President. He was replacing the first

democratically elected, and long serving (and frequently inebriated) leader, Boris Yeltsin. This change

in leadership would lead to what might be called a paradigm shift in Russian politics. Within Russia,

this led to, amongst other things, a more centralized government. Russian foreign policy changed

considerably. From being fairly invisible on the international arena during the 90’s, Russia has

increasingly adopted a confrontational foreign policy. This has been buoyed by high gas prices, which

have allowed increased spending on military and energy infrastructure, the two main avenues of

Russian foreign policy. What is more, low investments in energy diversification in Eastern Europe

have led to a dependency on Russian energy in this region, ensuring Russian influence here. Finally,

the collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in large Russian minority groups in the newly established

republics. Apart from possible future irredentist problems, these minorities represent an opportunity

for Russia to exercise its influence.

The newfound energy-wealth has allowed Russia to be more pro-active in its dealings with other

states. This increased activity can, for example, be seen in that Russian Security Council vetoes in the

noughties have increased several times as compared to the nineties. Other examples showing a

more active foreign policy includes being able to restrict energy-supplies to Western Europe to put

pressure on gas-transit states, and sending troops into other sovereign states.

This study will aim to examine the intra-state actors that decide these foreign policies, and more

specifically, these intra-state (or subdivisional) actors at times of crisis.

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As we shall see, though centralized, the Russian state is made up of several different actors. These

actors, which include amongst others the President and Prime Minister, will compete for influence in

deciding governmental policies. Examining historically which actors generate the most influence at

certain periods of bilateral relations crises may allow for future forecasts. Knowing which actor to

address could allow for focused lobbying in order to lessen negative externalities as a result of crisis.

Being able to do such forecasts would be of general relevance to the non-scientific community.

There are several theories which assume government output as being the result of organizational

activity. As this study examines this very activity in relation to crises, the academic relevance would

be to in a way test these theories. What is more, the results of this study may lay the foundation for

future research into correlations between Russian governmental organizations and Russian foreign

policy.

2. Aim

The purpose of this study is to examine the Russian foreign-policymaking actors in times of bilateral

relations crises. Russia has a number of hard power resources available when dealing with other

states. With increasing gas wealth, we can expect to see Russia use more power projection in the

future. It this therefore imperative that we identify which actors within the Russian state that can

and do have an effect on foreign policy. By looking at which intra-state actor (defined as power

ministry later on) is most active during certain bilateral relations crises, one should be able to deduce

the prime actors in Russian foreign policy. As will be explained later, it is assumed that such crises

allow for actors to ‘expand their territory’, thus being a good opportunity to examine these actors. By

examining actor activity during crises, one will be able to analyze influence during these crises.

As this is an extensive examination of Russian foreign policy actors, the actual study will be front-

heavy. The evidence, as well as the analysis, will largely be presented in tables and diagrams.

Consequently, it is imperative that the Method chapter clearly explains what is going on.

3. Research questions

In order to study the relationship between actors (power ministry) and foreign policy at times of

crises, this study will be divided up into three parts. These parts are reflected in the following three

research questions.

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The first research question is: Which hard power factors were present in the crisis?

This will allow for classifying the various crises according to how much power Russia could project.

The second research question is: How active was each power ministry during the crisis?

This will identify actor activity during each crisis.

The third research question is: Is there a correlation between crises where hard power factors were

present and certain power ministries?

4. Study outline The outline of this study has been designed as follows. As we have seen, the study begins with an

Introduction. The introduction chapter is followed by a section establishing the Aim of the study,

closely followed by a section outlining the actual Research questions. The Definitions section

contains definitions of key words and concepts used by this study. The Background section describes

the different power ministries studied, and leads into the Case descriptions chapter. The Case

descriptions chapter looks at and describes the different crises cases used by the study. The Theory

chapter will describe the theory behind the processes, thus attempting to give an understanding of

why the chosen method should be valid. The Method chapter gives a short description of the method

used, as well as a discussion on other possible methods. What follows is the Operationalization

section. Here the operationalization of the study is described in detail. The Sources section contains a

discussion on the sources used. This is followed by the Selection chapter, which discusses the

inclusion of the different crises. The Limitations chapter discusses the study delineation. The

Assumptions section outlines the assumptions made by the study. This is followed by the Previous

research section, which looks at previous research done within the context of this study. The

Evidence chapter presents the evidence, both for the Crises Scores and the Actor Activity. The

analysis section analyzes the information, and presents it in circle diagrams. Finally, the Conclusion

summarizes the study.

5. Definitions

In this chapter we will give the definitions for the different words and concepts used throughout this

study.

Bilateral relation – This will be defined as essentially the relationship between two states.

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Crisis – Crisis may be defined in several ways. The Oxford Dictionary defines crisis as a time of intense

difficulty or danger. This is clearly too broad a definition for this study as it would include

The crisis definition as defined by Rosenthal et al1 is that of situations when central decision makers

believe that:

1. Considerable properties and values are threatened

2. There is limited time available

3. The situation is characterized by considerable uncertainty

This definition is much more precise, and as we shall see later, better describes the types of crises

used by the study.

Bilateral relations crisis – A relations crisis as defined above, involving two states. An example of a

bilateral relations crisis could be the 2008 Mumbai attacks, which had the immediate effect of

chilling India-Pakistan relations.

Crisis Score –Russia has bilateral agreements and relations with almost all states2. With countless

environmental factors affecting bilateral relations, bilateral relations crises involving Russia and other

countries will therefore undoubtedly be different. In order to scientifically categorize these varied

crises, this study will examine the presence of hard power factors. The crisis score is calculated

through toting up the occurrence of three different hard power factors. These factors are military

presence, energy shut-off, and economic sanctions. The reasoning behind this will be further detailed

in the Method chapter.

Hard Power – Hard power is defined by Nye as being the ability to get others to do what they

otherwise would not do through threat of punishment or promise of reward3. This study will refer to

the term hard power both as a concept and as a collective term for the three foreign policy tools as

identified in the Theory chapter.

1 Rosenthal et al. p.10

2 http://www.russianembassy.net/

3 Keohane & Nye p.220

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Power ministry – Russian media often refer to the concept “power ministry” (silovye ministerstva).

Though largely undefined, the term refers to institutions and actors within Russia that are of critical

importance politically4. One early attempt at defining this has been to use it as a term for Russian

ministries and authorities that were concerned with ensuring internal and external security5. Bettina

Renz has since further defined power ministries as those ministries which maintain troops:

“Force structures are defined as ministries and other institutions within the federal system of

executive power that have under their command uniformed personnel and/or command of their own

militarized or armed formations6.”

Using this definition would reduce the meaning of power ministry to essentially those which control

security in Russia. As this study will examine those actors which are most active during bilateral

relations crises, they must have an element of foreign policy competence. This foreign policy

competence means that they should be able to influence a bilateral relations crisis. Consequently,

studying power ministries which lack foreign policy competence will be unnecessary. As many of the

power ministries as defined by Renz miss this competence (i.e. the State Courier Service of the

Russian Federation), the number of ministries of interest to this study shrinks.

Carolina Vendil Pallin defines power ministry as those ministries directly under the president. As the

leadership of many of these ministries is directly appointed by the president, it follows that power is

highly centralized. This could suggest that Russian ministry outputs would, by and large, be syncretic

with those of the Russian president. In other words, as the Russian president would likely only

appoint likeminded leaders for the ministries, their influence within their respective ministry would

ensure little friction with presidential policy. However, Allison and Zelikow’s second model7, where

governmental action is seen as organizational output, suggests that government policy will not

necessarily be shaped by a monolithic Leviathan. This will be further detailed in the Theory chapter.

One dilemma with Carolina Vendil Pallin’s definition, as regards this study, is the problem of

measuring activity. As will be explained later on in the Method chapter, this study will examine public

statements, in that actor activity will be assumed to be reflected in the number of public statements.

4 Vendil Palin p.55

5 Ibid. p.56

6 Renz p.561

7 Allison & Zelikow p.391

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As some power ministries will not make public statements (i.e. the Main Intelligence Administration)

they will not be researchable within the context of this study. It should be noted however that these

power ministries carry more of a support role to the others (again, the Main Intelligence

Administration) and therefore would likely be of marginal interest to this study.

Based on the above discussion, this study will use the following definition for power ministry: A

Russian state organization with foreign policy competence, and has the capability, and a history of, of

making public statements. This narrows down the list of power ministries to the following ten:

The Presidency

The Prime Minister

Foreign Ministry

The Duma (Lower House)

The Federation Council (Upper House)

The Finance Ministry

The Energy Ministry

The Defense Ministry

The Emergency Situations Ministry

The FSB (Federal Security Service)

Throughout this study, these power ministries will be referred to as either power ministry or actor.

6. Background

This chapter will flesh out the background. It describes the different power ministries examined in

the study.

As we saw in the introduction, Russian foreign policy has become much more active in the last

decade. As gas-wealth has allowed Russian power to expand, other factors are encroaching on what

is considered Russia’s near-abroad. EU membership for the Baltic States means that Russia now has a

border with The European Union. The EU’s Eastern Dimension, as expressed in the European

Neighborhood Policy, calls for increased influence in this very area. NATO expansion has also been a

cause for concern, with missile shields being seen as a direct threat.

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This chapter will attempt to flesh out the power ministries. Counter to established norms, the cases

will first be introduced here, and not in the Sources chapter. This is because the case descriptions can

also be seen as part of the background. The reasoning behind the selection of these cases will still be

found in the Sources chapter however.

These power ministries used are described as follows.

The President is the Russian head of state and shall determine the guidelines of the internal and

foreign policies of the state. The president shall represent the Russian Federation within the country

and in international relations.8.

The Prime Minister (Chairman of the Government) is appointed by the president, with the consent of

the Duma. The Prime Minister shall determine the guidelines of the activities of the Government of

the Russian Federation and organize its work9.

The Foreign Ministry (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) is main ministry responsible for foreign affairs.

The Federal Assembly consists of two chambers. The State Duma is the lower house of the Russian

Federation. It consists of 450 members, and among other responsibilities consent to the

appointment of the Prime Minister (effectively the government)10. The majority party in the State

Duma throughout the time period studied has been the United Russia party, which has been aligned

with Putin.

The Federation Council represents the upper house of the Russian Federation. There are 166

senators. The Federation Council jurisdiction includes amongst others approving border changes and

deciding on the possibility of using military forces abroad.

In the context of this study, Duma and Federation Council statements will only be considered when

done in an official capacity (i.e. individual senatorial statements will be ignored)

The Finance Ministry is responsible for financial policy.

8 Russian Constitution Article 80

9 Ibid. Article 113

10 Ibid. Article 103

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The Energy Ministry is responsible for energy policy

The Defense Ministry’s objectives are to deter the military and political threats to the security of

Russia; support the economic and political interests of Russia; mounting other-than-war enforcement

operations; and using military force11.

The Emergency Situations Ministry manages civil emergencies and disasters.

The FSB (Federal Security Service) is concerned with counter-espionage12 and intelligence

gathering13. It can be considered the main successor to the KGB14.

11

The Russian Ministry of Defense organizational mission 12

Vendil Pallin p.118 13

Ibid. p.121 14

Ibid. p.113

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7. Case descriptions

The following short descriptions are presented in order to ensure that the reader obtains a general

idea of what each crisis was about. As stated, this section can also be considered as belonging to the

Selection chapter.

Ukraine 2004 – Orange Revolution

The Orange Revolution in Ukraine caused a shift in focus for Ukrainian foreign relations away from

Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States towards the West15. With western Ukraine

being more pro-Europe and eastern Ukraine being pro-Russia, the internal Ukrainian discourse on

which side to approach economically and politically can be quite heated16.

For Russia, Ukraine is seen as being within its region of influence, and it is also seen essentially as a

buffer against NATO and EU influence. Many Ukrainians are also ethnically Russian. By losing political

influence in Ukraine, Russia would risk eventually having NATO on its doorstep.

The following description of the crisis is derived from a chronology of the Orange Revolution by Joerg

Forbrig and Robin Shepherd, for the German Marshall Fund17. By 2004 the presidential election in

Ukraine was promising to become the most contested election in over a decade. The main actors

involved in the election were Leonid Kuchma, the incumbent Ukrainian president who was retiring,

Viktor Yanukovych, Kuchma’s anointed heir, and Viktor Yushchenko, the main opposition candidate.

Leonid Kuchma had spent much of his administration ensuring friendly relations with Russia, and

Yanukovych, an ethnic Russian, promised to follow that policy. This led in large part to president

Putin officially declaring his support for Yanukovych. The amicable relationship between Putin,

Kuchma, and Yanukovych could be seen in the latter two frequently travelling to Russia, and also

being invited to celebrate Putin’s birthday. Viktor Yushchenko’s party, on the other hand, promised

closer relations with the EU and the US.

On September 5, 2004, less than two months before the election, opposition candidate Viktor

Yushchenko is poisoned by dioxin. October 31 sees the first round in the presidential election.

15

Forbrig & Shepherd p.11 16

Ibid. p.19 17

Ibid p.11

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Neither candidate manages to exceed the 50 percent threshold required to win. The Organization for

Security and Cooperation states its concern over the conduct of the first-round voting. The second-

round voting is held one month later, on November 21, amid talk of massive irregularities18.

Nevertheless, Putin hails Yanukovych as the victor. Three days later, Yanukovych is declared the

winner by the electoral commission. Yushchenko submits a formal protest to the Supreme Court.

Meanwhile, large numbers of protestors are beginning to gather in the capital. By November 29,

Kuchma acknowledges the need for new elections. This view is in time also shared by Putin. On

December 3 the Supreme Court states that the elections are null and void, and sets the new election

date on December 26. This time around, Putin does not lend his support to any candidate. The

election rerun sees Yushchenko winning with 51.99 percent of the vote, as opposed to Yanukovych’s

44.2 percent. Yushchenko is sworn in as president on January 23, 2005.

Lithuania 2006 – Druzhba shut-off

Lithuania is a NATO member, and with Russian opposition to NATO expansion this has ensured that

relations with Lithuania have at times been testy19. The Lithuanian Mažeikiai refinery in Lithuania was

established in the 60’s as the only oil refinery in the Baltics. This refinery was historically fed through

the Druzhba pipeline, which transported oil from Central Asia and the Urals, through Russia, to

COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) members in Europe20. In 1999, the refinery was

privatized, and ownership was transferred to an American company, the Williams Companies. The

Russian petroleum company Yukos later purchased a majority stake in the refinery21. In 2003 Yukos

faced claims of tax-fraud and was forced to sell off much of its assets to attempt to avoid bankruptcy.

This meant that the Mažeikiai refinery was put up for sale again22. This time the potential buyers

included Russian government, through a state-owned company. Russia had earlier begun to purchase

energy infrastructure in Eastern Europe, and the Lithuanian government deemed it imprudent to

allow such critical infrastructure in the hands of Russia. This, in part, led to the Mažeikiai refinery

instead being sold to a Polish company, PKN Orlen. The deal was finalized in June 200623. One month

later, on July 29, 2006, Russia announced that the Druzhba-pipeline leading to Lithuania had

ruptured, and that it had to be closed down for repairs. This would cut supply of 324,000 barrels per

18

Åslund & McFaul p.223 19

de Haas p.53 20

ORLEN Lietuva Company History 21

Ibid. 22

STRATFOR, Punishing the Baltics with a Broken Pipeline 23

Ibid.

12

day. Oil would now be transported by sea instead24. This meant higher costs for the refinery, and so

lowers profitability for PKN Orlen, and in the end higher energy costs in Lithuania.

Belarus 2007 – Energy dispute

Russian-Belarusian relations have been close since the collapse of the Soviet Union. As a country

which borders Russia, and where the majority of people speak Russian, ties to Russia have remained

fixed. The 2007 energy dispute between Belarus and Russia had its roots in the Russian post-Soviet

energy policy. By supplying gas and oil below market price, Russia has ensured the loyalty of CIS-

members. Those countries receiving the subsidized energy have been able to maintain industries and

low heating costs. The difference in gas costs between Western and Eastern Europe could be quite

considerable. The Belarusian gas price in 2006 was less than US$50 per 1000 cubic meters, whereas

the European market price was US$230 per 1000 cubic meters25. This price discrepancy allowed for

Belarus to resell Russian-subsidized refined gas and oil products to Europe, and keep the margin, in

effect becoming a considerable money maker for the state. By December 2006, Russia had started

complaining about the situation, claiming that Russia was losing billions every year due to Belarusian

re-exports26. As such Russia stated it would begin drastically increasing the price starting 200727. In

the beginning of January 2007, Belarus rejected the price increase, claiming that it would start

charging a transit fee for gas headed for western markets. This fee, according to Belarus, would come

in the form of siphoned off oil. By January 8, Russia had cut off oil supplies to Belarus, effectively

reducing supply to the rest of the European markets too28. This led the following day to Belarus

sending a delegation to Russia to negotiate a solution to the problem. By January 10 the Belarus

government abandoned the transfer fees, and the next day gas transports were resumed. A week

later, Putin claimed that “Russia would use markets, and not politics, as the basis for its relations with

all countries”29.

24

STRATFOR, Punishing the Baltics with a Broken Pipeline 25

RIA Novosti 2006-11-03 26

RFE-RL 2006-12-15 27


RFE-RL 2007-01-07 29

RFE-RL 2007-01-18

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Estonia 2007 – Bronze Night

Estonian-Russian relations have been tense since Estonia’s independence. Estonian NATO

membership has moved the western alliance’s borders very close to Russia’s second largest city, St

Petersburg. Many Estonians consider the annexation of the Baltics by the Soviet Union during World

War Two an occupation. Within Estonia, people with Russian ethnicity make up over 25 percent, thus

being a large minority. Stringent language requirements for citizenship have had the effect of

precluding many from the Russian minority of getting Estonian citizenship, essentially confining

Russian Estonians to the status of second class citizens30. For this minority, clearing away Soviet

symbols have been seen as an attack on their history. This is also the view of Russians in Russia

proper, who consider removal of Soviet and World War Two symbols revisionist. The Bronze statue in

Tallinn was a war memorial, which had been built over the graves of a number of unknown soldiers31.

Plans on moving this Soviet-era bronze statue located in central Tallinn had existed since

independence, however it was not until 2006 that these plans started to become reality.

Demonstrations began being held by the members of the Russian minority to block the relocation of

the statue to a nearby military cemetery. These demonstrations were noticed by the Russian state,

who officially sided with the minority32. In early 2007 the Estonian Parliament, the Riigikogu, passed a

law allowing for the reburial of World War Two soldiers, thus clearing the way for moving the

statue33. On April 26 that year, Estonian authorities cordoned off the area surrounding the statue.

This had the effect of leading to large numbers of people turning up to protest the relocation, and by

that night several riots had broken out. On the following morning of April 27, the bronze statue was

moved, and by now there were also large demonstrations outside the Estonian embassy in

Moscow34. The Russian response to the relocation was that of fury, with Russian Foreign Minister

Sergei Lavrov claiming that this constituted an “inhuman action”, and warning that Moscow would

“take serious steps” against Estonia35. The Federal Council, Russia’s upper house, wanted Putin to

sever diplomatic relations with Estonia36.

30

RFE-RL 2007-05-08 31

Ibid. 32

Country Report: Estonia 2007 p.1 33

Ibid. p.1 34

RFE-RL 2007-04-27 35

Ibid. 36

Ibid.

14

Estonian government websites were by now beginning to be targeted by coordinated cyber attacks,

effectively shutting down government services in the highly connected country. The following days

would remain tense, and on April 30, the Russian State Duma sent a fact-finding delegation to

Estonia37. The chairman of this delegation also called on the Estonian government to resign38. As the

statue was removed to its new location, the demonstrations were slowly beginning to evaporate, and

by May 9, had largely disappeared.

UK 2007 – Litvinenko

Alexander Litvinenko was an ex-KBG and FSB agent who had sought asylum in the United Kingdom. In

November 2006, he became ill with radiological symptoms. As it turned out, he appeared to have

been poisoned earlier that day when meeting two other ex-KGB agents, Andrei Lugovoi and Dmitry

Kovtun39. When Litvinenko died later that month a murder investigation was initiated. The British

police identify Lugovoi as the man poisoning Litvinenko and begin calling for his extradition from

Russia. Russian authorities, however, decided not to extradite Lugovoi40. This would eventually lead

to the expulsion of four Russian diplomats from the UK on July 1741. This had the natural effect of

causing a diplomatic crisis between the two countries. Although Lugovoi was never extradited, the

actual crisis would slowly die down over the next couple of months.

Georgia 2008 – War

During the Soviet Union, the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic administered areas in the north of

Georgia by the name of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast (South Ossetia) and the Abkhaz

Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Abkhazia). Though under Georgian administration, all these

areas, including Georgia, were tightly controlled by the central Soviet leadership in Moscow42.

As the Soviet Union collapsed, these regions came under nominally Georgian control43. As the

majority ethnic groups do not consider themselves Georgian, war broke out in the early 90’s

between South Ossetia and Georgia. This led to a cease-fire in 1992 which left control of South

37

RFE-RL 2007-05-01 38

Ibid. 39



Ibid. 42

Hewitt p.183 43

Ibid. p.188

15

Ossetia in the hands of an unrecognized Russian-backed government. In order to ensure the peace,

Russian peacekeepers were permitted to be in the area44. Nevertheless, these areas would still see

minor skirmishes throughout the 90’ and 00’s, and would represent some of the frozen conflicts left

in the wake of the Soviet Union45.

By 2008, the Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvilli had stated interest in joining NATO, and also

finding support for that idea in the US administration46. This would several years later be confirmed

by Russian president Medvedev as constituting a considerable potential threat towards Russia47. By

that summer, US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice would visit Tbilisi. As both sides were amassing

troops near the border, she would state that Russian behavior toward Georgia had “aggravated

tension” and urged both sides to show restraint48. On the night of August 7, 2008, Georgia sent

troops into South Ossetia, in order to reclaim the region49. After a successful initial Georgian

advance, Russian troops with support from South Ossetian elements would reverse the situation. By

August 9, the Georgian president accused Russia of launching “a full-scale invasion”50. It was

reported that Russian airplanes were bombing Black Sea target, and that Abkhazian troops,

supported by the Russian military, were advancing.

The following day the EU and the US demanded a stop to hostilities, and by August 12 Russian

president Medvedev ordered a stop to the fighting51. A Western-proposed six Point peace plan was

agreed upon. Smaller skirmishes did however still continue to break out, and there were reports of

looting. As the fighting died down, Georgia had suffered a heavy blow, with Russian troops reaching

as far as Gori, halfway through the country. Georgian military bases were occupied and emptied of

equipment, and a pipeline transporting Azerbaijani oil through the country was damaged. On August

17, Russian troops began to withdraw.

44

Hewitt p.190 45

Ibid. 46

RFE-RL 2008-05-10 47


Ibid. 49

RFE-RL 2008-08--08 50

RFE-RL 2008-08-09 51

RFE-RL 2008-08-12

16

Ukraine 2009 – Gas-dispute

As with the energy dispute with Belarus in 2007, the 2009 Ukrainian gas dispute had its roots in post-

Soviet energy policy. Subsidized Russian energy was seen as giving Russia an advantage in its

relations with Ukraine. Failing to come to an price agreement before the contract ran out, meant

that on January 1 2009, Russia shut off supplies52. This meant that countries further down the

pipeline were effectively without gas too53. After several weeks of active diplomacy, energy supplies

were restored on January 1854. As the 2004 Orange Revolution had replaced a pro-Russian

government with a pro-Western one, this may have been a highly visible attempt at punishing a state

that was being intransigent.

Tajikistan 2011 – Pilot-row

The 2011 Tajikistan pilot row began as two pilots, one Russian and the other Estonian, en route to

Russia from Afghanistan, were ordered to land in Tajikistan. Once there they were arrested by the

authorities and charged with smuggling55. On November 8 2011, they were sentenced to 10 and a

half years in prison56. This was immediately protested by Russian authorities. As pressure mounted

between Russia and Tajikistan, Russia began to expel Tajiki migrant workers57. As remittances from

Russia represents a large part of the Tajiki economy, the authorities there began to cave, and on

November 22 the Russian and Estonian pilots were freed58.

8. Theory

This chapter will look at the theory behind the policy processes. As mentioned before, this study is

divided into three parts. The first part of the study will classify each crisis. There are many different

factors available for research when classifying crises, ranging from, amongst others, calculating

human and economic costs, to geographic locations, and to whether they were man-made or natural

crises. As this study will examine bilateral relations crises, many of these factors are rendered

inadequate. For example, short of war, the human costs will in most cases be absent or negligible.

52

de Haas p.129 53

Ibid. p.128 54

Ibid. p.129 55

RFE-RL 2011-11-09 56

Ibid. 57


RIA Novosti 2011-11-22

17

In international relations, power is an often reoccurring term. As Keohane and Nye explain “power

can be conceived in terms of control over outcomes”59. Power can generally be seen as the ability of

an actor to get others to do something they otherwise would not do. This suggests that bilateral

crises are generally resolved in favor of the more powerful part, as the stronger part would be able to

force the weaker one to accept conditions and demands they would otherwise not agree to. As

Russia dominates most of its neighbors in terms of economic and demographic size, as well as

militarily, the power relation between Russia and other states can be of interest when classifying

crises. Joseph Nye has classified power into hard power and soft power. Hard power, according to

Nye, “can rest on inducements ‘carrots’ or threats ‘sticks’”60. This means that hard power generally

refers to economic, military and diplomatic factors. Soft power, on the other hand, refers to indirect

inducement factors. Essentially, one may say that it refers to the ability to influence behavior

through a non-coercive, and in many cases non-active, approach.

Wilson and Popescu have identified the following Russian hard and soft powers61:

Table 1 Table 2

Russian hard power is mostly based on “19th century paradigms”62, that is, military presence,

managed instability, and economic coercion. As Wilson and Popescu note, the first two factors,

Russian military power and managed instability, have ensured a number of foreign policy goals. The

2008 South Ossetia conflict effectively stopped Georgia from becoming a NATO member63, and

Armenian dependency on Russian support in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has had the effect of

59

Keohane & Nye p.10 60

Nye p.5 61

Wilson & Popescu pp.319-323 62

Ibid. p.321 63

RIA Novosti 2011-11-21

SOFT POWER

Russian Orthodox Church

Historical links

Media influence

Russia-supported NGOs

Russia-supported political parties

Cultural foundations

Visa-free travel

Access to relatively open labor market

Authoritarian public goods (i.e. law and order)

HARD POWER

Military presence

Managed instability

Economic coercion

18

making Armenia a de facto Russian economic satellite64. Other regions where Russia manages

instability include Transnistria and the Crimean peninsula, and to a lesser degree the Baltic States.

The third hard factor identified is economic coercion. As Wilson and Popescu explain, recent years

have seen Russia increasingly use this hard power tool in its international relations. This type of hard

power is mainly expressed through gas deliveries (e.g. prices and supply stops), though other types of

economic sanctions, such as the Russian ban on Georgian wines and water, have also occurred65.

Initially in the 90’s as the Soviet Union collapsed, policymakers hoped that by keeping low gas prices,

they would be able to keep the regional economies integrated66. This policy has had the further

effect of retaining Russian influence in the region. Basically, in return for providing cheap energy

Russia has received goodwill, political power, and economic stability. However, with the election of

Putin as Russian President in 2000, this policy has gradually changed. The new approach has been to

gradually hike gas prices for Eastern European and CIS states to levels seen in Western Europe.

According to Wilson and Popescu, high energy prices have generally been used as an instrument to

punish ‘unfriendly’ states67. They also note that as Russia “pushed for higher prices, it also offered the

target countries a political way out: either by ceding energy infrastructure or by fulfilling non-

economic Russian objectives”68. On the other hand, as Larsson observes, states which maintained

friendly relations with Russia were often allowed to keep subsidized gas prices69. Taking this policy to

its extreme, Russia has completely cut off energy supplies on occasion. As gas storage facilities in

Eastern Europe have been less than optimal, this has had the rather immediate effect of shutting

down industries and heating in the targeted country.

Russian soft power factors, as can be seen from the above table, are in many cases inherited from

earlier regimes. The Russian Orthodox Church can trace its roots to over a thousand years back, and

its influence has been spread through conquest, migration, and proselytizing. Russia’s historical links

with many of its neighbors similarly have their roots in conquest and migration. Due to these

historical facts, the Russian language enjoys a kind of lingua franca within the Russian near-abroad.

This enables Russian media to have a high degree of influence in these areas.

64

Wilson & Popescu p.322 65


Wilson & Popescu p.322 67

Ibid. p.322 68

Ibid. p.323 69

Larsson p.79

19

With Russian gas-wealth, Russia has also established pro-Russia NGO’s, and directly or indirectly

supported political parties. When compared to the hard power factors however, evaluating these

soft powers and putting a definite value on them may be difficult as their effectiveness is hard to

gauge. Going back to hard power, according to the Rational Actor framework developed by Allison,

one may assume that if “a nation performed a particular action, that action must have been selected

as the value-maximizing means for achieving the actor’s objectives”70. This suggests that Russia has

used its hard power intentionally to influence crisis resolutions in its favor

Figure 1

As mentioned earlier, the notion that more

powerful states are likelier to benefit from

bilateral relations crises than weaker ones

allows for the idea that there is a relationship

between the amount of power used during a

crisis (and as the Rational Actor Model quote

above shows, power, if used, is likely always used intentionally) and the outcome of a crisis. In other

words this means that the more power is applied, the likelier the outcome will be beneficial. The

figure above illustrates the concept with hard power.

Classifying each crisis through the presence of different Russian power tools, will therefore indicate

how Russia intended the crisis outcome to end. The more power factors Russia employs, the more it

needs the crisis outcome to be beneficial. Soft power is difficult to quantify, whereas hard power can

relatively easily be quantified. By nature of their practicality, this study will therefore make use of the

hard power factors. Thus, by looking at the presence of hard power factors, one may be able to

classify a crisis. As we saw in the Definitions chapter, this crisis classification will be in the form of a

Crisis Score.

The second part of this study examines the power ministries influencing Russian governmental

policy. As governmental policy will affect the use of hard power, this will allow for an analysis of

which actors are publically most or least active during the differently classified crises.

70

Allison & Zelikow p.24

Conflict

resolution

Hard Power 1

Hard Power 3

Hard Power 2

20

Coalition A Coalition B

Strategy A1 Strategy B1

Decisions by Governmental

Authorities

Institutional Rules, Resource

allocation and Appointments

Policy outputs

Advocacy Coalition Framework

Governmental policies can generally be seen as the result of politicking between actors. This public

policy process has been the focus of many studies, and as a result there are several models. Sabatier

identifies71 these models as:

1. The Stages Heuristic

2. Institutional Rational Choice

3. Multiple-Streams

4. Punctuated-Equilibrium Framework

5. Advocacy Coalition Framework

6. Policy Diffusion Framework

7. Funnel of Causality

Figure 2

These theories have in common in that they identify actors as

influencing government policy. As an example we can look at

Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalition Framework72.

Of interest in this theory are the actor coalitions, and their

effects on governmental decisions. Basically, what this theory

states is that actors will group into coalitions with likeminded

actors, and develop a joint strategy. These strategies will be

the framework for government decisions. These

decisions are then tempered by institutional rules, resource

allocation, and appointments, to produce policy outputs. The

figure to the right is a simplified illustration of the process.

When applied to this study, the idea of coalition can be

simplified to that of actor (or power ministry). Introducing

elements of Allison and Zelikow’s Organizational Behavior

Model, where a state consists of organizations, allows for

looking at the motivation behind creating the strategies. The power ministries can be seen as

essentially subdivisions within the Russian state. These numerous subdivisions within the state, such

as the foreign ministry and defense ministry, will have different organizational missions, and thus

different operational objectives, special capabilities, and organizational cultures73. These will impact

71

Sabatier pp.6-10 72

Ibid. p.191 73

Allison & Zelikow p. 391

21

on the sub divisional perspectives of crises. As an example, in the US, the State Department, due to

its nature, is more likely to see the solution to a particular international crisis as being diplomacy,

whereas the Department of Defense, on the other hand, may favor a military approach. These

different organizational characteristics will have an impact on each actor’s strategy as they try to

influence government decisions. But why would a power ministry want to influence government

decisions?

According to Allison and Zelikow, organizations want to be healthy, and “most organizations define

the central goal of ‘health’ as synonymous with autonomy”74. A goal for these organizations,

therefore, is to expand in terms of budget, personnel, and responsibilities75. By positioning

themselves as highly visible organizations during certain crises, this can be interpreted as making a

land grab and wanting to have more influence in the resolution of the crisis. If an organization shows

itself competent in an area, this could eventually lead to expanded responsibility, which in turn could

eventually lead to increased autonomy. In short, the actors have imperialist tendencies and want to

grow, a sort of Nietzschean will to power. They grow through accumulating more responsibilities.

And they accumulate more responsibilities through showing that they have the competence in these

new areas. Times of crisis tend to be good opportunities to show competence. Depending on the

crisis, different power ministries may want to show their competence. By adapting the Advocacy

Coalition Framework, and instead of using advocacy coalitions as actors simplify it to simply

organizations as actors (as per the Organizational Behavior Model) we get a slightly different model.

Figure 3

In this model as

seen below,

different actors,

or organizations,

are distinguished

with different

organizational

objectives, capabilities, competence, standard operating procedures, and programs and repertoires.

These differences will color their view of the situation, as defined by the Crisis Score. Being

imperialistic, they will want to grow. By showing activity and attempting to influence governmental

decisions during times of crisis (with each crisis classified in this model through the crisis score), they

will attempt to show they are competent in dealing with these situations. In short, what this model

74

Allison & Zelikow p. 181 75

Ibid.

Crisis Score Actor A

Actor B

Actor C

Actor D

Policy

outpu

ts

Decisions by

Governmental

Authorities

Crisis outcome

22

suggests is that the decisions by governmental authorities are a result of actors competing for

influence.

9. Method

This section will describe the method used in order to study the Russian power ministries and their

power projection. Initially, this study attempted to examine actor activity in relation to crisis

outcomes. The outcomes would be measured on a positive and negative scale as seen from Russia.

Positive outcomes for Russia could be identified as those where Russia did not punish the opposing

state. If Russia was happy with the outcome, it would not feel the need to punish the opponent. Vice

versa, negative outcomes for Russia would be identified if Russia did in fact feel the need to punish

the opposing state. These punishments would come in the form of hard power. For instance, if Russia

felt a crisis outcome was bad and wanted to punish a state, they could turn off the gas tap,

implement economic sanctions, or send troops to or near the opponent. By measuring the difference

in troop levels or economic trade before and after a crisis, we could easily see if a state was being

punished.

As it turns out, Russia withdrew from the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty in 2007, and

therefore stopped reporting troop levels. As no open source indexes Russian troop levels and

locations frequently enough that it would be possible to compare these levels before and after crises,

measuring this hard power became impractical. As one of the three Russian hard power factors was

rendered uncollectable, the feasibility of classifying crises in accordance with their outcomes was

abandoned. Instead of probing crisis outcomes, it was decided that this study examines the actual

presence of hard power factors, and use this presence to classify each crisis accordingly. The

assumption here is that if Russia has a hard power conduit in a country, then Russia will always

actively use that hard power.

To repeat from the Research Questions section, the research questions are:

Which hard power factors were present in the crisis?

How active was each power ministry during the crisis?

Is there a correlation between crises where hard power factors were present and certain

power ministries, and inversely, where some power ministries absent?

23

10. Choice of Method This study will use an extensive approach in order to examine these research questions. As extensive

methods are useful in identifying possible correlations between variables, and with this study

ultimately interested in looking at possible correlations between Crisis Score and power ministries,

this method should be the most practical. Quantitative data relatively easily can be gathered from

open source sources.

Further quantitative approaches for studying the relationship between hard power and power

ministries might be to do organizational structure analyzes. Here one would look at the individuals

employed within the different power ministries and their relationships with key individuals in the

Russian government (in this case likely limited to Putin).

Using a qualitative approach to examine the correlation between crises and power ministries may be

possible too. In this case, one would have to focus on one or two typical cases, such as an energy

crisis. The cases chosen would then be classified (i.e. energy crisis), and each power ministry

analyzed. This intensive approach would theoretically allow for a much deeper analysis of the power

ministries as compared to the method as chosen by this study. However, it would require much more

detailed information from each power ministry. This is essentially the method’s main Achilles’ heel,

in that much of the required information for a qualitative study is confidential, or at least not

accessible. Without access to actual power ministry reasoning, the validity of the study would suffer.

Another qualitative method that would counter this problem would be to interview power ministry

members in order to identify power ministry activity. Assuming access to unbiased and central

individuals, such a study would likely be highly reliable. It would also likely be highly expensive and

time consuming.

24

11. Operationalization

Part one

The first part of the study will examine and classify each crisis.

The dependent variable in this study will be the Crisis Scores. These will be coded in an interval scale

ranging from zero to three. 0 (zero) will denote a crisis where Russia lacks any form of hard power. 1

(one) will indicate a crisis where one hard power factor is present. 2 (two) means two hard power

factors were present, and 3 (three) means all three hard powers as identified by Wilson and Popescu

were present. The following table demonstrates how the Crisis Score data will be set up. A low score

would imply that Russia will not get its will through, whereas a higher score would imply that it

would.

Table 3

CRISIS Military presence Energy cut-off Trade sanctions Crisis Score

Crisis A X 1

Crisis B 0

Crisis C X X 2

The following hard powers will be examined:

Military presence will be calculated through the presence of significant Russian military capabilities

in the host country at the time of the crisis. These could take the form of already established military

bases or other more ad-hoc presence. The key word here is significant, in that presence must be

enough to be able to constitute a possible threat. If there is a military presence this will be coded as

an X on the Crisis Score table, and if not then the box will remain empty.

The energy cut-off variable will be calculated through examining whether Russia cut of energy

supplies during the crisis. If Russia did cut off energy supplies during a crisis, that will be recorded as

an X in the table. If it did not cut off supplies, the box will be empty,

If a trade sanction is instituted during or in the aftermath of a crisis, this will be interpreted as a

punishment. If a previously instituted trade sanction is withdrawn after a crisis, this will be

interpreted as a reward. For the sanction to be an effective punishment it should hurt, and for it to

25

hurt it should show up in the trade statistics. If exports of goods to Russia the year after the crisis are

shown to have fallen significantly enough to show a dip, then that will be assumed as Russia

restricting trade with the state, which in other words would be a trade sanction. If trade has fallen

that will be recorded as an X in the Crisis Score table, and if trade has not been affected negatively

then the box will be empty.

For this study, each hard power is assumed to be equally effective, and will not be weighted against

the others. Once the crises has been examined and recorded on the Crisis Score table, the presence

of each hard power will be tallied up for every crisis, as seen in the column to the right.

Part two

Once the crises have been identified and classified according to their Crisis Score, we will look at how

active each Russian power ministry is in each crisis. These will be the independent variables in the

study. As detailed in the Theory chapter, organizations compete for influence. They do this by

highlighting their competence, and one way of making oneself noticed is through public statements.

Within the framework of this study, actor activity is assumed to be reflected in public statements,

with a high number of public statements being indicative of high activity, and low numbers

suggesting low activity. Consequently, by tallying up each statement per power ministry, one would

get an indication of how involved they are in the policy process of that particular crisis. Once

gathered, the data will be put in a data matrix as presented below:

Table 4

CRISIS A Power

ministry (a)

Power

ministry (b)

Power

ministry (c)

Etc…

Nov 11 0 0 0

Nov 12 0 1 1

Nov 13 1 0 0

Nov 14 0 1 0

Total 1 2 1

To repeat from the Definitions chapter, the power ministries used in this study will be: the President;

the Prime Minister; the Foreign Ministry; the State Duma; the Federation Council; the Finance

26

Ministry; the Energy Ministry; the Ministry for Emergency Situations; and the Federal Security

Service.

The study will consider statements starting one month prior to the central crisis date(s), and end one

month after the immediate crisis has ended. This will mean that the statement table will be rather

extensive, and not very accessible. In order to present the statement data in a relatively organized

fashion the data will be put into timeline diagrams. These diagrams will present the time period

examined on the X-axis, with statements by power ministries presented as peaks on the Y-axis. The

following diagram illustrates the presentation. In the following example, we see that Power Ministry

A made a statement on July 7, and Power Ministry B made statements between July 16 and 18.

Figure 4

A bar chart

would arguably

be better suited

to present the

data; however,

due to the

relatively large

time scale examined per crisis, the bars would be too thin to distinguish.

Part three

As noted, these diagrams simply present the statement data. The actual statement tables can be

found in Appendix B. In order to analyze the total power ministry activity for a given crisis, each actor

statement is added up respectively. This frequency table gives the total actor activity per crisis (using

the above example Power Ministry A would have made a total of three statements, and Power

Ministry B a total of seven). Having done this, we can begin analyzing actor activity for every Crisis

Score. This will be done through calculating mean percentage values per actor for every Crisis Score

Again using the previous example, we see that Power Ministry A made three statements and Power

Ministry B made seven statements. This translates to an actor activity of 30 % for Power Ministry A,

and 70 % for Power Ministry B in that particular crisis. As each crisis is unique, calculating these actor

activity percentages for every crisis will get a range of different values for every actor.

27

We then organize these crises actor activities in accordance with the Crisis Scores. This will give actor

activity in correlation with hard power (with a low Crisis Score corresponding to fewer hard power

factors present). The following two tables show an example of actor activity values. As they will be

grouped in accordance with the Crisis Score, there will be a separate table with different crises for

every Crisis Score (Crisis Score 0 through 3).

Table 5 Table 6

Having done this, we can easily analyze which actor or actors are most active during certain crises,

and, conversely, absent in others. The best method of visually presenting these results will be

through simple circle diagrams. Using the mean values from the example tables above, we get the

following diagrams:

Figure 5 Figure 6

What these diagrams tell us is that during bilateral relations crises where Russia has relatively few

hard power tools present, Power Ministry B dominates the agenda. In crises where Russia would be

able to use more hard power, Power Ministry A dominates.

Crisis Score 2

Power Ministry A Power Ministry B

Crisis C 60 % 20 %

Crisis D 80 % 30 %

Mean Value 70 % 25 %

Crisis Score 1

Power Ministry A Power Ministry B

Crisis A 30 % 70 %

Crisis B 50 % 60 %

Mean Value 40 % 65 %

28

12. Sources

This section contains a discussion on the sources used. There are five criteria which need to be

fulfilled in order for a source to be reliable76. The first criterion is concerned with authenticity. What

this means is that the source must not be fabricated. This can be a problem in older historical

sources, as well as after sources written after conflicts (“history is written by the victors”, as Winston

Churchill aptly put it). As Teorell and Svensson point out, data from authoritarian countries may

suffer from a lack of authenticity77. It is imperative for any study that the source is authentic. The

second criterion deals with the contemporaneousness of the source to the event. Simply put, the

longer the time between an event and its reporting, the more likely that people involved would

forget details. With regards to this criterion, the earlier the reporting of an event, the better. The

third criterion focuses on centrality, or how distant the source is from an event. The big question

here is whether the source is a primary source or secondary source. Generally, primary sources

should be better than secondary sources. The fourth criterion is concerned with tendentiousness, or

whether a source favors a particular point of view. Bias can lead distorted event reports. For this

criterion to be fulfilled, tendentious sources should be kept to a minimum. The fifth and final

criterion looks at dependence. A good source should be independent of other sources, and should

not rely on other sources.

Part one

There are five criteria which need to be fulfilled in order for a source to be reliable78. The first

criterion is concerned with authenticity. What this means is that the source must not be fabricated.

This can be a problem in older historical sources, as well as after sources written after conflicts

(“history is written by the victors”, as Winston Churchill aptly put it). As Teorell and Svensson point

out, data from authoritarian countries may suffer from a lack of authenticity79. It is imperative for

any study that the source is authentic. The second criterion deals with the contemporaneousness of

the source to the event. Simply put, the longer the time between an event and its reporting, the

more likely that people involved would forget details. With regards to this criterion, the earlier the

reporting of an event, the better. The third criterion focuses on centrality, or how distant the source

is from an event. The big question here is whether the source is a primary source or secondary

source. Generally, primary sources should be better than secondary sources. The fourth criterion is

76

Teorell & Svensson pp.104-106 77

Ibid. p.104 78

Ibid. pp.104-106 79

Ibid. p.104

29

concerned with tendentiousness, or whether a source favors a particular point of view. Bias can lead

distorted event reports. For this criterion to be fulfilled, tendentious sources should be kept to a

minimum. The fifth and final criterion looks at dependence. A good source should be independent of

other sources, and should not rely on other sources.

For the first part of the study, classifying the various crises, a number of sources have been used.

Military presence

With regards to the Russian military presence source, ideally one would use a source released by the

Russian Ministry of Defense. As this information is of strategic importance, it is largely classified.

Instead, this study will employ a secondary source for this information. This data for Russian military

bases abroad has been collected and assembled by Dr. Margerete Klein of the German Institute for

International and Security Affairs (SWP). Dr. Margerete Klein is a researcher at SWP Russian

Federation/CIS Division. The research paper, ‘Russia’s Military Capabilities – “Great Power”

Ambitions and Reality’ from 2009, examines Russian military expansion since Putin’s second term as

president 2004-2008. Of interest to this study is table 6 in that paper. This table presents Russian

military facilities and bases abroad. This information is compiled from data by the International

Institute for Strategic Studies, and several news outlets. The table itself can be found in Appendix A.

As regards authenticity, this study has been published by the German Institute for International and

Security Affairs. This organization frequently reports to the German Bundestag and the German

Federal Government. Due to its high profile, this organization likely cannot afford to publish

unauthentic reports. The study was released in 2009, and as such should sufficiently fulfill the

contemporaneousness criterion. Ideally however, the data should have covered each year from 2004

to 2011 (the sample range of this study). The author of the report has not physically travelled to the

Russian military bases. This may have a negative effect on the centrality criterion, as her reporting

from other sources may include faulty data. Looking at the tendentiousness criterion, the

information gathered from the report only pertains to reporting actual military presence; the risk of

tendentious tendencies on behalf of Dr. Klein should therefore be minimized. As Dr. Klein uses other

sources to gather her information, the dependence criterion will be negatively affected. Overall, the

source should prove valid.

30

Energy cut-off

This data will be gathered through news agency reports of Russia shutting off energy supplies. As

completely shutting down energy-supplies to a country is a fairly big step, it is assumed by this study

that such actions would be reported. The news agencies used will be Radio Free Europe Radio

Liberty, and RIA Novosti. By using two independent news agencies as a source, this study ensures

that the risk of reports of pipeline shut-offs being missed are minimized. The news agency source

criteria discussion will be found further down

Sanctions

By using economic sanctions, states wish to express their dissatisfaction with an opposing part, and

influence change. Therefore it stands to reason that economic sanctions are implemented in a way as

to hurt the economy of the opposing country. Such sanctions should therefore turn up in the export

data of the targeted country. This study will look at the export of goods from each examined state to

Russia. The data will be collected from each country’s statistical agency. As these trade statistics are,

amongst other things, used to control import and export duties, it is of high importance for the states

that these figures are authentic. The export data collected will be for the year prior to the crisis, the

crisis year, and the year after the crisis. As the information will be sourced directly from that year,

the contemporaneousness criterion is fulfilled. Furthermore, as these data sets are self-reported,

they will also fulfill the centrality criterion. For tendentiousness, there is a small risk that the data

may be distorted in order to gain trade advantages vis-à-vis Russia. However, Russia would likely

corroborate this data with their import data to minimize unfair competition (i.e. dumping). The

export data depends on the national customs agencies fulfilling its task. This may potentially have a

negative effect on the dependence criterion. In the case of Tajikistan, their statistical agency seems

to have been defunded in 2008. Therefore, their data has been collected from the International

Monetary Fund (IMF). As the data needed for Tajikistan extends into 2012, the study will use the IMF

estimate for 2012. One may argue that the IMF might prove an even less tendentious source than

the national statistical agencies; however it would lose on the centrality criterion.

Once collected, the data will be put into diagrams in order to show the trend lines. If the trend line is

positive (increases for every year) then the assumption will be that Russia did not implement any

economic sanctions. The data can be found in Appendix A

31

Part two

The second part of the study, analyzing actor activity, requires collecting public statements.

The data for actor activity will be gathered as public statements from Radio Free Europe- Radio

Liberty (RFE-RL), and RIA Novosti. These two sources publish reports in English, making it possible to

examine power ministry statements. By using two sources, one can cross-reference data to ensure

no statements are missed.

RFE-RL was initially established in 1953 by the US to contest Soviet propaganda in Russia. Since then

it has expanded to serve regions such as the Middle East, and South East Asia. It is funded by the US

Congress, and it has local news bureaus in 20 regions, amongst them Russia80. This Russian news

bureau presence should allow for increased reliability when reporting on public statements. RIA

Novosti was established in 1991 by the decree of Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev. Its initial

mission was to “To provide information support for the USSR’s state domestic and foreign policies and

proceeding from the interests of the democratization of the mass media”81. As a Russian state-owned

news organization, it is highly likely to publish governmental actor statements. As news agencies, it is

their task to ensure that their information is authentic. This should provide for the authenticity

criterion. The news reports used in this study all stem from the day or days when the statements

were made, which means that the contemporaneousness of the sources are good. As these agencies

maintain news bureaus in Moscow, their centrality is relatively good. By using two news agencies

which are funded by two historically diametrically opposed states, overall tendentious effects should

be minimized. As there generally should not be any middle-man sourcing when reporting on power

ministry statements, the dependence criterion should also be fulfilled.

Ideally, statements should be gathered directly from the power ministries (such as through news

archives on official websites). Not all power ministries examined have news archives stretching back

to 2004 though, and those that do have them do not necessarily have them in English. As machine

translation (i.e. Google Translate) has not yet reached the level where translations are consistently

accurate, this study has elected not to gather the statements directly from the actors. Other relevant

news agencies could include Interfax and general news outlets. By adding these sources one would

likely further minimize the possibility of missing statements. It is however assumed by this study that

80

RFE-RL FAQ 81

RIA Novosti About

32

using and cross-referencing RFE-RL and RIA Novosti should be sufficient to ensure scientific reliability

on the statements.

13. Selection

This section discusses the crisis sample used by the study. As mentioned in the Background chapter,

the case descriptions section earlier could equally well be presented here.

This study will examine eight cases. Initially, the study was to consider all bilateral relations crisis

cases involving Russia, however time constraints ensured that this had to be limited. As the total

number of Russian bilateral relations crisis in the last decade have been fairly low, the eight cases

chosen should still represent a large sample when compared to the total population.

Because Yeltsin-era and Putin-era Russia are considerably different, with political power having

become much more centralized during Putin’s administration, comparing governmental actor

activities across two different eras would likely yield contradictory data. As Russia is wealthier today

than it was in the 90’s, this has also allowed for more extensive use of hard power, meaning the

Crisis Scores would not be compatible. Due to these considerations, this study will ignore crises from

the 90’s. The crises that have been chosen are fairly representative of the total number of Russian

bilateral relations crises. The most common type of bilateral crisis involving Russia has been

concerned with energy, and there have been several energy disputes over the last decade. This study

has chosen three of these crises: Lithuania 2006, Belarus 2007, and Ukraine 2009. Apart from these

three energy cases, Russia has had such disputes with Moldova, Bulgaria, and Ukraine in 2006.

The war in Georgia 2008 was chosen because the relations-fallout from this conflict did fit very well

with the definition of bilateral relations crisis. Another Georgian case of interest was the 2003 Rose

Revolution. With neither of the actor activity sources (RFE-RL and RIA Novosti) publishing data prior

to January 2004 though, gathering this information would be difficult. As such, the Rose Revolution

crisis was rejected. The 2006 Orange Revolution in Ukraine was a similar type of crisis, and as

information from that year was accessible, this case was added to the study.

The 2007 Estonia case represents what could be considered a managed instability case. This

instability stems from a large Russian minority within the country. Cases with similar demographic

33

undercurrents could arguably also be found in the other Baltic States too. However, as the Bronze

Night case caused the most uproar, and thus was the most reported, this case was chosen ahead of

any other similar Baltic cases.

The 2007 Litvinenko case is the only case involving a state outside Russia’s immediate zone of

influence. As it had considerable effects on the bilateral relations between Russia and the UK, it was

added.

The 2011 Tajikistan pilot case was added as it did create a crisis in bilateral relations between the two

states. Furthermore, in an effort to create a more diverse sample, adding a Central Asian country was

ideal.

The Jilin 2005 chemical plant explosion in China, which led to harmful chemicals leaking into the

drinking water of Russian cities downriver was considered, however as the industrial accident caused

no noticeable relational problems between Russia and China, this case was discarded. The 2010

Russian-American spy swap was also considered. As this case did not seem to have any noticeable

effects on bilateral relations, it too was discarded.

Considering that actor activity data cannot be gathered prior to January 2004, the sample range

(2004; 2006; 2007; 2007; 2007; 2008; 2009; 2011) makes for a fairly even temporal spread.

14. Limitations

This section establishes the delineations of the study. The time range surveyed in this study ranges

from 2004 to 2011, and the cases chosen have all been bilateral relations crises involving Russia and

some other country. This temporal limitation has been chosen as this is the time period covered by

the sources. As the main target of interest in this study is Russia, it holds that the study should limit

itself to looking at crises where Russia was involved. These time and national delimitations mean that

any generalizations drawn from this study will really only be applicable to Russia post-2004.

15. Assumptions

Here we establish the assumptions made by the study. First of all, it assumes that public statements

reflect internal activity, with a high number of statements suggesting high internal activity, and fewer

34

statements meaning lesser internal activity. Actors that make no public statements are assumed

uninvolved in that particular crisis.

Secondly, it assumes that all power ministries are equal; in that they are all central actors and that

there are no peripheral actors.

Thirdly, this study assumes that if hard power factors are present during a crisis, Russia will actively

use them.

Fourthly, the study assumes that the three hard powers examined are of equal worth (e.g. they are

equally effective in affecting change). As they are considered of equal worth, they will not have to be

weighted.

16. Previous research

This section looks at scientific research of importance to this study. As much of this research has

already been presented in earlier chapters, this section will act as a summary for previous research.

There have been copious amounts of research looking into the Russian state. As noted in the

definitions chapter, Bettina Renz and Carolina Vendil Pallin, amongst others, have identified and

defined the different power ministries that make up an important part of the Russian state8283.

Furthermore, as Paul Sabatier’s policy process study shows, one may assume that a state’s public

policy can generally be seen of as the output of different actors (or actor coalitions) within a state84.

Graham Allison developed the Organizational Behavior Model85. This model has been used to analyze

the American government during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. It connects the policy process with

organizational theory, and allows for explaining the reasons behind power ministry activity.

Searching for Russian policy process studies on the EBSCO database and on Google Scholar do not

yield any apparent results, which may indicate that the area is not particularly researched. Research

identifying the major sub-divisional actors in forming Russian foreign policy might have been of use

to this study.

When it comes to the actual Russian foreign policy, again there is a large number of studies looking

at this. Marcel de Haas has identified an increase in the use of hard power by Russia under Putin.

During Putin’s second term as President, de Haas notes that the increased revenues from oil would

82

Renz p.561 83

Vendil Pallin p.55 84

Sabatier p.191 85

Aliison & Zelikow p.143

35

allow for more power projection86. According to Donaldson and Nogee, the most visible change that

“Putin brought to Russia’s foreign policy was a heightened level of presidential activism”87. This would

suggest that the most important power ministry in Russia would be the President. Furthermore,

Wilson and Popescu have identified the Russian neighborhood policy, and defined the hard power

resources available to Russia. Their study is partially based on the concept of hard and soft power as

developed by Joseph Nye88.

Searching the EBSCO database and Google Scholar does not reveal any quantitative studies on power

ministries and Russian foreign policy. This strongly suggests that the research topic is fairly original,

and that more research may be needed.

17. Evidence

Here we present the evidence. This chapter will begin by looking at the first part of the study,

identifying the crises scores for each crisis. As explained in the Method chapter, we will look at each

crisis and identify which hard power factors were present. Once every crisis has been reviewed we

will summarize the information and establish each Crisis Score.

Once that is done we will go on to the second part of the study, presenting the actor activity data as

outlined in the Method chapter. As mentioned, these will come in the form of timeline diagrams,

where a peak would signify a statement.

86

de Haas p.165 87

Donaldson & Nogee p.352 88

Keohane & Nye p.220

36

Ukraine 2004

Military presence89

Type of Military Basis Troop Strength

Basis of the Russian Black Sea

Fleet in Sevastopol

13,000

As we can see from the table above, there was a Russian military presence in Ukraine in 2004.

Energy cut-off90

Energy cut-off present Energy cut-off not present

X

The table shows that Russia did not cut energy supplies during the crisis.

Sanctions91

To repeat from earlier, if the line goes up from year to year then exports are increasing. This means

that trade has not been negatively affected from the crisis. In the case of the above diagram, it shows

that trade with Russia was not negatively affected by the Orange Revolution.

89

See military presence table in Appendix A 90

See energy cut-off table in Appendix A 91

See export table in Appendix A

37

With only the military factor present in this crisis, it will be classified as a 1 on the four scale index.

Lithuania 2006

Military presence92


N/A None

The table shows that there was no Russian military presence in Lithuania in 2006.

Energy cut-off93


X

This table shows that Russia did cut off energy supplies to Lithuania during the crisis.

Sanctions94

The diagram shows no negative effects on Lithuanian exports as a result of the crisis.

As the only factor present in the crisis is that of energy cut-off, this crisis is classified as a 1.

92




38

Estonia 2007

Military presence95


N/A None

There was no Russian military presence during the crisis.

Energy cut-off96


X

Energy supplies were cut during the crisis.

Sanctions97

Estonian exports to Russia were not affected by the crisis.

As energy supplies was the only factor affected during the crisis, this crisis is classified as a 1

95




39

UK 2007

Military presence98


N/A None

As the table indicates, there were no Russian troops present in the UK during the crisis.

Energy cut-off99


X

Energy supplies to the UK were not affected by crisis.

Sanctions100

UK exports to Russia were not affected during the crisis.

With no factors present during the crisis, this crisis is classified as a 0 on the scale.

98




40

Belarus 2007

Military presence101


Radar station in Baranovichi

and communication center of

the navy in Vileyka

850

The table shows that there was a military presence in Belarus during the crisis.

Energy cut-off102


X

This table shows that energy supplies were cut during the crisis.

Sanctions103

The diagram shows Belarus exports to Russia were not seriously affected during the crisis.

With two factors present, military presence and energy cut-off, this crisis is classified as a 2.

101




41

Georgia 2008



Military bases in South Ossetia

and Abkhazia

3,000 – 7,600

The table shows that there was a military presence in Georgia during the crisis.

Energy cut-off105


X

The table shows that energy supplies from Russia were not affected by the crisis

Sanctions106

This diagram shows that exports to Russia were negatively affected during the crisis.

As there were two factors present in this crisis, it will be classified as a 2.

104




42

Ukraine 2009



Basis of the Russian Black Sea

Fleet in Sevastopol

13,000

As indicated, there was a Russian military presence in Ukraine during the crisis.

Energy cut-off108


X

Energy supplies were cut during the crisis.

Sanctions109

The table shows that trade with Russia was negative during the crisis. It shows that export to Russia

has dropped to less than US$ 2 Billion in less than 2 years. Although it looks extreme, this data is

confirmed by the source. With all three factors present, this crisis is classified as a 3 on the scale.

107




43

Tajikistan 2011



Military bases and joint use of

the air force base at Ayni

5,500

The table shows that there was a military presence in Tajikistan during the crisis.

Energy cut-off111


X

This indicates that energy supplies from Russia were not cut.

Sanctions112

This diagram shows that trade with Russia was expected to pick-up during the crisis year, indicating

that the crisis would not necessarily affect Tajiki exports.

With only one factor present, this crisis is classified as a 1.

110




44

18. Summary for crisis score

This section summarizes the evidence gathered from the previous section.

CRISIS MILITARY PRESENCE ENERGY CUT-

OFF

ECONOMIC

SANCTIONS

CRISIS SCORE

Ukraine 2004 X 1

Lithuania 2006 X 1

Estonia 2007 X 1

UK 2007 0

Belarus 2007 X X 2

Georgia 2008 X X 2

Ukraine 2009 X X X 3

Tajikistan 2011 X 1

As the summary table above shows, the crises scores were spread across the whole range, with one 0

and one 3, two 2’s and the rest as 1’s. It shows that the factor present in most cases was that of

military presence. Energy cut-offs were present in half the cases, and only two cases saw a negative

effect on trade.

The following diagram is the same as above, only it is organized according to Crisis Score.

CRISIS MILITARY PRESENCE ENERGY CUT-

OFF

ECONOMIC

SANCTIONS

CRISIS SCORE

UK 2007 0

Ukraine 2004 X 1

Lithuania 2006 X 1

Estonia 2007 X 1

Tajikistan 2011 X 1

Belarus 2007 X X 2

Georgia 2008 X X 2

Ukraine 2009 X X X 3

What we can see from this table is that economic sanctions were only implemented in the two crises

with the top Crisis Scores.

45

19. Actor activity

Here we present the actor activity. The following diagrams show power ministry activity, in the form

of public statements, during each crisis. Technical limitations make presenting the data clearly a

problem. This is especially so in cases where power ministries made statements on the same day, as

the peaks would overlap. In attempting to overcome this problem activity lines will be designed

differently (e.g. some are dotted). The statement tables can be referred to in Appendix B. In the

following diagrams, each peak represents a statement. For example, in the diagram below, the light

gray peak between December 14 and 16 means the State Duma made a statement on December 15.

These diagrams only show those power ministries which made statements.

Ukraine 2004

The central date in the Orange Revolution crisis is December 26, when the re-vote was held. As we

can see here, the most active power ministry was there Russian Foreign Ministry, which made

statements throughout the crisis. They were followed by the Russian State Duma, which made

statements prior and up to the central date. The Russian president, at the time Putin, made a total of

three statements

46

Lithuania 2006

In the case of the Lithuanian pipeline shut-off, the central date is July 29. This was when Russian

authorities stated that the Druzhba pipeline leading to Lithuania had ruptured. Of the ten power

ministries examined, only one, the Emergency Situations Ministry, made a statement. This statement

was made two days after Russia had shut off supplies.

Belarus 2007

The central dates for the 2007 Belarus energy dispute are January 8 through 10. The most active

power ministry here was the Russian president, with eight statements. He was followed by the

Finance Ministry, with five statements. Actor activity is mostly centered around and just after the

central dates.

47

Estonia 2007

The 2007 Estonian Bronze Night crisis began on April 26 and ended on May 4. As we see here, by far

the most active power ministry was the Russian Foreign Ministry, with eight statements. Most actor

activity was centered on the crisis dates.

UK 2007

The central date for the 2007 Litvinenko affair is July 17, when British authorities decided to expel

four Russian diplomats and suspend visa facilitation talks with Russia. As we see here, the most

active power ministry is the Foreign Ministry, with 12 statements. The Federal Security Service made

three statements prior to the central crisis date. Actor activity is relatively spread throughout the

measured time period.

48

Georgia 2008

Due to the technical limits, this particular crisis is a bit difficult to illustrate. The main difference

between this crisis and the others is that many of the power ministries involved made several

statements per day, thus leading to higher peaks. Again, the most active power ministry was the

Foreign Ministry. They were followed by the Defense Ministry and the Russian president, by now

Dmitri Medvedev. Of note is the new Russian prime minister, Putin, who made eight statements.

Ukraine 2009

The Ukrainian gas-dispute was centered from January 1 to January 18. The most active actor in this

crisis was the Russian prime minister, Putin. He was followed by the president, Medvedev. Trailing in

the back was the Russian Foreign Ministry, with only two statements.

49

Tajikistan 2011

The central date for the Tajikistan pilot row is November 8. The Russian Foreign Ministry is the most

active power ministry here, with six statements. The Russian president follows with three

statements. The statements are mostly centered on the central crisis date.

50

20. Analysis

This section contains the analysis part of the study.

The following chapter analyses actor activity for each Crisis Score category, as outlined in the Method

chapter. These percentages are the mean values for all crises with that Crisis Score. The circle

diagrams are added to better illustrate these percentages. The calculations can be found in Appendix

C

Score 0 - Activity

Presid

ent

Foreign

Min

istry

Defe

nse M

inistry

FSB

11% 67% 5% 17%

What this diagram tells us is that when Russia possesses no hard power factors against a country, the

by far most active power ministry is the Foreign Ministry. The Foreign Ministry represents over two

thirds of the measurable activity during crises where Russia lacks hard power projections. The

Federal Security Service represents 17 percent, and the President only 11 percent. The smallest actor

at this level is the Russian Defense Ministry, with only five percent.

51

Score 1 Activity

Presid

ent

Foreign

Min

istry

Du

ma

Federatio

n C

ou

ncil

Finan

ce Min

istry

Emergen

cy Situatio

ns

Min

istry

15% 38% 15% 5% 2% 25%

In cases where Russia can influence crises outcomes with one hard power, the situation becomes

much more dynamic. Here we can see that the Foreign Ministry still dominates the activity landscape

with 38 percent. They are followed by the Emergency Situations Ministry, with 25 percent. By

comparison, the President and the State Duma only represent 15 percent each. The Federation

Council and the Finance Ministry trail behind with five and two percent, respectively.

52

Score 2 Activity

Presid

ent

Prim

e min

ister

Foreign

Min

istry

Du

ma

Federatio

n C

ou

ncil

Finan

ce Min

istry

Energy M

inistry

Defe

nse M

inistry

Emergen

cy Situatio

ns

Min

istry

FSB

35% 12% 21% 0,5% 1% 14% 3% 13% 0,5% 0,5%

The Score 2 Crises are crises in which Russia can employ two hard powers in order to influence the

crisis outcomes. When compared to the Score 1 diagram, we see that there are even more actors

involved here. The main difference here is that the President now represents 35 percent of all

activity. The Foreign Ministry is no longer the most active actor, having fallen to 21 percent. They are

followed by the Finance Ministry, Defense Ministry. At this level the Prime Minister makes his first

appearance, at 12 percent.

53

Score 3 Activity

Presid

ent

Prim

e min

ister

Foreign

Min

istry

38% 56% 6%

Score 3 Crises are crises where Russia may use all three hard powers as identified by Wilson and

Popescu. The by far most active power ministry here is the Prime Minister, who represents over half

of all activity. The President’s office follows with 38 percent, and the marginalized Foreign Office

represents six percent.

Of interest here is the growth in activity by the Russian Prime Minister. The likely explanation for this

is that the crisis which achieved a Score 3 was in 2009, which meant that Putin was Prime Minister.

Overall, looking at the actor activity diagrams in the Evidence chapter, one can see that the role of

the Russian Prime Minister appears to have become more active as Putin entered that position.

54

21. Conclusion

This study set out to answer three questions. The first one was to identify which hard powers were

present in different crises. This was answered in the Summary for Crisis Score chapter. The second

question was to identify how active each power ministry was the crises. This information was

summarized in the Analysis chapter. Finally, the third question wanted to look at whether there was

a correlation between crises where hard power resources were present and certain power ministries.

The answer to that can be seen in the circle diagrams in the Analysis chapter.

As was noted in the Theory chapter, organizations (in this case the power ministries) define “the

central goal of ‘health’ as synonymous with autonomy”113. This means that one of their goals is to

expand in terms of budget, personnel, and responsibilities. By positioning themselves as highly visible

organizations during certain crises, this can essentially be interpreted as a land grab and wanting to

have more influence. As we saw in the circle diagrams presented in the Analysis chapter, there were

more actors involved in the higher Crisis Score crises (barring Crisis Score 3). As more hard powers

were available, more power ministries appeared to want to influence the government policy. This

seems to confirm the imperialist tendencies as noted by Allison’s Organizational Behavior Model.

The Crisis Score summary indicates that Russian hard power projection has increased over the years,

hovering around 1 from 2004 to 2007, and then increasing. This is in line with scientific observations

by de Haas, who has shown that this increased with Putin’s second term as president. As Russia has

received significant gas revenues, this wealth has allowed Russia to engage in power politics.

Looking at the actors, the Russian Foreign Ministry was the most dominant actor at the lower Crisis

Scores. As the number of hard powers available in dealing with the crises increased, the Foreign

Ministry was gradually replaced by the President. The conclusion we can draw from this is that as the

stakes become higher, the Russian President, as the ultimate arbiter, will want to ensure that the

crisis is resolved in a satisfactory manner. Incidentally, as there is more hard power resources

available at these higher level Crisis Scores, the likelihood that the outcome will be beneficial

increases. Whoever is the most active at these higher Scores is likely to be seen as a catalyst for good

foreign policy, and as such improve their organizational ‘health’ as defined by Allison114.

113

Allison & Zelikow p.181 114

Ibid. p.181

55

This study would benefit from having more cases. Teorell and Svensson note that extensive studies

should have a large sample group, generally having at least 20-30 cases115. As the total number of

bilateral relations crises involving Russia since 2004 is relatively low, it was assumed that using eight

cases would still represent a large sample of the total population. However, it is understood that

adding four or five more cases would vastly improve the generalizability of the study. Ideally there

should have been more cases at Crisis Scores 0 and 3.

Future quantitative studies should look further into the relationship between Russian power

ministries and Russian government policy. Using Allison’s third model, the Governmental Politics

Model, may reveal a better understanding of the Russian core sub-divisional actors. Other research

might look into the dynamics of Putin and Medvedev. For example, by looking at Prime Minister

activity prior to 2008 and after 2008, we see indications that the Prime Ministerial role has expanded

under Putin. Future research might want to look into how it has expanded, and why.

115

Teorell & Svensson p.80

56

References

Allison, G. & Zelikow, P. Essence of Decision – Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. 2nd Ed. Longman,

New York. (1999)

Edling, Christofer & Hedström, Peter. Kvantitativa metoder. Studentlitteratur, Lund (2003)

Forbrig, J. Shepherd, R. comps. and eds. Ukraine after the Orange Revolution: Strengthening

European and Transatlantic Commitments. German Marshal Fund of the United States, Washington

(2005)

Donaldson, R.H. & Nogee, J.L. The Foreign Policy of Russia – Changing Systems, Enduring Interests, 3rd

ed. M.E. Sharpe, New York (2005)

de Haas, Marcel. Russia’s Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century – Putin, Medvedev and beyond.

Routledge, New York (2010)

Hewitt, George. (2009) “Abkhazia and Georgia: Time for a Reassessment” Brown Journal of World

Affairs, vol. 15, Issue 2, pp.183-196

Keohane, R.O. & Nye, J.S., Power and Interdependence. 3rd Ed. Longman, New York, (2001)

Klein, Margarete. Russia’s Military Capabilities –“Great Power” Ambitions and Reality” Stiftung

Wissenschaft und Politik. Berlin (2009)

Larsson, R. Rysk energy makt – Korruption och säkerhetsfixering I nationens namn. Erzats,

LivoniaPrint, Latvia, (2010)

Nye, J.S., Soft Power – The means to success in world politics. PublicAffairs, New York, (2004)

Rosenthal, U., Charles, M.T. & Hart, P. eds Coping with crisis: The management of disasters, riots and

terrorism. Charles C Thomas, Springfield IL. (1989)

57

Sabatier, Paul A. Theories of the Policy Process. 2nd Ed. Westview Press, Boulder, CO, (2007)

Renz, Bettina. (2005) Russia’s “Force Structures” and the Study of Civil-Military Relations, Journal of

Slavic Military Studies, vol. 18, nr. 4, pp.559-585

Vendil Pallin, Carolina. De ryska kraftministerierna: maktverktyg och maktförsäkring. FOI, Stockholm,

(2006)

Wilson, A. & Popescu, N. (2009) Russian and European neighborhood policies compared. South East

European and Black Sea Studies, vol. 9, Issue 3, 2009

Åslund, A. & McFaul, M. comps. and eds. Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine’s Democratic

Breakthrough. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Washington D.C., (2007)

Web articles

RIA Novosti

Russia sets 2007 gas price for Belarus at $200 per 1,000 cu m

2006-11-03 http://en.rian.ru/russia/20061103/55362782.html

Ban on Georgia's Borjomi water to start May 7, Nabeglavi May 10


Russia to make statement on Litvinenko case


Putin calls London extradition demand ‘vestige of colonialism’


Russia deports 300 Tajik workers after pilot incarceration


Russia’s 2008 war with Georgia prevented NATO growth - Medvedev


58

Russian. Estonian pilots released in Tajikistan


RFE-RL

Putin, Lukashenka To Meet Amid Oil Row

2006-12-15 http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1073464.html

Belarus Says Compromise Reached, While Moscow Demurs


“Putin Says Market Governs Russia's Energy Relations” -


One Killed In Estonian Violence Over War Memorial


Russian Lawmakers Fuel Estonia-Russia Row


Estonia: War Anniversary Exacerbates Ethnic Divions


Rice: Russia should help resolve, not stoke, Georgia tensions

2008-05-10

http://www.rferl.org/content/Rice_Russia_Should_Help_Resolve_Not_Stoke_Georgia_Tensions/118

2835.html

Georgian Troops, Warplanes, Pound South Ossetia Separatists

2008-08-08

http://www.rferl.org/content/Georgian_Troops_Warplanes_Pound_South_Ossetia_Separatists/1189

386.html

59

Georgian President Accuses Russia Of Launching 'Full-Scale Invasion'

2008-08-09

http://www.rferl.org/content/Fierce_Fighting_Continues_In_South_Ossetia_As_Civilians_Flee/11896

75.html

Russian President orders halt to Military Operations in Georgia

2008-08-12 http://www.rferl.org/content/Russian_Planes_Renew_Attacks_On_Gori/1190334.html

Politicians Say Moscow Should 'Take Revenge' Against Dushanbe Over Sentencing Of Pilots

2011-11-09

http://www.rferl.org/content/politicians_say_moscow_should_take_revenge_against_dusanbe/243

86074.html

Miscellaneous web sources

'Country Report: Estonia' 2007, Country Report. Estonia, 10, 8, pp. 1-6, International Security &

Counter Terrorism Reference Center, EBSCOhost, viewed 16 January 2012..

STRATFOR, Punishing the Baltics with a Broken Pipeline, June 1 2007

(http://www.stratfor.com/russia_punishing_baltics_broken_pipeline)

Russian Constitution

http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-01.htm

Ministry of Defense Mission

http://eng.mil.ru/en/mission/tasks.htm

APPENDIX A

I

APPENDIX A

MILITARY DATA

The author wishes to emphasize that the following table was borrowed from a study created by

Margarete Klein of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

Russian Military Facilities and Bases Abroad

HOST COUNTRY TYPE OF MILITARY BASIS TROOP STRENGTH

ARMENIA Air base in Yerevan, military basis in

Gyumri

3,214

AZERBAIJAN Radar station in Gabala 900

BELARUS Radar station in Baranovichi and

communication center of the Navy in

Vileyka

850

GEORGIA Military bases in South Ossetia and

Abkhazia

Exact figure unknown; Officially 3000,

up to 7600 allowed

KAZAKHSTAN Radar station in Balkash Unknown

KYRGISTAN Air basis in Kant; negotiations for

another basis in the south of the

country are on-going

Ca. 700

MOLDOVA Peacekeepers in Transdnistria and

forces for the protection of ammo

depots

1500

TAJIKISTAN Military bases and joint use of the air

force base Ayni

5500

UKRAINE Basis of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in

Sevastopol

13000

SYRIA Logistical facilities of the Navy (under

repair)

150

Taken from:

Klein, Margarete. Russia’s Military Capabilities –“Great Power” Ambitions and Reality” Stiftung

Wissenschaft und Politik. Berlin (2009)

http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2009_RP12_kle_ks.pdf (p. 20)

APPENDIX A

II

ENERGY CUT-OFF DATA

The following table identifies which crises Russia curtailed gas supplies. The first column shows the

different crises, and the second column shows if Russia cut supplies. The figures correspond to the

links below.

CRISIS ENERGY CUT-OFF

UKRAINE 2004 NO

LITHUANIA 2006 YES (1)

ESTONIA 2007 YES (2)

UK 2007 NO

BELARUS 2007 YES (3)

GEORGIA 2008 NO

UKRAINE 2009 YES (4)

TAJIKISTAN 2011 NO

1. http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1070230.html



4. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Sharply_Curbs_Gas_Flow_To_Ukraine/1365501.html

APPENDIX A

III

EXPORT DATA

The following tables show each country’s export figures to Russia. The data includes the actual year

of the crisis, as well as the year prior to and after the crisis.

UKRAINE 2004

2003 4311395470

2004 5888676370

2005 7495821720

Sourced from the State Statistics Service of Ukraine

http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2004/zd/ztt/ztt_e/arh_ztt2004_e.html

LITHUANIA 2006

2005 3422100000

2006 4956100000

2007 6473000000

Sourced from Statistics Lithuania

http://db1.stat.gov.lt/statbank/SelectTable/omrade0.asp?SubjectCode=S6&PLanguage=1&ShowNews=OFF

ESTONIA 2007

2006 605267985

2007 709627389

2008 880385827

Sourced from Statistics Estonia

http://pub.stat.ee/px-

web.2001/Dialog/varval.asp?ma=FT09&ti=EXPORTS+AND+IMPORTS+BY+COUNTRY+%28MONTHS%29&path=../I_Databas/E

conomy/11Foreign_trade/03Foreign_trade_since_2004/&lang=1

UK 2007

2006 2069000000

2007 2833000000

2008 4132000000

Sourced from HM Revenue & Customs

https://www.uktradeinfo.com/pagecontent/datapages/tables/Webtbls_final2010.XLS

APPENDIX A

IV

BELARUS 2007

2006 6845300000

2007 8878600000

2008 10551900000

Sourced from the National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus

http://belstat.gov.by/homep/en/indicators/ftrade1.php

GEORGIA 2008

2007 45338456,17

2008 29783440,57

2009 21146172,62

Sourced from Statistics Georgia

http://www.geostat.ge/index.php?action=page&p_id=137&lang=eng

UKRAINE 2009

2008 15735571900

2009 8495072300

20010 1343188100

Sourced from the State Statistics Service of Ukraine

http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2009/zd/ztt/ztt_e/arh_ztt2009_e.html

TAJIKISTAN 2011

2010 87270876

2011 79800000

2012 88067280

Sourced from the EU Commission and the International Monetary Fund

http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113453.pdf

http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=28

APPENDIX B

I

APPENDIX B

The following tables show power ministry statements for each crisis. If a cell contains a number, that

means one statement was made by the power ministry that day, regardless of its numerical value. If

it contains more numbers, the power ministry made more statements. The actual number itself (i.e.

3 or 20) corresponds to the source list at the end of this Appendix B.

In the date column, the date(s) that are bold correspond to the central crisis dates.

UKRAINE 2004

Presid

ent

Prim

e

Min

ister

Foreign

Min

istry

Du

ma

Finan

ce M

inistry

Energy

Min

istry

Defen

se M

inistry

Emergen

cy

Situatio

ns

Min

istry

Federatio

n

Co

un

cil Secretary

FSB

November 26 1

November 27 2

November 28

November 29 3

November 30

December 1

December 2 4 5

December 3 6

December 4

December 5 7

December 6

December 7

December 8

December 9 8

December 10

December 11

December 12

December 13 9

December 14

December 15 10

December 16

December 17

APPENDIX B

II

December 18

December 19

December 20

December 21

December 22

December 23 11

December 24

December 25

December 26 12

December 27 13

December 28 14

December 29

December 30

December 31

January 1

January 2

January 3 15

January 4

January 5

January 6

January 7

January 8

January 9

January 10

January 11

January 12

January 13

January 14

January 15

January 16

January 17

January 18

January 19 16

APPENDIX B

III

January 20

January 21

January 22

January 23

January 24 17

January 25

January 26

TOTAL 3 0 7 6 0 0 0 0 1 0

LITHUANIA 2006

Presid

ent

Prim

e

Min

ister

Foreign

Min

istry

Du

ma

Finan

ce M

inistry

Energy

Min

istry

Defen

se M

inistry

Emergen

cy

Situatio

ns

Min

istry

Federatio

n

Co

un

cil Secretary

FSB

June 29

June 30

July 1

July 2

July 3

July 4

July 5

July 6

July 7

July 8

July 9

July 10

July 11

July 12

July 13

July 14

July 15

July 16

July 17

APPENDIX B

IV

July 18

July 19

July 20

July 21

July 22

July 23

July 24

July 25

July 26

July 27

July 28

July 29

July 30

July 31 18

August 1

August 2

August 3

August 4

August 5

August 6

August 7

August 8

August 9

August 10

August 11

August 12

August 13

August 14

August 15

August 16

August 17

August 18

August 19

APPENDIX B

V

August 20

August 21

August 22

August 23

August 24

August 25

August 26

August 27

August 28

August 29

TOTAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0

ESTONIA 2007

Presid

ent

Prim

e

Min

ister

Foreign

Min

istry

Du

ma

Finan

ce M

inistry

Energy

Min

istry

Defen

se M

inistry

Emergen

cy

Situatio

ns

Min

istry

Federatio

n

Co

un

cil Secretary

FSB

March 26

March 27

March 28

March 29

March 30

April 1

April 2

April 3 19

April 4

April 5

April 6

April 7

April 8

April 9

April 10

April 11

APPENDIX B

VI

April 12

April 13

April 14

April 15

April 16

April 17

April 18

April 19

April 20

April 22

April 23

April 24

April 25

April 25

April 26

April 27 20 21 22

April 28 23 24

April 29

April 30

May 1 25 26

May 2 27

May 3 28

May 4

May 5 29

May 6

May 7

May 8 30

May 9 31 32

May 10

May 11

May 12

May 13

May 14

APPENDIX B

VII

May 15

May 16

May 17

May 18

May 19

May 20

May 21

May 22

May 23

May 24

May 25

May 26

May 27

May 28

May 29

May 30

May 31

June 1

June 2

June 3

TOTAL 2 0 8 2 1 0 0 0 1 0

UK 2007

Presid

ent

Prim

e

Min

ister

Foreign

Min

istry

Du

ma

Finan

ce M

inistry

Energy

Min

istry

Defen

se M

inistry

Emergen

cy

Situatio

ns

Min

istry

Federatio

n

Co

un

cil Secretary

FSB

June 17

June 18

June 19

June 20

June 21

June 22

APPENDIX B

VIII

June 23

June 24

June 25

June 26

June 27

June 28

June 29 33

June 30

July 1

July 2 34

July 3

July 4

July 5

July 6

July 7 35

July 8 36

July 9

July 10

July 11 37

July 12 38

July 13

July 14

July 15

July 16 39

July 17 40

July 18 41

July 19 42 43

July 20 44

July 21 45

July 22

July 23

July 24 46

July 25 47

APPENDIX B

IX

July 26 48

July 27

July 28

July 29

July 30

August 1

August 2

August 3 49

August 4

August 5

August 6

August 7 50

August 8

August 9

August 10

August 11

August 12

August 13

August 14

August 15

August 16

August 17

TOTAL 2 0 12 0 0 0 1 0 0 3

BELARUS 2007

Presid

ent

Prim

e

Min

ister

Foreign

Min

istry

Du

ma

Finan

ce M

inistry

Energy

Min

istry

Defen

se M

inistry

Emergen

cy

Situatio

ns

Min

istry

Federatio

n

Co

un

cil Secretary

FSB

December 8

December 9

December 10

December 11

APPENDIX B

X

December 12

December 13

December 14 51

December 15

December 16

December 17

December 18

December 19

December 20

December 21 52

December 22

December 23

December 24

December 25

December 26

December 27

December 28

December 29

December 30

January 1

January 2

January 3

January 4 53

January 5

January 6 54 55

January 7

January 8 56

January 9 57 58

January 10 59 60

January 11

January 12 61

January 13 62

January 14 63

APPENDIX B

XI

January 15

January 16

January 17

January 18 64

January 19

January 20

January 21 65

January 22 66

January 23 67

January 24

January 25

January 26

January 27

January 28

January 29

January 30

January 31

February 1

February 2

February 3

February 4

February 5

February 6 68

February 7

February 8

February 9

February 10

TOTAL 8 3 1 0 5 1 0 0 0 0

GEORGIA 2008

APPENDIX B

XII

Presid

ent

Prim

e

Min

ister

Foreign

min

istry

Du

ma

Finan

ce m

inistry

Energy

min

istry

Defen

se m

inistry

Emergen

cy

Situatio

ns

Min

istry

Federatio

n

Co

un

cil Secretary

FSB

July 7

July 8 69

July 9 70 71

July 10 72

July 11

July 12

July 13

July 14

July 15

July 16

July 17 73

July 18

July 19 74

July 20

July 21

July 22

July 23

July 24

July 25

July 26

July 27

July 28

July 29

July 30

July 31

August 1

August 2 75 76

August 3

August 4 77 78

August 5 79

APPENDIX B

XIII

August 6 80

August 7

August 8 81, 82, 83

84 85, 86, 87

August 9 88, 89 90, 91 92 93, 94, 95 96

August 10 97 98 99

August 11 100, 101

102 103, 104

105, 106, 107, 108

109

August 12 110, 111

112, 113

August 13 114, 115

116

August 14 117 118, 119

120, 121

August 15 122 123

August 16 124 125

August 17 126

August 18 127 128

August 19 129 130, 131

August 20 132, 133

134 135

August 21 136 137, 138

August 22 139 140

August 23

August 24

August 25 141, 142

143 144

August 26 145, 146

147

August 27

August 28 148 149 150

August 29 151 152

August 30 153

August 31 154

September 1 155, 156, 157

September 2 158 159, 160

APPENDIX B

XIV

September 3

September 4

September 5 161 162

September 6 163

September 7

September 8 164

September 9 165 166 167

September 10

September 11

September 12 168

September 13 169

September 14 170

September 15 171 172

September 16

TOTAL 26 8 39 1 0 0 26 1 2 1

UKRAINE 2009

Presid

ent

Prim

e

Min

ister

Foreign

Min

istry

Du

ma

Finan

ce M

inistry

Energy

Min

istry

Defen

se M

inistry

Emergen

cy

Situatio

ns

Min

istry

Federatio

n

Co

un

cil Secretary

FSB

December 1

December 2

December 3 173

December 4 174

December 5

December 6

December 7

December 8

December 9

December 10

December 11

December 12

APPENDIX B

XV

December 13

December 14

December 15

December 16

December 17

December 18

December 19

December 20

December 21

December 22

December 23

December 24 175

December 25 176

December 26

December 27

December 28 177

December 29 178 179

December 30

December 31 180 181

January 1 182

January 2

January 3

January 4

January 5 183

January 6 184

January 7 185

January 8 186

January 9 187 188

January 10 189

January 11 190 191

January 12 192 193

January 13 194

January 14 195

APPENDIX B

XVI

January 15 196 197

January 16 198

January 17 199 200

January 18 201

January 19 202

January 20 203

January 21

January 22

January 23

January 24

January 25

January 26

January 27

January 28

January 29

January 30

January 31

February 1

February 2

February 3

February 4

February 5

February 6 204

February 7

February 8

February 9

February 10

February 11

February 12

February 13

February 14

February 15

February 16

APPENDIX B

XVII

February 17

February 18

TOTAL 12 18 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

TAJIKISTAN 2011

Presid

ent

Prim

e

Min

ister

Foreign

Min

istry

Du

ma

Finan

ce M

inistry

Energy

Min

istry

Defen

se M

inistry

Emergen

cy

Situatio

ns

Min

istry

Federatio

n

Co

un

cil Secretary

FSB

October 8

October 9

October 10

October 11

October 12

October 13

October 14

October 15

October 16

October 17

October 18

October 19

October 20

October 21

October 22

October 23

October 24

APPENDIX B

XVIII

October 25

October 26

October 27

October 28

October 29

October 30

October 31

November 1

November 2

November 3

November 4

November 5

November 6

November 7

November 8 205 206

November 9 207 208 209

November 10

November 11

November 12

November 13

November 14 210 211

November 15 212

November 16

November 17 213

November 18

November 19

November 20

November 21

November 22 214

November 23 215

November 24

November 25

November 26

http://www.rferl.org/content/politicians_say_moscow_should_take_revenge_against_dusanbe/24386074.html

http://en.rian.ru/world/20111108/168511094.html

http://www.rferl.org/content/russian_response_to_tajik_court_ruling_gains_in_clarity/24388218.html



http://en.rian.ru/russia/20111115/168716845.html


http://www.rferl.org/archive/Russia/20111201/666/666.html




APPENDIX B

XIX

November 27

November 28

November 29

November 30

December 1

December 2

December 3

December 4

December 5

December 6

December 7

December 8

TOTAL 3 0 6 1 0 0 0 0 1 0

APPENDIX B

XX

SOURCING

UKRAINE 2004 1. http://en.rian.ru/onlinenews/20041126/39774316.html

2. http://en.rian.ru/onlinenews/20041127/39774365.html
















LITHUANIA 2006 18. http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1070230.html

ESTONIA 2007 19. http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1075677.html


21. http://en.rian.ru/world/20070427/64566911.html












UK 2007 33. http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070629/68077832.html

34. http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070702/68188959.html








APPENDIX B

XXI










BELARUS 2007 51. http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1073464.html


















GEORGIA 2008

69. http://www.rferl.org/content/Four_Georgian_Soldiers_Being_Held_In_South_Ossetia/1182405.html

70. http://www.rferl.org/content/Rice_Russia_Should_Help_Resolve_Not_Stoke_Georgia_Tensions/1182835.html

71. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Calls_Georgia_A_Threat_To_Regional_Stability/1182583.html

72. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Says_Air_Force_Flew_Over_South_Ossetia/1182888.html

73. http://www.rferl.org/content/German_FM_To_Georgia_For_Abkhazia_Talks/1184369.html

74. http://www.rferl.org/content/Moscow_Calls_German_Plan_Abkhazia_Helpful/1184819.html

75. http://www.rferl.org/content/Six_Dead_In_Georgia_South_Ossetia_Shootout/1188046.html

76. http://www.rferl.org/content/Six_Dead_In_Georgia_South_Ossetia_Shootout/1188046.html

77. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Warns_Georgia_Over_South_Ossetia/1188429.html

78. http://www.rferl.org/content/Georgia_South_Ossetia_Rule_Out_Talks_On_Defusing_Rising_Tensions/1188395.h

tml

79. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Wont_Stand_Back_In_Ossetia/1188612.html

80. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Georgia_South_Ossetia/1188822.html

81. http://www.rferl.org/content/Georgian_Troops_Warplanes_Pound_South_Ossetia_Separatists/1189386.html

82. http://www.rferl.org/content/Large_Scale_Fighting_Erupts_In_South_Ossetia/1189442.html

83. http://www.rferl.org/content/Hundreds_Reported_Dead_In_South_Ossetia_Clashes/1189635.html


85. http://www.rferl.org/content/Georgian_Troops_Warplanes_Pound_South_Ossetia_Separatists/1189386.html


87. http://www.rferl.org/content/Hundreds_Reported_Dead_In_South_Ossetia_Clashes/1189635.html

88. http://www.rferl.org/content/Fierce_Fighting_Continues_In_South_Ossetia_As_Civilians_Flee/1189675.html

APPENDIX B

XXII

89. http://www.rferl.org/content/South_Ossetia_Fighting_Rages_As_Talk_Turns_To_War/1189803.html


91. http://www.rferl.org/content/South_Ossetia_Fighting_Rages_As_Talk_Turns_To_War/1189803.html






97. http://www.rferl.org/content/Georgian_Forces_Leaving_South_Ossetia_Conflict_Continues/1189866.html



100. http://www.rferl.org/content/Reports_Say_Fighting_Undiminished_In_South_Ossetia_Georgia/1190027.html

101. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Says_Operation_In_South_Ossetia_Winding_Down/1190082.html


103. http://www.rferl.org/content/Heated_Words_But_No_Action_On_UN_Security_Council/1189975.html

104. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russian_Raids_Continuing_Despite_Georgian_Moves/1189976.html

105. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russian_Raids_Continuing_Despite_Georgian_Moves/1189976.html

106. http://www.rferl.org/content/Reports_Say_Fighting_Undiminished_In_South_Ossetia_Georgia/1190027.html



109. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_West_Dispute_Georgia_Roils_UN/1194789.html

110. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russian_Planes_Renew_Attacks_On_Gori/1190334.html

111. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Says_Military_Action_In_Georgia_Is_Over/1190416.html

112. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russian_Planes_Renew_Attacks_On_Gori/1190334.html

113. http://www.rferl.org/content/Flurry_Of_Diplomacy_Over_Russia_Georgia_Conflict_Continues/1190439.html

114. http://www.rferl.org/content/Uneasy_Peace_Replaces_Georgia_Fighting/1190706.html

115. http://www.rferl.org/content/Sarkozy_Plan_Georgia_Abkhazia_Ossetia/1190775.html

116. http://www.rferl.org/content/Uneasy_Peace_Replaces_Georgia_Fighting/1190706.html

117. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Backs_Georgia_Separatist_Regions_On_Status/1191010.html

118. http://www.rferl.org/content/US_Aid_Arrives_As_Washington_Stresses_Commitment_to_Georgia__/1190991.ht

ml

119. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Backs_Georgia_Separatist_Regions_On_Status/1191010.html


ml


ml

122. http://www.rferl.org/content/Rice_Lands_Georgia_CeaseFire_Talks/1191302.html

123. http://www.rferl.org/content/Rice_Lands_Georgia_CeaseFire_Talks/1191302.html



126. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russian_Troops_Regroup_After_CeaseFire/1191655.html

127. http://www.rferl.org/content/Eyes_On_Russia_As_Georgia_Pullout_Scheduled_To_Begin/1191868.html

128. http://www.rferl.org/content/Eyes_On_Russia_As_Georgia_Pullout_Scheduled_To_Begin/1191868.html

129. http://www.rferl.org/content/Georgia_Russia_Begin_Prisoner_Exchange/1192158.html

130. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Georgia_Exchange_Prisoners/1192128.html

131. http://www.rferl.org/content/Georgia_Russia_Begin_Prisoner_Exchange/1192158.html

132. http://www.rferl.org/content/Diplomatic_Tensions_Grow_Amid_GoSlow_Pullback/1192483.html

133. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Rejects_UN_Security_Council_Resolution/1192538.html

134. http://www.rferl.org/content/Diplomatic_Tensions_Grow_Amid_GoSlow_Pullback/1192483.html

135. http://www.rferl.org/content/Abkhazia_To_Ask_Russia_To_Recognize_Independence/1192571.html

136. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Pulls_Back_Some_Forces_But_Stills_Holds_Key_Points_/1192734.html



139. http://www.rferl.org/content/UN_Security_Council_Divided_On_Georgia_Resolution/1192992.html

APPENDIX B

XXIII

140. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russian_Troops_Begin_To_Withdraw_From_Georgia/1193177.html

141. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Warns_Moldova_Against_Georgian_Mistake/1193614.html

142. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Recognizes_Abkhazia_South_Ossetia/1193932.html

143. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russian_Upper_House_Calls_For_Recognition_Of_Georgias_Breakaway_Regions/1

193553.html

144. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russian_Upper_House_Calls_For_Recognition_Of_Georgias_Breakaway_Regions/1

193553.html


146. http://www.rferl.org/content/West_Condemns_Russian_Recognition_Of_Rebel_Regions/1194155.html


148. http://www.rferl.org/content/SCO_Fails_To_Back_Russia_Over_Georgia/1194578.html

149. http://www.rferl.org/content/Putin_US_Politics_Georgia_Crisis/1194674.html

150. http://www.rferl.org/content/Putin_US_Politics_Georgia_Crisis/1194674.html

151. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Links_Its_Help_On_Iran_To_Georgia_Dispute_/1194774.html

152. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Says_Georgian_Breakup_Is_Irreversible/1194782.html

153. http://www.rferl.org/content/British_PM_Says_West_Wont_Be_Held_Ransom_To_Russia/1195188.html

154. http://www.rferl.org/content/British_PM_Says_West_Wont_Be_Held_Ransom_To_Russia/1195188.html

155. http://www.rferl.org/content/EU_Summit_To_Reevaluate_Relations_With_Russia/1195361.html

156. http://www.rferl.org/content/EU_Summit_To_Reevaluate_Relations_With_Russia/1195361.html

157. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Seeks_International_Police_Presence_In_Georgia/1195441.html

158. http://www.rferl.org/content/Medvedev_Says_US_Support_For_Georgia_Is_A_Mistake/1195850.html

159. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Regrets_EU_Decision_On_Partnership_Talks_/1195696.html

160. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Regrets_EU_Decision_On_Partnership_Talks_/1195696.html

161. http://www.rferl.org/content/Security_Treaty_Leaders_Condemn_Georgia_For_Aggression_/1196765.html

162. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Seeks_Backing_Over_Georgia_At_CSTO_Summit/1196550.html

163. http://www.rferl.org/content/Medvedev_West_Provocation_Black_Sea/1196878.html


165. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Agrees_Troops_Pullout_From_Georgia_Heartland/1197424.html

166. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Agrees_Troops_Pullout_From_Georgia_Heartland/1197424.html

167. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Plans_7600_Georgian_Rebel_Regions/1197656.html

168. http://www.rferl.org/content/Medvedev_Would_Attack_Georgia_Even_If_On_NATO_Track/1199555.html

169. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russian_Military_Leave_Georgian_Port_Of_Poti/1199722.html

170. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russian_Foreign_Minister_Visits_Georgian_Rebel_Regions/1199896.html

171. http://www.rferl.org/content/EU_NATO_Try_To_Keep_Up_In_Georgia/1200084.html

172. http://www.rferl.org/content/EU_NATO_Try_To_Keep_Up_In_Georgia/1200084.html

UKRAINE 2009




176. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Threatens_Ukraine_With_Sanctions_Over_Unpaid_Gas_Bill/1363487.html


178. http://en.rian.ru/business/20081229/119220791.html

179. http://www.rferl.org/content/Gazprom_Says_Gas_Price_For_Ukraine_Could_More_Than_Double/1364838.html









APPENDIX B

XXIV


















TAJIKISTAN 2011

205. http://www.rferl.org/content/politicians_say_moscow_should_take_revenge_against_dusanbe/24386074.html


207. http://www.rferl.org/content/russian_response_to_tajik_court_ruling_gains_in_clarity/24388218.html





212. http://www.rferl.org/archive/Russia/20111201/666/666.html




APPENDIX C

I

APPENDIX C

The following tables present the activity summary for each power ministry during the crisis, as

collected in Appendix B. The top table presents the activity summary, and the lower table shows this

activity as a percentage. These percentages are achieved through summing up all activity for a

particular crisis, and dividing a power ministry’s activity by the summed up total, thus getting a

percentage.

UKRAINE 2004

PR

ESIDEN

T

PR

IME

MIN

ISTER

FOR

EIGN

MIN

ISTRY

DU

MA

FEDER

ATIO

N

CO

UN

CIL

FINA

NC

E

MIN

ISTRY

ENER

GY

MIN

ISTRY

DEFEN

SE

MIN

ISTRY

EMER

GEN

CY

SITUA

TION

S

MIN

ISTRY

FSB

3 0 7 6 1 0 0 0 0 0

PR

ESIDEN

T

PR

IME

MIN

ISTER

FOR

EIGN

MIN

ISTRY

DU

MA

FEDER

ATIO

N

CO

UN

CIL

FINA

NC

E

MIN

ISTRY

ENER

GY

MIN

ISTRY

DEFEN

SE

MIN

ISTRY

EMER

GEN

CY

SITUA

TION

S

MIN

ISTRY

FSB

18 % 0 41 % 35 % 6 % 0 0 0 0 0

LITHUANIA 2006 P

RESID

ENT

PR

IME

MIN

ISTER

FOR

EIGN

MIN

ISTRY

DU

MA

FEDER

ATIO

N

CO

UN

CIL

FINA

NC

E

MIN

ISTRY

ENER

GY

MIN

ISTRY

DEFEN

SE

MIN

ISTRY

EMER

GEN

CY

SITUA

TION

S

MIN

ISTRY

FSB

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0

PR

ESIDEN

T

PR

IME

MIN

ISTER

FOR

EIGN

MIN

ISTRY

DU

MA

FEDER

ATIO

N

CO

UN

CIL

FINA

NC

E

MIN

ISTRY

ENER

GY

MIN

ISTRY

DEFEN

SE

MIN

ISTRY

EMER

GEN

CY

SITUA

TION

S

MIN

ISTRY

FSB

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100% 0

APPENDIX C

II

ESTONIA 2007

PR

ESIDEN

T

PR

IME

MIN

ISTER

FOR

EIGN

MIN

ISTRY

DU

MA

FEDER

ATIO

N

CO

UN

CIL

FINA

NC

E

MIN

ISTRY

ENER

GY

MIN

ISTRY

DEFEN

SE

MIN

ISTRY

EMER

GEN

CY

SITUA

TION

S

MIN

ISTRY

FSB

2 0 8 2 1 1 0 0 0 0

PR

ESIDEN

T

PR

IME

MIN

ISTER

FOR

EIGN

MIN

ISTRY

DU

MA

FEDER

ATIO

N

CO

UN

CIL

FINA

NC

E

MIN

ISTR

Y

ENER

GY

MIN

ISTRY

DEFEN

SE

MIN

ISTRY

EMER

GEN

CY

SITUA

TION

S

MIN

ISTRY

FSB

14 % 0 57 % 14 % 7 % 7 % 0 0 0 0

UK 2007

PR

ESIDEN

T

PR

IME

MIN

ISTER

FOR

EIGN

MIN

ISTRY

DU

MA

FEDER

ATIO

N

CO

UN

CIL

FINA

NC

E

MIN

ISTRY

ENER

GY

MIN

ISTRY

DEFEN

SE

MIN

ISTRY

EMER

GEN

CY

SITUA

TION

S

MIN

ISTRY

FSB

2 0 12 0 0 0 0 1 0 3

P

RESID

ENT

PR

IME

MIN

ISTER

FOR

EIGN

MIN

ISTRY

DU

MA

FEDER

ATIO

N

CO

UN

CIL

FINA

NC

E

MIN

ISTRY

ENER

GY

MIN

ISTRY

DEFEN

SE

MIN

ISTRY

EMER

GEN

CY

SITUA

TION

S

MIN

ISTRY

FSB

11 % 0 66 % 0 0 0 0 5 % 0 17 %

APPENDIX C

III

BELARUS 2007

PR

ESIDEN

T

PR

IME

MIN

ISTER

FOR

EIGN

MIN

ISTRY

DU

MA

FEDER

ATIO

N

CO

UN

CIL

FINA

NC

E

MIN

ISTRY

ENER

GY

MIN

ISTRY

DEFEN

SE

MIN

ISTRY

EMER

GEN

CY

SITUA

TION

S

MIN

ISTRY

FSB

8 3 1 0 0 5 1 0 0 0

PR

ESIDEN

T

PR

IME

MIN

ISTER

FOR

EIGN

MIN

ISTRY

DU

MA

FEDER

ATIO

N

CO

UN

CIL

FINA

NC

E

MIN

ISTRY

ENER

GY

MIN

ISTRY

DEFEN

SE

MIN

ISTRY

EMER

GEN

CY

SITUA

TION

S

MIN

ISTRY

FSB

44 % 17 % 5.5 % 0 0 28 % 5.5 % 0 0 0

GEORGIA 2008

PR

ESIDEN

T

PR

IME

MIN

ISTER

FOR

EIGN

MIN

ISTRY

DU

MA

FEDER

ATIO

N

CO

UN

CIL

FINA

NC

E

MIN

ISTRY

ENER

GY

MIN

ISTRY

DEFEN

SE

MIN

ISTRY

EMER

GEN

CY

SITUA

TION

S

MIN

ISTRY

FSB

26 8 39 1 2 0 0 26 1 1

P

RESID

ENT

PR

IME

MIN

ISTER

FOR

EIGN

MIN

ISTRY

DU

MA

FEDER

ATIO

N

CO

UN

CIL

FINA

NC

E

MIN

ISTRY

ENER

GY

MIN

ISTRY

DEFEN

SE

MIN

ISTRY

EMER

GEN

CY

SITUA

TION

S

MIN

ISTRY

FSB

25 % 8 % 37 % 1 % 2 % 0 0 25 % 1 % 1 %

APPENDIX C

IV

UKRAINE 2009

PR

ESIDEN

T

PR

IME

MIN

ISTER

FOR

EIGN

MIN

ISTRY

DU

MA

FEDER

ATIO

N

CO

UN

CIL

FINA

NC

E

MIN

ISTRY

ENER

GY

MIN

ISTRY

DEFEN

SE

MIN

ISTRY

EMER

GEN

CY

SITUA

TION

S

MIN

ISTRY

FSB

12 18 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PR

ESIDEN

T

PR

IME

MIN

ISTER

FOR

EIGN

MIN

ISTRY

DU

MA

FEDER

ATIO

N

CO

UN

CIL

FINA

NC

E

MIN

ISTRY

ENER

GY

MIN

ISTRY

DEFEN

SE

MIN

ISTRY

EMER

GEN

CY

SITUA

TION

S

MIN

ISTRY

FSB

38 % 56 % 6 % 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

TAJIKISTAN 2011

PR

ESIDEN

T

PR

IME

MIN

ISTER

FOR

EIGN

MIN

ISTRY

DU

MA

FEDER

ATIO

N

CO

UN

CIL

FINA

NC

E

MIN

ISTRY

ENER

GY

MIN

ISTRY

DEFEN

SE

MIN

ISTRY

EMER

GEN

CY

SITUA

TION

S

MIN

ISTRY

FSB

3 0 6 1 1 0 0 0 0 0

P

RESID

ENT

PR

IME

MIN

ISTER

FOR

EIGN

MIN

ISTRY

DU

MA

FEDER

ATIO

N

CO

UN

CIL

FINA

NC

E

MIN

ISTRY

ENER

GY

MIN

ISTRY

DEFEN

SE

MIN

ISTRY

EMER

GEN

CY

SITUA

TION

S

MIN

ISTRY

FSB

27 % 0 54 % 9 % 9 % 0 0 0 0 0

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