A STUDY OF PART 3 LOCAL GOVERNMENT (BUILDING &

MISCELLANEOUSPROVISIONS)ACT1993(TAS)

IsitEffectiveRegulationforSubdivisioninTasmania?

AnnMargueriteHarknessHamiltonBA/LLBHons(UTAS),MTax(UNSW)

AthesissubmittedinfulfilmentoftherequirementsofaMastersDegreeinLaw

attheFacultyofLaw,UniversityofTasmania

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DECLARATION

Thisthesiscontainsnomaterialwhichhasbeenacceptedforaotherdegreeor

diplomabytheUniversityoranyotherinstitution,exceptbywayofbackground

information and duly acknowledged in the thesis, and to the best of my

knowledge and belief, nomaterial previously published orwritten by another

person,exceptwheredueacknowledgementismadeinthetextofthethesis,nor

doesthethesiscontainanymaterialthatinfringescopyright.

The research associated with this thesis abides by the National Statement on

Ethical Conduct in Human Research (NHMRC 2007 Updated 2015) and the

rulingsoftheTasmanianSocialSciencesHumanResearchEthicsCommittee.

AnnMargueriteHarknessHamilton

This thesis may be made available for loan and limited copying and

communicationinaccordancewiththeCopyrightAct1968.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis studies Part 3 of the Local Government (Building & Miscellaneous

Provisions)Act1993 (Tas),which is theprevailing legislation forsubdivision in

Tasmania. As such, Part 3 plays an important role in Tasmania’s planning

regulatorysystem.Thatsystemiscurrentlythesubjectofsignificantreform.The

reform program does not, however, include a review of Part 3. The study

undertakenbythisthesisconductsalimitedreviewofPart3andthatstudyand

review is informed by theory as to the effectiveness of regulation. Regulatory

theorists identify reviewof regulation as an importantmeans of ensuring it is

effective.Suchreviewservestoidentifyissuesthatdetractfromtheeffectiveness

of regulation and is a means by which regulationmay be refined and remain

relevant and efficient. This study notes issues that reduce the effectiveness of

Part3asregulationofsubdivisioninTasmania.Thoseissuesincludeout-dated,

unclearlanguage,provisionsthatreflectnowredundantpolicy,andcumbersome

procedures.

This study also raises other broader andmore far-reaching issues. The lack of

integration of Part 3 into the planning system established under theLandUse

Planning and Approvals Act 1993 (Tas) has implications for the ability of

Tasmania’splanningsystemtooperateasacohesiveandintegratedwhole.This

examination also highlights the uneasy interaction between subdivision

regulationaspartofaplanningsystemfoundedinpublicpolicyandtheTorrens

land registration system that is focused on the registration of paramount

interestsinland.ThisstudyofPart3LocalGovernment(Building&Miscellaneous

Provisions)Act1993(Tas)callsattentiontothecomplexitiesthatarisefromthat

interaction and points to some of the implications of failing to adequately

addressthem.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Thankyoutomysupervisors,DrLyndenGriggsandDrBrendanGogarty.

Thankyoutothosepeopleinterviewedforthisthesisandwhogavewillinglyof

their time, experience and knowledge. Thank you to the Law Society of

Tasmania, the Local Government Association of Tasmania, the Surveying and

SpatialSciencesInstitute(TasDivision),thePlanningInstitute(TasDivision)and

theRecorderofTitlesfortheirassistanceinrelationtothoseinterviews.

Thank you to Tim Tierney and the members of the Law Society of Tasmania

Commercial and Property Law Committee for their help and interest.

ThankyoutothestaffoftheLawFacultyLibrary(UTAS),theAndrewInglisClark

LibraryandtheTasmanianParliamentaryLibrary.

ThankyoutoJohnDentandtothemanyotherpeoplewhoworkdailywithPart

3andwhohaveexpressedinterestinthisthesis.

Thankyoutomysons,NickandJock.

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TABLEOFCONTENTS

Chapter1Introduction 1

I Part3andtheTasmanianPlanningReforms 2

II TheLackofReview 3

III ResearchMethodology,MethodandStructure 4

A IntroducingRegulatoryTheory 4

B EmpiricalandDoctrinalResearch 7

C LimitsofthisThesis 11

D Structure 14

Chapter2BackgroundandContext 19

I TheTensionsunderlying PlanningRegulation 19

II PlanningReforminTasmania 22

III TheTaskofSubdivisionRegulation 25

Chapter3TheoryastoEffectiveRegulationandthePolicy

underpinningplanningregulation 31

I RegulatoryTheory–effectiveregulation 31

A Thereasonswhyweregulate 31

B ThepolicyunderpinningplanningregulationinAustralia 33

C Thetestforregulation 38

D Efficiency 39

E PoliticalAcceptability 40

F Designingeffectiveregulation 41

G EffectiveRegulation 43

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Chapter4 TheRoleofthePrevailingRegulationforSubdivision

inTasmania 45

I Context&Background 45

II TheTorrensSystemofLandRegistration 50

III Tasmania’sPlanningSystem 54

IV Part3–ItsplaceintheLUPAASystem 60

A TheProvisionsofPart3andtheirPlaceinTasmania’s

PlanningSystem 62

B ‘Councils’and‘PlanningAuthorities’ 68

V Conclusion 73

Chapter5 HoweffectiveisTasmania’sSubdivisionLegislation? 75

I TheLanguageofPart3andEffectiveRegulation 77

A AdhesionOrders 79

B PublicOpenSpace 83

II Part3andtheLandRegistrationSystem 89

A RoadTitleProvisions 90

B CovenantsandEasements 93

III Conclusion 99

Chapter6 LeasesasSubdivisions-IneffectiveRegulation 101

I LeasesasSubdivisions 102

II LeasesasSubdivisionsinTasmania 113

III IndefeasibilityandPlanningRegulation 119

IV Conclusion 126

Chapter7 Conclusion 127

I Part3aspartofTasmania’splanningsystem 127

II Part3-Ineffectiveregulation? 129

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III TheLeaseasSubdivisionProvisions 131

IV Issuesforfurtherresearch 131

V Conclusion 132

Appendix 135

Bibliography 139

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CHAPTER1-INTRODUCTION

This thesis studies Part 3 Local Government (Building and Miscellaneous

Provisions) Act 1993 (Tas), legislation that is part of Tasmania’s planning and

localgovernmentregulatorysystem.Part3wasintroducedaspartofsubstantial

reviewandreformofTasmania’slocalgovernmentandplanninglegislationthat

tookplacein1993.TheplanningreformswerefocusedontheLandUsePlanning

andApprovalsAct 1993 (Tas) (‘LUPAA’) and the StatePolicies andProjectsAct

1993 (Tas). Five bills were also introduced to reform the local government

legislation. The Local Government (Building & Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill

1993wasoneofthem.Part3oftheBillwasameansoftransposingtheexisting

regulation for subdivision from the Local Government Act 1962 into the 1993

LUPAAsystem. Thesolutionwasintendedtobetemporaryonly.Itwastobea

means of enabling local government to carry out the important functions

assignedtoitofregulatinghealth,building,andsubdivisionpendingthedrafting

ofnewlegislationtoreplaceitinthecomingmonths.1TheActhashowevernot

beenrepealedandPart3stillapplies.

Section 122 of Part 3 of the Local Government (Building & Miscellaneous

Provisions) Act 1993 (Tas) provides that it is the prevailing legislation for

subdivision inTasmania.Acknowledgingthe importanceofplanningregulation

andthecomplexityofthetaskitfaces,thisthesishaschosentopresentastudy

of Part 3 and to ask whether it is effective as regulation for subdivision in

TasmaniaandaspartofTasmania’splanningsystem.

The aim of this thesis is to make a timely and relevant contribution to the

practical world in which Part 3 applies, at a time when substantial reform is

again underway for Tasmania’s planning system. The study of Part 3 is

conducted through analysis of the results of both empirical and doctrinal

research in the context of the work of theorists who have considered how

1Tasmania,ParliamentaryDebates,LegislativeCouncil,10November1993,4588(PMcKay).

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regulation isor isnot effective.With theaimof anchoring the researchof this

thesis in that practical world, the author conducted interviews with those

workingonadailybasiswithPart3inTasmanianlegal,planning,surveyingand

landregistrationsystems.Regulatorytheoryastotheeffectivenessofregulation

is employed as a framework and background to the discussion of the issues

raisedbytheinterviewees.Doctrinal analysis of the legislation is also applied

againstthatframeworkandbackground.

IPART3ANDTASMANIANPLANNINGREFORMS

IncommonwithotherAustralianjurisdictions,2theTasmanianplanningsystem

is undergoing significant reform designed to establish a system that will be

‘fairer, faster, cheaper and simpler…’3The current reforms are designed to

tackle‘Tasmania’soverlycomplexplanningsystem[that]hasbeenahandbrake

on investmentand jobs.’4ThePropertyCouncilofAustraliahasconfirmed that

viewofTasmania’splanningsystemasithasconsistentlyawardedthewooden

spoontoTasmania’splanningsystem.5TheaimsoftheTasmanianGovernment

reflectpressuretostreamlinetheplanningprocess.Suchpressureisacommon

driverofreformtoAustralianplanningsystems inabid tostimulateeconomic

activity.6

ThecentrepieceoftheTasmanianreformsisasinglestate-wideplanningscheme

intended to replace the30 schemes that currently exist. There is howeverno

proposal to review and reform Part 3 of the Local Government (Building and

2ProductivityCommissionofAustralia,‘PerformanceBenchmarkingofAustralianBusinessRegulation:Planning,ZoningandDevelopmentAssessment’(ResearchReport),April2011,Volume1,[3.4]summarisesrecentandproposedAustralianplanningsystemreforms;seealsoPropertyCouncilofAustralia,‘DevelopmentAssessment2015ReportCard’(AssessmentReport)May2015,Chapter2;NicoleGurran,PatriciaAustinandChristineWhitehead,‘Thatsoundsfamiliar!AdecadeofplanningreforminAustralia,EnglandandNewZealand’(2014)51(2)AustralianPlanner186,PhilippaEngland,‘RegulatoryObesity,theNewmandietandoutcomesforplanninglawinQueensland’(2015)32EnvironmentalandPlanningLawJournal60.3WillHodgmanPremierofTasmaniaannouncementbyPeterGutweinTreasurerTasmania17May2014,<http://www.premier.tas.gov.au/releases/tasmanian_plannng_reform_taskforce_announced>4Ibid.5PropertyCouncilofAustralia,aboven2,8-9.6PeterWilliams,‘Thecourseofstatutoryplanningsystemreformandfast-trackingdevelopment’(2014)31EnvironmentalandPlanningLawJournal439;seealsoPropertyCouncilofAustralia,aboven2,74.

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MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993. The researchof this thesis identifiesboth a

lackofunderstandingoftheroleandcontentsofPart3andafailuretointegrate

Part3withtheplanningsystemestablishedunderLUPAAthatmayexplainthe

failuretoappreciatetheneedforitsreformandreview.

IITHELACKOFREVIEW

Someof the provisions of Part 3were carried forward fromearlier legislation

and in the absence of review and replacement they have become permanent

fixtures, irrespective of their relevance or the clarity of their language. An

exampleiss109oftheLocalGovernment(BuildingandMiscellaneousProvisions)

Act 1993 (Tas). 7 This one section spans five A4 pages and consists of 9

subsections. The section provides for minimum lot sizes and s 84 of Part 3

prohibitsacouncil fromapprovingasubdivision ifanyof the lotsdonotmeet

the minimum standards of s 109. The Land Use Planning and Approvals

Amendment(StreamliningofProcess)Act2014 enacted streamlining reforms in

anticipationoftheintroductionofthenewplanningscheme.Sections84and109

ofPart3wereamendedbyss54and56ofthatAct.Theamendmentsenableless

prescriptiveplanningschemeprovisionsastolotsizetohaveeffect.Section109

neverthelessremains.Thewordsofs109werecarriedforwardfroms185ofthe

HobartCorporationAct1947 into s 472 of theLocalGovernmentAct1962 and

thenceintoPart3.Thesectionreferstobuildingareas,aclassificationthatisno

longerrelevantanddatesbacktoatimewhensubdivisioncontrolappliedonly

tolandwithinbuildingareas.8

Astheneedtoamends84demonstrates,suchprescriptiveprovisionspre-date

the planning system that was established under the Land Use Planning and

Approvals Act 1993 (Tas). They reflect the language and policies of an earlier

planning regulatory environment. When it was enacted, Part 3 was not

integratedwiththeLUPAAsystemanditisstillnotintegratedwiththatsystem.

TheTasmanianAttorney-GeneralreferredtoPart3whensheacknowledgedin

7Thissectionwasreferredtowithbothbemusementandfrustrationbysomeoftheintervieweesspokentoforthisthesis,asanexampleofbotharchaiclanguageandredundancy.InterviewswithLawyer1,19thSeptember2016;Surveyor2,11thOctober2016.8LocalGovernmentAct1962,s470(2).

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2014, that despite ‘…years of intent it has not been reviewed or consolidated

withLUPAAproperly.’9Thosefamiliarwithitsprovisionsandwhoareobligedto

applyanddealwithitonaday-to-daybasishavehighlightedthelackofreview

of Part 3 of the Local Government (Building and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act

1993(Tas).TheLocalGovernmentAssociationofTasmania, inasubmissionon

theGovernment’sproposedplanning systemreforms, reported theopinionsof

itsmembers.ThosememberscalledforprioritytobegiventotherepealofPart

3 and the incorporation of its provisions into the Land Use Planning and

ApprovalsAct1993.10

Similaropinionswerereportedina2012thesisonissuesrelatedtoPublicOpen

Space in Southern Tasmania. In that thesis, Boss reported on interviews with

both council-employed planning and asset management staff and non-council

planning staff. 11 One of the council employed strategic planning managers

describedtheprovisionsofPart3as‘…datingbacktotheArk.’12Bossconcluded

byidentifyingtheinadequacyofthelegislativeframeworkforpublicopenspace

innewsubdivisionsastheprimereasonwhysufficientqualitypublicopenspace

cannotbedeliveredbytheTasmanianplanningsystem.13

IIIRESEARCHMETHODOLOGY,METHODANDSTRUCTURE

A IntroducingRegulatoryTheory

This thesis asks whether Part 3 of the Local Government (Building and

Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1993 is effective as regulation for subdivision in

Tasmania. Inbothaskingandansweringthatquestionthisthesishasturnedto

theworkof regulatory theorists.Theoristshave identified thereasonswhywe

regulate, the form regulationmay take, andwhat it is that renders regulation

9Tasmania,ParliamentaryDebates,LegislativeCouncil,19November2014,DrVGoodwin.10LocalGovernmentAssociationofTasmania,SubmissiononreformingTasmania’sPlanningSystemPositionPaper,2ndOctober2014,14.11IndraBoss,‘Inwhatwaysdopolicyandplanningdeliverqualityurbanpublicopenspace?PerspectivesfromSouthernTasmania’(MastersThesis,SchoolofGeography&EnvironmentalStudies,UniversityofTasmania,2012)51.12Ibid.13Ibid,86.

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effective and why it may be ineffective. The work of theorists provides a

frameworkandunderpinningstructureforthisstudyofPart3.14

Effectivenessofregulationiscentraltotheframeworkunderpinningthisstudy,

andefficiencyisakeyelementofeffectiveregulation.Theeconomicanalysisof

law conducted by Ronald Coase15assists identification of the true costs of

regulation. Analysts and designers of regulation have sought to maximise its

effectivenessandtheconceptofresponsiveregulationhasledtotheadoptionof

innovative regulatory techniques. The work of Holley and Gunningham 16

considers the use of those techniques in the design and operation of effective

planning and environmental regulation. Karen Yeung’s 17 work analyses

compliance with regulation and explains how regulation that is viewed as

irrelevantorredundantencouragesnon-compliance.

Regulation is the subjectofdifferentdefinitions,18and regulatory toolsmaybe

many and varied.19Primary legislation is only one of the regulatory tools

available as regulation spans a spectrum.20At one end of the spectrum is

decentred regulation that views regulation as extending beyond action and

enforcementbythestate. Attheotherendiscommand-and-controlregulation

14JuliaBlack,‘Criticalreflectionsonregulation’(2002)27AustralianJournalofLegalPhilosophy,1,11;JuliaBlackRulesandRegulators(ClarendonPress1997);ChristineParkerandJohnBraithwaite,‘Regulation’inPeterCaneandMarkTushnet(eds)TheOxfordHandbookofLegalStudies(OxfordUniversityPress2003);IanAyresandJohnBraithwaite,ResponsiveRegulation:Transcendingthederegulationdebate,(OxfordUniversityPress1992);BronwenMorganandKarenYeung,AnIntroductiontoLawandRegulation(CambridgeUniversityPress2007);ArieFreiberg,TheToolsofRegulation(TheFederationPress2011);NeilGunninghamandPeterGrabosky,SmartRegulation,DesigningEnvironmentalPolicy(OxfordUniversityPress1998).15RonaldHCoase,‘TheproblemofSocialCost’(1960)IIITheJournalofLawandEconomics1;16CameronHolleyandNeilGunningham,‘EnvironmentImprovementPlans:Facilitativeregulationinpractice’(2006)23EnvironmentalandPlanningLawJournal44817KarenYeung,SecuringCompliance(HartPublishing2004).18JuliaBlack,‘Criticalreflectionsonregulation’(2002)27AustralianJournalofLegalPhilosophy,1,1.19Forexamplesofthe‘everexpandingconcept’ofregulationseeJuliaBlackaboven18,16;andforoptionsavailableinenvironmentalregulationGunninghamandGraboskyaboven14,Table‘summaryofinstrumentmixes’428-9.20Freiberg,aboven14,85,Fig61,6b‘Thetoolsofgovernment’.

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asprimarily’alawandstate-centredprocessoflegislativeactioncombinedwith

administrativeenforcement.’21

Thisthesisadoptsa‘pragmaticapproach,’22anddefinesregulationaccordingto

whatitwantstodowithit.TheaimofthisthesisistostudyandreviewPart3

LocalGovernment(Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993(Tas) inaway

that is relevant to and anchored in, the practical world in which the Part is

applied. For this thesis, regulation is what the Australian government has

defineditas:‘Anyruleendorsedbygovernmentwherethereisanexpectationof

compliance.’23

Regulatory theorists may refer to regulation as being ‘good’ or ‘bad’ as this

comment by the editors of the first issue of Regulation and Governance

demonstrates:

Badregulation,afterall,candoterriblethingstopeople.Goodregulation

cancontrolproblems thatmightotherwise lead tobankruptcyandwar,

andcanemancipatethelivesofordinarypeople.Mediocre,unimaginative

regulationthatoccupiesthespacebetweengoodandbadregulationleads

to results that are correspondingly between the extremes of good and

bad.24

Referencesto“good”,“bad”,and“better”areincludedinthisthesisbecausethey

havebeenusedinaparticularcitationorquotationandaremadewithoutintent

tomakeamoralorvaluesjudgment.

Chapter3presentsageneraloutlineoftheregulatorytheoryemployedasalens

or framework through which to study Part 3. Although theorists highlight

21ParkerandBraithwaite,aboven14,127.22Freiberg,aboven14,4citingJuliaBlack,‘Criticalreflectionsonregulation’aboven18.23AustralianGovernmentGuidetoRegulation<https://www.cuttingredtape.gov.au/sites/default/files/files/Australian_Government_Guide_to_Regulation.pdf>3.24JohnBraithwaite,CaryCoglianeseandDavidLevi-Faur,‘Canregulationandgovernancemakeadifference?’(2007)1RegulationandGovernance1,4.

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elements of what is effective regulation, this thesis uses those elements as a

structure for its examination of Part 3, rather than as a set of criteria against

whichtoassessPart3.Effectiveregulationachievesitspolicygoalandchapter3

presentsasummaryofthedevelopmentofplanningregulationinAustraliaand

in Tasmania. The chapter highlights the public interest considerations that

underpintheregulationandthatthisthesisemploystostudytheeffectivenessof

Part3.

B. EmpiricalandDoctrinalResearch

TheaimofthisthesisistoreflectandtoberelevanttotheworldinwhichPart3

is appliedand toensure that its researchhas ‘apracticalpoint’.25Inpursuitof

that goal, this thesis combines doctrinal and empirical research. Doctrinal

analysis is employed to identify the law as represented by Part 3 of theLocal

Government (Building and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1993 as part of

Tasmania’splanningsystem,andtoreachaconclusionastowhatthat‘lawisand

the inconsistencies it contains.‘26 Conscious that ‘doctrinal scholarship in a

vacuum losesmuch of its value,’27this thesis also turns to empirical research.

Empirical research ‘has thepotential togenerateunique insights into law’28by

enabling an appreciationof how law identified throughdoctrinal research and

analysisand‘learnedinbooksisunderstoodandappliedinpractice.’29Inpursuit

of those insights, semi-structured interviewswere conductedwithTasmanians

whowork on a daily basiswith Part 3 andwho are involved in applying it to

developmentassessmentinTasmania.

The author sent invitations through professional and industry bodies whose

membersareroutinelyinvolvedintheapplicationofandcompliancewithPart3.

Acopyof the invitation letter isAnnexureAto this thesis. Thosewillingtobe

interviewed responded by email with the responses saved to the secure

25MartinDixon,‘Adoctrinalapproachtopropertylawscholarship:Whocaresandwhy?”(2014)3PropertyLawReview,16026Ibid,160.27,Ibid,165.28LisaWhitehouseandSusanBright,‘Theempiricalapproachtoresearchinpropertylaw’(2014)3PropertyLawReview,176.29Ibid,177.

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computer network of the University of Tasmania. The organisations chosen

weretheLawSocietyofTasmania, theSurveyingandSpatialSciences Institute

(Tasmanian Division) and the Local Government Association of Tasmania. A

consultantexperiencedinthecadastralsystemandwiththeimplementationof

developmentproposalswasinvitedasoneknowntotheauthorandreferredto

byseveralintervieweesasfamiliarwithnotonlyPart3,butalsothelegislation

that preceded it, theLocalGovernmentAct1962. An invitationwas sent to the

RecorderofTitlesandthroughapersonalcontactoftheauthortothePlanning

Institute.Someoftheinitialintervieweeswhorespondedtotheinvitationletter

suggestedothersintheirfieldtowhomacopyoftheinvitationletterwassentor

whoattendedinterviewswiththeoriginalrespondent.

Therewere fifteen respondents and the author travelled to interview them at

locationsinNorth-WestTasmania,LauncestonandHobart.Theinterviewswere

conducted over a period of four weeks in September and October 2016.

Interviews ranged from 40minutes to 90minutes with the average being 50

minutes long. Of the fifteen people interviewed, six were local government

employees, fourwere state service employees, threewere lawyers, one a self-

employed cadastral/development consultant and one a surveyor in private

practice. All but one interviewee had at least sixteen years of experiencewith

Tasmania’s subdivision regulation with the majority having 20-30 years

experienceandinthecaseoftwointerviewees,40plusyears.

Theauthormadehandwrittennotesduring the interviews thatwere reviewed

and transcribedand sentwithin2-3daysof each interview to the interviewee

witharequestthattheybecheckedandamendedastheintervieweethoughtfit,

in order to correct errors and to accurately record the interviewee’s intent.

Responses were received from all of the respondents and amendments were

made as requested.A summaryof themain issues raised andof the interview

processwassentbyemailtointervieweesinlateMarch2017.Theinterviewees

arereferredtointhisthesisbyoccupationandanumber,withfootnotestothe

dateoftheinterview.Intheinterestsofanonymitytheplaceoftheinterviewis

notincludedinthereference.

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Common themes emergedduring the interviews andwere sharedby those on

thedevelopers’sideofthefence,thoseontheassessmentsideandthosecharged

with implementing subdivision proposals. Those concerns focused on the

difficulty of the language, the existence of redundant provisions and the

impracticalityandexpenseofsomeoftheproceduresestablishedunderPart3.

The interviewees were of the unanimous opinion that review of Part 3 is

overdue,withvariation inemphasisas to theproblems reflecting thedifferent

roles played by a particular interviewee in the planning assessment and

developmentsystem.

Those engaged in local government also identified the importance of Part 3

provisions to the function of the local government system. They expressed

concern that its importance ispoorlyunderstoodandemphasised theneed for

thattobetakenintoaccountandforconsultationwiththemduringanyreview.

The interview letter referred to broad underlying policy questions that are

referred to in the sectionof this chapter entitled ‘Limits to thisThesis.’ Given

thattheinvitationsweresenttogroups,themembersofwhicharefamiliarwith

and regularly work with Part 3, the questions were deliberately broad. The

author’s hope was that the outline of regulatory theory and broad questions

would provide a starting point from which interviewees would respond and

volunteerinformationandcommentsastotheirownexperienceinworkingwith

Part 3. That proved to be the case. The concerns highlighted in the invitation

letterswererelegatedtothesidelinesduringalloftheinterviews.Themajority

of interviewees quickly expressed their frustration and concern with the

developmentsystemandtheplaceofPart3init.These‘representativeaccounts

ofhow[Part3]operatesinpractice’,30informedthedoctrinalresearch.

TheinvitationletterhighlightedthequestionoftherelationshipbetweenPart3

and the land registration system and interviewees responded to that question

andspokeoftheircommondifficultywithparticularprovisions.Theircomments

on the provisions coveringAdhesionOrders, road titles and covenants led the30Ibid,177.

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authortoconductthedoctrinalresearchthatisreportedinchapter6.Thepublic

open space provisions of Part 3were not identified as a separate topic in the

invitation letters. However several of the interviewees engaged in preparing

subdivisionproposalsandinassessingthem,quickly identifiedthepublicopen

space provisions as a significant problem. This led the author to research this

aspect of planning regulation in Tasmania. The common issues raised by the

intervieweesformthestructureandfocusforthereviewofPart3thatfollowsin

Chapter5.

The inclusion of leases within subdivision is a common provision of planning

systems in Australia, New Zealand and also in some Canadian jurisdictions.

Posing the question “does it work?” to the lease as subdivision provisions

highlights the issues theorists have identified as they have consideredwhat is

effective regulation and how it may fail to be so. In Tasmania the issues are

compounded,asthescopeofleasesthatfallwithinthedefinitionisunclear.The

leaseassubdivisionprovisionsthatwerereferredtointheinvitationletterwere

not identifiedas significantproblemsbymanyof the Interviewees.That result

perhaps reflects that surveyors and local government planners (rather than

lawyers required to advise on the provisions) made up the majority of

interviewees.Theresearchandanalysisintotheleaseassubdivisionprovisions

(presented in chapter 7) is consequently the result of largely doctrinal rather

thanempiricalresearch.

Inabidtomakean‘arguablycorrectandcompletestatementofthelaw,onthe

matterinhand’31thedoctrinalresearchofthisthesisreferstojudgmentsofthe

SupremeCourtanddecisionsoftheResourceManagementandAppealTribunal

(‘RMPAT’)andthecaselawandlegislationofotherAustralianandinternational

jurisdictionswhererelevantandascomparison.

31TerryHutchinson‘DoctrinalResearch:Researchingthejury’inDawnWatkinsandMandyBurton(eds)ResearchMethodsinLaw(TaylorandFrancis2013)7,10.

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C Limitsofthisthesis

This thesis seeks to review Part 3LocalGovernment (Building&Miscellaneous

Provisions) Act 1993 (Tas) and to answer the question whether it is effective

regulationforsubdivisioninTasmania.Thereviewhighlightsthecomplexityof

Tasmania’splanningsystemandtherole thatPart3plays in it. Someof those

interviewed for this thesis emphasised the importance of meaningful

consultationwith all stakeholders in a review of Part 3 and the value of their

contributionstoanyproposaltoreformorreplacePart3.Thisthesisaccordingly

doesnotattempttoprovideasolutiontowhatisacomplexregulatoryproblem.

ThesolutiontotheproblemspresentedbyPart3willrequireconsultationwith

and the contributions of, all stakeholders concerned with subdivision in

Tasmania.

Part 3 consists of nine divisions and forty-two sections. This study does not

attempt to analyse each section and its primary aim is to anchor its reviewof

Part3tothepracticalworldinwhichPart3isapplied.Theprovisionsthathave

been chosen for review are those that were the subject of comment by the

intervieweesspokentoforthisthesis.

This thesis does not address broader policy issues underlying Tasmania’s

planningandsubdivisionsystem.Suchissuesariseforallplanningsystemsthat

enable the subdivision and development of land and raise the question of the

appropriatevalues tobe reflected in subdivision legislation. Planning systems

must balance not only the demands of those concerned with efficient

developmentononehandandthoseconcernedwithprotectingtheenvironment

on the other, but also the competing social, environmental, and economic

impactsofadevelopment.32

There are other policy issues specific to Tasmania’s planning system that are

beyondthescopeof this thesis toconsider inanydepth.Althoughthese issues

wereflaggedintheinvitationlettersenttointervieweestheirresponsesproved

theywereprimarilyconcernedwithaddressingissuesrelevanttotheireveryday32ProductivityCommission,aboven2,ContexttoReport(NickSherry),III.

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needtoapplyandworkwiththeprovisionsofPart3.Neverthelesssuchissues

meritfurtherresearchandstudy.Briefcommentismadebelowonthreeofthese

issues being (a) the definition of ‘subdivision’ as ‘development’; (b) the Strata

TitlesAct1988;and(c)thedistinctionbetween‘Use’and‘Development’.

(a) Subdivisionasdevelopment

‘Development’ is defined in Tasmania’s planning legislation to include

‘subdivision.’33This treatment of subdivision is consistent with definitions in

other Australian jurisdictions, with the exception of Western Australia.34As

development,subdivisionmustcomplywithaplanningassessmentprocessthat

appliestodevelopmentproposalsingeneral.

Provisions affecting development, such as timeframes for applications to be

assessed, advertising,notificationand consent requirements, appeal rights and

stipulationsastoamendmentandthelifeofapermitwillapplytosubdivisionas

toother formsofdevelopment.The issues surroundingadvertisingandappeal

rights,inparticular,haveattracteddivergentviews.35

It may be that a system that did not include subdivision as ‘development’ as

Tasmania’s does, would allow design and implementation of a planning

assessment and approvals process that acknowledges and is tailored to the

specificchallengesandrequirementsofsubdivision.36

33LandUsePlanning&ApprovalsAct1993(Tas)s3(1);consolidationofparcelsoflandisalsoincludedinthedefinition.34Planning&DevelopmentAct2007(ACT)s7;PlanningAct1999(NT)s3(1);EnvironmentalPlanning&AssessmentAct1979(NSW)s6.2;SustainablePlanningAct2005(Qld)s7;PlanningAct2016(Qld)Sch2;DevelopmentAct1993(SA)s4(1);Planning,Development&InfrastructureAct2016(SA)s3;Planning&EnvironmentAct1987(Vic)S3(1)(d);Planning&DevelopmentAct2005(WA)s4doesnotinclude‘subdivision’asdevelopmentbutDiv2ofPart10providesforapprovalofsubdivisionandcertaintransactions.35ContrastviewsofthePropertyCouncilofAustralia,aboven2,10;LocalGovernmentAssociationofTasmania,aboven10,12andstudybyMadeleineFigg‘Protectingthirdpartyrightsofappeal,protectingtheenvironment:aTasmaniancasestudy’(2014)31EnvironmentalandPlanninglawJournal210;211-213.36TheWesternAustralianPlanningCommissionproducesModelSubdivisionConditionswithadvicenotesthatprovideasetoftestedandagreedconditionsthatapplytosubdivisionandthataretoberegulatoryreviewedtoreflectstatutoryandpolicyneeds:DepartmentofPlanning(WA)andWesternAustralianPlanningCommissionModelSubdivisionConditionsSchedule1-3<http://www.planning.wa.gov.au/Model-subdivision-conditions.asp>(October2017)

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(b) StrataTitles

DivisionundertheStrataTitlesAct1998 isoneof theTasmanianexceptionsto

‘subdivide.’ 37 Strata schemes consequently fall outside the definition of

‘development.’TheActrefers toapprovalofstrataschemesbycouncils,notby

the planning authorities established under LUPAA. 38 One practitioner has

suggestedtheconsequentexceptionunderthelandregistrationsystemandfor

planningassessmentisasourceofbothconfusionandpoorresults inplanning

andlandregistration.39

TheStrataTitlesAct1998was amended in 2006 by the addition of s 31AA to

removedoubt thatacouncilmight refuseastrataproposalon thebasis that it

was,infact,asubdivision.40Neverthelessasstrataproposalsarenotclassifiedas

‘development,’ they canoffer greater flexibility. Some commentators onPart 3

LocalGovernment(Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993havesuggested

it and the Strata Titles Act 1998 should be repealed and replaced, with

subdivision and strata titles provisions being absorbed into the Land Use

Planning&ApprovalsAct1993(Tas)andtheLandTitlesAct1980(Tas).41

(c) ‘Use’vs‘Development’

Tasmania’splanninglegislationdistinguishesbetween‘use’and‘development’of

land.42Thedistinctionwasmadebecausetheoriginaldefinitionsins3LandUse

Planning & Approvals Act carried the difficulty that prescriptive standards

pertinent to development would apply to applications to use (as opposed to

develop), land.43Thedistinctiononcemademeantperformance-basedplanning

controls focused on results or outcomes rather than prescriptive rules, could

37BycontrastSouthAustralianlegislationincludesdivisionunderCommunityTitlesAct1996(SA)andStrataTitlesAct1988(SA)in‘division’ofanallotment.38LandUsePlanningandApprovalsAct1993(Tas)s3;StrataTitlesAct1998(Tas)s30.ImplicationsofthisdistinctionarediscussedfurtherinChapter4.39TimTierneyLawSocietyofTasmania,‘StrataReform–whatdowedowell?Whattoreview?Whatcouldbedelivered?’PaperpresentedatStrataCommunityAustralia(Tas)CHUSymposium,LauncestonTasmania,12thFebruary2016.40Tasmania,ParliamentaryDebates,HouseofAssembly,2November2006(DLlewellyn).41Tierney,aboven39;LocalGovernmentAssociationofTasmania,aboven10,14.42LandUsePlanning&ApprovalsAct1993(Tas)s3(1).43Tasmania,ParliamentaryDebates,HouseofAssembly,24October1993,4553-4,4565-4566(MJCleary).

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apply to the use of land.44Development, on the other hand, was required to

complywith‘narrow,prescriptivestandards.’45

The introduction of standardised interim planning schemes into Tasmania’s

systemhasbroughtlessprescriptivestandardsthanthosesetoutinPart3ofthe

Local Government (Building&Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1993. The interim

schemes enable subdivisions to follow a more streamlined process and a

permittedpathwaywherethesubdivisionconformstothestandards.Aspartof

the current planning reform agenda, Part 3 has been amended to enable

subdivision proposals to be approved despite their not complying with its

prescriptivestandards.46

Given the change in policy does the legislative distinction between use and

developmentstillcontributetoaneffectiveplanningsystemforTasmania?The

distinctionhaspresenteddifficultiesininterpretingplanningschemesthatpre-

dated the 1995 amendments,47for the drafting of new schemes,48and for the

Resource Management and Appeal Tribunal. 49 The Minister for Local

Governmenthasonoccasionstruggledtomakethedistinction.50

D Structure

Thisthesisisdividedintosevenchapters,includingthisintroductorychapter.

As backgroundChapter2 considers planning regulation and identifies some of

thetensionstowhichitissubject.ThechapternotescommentontheTasmanian

planning reforms. Part 3 is regulation for subdivision andChapter2 considers

thetasksetforsubdivisionregulation.

44PeterJMay,‘RegulatoryregimesandAccountability’(2007)1RegulationandGovernance8;10.45MJCleary,aboven43,4554.46LandUsePlanning&ApprovalsAmendment(StreamliningofProcess)Act2014(Tas),s53.47GriffinvResourceManagementandPlanningAppealTribunal[2010]TASSC8(2March2010);JWestvKentishCouncil[1996]TASRMAT81.48LauncestonPlanningScheme1996PolicyPapers,5.49GibsonvResourceManagementandPlanningAppealTribunal[2011]TASSC72(22December2011)[50-55].50Tasmania,ParliamentaryDebates,HouseofAssembly,29October1993,6017(MJCleary).

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Chapter 3 presents an outline of the basic elements of regulatory theory. The

theoryisemployedbythisthesisasabackgroundagainstwhichtostudyPart3.

Thechapternotesthereasonsforregulationandconsidersthepolicyunderlying

planningregulationanditshistoricaldevelopmentinAustralia.

Chapter 4 provides some context and background to the study of Part 3 as

planning regulation. As regulation that affects competition, efficiency is a

particularly important attribute of planning regulation. The chapter notes the

direct and indirect costs in terms of both time andmoney that proponents of

development face under the typical planning assessment process inAustralian

jurisdictions.Theefficiencyofaplanningsystemmayalsobeaffectedifthereis

inconsistency or lack of cohesion among its component parts. As subdivision

regulationmustinteractwiththelandregistrationsystem,thechapternotesthe

essential elements of the Torrens system and outlines Tasmania’s planning

systemundertheLandUsePlanningandApprovalsAct1993(Tas)(‘LUPAA’)and

theinteractionbetweenPart3oftheLocalGovernment(Building&Miscellaneous

Provisions) Act 1993 and the LUPAA system. This thesis finds that there are

implications for theefficiencyandeffectivenessofTasmania’splanning system

asaresultofthatinteraction.

Chapter 5 focuses on the issues raised by the interviewees spoken to for this

thesis, and examines those issues against the background of theory as to

effective regulation. Efficiency is an important characteristic of planning

regulation, but effective regulation is also regulation that is recognised by the

regulated as a viable means of achieving a policy goal. Such political

acceptability is anattributeof effective regulationas it fostersawillingness to

comply.Chapter5examinestheissuesraisedbyintervieweesincludingsections

that contain redundant provisions, unclear language, or that establish

cumbersomeprocedures.Thechapteridentifiesprovisionsthatareenactments

of what is now redundant out-dated policy, and that also fail to interact

effectivelywiththelandregistrationsystem.Intervieweesidentifiedascausesof

concernandfrustration:

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• the difficult language of s 110 that prevents it (in the absence of any

other mechanism), being used as a cost-effective means of joining

multipleblocksofland,

• the failure of ss 116 and117 to achieve the establishment of adequate

publicopenspace,

• theineffectivenessofs95asameansofaddressingtheissuesraisedby

roadtitles;and

• the cumbersome procedure for the amendment of sealed subdivision

plansthroughremovalofredundanteasementsandcovenants.

Chapter6 examines the issues raised by the provisions pursuant towhich the

lease of part of a block of land will constitute a subdivision. The ‘lease as

subdivision’provisionsareconsideredinaseparatechapterastheydemonstrate

the complex interaction between land registration systems and planning

assessment and control and how that interaction can be ineffective. The

provisions are common to Australian legislation, including Part 3 of the Local

Government(Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993(Tas).Theyhighlight

what theorists studied for this thesis have identified as the attributes of

ineffectiveregulation.Compliancewiththe legislationexposesparties to leases

tothecostsanddelayassociatedwithplanningassessmentdesignedtocaterfor

thesubdivisionofthefeesimple. Theassociateddifficultyencouragesnotonly

thedevelopmentofstrategiestoavoidtheeffectorapplicationofthelegislation,

butalsothepossibilityofthelegislationbeingusedbyonepartytoaleaseasa

meansofachievingawindfallgain.InTasmaniathedifficultiespresentedbythe

leaseassubdivisionprovisionsarecompoundedasthewordingofthedefinition

ofsubdivideins80ofPart3isunclearanditisimpossibletostatewithcertainty

whatleasesarecaughtwithinitsscope.

Chapter7presentstheconclusionsofthisthesisandthepropositionthatPart3

cannotbeconsideredeffectiveregulationforsubdivisioninTasmania.Failureto

review Part 3 means that the difficulties presented by unclear language,

cumbersome procedures, and out-dated policy will be a continued source of

delay,cost,and frustration. Itsexistenceasaparallel systemofassessment for

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subdivision creates uncertainty. A review of Part 3 is long overdue. Such a

review should take into account the views of all participants in Tasmania’s

planningprocessandisunlikelytobeaneasyprocess.Thisthesisnevertheless

concludesthatsuchareviewisessential,despitethedifficulties itwillpresent.

Unless the provisions of Part 3 and their place in the planning system are

understood,consideredandassessed,thecurrentplanningreformsareunlikely

to achieve their stated goal. That is because a key component of Tasmania’s

planningregulation(itssubdivisionlegislation)isineffectiveandinefficient.

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CHAPTER2–BACKGROUNDANDCONTEXT

I THETENSIONSUNDERLYINGPLANNINGREGULATION

Oneofthetasksfacingpolicymakersworkingtoestablishandreformplanning

systems, is to balance the push for streamlining and efficiency and the

importance of transparency and public engagement in the planning process.51

The difficulty of attaining balance is heightened given the complexity of the

issues to be regulated. Planning regulation is viewed by some as a

‘…questionable intrusion into the rightsofpeople todetermine thebestuseof

landfortheirownpurposes…’52Personalpropertyrightscancomeintoconflict

withthepolicyunderpinningplanningregulation.Thepotentialforsuchconflict

isheightenedbythescaleofthefinancialgainsandlossesthatareatstakeinthe

developmentofland.InAustralia’sfederation,planningregulationandcontrolis

astateandterritoryresponsibility.53Understatelaws,thereisnocompensation

for invasion of ‘private proprietary interests or for capital loss incurredwhen

landisdevaluedbecausedevelopmentcannotproceed.’54

Theissuestoberegulatedbyplanningsystemsincludetheresolutionoflanduse

conflicts. Such conflicts include those that arise from the subdivision of rural

land for residential development that can result in the loss of a valuable

agricultural resource.55 The significance of that conflict is demonstrated by

Tasmania’s position as the only Australian jurisdiction to have ‘right-to-farm’

legislation.ThePrimaryIndustryActivitiesProtectionAct1995(Tas) isdesigned

to protect farmers against civil action in nuisance by landowners seeking a

51ProductivityCommissionofAustralia,aboven2,Volume1,XV111.52KAPalmer,PlanningandDevelopmentLawinNewZealandVolumeI,(TheLawBookCoLtd,1984)6.53ThesignificanceofthiswashighlightedbytheAustralianLawReformCommissioninTraditionalRightsandFreedoms,FinalReportNo129(2015)522[20.4],525[20.18].54A.SFogg,AustralianTownPlanningLawUniformityandChange(UniversityofQueenslandPress1982)90,112;alsosubmissionbyAustralianPropertyInstitutetoAustralianLawReformcommissionnotinglackofcompensationas‘anestablishedfeatureofAustralianrealproperty’;aboven53,555,[20.133].55GLLDavis,‘RuralSubdivision:policiesandpractice’(1981)19(4)RoyalAustralianPlanningInstituteJournal132.SeealsoGeoffAnstey‘Consideringtherighttohaveahouseonruralallotments’(2006)43(2)AustralianPlanner,20.

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lifestyle that might be disturbed by noisy machinery, pesticide sprays, and

livestock.56

Another problem for planning control is the appropriate form of urban

development. Planners are grappling with the choice between urban

consolidation and residential densification on the one hand, and urban sprawl

andthesubdivisionofgreen-fieldsitesontheother.57Planningandlanduseand

developmentpolicywillhaveevenbiggerroles toplay in the futureasclimate

change takes effect. Climate change poses difficult and increasingly pressing

questions. Those questions include how, or if, land close to the coast is to be

developed. Such questions are especially challenging for Australia, which is

vulnerableto‘…climatechangeinducedcoastalhazards…exacerbatedbythefact

thevastmajorityofthepopulationlivesclosetothecoast.’58

Asthetaskofdevelopmentcontrolbecomesmorecomplex,planningtoolssuch

as zoning mean that local government authorities will play an increasingly

important role. 59 Local governments play a pivotal role in implementing

planningpolicythroughtheirenforcementofplanningcontrolsandassessment

ofdevelopmentproposals.McLeodarguesthattheirtaskintheplanningsystem

isimportantbecausetheyarenotspecialistenvironmentalagenciesfocusedon

environmental law.60They are instead focused on ensuring that land use and

developmentproposalsare consistentwitha long-termstrategicandstatutory

56ThecomplexityofthetasksuchregulationfacesishighlightedinasubmissionbytheEnvironmentalDefendersOffice(Tas)Inc;SubmissionNo10totheDepartmentofPrimaryIndustries,ParksWaterandtheEnvironmentReviewofthePrimaryIndustryActivitiesProtectionAct1995,4August2014,‘CaseStudy’5.57LukeMcGregorandAndrewHKelly‘Ku-ring-gai,NewSouthWales:abattlegroundbetweenurbanconsolidationandgreenamenity’(2015)32EnvironmentalandPlanningLawJournal562,567.RecentSouthAustralianplanningreformhadasoneofitsgoals,areductioninurbansprawlandtheencouragementofin-filldevelopmentwithintheexistingurbanfootprintSouthAustralianGovernment‘PlanningReform–aDriverofEconomicGrowth’PolicyPaperFeb2014;2.58BrianJPreston,BookReview–ClimateChangeandCoastalDevelopmentLawinAustralia(2015)32EnvironmentalandPlanningLawJournal294,295.59GlenMcLeod,‘ReconcilingPlanningandEnvironmentalLawandPolicy’(2015)20LocalGovernmentLawJournal41,45.60Ibid,44-45.

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planning framework that is designed to apply the principles of the National

StrategyforEcologicallySustainableDevelopment.61

Thetensionbetweenthepublicinterestandprivatepropertyrightsmeansthat

development assessment processes are under regular review. The economic

advantagesofstreamlineddevelopmentassessmentwerenotedin1997bythe

Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) when it

referred to the importanceof good regulatorydesign to reduce theburdenon

business.62Inmorerecentdecades thedemand forplanningreformstodeliver

productivitydividendstotheAustralianeconomyhasbeenaconsistenttheme.63

In2011,theProductivityCommissionidentifiedkeyreformpointsincluding:

• removalofcompetitionrestrictions,

• attentiontobusinesscostsincurredintheassessmentprocess,

• timelyandconsistentdecisionsbycouncils,

• broadandsimplelandusecontrolstoreduceredtape;and

• agreaterroleforthemarketindetermininguses.64

Simplifyingandspeeding-upplanningassessmentandfacilitatingapprovalshas

been the focus of ongoing planning reform in Australia for some decades.65

Commonthemesofsuchreformaretheneedforsimplifiedproceduresandclear

language.Proponentsofdevelopmentalsoargue that thenumberof approvals

shouldbeminimisedandthatregulationshouldbefocusedonoutcomesrather

than prescriptive conformity. Thosewho argue against development push the

needfortransparencyandpublicconsultation.66

61Chapter3tracesthedevelopmentofAustralianplanningregulationasameansofimplementingchangingpolicytoprotectthepublicinterestinsustainabledevelopment.62OrganisationforEconomicCo-OperationandDevelopment,RegulatoryImpactAnalysis:BestPracticesinOECDCountries.Report(1997)3.63PropertyCouncilofAustralia,aboven2,11.64ProductivityCommissionofAustralia,aboven2,Volume1,XVIII.65ProductivityCommissionofAustralia,aboven2[3.4];PropertyCouncilofAustralia,aboven2,Ch2;GurranAustinandWhitehead,aboven2;PhilippaEngland,aboven2,61-62citingAustralianGovernment,‘RethinkingRegulation:ReportoftheTaskforceonReducingRegulatoryBurdensonBusiness’(31January2006)‘TheBanksReport’.66England,aboven2,62.

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In reforming planning systems, designers of such systems must balance

streamliningandefficiencyagainst transparencyandpublicengagement in the

planning process.67The Productivity Commission has noted that community

opinion is that governments have considerable scope for improvement in the

areaofcommunityengagement.68

Adequateresourcingandtimeforreviewarerequiredforthereformofasystem

as complex as a planning system. There is a danger that in proceeding with

reform and review to only part of a planning system, the functioning and

cohesivenessofthesystemwillbeweakened.TheProductivityCommissionhas

urged caution in the process of ongoing reform that is characteristic of

Australia’sdevelopmentassessmentsystems.69TheCommissionhaspointedout

that the performance of planning systemswill be affected as ‘rolling reforms’

take place and reforms are replaced by further reforms without full

implementation or evaluation.70The ability of planning authorities to make

consistent and timely decisions may be affected by rushed reform to the

regulatory environment in which they operate, as coherence is an important

qualityoftheplanningregulatoryenvironment.71

II PLANNINGREFORMINTASMANIA

ThePropertyCouncilofAustraliahasnotedasoneofthenegativeattributesof

its planning system Tasmania’s ‘inability to introduce ‘state-based planning

policiesthatadoptaneconomicfocusasopposedtoasingle-issueapproach.’72In

considering the proposed planning reforms, Castles and Stratford refer to the

‘paradoxthatisTasmania,’arelativelysmallpopulationthatischaracterisedby

“internal heterogeneity confounded by tensions”.73They note that, Tasmania

67ProductivityCommissionofAustralia,aboven2,Volume1XXIII;68Ibid,XXXVIII.69Ibid,Volume1XXII.70Ibid,X11.71Ibid,XVIII.72PropertyCouncilofAustralia,aboven2,76.73AngelaCastlesandElaineStratford,‘PlanningreforminAustralia’sisland-state’(2014)51(2)AustralianPlanner,170,171.Thequoteatfootnote77belowdevelopstheconceptofinternalheterogeneity.

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seemstobeunabletoproduceaplanningsystemthateithertheproponentsof

developmentorthoseopposingdevelopmentaresatisfiedwith.74

Oneofthereasonsforwhythisisthecase,isthatinTasmaniaelectedmembers

are close to the members of their electorate. That situation has not been

unrecognised by Tasmania’s Members of Parliament, as illustrated during

Parliamentary debate in 1993. In 1993 substantial reform of Tasmania’s

planningandlocalgovernmentsystemsawtheintroductionofseveralpiecesof

legislation includingtheStatePoliciesandProjectsBill1993.Duringdebateon

theBill, onemember remarked, ‘…wearebeingdrivenby the lowest common

denominator, and by that Imean theUpperHouse…dealingwithmatters on a

purelyparochialbasis,especiallyat[Legislative]Councilelectiontimes.’75

CommentatorsontheproposedTasmanianreformshavepointedoutthatthere

is a danger that the reforms may be focused on ‘election commitments and

project outcomes’ rather than sound planning policy.76Castles and Stratford

suggestthattheinfluenceoflocalissuesonpolicyisinherentintheTasmanian

politicalandsociallandscapethatconsistsof:

[L]ocalgovernments…overlaidbyamultitudeofsmalltowns,villagesand

settlementseachwithitsownhistoryandexpectations;eachdrawingon

specific and sometimes contentiously accessed or produced resources;

eachwithparticulareconomicanddemographicoutlooks–andplanning

challenges.77

Thecomplexityinherentinthereformofplanningregulationgenerallyandthe

hurdles facing reform in Tasmania are reflected in the response of the Local

Government Association of Tasmania to the proposal to facilitate the

74Ibid.75Tasmania,ParliamentaryDebates,HouseofAssembly,4May2004(PeterPatmore).76PlanningInstituteofAustralia,(Tasmania),SubmissionNo224onTasmanianPlanningScheme–DraftStatePlanningProvisions,18thMay2016,2.77CastlesandStratford,aboven73,171citingA.Harwood,ThePoliticalConstitutionofIsland-ness:The‘TasmanianProblem’andTendaysontheIsland(PhDThesis,UniversityofTasmania,2011).

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introduction of a single state-wide planning scheme. The Association urged

caution,theneedforadequateresources,timeandconsultation.78Ithighlighted

therisksofrushingmajorreform,commentingontheneedfor‘orderly,strategic

andbeneficialreviewandchange…ratherthanamoread-hocapproachthatcan

produceunintendedconsequences.’79

Othercommentatorshavehighlightedthattheintroductionandreplacementof

planning schemes without a coherent system of establishing the status of

permits, applications and appeals causes difficulties.80Public confidence in a

systemisaffectedifchangeisrushed.Changemadewithoutadequateresearch,

advice, and consultation can result in delays and uncertainty.81In response to

thedraftState-WidePlanningProvisions,theTasmanianDivisionofthePlanning

InstituteofAustraliaurgedtheneedforreviewofunderlyingpolicyandaclear

strategicdirection forplanninganddevelopment.82Thatsuchreview is to take

place after the introduction of the planning scheme that will be its primary

implementationtool,risksputtingthe‘cartbeforethehorse.’83

The Property Council of Australia, although welcoming the Government’s

commitment to reform and the new planning scheme, noted that structural

reform of the local government sector would be necessary to ‘reap the full

benefit.’84Other commentators have highlighted the need for solid legal and

policyframeworkstobeinplacebeforereformisenacted.85

78LocalGovernmentAssociationofTasmania,aboven10,1.79Ibid.80TheResourceManagementandPlanningAppealTribunal(Tasmania),AnnualReport(2013-2014),6,referenceinnote2toNorthernMidlandsCouncilvTelstraCorporationLtd[2014]TASSC54(15October2014).81AngelaCastlesandElaineStratford,aboven73,175.82PlanningInstituteofAustralia(Tasmania),aboven76,2.83Ibid.84PropertyCouncilofAustraliaSubmissionNo265onTasmanianPlanningScheme–draftStatePlanningProvisions,18thMay2016.85CastlesandStratford,aboven73,17.

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III THETASKOFSUBDIVISIONREGULATION

Planning regulation is subject to constant pressure for review and reform and

must address complex issues. As part of a planning system, subdivision

regulation is subject to that samepressureandcomplexity.The task it faces is

further complicated. Unlike other forms of planning regulation such as zoning

anddevelopment control, subdivision regulation is tied to the creation of new

interests in land.86Subdivisionregulationmustthereforeinteractnotonlywith

thebroaderspectrumofplanningregulationsuchasplanningschemes,butalso

withthelandregistrationsystem.Section17AoftheLandTitlesAct1980(Tas)

requiresthatlandnotregisteredundertheTorrenssystembeconvertedtothat

system before subdivision can take place. The interaction with the Torrens

systemaddscomplexity to the task that subdivision regulation faces.Thispart

aimstointroducesubdivisioncontrol,theroleitplaysinaplanningsystemand

theinteractionbetweensubdivisionregulationandtheTorrenslandregistration

system.

Oneofthekeytasksforplanningregulationistheimplementationofpolicyfor

thesubdivisionofland.Thattaskisperformedbyasystemtoassessproposalsto

create new interests in land and the creation of those interests. In 2014, the

LocalGovernmentAssociationofTasmaniannotedthewiderissuesthatsystem

mustaddress,including:

• servicesandaccess;

• dedicationoflandforpublicopenspace;

• roadwidening;

• deviationofroads;

• drainage;

• securityforworkstobeperformedbyadeveloper;

• provisionforeasements;and

• preparationoftitledocuments.87

86StanleyMMakuch,NeilCraik&SigneB.LeiskCanadianMunicipalandPlanningLaw2nded(Toronto:ThomsonCarswell2004)224-225.87LocalGovernmentAssociationofTasmania,aboven10,14.

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Thetaskofsubdivisionregulationistopromotethepublicinterestinsustainable

managementoflandandresources.KirbyJhassummedupthatpurpose:

Inordertounderstandthedevelopmentofplanninglaw…itisnecessary

to appreciate that it is concerned with fundamentally more important

objectivesthantherightsofthosewithvariousinterestsinlandinterse.

Of theirnature, such laws, governingconsent todevelopmentgenerally,

and to subdivisions in particular, are concerned with the orderly

management of land in society so as to protect at once the interests of

individuals,thecommunityandtheenvironment.88

In Tasmania the task of assessing subdivision proposals is assigned to local

government. The central role of councils in planning assessment has been

acknowledged fordecades and in1951promptedEvery-Burns to consider the

question as to whether the public interest is a separate head of power and

reasonin itself fordisapprovalofadevelopment.89Every-Burnsconcludedthat

ratherthancouncilsbeingcompetenttorefuseanapplicationwithinthevariable

rangeof their ownconceptionofwhat is in thepublic interest, councils are in

factentrustedwithvariouspowersthataretobeexercisedhavingregardtothe

publicinterest.90

ThefirstexampleofAustralianpolicymakerstakingadeliberatedecisiontouse

thelandregistrationsystemtoenforcesubdivisioncontrolinthepublicinterest

was the decision made by the Queensland Parliament of 1885. The Undue

SubdivisionPreventionAct1885(Qld)wastobeameansofaddressingsanitation

and health problems arising from the division of land into small parcels,

includingbythegrantingoflong-termleases.91ThesubheadingtotheActnotes

thatitwas:

88HillpalmPtyLtdvHeaven’sDoorPtyLtd(2004)220CLR472,496[71].89JWEvery-Burns,‘BuildingsandSubdivisions–DisapprovalforReasonsofPublicInterest’(1951)24AustralianLawJournal346.90Ibid,348-349.91Queensland,ParliamentaryDebates,HouseofAssembly,29September1885,850(JFerguson)and13October1885,1029(SGriffiths);seealsoAntraHood,‘ReconfiguringSubdivisionin

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AnActtomakeprovisionforregulatingthewidthofstreetsandlanesand

topreventtheSubdivisionofLandinsuchamannerastobeinjuriousto

thePublicHealth.

Section8of theActrequiredthat lotsonaplanofsubdivision lodgedwiththe

RegistrarofTitlesbenotlessthan16perches(404.68m2).Therewerecertain

exceptionsincludingaleaseforatermoffewerthantenyears.

Today, subdivision control is still used as a means of ‘preventing deleterious

development.’92Once a subdivision plan has been certified or approved by a

council,itwillbelodgedwiththelandregistrationauthoritytoberegisteredon

titlerecordstotheaffectedland.Itislongestablishedthatitisnottheroleofthe

RegistrarorRecorderofTitleswhenpresentedwithasubdivisionplanapproved

byacouncil tomakeadecisionon the ‘wisdomordesirabilityof theproposed

subdivision.’93The council’sdecision isneverthelessenforced through the land

registrationsystem.

InTasmania subdivisionplans thathavebeenapprovedbya council are tobe

sealedbyacouncilandtheRecorderofTitlesisnottoregistersubdivisionplans

that a council has refused to seal.94Similarly, in other Australian jurisdictions

andinNewZealand,landadministrationauthoritiescannotregistersubdivision

plans that do not have the consent or approval of planning authorities.95The

landregistrationsystemisthususedtoenforceplanningcontrol,assubdivision

Queensland:theIntegratedPlanningAct1997’(1998)15(2)EnvironmentalandPlanningLawJournal84,96.92LeslieAStein,UrbanLegalProblems(TheLawBookColtd1974)74-75,note3.93Anon‘TheConveyancer:SubdivisionPlans–DutyofRegistrarofTitles’(1929-1930)3AustralianLawJournal51.94LocalGovernment(Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993(Tas)s89(3).95LandTitleAct(NT)s52(2),s66(2);LandTitleAct1994(Qld)S50(1)(h);RealPropertyAct1886(SA)s223LD;SubdivisionAct1988(Vic);Planning&DevelopmentAct2005(WA)s147;ResourceManagementAct1991(NZ)S226.InNSWRegistrarGeneralmayrejectatransactionnotshownonacurrentplanasdefinedConveyancingAct1919(NSW)s23F(2).

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plans must be certified as compliant with the planning assessment system in

ordertoberegisteredandfornewtitlestoissue.96

Nevertheless,thedegreetowhichsubdivisionregulationisasuccessfulmeansof

controlling land use and development has been questioned. In 1974 Stein

queriedwhether theoriginal purposeof subdivision control hasbeen lost and

replacedwith ‘complex control devices’ that gomuch further than preventing

abuseoftheprocessofdividinglandandconstructingbuildings.97

In a review of Tasmania’s planning system in 1981, Mant commented that

subdivisioncontrolisa‘bluntinstrument’thatdoesnotcomparetomoreflexible

meansof controlling landuse.98He referred to those alternatives as including

design and siting controls, pricingpolicies, and treepreservation orders.Mant

proposed that subdivision controlsmight restrict innovation in thedesign and

sitingofhousing.Inthecaseofrurallandparticularly,theymaybeanineffective

waytoachievepolicyobjectives.

Canadiancommentatorshavealsonotedthatthetechniqueofimposinglanduse

controlthroughthelandregistrationsystemisingrained.99Theyproposethatit

is consequently unlikely to be abolished, despite the resultant inflexibility,

complexity,andthedevelopmentoftechniquestocircumventthecontrols.Such

comments are also applicable to control of land use and development in

Australia,includinginTasmania.

ThecaseofagreementsmadeandregisteredontitlerecordsunderPart5ofthe

LandUsePlanningandApprovalsAct1993(Tas)highlightsoneoftheissuesthat96ConveyancingAct1919(NSW)s195C;LandTitleAct(NT)ss51&52;LandTitleAct1994(Qld)s50;RealPropertyAct1886(SA)s223LD;LocalGovernment(Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993(Tas)ss87&88;SubdivisionAct1988(Vic)S5;Planning&DevelopmentAct2005(WA)s146andTransferofLandAct1893(WA)s166.97Stein,aboven92,75.98JohnHMant,‘LandUseManagementAdministrativeReview’ReportfortheTasmanianGovernmentJune1981;34.99Stanley.M.Makuch,NeilCraik&SigneBLeiskaboven86,224-225.TheauthorsrefertothevarioustechniquesemployedtoavoidtheeffectofCanadiansubdivisionlegislation;chapter6ofthisthesishighlightstechniquesemployedtoavoidtheresultsoflegislativeinclusionofleasesassubdivisions.

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arisewhensubdivisioncontrolisenforcedthroughthelandregistrationsystem.

Part5provides foragreementsbetweenaplanningauthorityanda landowner

thatcanberegisteredon title to land.100Onceregistered, thecovenants in the

agreementsaretorunwiththelandasiftheywerecovenantstowhichs102(2)

of the Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas) applies. The burden of the covenants

consequentlypasseswiththeland.

Such agreements offer a relatively flexible approach to subdivision control.

Controls can be tailored to a particular development by combining planning

regulationwith the land registration system. Nevertheless as the agreements

carry forward from a parent title to subsequently subdivided lots, failure to

review and remove them can result in redundant, irrelevant instruments

remaining registered on title records. Bell has referred to the continued

registration of redundant instruments as the ‘cluttering’ of the land titles

register.101Shenotesthatsuchclutteringisoneproblemthatarisesfromtheuse

of Australian land registration systems as a means of environmental

managementandsustainabledecision-making.102Cluttering implies inefficiency

and as noted in the following chapter, efficiency is a key characteristic of

effectiveregulation.

Planning and development regulation is a system of controlling the use and

development of land with the aim of protecting the public interest in the

sustainableandorderlydevelopmentof landandmanagingtheexpectationsof

competing stakeholders. This chapter has outlined some of the tensions

underlyingplanningregulationasasystemdesignedtomeetthosepolicygoals

andhasalsonotedtheparticularlydifficulttaskfacingsubdivisionregulationas

it interacts with the land registration system. Chapter 3 outlines regulatory

theorythat isusedasa frameworktoconsider theeffectivenessofPart3with

thatframeworkunderpinningtheconsiderationofparticularprovisionsofPart3

thatformthecontentofchapters4-6.100LandUsePlanningandApprovalsAct1993(Tas)ss78,79.101J.Bell‘Greeningthelandtitleregister–Howcanthelandtitleregisterassistwithsustainabledecision-making?’(2010)18AustralianPropertyLawJournal263.102Ibid.

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CHAPTER3THEORYASTOEFFECTIVEREGULATIONANDTHEPOLICY

UNDERPINNINGPLANNINGREGULATION

This thesis turns to the work of regulatory theorists for guidance as to the

questions to ask and the issues to consider in studying the effectiveness of

regulation.ThatworkformstheframeworkandstructurefortheanalysisofPart

3thatfollowsandthatisemployedinthefollowingchapters,asalensthrough

whichtoexaminePart3.

I REGULATORYTHEORYASTOEFFECTIVEREGULATION

Regulatory theorists have consideredhow to assesswhether regulationworks

andiseffectiveandwhyitworksorfailstobeeffective.Theoristshaveidentified

theelementsthatmakeupeffectiveandineffectiveregulation.Aswillbeevident

from this outline of thework of regulatory theorists, the elements of effective

regulationwillfrequentlyco-exist, interact,andbeinterdependent.Accordingly

regulationmaybeineffectivebecauseitisnotacost-effectivemeansofachieving

apolicygoal.Regulationmaynotbecost-effectivebecauseitsmeaningisunclear

orithasunintendedconsequences.Theregulatedmayrejectsuchregulationout

offrustrationandsofeeljustifiedinnotcomplyingwithit.

Althoughtheoristshighlightelementsofwhat iseffectiveregulation,thisthesis

usesthoseelementsasastructurefortheexaminationofPart3andasaguideto

therelevantquestionstoaskandissuestoconsider.Theidentifiedelementsof

effectiveregulationareappliedinthatwayratherthanasasetofcriteriaagainst

whichtoassessPart3.

A TheReasonswhyweregulate

Inevaluatingregulation,Diverreferstohowwellaruleperformsin‘effectingits

purpose.’103The purposes underlying regulationmay vary. Regulation, such as

planning regulation,may be introduced to protect the community, to advance

103ColinDiver,‘TheOptimalPrecisionofAdministrativeRules’(1983)93TheYaleLawJournal65,67.

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‘thecommongood’orinthe‘publicinterest.’104Suchregulationisareflectionof

community values. The regulation enables their expression and

institutionalisation and is a means by which policy decisions are put into

effect.105

Regulation may be enacted to manage risk. Workplace health and safety

regulation is an example. Regulation may also be introduced to promote the

interests of certain individuals or groups at the expense of the community.

Privateinterestandcapturetheoriesexplainhowsuchregulationcanbeenacted

andtakeeffect,oftenatanetsocialloss.106

Regulation may be a response to failure by the market ‘to deliver socially

beneficialresults.’107Marketforcesmayfailtotakeaccountofthepublicinterest

in the way in which resources such as land are used and developed. 108

Regulation may also be the most effective way to pursue social goals. 109

Regulation such as planning regulation alsoplays a ‘vital facilitative role’110by

providing a structure backed by the coercive force of sanctions that enables

orderly transactions and social interaction.111Regulation may however fail to

perform effectively the task assigned to it; identifying that task is key to

assessingtheeffectivenessoftheregulation.

104ArieFreiberg,aboven14,5citingIMcLean‘ThehistoryofregulationintheUnitedKingdom:Threecasestudiesinsearchofatheory’inJJordanaandDLevi-Faur(eds)ThePoliticsofRegulation:Institutionsandregulatoryreformfortheageofgovernance(EdwardElgar2004)45;andGHodge‘Evaluatingwhatwillworkinnanotechnologyregulation:inpursuitofthepublicinterest’inGHodge,DBowmanandKLudlow(eds)NewGlobalFrontiersinregulation:theageofnanotechnology(EdwardElgar2007)113.105MorganandYeung,aboven14,147,[3.4].106Ibid,43,[2.3].107AustralianLawReformCommission,PrincipledRegulation:FederalCivilandAdministrativePenaltiesinAustralia,ReportNo95(2002)[3.28]citingRBaldwinandMCave,UnderstandingRegulation:Theory,strategyandpractice(OxfordUniversityPress,1999)1-17.108LivingontheCoasttheCradleCoastRegionalLandUsePlanningframeworkhttp://www.planning.tas.gov.au/_data/assets/pdffile/0011/332984/Living_on_the_Coast-declared_27Oct2011.pdf;10.109AustralianLawReformCommission,aboven107[3.28].110MorganandYeung,aboven14,91[3.2].111Ibid147[3.4].

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B ThepolicyunderpinningplanningregulationinAustralia

Part3of theLocalGovernment(BuildingandMiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993

is planning regulation. The task assigned to planning regulation is that of

providing a solution to the problem of incompatible uses and a reason for

increasing government legislation governing land use, the environment and

conservation.112Thedevelopmentofplanningregulation inAustraliahighlights

thepublicinterestconsiderationsthatunderpinplanningsystems.Australiahas

beennamedasoneofthe‘frontier’nationsoftheAnglo-Saxonworld,theother

twobeingtheUnitedStatesofAmericaandCanada.113MantandNielsonreferto

theideathatdevelopmentrightscamefromthelanditself,asiftheywerecrops,

and note the movement in English law from the feudal system to the

developmentoffeesimplerightstoland.114

InAustralia,estatesinfeesimplereplacedearlygrantsofleasesandlicences.115

Theseunrestrictedrightstoenjoylandwereameansofencouragingcoloniststo

occupy the vast tracts of undeveloped land, at the expense of the indigenous

population.Thementalitythatlandwasafrontiertobedevelopedfosteredthe

idea of land as a profit-making resource. Wakefield’s model of systematic

colonisationwas designed to control the release of land to those seeking such

‘super-profits’inordertoensuretherequiredworkforcewasretained.116

The encouragement todevelop land and to reapprofitsmeant therewas little

effective planning control. Dawkins has suggested that in Australia desire to

exertcontrolovertheuseanddevelopmentoflandwasasignificantfactorinthe

1808coupknownas theRumRebellion.117Heargues that themilitaryofficers

112JohnH.MantandLyndsayNielson,‘LandUsesinAustralia’(1975)47(4)TheAustralianQuarterly20,23.113Ibid,22.114Ibid.115Ibid.116AWPWhimpress,‘TheWakefieldModelofSystematicColonisationinSouthAustralia:anexaminationwithparticularreferencetoitseconomicaspects,’(PhDThesis,SchoolofNaturalandBuiltEnvironmentsUniversityofSouthAustralia2008),55citingEGWakefield(1841)ParliamentarySelectCommitteeEnquiryQ2623.117JeremyDawkins,‘Theroleofdiscretioninthehistoryofdevelopmentcontrol’(1985)16WesternAustralianLawReview295,296-297.

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involved sought to resist Governor Bligh’s attempts to recover land they had

expropriated in defiance of planning principles Governor Arthur Phillip had

earlierputinplaceforthedevelopmentofSydney.

Despite such resistance, policymakers increasingly looked to control the

developmentoflandas‘theultimateexampleofafiniteresource.’118Asplanning

regulatory systems were established the early ‘laissez-faire’ approach to

controlling landuseanddevelopmentwas substantiallymodified.119Australian

Parliamentarydebateofthelate19thandearly20thcenturiesreflectsthischange

atatimewhentheurbanpopulationwasgrowingandplanningsystemswerein

their infancy. Legislators were concerned with controlling slums, building

standards,lotsizes,andthepresenceofblacksmithsandpiggeriesinresidential

areas.120MembersofParliamentexpressedtheneed‘torearadesirableclassof

Australians.’121 Those desirable Australians required ‘pure air to breathe’ free

fromcongestion.122

Stein refers to the argument that subdivision control in Australia was the

historicalresultoftheneedtodirecttheintensesubdivisionoflandinitscapital

cities.123 Such controlwas an attempt to ensure that developers did not shirk

theirresponsibilitytoprovideandpayforinfrastructureaslandwasdeveloped.

That infrastructure included roads, drainage, sewerage, and water supply.

Municipalandplanningauthoritiesweregiven the responsibilityofoverseeing

andcontrollingdevelopmentandofensuringthatminimumstandardsappliedto

118MantandNielson,aboven112,22.119APRanderson,‘TheexerciseofdiscretionarypowersundertheResourceManagementAct1991’(1991)NewZealandRecentLawReview444,445;seealsoMantandNielsonaboven112,25-26.120NewSouthWales,ParliamentaryDebates,LegislativeAssembly,30October1918,2517(BJDoe);24October1918,2353(AGFJames);Queensland,ParliamentaryDebates,LegislativeAssembly,29September&13October1885,848-853&1028-1030(SWGriffith,EPalmer,JMacfarlane);AntraHood,aboven91;‘BuildingBlocksinHobartArea’TheMercury(Hobart),19November1943,42.121NewSouthWales,ParliamentaryDebates,LegislativeAssembly,24October1918,2498(SHickey).122Ibid.123Stein,aboven92,74-75,note3.

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landdevelopment.Thosestandards includedregulationscontrolling thesizeof

lots,thedesignandlocationofroads,andtheconstructionofbuildings.

An example of such regulation is the Local Government Bill 1919 (NSW).

Parliamentary debate on the Bill records that itwas intended towipe out the

practice of ‘cutting up a piece of land into pocket-handkerchief allotments.’124

Councilswere ‘…tobearmedagainstthepossibilityof theresurrectionofslum

areas.’125Subdivisionoflandmeantthatwithoutadequateregistrationrecordsit

was difficult to trace landowners and to collect rates and taxes,126providing

additionalincentiveforgovernmentcontrol.

InTasmanialegislationalsoassignedthetaskofcontrollingthedevelopmentof

landtolocalgovernment.AnearlyexampleofsuchlegislationisPartVIIIofthe

Town Boards Act 1896 (Tas). This Part provided for by-laws to be made

regulatingsewerageanddrainage,publicandprivatestreets,watersupply,and

theconstructionofbuildings.Section194prohibited the layingoutordisposal

(with ‘disposal’ beingundefined), of land forbuildingpurposeswithout aplan

being firstsubmittedto theTownBoard. Theprohibitionwascarried forward

bys199(9)oftheLocalGovernmentAct1906(Tas)andthens48(1)oftheTowns

Act1934(Tas).

Non-compliance with the legislation affected commercial agreements.

Annotationstos48oftheTownsAct1934inVolumeVoftheTasmanianStatutes

refertotheeffectofnon-compliancewiththesectiononcontractsforthesaleof

land.ThecasesreferredtoaredecisionsoftheHighCourtconsiderings23ofthe

Town Planning&Development Act 1920 (SA) that prohibited offering for sale,

selling, conveying, transferring or otherwise disposing of land except in

accordance with the Act.127Isaacs J considered the question whether the Act

124NewSouthWales,ParliamentaryDebates,LegislativeAssembly,30October1918,2517(BJDoe).125Ibid.126Queensland,ParliamentaryDebates,LegislativeAssembly,29September1185,850(JFerguson).127GeorgevGreaterAdelaideLandDevelopmentCo(1929)43CLR91,AdelaideDevelopmentCoPtyltdvPohlner(1933)49CLR25.

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rendered a contract for the sale of land, as opposed to the transfer of land

pursuanttothatcontract,void.InthiscasethepartieshadrealisedtheActhad

not been complied with but had determined that the provisions could be

complied with after sale, but before conveyance. In considering that question

Isaacs J turned to the purpose of the Act and noted that the Act’s disclosed

purposewas thepromotionofpublic interests, convenience, and safety.128The

HighCourt judgments reflect thatpurposebyholdingnon-compliant contracts

void. Itwasnotuntil1947 that theHobartCorporationsAct includedasavings

provision in s 199(1) by which such contracts would be saved. The section

deemedtheinclusionofaconditionintosuchagreementsthattheybesubjectto

thegrantingofplanningapproval.

Hansard records did not exist in Tasmania until 1979 and the only records of

Parliament’s proceedings before that time are reports of Tasmanian

Parliamentary debates written by unnamed journalists for the Hobart-based

newspaper The Mercury.As noted in the following paragraphs, those reports

showthatthepublicinterestinthedevelopmentof landoccupiedthemindsof

Tasmanian Parliamentarians, with the content of their debate echoing the

concernsoftheNewSouthWalesParliamentin1918.

In1943,MrSoundyoftheTasmanianHouseofAssemblyisreportedashaving

referred to the ‘persons in Hobart [who were] determined to perpetuate

slums.’129Theimportanceofprotectingthepublicbycontrollingthesubdivision

oflandexercisedthemindsofTasmanianmembersin1947astheyconsidered

the Hobart Corporation Bill. A proposal to reduce the Council’s minimum

requirementsforthesaleofalotonwhichtwodwellingsweresituatedwasthe

subjectofdiscussion,amendment,andcounter-amendmentbetweentheHouse

of Assembly and the Legislative Council. The Hobart Corporation itself was

reluctant to reduce its standardsandwarned that if thechangewasmade ‘…it

would be the responsibility of the House for permitting undesirable

128GeorgevGreaterAdelaideLandDevelopmentCo(1929)43CLR91,(IsaacsJ)101.129‘BuildingBlocksinHobartArea’TheMercury(Hobart),19November1943,42.

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conditions.’130Memberswereconcernedthatreductionintheminimumfrontage

andareaofalotwouldencouragesubstandardhousesandinfectiousdisease.131

In1962theLocalGovernmentAct(Tas)waspassed;itspurposewasstatedtobe

theconsolidationandamendmentofthelawrelatingtolocalgovernment. The

variousCorporationsActswere repealed.132Division2ofPartXVIof theLocal

Government Act 1962 (Tas) dealt with not only subdivision but also building,

whichmeantsomeinternalduplication.

Writing in 1974Mant and Nielson noted with respect to the post-war period

that:

One of the primary reasons for the rapid increase in government

legislationconcerninglanduse,environmentandconservation….hasbeen

theincreasingrecognitionthatlandusedecisionsfreelymadebyprivate

individuals, corporations and for thatmatter governments,which serve

theirowninterests,alltoooftenhavenegativeflow-oneffectswhichhave

impactonthecommunityatlarge.133

Modernplanning regulatory systemshavebeenbuilt on a policy of promoting

thepublicinterestinsustainableuseoflandandresourcesandaredesignedasa

meansofoverseeing theeffective implementationof thatpolicy.134In response

totheUnitedNationsBruntlandReport,Australiangovernmentsacknowledged

in 1992 the importance of a forward planning system.135In that year, the

National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development was released. The

130‘HobartCorporationBillpasses:Newclauseapproved’TheMercury(Hobart),24April1947,37-38.131‘CorporationBillAmendments’TheMercury(Hobart)2October1947,45.132EgTheHobartCorporationAct1963repealedallpreviousHobartCorporationActs.133MantandNielson,aboven112,23;seealsoAnsteyaboven55;Davisaboven55.134England,IntegratedPlanninginQueensland(TheFederationPress2001),2.135McLeod,aboven59,44citingCouncilofAustralianGovernmentsEcologicallySustainableDevelopmentSteeringCommittee(December1992)andReportoftheWorldCommissiononEnvironmentandDevelopment:ourcommonfuture(1987)ChairedGrohHarlemBruntland;seealsosummaryofkeyperiodsofplanningpolicy1979-2013;Gurran,AustinandWhiteheadaboven2,190(Table2).

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Strategyprovides for a Goal, Core Objectives and Seven Guiding Principles.136

TheStrategyisdesignedtoprovideabalancedapproachtodecision-makingand

toensurethateconomic,environmental,social,andequityconsiderationsareall

taken intoaccount.TheGuidingPrinciples refer to theneed to takeaccountof

environmental considerations. They also recognise the need for a strong

internationally competitive economy in order to enhance environmental

protection. These principles are reflected in the Objectives of Tasmania’s

planningsystemandprocessandarespeltoutinSchedule1Parts1and2ofthe

LandUsePlanningandApprovalsAct1993.

C Thetestforregulation

Evaluationoftheeffectivenessofaregulatorysystemistheeventualobligatory

questionpromptedbyanexaminationofaregulatorysystem.137Toaskwhether

regulation is effective is to ask – “does it work?”138Whether regulation is

successful has been said to be ‘typically andprimarily assessed in termsof its

effectiveness: the extent to which it ensures that the chosen policy goal is

achievedinpractice.’139

In evaluating regulation, theorists have referred to qualities other than

effectiveness. Freiberg refers to the test of whether regulation is ‘effective,

efficient and just.’140Gunningham and Grabosky refer to the criteria ‘that find

theirway intoalmost all lists,’141includingeffectiveness, efficiency, equity and,

they add political acceptability. Parker and Braithwaite use ‘effectiveness,

responsivenessandcoherence’torefertotheextenttowhichregulationshapes

136AustralianGovernment,DepartmentoftheEnvironmentandEnergy<http://www.environment.gov.au/about-us/esd/publications/national-esd-strategy>137Freiberg,aboven14,260.138Freiberg,aboven14,260;AustralianLawReformCommission,aboven107[3.111].139KarenYeung,‘Towardsanunderstandingofregulationbydesign’inRogerBrownswordandKarenYeung(eds),RegulatingTechnologies:LegalFutures,Regulatoryframesandtechnologicalfixes(OxfordHartPublishing2008)79,91.140Freiberg,aboven14,viii.141GunninghamandGraboskyaboven14,26.

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social practices, the extent to which it is efficient and involves practicality of

complianceandtheextenttowhichitiscertain,consistentandpredictable.142

Planningregulationhasitsgenesisintheprotectionandpromotionofthepublic

interest. The public has a stake in the successful operation of the regulation.

Suchregulationshouldconsequentlybeaneffective,efficientmeansofachieving

thepolicygoalssetforit.

D Efficiency

In assessing regulation, efficiency is used in the sense of the relationship

betweenappliedresourcesanddesiredoutcome.143Cost/benefitanalysisisone

methodofassessingtheefficiencyofregulation.144Informulatingwhathascome

tobeknownastheCoaseTheorem,145RonaldCoasehighlightedthecoststobe

takenintoaccount.Thosecostsmaybeincurrednotonlyincreatingregulation,

butalsoincomplyingwithit. Suchcostsinclude‘transactioncosts,’whichmay

becostsofnegotiatingcontractsandcompletingtransactions.146

Less obvious costs may be incurred as regulation is made by fallible

administrations that are subject to political pressure and operating without

competitive market checks.147 It is possible that the economic gain from

regulatoryinterventionmaybelessthanthecostsinvolvedinorresultingfrom

it.148

Government interventionmaynotalways increaseefficiencybut it shouldalso

notbepresumedthatitwillalwaysreduceefficiency.Thismaybeparticularlyso

ifalargenumberofpeopleareaffectedasthecostsofresolvingtheproblemby

142ParkerandBraithwaite,aboven14,127-129.143Freiberg,aboven14,263.144ProductivityCommissionofAustralia,aboven2,[XIX];Freiberg,aboven14,263;AustralianGovernmentGuidetoRegulationaboven23,‘RISQuestion4’,5.145Coase,aboven15,2.146Ibid,15;seealsoLawrenceLai,TheideasofRonaldHCoaseMarketfailureandplanningbycontractforsustainabledevelopment(Routledge2011)48[3.3.3],226[8.3].147Coase,aboven15,18.148Ibid.

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the operation of market forces may be prohibitively high. Government

interventionmayconsequentlybethemostcost-effectivewaytoachieveapolicy

goal.149Planningregulationisanexampleofsuchinterventionasitisenactedto

controltheuseanddevelopmentofland.Landisavaluableeconomicresource.

Marketforcessuchasprice,maynotbesufficienttoprotectthepublicinterestin

sustainable development, the conservation of natural habitat, or the

establishmentofpublicopenspace.

E Politicalacceptability

Regulation may be nevertheless ineffective when assessed against non-

instrumental values that contribute to its being ‘politically acceptable’ and so

encouragecompliance. Similarvaluesarereflected in the ‘threedimensionsof

rules’ 150 being transparency, accessibility, and congruence with the policy

objective. Regulatory theorists analyse how regulation can become ineffective

because it fails to reflect societal attitudes and is rejected as irrelevant,

inefficientanddisproportionate.

JuliaBlack suggests three reasonswhy regulation becomes ineffective andher

categories of Inclusiveness, Indeterminacy and Interpretation offer a structure

forgroupingtheworkofregulatorytheoriststhatsharescommonthemes.151

Inclusiveness encompasses congruence between the rule and its purpose, if

policytargetsaremissedorinefficienciesoccur,theregulatedwillchangetheir

attitude to a rule.152Regulationmaybe Indeterminate and such indeterminacy

unavoidable, simply because regulation must be expressed in words that will

inevitably be inadequate to express the vagaries of future events. 153

Interpretation focuses onParliament’s intent but it is not enough that there is149Ibid.150Diver,aboven103,67.151MorganandYeung,aboven14,153-158quotingJuliaBlackRulesandRegulators(ClarendonPress1997)5-45.152Ibid.Yeungnotesthedevelopmentofformalism,referredtobelown425;chapter6discussesthetechniquesusedtoavoidtheeffectofthe‘leaseassubdivision’provisions.153Ibid.Braithwaitebelown188;referstothedevelopmentofa‘greyarea’astheboundariesofregulationaretestedandchapter6discusseswhatButtsuggestsmightbe‘thecrafting’ofleasestoavoidtheeffectofthe‘leaseassubdivision’provisions,belown446.

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judicialunderstandingofregulation.Thecommunitymusthaveconnectionifthe

legitimacy of the regulation is to be maintained and the regulated are to be

willingandencouragedtogiveitallegiance.154

Considerationssuchasthesehighlightthatelementsotherthanthosethatcanbe

measuredmayneed tobe considered, as themeasurableelementsmaynotbe

those that reveal the most about how well a regulatory system is

performing.155Inthecaseofsubdivisionregulation,thenumberofissuedpermits

or registered subdivision plans may not be accurate measures of the

effectivenessoftheregulatorysystem.

F Designingeffectiveregulation

Ifaregulatorysystemfailstoperformwell,theresultmaynotonlybefailureto

meet policy goals. Other consequences include unnecessary financial costs,

includingthoseassociatedwiththepostponementofthepolicygoal,erosionof

confidenceinthelaw,andunderminingofotherregulationandthelawitself.156

The work of systems theorists such as Teubner analyses how it is that these

consequencescomeaboutasregulation loses itsconnectionwithsocietyanda

‘regulatory trilemma’ develops. 157 Teubner argues that the solution lies in

greater integration between society and the law through a system of joint

information and interference 158 and the use of more flexible regulatory

strategies. 159 Such regulatory strategies have developed as regulators have

154JuliaBlackRulesandRegulators(ClarendonPress1997)12-19;MorganandYeung,aboven14,11.155AustralianLawReformCommission,aboven107,[3.111].156Freiberg,aboven14,269citingOrganisationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment,ComparingRegulatorySystems:Institutions,ProcessesandLegalFormsinIndustrialisedCountriesReport(2000)Ch2.157GuntherTeubnerinTeubner(ed)JuridificationofSocialSpheres:AComparativeAnalysisintheAreasofLabour,CorporateAntiTrustandSocialWelfareLaw(WalterdeGruyter1987)18[3.3]at19,22[4.1].158GuntherTeubner,LawasanAutopoieticSystem(Blackwell1993)65.159Teubneraboven157,40[5.3].AsnotedbyAnnWardrop‘Co-regulation,ResponsiveregulationandthereformofAustralia’sretailelectronicpaymentsystems’(2014)30LawinContext197,201,the‘veryhighlevelofabstraction’ofsystemstheoryalienatessomeregulatoryscholarsandforotherstheyarecontroversialandfar-reaching(seeBradleyCKarkkainen‘“New

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sought to address what has been called ‘the failure of command-and-control

regulation.’ 160 Such regulation consists of prescriptive rules focused on

enforcementbythestatewithpenaltiesfornon-compliance.161

The publication of Responsive Regulation: Transcending the deregulation

debate162 was a response to the debate that arose from that failure, and

prompted a much broader view of what regulation is and can achieve.163

Although responsive regulation has attracted criticism, 164 it has been the

foundation for ‘win/win solutions’ and innovative regulatorydesign165andhas

been adopted by Australian regulators and governments. 166 Responsive

regulation underlies smart regulation that has been introduced into planning

andenvironmentalfieldsinAustralia.167

Acentral featureof responsiveandsmartregulatorydesign is that it isable to

respondtotheindustryitregulates.168Regulatorsmay,however,needassistance

toengagewithand toadapt thevarious responsive regulatory techniques toa

particular industry.169Designersof smart regulationemphasise thatbecauseof

its range of actors and regulatory tools, monitoring and evaluation must be

Governance”inlegalthoughtandintheworld:somesplittingasantidotetooverzealouslumping’(2004)89MinnesotaLawReview471,483.160Wardrop,aboven159,201.161Parker&,Braithwaiteaboven14,127[4].162Ayres&Braithwaite,aboven14.163TheinfluenceofresponsiveregulationisacknowledgedbyGunninghamandGraboskyaboven14;Freiberg,aboven14;Wardropaboven159.164Thecriticismmaybegroupedinto‘policyorconceptual’,‘practical’and‘theprincipled.RobertBaldwinandJuliaBlack,‘Reallyresponsiveregulation’(2008)71ModernLawReview59,62-64;alsoMorganandYeungaboven14,201quotingKYeungSecuringCompliance(HartPublishing2004).165Gunningham&Graboskyaboven,14,11.166Freiberg,aboven14,105-106;Wardropaboven159,227,referstothe‘embrace…ofthetoolkitofresponsiveregulation’byAustraliangovernmentsandregulators.167SeeegPaulMartinandNeilGunningham‘NaturalResourceManagementLaw:CorePrinciples’(2011)28EnvironmentandPlanningLawJournal137;NeilGunningham,CameronHolleyandCliffordShearing‘NeighbourhoodEnvironmentImprovementPlans:Communityempowerment,voluntarycollaborationandlegislativedesign’(2007)24EnvironmentandPlanningLawJournal125.168Wardropaboven159,227.169Ibid197.

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maintained.170Policy adjustments may need to be made in the interests of

effectivenessasdiminishingreturnsmaydevelopovertime.171

SuchpolicyadjustmentsmaybethroughreviewproceduressuchasRegulatory

ImpactAnalysis.Australianpolicymakershaveadoptedsuchanalysisinorderto

refinepolicymakingandtoreviewandassesstheeffectivenessofregulation.The

Australian Government requires policymakers to include a regulatory impact

statementthataddressessevenissues.Thoseissuesincludeidentificationofthe

problem to be addressed, the net benefit of each policy option, and how each

optionwillbeimplementedandevaluated.172

The Productivity Commission assessed howwell Australian jurisdictionswere

conducting Regulatory Impact Analysis in a 2012 report. 173 The Report

concludedthatAustralianprocedureswere‘reasonablyconsistent’withguiding

principlesforregulatoryimpactanalysispromulgatedbyboththeOrganisation

for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) and the Council of

AustralianGovernments(COAG).174TheCommissionnotedthatthereweresome

shortcomings in system design and a gap between agreed principles and

practice.Inthecaseofplanningregulation,suchshortcomingsmaybeexplained

by the costs required to assess the costs and benefits of the regulation. Such

assessment can be complicated, costly, time-consuming, and is dependent on

adequatedatabases.175

G Effectiveregulation

Insummary:

• Effective regulation is regulation that is a cost-effective means of

achievingapolicygoal.170HolleyandGunninghamaboven16.171Ibid.172AustralianGovernment,aboven23,5.173ProductivityCommissionofAustralia‘RegulatoryImpactAnalysis:Benchmarking’ResearchReport(2012)keypoints2.174Ibid.175DepartmentofInfrastructure(Victoria)NationalCompetitionPolicyReviewofVictoria’sPlanningandEnvironmentAct1987andAssociatedSubordinateInstrumentsFinalReport(2001)47-48.

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• Such regulation is efficient in terms of the costs (including both direct

andindirectcosts)incurredincomplyingandnotcomplyingwithit.

• Regulation, the wording of which is unclear or that requires further

resourcestointerpretit,willnotbeefficient.

• Complianceisencouragedifregulationisefficient.

• Effective,efficientregulationisalsopoliticallyacceptableandrecognised

by the regulated as justifiable, legitimate and consistentwith the aims

andaspirationsofthesocietyitregulates.

• Regular review of regulation is an essential means of ensuring that it

retains its social legitimacy and that it is the most cost-effective and

efficientmeansofachievingapolicygoal.

This studyadopts theseprinciples in analysing and studyingPart3. Chapter4

providescontextandbackgroundtoplanningregulationandoutlinesTasmania’s

planning system before considering the interaction of Part 3 with the LUPAA

system and whether that interaction is an efficient, cost-effective means of

achieving thepolicygoal thatunderpins thesystem.Chapters5and6examine

particular provisions of Part 3 against the background of what is effective

regulation as summarised above. The chapters note problems with unclear

wording, cumbersome, costly procedures and redundant policy. In the case of

the leaseas subdivisionprovisions chapter6 alsonotes a lossof legitimacyas

techniquessuchasformalismareemployedtoavoidtheeffectoftheregulation.

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CHAPTER4–THEROLEOFTHEPREVAILING

REGULATIONFORSUBDIVISIONINTASMANIA

This chapter will provide context and background. It will outline the typical

planning assessment process in Australia and note that coherence and

cohesivenessarebothimportanttotheeffectiveoperationofaplanningsystem.

The chapter will then move to outline the essential features of the Torrens

systemoflandregistrationandTasmania’splanningsystem.Asnotedinchapter

3,theeffectivenessofregulationisassessedbyhowwellitworksasameansof

achieving a policy goal. This chapterwill build on thematerial introduced in

chapter3and look firstlyat thepolicyaimsof theTasmanianplanningsystem

before outlining how planning assessmentworks in Tasmania under theLand

UsePlanningandApprovalsAct1993 (Tas) and then introducing Part 3 of the

Local Government (Building &Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1993. The chapter

concludesthatthelackofintegrationofPart3intothesystemestablishedunder

LUPAAhas implications for theeffectivenessofTasmania’splanningregulation

asfarassubdivisionisconcerned.

I CONTEXTANDBACKGROUND

In 2011 theProductivity Commission examined the performance ofAustralian

planning regulation and although the systems of each state and territory vary

anddirectcomparisonisdifficult, thebasicdevelopmentassessmentprocessis

thesame.176TheCommissionoutlinedthetypicalprocessasfollows:

• The applicant lodges an application with necessary documents and

fees;

• The assessment authority checks the application and requests

additionalinformationiftheapplicationisincomplete;

• The application may be passed to referral agencies and placed on

exhibitionforcomment fromownersofneighbouringpropertiesand

fromthecommunity(thesemaynothappenconcurrently);

176ProductivityCommissionofAustralia,aboven2,Vol1,76;ch3summaryofAustralianplanningsystemsanddevelopmentassessmentprocesses.

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• Relevantassessmentauthoritiesconsider theapplication, taking into

account comments, submissions, and what is allowed under the

planningregulation;

• Theassessmentauthoritydecidestoreject,approve,orconditionally

approvetheapplication;

• The applicant (or a third party, in some cases) may apply for

independentreviewofthedecision.177

The process is costly in terms of both time and financial expense. The

Commission noted that the statutory timeframes for assessment of proposals

vary among Australia’s jurisdictions.178Those timeframes can present hurdles

for developers and significantly affect the efficiency of planning regulatory

systems.

Efficiencyinthiscontextisusedinthesenseoftherelationshipbetweenapplied

resourcesandthedesiredoutcome.179Thatrelationshipishighlightedbyacost-

benefitanalysisthatmustincludeboththedirectcostsandtheindirectcostsof

regulation. Planning regulation is regulation that affects competition. The

Tasmanian Legislative Review program requires that such regulation firstly

deliver benefits that outweigh the costs it imposes, and secondly that those

benefitsbeonesthatcanonlybeachievedbyrestrictingcompetition.180

The Productivity Commission summarised the typical direct costs of planning

assessmentregulation:

• [P]rocedural requirements (preparing, submitting and providing

supportingmaterialforplanningamendments(rezoning)ordevelopment

applications);

177Ibid,78.178Ibid.179Freiberg,aboven14,263.180DepartmentofPrimaryIndustriesWater&Environment(Tas)‘ReviewoftheLandUsePlanningandApprovalsAct1993’MinorReviewStatement(January2000),[1.1].

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• Compliance costs of meeting specified development controls (location,

operating hours, business format, housing density, amenity,

environmental,andheritagerequirements);

• Fees and charges – application or other administration fees; charges to

verify developments accord with approved drawings; reports and

conditions of development and developer contributions…for local,

headworkandcommunityinfrastructureprovisions;and

• Increasedholdingcostsassociatedwithunnecessarydelays inobtaining

planningapproval.181

Indirectcostsaddtotheriskandcomplianceburden,including:

• Uncertainandprotractedtimeframes;

• Complex,inconsistent,andunpredictableregulatoryframeworks;and

• Intra- and inter-jurisdictional differences in administration and

regulatoryprocesses.182

Suchdirectandindirectcostsmaybeunavoidableasplanningdecisionscanbe

complexandrequiretrade-offsbetweenthe interestsof theproponentandthe

variouspartiesaffectedbyadevelopmentproposal.TheTasmanianDepartment

of Treasury and Finance administers regulatory review as part of the

Government’scommitmenttotheCouncilofAustralianGovernments’regulatory

reform program under the National Competition Policy and the Competition

Principles Agreement. The Department of Primary Industries, Water & the

Environment conducted such a reviewof theLandUsePlanningandApprovals

Act1993 (Tas) in2000.TheTermsofReferenceemphasised the impactof the

legislation on competition. The report nevertheless noted the trade-offs as it

referred to the broader community benefit to be derived from the permit

process, and the sustainabledevelopmentobjectiveof theTasmanianplanning

systemandprocesses.183

181ProductivityCommissionofAustralia,aboven2,228.182Ibid.183DepartmentofPrimaryIndustriesWater&Environmentaboven180,[4.3]

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The efficiency and the effectiveness of a planning regulatory system may be

reducedifthereislackofcoherenceamongthevariouspartsofthesystem.The

Productivity Commission has highlighted that unreviewed rolling reform to

planningregulatorysystemsrisksincoherence.184

Tasmania’s system for subdivision assessment and implementation is

particularlysusceptibletoincoherence.Part3oftheLocalGovernment(Building

& Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1993was introduced as a means of carrying

forwardexistingsubdivisionregulationtotheLUPAAsystempendingabroader

review. Although there has been minor amendment, the extensive review

referred toand thatwas foreshadowed in1993hasnot takenplace.Thatsuch

reviewhasnottakenplaceraisesthequestionofhoweffectivePart3is.

Effective regulation is an efficient means of achieving policy purpose. Such

regulationmayachieve thatpurposebecausewhenassessedusingcost-benefit

analysis, it is the most cost-effective means of achieving a policy goal. The

financial cost is however, not the only relevant factor when assessing the

effectiveness of regulation. Regulation should also be clear, understandable,

consistent, relevant and cohesive. Unless the law is also certain, ‘…ongoing

relations and dealings [are] at risk of whim and fancy.’185The Queensland

Governmentnotedtheimportanceofsuchfactorsinthe2015DirectionsPaper:

BetterPlanningforQueensland:

Practical well-structured legislation is crucial so that it is easy to

understandandapply,andcanbeused tocreateplanningschemes that

are purposeful and establish sensible and straightforward development

requirements.Havingpracticallegislationwillalsoassistthecommunity

whenengagingwiththeframework.186

184ProductivityCommissionaboven2185PagoneGT,‘TaxUncertainty’(2009)33MelbourneUniversityLawReview886-7.186QueenslandGovernment,BetterPlanningforQueensland,May2015,9.

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Coherence and consistency are particularly important in planning systems.

Planning regulatory systems comprise not only primary legislation, but also

subordinate regulation such as planning schemes. Inconsistency between a

statuteandaplanningschememayresultinafindingthattheinconsistentpart

of the planning scheme is repugnant in the sense that it is beyondpower and

accordinglyinvalid.’187

Uncertaintyanddelaywillalsoresultifthereareinconsistenciesinterminology

and effect between primary legislation and subordinate instruments.

Determiningwhetherthereissuchaninconsistencyrequiresadecisiononwhat

Parliament intended. That decision means assessing whether there can be

reconciliation between the components of the regulatory system. Such

assessment may require significant financial expenditure. To some extent the

costsanddelayassociatedwiththeneedforsuchassessmentwillnevertheless

beinevitableaswordswill invariablybeinadequate.Braithwaitereferstosuch

inadequacywhen hewrites of a ‘grey area’ that develops around the edges of

regulation.Suchindeterminacyencouragestestingoftheregulation,especiallyif

thereissignificantfinancialincentivetoavoiditsapplication.188

Planning assessment requires significant expenditure of both time andmoney

andthefinancialimplicationsofitsapplicationarehigh. Thereisconsequently

substantial incentive to test its scope and application. The regulation that

underlies planning systems must be as coherent and cohesive as possible in

orderforplanningregulatorysystemstobeeffective.Theinevitableuncertainty

thatattachestothemeaningofwordsandtheprocedurestheyestablishneedsto

beminimised.

Subdivision regulation,unlikeother formsofplanning regulation, faces further

challenges,asitcannotbeconsideredinisolation. Subdivisionregulationmust

inevitably interactwith the landregistrationsystem.The followingparagraphs

187GriffinvResourceManagementandPlanningAppealTribunal[2010]TASSC8(2March2010),[7]citingRvMinisteroftheInterior(1972)20FLR449;457-458.188JohnBraithwaite‘RulesandPrinciples:atheoryoflegalcertainty’(2002)27AustralianJournalofLegalPhilosophy47,54.

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outline the essential features of the Torrens system of land registration as

background to the examination of Tasmania’s planning system and the

provisionsofPart3thatfollows.

IITHETORRENSSYSTEMOFLANDREGISTRATION

UnderTorrenssystems,suchasthosethatapply inAustralia,189registrationby

thetitlesadministratorofdealingsismuchmorethanthemerenotificationthat

applies in recording systems.190In designing the Torrens system, Sir Robert

Torrenssoughtto‘strikeablow’attheexistingEnglishlandregistrationsystem

thatenabled the ‘grievous injuryand injustice…miseryandruin’ thatbefellhis

friendwhenadefectinhistoricaltitletopurchasedlandwasfound.191Underthe

English systemof the time, itwas impossible to establish theprecise statusof

titletolandwithoutexpensive,time-consumingexaminationofthedocumentary

historyofthetransactionsaffectingthatland.

Torrensdesigned a systemunderwhich all interests affecting landwere tobe

shownontheregister.Asoutlinedmorefullybelow,undertheTorrenssystem

registration confers paramount status or indefeasibility on the registered

dealing. The title of the registered proprietor under the Torrens system ‘… is

clearedofanyerrors,mistakesordefects,theprocessofregistrationactingasa

purgeofpastomissionsor incorrectadditions.’192Registration is central to the

Torrens system and required to pass an estate or interest at law. 193 An

189LandregistrationsystemsinAustraliaarepredominantlyTorrenssystem(LandTitleAct(NT),RealPropertyAct1900(NSW),LandTitleAct1994(Qld),RealPropertyAct1886(SA),LandTitlesAct1980(Tas);TransferofLandAct1958(Vic);TransferofLandAct1893(WA)althoughinsomejurisdictions(includingTasmania)landisstillregisteredundertheGeneralLawsystem.HowevertheprocessofconversionisunderwaywiththeLandTitlesOfficeautomaticallyconvertinglandonconveyanceandwithconversionbeingaprerequisiteforsubdivision.LandTitlesAct1980(Tas)s17A.190LGriggs,RLow,RThomas‘Accountingforrisk:Theadventofcappedconveyancingtitleinsurance’(2016)24AustralianPropertyLawJournal371;titlerecordingsystemsexistinFranceandtheUSA.191LesAMcCrimmon‘ProtectionofEquitableInterestsUndertheTorrenssystem:PolishingtheMirrorofTitle’(1994)20(2)MonashUniversityLawReview,300,301quotingRRTorrens,TheSouthAustralianSystemofConveyancingbyRegistrationofTitle(1859)v-vi.192Griggs,Low,Thomasaboven190.193LandTitlesAct1980(Tas),s49(1).

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unregisteredinstrumentmaygiveentitlementsinequitybuttheywilldependon

theavailabilityofspecificperformance.194

In 1952, Ruoff wrote articles that offered an outsider’s (an Englishman’s)

‘disinterested observations’ as he described and commented on the three

fundamentalfeaturesoftheTorrenssystem.

• Firstly the ‘mirror’ – the principle that the Registerwill reflect all facts

materialtoalandowner’stitle.195

• Secondly the ‘curtain’ – the principle that a purchaser need not look

behindtheRegisterasitisthesolesourceofinformationontitle.196

• Thirdly the insurance principle by virtue of which anyone who suffers

lossduetoaflawinthemirrorwillbecompensated.197

UltimatelytheprincipleattheheartoftheTorrenssystemisthattheRegisteris

everything.198TheTorrens legislationvaries inAustralian jurisdictionsbut the

principleunderlyingitisthat‘itisasystemoftitlebyregistration,notasystem

ofregistrationoftitle.’199Aregisteredproprietorisvestedwithtitlebyvirtueof

registration.200

The holder of a registered interest in land is the holder of the benefits of

conclusive evidence as to the entitlement of that estate or interest.201The

registeredinterestisparamountandwillnotbesubjecttoerosionordestruction

by unregistered interests, even though they may pre-date the registered

194GDalPont,EquityandTrustsinAustralia(ThomsonReutersLawBookCo5thed2011)[1.165];ChanvCresdonPtyLtd(1989)168CLR242.195TBFRuoff‘AnEnglishmanlooksattheTorrensSystem:PartIthemirrorprinciple’(1952)26AustralianLawJournal118.196TBFRuoff‘AnEnglishmanlooksattheTorrensSystem:PartIIsimplicityandthecurtainprinciple’(1952)26AustralianLawJournal162.197TBFRuoff‘AnEnglishmanlooksattheTorrensSystem:PartIII’(1952)26AustralianLawJournal194.198LandTitlesAct1980(Tas),s40(3).199BreskvarvWall(1971)126CLR376at385perBarwickCJ;[1971]HCA70citedinCassegrainvGerardCassegrain&CoPtyLtd[2015]HCA2(4February2015),[16].200BreskvarvWall(1971)126CLR376at385perBarwickCJ;[1971]HCA70citedinCassegrainvGerardCassegrain&CoPtyLtd[2015]HCA2(4February2015),[16].SeealsoClarenceCityCouncilvHowlin[2016]TASSC61(21November2016)[26]-[32].201LandTitlesAct1980(Tas),s39(2).

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interest.202Aregisteredinterestisconsequentlyaccordedpriorityasopposedto

those interests registered subsequently.203There are statutory exceptions to

indefeasibility (including fraud), and also non-statutory exceptions (including

theinpersonamexception).204

SomecommentatorshavesuggestedthattheTorrensmirrormaybeinneedof

polishing.ThestatusofunregisteredinterestsintheTorrenssystemisonesuch

topic that has prompted comment. 205 Increasingly conflict with planning

instruments,isanother.206Theinteractionbetweenplanningregulationandthe

Torrens system leads to complexity, and conflict arises because of the

fundamentalfeaturesoftheTorrenssystem.TheTorrenssystemisdesignedto

establishandprotectprivate interests in land.The implementationofplanning

policythroughthelandregistrationsystemmeansthat it isusedasameansof

enforcing planning controls, with such controls designed to promote public

policy. Planning controls, such as the regulationof subdivision,may come into

conflictwith the landregistrationsystemthat isdesigned toprovidea reliable

andfullrecordofprivaterightsandinterestsinland.207

Statutory rights and obligations designed to promote sustainable development

and government policies to protect the community at large may create

inconsistenciesandexceptionsinthelandregistrationframeworkthataffectthe

indefeasible titleof the registeredproprietor.208There isa collision inpurpose

between planning statutes designed to protect the public interest over the

demandsofparticipants inamarket for realestate.Thoseparticipants require

202LandTitlesAct1980(Tas),s40(1).203LandTitlesAct1980(Tas),s48(5).204SeeTangHangWu,‘BeyondtheTorrensMirror:aframeworkoftheinpersonamexceptiontoindefeasibility’(2008)32MelbourneUniversityLawReview672.205McCrimmon,aboven191.206SharonChristensenandWDDuncan,‘AligningSustainabilityandtheTorrensregister:challengesandrecommendationsforreform’(2012)20AustralianPropertylawJournal112;seealsoBrendanEdgeworth‘PlanningLawvPropertyLaw:OverridingstatutesandtheTorrenssystemafterHillpalmvHeaven’sDoorandKogarahvGoldenParadise’(2008)25EnvironmentalandPlanningLawJournal82.207ChristensenandDuncanaboven206.208Ibid[2].

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cheap, efficient and secureproperty transactionsand the certainty that results

fromregistrationundertheTorrenssystem.209

Onenotableexampleofthatconflictistheconflictthatarisesfromtheinclusion

ofleasesofpartofablockoflandwithinsubdivision.Theeffectofthelegislative

provisions isanexampleof thecomplexityof the interactionbetweenthe land

registration system and regulatory provision for subdivision in planning

systems.Australianplanningregulation,incommonwiththatofsomeCanadian

jurisdictions and New Zealand, includes within the definition or treatment of

subdivisiontheleasingofpartofablockofland.210Thetreatmentofsuchleases

as subdivisions means that they may be submitted to the same planning

assessment process as the division of a fee simple title. In addition to the

resultantcostanddelay,a leasemaynotmeet thestandardsapplicable to ‘the

conventionalnotionofsubdivision,namelythecreationofadditionaltitlesoutof

anexistingtitle.’211

The issues that arise highlight how regulationmay fail to be effective and the

consequences of such failure. The effect of the provisions has prompted the

development of techniques to avoid their application. The application of the

provisions poses more far-reaching questions, including the enforceability of

leases that do not comply with planning assessment and the position of such

leaseswhenregisteredintheTorrenssystem. Thedifficulty iscompoundedin

the case of the Tasmanian provisions because of uncertainty in theirmeaning

and scope. The ‘lease as subdivision’ provisions and the issues they raise are

examinedinchapter6.

209Edgeworth,aboven206,82;seealsoPeterButt‘IndefeasibilityOverridden–Significantly’(2003)77AustralianLawJournal88and‘PlanningvsPropertyRights’(2011)85AustralianLawJournal711,712.210Planning&DevelopmentAct2007(ACT)s7(2);EnvironmentalPlanningandAssessmentAct1979(NSW)s6.2,(3)(D),ConveyancingAct1919(NSW)s23G(d),PlanningAct1999(NT)s5(3);SustainablePlanningAct2009(Qld)s10(1);PlanningAct2016(Qld)Sch2;DevelopmentAct1993(SA)s4(10(c);Planning,DevelopmentandInfrastructureAct2016(SA)s3(1);LocalGovernment(Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993(Tas),s80;WesternAustraliadoesnotincludeleasesassubdivisions,butprovidesforaseparateplanningassessmentofleasesPlanningandDevelopmentAct2005(WA)ss136,139;ResourceManagementAct1991(NZ)s218(1)(a)(iii);MunicipalGovernmentActRSA2000,cM-26s616(ee);LandTitleAct,RSBC1996,c250s73(1).211BenmarPropertiesPtyLtdvMakucha[1993]QSC269(10September1993),17ThomasJ.

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III TASMANIA’SPLANNINGSYSTEM

In evaluating a regulatory system, those involved ‘typically and primarily

assess……theextenttowhichitensuresthatthechosenpolicygoalisachievedin

practice.’212Accordingly in order to assess the effectiveness of a regulatory

system, thepolicy goals that underlie the systemmust be identified. TheLand

UsePlanningandApprovalsAct 1993 (Tas) (LUPAA) and the StatePolicies and

ProjectsAct1993 (Tas) setout thepolicygoalsofTasmania’splanning system.

TheActsalsoestablish theregulatory frameworkandstructure forTasmania’s

resourcemanagementandplanningsystemand theassessmentprocess. They

provide for state planning policies, regional planning strategies and planning

schemes.

Thefocusofthesystemistheachievementofsustainabledevelopmentdefined

as:

[M]anagingtheuse,developmentandprotectionofnaturalandphysical

resourcesinaway,oratarate,whichenablespeopleandcommunitiesto

provide for their social, economic and cultural well-being and for their

healthandsafetywhile–

(a) sustainingthepotentialofnaturalandphysicalresourcestomeet

thereasonablyforeseeableneedsoffuturegenerations;and

(b) safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of air, water, soil and

ecosystems;and

(c) avoiding,remedyingormitigatinganyadverseeffectsofactivities

ontheenvironment.213

Thesystemaimstoincludeconsiderationoftheenvironmentandthecapability

oflandintheplanningframeworkandinthemakingofdecisionsontheuseand

development of land.214The planning process also aims to be an integrated

212Yeung,aboven17,91.213LandUsePlanning&ApprovalsAct1993(Tas)Sch1Part1.214LandUsePlanning&ApprovalsAct1993(Tas)Sch1Part2.

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system of environmental, social, economic, conservation and resource

managementpolicies.215

TherearethreestatepoliciesissuedundertheStatePolices&ProjectsAct1993

that regulate land and environment use andmanagement.216In addition, three

regional land use strategies have been declared that set out the long term

planning goals and land use policies and strategies for the three Tasmanian

regions.217 The strategies are a joint initiative between the state and local

governmentsandaretobe‘monitored,maintainedandreviewedinanongoing

process to ensure they remain relevant and responsive.’218The strategies are

intendedtofillthegapbetweenthebroadobjectiveofsustainabledevelopment

and locally relevant land use planning directions including the integration of

infrastructureandserviceswiththedevelopmentofland.219Inadditiontostate

policies and regional strategies the Minister may issue planning directives on

planningmattersincludingastothecontentofplanningschemes.220

The Tasmanian Planning Commission is established under the Tasmanian

Planning Commission Act 1997 (Tas) with its functions including advice to

councils in relation to planning schemes.221 LUPAA sets out what planning

schemesmayprovidefor.222Legislationtoenabletheintroductionofthesingle

state-wideschemewasassentedtoinDecember2015,223withtheintentthatthe

scheme be operational by the end of 2017.224State Planning Provisions have

215LandUsePlanning&ApprovalsAct1993(Tas)Sch1Part2.216ThepoliciesaretheTasmanianStateCoastalPolicy1996,theStatePolicyonWaterQualityManagement1997andtheStatePolicyontheProtectionofAgriculturalLand2009.S12AoftheActalsorecognizesnationalenvironmentprotectionmeasuresasstatepolicies.217TheLivingontheCoast–CradleCoastRegionalLandUsePlanningFramework2011;TheRegionalLandUseStrategyofNorthernTasmaniaJanuary2016;TheSouthernTasmanianRegionalLandUseStrategy2010-2035.218TheSouthernTasmanianRegionalLandUseStrategy2010-2035,[1.1].219TheSouthernTasmanianRegionalLandUseStrategy2010-2035,17[SD1]..220PlanningDirectiveNo1–TheFormatandStructureofPlanningSchemescameintoeffecton17February2016.221TasmanianPlanningCommissionAct1997(Tas)s6(1A)(c)222LandUsePlanning&ApprovalsAct1993(Tas)s11.223LandUsePlanning&Approvals(TasmanianPlanningScheme)AmendmentAct2015(Tas).224TasmanianGovernmentTasmanianPlanningSchemeFactSheet<http://www.justice.tas.gov.au/tasmanian_planning_reform>

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beendeclaredwitheach council toprepare localprovisions. Tasmaniahas29

municipalcouncilsand30planningschemes,withoneschemebeingdedicated

totheSullivansCoveareaofHobart.

Use and Development proposals in Tasmania are categorised by planning

schemesasfollows:

• ProposalsmaybeExempt(noapplicationrequired);

• No Permit Required (does not rely on a performance criterion tomeet

applicablestandardsandisnotdiscretionaryorprohibited);

• Permitted (planning authority must issue permit if proposal meets

standards and does not rely on performance criterion and is not

discretionaryorprohibited);

• Discretionary(planningauthorityhasdiscretionwhetherornotto issue

permitandmaydosoifproposalcomplieswithstandardsbutreliesona

performancecriteriontodosoandisnotprohibited);

• Prohibited(planningauthoritycannotissueapermit).225

Thecommencementofauseordevelopmentthatrequiresapermitisprohibited

until the permit has been granted and is in effect.226 Under some Tasmanian

interim planning schemes,227a planning authority has discretion to refuse or

grantapermit.228UnderotherschemessuchastheLauncestonInterimScheme,

andtheStatePlanningProvisions,subdivisionmayfollowapermittedpathway225ExplanatoryDocumenttoStatePlanningProvisionsexplainscategoriesofassessment[6.4.5]-[6.5.9]226LandUsePlanning&ApprovalsAct1993,s51;LocalGovernmentBuilding&MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993,s81providesforafinenotexceeding50penaltyunits(asat1stJuly2018aTasmanianPenaltyunitisvaluedat$163.00-PenaltyUnits&OtherPenaltiesAct1987(Tas),s4A(1).227TheSouthernInterimPlanningschemes(commonformatformostofthesouthernandsomenortherncouncils)ofwhichtheHobartplanningschemeandalsotheWestTamar,BreakODayandCentralHighlandsschemesareexamples,includeaclauseinthewordsofcl9.7.2oftheHobartschemespecifyingthatsubdivisionisdiscretionary.228Section57LandUsePlanning&ApprovalsAct1993;s85&s85ALocalGovernment(Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993providecriteriaforapprovalofsubdivision;s85A(2)enablesasubdivisiontofollowapermitted(asopposedtodiscretionary)pathwaythatmeansapermitmustbegrantedifitcomplieswith‘acceptablesolution’setoutinplanningscheme.Thisamendmentthattookeffecton1stJanuary2015enablesasubdivisiontobeapprovedincircumstancesthatvaryaccordingtothezoningoftheland.Thiscontrastswiththerestrictiveprovisionsofs84thatspecifiesrequirementssuchasminimumlotsizesandpreventsacouncilfromapprovinganon-conformingsubdivision.

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(as opposed to discretionary pathway), if it conforms to certain acceptable

solutions.229Thecouncilactingasplanningauthoritymustgiveatleast14days

noticetothepublicofanapplicationclassedasdiscretionary,enablingthepublic

to make representations before the council makes a decision.230The planning

authoritycannotmakeadecisiononanapplicationforapermitearlierthan14

daysfromthedateofadvertisingoftheapplication.

Thetimeavailableto localgovernmentplanningauthoritiestomakeadecision

onaproposaldependsonwhethertheapplicationconcernsadevelopmentthat

will followapermittedordiscretionarypathway. Apermittedpathwaymeans

thattheauthoritymustissueapermitwithin28daysifthedevelopmentmeets

acceptable solutions specified in zone provisions. 231 If the authority has a

discretion to grant or refuse the permit, the authority has a maximum of 42

days.232Further time isavailablebyagreementwith thedeveloper.233Once the

authorityhasmadeadecisionanownerofland,theapplicant,orapersonwho

hasmadearepresentationhaveaperiodof14daystolodgeanappealwiththe

ResourceManagementandPlanningAppealTribunal.

TheTasmanianStatePlanningProvisions234areanexampleofthestandardsthat

applytoasubdivisionproposalthatisassessedundertheLUPAAsystem.Clause

5.6.1providesthatauseordevelopmentmustcomplywiththestandardsinthe

StatePlanningProvisionsthatareapplicabletoazone.Theuseordevelopment

must complywith either themoreprescriptive acceptable solutionsor relyon

229TheLauncestonInterimschemedoesnotcontainsuchaclause.Theconditionsasubdivisionmustfulfillvaryandinsomezones(suchastheRuralResourceZone)acceptablesolutionsforlotsizeanddimensionsrestrictthesubdivisionproposalsthatcanfollowpermittedpathways.230LandUsePlanning&ApprovalsAct1993(Tas)s57(5)231LandUsePlanningandApprovalsAct1993(Tas)s58.232LandUsePlanningandApprovalsAct1993(Tas)s57.233LandUsePlanningandApprovalsAct1993(Tas)s57(6)&(6A);s58(2A).234TasmanianGovernmentStatePlanningProvisions,<http://www.justice.tas.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/370294/State_Planning_Provisions.PDF>TheStatePlanningProvisions(Part3LandUsePlanningandApprovalsAct1993)includeadministrative,zoneandcodeprovisionsthatwillapplystate-wide;councilswillprepareLocalProvisionsSchedules(Part3ALandUsePlanningandApprovalsAct1993)thatwillincludemapsandoverlaysandmustincludeprovisionsrequiredundertheSPPandcannotbeinconsistentwiththeTasmanianPlanningScheme.TheSchemewillbecomeoperationaloncetheLocalProvisionsScheduleshavebeenapproved.

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meeting the performance criteria for that standard.235 Clause 6.1.2 of the

Schemeprovidesthatanapplicationforapprovalofauseordevelopmentmust

include:

·detailsofthelocationoftheuseordevelopment;

·acopyofthecertificateoftitle;

·afulldescriptionoftheproposeduseordevelopment.

Inadditiontheplanningauthoritymayrequireasiteanalysisandplan.Whereit

isproposedtoerectbuildings,adetailedlayoutplanmayberequired.236Clause

6.8.1provides that a proposalwill follow thediscretionarypathway in certain

circumstances including if the use or development does not fit an Acceptable

SolutionbutreliesonaPerformanceCriterion.

AsubdivisionproposalthatmeetstheAcceptableSolutionrequirementswillbe

permitted whichmeans that a council must approve the development. Unlike

proposals that are exempt, permitted proposals must still be checked against

planningcontrolstoverifytheyarepermitted.237

The Table below is an extract from the State Planning Provisions and

demonstrates the difference between Acceptable Solutions and the less

prescriptive Performance Criteria. 238 The objective of the development

standards for subdivision include ensuring that each lot has an area and235Clause5.6.1,5.6.3TasmanianStatePlanningProvisions.236Clause6.1.3StatePlanningProvisions.AsubdivisionproposalnolongerhastobeclassifiedintoaUseclassundertheStatePlanningProvisionsduetothedifficultyofclassifyingsomeproposalsintoparticularUseclasses.MinisterforPlanningandLocalGovernmentExplanatoryDocumentforthedraftoftheStatePlanningProvisionsoftheTasmanianPlanningScheme7March2016.237Clause6.4.7ExplanatoryDocumentforthedraftoftheStatePlanningProvisionsoftheTasmanianPlanningScheme7March2016;LocalGovernmentAssociationofTasmaniaSubmissiontoTasmanianGovernment,‘ReformingTasmania’sPlanningSystemPositionPaper,’2October2014,11.238GeneralResidentialZone[8.6]StatePlanningProvisions.ThepurposesoftheGeneralResidentialZoneincludeprovisionof:

• residentialuseanddevelopmentwherefullinfrastructureservicesareavailable,• theefficientuseofsocial,transportandotherinfrastructure,• compatiblenon-residentialusethatdoesnotreduceamenityordisplaceresidentialuse

andservesthelocalcommunity[8.1].

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dimensionsappropriateforuseanddevelopmentinthezone.AcceptableSolutions PerformanceCriteriaA1Eachlotmust:(a) haveanareaofnotlessthan450m2and:

(i) be able to contain a minimumbuilding area of 10 m x 15 mwithagradientnotsteeperthan1in5clearof:a. allsetbacks…and;b. easements or other title

restrictions that limit orrestrictdevelopment;and

(ii) existingbuildingsareconsistentwithsetback…

(b) berequiredforpublicuse…(c) be required for the provision of public

utilitiesor(d) be for the consolidation of a lot with

another lot provided each lot is withinthesameZone.

P1Each lot, or a lot proposed in a plan ofsubdivision,must have sufficient useable areaand dimensions suitable for its intended usehavingregardto:

(a) the relevant requirements fordevelopment of existing buildings onthelots;

(b) the intended location of buildings onthelots;

(c) thetopographyofthesite;(d) thepresenceofanynaturalhazards;(e) adequate provision of private open

space;and(f) thepatternofdevelopmentexistingon

establishedpropertiesinthearea.

A2Each lot, excluding for public open space, ariparian or littoral reserve or Utilities,musthaveafrontageofnotlessthan12m.

P2Each lot, or a lot proposed in a plan ofsubdivision,excludingforpublicopenspace,ariparianorlittoralreserveorUtilities,mustbeprovidedwithafrontageorlegalconnectiontoa road by a right of carriageway, that issufficient for the intended use, having regardto:

(a) thewidthofthefrontageproposed,ifany;(b) thenumberofotherlotswhichhavehadthe

land subject to the right of carriageway astheirsoleorprincipalmeansofaccess;

(c) thetopographyofthesite;(d) the functionality and useability of the

frontageoraccess;(e) the anticipated nature of vehicles likely to

accessthesite;(f) theabilitytomanoeuvrevehiclesonthesite;

and(g) the pattern of development existing on

establishedpropertiesintheareaandisnotlessthan3.6mwide.

Part 3 of the Local Government (Building&Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1993

also contains provisions relevant to the assessment of a subdivision proposal.

Despite the planning schemes established under the LUPAA system, the

provisions of Part 3 still exist as separate or parallel assessment process for

subdivision proposals. The next sectionwill consider the provisions of Part 3

anditsplaceintheLUPAAsystem.

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IVPART3-ITSPLACEINTHELUPAASYSTEM

Part3oftheLocalGovernment(Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993 is

entitled‘Subdivision,’withitsprovisionstacklingthetaskoftheassessmentand

implementationofsubdivisionproposalsinninedivisions.Thevarioussections

of Part 3 set out the procedural detail for the approval and registration of

subdivisionproposals. TheprovisionsofPart3 are stated toprevail over any

other Act, regulation, rule, or by-law made under any other Act relating to

subdivisions.239 Byway of further introduction to Part 3, a brief outline of its

provisionsandstructurefollows.

Division1ofPart3definestermsrelevanttosubdivision.240Thosetermsinclude

‘subdivide’, ‘public open space’, ‘minimum lot’ and phrases to identify

subdivision plans at different stages of the assessment, approval, and

implementationprocess.

Division2ofPart3dealswiththeapprovalprocessforsubdivision.Section81

providesthatitisanoffencetosubdivideexceptinaccordancewithapreviously

approved plan or pursuant to a permit issued under LUPAA. Section 81(3)

providesthatinplaceofafine,alandownerwhosubdividesincontraventionof

thesectionmaybeorderedtoforfeitthevalueoftheestatedisposedofthrough

theunauthorisedsubdivision.

Division 3 provides for ‘final plans’, being plans prepared once a council has

grantedapermitforasubdivision.

Division4providesfortheregistrationbytheRecorderofTitlesof‘sealedplans’

being plans that have been formally approved by a council. The Division also

providesforlanddedicatedasapublicroadwayandeasements.

Divisions5and6addressamendmentofsealedplansandmiscellaneousmatters

inrespectofplans.

239LocalGovernment(Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993s122.240LocalGovernment(Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993s80.

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Divisions7and8dealwithminimumlotsandpublicopenspacerespectively.

Division9containsmiscellaneousprovisionsincludings120thatsavescontracts

thatmightnotcomplywiththeprovisionsofPart3.Section122declaresPart3

tobetheprevailingregulationforsubdivisioninTasmania.

Despite the assessment regime established under LUPAA and its planning

schemes,thePart3provisionsfortheassessmentofsubdivisionproposalsstill

apply. These provisions set prescriptive standards such as the permitted size

and frontage of proposed lots241and the drainage of roads.242By contrast, less

prescriptive standardsapply to theassessmentof subdivisionproposalsunder

theLUPAAsystem.

Although there are still 30 planning schemes under the LUPAA system, the

individualised municipal schemes have been replaced through the interim

planning schemeprogram thathas standardisedTasmanianplanning schemes.

Theprogramhasintroducedmoreperformance-basedstandardsthatcanenable

asubdivisiontofollowapermittedpathwaywherethesubdivisionconformsto

thestandardsspecifiedintheplanningscheme.243

Part3wasamendedin2014aspartofthecurrentplanningreformprocessand

inpreparation for the introductionof a single statewideplanning scheme.The

amendmentsenableassessmentofsubdivisionsunderLUPAAplanningschemes

toco-existwiththeprocessestablishedunderPart3.244Theamendmentswere

required in order that Part 3 could accommodate the less restrictive interim

planningschemesandStatePlanningProvisionsthatcontainperformance-based

241LocalGovernment(Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993s109retainsthereferencesto‘buildingareas’thatwereinthe1962Actandthatarenolongerrelevanttotheplanningsystem.242LocalGovernment(Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993s84(1).243Aspartofthestreamlininglegislationaimedatfacilitatingthereformprogram,LUPAAwasamendedin2014toenableplanningschemestocontainperformance-basedstandards;s84(1A)wasintroducedbyLandUsePlanningandApprovalsAmendment(StreamliningofProcess)Act1993s53.244s85Aintroducedbys54LandUsePlanningandApprovals(StreamliningofProcess)Act2014.

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standards.Thoseacceptablesolutionsandperformancecriteriaareincludedin

the interim planning schemes and the state-wide planning provisions. They

enableacounciltoapproveaplanofsubdivision,despiteitsnotcomplyingwith

the prescriptive provisions of s 84 of the Local Government (Building &

MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993.

Despite such legislative amendment Part 3 has not been integrated or

consolidatedwith theLUPAA system. TheGovernmenthasacknowledged that

the continued existence of Part 3 means there are ‘two sets of controls for

subdivisions.’245TheAttorneyGeneralreferredtothe‘safetynet’ofPart3being

retainedasoldmunicipalplanningschemeswerereplacedbythestandardized

interim planning schemes.246This section of chapter 4 seeks to explore the

implicationsforTasmania’splanningsystemofthecontinuedexistenceofPart3.

Part 3 is Tasmania’s prevailing legislation for subdivision and it continues to

existatatimewhenextensiverestructuringandreformoftheLUPAAsystemis

takingplace.

A TheprovisionsofPart3andtheirplacein

Tasmania’sPlanningSystem

ThePart3assessmentprovisionsincludethosestipulatingstandardswithwhich

plansmust comply and provisions dealing withmatters such as public roads,

public open space, and infrastructure. Part 3 establishes a system that grants

powers and discretions to ‘councils’ as opposed to the ‘planning authorities’

referredtoinLUPAA.ThepowersanddiscretionsgrantedtocouncilsbyPart3in

the assessment of subdivision proposals are not granted under LUPAA. Under

Part 3 councils are given discretion not to approve subdivisions.247There are

alsoprescriptiveprovisionsprohibitingtheapprovalbycouncilsofcertainplans

of subdivision, subject to the application of LUPAA planning scheme

provisions.248

245Tasmania,ParliamentaryDebates,LegislativeCouncil19November2014(VGoodwin).246Ibid.247LocalGovernmentBuilding&MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993(Tas),s85.248LocalGovernmentBuilding&MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993(Tas),s84(1)(a);‘minimumlot’isdefinedbys109oftheActsubjecttoanyprovisioninaplanningscheme(whichscheme

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Under ss 83 and s 85 a council has discretion to refuse approval and is given

specificguidanceastothecircumstancesinwhichitmayexerciseitsdiscretion

not to approve a subdivision. Section 85 lists a series of factors that entitle a

counciltorefusetoapproveasubdivision.

Thes85listincludessomefactorsthatarenotreferredtoinplanningschemes.

Consequently, the council may determine to refuse the subdivision permit

despitetheAcceptableSolutionorPerformanceCriteriaofthePlanningScheme

beingpresent.Thecircumstancesins85includethatthecouncilisoftheopinion

that:

• theroadsofthesubdivisionwillnotsuitthepublicconvenienceornot

givesatisfactoryinter-communicationwithexistingroads,

• that the layout shouldbealtered to includeoromit alleys andblind

roads,

• that the site layout may render the cost of providing electricity or

watertooexpensive;and

• thatwheregroundishigherononesideortheother,widerroadsmay

needtobeprovidedtogivereasonableaccesstobothsides.

TheResourceManagementPlanning&AppealTribunal(“TheRMAPT”)andthe

SupremeCourtofTasmaniaconsideredthediscretionunders85 inaseriesof

decisions, the first of which was the RMPAT decision of Smith v Hobart City

Council.249Thedecisionsand judgments concerned theexerciseby theHobart

CityCouncilof itsdiscretionunder s85(a).TheCouncil refusedapermit for a

subdivisionat502MtNelsonRoadtakingintoaccounttheconsiderationssetout

in s 85(a). Those considerations were that the roads ’did not suit the public

convenience’ nor did they allow for ‘satisfactory inter-communication’ to the

inhabitantsoftheHobartCity.

Thehistoryofthelandintheimmediatevicinityoftheproposedsubdivisionwas

mayprovideforacceptablesolutionsorperformancecriteriainwhichcasesub-s(1)willnotapply).Seealsoabove,chapter1,3.249SmithvHobartCityCouncil[2009]TASRMPAT94

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lengthyandcomplex.Oneofthosepiecesoflandwas512NelsonRoad.250Some

of the difficulties of the matter were found to derive from earlier planning

assessment decisions that had rendered 512 Nelson Road landlocked.251The

Council was particularly concerned, in assessing the subdivision proposal for

502NelsonRoad,toprovideforpublicroadaccessto512NelsonRoad.252

TheRMPAToverturnedtheCouncil’sdecisiontorefuseapermit,promptingan

appealtotheSupremeCourtandultimatelyadecisionbytheFullCourt.TheFull

Court held that the RMPATposition that the Council’s refusal was not within

powerwas incorrect and the Tribunal had erred in law. The Full Court then

remitted thematter to theRMPAT for reconsideration. The Court directed the

TribunaltoconsiderthehistoryoftheCouncil’spastplanningdecisionsandthe

financialconsequencesofitsrequirementthat512NelsonRoadbegivenaccess

toapublicroad.

Although the subdivisionwaseventuallypermitted,253the judgmentof theFull

CourtdealtwiththeargumentthattheCouncildidnothavepowertorefusethe

subdivisiononthebasisofthemattersprovidedins85.BlowJ(ashethenwas)

stated:

There isnodoubtthattheCouncilhadadiscretiontorefusetoapprove

by virtue of the LGBMP Act, S 85(a). There is nothing in the relevant

legislationthatfetterstheexerciseofsuchadiscretion.254

Morerecently,theRMPAThasconsideredthediscretioninthecontextofPublic

OpenSpacerequirementsonsubdivision.InPBarker&AWoolleyvClarenceCity

Council,255theCouncilrefusedapermitforsubdivisionontwogrounds.Thefirst

250ThehistorywassummarisedbyBlowJ(ashethenwas)inSmithvHobartCityCouncil[2010]TASFC9(21December2010)[10].251TheTribunalreferredtothe‘adhocery’ofearlierplanningdecisionsinJ&PSmithvHobartCityCouncil[2011]TASRMPAT122(19August2011)[17-18].252SmithvHobartCityCouncil[2010]TASFC9(21December2010)[4].253ThedecisionoftheRMPATinJandPSmithvHobartCityCouncil[2012]TASRMPAT29(22February2012)addressesthescheduleofconditions,includingthoserequiredtoaddressthebushfirerisk.254SmithvHobartCityCouncil[2010]TASFC9(21December2010)[20].255PBarker&AWoolleyvClarenceCityCouncil[2017]TASRMPAT15(30August2017).

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groundwas the exercise by the Council of the discretion under s 85(d)(iii) to

require alteration to the plan to includePublicOpen Space.TheRMPAT noted

that under s 85 the decision maker is not constrained by a Council’s formal

PolicyonPublicOpenSpace.ThediscretionunderPart3isalsonotfetteredby

the legislation.256TheRMPATdeterminedthat thediscretionmustbeexercised

reasonably under Part 3. In the case before it the RMPAT determined that it

wouldnothaverefusedthesubdivisiononthatgroundanditwasunreasonable

fortheCounciltodoso.257

That the discretion granted to Councils under Part 3 is alive and well poses

questionsforitsplaceinTasmania’splanningsystemestablishedunderLUPAA.

InPBarker&AWoolleyvClarenceCityCouncil,theTribunalnoted:

Section85of[LocalGovernment(Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)Act

1993)] confers a power through which subdivision can be regulated

independently of the [Planning] Scheme. At its ‘bluntest’ the power of

refusal therein could be exercised repeatedly until an acceptable

subdivisionapplicationaddressingpublicopenspace,wassubmitted.258

TheissueofthePart3discretionanditsinteractionwiththeLUPAAsystemwas

also considered by those interviewed for this thesis. One senior council

infrastructuremanagercommentedontheimportanceofprescriptiveprovisions

such as s 85 of Part 3.259He noted they act as a source of enabling power for

councils thatare required toplaymultiple roles.Councilsmustactnotonlyas

planningauthoritiesintheassessmentofdevelopmentproposals,butalsoasrisk

managersandstrategicforwardplannersfortheprovisionofinfrastructure.The

powersanddiscretionsgrantedunderPart3toCouncilsweredescribedas‘the

backbone of sustainable development’ by subdivision,260and its provisions as

essential to theabilityof localgovernment toplay therolesassigned to it.The

256PBarker&AWoolleyvClarenceCityCouncil[2017]TASRMPAT15(30August2017)[76].257PBarker&AWoolleyvClarenceCityCouncil[2017]TASRMPAT15(30August2017)[78].258PBarker&AWoolleyvClarenceCityCouncil[2017]TASRMPAT15(30August2017)[73].259InterviewwithSurveyor1,29thSeptember2016.260InterviewwithSurveyor1,29thSeptember2016.

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interviewees who made these comments emphasized the importance of

meaningfulconsultationwithlocalgovernmentinanyreviewofPart3.

Another interviewee predicted that the powers and discretions granted to

CouncilsunderPart3wouldbecomemoreusefulandmeaningfultoCouncils.261

He suggested that the planning scheme changes through firstly, the interim

planningschemesandnowthestatewideprovisionshavemeant limitationson

theirdiscretionanddecision-makingpowerthatsomeCouncilsareyettocome

totermswith.ThefailuretoappreciatetheroleofPart3wasalsonotedbyone

Councilincommentontheprovisionsofthestate-wideplanningscheme.Itwas

pointedoutthatthe‘fullambitofgeneralconsiderationsandgroundsforrefusal

under sections 84 and 85…’ is not reflected in the scheme leading to the

possibility of a challenge for decisions that do not take into account those

provisions.262

Such an argument was presented to the RMPAT in P Barker & A Woolley v

ClarenceCityCouncil.263Thedeveloperchallengedthevalidityofclause14.5.3P2

of the Planning Scheme264on the ground that it purported to remove the

discretiongrantedtotheCouncilunders85(d)(iii). TheTribunalnotedthatit

did not have legal authority to make a declaration as to the validity of that

provision. If it did have such power, it would reject the argument,265on the

grounds that theSchemeshouldbereadasconferringadiscretion tomakeno

requirementforopenspace.266TheSchemeproperlyappliedcouldaccordingly

have the effect that the proposed development could ‘not be conditioned to

require open space.’ The Tribunal commented that it might, therefore, be

arguable whether the Council technically retained its discretion, but that

argumentwasnotone for theTribunal todetermine. The limitsof theRMPAT

261InterviewwithPlanner4,12thOctober2016.262WestTamarCouncil,SubmissionNo260onTasmanianPlanningScheme-draftStatePlanningProvisions,18thMay2016,2.263PBarker&AWoolleyvClarenceCityCouncil[2017]TASRMPAT15(30August2017).264Clause14.5.3P2providesthat‘PublicOpenSpacemustbeprovidedaslandorcashinlieu,inaccordancewiththerelevantpolicy.’265PBarker&AWoolleyvClarenceCityCouncil[2017]TASRMPAT15(30August2017)[18].266PBarker&AWoolleyvClarenceCityCouncil[2017]TASRMPAT15(30August2017).[21]

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decision leave open the possibility of further challenges to both planning

schemesandthePart3discretion.

AnystudyofPart3oftheLocalGovernment(Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)

Act 1993 must take into account its status as the prevailing regulation for

subdivisioninTasmania.Despitethatlegislatedstatus,theresearchofthisthesis

suggeststhattheroleandsignificanceplayedbyPart3intheplanningsystemis

not appreciated. Thiswas confirmedby twoof the interviewees spoken to for

this thesis who have extensive experience with Tasmania’s planning system.

TheybothsuggestedthesignificanceofPart3anditspositionbyvirtueofs122

as the prevailing regulation for subdivision in Tasmania is not widely

understood.267

Suchlackofunderstandingandappreciationseemstohaveaffectedeventhose

responsible for administering Part 3. Reports submitted by theDepartment of

Primary IndustryWater and the Environment as part of the legislative review

programundertheNationalCompetitionPolicyrecordtheprogressmadeunder

that program.268The report submitted in 1999, noted that there was to be a

state-based reviewofPart 3during1999.269Subsequent reports submitted for

the program between May 2000 and March 2005 incorrectly and, rather

alarmingly, record that Part 3 had been repealed and replaced by new

legislation.270

267InterviewswithPlanner2,22ndSeptember2016andSurveyor1,29thSeptember2016.268TasmanianGovernment,‘NationalCompetitionPolicyProgressReport’,May1999<http://ncp.ncc.gov.au/search/results?searchstring=tasmania&SUBMIT=Search&jurisdiction=TAS&doc_type=2&year=&sector=&pagesize=10>269IninterviewSurveyor1,29thSeptember2016referredtoareviewofPart3thatwasconductedin1998.TheauthorhasbeenunabletofindarecordofareportintheStateArchivesorParliamentaryLibrary.Onestateserviceemployeesuggestedafterinterviewthatthereviewmightneverhavebeencompletedduetotheretirementofitschair,areviewofdepartmentalprioritiesorachangeingovernment.270egTasmanianGovernment,‘NationalCompetitionPolicyProgressReport’,May2001,89.<http://ncp.ncc.gov.au/docs/Tasmania%27s%20fifth%20NCP%20progress%20report%20to%2031%20December%202000%2C%20May%202001.pdf>TasmanianGovernment,‘NationalCompetitionPolicyProgressReport’,May2005,66.<http://ncp.ncc.gov.au/docs/Tasmania%20ninth%20NCP%20progress%20report%20as%20at%2031%20March%202005%2C%20May%202005.pdf>

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Intervieweesspokentoforthisthesisreferredtotheneedforbetterintegration

ofPart3andforallregulatoryprovisionsrelevanttodevelopmentassessmentto

becentralized.Twoplanningassessorsspokeofthecomplicationandconfusion

thatcanarisebecauseoftheneedtotakeaccountoftheprovisionsofPart3ina

systemthatisfocusedonLUPAAanditsplanningschemes.271

SuchaviewofTasmania’splanningsystemisreflectedinthe2015ReportCard

on development assessment issued by the Property Council of Australia. The

Property Council report welcomes the reform to planning schemes as broad

scale reform of the system, but does not take into account Part 3.272Other

interviewees suggested that the assessment provisions of Part 3 should be

incorporated intoLUPAAand itsplanningschemes,withprovisionsrelevant to

land titlesbeing transferred to theLandTitlesAct.273 Foranother interviewee,

thesolutionliesinlegislationsuchastheSubdivisionAct1988(Vic)thatprovides

aone-stopshopfordealingwiththemechanicsofputtingasubdivisionproposal

intopractice.274

B ‘Councils’andPlanningAuthorities’

The complexity arising from the interaction between the Part 3 prescriptive

provisionsandtheLUPAAsystemishighlightedwhenconsideringthedistinction

between a ‘council’ under Part 3 of the Local Government (Building &

MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993 and a ‘planning authority’ under the LUPAA

system. Unlike Part 3 that refers to councils, LUPAA is focused on planning

authorities. A planning authority is defined as meaning a council. 275 As a

planning authority, a council is charged by LUPAA with enforcement of a

planningscheme.276

271InterviewwithPlanner3,22ndSeptember2016andPlanner5,12thOctober2016.272PropertyCouncilofAustraliaaboven2,72.273InterviewwithLawyer1,19thSeptember2016,Planner2,20thSeptember2016.274InterviewwithConsultant,23rdSeptember2016.275LandUsePlanning&ApprovalsAct1993,(Tas),s3.276Unders63AofLUPAAaplanningauthoritymusttakeallreasonablestepstoensurethattheprovisionsofaplanningschemearecompliedwith;s48enforcementofplscheme;s5&sch1.

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In exercising its powers under LUPAA, a planning authority must seek to

promote sustainable development and the objectives of the planning system

establishedunderLUPAA.277Section51ofLUPAAprohibits thecommencement

ofuseordevelopmentthatrequiresapermitunlesstheauthoritychargedwith

administering the planning scheme has granted a permit and the permit is in

effect.

In itsroleasplanningauthority,acouncil issubject toreviewby theResource

Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal (the RMPAT). 278 In making a

determinationtheRMPATcanexercisethepowersconferredonthepersonwho

madethedecision.279TheRMPATmayaffirm,varyorsetasidethedecisionofa

planningauthorityandmaysubstituteadifferentdecision.280Consequently the

RMPATmayexercise thediscretionofacouncilactingasplanningauthority in

respect of a subdivision proposal in a way that is contrary to the council’s

exerciseofit.281

AreviewbytheRMPATmaybetriggeredbyadecisionmadebyacouncilacting

as planning authority pursuant to the powers and discretions granted under

LUPAA and theLUPAA planning schemes.A reviewby theRMPATmay alsobe

triggered by a decision made by a council acting under the powers and

discretionsgrantedbythePart3assessmentsystem.ThereviewbytheRMPAT

thatwasthesubjectofdecisionsbyPorterJatfirstinstance282andonappealto

theFullCourtinSmithvHobartCityCouncil283wasonesuch.Thereviewwasthe

result of a decision by the council not to approve a subdivision based on the

discretiongrantedtoitunders85(1)(a)ofPart3.

Nevertheless although the RMPAT is placed in the position of the planning277LandUsePlanning&ApprovalsAct1993,(Tas),Sch1.278LandUsePlanning&ApprovalsAct1993,(Tas),s61(3).279ResourceManagement&PlanningAppealTribunalAct1993(Tas),s23(1).280ResourceManagement&PlanningAppealTribunalAct1993(Tas),s23(2)281ResourceManagement&PlanningAppealTribunalAct1993(Tas),s23(1).Duringthe2015-2016yearof141planningappealsheardbytheRMPAT,19relatedtosubdivisionproposals(figuressuppliedbytheRMPATonrequestastheRMPATAnnualReportsdonotprovideabreakdownofappealslodgedunderLUPAA).<http://www.rmpat.tas.gov.au/annual_reports>282HobartCityCouncilvSmith[2010]TASSC11(19March2010).283SmithvHobartCityCouncil[2010]TASFC9(21December2010).

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authorityand isabletoexercise itspowersanddiscretions, itcannotrequirea

planningauthority toenteranagreement that theplanningauthoritydoesnot

want toenter.284InAMoonvWestTamarCouncil,285theCouncilhadrefusedto

approve a subdivision.The refusalwasbasedon theCouncil’s finding that the

proposaldidnot adequately address theneed for either initial orongoing risk

managementoflandslipasrequiredbythelandslipcode.

TheCouncilrefusedtoenterthePart5agreementthattheRMPATheldtobea

solutiontotheriskmanagementissue.ThatrefusalpromptedanappealtoBlow

CJwho found that theRMPAT powers extended to ordering a council to enter

into an agreement.286The Council appealed and the Full Court upheld the

appeal.287Thematterwasremitted to theRMPATwhichreiteratedwhat it saw

asthesoundpolicyreasonsforthePart5agreement.Despitethosereasons,as

the Council refused to enter the Part 5 agreement and as therewas no other

solution to the management of the landslip risk, the subdivision did not

proceed.288It is consequently clear that although it is a planning authority a

councilretainsitsrightsasanautonomousentity.Assuchitretainsthefreedom

based on common law principles to decide whether or not to enter into an

agreement.289

ThereispotentialfortherelationshipbetweentheRMPATandcouncilsactingas

planning authorities to be fractious. In a submission reported inWest Tamar

Council v RMPAT, the Solicitor General referred to the possibility when

suggesting that a ‘politicallymotivated‘ councilmight refuse a development in

order to capriciously abrogate theTribunal’spowers.290Estcourt J rejected the

submission. The submission was made in support of argument for an

284WestTamarCouncilvRMPAT[2015]TASFC12(30thSeptember2015)EstcourtJ[54].285AMoonvWestTamarCouncil[2014]TASRMPAT27(27October2014).286WestTamarCouncilvResourceManagementandAppealTribunal[2015]TASSC32(23July2015),[12].287WestTamarCouncilvResourceManagementandAppealTribunal[2015]TASFC12(30September2015),288AMoonvWestTamarCouncil[2016]TASRMPAT11(31/May2016).289WestTamarCouncilvRMPAT[2015]TASFC12(30thSeptember2015)EstcourtJ[54].290WestTamarCouncilvRMPAT[2015]TASFC12(30thSeptember2015),[47].

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interpretationofs23(1)oftheRMPATActthatwouldhaveenabledtheRMPAT

to order the planning authority to enter the Part 5 agreement. The RMPAT

considered the Part 5 agreement to be an appropriate means of addressing

issuesarisingfromlandsliprisk.

Althoughaplanningauthorityisacouncil,acouncil’sroleextendsbeyondacting

as planning authority. That has significance for a study of Part 3 of the Local

Government(Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993.Part3refers toand

gives discretions and powers to councils that they do not possess under the

LUPAAsystem.Thebroaderscopeofthetasksallottedtocouncilsandtheroles

theyplay,bringintofocustheinteractionofLUPAAandPart3.

ThetaskscouncilsaretoperformaresetoutinLocalGovernmentAct1993,and

arefocusedonthecommunitytheyserve.TheGovernment’s2012reportonthe

roleofgovernmentexpressedineightpointstherolescouncilsplay,including:

• enhancinglocalidentityandpromotingsocialcohesion,

• providingstrategicplanningandleadership;and

• improvingacommunity’seconomicviability.291

The council is to provide for that community’s health, safety and welfare, its

peace, order, and good government. The council is also to involve and be

accountabletothemembersofthatcommunity.292

TherecentTasmanianGovernmentreviewoftheroleofcouncilsreferredtothe

changing nature of that role but emphasized the prime tasks of councils in

providingservicesandpromotingtheinterestsofthecommunitytheyserve.293

291DepartmentofPremier&CabinetTasmaniaPremiersLocalGovernmentCouncilPhase1Finalreport<http://www.dpac.tas.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0016/183040/Phase_1_Final_Report_role_of_Local_Government.pdf>;8.292Section20LocalGovernmentAct1993;InMitchellHodgetts&AssociatesPtyLtdvRMPAT[2010]TASSC61(17December2010)EvansJciteds20(1)(a)oftheLocalGovernmentActasoneofthelegislativeprovisionsleadingtotheconclusionthataplanningauthorityisresponsibleforlanduseandplanningwithinitsmunicipalareapursuanttoaplanningschemeandthattheplanningauthoritymustseektofurthertheobjectivesoftheLUPAAsystem.[20]293DepartmentofPremier&CabinetTasmaniaPremiersLocalGovernmentCouncilOct2012discussionpaper<http://www.dpac.tas.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/179608/Discussion_Paper_Role_of_Local_Government.pdf>

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Councils were described as ‘…strategic land-use planners who work with

communities to create an environment that guides the use of land to balance

economic, environmental and social values.’294The review suggested four key

areas for assessment of a council’s performance; those being financial

management, asset management, land-use planning, and community

satisfaction.295

The distinction between councils acting as such under Part 3 of the Local

Government (Building & Miscellaneous Provisions) Act and councils acting as

planningauthoritiesundertheLUPAAsystemraisesquestions.Aseniorcouncil

planner referred to the distinction when discussing the public open space

provisionsofPart3.296ItwassuggestedthattheprovisionsofPart3requirethat

anyapprovalofasubdivisionproposalsubmittedunderLUPAAshouldincludea

statement by the generalmanager of the council’s position acting as a council

(ratherthanasplanningauthority),inrespectofpublicopenspace.297

ThedistinctionalsoraisesquestionsforthereviewofdecisionsundertheLUPAA

system.TheRMPATmayreviewthedecisionofacouncilonanapplicationfora

permitunderLUPAA that ismadeonthegroundsofmatters ins85. However

thestatusofadecisionofacouncilinrespectofaproposalthatisnotthesubject

ofanapplicationforapermitunderLUPAAisnotsoclear.Plannersinterviewed

forthisthesisincludedrepresentativesofonecouncilthathasestablishedapre-

assessment procedure for subdivision proposals.298The process takes place

beforeanapplicationforapermitunderLUPAAislodged.Thecouncil’splanning

and infrastructure staff members make an initial assessment of a subdivision

proposal including matters such as details of drainage arrangements, and

294DepartmentofPremier&CabinetTasmaniaPremiersLocalGovernmentCouncilFinalReportreport<http://www.dpac.tas.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/232651/Local_Government_Role_Assessment_-_Final_Report.PDF>August2014.Thereportnotesthatitwaspromptedbycommunitydebateontheongoingandfuturerolesofcouncils.295DepartmentofPremier&CabinetTasmaniaPremiersLocalGovernmentCouncilOct2012discussionpaper,aboven298.296LocalGovernmentBuilding&MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993(Tas),s116.297InterviewwithPlanner2,20thSeptember2016.298InterviewwithPlanners4and5,12thOctober2016.

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provisions for public open space. The staff acts as the staff of a council as

opposedtoofaplanningauthority. A formalapplicationmaybe lodgedunder

LUPAA after the pre-assessment consultationwith the council has takenplace.

WhethersuchanassessmentprocesswouldbesubjecttoreviewbyRMPAThas

notyetbeentested.

VCONCLUSIONIt might be assumed that as part of Tasmania’s planning system and the

prevailingregulationforsubdivision,Part3oftheLocalGovernment(Building&

MiscellaneousProvisions)Actplays a vital and pivotal role in the regulation of

subdivisionandmakesaneffectivecontributiontotheoperationofthatsystem.

However, the research reported in this chapter indicates there is a lack of

integration between Tasmania’s prevailing legislation for subdivision and the

LUPAAsystem.Totheextentthatthereisincoherence,lackofcertainty,andlack

of integration in Tasmania’s planning system, its effective operation and the

successof thecurrentplanning reformwillbeaffected. Chapter5will further

considertheeffectivenessofPart3asitexaminesagainstthebackgroundofthe

elements of effective regulation, the issues raisedby intervieweeswhen asked

aboutPart3.

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CHAPTER5–HOWEFFECTIVEISTASMANIA’SSUBDIVISION

LEGISLATION?

Part 3 of the Local Government (Building & Miscellaneous Provisions) Act is

primarylegislationandfallsatoneendoftheregulatoryspectrum.Asastatute

enactedbyParliament it is a prescriptive regulatory tool at the command and

controlendofthespectrumandisthe‘coreunderstanding’ofmanypeopleasto

what regulation is.299Such regulation is centred on and enforced by the state

withpenalties applying in the caseof contravention.300At theotherendof the

spectrum is regulation based on a ‘decentred analysis’ 301 of regulation as

somethingthatisnottiedexclusivelytothestate.Suchanalysisofregulationhas

its origins in what has been called ‘the failure of command-and-control

regulation.’302

Command-and-control regulation suffers from limitations inherent in its

characterasprimary legislation.Statutesrepresent the ‘mostrigid[regulatory]

implementation technique’303witheffects that ‘areongoingand long lasting.’304

Regular reviewof regulationhasbeen identifiedasessential tomaintaining its

effectiveness;monitoringandevaluationenablepolicyadjustments tobemade

to keep the regulation relevant. 305 Primary legislation risks suffering from

rigidity because the process to introduce, draft, amend and repeal it is

cumbersomeandtimeconsuming.Therigidityofthisprocessisoneexplanation

for the failure to review Part 3; regulation that was intended as a temporary

solutiontobereplacedinthemonthsafteritsproclamation.

Regulation, if unreviewed, risks becoming ineffective as the regulated lose

connection with it. That connectionmay be lost because regulationmay be a

disproportionatemeansofachievingapolicygoal,orsimplynotmeetitspolicy299Black,aboven18,1,2.300ParkerandBraithwaite,aboven14,127[4].301Black,aboven18,1,2.302Wardrop,aboven159,197,201.303AustralianLawReformCommission,aboven107,[6.20].304Ibid,[6.33].305HolleyandGunningham,aboven16;AustralianGovernmentaboven23,5.

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goal. Regulation should exhibit both ‘proportionality’ and ‘parsimony.’ 306 It

should be nomore than is required tomeet its objective and nomore severe

thannecessarytoachieve itspurpose. ‘Good’regulation involvesarelationship

and what has been described as a ‘regulatory conversation,’307between the

regulated and the regulator that allows a shared understanding of the

problem.308

Thisunderstandingcanenabletheregulatortoexercisepersuasionorwhathas

beencalled‘softpower,’ratherthanrelyingonenforcementbythestate.309For

this soft power to be successfully exercised, the community must have a

connection to the regulation and see it as legitimate.310It is not sufficient that

only the judiciary isable to interpret it.Regulatory legitimacy isdependanton

‘theextentto[which]principalstakeholdersandthegeneralpublicarewillingto

giveitallegiance.’311

Ifsuchconnectionisabsent,ortherulesareindeterminateorinflexible,creative

compliance can be encouraged. 312 This occurs where there is technical

compliancewiththewordsofarulebutformalismisusedtodefeatitspurpose

orpolicy.Yeunghashighlightedthisinherdistinctionbetween‘rulecompliance’

and ‘substantivecompliance,’andhaspointedout that theymaynotalwaysbe

coextensive.313

Ineffective regulation results inmore than simply failure tomeet policy goals.

Otherconsequencesareunnecessary financialcosts, including thoseassociated

with postponement of the policy goal, erosion of confidence in the law and

306Freiberg,aboven14,267-268.307Braithwaite,aboven188,71quotingJuliaBlack‘Talkingaboutregulation’(1998)SpringPublicLaw77. 308Freiberg,aboven14,80-81.309RichardHooper‘Betterregulation’(2014)NewZealandLawJournal269,271.310JuliaBlackRulesandregulators(ClarendonPress1997)12-19.311MorganandYeung,aboven14,11.312Freiberg,aboven14,262.313MorganandYeung,aboven14,152quotingKYeungSecuringCompliance(HartPublishing2004)11.

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undermining of other regulation and the law itself.314Poor regulatory design

maybe the cause of such regulatory failure.315Prescriptive regulationmay fail

and be ineffective because it is ossified and removed from societal norms and

regulationmayfailbecauseitinvitesevasionthroughloopholes.316

The research that is reported in this chapter demonstrates that Part 3 of the

Local Government (Building & Miscellaneous Provisions) Act suffers from the

problemsthatcanafflictcommand-and-controlregulation.Thefailuretoattend

toitsrevieworreplacementandtointegrateitwiththeLUPAAplanningsystem

has been lamented and acknowledged. Interviewees spoken to for this thesis

identified problems, including provisions that contain drafting errors or the

wordingofwhichisunclear.Theyalsoexpressedfrustrationwithcumbersome

procedures, regulation that isnotanefficientoreffectivemeansofachievinga

policygoal,andthatisredundant.Thischapterwillexaminetheissuesraisedby

interviewees in the context of regulatory theory as to what it is that makes

regulationeffective.

ITHELANGUAGEOFPART3ANDEFFECTIVEREGULATION

Whenconfrontedwithlegislationthatcontainserrorsorthatisatoddswiththe

intent of Parliament, a Court must give effect to the will of Parliament as

expressedinthestatute.317That judicialobligationcanreducetheeffectiveness

of the regulation as policy goals may be missed. Unclear language may also

contribute to what Braithwaite calls a ‘thicket of rules’ that provide

opportunities and ’sign-posts’ for avoidance.318 In addition, if legislation is

unclear or obviously incorrect the linkbetween it and society that encourages

314Freiberg,aboven14,269citingOrganisationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment,ComparingRegulatorySystems:Institutions,ProcessesandLegalFormsinIndustrialisedCountriesReport(2000)Ch2.315MorganandYeung,aboven14,152quotingKYeungSecuringCompliance(HartPublishing2004)11.316ParkerandBraithwaite,aboven14;127-128.317ReBolton:ExParteBeane(1987)162CLR514;518;ClarenceCityCouncilvHowlin[2016]TASSC61(21November2016)[11].318Braithwaite,aboven188,56.

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compliance may be weakened. The effectiveness of the regulation will be

consequentlyreduced.319

Theintervieweesspokentoforthisthesisidentifiedsomeoftheproblemswith

the language of Part 3. Those problems include provisions that are redundant

under thenewLUPAA systemanddrafting errors. Someof those errors are of

relatively minor effect, and in practice are ignored. They do however

demonstratelackofcareindraftingandhighlightthelackofreviewtoPart3.320

The drafting errors include references in ss 86 and 117 of Part 3 to councils

takingcertainactionbeforeapprovingaplanofsubdivision.Thesectionsshould

correctlyrefertocouncilstakingthataction,notbeforeapprovingasubdivision

proposalbyissuingapermit,butbeforefinallysealingaplan.Sealingoftheplan

enables the plan to be lodged with the Land Titles Office. A similar error is

apparentins90thatincorrectlyreferstoDivision3ofPart3.Theclausenotesto

theLocalGovernment (Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)Bill1993confirm

that s 90 was to be of the same substantive effect as s 483 of the Local

GovernmentAct1962.Inorderfors90tohavethateffect,itmustbeinterpreted

torefertoDivision2ofPart3,nottoDivision3.

Ofmore significance is thewordingof s 80 that givesmultiple options for the

definitionofa ‘block’or ‘blockof land’ ins80ofPart3.321Theclausenotesfor

the Local Government (Building & Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill record the

carrying forward of the definitions from the Local Government Act 1962.The

Notes record that some of the definitions were included for the purposes of

simplifyingdrafting.Themultipledefinitionsraisequestions,however.

Oneprovisioncarriesforwards462(11)oftheLocalGovernmentAct1962.That

provision iss80(2)ofPart3.Thedefinitionof ‘block’ ins80(2)excludes land319MorganandYeung,aboven14,11;Freibergaboven14,262.320Planner2highlightedsomeofthedraftingerrorsduringinterviewon20thSeptember2016,mentioningthemmoreasasourceofirritationthanasbeingofsubstantiveeffect,astheyareeffectivelyignoredinpractice.321s80(1),s80(2),s80(3),s80(4)ands80(4A)oftheLocalGovernment(Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993.

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thatisunlikelytobeusedbyafarmer,grazierfruitgrowerorsimilarpersonas

the sole source of income. One interviewee with extensive experience

commentedonthatearliersubdivisionregulationlegislation,PartXVI,Division2

oftheLocalGovernmentAct1962.Underthatregulation,itwaspossibleoutside

ofproclaimedbuildingareas,todowhathedescribedas‘yourownthing’asfar

as subdivision was concerned.322The definition of ‘block’ in s 462(11) Local

GovernmentAct1962supportsthatsuggestion.Theexclusionins80(2)ofPart3

suggests that rural land is not to be the subject of subdivision control. Such a

provision is at odds with, and is redundant under the LUPAA system as

subdivisioncontrolsclearlyapplytoruralland.

Section 109 is another redundant provision. The section was highlighted in

chapter1asasectionthatisredundant,butremains.Thebuildingareasitrefers

toarenolongerarelevantmeansofclassifyingland.Theprescriptivestandards

itsetsareatoddswiththeperformance-basedstandardsofmorerecentLUPAA

planningschemes.

A AdhesionOrders

ThissectionconsidersthePart3provisionsthatprovideforadhesionofmultiple

blocks of land. Adhesion does not fall within the definition of subdivision.323

Nevertheless,thewordingofs110ofPart3thatprovidesforAdhesionOrdersis

anexampleofthedifficultiescausedbythelanguageofPart3thatdetractfrom

its effectiveness. The limits of the provisions also highlight the lack of a cost-

effective means in Tasmania’s planning and land administration system of

joiningmultipleblocksofland.324

322InterviewwithConsultant23rdSeptember2016.323S81(e)LocalGovernment(Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993.–definitionof‘subdivide’excludes‘anorderadheringexistingparcelsofland’.324Thedefinitionof‘subdivide’inPart3includeswhatisthoughtofasamereboundaryadjustment.Thedistinctionbetweenaboundaryadjustmentandafull-scalesubdivisionliesinwhetherornottheproposalinvolvesthereconfigurationoflotsorthecreationofnewlots.(BreakODayCouncilvRMPAT[2009]TASSC59(4August2009)followingOusleyPtyLtdvWarraingahShireCouncil(No2)(1999)104LEC250;McCabevBlueMountainsCityCouncil[2006]NSWLEC176;seealsoGD&DAdamsvHuonValleyCouncil[2011]TASRMPAT45(12April2011).Boundaryadjustmentswillfollowapermittedpathway.Neverthelesstheplanningauthoritymustcheckthedevelopmenttoconfirmitisinfactpermittedandmustdetermine

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Unders3ofLUPAA,subdivisionandconsolidationareincludedinthedefinition

of ‘development’ meaning that any such proposal must be submitted to a

planning authority for assessment. Section 110 of Part 3 Local Government

(Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993providesamechanismforjoining

multiplelotsoflandontheLandTitlesRegister,withouttheneedtocomplywith

theLUPAAdevelopmentassessmentprocess.However,thedifficultiespresented

by the language of s 110 prevent it from being a cost effective and efficient

solution.

Interviewees on both sides of the fence (those acting in the interests of

developers and those acting to regulate and assess development) emphasised

theneedforsuchasolution.Thejoiningofmultipleblocksoflandisfrequentlya

conditionofplanningpermitsfordevelopment.Thelackofasimpleandefficient

meansofachieving thatdetracts fromtheeffectivenessofTasmania’splanning

provisions. The lack of such a procedure means that any proposal to join

multipleblocksoflandmustbesubmittedtoplanningassessment.

AdhesionOrdersalsoofferacost-effectivemeansbywhichland,thedescription

ofwhichisderivedfromthewordsofagenerallawdeed,maybejoinedtothe

title records of land held under the Torrens system.325 On conversion from

generallaw,aparceloflandmaybenotedonplanrecordsas‘sketchbywayof

illustrationonly.’Suchanotationmeansthattheparcelhasnotbeenthesubject

of survey. The plan has been drawn from an interpretation of the meets and

boundsdescriptionofagenerallawdeed.Afullsurveywillberequiredtojoin

such a piece of landwith commonly-owned adjacent land, unless anAdhesion

Ordercanbeused. In thecaseof rural land,whereoneparcelmaybeseveral

hundredsofhectaresinarea,thecostofsuchasurveyisprohibitive.

whetheranypermitconditionsarerequiredtoaddressissuessuchasenvironmentalorengineeringconsiderations.325ThisissuewasraisedduringinterviewwithSurveyor2,11thOctober2016.

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AcouncilmaymakeanAdhesionOrderunders110ofPart3.Intheabsenceofa

development permit for consolidation, Adhesion Orders offer a relatively

inexpensive and quick alternative. However, the section suffers from language

that is obscure and imprecise and the effect of the Orders is unclear.

Intervieweesconsistentlyraiseds110asasignificantproblemasthewordingof

thesectionpreventingitsbeingusedasacosteffectivemeansofjoiningtwoor

moreblocksofland.

AnAdhesionOrdermaybemadeifablock:

(a) hasthequalitiesofaminimumlot;and

(b) consistsoftwoormoreparcelsthatmay,withouttheapprovalof

anyplanbythecouncil,lawfullybesoldseparatelysoastocreate

ablockwhich

(i) wouldnothavethequalitiesofaminimumlot;and

(ii) thatthecouncilbelievesislikelytobebuiltonorboughtfor

building.326

Thatextractfroms110(1)highlightssomeoftheissuesraisedbythelanguage

ofs110.ThelanguageisdifficulttointerpretbutseemstomeanthattheOrder

mayonlybemadefirstly,ifeachofthejoinedparcelsisasub-minimumlot.Such

lots are lots thatdonotmeet theminimumrequirements in termsofqualities

suchasareaorfrontage.Secondlythesectionseemstomeanthattheblockthat

results from joining them must be likely to be used for building. If that

interpretationiscorrectthecircumstancesinwhichAdhesionmaybemadeare

necessarilylimited.

TheeffectofanOrderisthatonefoliooftheRegisterwillbeissuedand:

….the parcels comprised in the block subject to the order are not to be

dealtwithsothattheycomeintothepossessionofdifferentpersonsfor

326S110(1)LocalGovernment(Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993(Tas).

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anestateoffreeholdoratlaworinequityforatermatlaworinequityof

3yearsormore.327

One of the questions asked of interviewees for this thesis was their

understanding of those words, their effect and why they were chosen.328The

typical responsewas amystified one, although one interviewee suggested the

referenceto3yearsmightberelatedtos64(2)LandTitlesAct1980(Tas).329

Thedifficultiesofs110areimmediatelyapparentfromevenacursoryperusalof

its wording. One local government planner referred to the ‘nightmare’ of s

110.330Henotedthathefindshimselffeelingconfidentinaninterpretationone

week,onlytofindhimselfrevisinghisopinionthenextweek.

Onesurveyornotedthatsomecouncilsinthenorthofthestatearereluctantto

make Adhesion Orders.331This reluctance has its origins in a situation that

reflectsthepeculiaritiesthataretypicalofthe‘paradox’thatisTasmania.332The

reluctanceseems to stem froma legalopinionknown tomanyof thenorthern

councils that refers to the proviso in sub s 2(b). The words state that an

Adhesion Order cannot bemade if the parcels have ‘at any time been owned

separatelybypersonswhodidnotthenownadjoiningland.’

A council may discharge an Adhesion Order.333One planner noted that his

reluctance to recommend themakingof anAdhesionOrder stemmed fromhis

experience when the Recorder of Titles revoked an Adhesion Order without

referencetothecouncil thathadmade it.334Theresultwasofsomeconcernto

327S110(4)LocalGovernment(Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993(Tas).328Section110repeatsthewordingofs477AoftheLocalGovernmentAct1962.HansardrecordsdidnotexistinTasmaniauntil1979andtheauthorhasbeenunabletofindanyofficialrecordofwhys477AwasintroducedintotheLocalGovernmentAct1962in1963orwhyitswordingisasitis.329S64(2)LandTitlesAct1980(Tas)providesthataleaseoflessthan3yearsisnotregistrable.330InterviewwithPlanner1,20thSeptember2016.331InterviewwithSurveyor2,11thOctober2016.332CastlesandStratford,aboven73.333S110(11)LocalGovernment(Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993(Tas).334InterviewwithPlanner4,12thOctober2016.

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thecouncilasoneparcelonwhichwastewaterandsewerageinfrastructurefora

dwellingwas locatedwas subsequently sold, despite the fact that thedwelling

itselfwasontheother.335

Adhesion Orders do serve a useful purpose as development control tools for

councils toensure thatbuildingproposals thatstraddleboundariesare located

onlandthatisonefoliooftheRegister.Oneplannernotedthatduetothelackof

any other simple mechanism for joining multiple parcels of land, Adhesion

Orders have been increasingly sought by land-owners looking to avoid the

necessityofadevelopmentapplication.336Unfortunatelythedifficultieswiththe

languageofs110preventitsbeinganeffectiveregulatorysolution.

Areviewofthestatutoryprovisionsforjoiningblocksoflandisneeded.Sucha

reviewcouldtakeintoaccountprovisionsofotherjurisdictions,including

s 223LJ Real Property Act 1886 (SA). That section provides a method of

amalgamatingblocksbyapplicationtotheRegistrar-Generalwiththeconsentof

themortgagee and any other person the Registrar-General deems appropriate

(whichmay,butneednot,includeacouncil).

B PublicOpenSpace

Part 3 provisions relating to public open space suffer similarly from

ineffectivenessduetotheirimprecisewordinganddifficultlanguage.Ina2012

thesis, Indra Boss has highlighted the importance of public open space as a

planningtool,andstressedtheneedforAustralianplannerstoseeitas‘critical

infrastructureratherthananafterthought.’337Inreferringtoplanningliterature

citingpublicopenspaceasanon-renewableresource,shestressestheneedfor

adequatesupply,338andtheincreasingpressureonlocalgovernmentstodeliver

environmentallysustainabledevelopment.339

335WithoutdetailastothereasonfortherevocationithasnotbeenpossibletocheckthelegitimacyofsuchactionbytheRecorderofTitles.336InterviewwithPlanner2,20thSeptember2016.337Boss,aboven11,19.338Ibid,20.339Ibid,24.

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Boss interviewedbothcouncilandnon-councilstaffallofwhomwereinvolved

in varying degrees in planning for, or management of, urban open space in

Hobart.Theinterviewscentredonfourthemes,oneofwhichwasthelegislative

constraintsonthedeliveryofqualitypublicopenspace.Thefrustrationofthose

interviewed with the provisions of Part 3 Local Government (Building &

MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993 (Tas)isevidentinthequotesreproducedin

thethesis.Referencesaremadeto:

• legislativeprovisionsthat‘datefromtheark’;

• theweaknessesintheprovisionsastovaluation;and

• thearbitrarinessoftheamountofcashinlieuthatmaybeclaimed.340

The thesis reports strategies adoptedby councils in attempts to overcome the

problems.Thosestrategiesinclude:

• Councilsrefusingofferingsof‘poor’land;

• impositionofconditionsrequiringthatcertainareasoflandbesetaside;

and

• strategiclandpurchasebycouncilsaspartofanopenspacestrategy.341

The thesisdiscussionconcludes that the currentgovernancearrangementsare

unlikely to ensure that sufficient open spacewill be delivered.342The primary

reason given for that conclusion is the inadequacy of the legislative

framework.343ThatgovernanceframeworkincludestheLUPAAsystemandPart

3.

Part 3 provides for public open space in the context of new subdivision

developments.TheresearchofthisthesissupportstheconclusionofBoss’thesis.

340Ibid,51.341Ibid51-52.342Ibid,86.343Ibid.

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TheprovisionsofPart3thatrelatetopublicopenspacewereacommontheme

ofinterviewsandasourceofconcernforboththoseactingfordevelopers,344and

councilstaffrequiredtoassesssubdivisionproposals.Oneintervieweesummed

up the sentiments of intervieweeswhen he referred to the public open space

provisionsofPart3asa ‘thorn.’345Thoseprovisionsares83,s116ands117.

Section 85 also applies to the question of public open space. The discretion

under sub-s (d)(iii) enables aCouncil to refusepermissionon thegrounds the

proposalshouldbealteredtoincludeoromitpublicopenspace.

In contrast to the provisions of some other jurisdictions,346Part 3 does not

specifythecircumstancesinwhichacouncilmayrequirepublicopenspacetobe

provided. Section83(1) simply provides that a councilmay require land to be

soldtoitfornominalconsideration.Thesectionisexpressedtobesubjectto

s116thatprovidesthatacouncilmustpayforlandifthevalueofitexceedsone-

twentieth of thewhole area in the subdivision. The value of the land is to be

takenatthedateoflodgmentoftheplan.347Sections116and117donotmakeit

clearwhetherthevaluetobeappliedistheimprovedorunimprovedvalue.348

The imprecision of the language causes other difficulties. One interviewee

outlinedsomeoftheproblemsfromtheperspectiveofdevelopers.349Duetothe

lack of detail in the legislation different councils adopt different approaches.

Councilshavedifferent requirements as towhen theywill requirepublicopen

spaceorcash-in-lieu tobeprovided,andhowtheamountofanysuchcash-in-

lieuiscalculated.350

344InTasmaniasubdivisionproposalsaremostoftenmadebysurveyorsactingonbehalfofdevelopers.345InterviewwithConsultant,23rdSeptember2016.346EgEnvironmentalPlanning&AssessmentAct1979(NSW)s7.11thatlinksthededicationoflandorthepaymentofamonetarycontributiontoincreaseindemandforpublicamenitiesorpublicservicesasaresultofthesubdivision;similarlySubdivisionAct1988(Vic)s18.347LocalGovernment(Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993(Tas)s116(6).348WestTamarCouncilvPhillips[2013]TASSC16(10thMay2013)[7].349InterviewwithSurveyor2,11thOctober2016.350DuringinterviewSurveyor2providedredactedcopiesofpermitsissuedbyvariouscouncilsnotingthedifferentmethodsofcalculatingandvaluingpublicopenspacecash-in-lieucontributions.Somecouncils,concernedtopromotedevelopmentdonotroutinelyrequirepublicopenspacecontributions.

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Some of the highlighted issues were that some councils require public open

space or cash-in-lieu payments for every subdivision proposal, while some do

not.Somecouncilslevythecash-in-lieupaymentoneachsuccessivesubdivision

thatmayoccurof the initialblock.Somecouncils requirepublicopenspaceor

cash-in-lieuinrespectof landzonedcommercialor industrialwherethepublic

wouldgainlittlebenefitfromthededicationorpayment.Thelackofdetailasto

the valuation means that cash-in-lieu may be required despite a developer

bearing additional costs such as those associated with playgrounds and

landscaping.Differentcouncilsadoptdifferentapproachestovaluationmethods,

with consequent difficulties of preparing subdivision proposals and predicting

results.

Ontheothersideofthedebate,councilstaffsimilarlyexpressedfrustration.One

concernisthatlandofferedforpublicopenspacemaybetheleastvaluableand

desirable.Councilsareconsequentlyleftwithoddpiecesoflandthatareoflittle

useorbenefittothepublic.Onecouncil’smanagernotedhiscouncil’spreference

forcash-in-lieupaymentsasaresult.351Theaccumulationofoddpiecesof land

has led to one council investigating the possibility of, and commencing, the

processofsellingsuchoddmentsoflandunderthesaleofpubliclandprovisions

oftheLocalGovernmentAct1993.352Insomecases,acouncilplannermayprefer

to impose conditions such as to the provisions of innovative street-scaping

ratherthanrequiringeitherdedicationoflandorcash-in-lieu.353

Thelackofguidanceforcouncilsastotheirobligationsinrespectofcash-in-lieu

paymentsunderthelegislationwasnotedasaproblemforcouncilmanagers.354

Section117(6)provides that a councilmusthold any cash-in-lieuamounts ‘on

trust for the acquisition or improvement of land for public open space.’ The

amountsaretobeappliedinaccordancewithany‘prescribedrequirements.’

351InterviewPlanner1,20thSeptember2016.352Ibid.353Ibid.354InthisrespectthePart3provisionsmaybecontrastedwiththoseoftheSubdivisionAct1988(Vic)ss18-20.

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There are no prescribed requirements although the Second Reading Speech

referredtotheintendedregulationsthatwouldactasasafeguard.355

Underthoseintendedregulationscouncilswouldberequiredto:

• identifythelocalityfromwhichfundshadbeenraised;

• assess the extent and condition of public open space and recreational

facilitiesinthatlocality;and

• consultwiththeresidentsofthatlocality.

The factors that were to be covered in the regulations were similar to those

suggested by one of the interviewees as the desirable detail thatwould assist

councils.356

As no regulations have been proclaimed, the use to which any cash-in-lieu

paymentistobeputisbroadlystatedas‘beingforthebenefitoftheinhabitants

ofthemunicipalarea.’357Oneintervieweenotedthatthelackofguidancemeans

thatcouncilshaveovertheyearsaccumulatedsignificantsumsthatareinsome

casesheldingeneralrevenueaccountswithnopolicyorplanastohowtheyare

tobeusedoraccountedfor.358Another intervieweenotedthatonecouncilhad

forsomeyearsadoptedapolicyofnotrequiringpaymentofcash-in-lieubecause

ofthepotentialforliabilityasaresultoftheimprecisionofthewordsofs117(5)

ands117(6).359

In P Barker & AWoolley v Clarence City Council360the RMPAT considered the

issue of the Council’s policy to require open space as a matter of course in

respect of any subdivision. The RMPAT stated that such an approach was

incorrect,asacouncilisnotpermittedtomakepublicopenspacemandatoryor

355Tasmania,ParliamentaryDebates,LegislativeCouncil,1December1993,5391,(PMcKay).356InterviewPlanner5,12thOctober2016.357LocalGovernment(Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993s117(5).358InterviewPlanner4,12thOctober2016.359InterviewSurveyor1,29thSeptember2016;thatcautionwasperhapsjustified.TheSecondReadingspeechforPart3(Tasmania,ParliamentaryDebates,HouseofAssembly,19October1993,6017(TJCleary)notedthatitwastobeananswertoaproblemunderwhichapproximately$1.4Millionofcash-in-lieupaymentshadbeencollectedbycouncilsonthebasisoflegislativeauthoritythatwassubsequentlyfoundtobedoubtful.360PBarker&AWoolleyvClarenceCityCouncil[2017]TASRMPAT15(30August2017).

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torequirecashinlieuinrespectofeverysubdivisionproposal.361TheTribunal’s

approachtothediscretionunders85wastofindthatalthoughthecouncilhada

discretion, it should be exercised reasonably and fairly relate to the

development.TheRMPATheldthatapplyingthediscretionunders85,thetestto

apply in determiningpublic open space requirements is ‘inextricably linked to

thedemandcreatedbythedevelopment.’

It is evident that there are significant problemswith the provisions for public

openspace inTasmania’s subdivision legislation.Thoseproblemsdetract from

itseffectivenessasameansofachieving thepolicygoal set for that regulation.

Those working regularly with the legislation expressed concern at continued

failuretoaddresstheproblemsofthewordingofthesectionsandthefailureto

implementappropriatestrategiesforopenspace.362Thereisclearlyaneedfora

review of both the policy underlying the provisions of Part 3 and of their

wording. The provisions exhibit the elements and consequences of ineffective

regulation.

The language is unclear and imprecise leading to inefficiencies, additional cost

andfrustrationatthe lackofguidance. Thatthepotentialconflictbetweenthe

discretiongrantedunders85andtheprovisionsofplanningschemeshastobe

addressed by appeal to the RMPAT is evidence of the uncertainty that results

fromthelegislativeprovisions.Thepolicygoalismissed,asthelegislationfails

toprovideaneffectivemeansofprovidingwhatisrecognisedasavaluableasset

forurbanenvironments.

Thecommentsofintervieweesdemonstratehowregulationcanbeineffectiveas

itcausesfrustrationthatweakenstheconnectionbetweentheregulatedandthe

regulation.Suchconnectionencouragesrespectforthelawandcompliance.363If

respect isnotpaidby the regulated to the regulation, theabilityof councilsas361PBarker&AWoolleyvClarenceCityCouncil[2017]TASRMPAT15(30August2017)[66]-[77]applyingBunningsPropertiesPtyLtdvKingstonCC[2013]VCAT1257,[26]res18SubdivisionAct1988(Vic).362ThisconcernwasechoedbytheLocalGovernmentAssociationofTasmaniainitssubmissionontheproposedstate-wideplanningprovisions,aboven10,7.363MorganandYeungquotingKYeungaboven313.

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regulators toexercisewhathasbeen referred toas ‘softpower’364thatderives

fromasharedunderstandingoftheproblemsassociatedwithandthebenefitsof

theprovisionofpublicopenspace,islimited.

This thesisechoes theconclusionreachedbyBoss’ thesis.There isobviouslya

need for review and reform of the public open space provisions: ‘There just

needstobeacommitmenttoact!’365

IIPART3ANDTHELANDREGISTRATIONSYSTEM

Effective regulation is efficient and cost-effective and it is a relevant and

proportionate means of achieving a policy goal.366 The task of subdivision

regulation is complicated by the fact that it must not only provide for and

interactwiththeplanningandassessmentsystem,itmustalsointeractwiththe

landregistrationsystem.Subdivisioninevitablyaffectsinterestsinland.

IntervieweeshighlightedtwoprovisionsofPart3LocalGovernment(Building&

MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993 (Tas)that interactwiththe landregistration

system as being cause for frustration. Those provisions were s 95 and s 103.

Section 95 deals with the dedication of land for new roadways. Section 103

establishesaprocedurefortheremovalofcovenantsandeasementscreatedon

registrationof a sealedplanof subdivision. Section95washighlighteddue to

the difficulty that results because the fee simple in roadways does not vest

automatically in councils. Section 103 was highlighted because of the

cumbersome procedure required to remove redundant covenants and

easements. The cost of the procedure, both in terms of money and time,

discouragesdeveloperstoundertakesuchremoval.

As effective regulation, Part 3 should facilitate subdivision that meets the

sustainabledevelopmentpolicygoalthatunderliesTasmania’splanningsystem.

That provisions of Tasmania’s subdivision legislation establish cumbersome

procedures, are the cause of frustration and discourage development that fits364Hooperaboven309.365Boss,aboven11,87.366Freibergaboven14;Gunningham&Graboskyaboven14;Parker&Braithwaiteaboven14.

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within the planning assessment system, points to the need for review and

reform.

A Roadtitleprovisions

Section95ofPart3providesforthededicationofnewpublicroads,referredto

ashighways,onregistrationofasubdivisionplan.Itshouldbenotedthatother

provisions relevant to such roadways, including the process of opening and

closing them, removal of trees, recovery of repair costs, bridges, and security

thatacouncilmayrequirealandownertoprovideforhighwayworks,areinthe

Local Government (Highways) Act 1993. One interviewee pointed out that it

wouldmakesensetohaveallprovisionsrelevanttosuchroadwaysconsolidated

inonepieceoflegislation.367

LegislationofsomeotherAustralianjurisdictionsprovidesforautomaticvesting

ofthefeesimpleinpublicroadwaysinthehighwayauthorityonregistrationofa

plan of subdivision.368Part 3 provides for the dedication of roadways to the

publicwhichmeansthatthefeesimpleofaroadwayisnotautomaticallyvested

inacouncilonregistrationofasubdivisionplan.369ThatTasmania’slegislationis

out-of-stepwiththedevelopmentof legislationofotherstatesishighlightedby

Peter Butt’s comments on dedication. He comments that dedication has its

originsincommonlaw,andthatinNewSouthWalesthechangetothestatutory

vestingofthefeesimpleoccurredundertheLocalGovernmentAct1919(NSW)370

Dedicationdoesnotaltertheownershipofthelandunderlyingtheroadway.371

The highway authority has the right to perform works or to take action

necessaryfortheuseofthelandasahighway,buttheownerofthelandretains

therighttousethelandinwaysthatdonotinterferewiththeuseofthelandasa

367InterviewwithPlanner2,20thSeptember2016.368RoadsAct1993(NSW)s145;RealPropertyAct1886(SA)s223LF;SubdivisionAct1988(Vic)s24.369G.JDonnellySeniorDistrictSurveyorDepartmentofMainRoads,Tasmania‘HighwaysinTasmania’(1985);articlereviewedandupdatedwithpermissionbyJVanderNiet,OfficeoftheSurveyorGeneralTasmania(2010),6.370PeterButtLandLaw,(LawBookCo,6thEd2009)32,[2.43].371Donnellyaboven369;5.

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highway.372The authorities for this proposition include the House of Lords in

TunbridgeWells Corporation v Baird and Collins MR in Finchley Electric Light

CompanyvFinchleyUrbanCouncil.373These casesarediscussed inmoredetail

below.

ThisstateofaffairshascausedproblemsinTasmaniaasformaltransfersofthe

feesimpleinroadsonsubdivisionplanshavebeenforgotten.Theresultisthat

roadsintendedtobeforthebenefitofthepublic,andwhethermadeupornot,

mayberegisteredindeceasedestatesorderegisteredcompanies,mortgagedto

financialinstitutions,orsold.374Theresultingprocessofamendingtitlerecords

ordealingwiththelandisprohibitivelycostlyintermsofbothtimeandmoney.

Councils have addressed the issue by making it a condition of a subdivision

permitthatanexecutedtransferoftheroadwayisprovidedonsubmissionofthe

subdivisionplan for sealingby a council. This raisespractical issues, including

thenecessityofarrangingadischargeofamortgageoftheroadwayland.375

TheroadtitlesprovisionsofPart3havebeendescribedascreating‘ananomaly

at law.’376Theeffectof s95 is, nevertheless, consistentwith s111of theLand

TitlesAct1980.377Thetwostatutoryprovisionsare,however, inconsistentwith

thepracticeof registeringcouncilsasproprietorsof road land, andof councils

closing unused roads and transferring title to that roadway land. 378 The

provisionsseemtobeanexampleofout-datedpolicythat is inneedofreview.

Theargumentforreviewoftheseprovisionsisreinforcedonexaminationofthe

clausenotes for theLandTitlesBill 1980and theEnglish case law referred to

above.

372Ibid,5.373TunbridgeWellsCorporationvBaird[1986]AC434andFinchleyElectricLightCompanyvFinchleyUrbanCouncil[1903]1Ch437.BothdecisionswerereferredtoasauthorityintheclausesnotestotheLandTitlesBill1980.374InterviewwithConsultant,23rdSeptember2016.375SeebycontrastSubdivisionAct1988(Vic),S24(2)(b).376Donnelly,aboven369,6.377Thislinkwaspointedoutduringinterviewwithastateserviceemployeeon29thSeptember2016.378Ininterview,Consultant23rdSeptember2016,referredtoadvicehehadgiveninsuchascenariowhenoutliningtheproblemsthatariseasaresultofthefailuretoautomaticallyvestthefeesimple.

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Section111oftheLandTitlesAct1980providesasfollows:

WherebyanyActahighwayisvestedinahighwayauthoritywhichisnot

theproprietorofthelandlyingunderthehighway,thehighwayauthority

shallnotbe registeredunder thisActasproprietorof thehighway, and

this Act shall not apply to any extension, diminution, or transfer of the

estateofthatauthorityinthehighway.

Theclausenotesforclause111oftheLandTitlesBill1980(nowsection111),

are that it reproduces s 28Aof theRealPropertyAct1886.379The clausenotes

recordthatinmanyinstancesinTasmaniathehighwayauthoritydoesnotown

the soil under a roadway. The recorded purpose of clause 111 was to forbid

registrationof title to the roadwaybecause such registrationwasunnecessary

andbecause‘[h]ighwaysarenotarticlesofcommerce.’TheEnglishcasescitedas

authorityfortheinclusionofclause111intheLandTitlesBill(TunbridgeWells

CorporationvBairdandCollinsMRinFinchleyElectricLightCompanyvFinchley

UrbanCouncil) raise thequestionwhether they are appropriately cited for the

propositionmadeintheclausenotes.Asecondandmorefundamentalquestion

iswhy Tasmanian subdivision legislation cannot do as the legislation of other

jurisdictionsdoes(referredtoearlierinthischapter),andenabletheautomatic

vestingofthefeesimpleinthecouncilorhighwayauthority.

The two English cases deal with situations where highway authorities were

vestedwithrightsinrespectofhighwaylandbystatute.Thejudgmentsresolved

issuesarisingfromtheassertionbythehighwayauthoritiesofrightsinexcessof

thoseresultingfromthededicationofthelandashighway.CollinsMRnotedthat

thededicationofthehighwayintheauthorityhadnothingtodowiththetitle.380

All that thededicationprovisionsdid, andweredesigned todowasdetermine

howmuchofthephysicalpropertyofthestreetwouldbevestedintheauthority.

379Section28AwasaddedtotheRealPropertyAct1886(Tas)bytheHighwaysActNo83of1951.380FinchleyElectricLightCompanyvFinchleyUrbanCouncil[1903]1Ch437;444.

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In Tunbridge Wells Corporation v Baird, 381 the authority sought to rely

(unsuccessfully) on the statutory dedication, to construct underground

lavatoriesandconveniences.TheHouseofLordsdeterminedthatsuchusewent

beyondtheordinaryuseof thestreetasastreet thatwascontemplatedbythe

statutory dedication. 382 Lord Halsbury, with whom Lords Herschell and

MacNaghtenagreed, felt justified ingiving thematter ‘veryshort treatment.’383

They rejected the contention on behalf of the authority that the dedication

vestedthesubsoilintheauthority.

TheconclusionisinescapablethattheprovisionsforroadtitlesunderPart3and

s111LandTitlesAct1980areineffectiveregulationandshouldbereviewed.The

Englishcaselawonwhichs111isbasedlimitsthepowersofcouncils.Councils

are required toprovide for infrastructure (such as storm-waterdrainage) that

passesbeyondwhatisnecessaryfortheuseofaroadwayasaroadway.Thatthe

provisions arenot inpractice compliedwithhighlights their ineffectiveness as

they fail to provide the solution to the issue of public roadways created on a

subdivision that is required. Councils are in fact registered as proprietors of

Torrens system land that is roadway in a subdivision, and are permitted to

transfer such land under that system. Congruence between a rule and its

purpose is a characteristic of effective regulation.384There is a substantial gap

betweenTasmania’sroadtitlesprovisionsandtheirpurposethathighlightsthe

ineffectivenessoftheprovisions.

B CovenantsandEasements

TheprovisionsofPart3LocalGovernment(Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)

Act1993thataddresstheissuesarisingfromcovenantsandeasementscreated

on registration of a subdivision plan also demonstrate the characteristics of

ineffective regulation. Private restrictive covenants on land may provide for

matterssuchasalimitonthenumberoflotsthatcanbecreated,thenumberof

381TunbridgeWellsCorporationvBaird[1896]AC434.382TunbridgeWellsCorporationvBaird[1896]AC434;439.383TunbridgeWellsCorporationvBaird[1896]AC434;440.384BlackquotedbyMorgan&Yeungaboven151.

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dwellingstobebuiltonablockofland,orconfinelandtoaparticularuse.385As

such covenants are the result of private agreement and commercial judgment

theymaybeinconsistentwithplanningpolicies.386Theymaybedecadesoldand

therestrictionsout-dated.387Subdivisionoflandmayrenderthewordingofthe

covenantsinsufficientlycleartobeenforceableandsubdivisionofthebenefited

land may also render the covenant unenforceable.388Australian jurisdictions

dealwithcovenantsandtheissuestheyraiseindifferentwaysandwritershave

highlighted the need for reform and consistency.389In Tasmania, restrictive

covenants are noted on the Register and will run with the land if certain

conditionsarefulfilled.390

Part3providesthatasealedplanofsubdivisionmustrefertoalltheeasements

andcovenantsaffectingthelandandtheinteractionofPart3withtheLandTitles

Act1980enablesthecovenanttorunwiththeland.391Covenantsarethennoted

on title records. That notationmeans that the terms of the covenant and any

reservationofpowerinthedevelopertomodifytheeffectofthecovenantorto

releaselandfromtheburdenofthecovenantareavailabletosomeonesearching

the register.392 The enforceability of covenants is determined by equitable

385Privaterestrictivecovenantsaredistinguishedfromcovenantsingross,whichalthoughtheyrunwithlanddonotbenefitadominanttenement,butinsteadbenefittheCrown,oralocalorpublicauthority.Covenantingrossisdefinedbys90ABConveyancingandLawofPropertyAct1884(Tas).386Covenantsthatrestrictthenumberoflotsordwellingsmayconflictwithpoliciesdesignedtoencouragein-fillurbandevelopmentasopposedtourbansprawl.387VictorianLawReformCommission,EasementsandCovenants,FinalReportNo22(2010)105,7.91;WesternAustralianLawReformCommission,RestrictiveCovenants,FinalReportNo91(1997)72,[5.23].388ChristopherConolly,‘ConsequenceofSubdivisionforregisteredeasementsandcovenants’,March2011LawSocietyJournal54(NSW).389SharonChristensenandWDDuncan‘IsittimefornationalreviewoftheTorrenssystem?–theeccentricpositionofprivaterestrictivecovenants’(2005)12AustralianPropertyLawJournal104.390S102LandTitlesAct1980(Tas);seealsoAdrianJBradbrookandSusanVMacCallum,BradbrookandNeave’sEasementsandRestrictiveCovenants(LexisNexisButterworths,3rded2011)467,[17.38].391LocalGovernment(Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993ss88,99;LandTitlesAct1980s102(2)(b).392LandTitlesAct1980s102(3);ClarkevBurnieCityCouncil[2008]TASSC75(26November2008),[7].

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principles meaning that considerations such as hardship and the balance of

conveniencemaybetakenintoaccount.393

Tasmanianplannersinterviewedforthisthesisindicatedthat(ifawareofthem),

theyroutinelyadviseadeveloperthatlandissubjecttoacovenant.394Inorderto

be aware, a plannermust beprovidedwith a copyof title documents that not

only disclose a covenant but also details of the covenant. Development

assessment decisions are, nevertheless, made independently of the covenant

termsonthegroundsthatenforcementofthecovenantisamatterbetweenthe

ownerofthelandsubjecttothecovenantandtheownerofthelandthatbenefits.

Planningauthoritiesdotakeaccountofcovenantsasapermittosubdividemay

be subject to a condition that no covenants be included unless previously

approvedbytheplanningauthority.

TheScheduleofEasementstobecreatedpursuanttos87ofPart3mustrecord

allcovenants,allexistingeasements,andalleasementscreatedtobenefitaloton

theplanofsubdivision.395Theeasementsintheschedulewillberecordedonthe

newtitlescreatedonregistrationoftheapprovedandsealedplan.396Easements

registeredontitlerecordscanrestricttheusetowhichlandcanbeputandthe

development that can be undertaken. Redundant pipeline and drainage

easements, in particular, may render a piece of land useless as far as

development is concerned.397 Layers of easementsmay be the result, as they

must be carried forward on successive sealed plans creating plans that are

confusing,complicated,anddifficulttointerpret.398

The problem has been compounded in Tasmania since the introduction of a

separateentity,TasWater,responsiblefortheprovisionofwaterandsewerage

393BradbrookandMacCallum,aboven390,505,[18.31].394InterviewswithPlanners1&2,20thSeptember2016.395TherequirementsoftheRecorderofTitlesarenotedat<http://dpipwe.tas.gov.au/land-tasmania/land-titles-office/plan-documentation/plan-regsitration-guidelines#EasementsonPlans>396LocalGovernment(Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993s99.397InterviewPlanner120thSeptember2016.398InterviewSurveyor211thOctober2016.

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services.399Onreceiptofaplanningapplicationthatwillaffectdemandforwater

servicesorincreasetheamountofsewageinasewerageinfrastructuresystem,

the planning authority must invite a submission from TasWater as to its

requirements.400The authority must take those requirements into account in

makingadecisionontheapplication.401TasWaterstipulatesitsrequirementsfor

thewidthand termsofeasements thatare for itsbenefit. Inmanycases, these

relatively new requirements do not match the previous standard form of

easements.402

Landmaybeexemptedfromcovenantsandeasementsthroughwaiver,release,

modification, or exemption by the subdivider or vendor of land. Blow J (as he

thenwas)consideredthequestionoftheabilitytoexemptorreleaselandfrom

covenants inClarkevBurnieCityCouncil.403HisHonournotedthatalthoughthe

LocalGovernmentAct1962(andnowPart3)permitstherecordingofcovenants,

the legislation is silent as to whether a developer may reserve the right to

exemptorreleaselotsfromacovenant.404Thepowertoremoveorexemptland

from covenants exists at general law.405 As Parliament apparently gave no

thought to the issue of the powerwhen enacting the 1962Act, the legislation

should be interpreted as enabling such removal or variation.406This solution

seemstobedependantonthesubdividerreservingapowertovaryorexempt

landfromcovenantsandthenvalidlyexercisingit.407

399WaterandsewerageservicesweredivestedfromcouncilsandvestedinthreewaterandsewerageentitiesunderWater&SewerageIndustryAct2008(Tas);thethreeregionalentitieshavenowbeenreplacedwithoneTheTasmanianWater&SewerageCorporationLtd–witheffectfrom1stJuly2013.400Water&SewerageIndustryAct2008(Tas)s56O.401Water&SewerageIndustryAct2008(Tas)s56O-56Q.402InterviewSurveyor211thOctober2016whonotedthatdrainageandpipelineeasementshavefordecadesbeennotedasastandard2metreswide;Taswaterrequiressucheasementstobeatleast2.5metres.403ClarkevBurnieCityCouncil[2008]TASSC75(26November2008).404ClarkevBurnieCityCouncil[2008]TASSC75(26November2008)[12].405ClarkevBurnieCityCouncil[2008]TASSC75(26November2008),[18].406ThelegislationreferredtobeingLocalGovernmentAct1962s464(17)andLocalGovernment(Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993ss103,104.407ClarkevBurnieCityCouncil[2008]TASSC75(26November2008)[4],[20],[27].

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CovenantsandeasementsmayalsoberemovedbyapplicationtotheRecorderof

Titlesunders84C(1)(b)oftheConveyancingandLawofPropertyAct1884,orby

agreementandreleaseunders108LandTitlesAct1980.Part3providestheonly

mechanismfortheremovalofcovenantsandeasementsthathavebeencreated

by a sealed plan of subdivision. Section 103 enables a council to make an

amendmenttoasealedplanandtheprocesscanbeusedtoremoveredundant

easementsorcovenantsifcreatedbythatsealedplan.

Therearehoweverdifficultieswiththeprocessandlimitsonthepowersthata

councilmayexercise.Theproblemswiththeavailableremediesrenderthecost

prohibitiveandimpossibletorecommendtodeveloperclients.408Noticemustbe

giventoallpartieswithaninterest inthe landsubjecttotheplanassuchland

might be affected by the removal of the covenant or easement. In large

subdivisionsnoticemustbegiventoallofthelotownersandtheirmortgagees,

and if a lot has been divided to the owners of the new lots. The process of

petitioningcouncilcanbecumbersomeandunwieldyiflargenumbersofpeople

needtobeservedandproofprovidedoftheservice.409

Unders103,thecouncilmaydecidetoamendasealedplanofitsownmotionor

maydosoonpresentationofapetition.Thecouncilcannotmakeadecisionon

anapplicationtoamendtheplanortoremovethecovenantsforatleast28days

andifanyonehasobjectedtotheremoval,thecouncilmustthensetadatefora

hearing.410Intervieweesnoted the lackofguidance in the legislationas tohow

hearingsshouldbeconductedandthattherearenoappealrightstotheRMPAT

fromadecisionofacouncilcommittee.411Itwassuggestedthatthepotentialfor

committeememberstobe influencedbypowerful lobbyistsmakessuchappeal

408InterviewSurveyor2,11thOctober2016.409InterviewLawyer228thSeptember2016.410LocalGovernment(Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993s104.411InterviewLawyer1,19thSeptember2016,InterviewPlanners1&2,20thSeptember2016.

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rightsessential.412ConsiderationbytheSupremeCourtpursuanttothe Judicial

ReviewAct2000(Tas)istheonlypathwayforreview.413

Thepower to amend the sealedplan and remove the covenantor easement is

unfetteredandthereisnoguidanceinthelegislationastothefactorstobetaken

into account in exercising the discretion.414Blow J highlighted the scale of the

task facing council committees in making a decision to remove a restrictive

covenant.415As thediscretionvested in councils isunfettered, there isno legal

duty to determine a ‘difficult non-jurisdictional question of law,’416such as

whether or not the power reserved by a land-owner to exempt land from the

covenantexistedandhadbeenvalidlyexercised.

Although thediscretion isunfettered, as anadministrativebodya councilmay

exercise the s103poweronly for thepurposeof ensuringproper andorderly

planning. The council is not entitled to alter the title to land by exercising

equitableprinciples.417Part 3provides that a person adversely affectedby the

amendment isentitledtocompensationtobepaidbythepersonpetitioningto

amend the plan.418Nevertheless, the exercise of that power by a council may

indicateithasexceededitspowers.Itmaybefoundthatthecouncilisseekingto

exercisetheequitable jurisdictionoftheSupremeCourtasprovidedins84Jof

theConveyancingandLawofPropertyAct1884.419

Thereareuncertaintiesastohowacouncilistoexercisethepowerunders103,

andtherearealsolimitsonthescopeofthepower.Theproblemspresentedby

412InterviewLawyer1,19thSeptember2016.413SuchreviewwasconductedinClarkevBurnieCityCouncil[2008]TASSC75(26November2008)andNationvKingboroughCouncil(No2)[2003]TASSC128(27November2003).414ClarkevBurnieCityCouncil[2008]TASSC75(26November2008),[24].415ClarkevBurnieCityCouncil[2008]TASSC75(26November2008).416InClarkevBurnieCityCouncil[2008]TASSC75(26November2008)thedifficultquestionwaswhethertherewaspowerinthesubdivider’ssuccessorintitletowaiveorremovethecovenantsandwhethertheyhadvalidlydoneso[27].417NationvKingboroughCouncil(No2)[2003]TASSC128(27November2003);[29]-[32].418LocalGovernment(Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993s105.419S84JprovidesthattheCourtmaycreateastatutoryrightofuseroverlandifsatisfiedthatitisrequiredforreasonableusetobemadeoftheland;theCourtisnottomaketheorderunlesssatisfiedthereisnocontraventionofPart3;seeaboven417.

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thatuncertaintyareexacerbatedby the lackof a simpleandaccessible review

procedure for aggrieved parties. The s 103 procedure is cumbersome and

discouragestheremovalofeasementsthatmayberedundantandcovenantsthat

maybecontrary to theobjectivesofplanningschemes. If thequestion “does it

work?”420isaskedofthes103procedure,theanswermustbeno;theregulation

duesnotachieveitspurposeandisnotaneffective,efficientmeansofachieving

policygoals.421

IIICONCLUSION

Theempiricalresearchreportedinthischapterhashighlightedproblemsarising

fromtheprovisionsofPart3oftheLocalGovernment(Building&Miscellaneous

Provisions)Act1993.AlthoughsomeparticipantsstressedtheimportanceofPart

3 as a source of powers and discretions for councils, a common theme of the

interviewswas theneed forreview,bothof its languageandof itsplace in the

planning system. The majority of interviewees expressed frustration with

archaic,unclearlanguage,cumbersomeprocedures,andout-datedpolicy.

This chapter includes comments on the difficulties arising from the Adhesion

Orderprovisions.Thedifficultiesmean that land-ownersdonothaveasimple,

cost-effectivemechanism for joining two ormore pieces of land. The chapter

also discussed sections 116 and 117. Those sections are not an adequate

regulatoryframeworkthatcandeliverqualitypublicopenspace,recognisedasa

valuabletoolinurbanplanningsystems.

Part3includess95thatdealswiththededicationofpublicroadways.Duetothe

link with the land registration system, review of that section will necessitate

reviewofs111oftheLandTitlesAct1980andthecaselawonwhichitisbased.

Chapter6willconsidertheimplicationsoftheprovisionsunderwhichthelease

ofpartofablockoflandwillconstituteasubdivision.Thechapterconsidersin

additiontothatofTasmania,thelegislationandcaselawofjurisdictionsother420Freiberg,aboven14,260.421Yeungaboven139.

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thanTasmania.Theprovisionsareanexampleofineffectiveregulationand

examinationofthemrevealsproblemswiththeinteractionofplanning

regulationwiththelandregistrationsystem.InTasmaniatheuncertaintyofthe

wordsusedtodefine‘subdivide’addstothedifficulty,asitisunclearwhatleases

fallwithintheirscope.

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CHAPTER6LEASESASSUBDIVISIONS–ANEXAMPLE

OFINEFFECTIVEREGULATION

RegulatorytheoryisemployedbythisthesisasaframeworkforitsstudyofPart

3of theLocalGovernment(BuildingandMiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993as it

considerstheeffectivenessofPart3asregulationforsubdivision.Thischapter

considers the effectiveness of the ‘lease as subdivision provisions’ of Part 3.

These provisions are common to Australian jurisdictions422and also to New

Zealand423and to some Canadian jurisdictions424and the doctrinal analysis of

this chapter illustrates how they are an example of ineffective regulation.

Analysisoftheprovisionsinthischapterdemonstrateshowregulation,through

lackofreview,canbecomeineffective.Theprovisionsdatefromaverydifferent

planning environment and their application encourages the development of

formalism,beingtechnicalcompliancewiththewordsoftheregulationbutnon-

compliancewith its intent.425Theprovisionsaredisproportionateandresult in

unintendedconsequencesthatmayincludewindfallgainstoonepartyresulting

from the effect of the regulation.426As noted in chapter 4, they highlight the

complex interaction between the land registration system and regulatory

provisionforsubdivision.Theyalsohighlighttheimportanceofreviewingboth

thecontentofregulationandthepolicyunderpinningit.

422Planning&DevelopmentAct2007(ACT)s7(2)‘subdivision’includessurrenderandgrantofleases;EnvironmentalPlanningandAssessmentAct1979(NSW)s6.2(1),ConveyancingAct1919(NSW)s23G(d);PlanningAct1999(NT)s5(3);SustainablePlanningAct2009(Qld)S10(1),PlanningAct2016(Qld)Sch2;DevelopmentAct1993(SA)s4(1)(c);Planning,DevelopmentandInfrastructureAct2016(SA)s3(1);WesternAustraliadoesnotincludeleasesas‘subdivision,butprovidesseparatelyforplanningassessmentofleasesPlanningandDevelopmentAct2005(WA)ss136,139.423ResourceManagementAct1991(NZ)s218(1)(a)(iii).424MunicipalGovernmentAct,RSA2000,cM-26s616(ee);LandTitleAct,RSBC1996,c250s73(1).425MorganandYeung,aboven14,152[4.1]quotingKYeungSecuringCompliance(HartPublishing2004)11.426BlackreferstounderandoverinclusivenesswhenconsideringtheissueofcongruencebetweenaruleanditspurposequotedinMorganandYeungaboven151,153-155[4.2]RulesandRegulators5-45.

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Theinclusionofleasesofpartofablockoflandwithintheconceptofsubdivision

exposesthemtothecostanddelayofaplanningassessmentsystemdesignedto

address the issues arising from the division of a fee simple title. The cost of

compliance encourages techniques to avoid the application of the regulation.

Partieswhofailtosubmitleasesofpartofablockoflandthataresubdivisionsto

planning assessment risk their being rendered unenforceable or ineligible for

registrationontitlerecords. Theprovisionsalsohighlighttheconflictbetween

planninginstrumentsfocusedonthepublicinterestinsustainabledevelopment

withtheprincipleofindefeasibilitythatisatthecoreoftheTorrenssystem.

In Tasmania the problems are compounded, as the language of s 80 of Part 3

Local Government (Building & Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1993 that defines

‘subdivide’isunclear,anditisdifficulttodeterminetheleasesthatfallwithinits

scope. This chapter will firstly consider the lease as subdivision provisions

generallyinthecontextoftheelementsofeffectiveregulation.Thechapterwill

then turn to the issues raised by the Tasmanian provisions and finally to the

implications of the registration of a lease that is not compliant with planning

assessmentonTorrenssystemtitlerecords.

I LEASESASSUBDIVISIONS

In common with the legislation of the other Australian and international

jurisdictions referred to in the introduction to this chapter, Tasmania’s

subdivision legislation includes leases of part of a block of land within the

definition of subdivision. The legislation exempts some leases from the

provisions, including those affecting part of a building and those defined by

referencetotheirterm.Theprovisionsofeachjurisdictionaredifferentandthe

lengthof the termof theexcepted leasesvariesamongAustralia’s jurisdictions

fromfiveyearsinNewSouthWalesto20yearsinWesternAustralia.

InTasmanias80exemptstheleaseofpartofablockoflandifthetermdoesnot

exceedorisnotcapableofexceeding10years.Someofthejurisdictionsinclude

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licences as well as leases within the provisions.427Some jurisdictions make

provision for executory agreements to lease, as opposed to instruments of

demise.428Although the provisions vary the policy issue at which they are

directedisthesame.

InAustralia, the policy canbe tracedback to theUndueSubdivisionPrevention

Act1885 (Qld). That legislationwas designed to address sanitation and public

healthproblemsstemmingfromthegrantingoflong-termleasesofsmallpieces

oflandforbuildingpurposes.429Alawyerinterviewedforthisthesissuggested

itistimetorevisitandreviewthepolicyunderlyingtheissueofleasesofpartof

ablockof landassubdivisionsandto focusontheevilatwhichtheprovisions

are addressed.430He suggested that different types of leases present different

threats to orderly planning. Long-term leases of small pieces of land for

infrastructure thathas somepublicbenefitmaybe considereda low-level risk

comparedwithleasesthatresultinthecuttingupofprimeagriculturalland.

Itisdifficulttounderstandthecontinuedtreatmentoftheleaseofpartofablock

oflandasasubdivision,despitetheassociatedcosts(ofbothcomplyingwithand

notcomplyingwith theregulation).431That isparticularly soas thedecision to

include leasesas subdivisions in theassessmentprocesswasonemade in ‘the

very different commercial situation and social conditions’ to those that exist

now.432Notonlyarethecommercialandsocialenvironmentsdifferent,modern

planning systems now provide a range of tools for regulators. Those tools

include:

• zoningrestrictionsontheusethatcanbemadeofland;

427PlanningAct1999(NT)s5(3),(4);DevelopmentAct1993(SA)s4(1)(c);Planning,DevelopmentandInfrastructureAct2016(SA)s3(1);PlanningandDevelopmentAct2005(WA)ss136,139.428DevelopmentAct1993(SA)s4(1)(c);Planning,DevelopmentandInfrastructureAct2016(SA)s3(1).ForacomparisonofexecutoryagreementtoleaseandinstrumentofdemiseseeMidazPtyLtdvBenbergPtyLtd(1999)TASSC66(7June1999)CrawfordJ.429Hood,aboven91,96;seealsoQueensland,ParliamentaryDebates,HouseofAssembly,13October1885,1029(SGriffiths).430InterviewwithLawyer3,29thSeptember2016.431Efficiencyassessedoncostbenefitanalysisisacharacteristicofeffectiveregulation,seeaboven140,n141;FreibergandProductivityCommissionofAustraliaaboven144.432AndrewLang,‘Subdivisionbylease’(1988)LawSocietyJournal66.

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• agreements limiting the use of land that can be registered on title

records;

• measures designed to assess and control the construction and use of

dwellingsandbuildings;and

• requirements that any change of use of land be submitted to planning

assessment.

Nevertheless, despite the changes in the planning environment, reviews of

planning regulation that includes leases as subdivisions have in some cases

resulted in amendment to increase the lengthof excepted leases, buthavenot

removed the provisions. By way of example, in Western Australia and New

Zealandreviewoflegislationinabidtostreamlineplanningprocedures,resulted

in the length of the excepted lease being extended from 10 years to 20 in

WesternAustraliaandfrom20to35yearsinNewZealand.433InSouthAustralia

thechangefromfivetosixyearswasmadeinresponsetoarepresentationbya

prominent legal practitioner. That practitioner pointed out the provision

referring to a five-year lease term was anomalous. Leases in South Australia

werecommonlygrantedforaninitialthree-yeartermwithanoptiontoextend

forafurtherthreeyears.434

Amendmenttoextendthetermoftheexceptedleasedoesnot,however,address

theproblemscausedbythelegislation.Thelimitationsofthismeansofdealing

with the issuewerehighlightedby theLaw InstituteofBritishColumbia in its

reporton thedecisionof theBritishColumbiaCourtofAppeal in International

PaperIndustriesLtdvTopLineIndustriesPtyLtdTopLinecase.435

433s20(1)(a)oftheTownPlanningAct1928(WA)ands136Planning&DevelopmentAct2005(WA);NewZealand,ParliamentaryDebates,HouseofRepresentatives,6May2003,5312(SecondreadingspeechMHobbs).AmendmenttotheResourceManagementAct1991(NZ)wasmadebytheResourceManagementAmendmentAct2003.434SouthAustralia,ParliamentaryDebates,HouseofAssembly,14May1985,4265(DJHopgood).435InternationalPaperIndustriesLtdvTopLineIndustriesPtyLtd(1996)135DLR(4th)423;Reporton‘LeasesofUnsubdividedlandandtheTopLinecase’BritishColumbiaLawInstituteBCLIReportno38July2005;6.

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The‘TopLine’caseconcernedaleaseof51monthsofpartofalotoflandthatthe

partiesenteredintowithoutlegaladviceandwithoutknowledgeoftheleaseas

subdivision provisions. The relationship between them soured andwhen the

tenant attempted to exercise the option the landlord refused to grant an

extendedtermsettinginmotiontheproceedings.Duringthoseproceedings,the

landlord sought to argue for the first time that the lease was invalid. The

landlordarguedthattheleasedidnotcomplywiththerequirementins73Land

TitleActRSBC1996,c250.Thatsectionrequiredthataleaseexceeding3years

thatsubdividedlandintosmallerparcels,beanapprovedsubdivision.

TheconsequentfindingthattheTopLineleasewasvoidabinitioduetoitsnon-

compliancewithplanningassessmenttriggeredwhattheBritishColumbiaLaw

Institute reported to be a trebling of litigation as parties sought to have non-

compliantleasesdeclaredvoid.Thelitigationachievedthis‘…bygivingpersons

a means to escape from their contractual obligations…’436 The use of the

legislationinthiswayalloweda ‘…disasterforonepartyandawindfall forthe

other’.437

Duringitsinquiry,theInstitutereceivedsubmissionssuggestingthatasolution

totheproblemswastoincreasethetermoftheexceptedlease.Themembersof

the Institute refused to adopt those submissions as a recommendation, stating

that the submissions were evidence of broader complaints about subdivision

controlthanthenarrowfocusontheTopLinedecisionthatwasitsbrief.

OneoftheoptionstheInstituteconsideredwasaddingasectiontoprovidethat

non-compliant leaseswould takeeffectas licences for thepurposesofcreating

personal rights. The solution was presented by the Institute as a means of

avoiding theharshconsequencesof the finding thatanon-compliant leasewas

void ab initio.438The amendment that was in fact made to the Land Title Act

RSBC1996,c250wastheinclusionofsection73.1.Thatsectionprovidesthata

436BritishColumbiaLawInstituteaboven435,6.437Ibid.438Ibid,15.

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non-compliant lease will not be unenforceable as between the parties to it

simplybyreasonofitsnon-compliance.

Effectiveregulationisregulationthatisanefficientmeansofachievingapolicy

goal. Thedifficultiestheprovisionspresent forpartiesto leaseshavebeenthe

subjectofcommentfordecades.Thecostforpartiestoleasesofcomplyingwith

subdivision assessment is considerable. In Re Nelson and Tammers Contract,

Smith J acknowledged the argument of counsel that the construction he felt

obliged to give to the provisions would cause ‘serious and unnecessary

inconvenience.’439

InBenmarPropertiesPtyLtdvMakucha, Thomas J noted that ‘[i]t is generally

undesirable that subdivisions by lease be visited with the same expensive

provisions as are thought necessary in order to identify separate titles.’440The

enactmentoftheIntegratedPlanningAct1997(Qld)promptedthesecomments:

Practicallytheprovision[s1.3.2(d)IntegratedPlanningAct1997]creates

unreasonableobstaclesinsomecommercialsituations…Placingafurther

requirement for subdivisionapprovalupon these typesof leases results

in increased costs and delays for public utility providers, which are

eventually reflected in higher prices for the purchaser of the services…

Theconsequenceof thedefinition is thatasubdivisionapplicationmust

bemadetotherelevantlocalgovernmentwheneveraleaseofthiskindis

entered into. The local government can impose conditions which are

reasonableorrelevant…includingconditionstoensurethatrestrictionsof

thezoningarecompliedwith.441

As that observationdemonstrates, thenecessity for the subdivision that arises

on the long-term lease of part of a block of land complicates commercial

arrangements. To complywith the planning assessment process increases the439ReNelsonandTammersContract[1952]VLR391,396-7.440BenmarPropertiesPtyLtdvMakucha[1993]QSC269(10September1993)19;seealsoLang,aboven432andHoodaboven91.441Hood,aboven91,96.

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costtothepartiestotheleaseandresultsindelay.Itispossiblethataleasemay

beaffectedbyobjectionstothegrantingofthediscretionarypermitrequiredby

the planning process for subdivision or the permit for the subdivisionmay be

subject to appeal. The lease might not be able to meet the development

standards dictated by the zoning of the affected land. That is likely to be

particularly the case as far as requirements relating tominimum lot sizes are

concerned.

In Western Australia there is a separate planning assessment process for

leases,442buteveninthatjurisdictionthereisuncertaintyastowhatleasesare

subjecttothe legislation.RosebridgeNomineesPtyLtdvCommonwealthBankof

Australia Ltd443concerned a lease that included an option to extend that was

dependent on the lessormaking a decision to redevelop. The Court of Appeal

determined that the lease did not create an option that triggered planning

assessmentforthelease,asanoptiondependentonadecisionofthelessorwas

notanoptionwithintheordinarymeaningoftheword.Thejudgmentdoesnot

disclosewhether the optionwas deliberately crafted to avoid the effect of the

legislation. The history of the case demonstrates the difficulties caused by the

legislation.Theleasewasoriginallyexecutedin1988.Uncertaintyastowhether

itwascaughtbytheplanningassessmentrequirementsledtolitigationthatwas

stillonfootin2014.

In jurisdictions other than Western Australia, 444 leases that qualify as

subdivisionsmustbesubmittedtothesameplanningassessmentprocessasthe

subdivision of a fee simple. In addition to the cost and delay of the process, a

442Planning&DevelopmentAct2005(WA)s136,s139.443RosebridgeNomineesPtyLtdvCommonwealthBankofAustraliaLtd(2008)36WAR561.444InVictorialeasesarenotroutinelyregisteredasthescopeoftheindefeasibilityprovisionins42(2)(e)oftheTransferofLandAct1958(Vic)isbroaderthatthatofotherjurisdictionsandtenantsrelyontheprotectionprovidedbyit.WDDuncan&SharonChristensenCommercialLeasesinAustralia(ThomsonReutersLawBookCo7thed2014)41,[10.4500].TheVictorianPlanningProvisionsrequireapermitforsubdivisionofland(egcl35.06-3).Inthesamezoneapermitisrequiredforalong-termleaseforthepurposeofaccommodationiftheleaseismorethan10yearswitharestrictiononthesizeoftheleasedarea.

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leasemaynotbeabletomeetstandardsapplicableto‘theconventionalnotionof

subdivision,namelythecreationofadditionaltitlesoutofanexistingtitle.’445

Thecostsofcomplyingwith theprovisionsencouragecreativecomplianceand

formalism designed to avoid the effect of the legislation. Butt has referred to

suchpracticesas ‘somewhatofanindustryindrafting(mightwesaycrafting?)

leases’ to take advantage of the statutory provisions.446 He reports on the

‘somewhat idiosyncratic practice[s],’ 447 that have developed. They include

describingtheleasedpropertyas‘premises.’Thiswasdoneonthebasisthatthe

leasewas exempt fromplanning assessment as it related to part of a building

rather than the landonwhich thebuildingwassituated.AnotherpracticeButt

referstoistheestablishmentofaseriesofsuccessiveleasesseparatedbyatime

gap(perhapsoneday)sothat‘judicial“accumulation”oftheleaseterms’ismore

difficult.448The development of such creative compliance and formalism in

responsetotheprovisionsisanindicationthatthemembersofsocietyaffected

bythemdonotviewthemasrelevant,proportionate,andeffectiveregulation.449

The costs of not complying with the regulation are also significant. In some

jurisdictions(includingTasmania),thestatutesavesaleasefrombeingvoidbut

imports a condition as to planning assessment into the lease.450Failure to

comply with the condition within a reasonable time may render the lease

unenforceable. 451 In Tasmania failure to comply with planning assessment

445BenmarPropertiesPtyLtdvMakucha[1993]QSC269(10September1993)17;ThomasJ.446PeterButt,‘Leasesandillegalsubdivisions’(2012)86AustralianLawJournal515,518.447PeterButt,‘Conveyancingpracticeandthelaw:leasesandsubdivision’(2002)76AustralianLawJournal346;seealsoPeterButt‘Successiveleasesforfive-yearterms’(2007)81AustralianLawJournal783,784;PeterButt‘AccumulatingLeaseterms:ordoes5x5=25?”(2009)83AustralianLawJournal77;PeterButt‘Leaseofpremisesnotincludinglandbeneath’(2012)86AustralianLawJournal11,13.448PeterButt‘AccumulatingLeaseterms:ordoes5x5=25?”(2009)83AustralianLawJournal77.449Morgan&Yeung,aboven14,123.450ConveyancingAct1919(NSW)S23F(3);RealPropertyAct1886(SA)s223LB(5);LocalGovernment(Building&MiscellaneousProvisionsAct1993(Tas)s120(1);Planning&DevelopmentAct2005(WA)S140;ResourceManagementAct1991(NZ)s225(1))savesagreementsforsaleofland(notleases).451EquuscorpPtyLtdvBelperio[2006]VSC14(30,31August,1,6-9,12-15September20056February2006)[266-274]confirmedonappealEquuscorpPtyLtdvAntonopoulos[2008]VSCA179(16September2008)[23-29]BuchananJA.

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requirements for a subdivision is an offence and as an alternative to a fine, a

courtmayorderforfeitureofthevalueoftheinterestcreatedbyanon-compliant

lease.452

Itmaynotbepossibletoregisterleasesthatassubdivisionsshouldcomplywith

planning assessment, but do not.453As proprietors of a registered interest in

land, a lesseewillbeentitled to thebenefitsofpriority, indefeasibilityand the

transferofalegalinterestinland.Alessormayhaveaclearobligationunderthe

terms of a lease to register it. A lessee may accept failure to register as a

repudiationof theagreement.Suchconductmay thenbesufficient todeny the

lessor resort to the remedy of specific performance and to terminate the

agreement.454

Thedifficultiesoftheregulationmaycauseproblemsforprofessionaladvisorsto

parties to leases.Forpractitioners, a solicitor’sadvice that leads toa leasenot

beingregistered,orbeingrenderedunenforceablemaysatisfythe‘ButFor’test

ofcausationofloss.Suchlossmayarisefromthelackofregistrationorinability

toenforcealease.455Thatmaybesoeventhoughtheimmediatecauseoflossis

theactionoftheotherpartytoa lease.Thatasolicitoracts inaccordancewith

acceptedprofessionalpracticemayalsonotbesufficienttopreventafindingof

negligence.456

Costsofregulationmayalsoincludethelessobviouscostofwindfallgaintoone

partytothetransaction.Partieswhowishtorenegeontheirbargainhaveused

theleaseassubdivisionprovisionstoescapecontractualobligationsonthebasis

452LocalGovernment(Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993(Tas)s81(3).(a).453LandTitleAct(NT)s66(2);ConveyancingAct1919(NSW)s23F(2);LandTitleAct1994(Qld)s65(3A);RealPropertyAct1886(SA)s223LD(5a);LocalGovernment(Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)Act(1993)(Tas)s90certificateofapplicabilityofDivision3mayberequiredbyRecorderofTitles;TransferofLandAct1958(Vic)s106(1)(a);Planning&DevelopmentAct2005(WA)s147;ResourceManagementAct1991(NZ)s226.454WDDuncan&SharonChristensen,aboven444,46-47[10.5000]citingLaurindaPtyLtdvCapalabaParkShoppingCentrePtyLtd(1989)166CLR623&AbacistPtyLtdvManagedInvestmentsPtyLtd(1991)QConvR54-3999.455BarnesvHay(1988)12NSWLR337.456StoneJamesCovInvestmentHoldingsPtyLtd[1987]WAR363.

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that leases that do not comply with planning assessment are void or

unenforceable.

ATasmanianexample is thecaseofSullivanvThurley.457Thecaseconcerneda

dispute arising under an agreement to sell a parcel of land thatwas to result

fromasubdivision.Theagreementprovided fora lease tobegrantedshoulda

subdivisionofthefeesimpleberefused.Thecouncilrefusedtograntpermission

fora subdivisionof the fee simpledue to concernsabout inadequatedrainage.

Thewould-be purchaser entered into possession as tenant in accordancewith

theagreement.Thevendorsoughttoejecthim.Oneofthegroundsforejection

wasthattogranttheagreedleasewastocarryoutanillegalactassubdivision

permission had been refused. In considering s 462LocalGovernmentAct1962

(Tas), Wright J agreed and noted that to grant the agreed lease would be to

promoteandcondoneunlawfulconduct.458

In Starr v Barbaro,459the tenants had spent a considerable amount of money

developing a palm plantation on the land. They faced significant loss if the

landowner succeeded in its argument that the lease was illegal (as a non-

compliantsubdivision),andincapableofcreatinganyrightsforthetenants.The

windfallgaintothelandlordpromptedPowell J torightthewrongincurredby

thetenant.Alicenceinthesametermsastheleasewasdeclaredinfavourofthe

tenant. Powell J felt that such orders could be justified as ‘substantially

permittingthesatisfactionoftheplaintiff’sequity,if…soframedthatthereisno

breachofthesections.’460

The British Columbia Court of Appeal in the decision of International Paper

IndustriesLtdvTopLineIndustriesPtyLtd (‘TopLine’) refused the invitationof

457SullivanvThurley[1987]TASSC19(9March1987).458SullivanvThurley[1987]TASSC19(9March1987)[25].Thevendor/landlorddidnotsucceedonothergroundsasWrightJheldthenoticetoquittobeineffective.459StarrvBarbaro(1986)NSWConvR55-315,confirmedonappealinSilvioPtyLtdvBarbaro(1988)13NSWLR466.460SilvioPtyLtdvBarbaro(1988)13NSWLR466,474(PriestleyJA).

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the tenant’s counsel to carry out a similar ‘rescue operation,’461noting that it

would be ‘exceedingly artificial’ to do so. The joint judgment declared that to

grantthetenantpersonalrightsintheformofa ‘SilovivBarbarolicence’would

betocircumventtheplanningassessmentregimethatwasdesignedtoconsider

issues suchasaccessandenvironmental impact. Notonly that,but the tenant

would be exposed to defeat by a third party purchaser. The door would be

opened for land-owning developers either ignorant or who appeared to be

ignorantofplanningassessmentrequirements,andwhosoughttoavoidthem.

InTalujavAustralianInternationalAcademyofEducationLtd,462YoungJapplied

s 4B(3)(a) of the Environmental Planning & Assessment Act 1985 (NSW) that

exempted from the subdivision definition the lease (of any duration) of a

building or part of a building. Although acknowledging that the case involved

nottheleaseofabuilding,but‘themirrorreverse’beingtheleaseoflandexcept

for somebuildings,HisHonour felt the exception could still apply.Butt points

out that the decision is not necessarily consistent with the words of the

legislativedefinition.463

The dangers of judges seeking to reach a fair result in every case have been

highlightedbyLordNeubergerinthe2014Lehanelecture:‘[N]otonlyisfairness

oftenintheeyeofthebeholder,butchangingordistortingthe lawtogetwhat

seems to be the right result…has significant risks.’464Those risks include the

impactandcostsofadifferentdecisiononappeal;thatthelawisleftinastateof

uncertainty;andthatwhatmaybejustinonecase,maybeunjustinanother.465

In commenting on the decision of Powell J in Starr v Barbaro, Hargraves J in

Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Belperio466(‘Equuscorp’) referred to the ‘fashion[ing] of a

461InternationalPaperIndustriesLtdvTopLineIndustriesPtyLtd(1996)135DLR(4th)423,440[34-35]perNewburyJA.462TalujavAustralianInternationalAcademyofEducationLtd[2011]NSWCA416,[76].463Butt,aboven446,520.464LordDavidNeuberger‘Equity:thesoulandspiritofalllaworarougishthing?”Lehanelecture(2014)88(11)AustralianLawJournal802,811.465Ibid.466EquuscorpPtyLtdvBelperio[2006]VSC14(30,31August,1,6-9,12-15September2005,6February2006),[266-274]confirmedonappealEquuscorpPtyLtdvAntonopoulos[2008]VSCA179(16September2008)[23-29]BuchananJA.

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remedy.’ Regulation that prompts formalism, creative compliance and the

judiciaryto findsolutionsthatexempt leasesfromitsscope,doesnotmeetthe

standardofeffectiveregulation.

The lease as subdivision provisions are planning regulation reflecting the

concernof legislators toprotect thepublic interest in theprocessofusingand

developing land. Such public interest considerations influence the judicial

interpretationoflegislation.HargravesJinEquuscorp467citedthePrivyCouncil

decisionofKokHoongvLeongCheongKwengMinesLtd468asheconsidered the

correct interpretation of s 4 Local Government Act 1919 (NSW) that included

within the definition of ‘subdivision’ a lease exceeding five years. The Privy

Councildecisionisauthorityforthepropositionthatwhetherestoppelwilllieis

notsimplyaquestionofstatutoryinterpretationasthepublicpolicyunderlying

thestatuteisalsorelevant.469

ThePrivyCouncilechoed theearlierwordsof IsaacsandGavanDuffy JJof the

HighCourt inRoachvBickle.470ThePrivyCouncil stated thatwhere legislation

represents public policy, the Courtmust give effect to that policy despite any

evidence that the parties have created by their conduct; the public policywill

consequentlydeterminewhetheranestoppelwill succeed. In thewordsof the

jointjudgmentofthePrivyCouncildeliveredbyViscountRadcliffe:

General social policy does from time to time require the denial of legal

validitytocertaintransactionsbycertainpersons.Thismaybefortheir

ownprotection…orfortheprotectionofothers…Inallsuchcasesthereis

no room for theapplicationof anothergeneral and familiarprincipleof

the law that a man may, if he wishes, disclaim a statutory provision

enactedforhisbenefit,forwhatisforaman’sbenefitandwhatisforhis

467EquuscorpPtyLtdvBelperio[2006]VSC14(30,31August,1,6-9,12-15September2005,6February2006),[266-274].468KokHoongvLeongCheongKwengMinesLtd[1964]AC1993.469SeealsoNSeddon,RBigwood,MEllinghausCheshire&FifootLawofContract(10thAustralianed2012)886,[16.68].470RoachvBickle(1915)20CLR663;671

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protectionarenotsynonomousterms.NorisitopentotheCourttogive

its sanction todepartures fromany law that reflects suchapolicy,even

thoughthepartyconcernedhashimselfbehavedinsuchawayaswould

otherwisetiehishands.471

HargravesJappliedtheprincipleofKokHoongvLeongCheongKwengMinesLtd

andhisdecisionwasconfirmedonappeal.TheEquuscorpCourtsconsideredthe

wholeofthetransactionbeforethem.Theynotedthatthesixsuccessiveleases,

each less than the five-year term stipulated in the LocalGovernmentAct 1919

(NSW), were interdependent. The rent for each lease was calculated by

reference to the rent of the previous lease. Each subsequent lease would be

terminatediftheearlieronewasterminated;alloftheleasesweresignedatthe

sametimeandamanagementcontractdefined‘thelease’asmeaningtheseries

ofsuccessiveleases.472Thepublicpolicyjustifieda‘strainedconstruction’ofthe

legislation,ifnecessarytoachievetheclearintentofthestatute.473Commentary

on the Equuscorp judgments has suggested practitioners avoid the use of

successiveleasesinadeliberateattempttoavoidtheeffectofthelegislation.474

II LEASESASSUBDIVISIONSINTASMANIA

The problems that render the lease as subdivision regulation ineffective

regulation are compounded in Tasmania because of lack of clarity in the

legislationthatmakesitdifficulttodeterminewhichleasesfallwithinitsscope.

The definition of ‘subdivide’ in s 80 of Part 3 Local Government (Building &

MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993(Tas)asitappliestotheleaseofpartofalot

oflandisasfollows:

471KokHoongvLeongCheongKwengMinesLtd[1964]AC9931016-1017472EquuscorpPtyLtdvBelperio[2006]VSC14(30,31August,1,6-9,12-15September2005,6February2006),[242-243].473EquuscorpPtyLtdvBelperio[2006]VSC14(30,31August,1,6-9,12-15September2005,6February2006),[246].474WDDuncan‘Subdivisionoflandbylease:theseriousconsequencesofnon-compliance’(Nov2008)AustralianPropertyLawBulletin54,56;Duncan&Christensenaboven444,55[10.6210];Buttaboven446.

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Subdivide means to divide the surface of a block of land by creating

estates or interests giving separate rights of occupation otherwise than

by…

(a) aleaseofabuildingorofthelandbelongingtoandcontiguous

toabuildingbetweentheoccupiersofthatbuilding;or

(b) aleaseofairspacearoundoraboveabuilding;or

(c) a lease of a term not exceeding 10 years or for a term not

capableofexceeding10years;…

The words of the section are unclear. The lack of clarity is demonstrated by

firstly referring to the exception relating to buildings. Considering whether

leases,theoriginaltermofwhichisextendedbeyond10yearsbytheexerciseof

an option fall within the definition of ‘subdivide,’ is another example of the

unclearwords.Dothewordsmeanthataseriesofconsecutive, interdependent

leasessuchasthosethesubjectoftheEquuscorpdecisions,fallwithinthescope

ofsubdivision?

A TheExceptionforBuildings

Asnotedabove,theexceptionfor leasesofpartsofbuildings iscommontothe

legislationof the jurisdictionsthatdefine leasesofpartofablockof landtobe

subdivisions. It isneverthelessnoteasytobecertainthatparagraph(a)ofthe

Tasmaniandefinitionof ‘subdivide’meansthattheleaseofpartofabuildingis

not included within the definition of ‘subdivide’. In order to justify that

interpretation of thewords of the paragraph it is necessary to apply accepted

principles of statutory interpretation and to turn to external sources. In

construingambiguousorobscure legislationorwheretheremaybecompeting

constructions, theCourt shouldprefer the construction thatbestpromotes the

purposeofanAct,andmayresort toextrinsicmaterial toestablishthat intent,

includingParliamentaryrecords.475

475PipeNetworksPtyLtdvCommonwealthSuperannuationCorporation[2013]FCA444(16May2013[87];s15AAActsInterpretationAct1901(Clth)ss8A&8BActsInterpretationAct1947(Tas).;CICInsuranceLtdvBankstownFootballClubLtd(1997)187CLR384;408.

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The words of the paragraph were introduced as amendments made by the

LegislativeCounciltotheLandUsePlanningandApprovals(Consequentialand

Miscellaneous Amendments) Bill in 1993. They were then carried forward to

Part3oftheLocalGovernment(Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)Bill1993.

Hansardrecordstheintentbehindtheamendmentswastoensurethatadivision

ofabuildingorof landcontiguous toabuildingwouldnotbeasubdivision.476

Theparagraphmayaccordinglybe interpretedso that thewords ‘between the

occupiersofabuilding’applybothtothebuildingandthelandcontiguoustoa

building. That interpretation justifies the conclusion that the words of the

paragraph mean that the lease of part of a building is exempt from the

subdivisionrequirements.Itisunsatisfactorythatthemeaningoftheparagraph

is not immediately clear from thewords used, and that resortmust be had to

Parliamentaryrecordstoestablishtheirmeaning.

B TheExceptionforLeasesoflessthan10years

Thesecondquestionrelatestotheexceptingofleasesthetermofwhichexceeds

10yearsor is capableofexceeding10years.Tasmania’s legislation is theonly

Australian legislation the wording of which permits the possibility of using

options to extend the lease beyond10 years. In other jurisdictions legislation

hasbeenamendedtoclarifythatleasetermsextendedbytheexerciseofoptions

will fall within the definition of subdivision. In New South Wales, the Local

Government Act 1919 was amended by the Local Government (Subdivisions)

AmendmentAct1988 (NSW) after commentsmade byNeedham J inMisiaris v

AFC Holdings Pty Ltd.477Needham J noted several options were available in

interpreting s327AA(2), noneofwhichhe found satisfactory.Theamendment

madeitclearthataleaseextendedbeyondfiveyearsbytheexerciseofanoption

would qualify as a subdivision.478 Similarly in Queensland, the Integrated

Planning Act 1997 (Qld) repealed the Local Government (Planning &

476Tasmania,ParliamentaryDebates,LegislativeCouncil,17August1993,2442(RBailey);Tasmania,ParliamentaryDebates,LegislativeCouncil,1December1993,5402(RBailey),PMcKay).477MisiarisvAFCHoldingsPtyLtd[1988]15NSWLR231478TheLocalGovernmentAct1919wasreplacedbytheLocalGovernmentAct1993andthecurrentdefinitionofsubdivisionisinEnvironmentalPlanningandAssessmentAct1979(NSW)s6.2(1).

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Environment)Act1990, in the process clarifying that terms resulting from the

exerciseofoptionsweretobeincludedintheperiodthatatthesametimewas

increasedto10years.

The Tasmanian Supreme Court considered the question of whether leases

extended by options qualify as subdivisions under s 80 of Part 3 in APF

PropertiesPtyLtdvRobinsonInvestmentCapitalPtyLtd in2013(‘APF’).479The

caseconcerneda leaseofpartofa farmingproperty thatwasstructuredasan

initial nine year termwith nine options to extendby 10-years each. The lease

structurewaschosenasasolutionbythepartiestotheleaseafterapermitfor

thesubdivisionofthefeesimplewasrefusedonthegroundthatthesubdivision

contravenedthestatepolicypreventingsubdivisionofvaluablefarmingland.

The 99-year lease term enabled the vendor to continue to occupy one of the

residencesonthefarminglandafterthebalanceofitwassold.TheRecorderof

Titles had registered the lease. Blow CJ was prepared to grant discretionary

relieftothetenantundertheAustralianConsumerLawdespiteitsparticipation

inthe‘lawfulcircumvention’oftheleaseassubdivisionprovisions.480

In reaching his conclusion, Blow CJ demonstrated a different attitude to the

policyunderlyingthelegislationanditseffectontheconstructionof legislation

tothatdemonstratedbytheVictorianCourtsintheEquuscorpdecisions.BlowCJ

held thats80shouldnotbegiven ‘anextendedmeaning’, as ifParliamenthad

intendedto includeoptionsperiodswithinthe10-year limit, itcouldhavesaid

so.481 It is submitted that therearedifficultieswith that conclusion, as it does

not take into account what is discussed below, namely the ambiguity and

obscurityofs80.Italsodoesnottakeintoaccounttheimportanceofthepolicy

underlyingtheprovisions.

479APFPropertiesPtyLtdvRobinsonInvestmentCapitalPtyLtd[2013]TASSC59(9October2013).480APFPropertiesPtyLtdvRobinsonInvestmentCapitalPtyLtd[2013]TASSC59(9October2013),[41].481Ibid.

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The words of s 80 refer to a lease ‘of a term not exceeding 10 years’. In

consideringtheapplicationofthosewordstoleases,theinitialtermofwhichis

extendedby theexerciseofanoption, theeffectofanoption is instructive.An

optiontorenewis’…arighttocallforafreshlease…afreshdemise:afreshlease

with fresh covenants’ even if those covenants are identical to the old ones.482

Giventhat,itseemsappropriatetointerpretthewords‘ofatermnotexceeding

10years,’asreferringtoeachseparate9-yeartermoftheAPFlease.However,if

that is so, what is the purpose of the words ‘or for a term not capable of

exceeding10years?”Ifthewordsrefertoeach9-yearterm,theyareredundant.

If the words refer to a lease containing options that would result in a total

leasehold interest not exceeding 10 years, the 99-year interest created by the

APFleasecouldnothavecomewithintheexemptionandwasaleasethatshould

havebeensubmittedtoplanningassessmentasasubdivision.

Tasmania’sParliamentaryrecordsrevealthatParliamentintendednotonlythat

thetotalleaseholdinterestnotexceed10years,butalsoasthefollowingextract

shows, that protection was to apply only to agricultural land.483Leases of all

otherland(irrespectiveoftheirterm)weretofallwithinthesubdivisionnet.

ThefollowingextractshowsthatfortheTasmanianParliamentthe99-yearlease

thatwasthesubjectoftheAFPdecisionwasexactlythesortofarrangementthat

constituted subdivisionby lease and that thereforeneeded to complywith the

planningassessmentregime.

Theprincipleofthisamendmentistomakeitquiteclearthatifleasesare

partofa farmorpartofabuildingcomplexthatcouldbedividedintoa

seriesofseparateleases,providedthetermoftheleaseorthecapacityof

theleasedoesnotexceedtenyears–byaseriesofoptionswhichcanbe

automatically renewed– that isokay…Wewouldnotwanta lease tobe

enteredintofor99years;thatwouldcompletelyfrustrateandabortany

planningprinciples thatmightotherwisehavebeen in force, soas I say

482Duncan&Christensenaboven444,380[120.4000].483Tasmania,ParliamentaryDebates,LegislativeCouncil,17August1993,2441-2443(RFBailey);Tasmania,ParliamentaryDebates,LegislativeCouncil,1December1993,5402[RFBailey];FactSheetLocalGovernment(Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)Bill1993.

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theleasecouldbeforastraighttenyears,forfiveyearswithanoptionof

another five years, or it could be for three years with two successive

termstotakeittonineyears,andallofthosewouldcomply.Butifitwent

forovertenyearsthedangerwouldbethatifitdidnotcomewithinthe

exception to the additions of the definition of ‘subdivide’, it would be

unlawfulandunenforceable.484

Thepositionforleasesofrurallandisfurthercomplicatedwhenthedefinitionof

‘block’ is considered. As noted in chapter 5, there aremultiple definitions of

‘block’ in s80. The resultofoneof thedefinitionsseems tobe that a leaseof

farmland isnot subject to thesubdivisionrequirementsas it isnota ‘block’ to

whichthes80definitionapplies.Thepossibleexceptionseemstohaveescaped

thenoticeofnotonlythepartiesintheAPFcase,butalsoofthepartiesinLinks

Golf Tasmania Pty Ltd v Sattler.485In the latter case, the land to be leased

although a coastal strip, was part of a larger grazing property. This possible

effect doesnot seem tobewhat theParliament intended, as the above extract

indicates that leases of farming land were intended to be subject to planning

assessment.

The decision of Blow CJ in the APF case demonstrates a markedly different

attitudetotheeffectofthepublicpolicyunderlyingtheprovisionstothatofthe

VictoriancourtsintheEquuscorpjudgments.Similarlyintheearlierdecisionof

Symmons Plains Pastoral Holdings and EB Management Pty Ltd v Tasmanian

Motor Racing Company Pty Ltd; Ex Parte the Minister administering the

TasmanianDevelopmentAct1983,486ZeemanJ’sattitudeanticipatedthatofBlow

CJ to the public policy underlying the provisions. Zeeman J was prepared to

granttheequitableremedyofreliefagainstforfeituretothelesseeundera40-

yearleasethatdidnotcomplywithplanningassessment.

484Tasmania,ParliamentaryDebates,LegislativeCouncil,17August1993,2443(RBailey);485LinksGolfTasmaniaPtyLtdvSattler[2012]FCA634.486SymmonsPlainsPastoralHoldingsandEBManagementPtyLtdvTasmanianMotorRacingcompanyPtyLtd;ExPartetheMinisteradministeringtheTasmanianDevelopmentAct1983[1996]TASSC149(27November1996)

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Whether or not the underlying policy is out-dated and in need of review, the

provisionsarefoundedinpublicpolicythatshouldinfluencetheinterpretation

of the legislation. The only conclusion that can be drawn from examining the

Tasmanian ‘lease as subdivision’ provisions in Part 3 of the LocalGovernment

(Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993 is thatnoclearstatementcanbe

made as to what leases of Tasmanian land constitute subdivisions. That

conclusionhasimplicationsforpartiestosuchleases,giventhepotentialforthe

leases to be unenforceable or incapable of registration. More generally, the

implications of the registration of leases that do not comply with planning

assessment highlight the complications arising from the interaction of the

Torrenssystemwiththeplanningassessmentsystem.

III INDEFEASIBILITYANDPLANNINGREGULATION

Asnotedabove, leases thatqualifyas subdivisionsbutdonot complywith the

requisiteplanningassessmentprocessshouldnotberegisteredontitlerecords.

The land registration system is used deliberately as a means of enforcing

planningregulation.Ifsuchleasesareregisteredtheywillattractindefeasibility

despitebeingpotentiallyunenforceable at common law. Thepositionof these

leasesisanexampleofthebroaderissuesthatarisefrom‘thetensionbetween

planningcontrolsfoundedinpublicpolicyandprivatepropertyrights’.487

ThecaseofHillpalmPtyLtdvHeaven’sDoorPtyLtd488broughtthepotential for

thecollisiontobeconsideredbytheHighCourt.ThemajorityoftheCourtheld

that the consent to subdivision under the Environmental Planning and

AssessmentAct1979 (NSW) created a right in personam rather than a right in

rem. That findingmeantwhathasbeendescribedasamissedopportunity for

theHighCourttoconsidertheissueofoverridinglegislationasanexceptionto

indefeasibility.489

487Butt,aboven209.SeealsoChristensenandDuncan,aboven206;Edgeworthaboven206.488HillpalmPtyLtdvHeaven’sDoorPtyLtd(2004)220CLR472.489LyndenGriggsCasenotesonHillpalmPtyLtdvHeaven’sDoorPtyLtd(2005)11AustralianPropertyLawJournal244,250.

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In2008Edgeworth tracedsubsequentcase lawandconcluded ‘…if legislatures

wishtooverrideTorrensstatutes…theywillneedtoclearahighhurdleinorder

tomakethatintentionunambiguouslyclear.’490Hepointedtothecomplexityof

theissuestobereconciledwhenreferringto‘thedivergentregulatoryregimes’

ofplanningregulationandtheTorrenssystem.491

In considering the status of a lease that is non-compliant with planning

assessment, the issue to be decided is whether the planning statute

demonstratesanintentiontooverrideanyinconsistentindefeasibilityprovisions

oflandregistrationstatutes.492Thedecisionmusttakeintoaccounttheneedto

reconcile the two statutes if possible and that there is public interest in both

upholdingplanningregulationandtheindefeasibilityprovisions.493

MorerecentlyChristensenandDuncanhaveconcludedthatitisverydifficultto

predict whether a statute will override indefeasibility and bind successive

owners of the land.494They have urged Australian authorities to strive for

consistencyinthelegislativeapproachtobothoverridingindefeasibilityandthe

recordingandregistrationofplanninginstruments,togetherwithanappropriate

framework for determining the effect of regulatory instruments on

landowners.495Theypoint out that sustainabilitywill not be served if the land

management system isdependantonpersonal obligationsof a landowner that

canbecircumventedbytransfertoanewownerwhowilltaketheindefeasible

title.496Similarlyprinciplesunderpinningsecurityof titlewillbeerodedunless

there is ‘better alignment between Torrens principles and the sustainability

agenda.’497

490Edgeworthaboven206,83.491Ibid,97.492AlisonStanfield‘Defeasibilityofleaseregisteredwhereplanofsubdivisionnotregistered’(1995)16QueenslandLawyer80,81referringtoMakuchavBenmarPropertiesPtyLtd[1996]QdR578.493CityofCanadaBayCouncilvBonaccorsoPtyLtd[2007]NSWCA351(10December2007)[87].494ChristensenandDuncanaboven206,[4].495Ibid,[2].496Ibid,[4].497Ibid,[5].

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The tension between planning principles andTorrens principles is relevant to

the issuesraisedby the leaseassubdivisionprovisions. If there isdoubtas to

whetheraleaseshouldbesubmittedtoplanningassessment,itsregistrationon

title records whilst non-compliant with planning assessment means that

although it may be unenforceable at common law, it will still attract

indefeasibility.Thiswas the findingofThomas J inBenmarPropertiesPtyLtdv

Makucha 498 whose decision was confirmed by the Queensland Court of

Appeal.499

Somejurisdictions,includingTasmania,haveastatutoryprovisionthatimportsa

condition designed to save a lease that is not compliant with planning

assessment frombeingvoid.500As the condition is for thebenefit of thepublic

andisimportedbystatute,itseemsthepartiestotheleasecannotwaiveitand

inclusion of such an implied term will not be subordinated to the parties’

expressedintent.501

A Court may also impose a condition that a planning assessment be

performed. 502 If such a condition requires that planning assessment be

undergoneandthateitherdoesnotoccurorapprovalisnotgranted,aleasemay

be unenforceable as public policy dictates that planning assessment occur.503

Failure to comply with that requirement within a reasonable time may

498BenmarPropertiesPtyLtdvMakucha[1993]QSC269(10September1993)499MakuchavBenmarPropertiesPtyLtd[1996]QdR578.SeealsoStanfieldaboven492.500S120LocalGovernment(Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993(Tas);s140Planning&DevelopmentAct2005(WA);S225(1)ResourceManagementAct1991(NZ);bycontrastanon-compliantinstrumentisvoidinotherjurisdictions-PlanningAct1999(NT)s63(2),RealPropertyAct1886(SA)S223LB(4).501EquuscorpPtyLtdvBelperio[2006]VSC14(30,31August,1,6-9,12-15September20056February2006)[260];EquuscorpPtyLtdvAntonopoulos[2008]VSCA179(16September2008)[18-19].SeealsoNCSeddonRBigwood&MEllinghausCheshire&Fifoot’sLawofContract(LexisNexisButterworths,10thAustralianed,2012)456-457n337andJWCarter&WayneCourtney,‘Impliedtermsincontracts:AustralianLaw’(2015)43(3)AustralianBusinessLawReview248.502TalujavAustralianInternationalAcademyofEducationLtd[2011]NSWSC647(6July2011)[77]YoungJAendorsedthesolutionofBallJatfirstinstancetosucheffect.503EquuscorpPtyLtdvBelperio[2006]VSC14(30,31August,1,6-9,12-15September20056February2006)confirmedonappealEquuscorpPtyLtdvAntonopoulos[2008]VSCA179(16September2008).

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consequentlyrendera leaseunenforceable.504TheEquuscorpdecisionsindicate

thatalapseofsixyearsexceededwhatisreasonable.Bycontrast,theSupreme

Court of Tasmaniamade no adverse comment on a failure to obtain planning

approvalafterthelapseof30years.505

A lease that is unenforceable will nevertheless attract indefeasibility, as the

Torrenssystem‘canoperatetoturnanotherwisedefectivetitleintoonethathas

the imprimaturandtheguaranteeofthestate.’506However,registrationcannot

guaranteethevalidityorenforceabilityofeverycovenantsuchaleasecontains,

as that will be determined under general law.507That consequence raises the

question of the impact for the parties to a registered lease of it being

unenforceable. The existence of a registered lease on title records can render

dealingwiththetitledifficult fortheregisteredproprietorof thefeesimple,as

the consent of the lessee may be required for registration of certain dealings

with the land. That issue raises the question whether a lease that is not

enforceableatcommonlawcanberemovedfromthetitlerecords.

Torrens legislation gives power to Registrars to correct the Register, although

‘thepreciseambitof thepowers remainsuncertain’.508Registrarsmaycorrect

underboththeslipprovisionsinthecaseofobviousclericalerror,and(withthe

exceptionofVictoriaandofSouthAustraliaunderrecentamendment),509what

504AstoeffectoflapseofreasonabletimetofulfillconditionPerrivCoolangattaInvestmentsPtyLtd(1982)149CLR537GibbsCJandEquuscorpPtyLtdvBelperioperHargravesJ[263]andEquuscorpPtyLtdvAntonopoulosperBuchananJA[18-19]505SymmonsPlainsPastoralHoldingsandEBManagementPtyLtdvTasmanianMotorRacingcompanyPtyLtd;ExPartetheMinisteradministeringtheTasmanianDevelopmentAct1983[1996]TASSC149(27November1996);ZeemanJ.506Griggs,Low&Thomas,aboven190,5.507TravintoNomineesvVlattas[36](1973)129CLR1BarwickCJ,[36].508NatalieSkeadandPennyCarruthersand‘TheRegistrar’spowersofcorrection:“Aliveandwell’”thoughperhaps“unwelcome”?PartI:Theslipprovision’(2010)18AustralianPropertyLawJournal32;PennyCarruthersandNatalieSkead:‘TheRegistrar’spowersofcorrection:“Aliveandwell”,thoughperhaps“unwelcome?”PartII:Thesubstantiveprovision‘(2010)18AustralianPropertyLawJournal132.509RealPropertyAct1886(SA)wasamendedbyRealProperty(ElectronicConveyancing)AmendmentAct2016(SA)Sch2witheffectfrom4July2016todeletess60-63aspartofpreparationfortheNationalElectronicConveyancingsystem.

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havebeentermedthesubstantiveprovisions.510CarruthersandSkeadnotethat

the exercise of the discretionary substantive correction power would have

potentiallydestructiveeffectsanddetractfromindefeasibility.511

Thelimitsontheextentofthecorrectionpoweraresaidtojustifythecautionof

registrarsintheexerciseoftheirpowertocorrect.512Itseemsunlikelytherefore,

that Registrars of Torrens systems can, or would be prepared to, cancel the

registration of a lease that is not compliantwith planning procedures, or that

fails to receive suchapproval followingregistration.Refusalor inabilityon the

partofRegistrars to remove instruments thatarenot compliantwithplanning

assessment from the register means that removal will be dependent on

application to the Court under provisions such as s 141 of the LandTitlesAct

1980 (Tas). Section 141 does impose limits on the extent and scope of the

Court’spowerandthefurtherlimitsimposedbys149arenotedbelow.

That result requires an examination of how planning regulation and land

registrationregulationstandtogether.Thefirststepinaddressingthequestion

ofhowstatutesstandtogetheristoestablishaninconsistencyastheinterpreter

should reconcile statutes if possible and seek a way by which they can stand

together.513

Edgeworthreferstolongstandingcaselawprinciple,datingbackat leasttothe

decision of the High Court in South-EasternDrainage Board v Savings Bank of

Australia, that later statutesmaymake inroads into Torrens legislationwhere

they expressly or impliedly repeal its provisions. 514 Edgeworth’s analysis

suggests thatwhether a Courtwillmake such an orderwill depend firstly on510RealPropertyAct1900(NSW)ss136,137;LandTitleAct2000(NT)ss20,158;LandTitleAct1994(Qld)ss15(2)(B),19,160;LandTitlesAct1980(Tas)ss163,164;TransferofLandAct1893(WA)ss76,511Carruthers&Skead,aboven508,149whorefertoMedicalBenefitsFundofAustraliaLtdvFisher(1984)1QdR606,611.512Ibid.513CityofCanadaBayCouncilvBonaccorsoPtyLtd[2007]NSWLR424[83](NSWCourtofAppeal).Inhisarticlequotedaboven206,EdgeworthanalysedthedecisionatfirstinstanceofBiscoeJ.514Edgeworthaboven206;82–suchinterpretationbeingtracedbacktoSouth-EasternDrainageBoardvSavingsBankofAustralia(1939)62CLR603.

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whetherthereisacontradictionbetweenalaterplanningstatuteandanearlier

land registration statute, and secondly whether the later planning statute

evinces intent to override the indefeasibility provisions of the earlier land

registrationstatute.515

Part 3 of the Local Government (Building&Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1993

(Tas)islaterintimetotheLandTitlesAct1980.Adoptingtheprinciple,ofSouth-

EasternDrainageBoardvSavingsBankofAustralia,itsprovisionsshouldprevail

incaseofaninconsistencyifPart3evincesintenttooverridetheLandTitlesAct

1980.Supportforthatpropositionisfoundins122ofPart3thatprovidesthatit

istheprevailingregulationforsubdivision.

In Makucha v Benmar Properties Pty Ltd,516the Queensland Court of Appeal

consideredthematterofsuchintentinthecontextofaleasethatdidnotcomply

with planning assessment requirements. The Court of Appeal confirmed the

decision of Thomas J at first instance that the interest of the lessee was not

defeasible by virtue of the failure to obtain planning approval for lease as a

subdivision. The facts of the case illustrate the difficulties the lease as

subdivisionprovisionscanraise.

Thecaseconcerned99-year leasesof smallpiecesof landonwhich the tenant

erected illuminated signs and paid $1.00 rent per year. The leases were

registered on title records. The Court of Appeal referred to the finding of the

judge at first instance that thedefendant landlordhadengaged in a ‘sustained

commercial raidwith a number of oppressive features.’ One of those features

wasthelandlordarguingthattheleasesweresubdivisionsandsovoidandtheir

registrationinvalid.

TheCourtofAppealrejectedthatproposition,holdingthattherewasnoevident

intentthattheLocalGovernmentAct1936(Qld)wastorendervoidorunlawfula

515Edgeworthaboven206;94.516MakuchavBenmarPropertiesPtyLtd[1995]QCA240(11August1995);BenmarPropertiesPtyLtdvMakucha[1993]QSC269(10September1993)17;ThomasJ.

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notional subdivision on the ground of noncompliance with its provisions. By

virtueofregistration,theleaseswereindefeasible.

As faras theprovisionsofTasmania’s legislationareconcerned, s81ofPart3

providesthatanowneroflandmustnotsubdivideitexceptinaccordancewith

anapprovedplan.Section90ofPart3providesthattheRecorderofTitlesmay

requireacertificate fromacouncil ifunsurewhetheran instrumentpresented

forregistrationshouldhaveundergoneplanningassessment.Itissubmittedthat

neithersectiondemonstratesintenttooverridetheindefeasibilityprovisionsof

theLandTitlesAct1980.

GiventhediscretiongrantedtotheTasmanianRecorderofTitlesbys90ofPart

3, it issubmittedthereisnocontradictionbetweens90andtheindefeasibility

grantedbys40oftheLandTitlesAct1980.Thestatutescanbereadtogetheron

thebasisthattheobligationtosubmitaleaseforplanningassessmentrestswith

the registered proprietor of the land. In addition the Recorder has the

opportunitytocheckthatsuchassessmenthastakenplace. It issubmittedthat

oncetheleasehasbeenregisteredtheinterestofthelesseewillbeindefeasible

despitetheleasenothavingbeensubmittedtoplanningassessment,anddespite

theleasenotbeingenforceableatcommonlaw.

Thepositionof leasesunder theLandTitlesAct1980seemsevenclearergiven

that s149protects a registeredproprietor (including as lesseeunder a lease),

againstejectmentexceptincertaincircumstances.Theleasewillbeanabsolute

bar and estoppel to any action that does not fall within the exceptions of s

149(1).Inconclusion,thereisnoclearintentinPart3tooverridetheprovisions

of theLandTitlesAct thatwould enable or justify an order to remove a lease

fromtheRegisterthatdoesnotcomplywithplanningassessmentrequirements.

Thatconclusionisatoddswiththepolicy,whichalthoughperhapsoutdatedand

inneedofreview,underpinstheleaseassubdivisionprovisions.

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IV CONCLUSION

Thischapterhassought topresent thevarious issuesraisedby legislation that

classes the lease of part of a block of land as a subdivision. The provisions

highlighttheelementsandimpactofregulationthatisnotaneffectivemeansof

achievingapolicygoal. Theregulationdatesback toaverydifferentplanning

environment.Thecostthatpartiestoleasesareexposedtoincomplyingwithit

is considerable. That members of society affected by the regulation have

developedtechniquestoavoiditsapplicationindicatesthattheydonotviewitas

eitherproportionateorrelevant.Partiestoleaseshavesoughttousetheeffectof

the legislation to escape commercial bargains they havemade by arguing that

leases that do not comply with planning assessment requirements are

unenforceable.

Theregulationalsopointstobroaderandmorefar-reachingissues.Thoseissues

arisefromtheinteractionofaplanningsystemfoundedinandfocusedonpublic

policy and a land registration system that is founded in and focused on the

protectionofindividualrightsinland.

Regulationmustbereviewedinorderforitseffectivenesstobeassessedandin

order for adjustments to be made in underlying policy, wording and

application. 517 The Tasmanian provisions under which a lease may be a

subdivisioncauseparticularproblems.Thewordingisunclearanditisdifficult

toascertainwhatleasesfallwithintheirscope.Theproblemsthatariseare

compounded in Tasmania. That is a strong argument for review and reform.

517HolleyandGunningham’sreviewofEnvironmentImprovementPlansisanexampleofsuchreview.Theynoteafindingof‘diminishingreturns’oftheregulation,aboven16,448andidentifybothlimitationsandtheopportunitytomakerefinements,at462-464.

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CHAPTER7–CONCLUSION

This thesis asks whether Part 3 of the Local Government (Building &

MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993(Tas)iseffectiveasregulationforsubdivision

inTasmania.Thatquestionisposedinthelightofproposedextensivereformto

Tasmania’s planning system that will introduce a single state-wide planning

scheme. This thesis concludes that the importance of Part 3 and its role are

poorlyunderstood.ThatlackofappreciationexplainsthefailuretoreviewPart3

and is in turn an explanation the ineffectiveness of Part 3 as regulation for

subdivisioninTasmania.

This study of Part 3 identifies unclear language, redundant policy, and

cumbersome procedures that reduce the ability of Part 3 to contribute to the

policygoalsofTasmania’splanningsystem.Thestudyalsohighlightsmorefar-

reaching issues, including the potential for conflict between Part 3 and the

systemestablishedunderLUPAAandbetweenplanningregulationandtheland

registration system. The findings of this study into Tasmania’s subdivision

legislation,althoughnecessarilylimitedinscope,highlightthatadequatereview

of all the components of the planning systemand the underpinning policy are

essentialforthesuccessoftheTasmanianplanningsystem.

Theconclusionsofthisthesiswillbepresentedasthreeheadings.

I-PART3ASPARTOFTASMANIA’SPLANNINGSYSTEM

Planningsystemsarerequiredtonotonlytakeintoaccountthepublicinterestin

sustainable use and development of land resources, but are also expected to

deliver productivity dividends to the economy. Proponents of development

demand streamlined processes, clear language, predictable outcomes, and

regulationfocusedonthoseoutcomesratherthanonprescriptiveconformity.

InAustralianjurisdictions,includingTasmania,planningassessmentandcontrol

islargelyassignedtolocalgovernmentandtheperformanceofplanningsystems

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is under constant scrutiny. Such scrutiny is justified as the regulatory

environment created by state governments influences the efficiency and

effectivenessofplanningsystems.518Neverthelessrushedreformthatisnotbuilt

onsolid legalandpolicy foundationsmay lead to incoherenceanduncertainty.

Rushed reformmay fail to adequately take into account complex policy issues

that underpin regulation. The complexity facing planning regulation is

heightenedinthecaseofsubdivisionregulation,asitmustinteractwiththeland

registrationsystem.

Tasmania’s subdivision regulation is further complicated as Tasmania has

parallel systems, in the planning schemes established under LUPAA and the

provisionsofPart3.AlthoughPart3hasreceivedminoramendment, itretains

its status as a system of assessment and approval of subdivision and has not

been integrated with the LUPAA system. Part 3 establishes an unfettered

discretion for councils in the assessment of subdivision proposals that sits

uneasilywith the system established underLUPAA. The Part 3 discretions are

aliveandwellandprovideamechanismbywhichsubdivisioncanberegulated

independently of LUPPA planning schemes.519Council planners and managers

identifiedPart 3 as a source of discretion andpowers for councils that enable

themtoperformthetaskassignedtothem.Nevertheless,asnotedinchapter4,

thedualsystemforassessmentofsubdivisionproposalsthatexistsisasourceof

uncertaintywithimplicationsforthecoherenceandeffectivenessofTasmania’s

planningsystem.

The role of Part 3 is poorly understood and raises the potential for conflict

betweenthePart3discretionsgrantedtocouncilsasautonomouslegalentities

and the standards and processes established for councils acting as planning

authoritiesunderLUPAA.Theeffectivenessofaregulatorysystemisassessedby

how well it implements and achieves its policy goal. Effectiveness includes

efficiency assessed by cost-benefit analysis. To the extent that Part 3 is not

518ProductivityCommissionofAustralia,aboven2,keypoints.519PBarker&AWoolleyvClarenceCityCouncil[2017]TASRMPAT15(30August2017).

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integratedwith theLUPAA systemand the interactionbetweenPart 3 and the

LUPAAsystemisunclear,520Tasmania’splanningsystemlackscoherenceandits

effectivenessandefficiencywillbeadverselyaffected.

II–PART3-INEFFECTIVEREGULATION?

This thesishasemployed theoryas toeffective regulationasa frameworkand

structure for its analysis andexaminationofPart3.That theoryaddresses the

questions:Whydoweregulate?Whattestsshouldweapplytoregulation?How

dowedesignandmaintainregulationsothatitiseffective?

The stated objective of Tasmania’s planning systemas set out inLUPAA is the

goal of sustainable development. Theorists have identified that to effectively

perform the task assigned to it, the words of regulation must be clear and

accessibletothosewhoareregulated.Theregulatedmustfeelaconnectionwith

the regulation in order for it to have legitimacy and for compliance to be

encouraged.Efficiencyisanimportantcharacteristicofeffectiveregulationthat

affectscompetition,asplanningregulationdoes.Inassessingefficiencythecosts

tobeassessedincludenotonlydirectfinancialcosts,butalsoindirectcostssuch

as those incurred due to delay. Review is essential to establishing and

maintainingeffectiveregulation.

The empirical research conducted by this thesis and reported in chapter 5

recountsissuesraisedbyTasmaniansobligedtoworkonadailybasiswithPart

3. Those interviewed spoke with frustration of unclear language, inadequate

mechanisms to achieve policy objectives, and cumbersome procedures that

renderPart3ineffectiveasregulationforsubdivision.

Theproblemsincludeunclearlanguagesuchasthatofs110ofPart3(Adhesion

Orders). The unclear language of s 110 is one indication that it is ineffective

regulation.Perhapsmoresignificantlythefailingsofs110emphasisethelackof

520TheRMPATinPBarker&AWoolleyvClarenceCityCouncil[2017]TASRMPAT15(30August2017)notedthatthequestionofwhetherthecounciltechnicallyretaineditsdiscretionwasnotonethatwasforittodetermine.

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a simple, cost-effective means of amalgamating multiple blocks of commonly

ownedlandinTasmania’splanningsystem.

The shortcomings of the legislative framework provided by Part 3 are also

evident in the difficulties presented by ss 116 and 117 of Part 3. Public open

spacehasbeen identifiedasan importanturbanplanning tool,butPart3does

not provide consistent guidance to councils and developers as to when open

spaceshouldberequiredorhowcash-in-lieuamountsaretobedealtwith.The

result is that different councils apply different criteria as to calculation of the

valueofthecontributionorchooseoptionsotherthanthesettingasideoflandas

public open space. Without an adequate regulatory framework, development

proposals will not include quality public open space. A single state-wide

planningschemewillnotbesufficienttoachievethegoalofqualitypublicopen

spacewithoutanunderlyingeffectivelegislativestructure.

Section95ofPart3thatprovidesforthededicationofpublicroadwaysisoutof

stepwith the legislationofotherAustralian jurisdictions.Thesectionseems to

befoundedonamisunderstandingoftherelevanceofEnglishcaselawofthelate

nineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturies.Theineffectivenessofboths95ofPart

3ands111oftheLandTitlesAct1980isunderscoredbythepracticalsolutions

adoptedbythoseworkingwithPart3,totheproblemstheypresent.

Section 103 of Part 3 provides for the only means of removing redundant

easements and covenants that have been created by plans of subdivision. The

procedure is cumbersome and expensive. Planning reform focused on a single

state-wideplanningschemewillnotaddresstheproblemscausedbyeasements

that are no longer relevant. These easements can prevent the use of land and

development of land thatmight otherwise be possible under the provisions of

thatplanningscheme.

Theproblemsidentifiedthroughtheempiricalresearchofthisthesisleadtothe

inescapableconclusionthatPart3isoverdueforreviewandreformtoaddress

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out-dated policy and cumbersome procedures that are a disincentive to

sustainabledevelopmentandthecauseofuncertainty,delayandexpense.

III–THELEASEASSUBDIVISIONPROVISIONS

The classification of the leasing of part of a block of land as a subdivision is

common to the legislation of all Australian jurisdictions, some Canadian

jurisdictions and to New Zealand. Tasmania’s provisions are particularly

problematic as the scope of leases caught by the definition of ‘subdivide’ is

unclear. Theprovisions are an example of ineffective regulation andhighlight

theissuesraisedbytheoristsastheyconsiderwhatitisthatrendersregulation

effectiveandhowsuchregulationfailstobeeffective.Thecostsintermsofboth

timeandmoneyofcomplyingwiththeregulationencouragethedevelopmentof

techniques to avoid its application. Consequences of the regulation include

windfallgainstoonepartytoaleasewhomayrelyonnon-compliancewiththe

regulationtorenegeonabargain.

Theprovisionsalsohighlightthetensionsbetweenplanningregulationandthe

Torrens systemof registration. Indefeasibility of title is central to the Torrens

system and may conflict with planning systems focused on sustainable

developmentandthepublicinterest.Thisthesishasonlytouchedbrieflyonthat

issueanditisonethatmeritsfurtherresearchandstudy.

IV ISSUESFORFURTHERRESEARCH

Chapter 1 of this thesis referred to other policy issues thatwere flaggedwith

interviewees in the invitation letter but not pursued during interviews, as the

intervieweesweremoreconcernedwithissuesdirectlyrelatedtotheireveryday

experiencewithPart3.Astheyformpartoftheregulatorysystemforplanning

inTasmania, these issuesnevertheless deserve inclusion in any reviewof that

system.

This thesis identified those issues as firstly, the definition of subdivision as

‘development.’ That definition means that planning assessment requirements

tailored to development (such as timeframes for assessment and advertising)

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will apply to subdivision.Reconsiderationof thedefinitionof ‘development’ to

exclude subdivision could enable the introduction of planning assessment

proceduresandprocessestailoredtotheparticularchallengesandrequirements

ofsubdivision.Secondly,areviewofboththeprovisionsandroleofstratatitles

legislation and Tasmania’s subdivision legislation could lead to adoption of

procedures and processes that more flexibly and effectively address the

particular issues associated with the division of land. Thirdly, policy changes

havebeenreflectedinTasmania’splanningassessmentproceduresthroughthe

adoptionof lessprescriptivestandards.The implementationofsuchchanges is

incompletewithoutreviewoftherelevanceofprovisionssuchasthedistinction

between ‘use’ and ‘development.’ Retaining provisions that do not match

underpinningpolicycandetractfromtheeffectivenessofregulation.

VCONCLUSION Part3oftheLocalGovernment(Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993 is

planning regulation, and planning regulation is regulation that affects

competition. The benefits, in terms of efficiency and increased productivity, of

regulationthataffectscompetitionshouldoutweighthecosts.Planningsystems

impose significant costs on proponents of development, in terms of both

financialcostandtime.Itisconsequentlyimportantthatplanningregulationbe

anefficientandcost-effectivemeansofachievingapolicygoal.Reviewof such

regulation is essential to identifying inefficiencies and issues that reduce its

effectiveness.

Part3oftheLocalGovernment(Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993 is

primarylegislation.Primarylegislationisespeciallysusceptibletoproblemsthat

result from lackof review, as ‘…there arenumerouspractical impediments in

thewayofchange,even“changeforthebetter”.’521Thoseidentifiedimpediments

include‘inertia,apathyandacceptance.’522Theseexplanationsareappropriateto

the failure, despite the proposal to do so within months of its enactment, to

521MKirby,ReformtheLaw:EssaysontheRenewaloftheAustralianLegalSystem(OxfordUniversityPress1983),8.522Ibid.

133

133

review and reform the Local Government (Building&Miscellaneous Provisions)

Act1993.

This thesishas adopteda three-prongedapproach to its studyofPart3of the

LocalGovernment(Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993.Part3hasbeen

examinedthroughdoctrinalandempiricalresearch.Theresultsofthatresearch

havebeenconsideredagainstthebackgroundoftheoryastoeffectiveregulation.

That examination and consideration leads to the inescapable conclusion that

Part3isineffectiveregulationforsubdivisioninTasmania.Thecaseforreview

andreformofPart3isclear,andchangeforthebetterisonesourceofsupport

forreform.523

Thecautionexpressedinthefollowingcommentsisappropriatetothereforms

to the planning system that are currently proposed by the Tasmania

Government.

First theproposal for reformmust fit,without anarchy, into the system

that is the subject of reform. Secondly, itwill involve generally at least,

action, movement, advance. Thirdly, the reform will seek to improve

things….Reform and proposal for reform imply the improvement, if not

themaximisationoftheperformanceofthelegalsystem.524

In conducting its review this thesis has noted the importance of not rushing

majorreformofTasmania’splanningsystemandtheneedforadequatereview

andconsultation inorder toavoiddelaysanduncertainty.Commentatorshave

referred to the danger of introducing a single planning scheme as the tool for

implementation of planning policy, without review of that policy. As the

problemsidentifiedinthisthesisdemonstrate,thatcommentappliesequallyto

the need to review the legislative framework for subdivision proposals in

Tasmania. The introduction of a single state-wide planning scheme, without

adequate review and reform of the policy that underlies it or the legislative

523Ibid,10.524Ibid,10.

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134

frameworkthatenablesittobeapplied,risksincreasingthelackofcohesiveness

andtheinefficiencytowhichTasmania’splanningsystemisalreadysusceptible.

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135

APPENDIX

LettersentinAugust2016to:

LawSocietyofTasmania

PlanningInstitute

SurveyingandSpatialSciencesInstitute(TasmanianDivision)

LocalGovernmentAssociationofTasmania

RecorderofTitles

A Study of Part 3 LocalGovernment (Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)

Act1993

What is the purpose of this study? Are there any benefits to the

community?

IamstudyingforaMasterofLawsdegreebyresearchthesisattheUniversityof

Tasmania.MyresearchquestionistheeffectivenessofPart3LocalGovernment

(Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993(Tas)asregulationforsubdivision

inTasmania.

Regulatory theorists have identified certain elements or qualities of what is

effectiveregulation.Effectiveregulationshouldachieveitspolicyobjectives,be

anefficientandcost-effectivemeansofachievingthoseobjectivesandshouldbe

relevanttoitscontext,politicallyacceptable,clearandaccessibleandencourage

compliance. I hope to produce a thesis that is relevant to members of the

Tasmanian community and that will be a useful resource for reform of

Tasmania’ssubdivisionlegislationshouldthateventuate.

Invitationtoparticipateandwhy

Iamwritingtoinvitemembersofthelegal,surveyingandplanningassociations

aspeoplewhoroutinelydealwithanapplyPart3,toparticipateininterviewsto

beconductedbymebetweenlateSeptemberofthisyearandtheendofFebruary

nextyear.Ianticipatethattheinterviewswilllastforapproximately30minutes

136

136

and I will travel to attend the interviews at the interviewee’s place of work

(whether thatbeHobart,Launcestonor theNorthWest) if that isappropriate.

Myresearchisself-fundedandIamconsequentlyunabletooffertopayforthe

cost of the interviewee’s time. Iwould be grateful if youwould distribute this

letter to your members and invite those members willing to participate to

contactmeatthisemailaddress(utasaddresssupplied)toindicatetheirconsent

andtomakearrangementsfortheinterview.

WhatamIaskingfor?

Iwill outline the characteristics of effective regulation and ask four questions

(havingnoted thatno confidential or client information shouldbedisclosed to

me)andrecordanswers.

1. Howdoestheintervieweeaddresstheissueofleasesthatfallwithinthe

definition of subdivision? How are such leases dealt with by local

governmentplanningassessors?

2. HowdoesPart3integratewiththelandregistrationsystem?Whatissues

arise for mixed general law/Torrens land? Are restrictive covenants

consideredinsubdivisionproposals?

3. Does the distinction between ‘use’ and ‘development’ serve a useful

purpose?Anddoesitcauseanydifficulties?

4. How does Part 3 integratewith the planning system established under

LandUsePlanningandApprovalsAct?

I will then invite comment from the interviewee on his/her views ofwhether

Part3constituteseffectiveregulationandwhetherthereareparticularissuesfor

theintervieweedealingwithsubdivisionproposalsinTasmania.

Whatwillhappentothedate?Andhowwilltheresultsbepublished?

Iwillrecordtheinterviewbyhandwrittennotesandwillprovideacopyofthe

transcribed record to interviewees for comment, amendment and approval as

soonaspossibleafterthe interviewandbeforepublication.Thecommentswill

becollatedandcomparedtoidentifyanycommonthemesandasbaseforfurther

researchanddoctrinalanalysisifrequired.Theresultswillbereproducedinthe

137

137

thesisaspartoftheevaluationofthelegislation.Thedatawillbekeptsecurely

for 5 years on the University’s network in accordancewith standard research

dataproceduresof theUniversity ofTasmania. After5 years, thedatawill be

deletedfromtheUniversity’snetwork.

Arethereanyrisksforinterviewees?

Interviewees will not be identifiable in the thesis and will be referred to by

reference to profession and a number. The research data records of interview

will enable the interviewee to be linked to the published comments but the

intervieweewillnotbeidentifiableinthepublishedworkorindisseminationof

thefindings. Intervieweesmaywithdrawfromthestudyatanytimebeforeits

completion and the information they have provided will be destroyed and

deletedfromthestoreddatarecords.

Anyquestionsaboutthestudy?

This study has been approved by the Tasmanian Social Sciences Human

Research Ethics Committee. If you have concerns or complaints about the

conduct of this study, please contact the Executive Officer of the HREC

(Tasmania)Network on +613 62266254 or email human.ethics@utas.edu.au.

The Executive Officer is the person nominated to receive complaints from

researchparticipants.PleasequoteethicsreferencenumberH0015919.

YoursSincerely

AnnHamilton

138

138

139

139

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KokHoongvleongCheongKwengMinesLtd[1964]AC1993

LaurindaPtyLtdvCapalabaParkShoppingCentrePtyLtd(1989)166CLR623

LinksGolfTasmaniaPtyLtdvSattler[2012]FCA634

MakuchavBenmarPropertiesPtyLtd[1995]QCA240(11August1995)

McCabevBlueMountainsCityCouncil[2006]NSWLEC176

MidazPtyLtdvBenbergPtyLtd(1999)TASSC66(7June1999)

MisiarisvAFCHoldingsPtyLtd[1988]15NSWLR231

Mitchell Hodgetts & Associates Pty Ltd v Resource Management and Planning

AppealTribunal[2010]TASSC61(17December2010)

NationvKingboroughCouncil(No2)[2003]TASSC128(27November2003)

147

147

OusleyPtyLtdvWarringahShireCouncil(No2)(1999)104LEC250

PBarker&AWoolleyvClarenceCityCouncil[2017]TASRMPAT15 (30August

2017)

PipeNetworksPtyLtdvCommonwealthSuperannuationCorporation[2013]FCA

444(16May2013)

ReBolton:ExParteBeane(1987)162CLR514

ReLehrer(1961)61SR(NSW)365

ReNelsonandTammersContract[1952]VLR391

RoachvBickle(1915)20CLR663

RosebridgeNomineesPtyLtd vCommonwealthBankofAustraliaLtd (2008) 36

WAR561

SilviovBarbaro(1988)13NSWLR466

SmithvHobartCityCouncil[2009]TASRMPAT94

SmithvHobartCityCouncil[2010]TASFC9(21December2010)

StarrvBarbaro(1986)NSWConvR55-315

StoneJamesCovInvestmentHoldingsPtyLtd[1987]WAR363

SullivanvThurley[1987]TASSC19(9March1987)

Symmons Plains Pastoral Holdings and EB Management Pty Ltd v Tasmanian

Motor Racing Company Pty Ltd; Ex Parte the Minister administering the

TasmanianDevelopmentAct1983[1996]TASSC149(27November1996)

TalujavAustralianInternationalAcademyofEducationLtd[2011]NSWSC647(6

July2011)

TalujavAustralianInternationalAcademyofEducationLtd[2011]NSWCA416

TravintoNomineesvVlattas(1973)129CLR1[36]

TunbridgeWellsCorporationvBaird[1986]AC434

WestTamarCouncilvPhillips[2013]TASSC16(10thMay2013)

West Tamar Council v Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal

[2015]TASSC32(23July2015)

West Tamar Council v Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal

[2015]TASFC12(30September2015)

148

148

C Legislation

ActsInterpretationAct1901(Cth)

ActsInterpretationAct1947(Tas)

ConveyancingAct1919(NSW)

ConveyancingandLawofPropertyAct1884(Tas)

DevelopmentAct1993(SA)

EnvironmentalPlanning&AssessmentAct1979(NSW)

HobartCorporationAct1947(Tas)

HobartCorporationAct1963(Tas)

IntegratedPlanningAct1997(Qld)

JudicialReviewAct2000(Tas)

LandTitleAct(NT)

LandTitleAct1994(Qld)

LandTitleAct,RSBC1996,c250

LandTitlesAct1980(Tas)

LandUsePlanningandApprovalsAct1993(Tas)

LandUsePlanningandApprovalsAmendment(StreamliningofProcess)Act2014

(Tas)

LocalGovernmentAct1906(Tas)

LocalGovernmentAct1919(NSW)

LocalGovernmentAct1962(Tas)

LocalGovernment(Building&MiscellaneousProvisions)Act1993(Tas)

LocalGovernment(Planning&Environment)Act1990(Qld)

MunicipalGovernmentActRSA2000,cM-26

PenaltyUnits&OtherPenaltiesAct1987(Tas)

PlanningAct1999(NT)

PlanningAct2016(Qld)

Planning&DevelopmentAct2007(ACT)

Planning&DevelopmentAct2005(WA)

Planning&EnvironmentAct1987(Vic)

PlanningDevelopment&InfrastructureAct2016(SA)

PrimaryIndustryActivitiesProtectionAct1995(Tas)

RealPropertyAct1886(SA)

149

149

RealPropertyAct1886(Tas)

ResourceManagementAct1991(NZ)

StatePolicies&ProjectsAct1993(Tas)

SubdivisionAct1988(Vic)

SustainablePlanningAct2005(Qld)

TownBoardsAct1896(Tas)

TownBoardsAct1934(Tas)

Town&CountryPlanningAct1944(Tas)

TownPlanningAct1928(WA)

TransferofLandAct1958(Vic)

TransferofLandAct1893(WA)

UndueSubdivisionPreventionAct1885(Qld)

Water&SewerageIndustryAct2008(Tas)

D WebsitesandParliamentaryRecords

WebsitesAustralianGovernment,DepartmentoftheEnvironmentandEnergy<<http://www.environment.gov.au/about-us/esd/publications/national-esd-strategy>(December1992)CommonwealthofAustralia,DepartmentofPrimeMinisterandCabinetAustralianGovernmentGuidetoRegulation<https://www.cuttingredtape.gov.au/sites/default/files/files/Australian_Government_Guide_to_Regulation.pdf>(2014)DepartmentofPremierandCabinetTasmania,RoleofLocalGovernmentDiscussionPaper<http://www.dpac.tas.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/179608/Discussion_Paper_Role_of_Local_Government.pdf>(October2012)DepartmentofPremier&CabinetTasmaniaPremiersLocalGovernmentCouncilRoleAssessmentFinalReport<http://www.dpac.tas.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/232651/Local_Government_Role_Assessment_-_Final_Report.PDF>(August2014)ResourceManagementandPlanningAppealTribunal<http://www.rmpat.tas.gov.au/annual_reports>WillHodgmanPremierofTasmaniaannouncementbyPeterGutweinTreasurerTasmania

150

150

<http://www.premier.tas.gov.au/releases/tasmanian_plannng_reform_taskforce_announced>(17May2014)TasmanianGovernmentTasmanianPlanningSchemeFactSheet<http://www.justice.tas.gov.au/tasmanian_planning_reform>(September2017)TasmanianGovernment,LivingontheCoasttheCradleCoastRegionalLandUsePlanningframework<http://www.planning.tas.gov.au/_data/assets/pdffile/0011/332984/Living_on_the_Coast-declared_27Oct2011.pdf>TasmanianGovernmentStatePlanningProvisions,<http://www.justice.tas.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/370294/State_Planning_Provisions.PDF>(22February2017)TasmanianGovernment,‘NationalCompetitionPolicyProgressReport’,May1999<http://ncp.ncc.gov.au/search/results?searchstring=tasmania&SUBMIT=Search&jurisdiction=TAS&doc_type=2&year=&sector=&pagesize=10>TasmanianGovernment,‘NationalCompetitionPolicyProgressReport’,May2001.<http://ncp.ncc.gov.au/docs/Tasmania%27s%20fifth%20NCP%20progress%20report%20to%2031%20December%202000%2C%20May%202001.pdf>TasmanianGovernment,‘NationalCompetitionPolicyProgressReport’,May2005.<http://ncp.ncc.gov.au/docs/Tasmania%20ninth%20NCP%20progress%20report%20as%20at%2031%20March%202005%2C%20May%202005.pdf>WesternAustralianPlanningCommissionModelSubdivisionConditionsSchedulehttp://www.planning.wa.gov.au/Model-subdivision-conditions.asp(October2017).

ParliamentaryRecords

Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 29 September 1885

Queensland,ParliamentaryDebates,LegislativeAssembly,13October1885

NewSouthWales,ParliamentaryDebates,LegislativeAssembly,24October1918

NewSouthWales,ParliamentaryDebates,LegislativeAssembly,30October1918

NewZealand,ParliamentaryDebates,HouseofRepresentatives,6May2003

SouthAustralia,ParliamentaryDebates,HouseofAssembly,14May1985

Tasmania,ParliamentaryDebates,LegislativeCouncil,17August1993

Tasmania,ParliamentaryDebates,LegislativeCouncil,1December1993

151

151

Tasmania,ParliamentaryDebates,HouseofAssembly,24October1993

Tasmania,ParliamentaryDebates,HouseofAssembly,29October1993

Tasmania,ParliamentaryDebates,LegislativeCouncil,10November1993

Tasmania,ParliamentaryDebates,LegislativeCouncil,1December1993

Tasmania,ParliamentaryDebates,HouseofAssembly,4May2004

Tasmania,ParliamentaryDebates,HouseofAssembly,2November2006

Tasmania,ParliamentaryDebates,LegislativeCouncil,19November2014