a structural theory of social exchange

A Structural Theory of Social ExchangeAuthor(s): Thomas BurnsSource: Acta Sociologica, Vol. 16, No. 3 (1973), pp. 188-208Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4193943 .

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A STRUCTURAL THEORY OF SOCIAL EXCHANGE*

7homas Burns University of New Hampshire

A theory is formulated with which to analyze transactions in social relationships. Economic types of exchange characterized by calculation and self-interest on the part of the actors are contrasted with more "social" forms of transaction such as occur in the cases of role relationships with interlocking rights and obligations and persons strongly attached to one another. The social factors and conditions determining the types of transaction likely to occur between actors are examined in the paper. The key idea in this respect is that the structural and temporal context of interaction, including the past and anticipated character of their relationship, affects actors' orientations toward one another, their preferences, decisions and interaction patterns.

1. Introduction

Social exchange has been analyzed by Homans (1961), Thibaut and Kelley (1967), Blau (1964), Dahlstrom (1966), and Sahlins (1965, 1968), among others. The point of departure for Homans, Thibaut and Kelley, Dahlstr6m and to a certain extent, Blau, is the economic model of exchange. The emphasis is on "reward" and on the exchange of "rewards" in human relationships. Blau (1964:88) states;

Processes of social association can be conceptualized, following Ho- mans' lead, "as an exchange of activity, tangible or intangible, and more or less rewarding or costly, between at least two persons." Social exchange can be observed everywhere once we are sensitized by this conception of it, not only in market relations but also in friendship and even in love . . . as well as in many social relations between these extremesof intimacy.

"Exchange theory" in sociology assumes the following: (i) Social behavior can be explained in terms of rewards, where rewards are goods or services, tangible or intangible, that satisfy a person's needs or goals. (ii) Individuals attempt to maximize rewards and minimize losses or punishments. (iii) Social interaction results from the fact that others control valuables or necessities and can therefore reward a person. In order to induce another to reward him, a person has to provide rewards to the other in return.

* I am grateful to Tom Baumgartner, Walter Buckley, Loren Cobb, Richard Downs, Arnold Linsky, Howard Shapiro, Murray Straus, and Michael Walker for their helpful comments on an earlier draft to this paper. The research presented in this paper has been supported in part by a faculty fellowship from the University of New Hampshire, 1972.

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(iv) Social interaction is thus viewed as an exchange of mutually rewarding activities in which the receipt of a needed valuable (good or service) is contingent on the supply of a favor in return (usually immediate).

Critics of such a model of social behavior have made the following points among others: (i) Much social behavior appears patently "unrewarding" or unmotivated by the desire for "rewards" (Singelman, 1972; Abrahamsson, 1970). (ii) Exchange theory overemphasizes calculation of gains and losses and the capacity of actors to make such calculations (Bums and Cooper, 197 1; Abrahamsson, 1970). (iii) "Reward" is often taken for granted or viewed in the most mechanical way (Abrahamsson, 1970) with little or no attempt to analyze the values an actor assigns to what others offer. In general, there has been a serious neglect of actors' interpretations and evaluations of acts and, in particular, exchange acts. (iv) There is a neglect of, or obvious de-emphasis on, the institutionalized and enduring character of many social relationships or, in general, on the context in which exchange takes place (Burns and Meeker, 1973).

The analysis of social transactions presented in this paper is not addressed specifically to the shortcomings of sociological exchange theory. Rather, a theory of social transactions is formulated which differentiates social relationships in terms of a set of variables and concerns itself with the influence of normative or contextual factors on such relationships. Although inspired in part by Sahlins' typology (1965, 1968), the formulation is intended to provide a theoretical foundation, absent in Sahlins' presentation, for differentiating types of social transaction and their bases.

The theory rests on the assumption that evaluation, decision-making, and social interaction processes cannot be understood apart from the social context in which they occur. Explicit consideration is given to factors such as normative controls, distribution of resources, the exchange content and stability of relationships and, in general, the structural and temporal context of social interactions. Such factors have been ignored or seriously neglected in sociological exchange theory with its emphasis on pairs of individuals engaged in the exchange of more or less specific "rewards".

In the formulation presented here, institutionalized forms of exchange are differentiated from interpersonal reciprocity. In highly institutionalized forms of exchange the actors are socially constrained to orient to one another and to transact in a particular manner. Thus, although an "exchange" may appear to be instigated by the actors themselves, it often derives from the performance of social norms or interlocking role obligations. In the case of "mutually contingent reciprocation", the engaged actors establish and maintain the exchange themselves, more or less free from rigorous constraints. It is distinguished from more institutionalized forms by self-regulating mechanisms - e. g., the personal interest

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of the actors to maintain one another's good-will or to express themselves altruistically in a social relationship.

The specific character of interpersonal reciprocity is assumed to be a function of the actors' cognitive states, in particular their behavioral expectations, and their orientations toward one another. Types of reciprocity are distinguished in terms of social orientations or attitudes varying from selfless concern for one another through joint self/other interest to pure self-interest and even hostility.

However, the social context of interaction, cultural understandings, and norms and values regarding reciprocity play an important role in shaping exchange behavior even in the case of interpersonal reciprocity (for example, social norms prohibiting fraud and exploitation and sustaining trust provide advantageous conditions for positive social relationships (Burns and Cooper, 1971)). Thus, the orientations underlying the specific character of interpersonal reciprocity are not assumed to be independent variables. One purpose of the paper is to specify some of the factors influencing actors' orientations toward one another and the type of reciprocity likely to occur between them. The key idea in this respect is that the structural and temporal context of interaction, including the past and anticipated character of their relationship, influen- ces actors' orientations and behavioral expectations, their preferences, decisions, and interaction patterns (Burns and Cooper, 1973; Buckley et at., 1973).

The paper provides a theoretical basis on which to contrast "economic" types of exchange based on self-interested motivation and calculation with more "social" forms of exchange. Examples of the latter are (a) role relationships with interlocking rights and obligations, and (b) persons strongly attached to one another (such as close kinsmen and friends). Both cases display what might appear to be "exchange"- behavior. In considering such phenomena, the theory presented here sheds light on several of the questions raised by critics of sociological exchange theory.

The remainder of the paper is divided into three parts. Section 2 contains an introduction to the concept of social orientation and a discussion of sources of social orientation. It also conceptualizes institutional forms of exchange. Section 3 introduces a typology of interpersonal reciprocity and provides an analysis of the conditions under which the various types are likely to occur.

2. Social Orientations and the Context of Social Behavior

2.1 Social Orientations

This section focuses on the extent and manner in which actors take one another into account in their evaluations and decision-making. A social orientation or attitude with respect to self, another actor, a class of actors, or a collectivity, is a basis of evaluation and choice. It refers to the extent to which outcome evaluation and choice behavior depend not

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only on an actor's own personal preferences but on those of other actors with whom he interacts or has a relationship.

For the purposes of this paper, the following orientations are defined (Burns and Meeker, 1973; McClintock, 1972; Meeker, 197 1).'

Self-orientation ("individualism"). Actor A evaluates action alternatives and outcomes in terms of their satisfying his personal goals and values. He chooses from among a set of action alternatives the most preferred alternative evaluated on this basis.

What is important in this case is the actor's singular orientation toward his own benefit, his attention to his own gains and losses with complete (in the purest case) neutrality toward the gains and losses of the other person(s).

Actors may "take one another into account" in several distinct ways. Positive other-orientation ("altruism"). A evaluates action alternatives and outcomes in terms of their satisfying the goals and values of another actor B (where it may be assumed that the evaluations are made on the basis of B's goals and values).2 A chooses the most preferred alternative evaluated on this basis.

The other-orientation may apply to a specific actor, a class of actors, or a collectivity. (The extent of the class corresponds to the social boundary of A's "benevolent" or altruistic orientation.) For example, members of a group adopt group goals or values. This reveals itself in efforts to achieve group objectives and activities, often at the expense of individual objectives and activities.

An action usually has simultaneous meanings for individual objectives and for those of the group. When these are convergent, there is little ambivalence or indecisiveness. In the case of divergence, the primary consideration for an actor whose group or other orientation is dominant is the extent to which the act benefits the group. His personal interests are secondary. The converse would be true in the case of a dominant self-orientation.

Parsons (1951:60) points out that a role or a position in a social system may specify certain areas of private interest where actors legitimately have self-orientations and other areas where actors are obligated to pursue the interests of others or of a collectivity as a whole. For instance, the "professional ethic" entails other orientations toward a certain class of actors or clientele. On the other hand, the "market ethic" entails self-orientations.

Negative other-orientation ("hostility"). A evaluates and chooses action alternatives in terms of their producing dissatisfaction (loss or harm) with respect to the goals and values of another actor B.

Joint self/other orientation ("cooperativeness"). A evaluates actions and their outcomes in terms of their satisfying his own goals and values as well as those of another actor B - where the extent of agreement in their goals and values is left unspecified. A attempts to choose the action alternative from among a set of alternatives which is the preferred alternative evaluated in self/other terms.

See footnote 10.

2 I assume here that A knows B's goals and values (or preference structures). In general, his judgements are based on his perceptions or beliefs about B's senti- ments.

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Each of the orientations in conjunction with a given set of perceived outcomes generates specific preferences and provides guidelines for choice in social situations (Burns and Meeker, 1973). In section 3, I shall analyze the behavior of pairs of actors in relation to one another in terms of their social orientations.

2.2 The Context of Social Orientations and Behavior

Actors' orientations (their evaluation and decision bases) depend on their personalities, their on-going relationship to one another, and the social and cultural context in which interaction takes place. In this section, I attempt to point out several of the social and psychological conditions which make one behavioral pattern or basis of evaluation and choice more likely than another. (a) Constraint and the Availability of Action Opportunities

The concept of "constraint" can be counterpoised to that of choice (Burns and Cooper, 1971:77-86). Behavioral constraints, above all, those of a social and institutional nature, serve to determine actors' access to resources and action opportunities and, therefore, to define the limits within which actors make choices. In Buchler and Nutini's terms (1968:7), these are the "ground rules", for example, cultural norms and jural rules.3

The performance of most actions entails certain requisites: material and human resources, skills, knowledge, and other factors which are essential to executing the actions. Restrictions on an actor's access to these (e. g., they are under the control of other actors, including those with whom he interacts directly) may make it impossible for him to carry out particular acts, even when the action possibilities are known to him. On the other hand, his performance will be facilitated by his having access to or control over action resources.

The constraints on A's and B's actions define the set of possible interactions between them (as represented by the matrix of interaction possibilities (Burns and Meeker, 1973)). Any of several factors may determine such bounds - different factors often producing the same effect - thereby constraining or facilitating A's and B's opportunities to engage in conflict or exchange or in different types of conflict or exchange. This idea encompasses several types of factors among which are the following: (i) Many action possibilities fail to exist because of the state of technology (in a cultural milieu or historical period) of the society in which the actor finds himself. Certain alternatives requiring particular tools or methods are simply not available. (ii) Action alternatives may exist "objectively" but remain unknown to the actor. In an extreme case, he may perceive but a single action possibility (e. g., that prescribed by tradition or authority). (iii) The actor may know of alternatives but remains unwilling or unable to consider them, lacking the time, capabilities, or opportunities to go

3 B. Lieberman (in Buch- ler and Nutini, 1966: 100) points'out:

Incest taboos may be interpreted as quite successful attempts to prevent family members from expressing their sexual preferences for each other. The as- signment of certain economic activities to certain families or sub- groups of a particular society serves to prevent other members of the society from expressing their preferences for desirable occu- pations, with the resul- tant economic conflict.

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through the process of collecting information, comparing, evaluating, and making decisions in regard to them (habitual and traditional forms of behavior are especially likely under such conditions). (iv) Many actions are social. They require the cooperation or, at least, the acquiescence of others (possibly the other actors involved in the interaction). An actor's "opportunity structure", through which he has access to and control over action resources, depends on his position in a power structure, a network of social relationships. His options may be strictly limited by the absence of rights, by the refusal of others to cooperate in the case of activities which require such cooperation, or by normative constraints on his activities.

Persons of low social status or power lacking control over essential resources (material and social) are unable generally to carry out many types of collective action, either of an exchange or conflict nature. On the other hand, those with high social status and power (with access to and control over essential resources) have more action possibilities, including that of generating new action alternatives. In sum, the social structuring of a society results in differential constraints on actors' possibilities of action ("opportunity structures").

Constraints on A's and B's action possibilities define the set of possible interactions between them, e. g., the possible types of exchange or conflict that can take place.4 For instance, there may be constraints preventing the development of close relationships between persons who come into contact with one another in their everyday work. Certain social attributes such as those of age, sex, religion, tribe, or ethnic group often serve to disassociate some actors (or, on the other hand, associate them with) other persons or groups in the situation. Such conditions affect actors' access to important resources and valuables.

Action and interaction opportunities - and the constraints and facilities affecting these - are of more fundamental significance to behavioral analysis than "choice behavior" as such, for they determine the limits of social interactions and, in particular, exchange and conflict: what actors can and cannot do, in particular, whether they can or cannot engage in mutual exchange or conflict, what types of exchange or conflict are possible, and so forth. Within the limits determined by actors' knowledge, performance capabilities, and social constraints - and only within these limits - actors "choose" and "decide".5 (b) Institutionalized Forms of Exchange: Role and Role Relationships

Actors in certain role positions (such as doctors and nurses, teachers, public servants, parents, etc.) in relation to other persons, classes of persons, or roles (patients, students, citizens, children, etc.) are normatively obligated to pursue the interests of the latter. That is, their behavior is expected to be guided by a positive concern for others or "other-orientation" in particular social settings ("service context"). As discussed below, social controls maintain or reinforce the orientations and related service behavior. In addition, incumbents of such roles are usually socialized to have other-orientations toward their "clients".

4 The various constraints on actors A and B serve to delimit or determine their action repertoires, C(

=At^1,A2 ..*.*.* Akt .ki and -B1,B2,.- B the constraints pos- siky affecting their action opportunities dif- ferentially. Thus, under one set of social and institutional conditions, we would expect an interaction situation to be represented by an interaction matrix consisting of the coupling of et and P3. Under other structural conditions, a new matrix would obtain, defined by the repertoires oW and ( (where a4 ct and ,B* + (), determined by the situational constraints unique to those conditions. Through the actors' efforts as well as those of others, their repertoires may be changed, in some cases expanding, in others con- tracting (Burns and Mfee- ker, 1973). S Buchler and Nutini distinguish between the anthropolo- gist's general interest in ground rules, which structure the cultural framework within which decision-making occurs, and the game theorist's interest in strategy rules or rules for playing games intelligently, which guide choices among the options the cultural framework allows (1969:8):

Just as the anthropolo- gist often ignores strategy rules and the context in which various moves may be em- ployed, the mathematical game theorist and the experimentalist often ignore in the name of experimental control, the rules that structure the framework within which decision-making occurs.

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The prescriptions concerning A's orientation or behavior toward B

define A's obligation to B. The obligations may be of a specific nature

such as to pursue a particular course of action ("giving some valuable")

in relation to B, possibly specified by time and occasion, or of a more

abstract and general nature, entailing directives to choose helpful acts over

harmful acts. That is, A is expected to offer help to B in situations of

apparent need or whenever B asks for assistance. Or the obligations may

appear in the form of general service orientations toward B: evaluate,

make decisions and act in terms of a positive other-orientation toward a

particular person or a class of persons. Reciprocation of any help

provided may also be expected. The discussion above suggests that an actor's behavior toward a

particular person or class may reflect a decision rule or norm prescribed

and enforced by the group of which the actor is a part (as contrasted to

"enforcement" by the actors directly involved in interpersonal reciproca-

tion). That is, A's orientation toward B, his display of deference or

respect, his provision of services and gifts (for example, in relation to

particular kinsmen, elders, persons in positions of authority) is grounded

in the social context and may have little to do with the behavior of the

recepient (for example, whether or not he reciprocates). Rather, it

depends on the collectivity C. This structure of relations can be

represented as follows:

C

A B

Role Obligation of A to B

The formulation sketched above can be extended to cover the case

where A and B are both normatively constrained to "exchange" with one

another, that is, they have certain obligations or functions with respect

to one another. The implementation of these gives the appearance of

"exchange" but differs significantly from interpersonal reciprocation,

although the transfer of goods and services can serve to reinforce the

actors' commitments to the role relationship (and to the group which

maintains it). Institutionalized forms of mutual orientation (interlocking role or status obligations) and exchange can be represented as follows:

C

A < 7B

Interlocking Role Obligations 194



Such exchanges are best understood through structural analysis (Burns et al., 1973). Actors occupy roles in a social structure which give them access to different resources and which specify their orientations toward one another, and, possibly, the goods and services they are to provide one another. Such systems of mutual orientation and exchange are maintained by the machinery of social control in the group. Compliance with prescribed orientations and norms of behavior will be more likely, the more power and authority the group has over the actor. Group power over him is greater: (I) the more he depends on the group for the satisfaction of important goals and values, that is, the greater the sanctioning power of the group; (2) the more he lacks alternative groups or means of satisfying his goals and values; (3) the more his relationship to the group is an enduring one; (4) and the more he depends on group authority to guide his behavior in a world of ignorance and uncertainty. Actors who for one reason or another behave contrary to the prescribed orientation or behavioral pattern in a situation where they are called for, experience shame or embarrassment and attempt to either conceal their behavior or to redefine it for the group so as to appear to have abided by the norms.

In any collectivity, prescribed orientations and behavioral patterns can derive their initial as well as continuing reinforcement from a variety of sources: social controls, traditions, habitual action, social conscience, and interpersonal reciprocity. What stands out, however, is that members are rarely able to calculate and determine if the orientation or institutionalized pattern "pays off" in some cost-benefit sense (see discussion on page 203). Indeed, it is often impossible to consider or even know all of the outcomes which result from breaching an important norm or prescription. Moreover, the terms exchanged by two actors in their institutionalized role relationships in no sense have to "balance" one another out, even assuming such calculations are possible. For instance, persons in statuses A and B may have certain obligations vis-a-vis one another, yet their "exchanges" work invariably to the advantage of A. (c) Cultural, Ethnic, and Class Factors

Social orientations can be inferred from more general values in a culture. For example, differences between cultures in the propensity to compete or cooperate have been noted by anthropologists such as Benedict (1935) and Mead (1937). In a small group experiment conducted in Liberia, Meeker (1970) found a positive relationship between competitive type behavior and participation in Western institutions.

Meeker (1970:492) also reports an interview study which found social class differences with respect to norms of social obligation to role categories such as relatives, neighbors, and friends (see discussion in (b) above). The norms included guidelines concerning the appropriateness of giving favors and the necessity of repaying dinner invitations. Moreover, persons in different classes have differential access to and control over action resources and, therefore, have differential action possibilities (see (a) above).

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(d) On-going Relationships between Actors and the Context of Relation- ships

A number of studies have shown that the nature of an existing relationship between actors affect their propensity to engage in cooperative or self-oriented behavior in the future. For example, McClintock (1970) reports studies in which subjects who had previously been friends or who had been experimentally manipulated into mutually friendly relations were less likely to behave competitively than actors who were strangers or unfriendly.

As argued elsewhere in this paper, actors with positive orientations toward one another tend to cooperate; the converse holds true for persons with negative orientations. The cooperation itself, however, would tend to elicit or reinforce mutually positive orientations (or negative orientations in the case of competition or conflict). Thus, we would expect reinforcing cycles of the following form:

Positive (negative) orien- + Cooperative (competitive + tations of the actors t or conflictive) inter- toward one another action patterns

This feedback gives interaction patterns such properties as "benign" and "vicious" circles and produces relationships (mutually positive or negative) which resist change. In a word, the patterns tend to be stable. (e) Personality Factors

A number of personality factors have been found to be related to

cooperative and competitive behavior. Deutsch (1960) found that subjects high in authoritarianism as measured by the California F scale were less likely in experimental games to choose "cooperative behavior" than those who scored low on authoritarianism. Such factors as "internationalism" (McClintock et al., 1963) and "flexible ethicality" (Lutzker, 1960) have been found to be associated with "cooperative behavior" and, presumably, to the orientations (evaluations and choice bases) underlying such behavior.

3. Types of Interpersonal Reciprocity

Most "exchanges" take place in a social or cultural context which affects actors' conceptions as well as the specific forms of their interaction behavior. In section 2.2, highly institutionalized forms of exchange such as are found in role relationships were discussed. The emphasis in this section is on exchanges in which the actors have a considerable degree of discretion to establish and maintain different types of relationship, although social constraints may and usually do play some role in the

interactions. Social behavior within situational constraints is a function of social

orientations and behavioral expectations. In formulating a typology of social exchange, I assume that actors have definite behavioral expecta-

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tions with respect to one another. In particular, it is assumed that they know one another's orientations or behavioral propensities. This knowledge may be based on shared cultural understandings, role or previous social relationships, or even information provided each of them by an authority (e. g., the experimenter in small group experiments) (Buckley etal., 1973).

The actors base their actions on their orientations toward one another, each behaving in a manner consistent with his particular orientation. What is of central concern in the analysis below is the response of actors to interaction situations (entailing specific cooperative or opposition conditions) as a function of their relationship or orientations toward one another.

The four types of reciprocation defined below entail parallel or "equivalent" orientations.6 Combinations are possible but generally unstable. In other words, a "balance" or equivalence in orientation is predicted, at least over the long-run. Generally speaking, one actor does not commit himself, for example, to an other-orientation unless the other actor does so also.

The symmetry in orientations obtains mainly because the exchanges considered below are established and maintained to a considerable extent by the actors themselves, that is, there is mutually contingent reciprocation.7 Asymmetrical exchange relationships occur usually under conditions of normative or political constraint when, for example, one actor is required to have an other-orientation toward another but the latter does not need to reciprocate (see section 2.2). An obvious example is the relationship between mother and infant. (A future paper will deal with asymmetric exchange relationships.)

Type I relationships can be thought of as those found between close friends (or close kinsmen in the case they are not subject to substantial normative constraint in their relationships). Type II relationships are characterized by a certain degree of mutual concern for one another, although there is a strong element of self-interest - for example, exchanges are often initiated to obtain some good or service. Types I and II can be distinguished conceptually from Type II which corresponds to the classical market behavior of economic theory (with short-run individual maximization).8 A Type IV relationship is one of mutual hostility.

Each of these types is discussed below. Illustrations are provided and the conditions under which each is likely to occur are specified. Of course, the four types of exchange are never found in pure form. Social interactions usually contain differing mixtures of all the types. However, the typology is useful as an analytic tool to identify various combinations of factors that produce relationships closer to one pure type rather than another.

6 "Vacuous exchange" - withdrawal, disengagement, or "leaving the field" - is an important fifth type, which cannot be investigated here. One or both actors may "leave the field" in order to avoid contact, the costs or burdens of exchange of goods (e. g., the necessity of reciprocation) or of conflict. Examples are persons who are not "on speaking terms", or who refuse to attend meetings or gatherings at the same time or become involved with one another in some activity. 7 Institutionalized forms of these types are possible but need not be sym- metrical (see section 2.2), as is hypothesized in the case of interpersonal reciprocity. 8 There is a saying among economists, "Market exchange occurs when two businessmen believe they have cheated one another."

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Typology of Exchange Relationships9" 0

Type I: Mutually Benevolent A has a pure positive B has pure positive Relationship orientation toward orientation toward A

B and believes B to *-Reciprocity-+ and believes A to have the same have the same toward him. toward him.

Type I: Mutually Consider- A has joint self/ B has joint self/other ate Relationship other orientation orientation and be-

and believes B to +-Reciprocity-+ lieves A to have the have the same same toward him. toward him.

Type III: Mutually Exploita- A has pure self B has a pure self tive Relationship orientation and orientation and be-

believes B to have +-Reciprocity-+ lieves A to have the the same toward same toward him. him.

Type I V: Mutually Hostile A has pure negative B has a pure negative Relationship orientation toward orientation toward A

B and believes B to +-Reciprocity-+ and believes A to have the same have the same toward him. toward him.

3.1 Type III Exchange Relationship: Mutually Exploitative

In Type III exchange relationship, each actor evaluates and chooses

purely from his own viewpoint, disregarding the interests of the other. I I

Once this condition is common knowledge, that is, there is mutual

awareness of the character of their relationship, each would expect the

other to be indifferent about his preferences and would feel he must

watch out for himself, especially in a context where conditions of

opposition or even partial opposition (as in the prisoners' dilemma game)

conditions prevail.

Examples of Type III social exchange are numerous: in general,

whenever the actors engaged in transactions belong to alien, competitive,

or hostile groups.'2 Each actor is prepared to take advantage of the

other, to the point of obtaining something for nothing in retum, and to

engage in deceitful or other dishonest practices vis-a-vis the other. In

business transactions, this might entail the use of false measures and

weights, misrepresentation of goods and services, refusal to fulfill

promises, to meet contractual obligations (for example, in regard to the

nature of quality of the goods, payment or delivery time, or other

aspects of the exchange) or to pay debts, or outright theft. ' 3

The readiness to deceive and take advantage of one another fosters

mutual distrust and resistance to overtures from the other; for instance,

an honest attempt by one to reach a settlement evokes suspicion on the

part of the other about the motives behind such attempts. They would

be less likely than actors with more positive orientations to cooperate

with one another in attempting to work out an "exchange solution" or

9 Differentiation of Types i, 11, and III is found in M. Sahlin's typology of reciprocity (1965). His "generalized reciprocity", "balanced reciprocity", and "negative reciprocity" cofe- spond to some extent to Types 1, 11, and III, re- spectively. Numerous ethnographic illustrations of the various types of exchange are presented in his paper. 10 In concrete situations we would expect to find sub-types and mixed types (as well as asymmetrical combinations, although these are usually unstable). As Weber (1968:47) pointed out in regard to his ideal types of legitimate authority:

The fact that none of these three ideal types . . . is usually to be found in historical cases in "pure" form is naturally not a valid objection to attempting their conceptual formulation in the sharpest possible form. Analysis in terms of sociological types has, after all, as compared with purely empirical historical investigation, certain ad- vantages which should not be minimized. That is, it can in the particular case of a concrete form of authority determine what con- forms to or approxi- mates such types as "charisma," "heredi- tary charisma"' . . . and in so doing it can work with relatively unambi- gious concepts. But the idea that the whole of concrete historical reality can be ex- hausted in the conceptual scheme about to be developed is as far from the author's thoughts as anything could be.

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interaction pattern satisfactory to both. In general, because both actors are intent on gaining the best possible bargain or maximizing their personal gains without regard to the other person, there will be a high degree of haggling and conflict as well as a relatively high probability of withdrawal and disruption of exchange between them, at least when compared to Type I and II relationships (see footnote 15).

Type III exchanges are likely under conditions where there are few or no social constraints on the interaction and when the actors anticipate no enduring relationship between them (socialization could, in part, offset the absence of social constraints). Neither in their own direct relationship nor in indirect relationships through kinsmen or friends do they perceive long-term consequences of their actions toward one another. The temporary character of the relationship, the expectation that there will be no future consequences, and the absence of normative constraints provide opportunities for one-sided exploitation. The principle of "tit- for-tat" is ineffective, since the one who takes advantage of the other initially may be unavailable in the future to "receive his due."

In Type III exchanges, the actors limit their attention to the specific goods and services exchanged. In a word, they focus on the objects of exchange rather than on the good-will or feelings of the person who is the source of the good or service, hence the "impersonality" of such exchanges. Given this type of social arrangement, the actors would expect, even insist on immediate reciprocation (that is, a minimum of delay in contrast to the mutual "long-term investment" in one another, characteristic of some Type I relationships or "short-term investments" that can be seen in Type II relationships).

3.2 Type II Exchange Relationship: Mutual Consideration

In Type II exchange, actors have joint self/other orientations and are mutually aware of this fact. They assign values to outcomes and choose on the basis of favorable or fair outcomes to both actors. For instance, A would give XI to B in exchange for or in expectation of X2 in return, where the "exchange packet" (X,,X2) satisfies norms of fairness or culturally defined equivalence (XI and X2 are, therefore, comparable goods and services).' 4The actors often enter into the exchange for the express purpose of obtaining specific goods or services, in A's case X2 and in B's, XI. Although there is often a selfish component (see footnote 15) in the motivation to satisfy personal needs or wants, the social and normative aspects of the relationship are as important as self-oriented motives. The reasons for this are now examined.

Type 11 exchanges are likely to occur under two sets of conditions: (i) Social Constraint. Strong social controls and socialization serve to maintain and reinforce "fair" or "just" exchange terms. For example, social norms or laws regulate business practices and trade, defining and enforcing "fair prices", correctly labeled and guaranteed quality goods, standard and reliable weights and measures, adherence to promises and

II Sahlins (1968:83) de- scribes "negative reciprocity" in the following terms:

TMis is the attempt to get something for nothing: transactions opened and conducted toward net utilitarian advantage. The participants in all instances confront each other not merely as distinct but opposed interests, each looking to maximize his position at the other's expense. Bar- gaining with an eye to the main chance is one of the more sociable forms.

12 In many parlor games, participants are expected to take advantage of one another within a set of well-defined rules. 13 Such actors often attempt to create or to exploit unclarity or uncertainty in the interaction situation so as to gain the most favorable terms of exchange possible (see footnote 21). 14 Sahlins (1968:83) de- scribes balanced exchanges as follows:

...The return is made straight off and is equivalent in value to the goods received. The perfect type of balanced reciprocity, a simultaneous exchange of identical things, is not only conceivable but ethnographically documented in certain marital transactions between bride's and groom's kinsmen, blood-brotherhood pacts and peace agree- ments. More loosely, "balanced reciprocity" may be applied where goods of commensurate worth or utility should be given in return within a customary finite period or short run. Many of the "gift-

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contracts, payment of debts (see section 2.2). Under such conditions, exchange partners are likely to view one another with a certain degree of trust and to be disposed favorably to cooperate in working out "fair" exchange terms.

A general norm of reciprocity serves the same function. As Gouldner points out (1960:177):

When internalized in both parties, the norm obliges the one who has first received a benefit to repay it at some time; it thus provides some realistic grounds for confidence, in the one who first parts with his valuables, that he will be repaid. Consequently, there may be less hesitancy in being the first and a greater facility with which the exchange and the social relation can get underway.

As suggested in this passage, Type II relationships are encouraged and stabilized by a generalized norm of reciprocity. However, the effective- ness of the norm depends on the social context, either in terms of direct enforcement of the norm by a collectivity (see page 195) or in terms of providing conditions for an enduring relationship, (as discussed below). Thus, the potentiality of stable relations between the actors supports a norm or at least an understanding of "reciprocity". But, such a norm also supports stable relationships. (ii) Enduring Relationships. The actors, although exchanging with one another on a very narrow or specific basis ("limited exchange content"), have or anticipate having an enduring relationship. The relationship is already, or might in the future become, of value or advantage to both actors. They feel strongly motivated to establish "fair exchange terms" and the "good-will" of the other so that the relationship can be maintained over time and activated on future occasions.' S (Note the contrast in this respect with the Type III exchanges: whereas social constraints or an enduring relationship give Type II an institutionalized character, Type III is characterized by laissez-faire.) For example, kinsmen or neighbors often expect that an occasion will arise when they will need or want to call on one another for assistance. Breach of the norms or reciprocity or of fair exchange (as would likely occur in Type Ill exchanges) threatens the future of the relationship and future possibilities of assistance, either from the other actor himself or from others to whom he is closely connected.

Given the actors' commitment to maintaining the good-will and trust of one another, they would exchange on a quid pro quo basis and consummate the exchange within a more or less well-defined period of time (contract period, written or understood) so that no suspicions of exploitation or taking-advantage-of-the-other would arise.

The goods and services exchanged remain the major reason for the exchange. However, social considerations play a substantial role: namely, satisfaction of certain norms or understandings of "fairness" and main- tenance of good relations for the purpose of future exchanges of the same kind or the potential of exchanges with a different content.

exchanges" of which ethnographers write, as well as much of the "trade," "barter," and buying with "primitive money" belong in this class of reciprocity ...

Is Sahlins ( 968:85) points out that "fair dealing" may be extended into alien areas precisely in order to promote peace and facilitate trade:

Silent trade, as between Bantu agriculturalists and Pygmy hunters in the Congo, is a case in point: good relations are maintained by preventing direct relations. The external "trade- partnership," of which Melanesia affords classic examples, is even more prevalent than silent trade. A continuing compact between individuals of different communities or tribes, perhaps established along lines of classificatory kinship, the trade-partnership not only constitutes a binding exchange agreement but encapsulates it in solidary social relations. Internal relations are, as it were, pro- jected across tribal boundaries. Chicanery is thus outlawed and customary standards of equivalence come into force.

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Sahlins (1965:193) contrasts Type li and Type Ill exchanges as follows:

In Kuma trading, there are two distinct forms: institutionalized transactions through trading partners and casual encounters along the trade routes. In the former a man is content to conform to the ruling scale of values ... but in the latter, he haggles for a bargain trying to gain a material advantage . . . He (the trading partner), is as it were, drawn into the "in-group" of the clansmen and affines, the people who should not be exploited for private ends . . . to exploit a partner for material gain is to lose him (my emphasis).

3.3 Type I Exchange Relationship: Mutual Benevolence

By a Type I or higher order social exchange relationship is meant one in which the evaluations and decisions of the actors engaged are governed by abstract, general rules of generosity or positive other-orientations toward one another, rather than by evaluations and calculations about concrete goods or services exchanged on a particular occasion (as in Types II and III).' 6 In return for B taking A into account and orienting toward the satisfaction of A's goals and wishes, A takes B into account and orients in a like manner. In short, A's generosity toward B corresponds to B's toward A. Each of them is primarily concerned with and committed to maintaining the relationship and the positive orientation of the other person.

Types II and III exchange are based on evaluations and decisions concerning specific goods and services exchanged at some moment or in a limited period of time: A gives X1 to B in return for which he obtains X2 from B. It is essential that the goods involved be sufficiently specified so that more or less "objective" or extrinsic evaluations and decisions about the "terms of exchange" can be made - such calculating behavior is characteristic of these relationships. In contrast, the "other-orientation" found in Type I exchange relationships does not find expression in a single decision or specific act as in Type II and III exchanges. Rather, the reciprocity is an abstract or general one (Sahlins, 1965). Typically, the actors do not concern themselves with whether or not particular "gifts" are reciprocated or rewarded. Nonetheless, the exchange of specific services, goods, and other valuables is observed in Type I exchange relationships, since the actors are oriented to provide valuables to one another. However, these are the result of the social relation, its expression, not its purpose. The valuables provided demonstrate one another's commitment and serve to strengthen continued commitment of each to the realtionship.

In Type I relationships, the actors do not provide rewards to one another in order to receive immediate or proportionate rewards in return (contrast to Types II or III or the types of exchange assumed in sociological exchange theory (pp. 188-189)). The motives or objectives of such behavior can be several.

16 In Sahlins (1968: 82-83) we find the following description of "generalized reciprocity":

These transactions are at least putatively altruistic, on the lines of assistance returned. Aside from the "pure gifts" mentioned before, other concrete forms of generalized reciprocity appear in ethnographic accounts as "sharing," "hospitality," "token gifts," "mutual aid," and "generosity." Obli- gatory gifts to kinsmen and chiefs ("kinship dues" and "chiefly dues") as well as noblesse oblige are less sociable but, without stretching the point too much, in the same class. At the extreme, say voluntary food- sharing among very close relatives - or for its logical value one might think of a mother suckling her child - the expectation of a direct material return is unseemly, at the most implicit.

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(i) An actor "identifies" with another person or group as a result of

responsibility or love for the other (Bums and Cooper, 1971). The

concerns, satisfaction, and disappointments of the other become those of

the self. (ii) He displays an other-orientation or is generous toward another actor

in order to achieve or maintain a sense of self-worth (in societies where

such attitudes or behavior are valued).' 7Often, actors seek out and value

Type I relationships precisely because they provide opportunities for

self-expression in giving and showing concern for another.

(iii) The actor seeks to promote or to maintain the positive orientation

of the other actor. The latter's attachment to self is valuable. It

represents current and future assistance, valuable goods and services,

many unspecified, some unknown, which the other person to a greater or

lesser extent will provide when called upon. Clearly, the more varied such

goods and services (that is, the more "multiplex" the relationship) and

the greater their value, the more valuable the other person's orientation

and the relationship to him.' 8 But the value of the orientation and of

the Type I relationship derives in part from the commitment of the other

actor toward self, his active concern for self, the abstract and general

character of his reciprocation. It is clear why "economic exchange" with its limited focus on

immediate goods and services and the calculation of immediate advantage

or satisfaction is substantially different from higher order reciprocity

such as Type 1. Components in Type I "exchange packets" (XX ,X2) may

remain unspecified either as to content, time or place (see characteriza-

tion of Type II in section 3.2. Moreover, the components typically

make up a wide range of goods and services - extensive or "diffuse"

exchange content - many of which are of non-comparable value.

Because of the lack of specification, the many unknowns (future goods,

services, and other valuables), and the non-comparabilities, the exchange

relationship cannot be evaluated and judged in extrinsic terms as Type II

and III exchanges where actors examine specific exchange packets

(X I,X2), as for "gains," "losses," or "fairness".' 9 Rather, evaluations are

made in terms of the extent another actor takes self into account or

shows generosity toward self. There is a de-emphasis on "exchange

packets". In sum, the defining characteristics of Type I exchange relationships

are: (a) their enduring quality. Permanent spatial or social proximity provides

the necessary condition for durability. There is a clear and apparent value

in the good-will of other persons toward self, particularly if the actors are

likely to require on future occasions one another's assistance or coopera-

tion (or that of others with whom they have common linkages) in

productive activities, provision of goods and services, physical defense,

etc. Type I exchange shares this quality with Type II relationships,

although the social or physical closeness or durability of the relationship

is likely to be greater in Type I than Type II exchange relationships.

17 An actor is usually linked to the acts he per- forms (Bums and Cooper, 1971). In his own eyes as well as in the eyes of others, his actions define him and his value or status in the setting. Thus, what a person does involves more than the rational properties of in- strumental effects of the act, it has meaning in terms of his self-worth and social status. For this reason, people seek to avoid being associated with acts that are viewed negatively. Conversely, they try to perform acts of which they can be proud or which afford them status in the eyes of others, in many instances even if such action entails personal sacrifices. In this sense a person's concern with self-worth in- fluences his behavior. I8 Patron/client relationships, which are hier- archical, entail Type I reciprocity. Each actor is committed to act on the other's behalf to some degree, although their powers and abilities to do so are unequal. Hence, there is obvious asym- metry in the relationship. Wolf (1966:86-87) states:

The tie is asymmetrical; it has been described as a kind of "lopsided friendship." At the same time it is many stranded. . . Patron/ client relations involve multiple facets of the actors involved not merely the segmental single-interest of the moment. In such a relation the patron offers economic aid and pro- tection against legal and illegal exactions of authority. The client in tum pays back in intangible assets.

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(2) Multiple Exchange Bases. Due to the social proximity of the actors and the greater durability of their relationship, there is usually a larger number of exchange bases in Type I relationships than in Type Il. For example, a person may have dealings with his work-mates outside the work situation, as neighbors, friends, kinsmen, political and religious associates. Any specific exchange then has a context, namely, all the other bases of their relationship. Moreover, the exchange content entails more than economic type valuables ("extrinsically evaluatable goods" (Blau, 1964)). The actors may exchange entertainments, military or

political assistance, women, children, dances, etc. Economic valuables would be just one part of a wide and enduring contact. (3) Degree of Non-Calculability. The multiplex character of Type I exchange relationships makes systematic calculation of "gains" and "losses" extremely difficult, if not in many instances impossible. These usually entail non-comparabilities and, in an enduring relationship, unspecified or unknown future services and goods. In other words, benefits do not have a common, exact value (that is, they are not comparable and subject to calculation (e. g., in terms of a unidimensional quantitative medium of exchange (Bums and Cooper, 197 1)) . In Type I exchange relationships, the prime emphasis is on the value of a person's orientation or commitment, the multiple purposes which the relationship serves, and its potential for assistance in unknown and unspecified ways. The degree of non-calculability of Type I exchange further distinguishes it from Type II exchanges.

3.4 Type IV Exchange: Conflict

A Type IV exchange relationship consists of two actors hostile toward one another and aware of their mutual hostility. "Negative exchange" or social conflict occurs when the actors attempt or threaten to cause harm or dissatisfaction to one another.2 0

Actors who are or have engaged in conflict interaction, particularly costly or seriously threatening conflict, develop negative orientations as well as particular behavioral expectations with respect to one another. The orientations and behavioral expectations may also derive from socialization about the evil character of persons or groups defined as 9"enemies".

Established orientations and expectations play a highly influential role in behavior under conditions of uncertainty or ignorance, especially in social situations which are complex, changing, or in some way threatening. The Type IV relationship enhances the influence on behavior of such internalized elements for two reasons. First, it obstructs communication and the exchange of information - just as it inhibits cooperation generally (see footnote 22>.2 1 Second, because the actors are inclined to deceive and take advantage of one another, mutual suspicion with anticipation of negative outcomes of interaction is a characteristic property of their relationship (highly ritualized or institutionalized

19 In Type 11 exchanges "benefits" are assumed to have more or less comparable values. Even in this case, however, there are usually multiple (and indeed unknown) valuables involved in transactions. As a result, actors cannot make unambiguous calculations of gains and losses (Burns and Cooper, 1971).

20 This is similar to Weber's conception (1968:8-9) of conflict as a relationship in which each actor intentionally carries out his own will against the resistance of the other.

21 The use of secrecy and deceit are common in Type IV as well as in Type III relationships. In- deed, the random or "mixed" strategy of game theory must be viewed in this light as a device to keep an "opponent" from obtaining behavioral information.

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"violent relations"' and those that entail complete disengagement are excluded from consideration).

The difficulty in hostile social settings of obtaining hard and fast evidence reinforces reliance on established behavioral expectations, orientations, and patterns of behavior. On the basis of their behavioral expectations (specifically, their knowledge of one another's negative orientations) the actors tend to project hostile intentions into one another and negative outcomes of their interactions as well as to distrust any peaceful overtures from one another (in view of the nature of their relationship, such overtures might or might not be made in good faith). Given the usual uncertainties of social situations, magnified by the hostile relationship, the actors would be reluctant to cooperate with one another or to engage in interactions other than conflictive ones.22'23 Whenever one actor's (say B's) orientation toward the other (A) is negative - and A expects negative behavior from B - then A's incentive to orient positively and behave in a rewarding or generous manner will be reduced. Such properties of the relationship reinforce and perpetuate the actor's negative orientations and hence their negative interactions (see feedback loop on p. 196).

Because they tend to rely on their beliefs and orientations in conditions where they are invalid (for example, in response to a genuine attempt of one actor to improve the relationship), the actors are likely to distort and exaggerate one another's intentions and capabilities. They make pessimistic estimates of these in order to be certain of anticipating and coping with the worst possible contingency - in a word, the 9"minimaxing approach" (Burns and Meeker, 1973).2 4 Consequently, hostile communications or other negative actions are often given exagge- rated interpretations. When one or both actors respond according to such distorted estimates, the "'spiral" or escalation characteristic of conflict processes is likely to result.2 s

Clearly, interaction between A and B entails "feedback loops" to the effect that A's hostile orientation and actions provoke or reinforce similar behavior in B and vice versa (see p. 196). Because of such positive loops, conflict exchanges are usually characterized by "vicious circles" and "spiraling effects."26 Change of such a relationship is most likely to come about through changes in conditions external to it - threat from a third party or imposition of social constraints (e. g., institutionalization of conflict) on the interaction by other parties,.which significantly alter one or more of the "vicious circles" and increase the likelihood of a more positive relationship.

4. Conclusion

A general distinction has been drawn between social relationships based on exogenous constraints (institutionalized forms of exchange) and on endogenous constraints (mutually contingent reciprocation). In institutionalized forms, actors are socially constrained to orient and to transact

22 Because of their negative relationship, the actors are unlikely to attempt together to change (improve) a situation of pure opposition or, in situations which objectively entail no opposition in preferences, to cooperate in their actions. It follows that the actors find it difficult to redefine and change their relationship - though each may wish to change it - to a stable, more positive relationship, at least through internal effort and development (see page 204). 23 Even given mutual hostility, the two actors may have unequal ability or willingness to engage in conflict. For example, a prudential actor either concerned with mini- mizing losses or committed to pacific norms and values would be reluctant to engage in conflicts, especially in cases likely to entail escalation or unknown outcomes. He would tend to choose action alternatives minimi- zing the possibility of conflict, even given hostility toward another actor. On the other hand, a more venturous actor eager for "gains (using maximizing decision pro- cedures (Bprns and Meeker, 1973)) and not subject to pacific norms or similar constraints, would be more inclined to engage in conflict behavior. Conflict would be less likely between two prudential actors or a prudential actor engaged with a venturous one than two venturous actors. Note that, other things being equal, a venturous actor would be able to impose his "will" (demands) on a more prudential opponent eager to avoid conflict.

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with one another in a particular manner. In the case of interpersonal reciprocity, exchange activity, its type and content, is established and maintained principally by the actors themselves - and hence is distinguishable from more institutionalized forms by the prominent role of self-regulating mechanisms. (Of course, in actual interaction situations, endogenous and exogenous factors may either reinforce one another or work in opposition.) Thus, in the cases of Types I and II reciprocity, each actor has a personal interest in sustaining the relationship, for example, to maintain the good-will of the other or to express himself altruistically (see page 202).

Social context affects both classes of relationship. This influence is usually more apparent in the institutionalized case. However, the social context of interaction, cultural understandings, and specific norms and values about reciprocity play an important role in shaping exchange behavior even in the case of interpersonal reciprocity. (For example, norms of reciprocity or social norms prohibiting fraud and exploitation provide advantageous conditions for Type I and II relationships (Burns and Cooper, 1971).) The critical factor distinguishing interpersonal reciprocity from institutionalized forms of exhange is the degree of discretion or initiative the actors have in establishing and maintaining a particular exchange relationship.

Although social norms and constraints underlying institutionalized forms of exchange can be interpreted as the "substitution of indirect exchange for direct transactions between individuals" (Blau, 1964:259), doing so in terms of notions of immediate or specific group "rewards" neglects the total structural and temporal context of institutionalized exchange behavior. Whenever an actor's relation to a group is enduring (stable) and, because of established direct and indirect social linkages in the group, rich with consequences, then his behavior is likely to be governed more by the processes and conditions found in Type I (or Type II) relations than in Type III. In general, it is necessary to investigate the character of the relationship between an actor and a group with respect to such factors as the permanence of the relationship, the variety or diversity of exchange content, and the degree of calculability entailed in the relationship. The extent to which an actor is "group oriented" and takes the group into account in his evaluations and decisions will depend on the degree such factors make up a Type I configuration.

A major idea in back of the theory of transaction formulated in this paper is that the character of a social relationship (and the orientations of the actors toward one another) depends on the context in which their interaction takes place. As Sahlins (1968:83-84) puts it:2 7

It is a long way from a suckling child to a Plains Indian Horse-raid. But the exchanges of even a single tribal society can grade into each other along the whole span. Not however, in a random way. After all, one suckles one's own child and steals horses from some other outfit. The disposition to practice one or another mode of reciprocity is sectorally organized. It is close kin who are inclined to share, to enter into

24 Possession of weapon- ry and great capacity to do harm exaggerates the pattems described above, for they introduce greater risks into the situation. See S. L. Andreski (1954:9-10). 2 5 Ole R. Holsti et al (1969:62-79) and others (most notably, L. F. Richardson (1960)) have formulated quite simnple, but nonetheless represen- tative models of conflict interaction in which rising hositility and conflict escalation feed on one another. 26 Frequent involvement in conflict brings about the creation of new goals and values, the development of particular actior capabilities, and various social and organizational preparations. For instance, persons within conflict groups may be intentionally or fortuit- ously socialized into taking on bellicose goals and attitudes toward the "enemy". Behavioral and technical preparations art made, involving the ac- quisition of knowledge, skills, and "weapons" essential to the performance of conflict acts. In "advanced" societies this also entails establishment of an organization or network of organizatlons for such purposes.

The internalized goals and orientations, the conflict preparations and capabilities, and the social structures established within the collecti- vities for conflict action reinforce the hostile and conflictive relationship, for such developments confirm in a permanent, highly structured manner the beliefs of each about the bellicose intentions and capabilities of the other.

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generalized reciprocity, and distant and non-kin who trade and horse-trade. The need to strike a balance becomes compulsory in proportion to kinship distance, lest relations break off altogether, for with distance and separation of interests there can be little tolerance for gain and loss, even as there is little inclination to extend oneself on another's behalf. As far as non-kinsmen are concerned - those "other people" who are perhaps not even "people" - no quarter need be given and none is asked; but let the buyer beware.

The perceived durability or stability of a relationship provides a temporal context to any given interaction situation. Betrayal, cheating, or exploitation of another actor will have more than immediate or temporally circumscribed consequences (specific - rewards or punishments). This condition serves to constrain such behavior. Similarly, relationships in an enduring group (that is, a stable network) make up a structural context to any given interaction situation. Chicanery or exploitation will have more than immediate or even fully perceivable consequences.

The temporal and social nature of Type I and II transactions is at least as important as the material (the immediate benefits from transactions). In other words, the perceived or potential value of a positive social relationship to the actors involved weighs as much as or more than rewards or losses in specific transactions. Commitment to the relationship is closely associated with a concern about future interactions, the possibility of direct or indirect involvement of others, and a variety of known and unknown outcomes, and a corresponding de-emphasis on immediate material gains and losses.

The economic model of exchange and its derivative in sociology, exchange theory, ignore human inability or, in some instances, unwilling- ness, to calculate "rewards" and "costs" in social transactions. More seriously, such theories fail to consider that exchanges may be initiated so as to establish or maintain a relationship (e. g., bonds of friendship or superordination over others (patron/client relationships)) rather than to obtain goods or services. In a word, the relationship itself or participation in it is the objective. As emphasized throughout this paper, the major shortcoming of the economic model of exchange is its general neglect of the temporal and structural context of social transactions.

Although the typology of social transaction formulated in this paper is a hypothetical construction, it has served to point up in a more or less unambiguous manner certain major characteristics of social relationships. In most concrete interaction situations, however, there is likely to be ambiguity as to which type of relationship obtains (for example, Type I or Type II, Type II or Type III). The analysis has not concerned itself with the important methodological problems of distinguishing empirical- ly the various types of relationship. Moreover, the standards of fairness or equivalence in Type II or the level of generosity in Type I exchanges will vary from situation to situation. These problems will require careful investigation. Finally, as mentioned earlier, there has been no consideration of asymmetrical relationships (such as power relations (Bums and

27 Service (1966:15-16) writing on the same subject puts it succintly:

... the closest kinship relationship is the one that also admits the most generalized form of reciprocity. The more distant the relationship, the more the tendency to balance the reciprocity. Finally, only strangers or enemies exchange, if they do, unsociable - that is, by haggling, guile, or theft.

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Cooper, 1971) or relationships characterized by different orientations on the part of the actors) or of transitions from one type of relationship to another. These matters will be taken up in future papers.

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