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Psychological Review1979, Vol. 86, No. 1, 61-79

A Schematic Model of Dispositional Attributionin Interpersonal Perception

Glenn D. ReaderIllinois State University

Marilynn B. BrewerUniversity of California at Santa Barbara

Previous research on dispositional attribution has failed to take into account howthe inference process may be affected by variations in schematic representationof dispositional attributes. A schema is denned here as a set of implicational linksbetween dispositional levels and categories of relevant behaviors. Three generalschemata are discussed—the partially restrictive schema, the hierarchically re-strictive schema, and the fully restrictive schema—each having different implica-tions for the rules of inference employed in making attributions based onobserved behaviors. Relevant research on utilization of information regarding con-sensus, situational context, and actor's past behavior is reviewed in this frame-work.

Despite the extensive research undertakenwithin the framework of attribution theorysince the appearance of the seminal papers byJones and Davis (1965) and Kelley (1967),little attention has been paid to how the in-ference processes involved in dispositionalattribution may be affected by characteristicsof the particular dimension of judgment beingutilized. Instead, very general rules of in-ference are proposed, as if the same processeswere presumed to underlie the attribution ofall dispositional qualities, from tennis skill toracial prejudice. As a result, the effects onattribution of informational cues such as sit-uational context, consensus data, and pastbehavior have been studied without regard topotential interactions between these factorsand the nature of the attribute being inferred.The purpose of the present article is to pro-pose alternative ways in which the nature ofdispositional attributes can be representedschematically and to demonstrate that dif-ferences among these alternative schematicrepresentations lead to differences in the rulesof inference invoked and the utilization of

The authors wish to thank Charles MoClintock,David Messick, and Carol Bowman for criticalreading of earlier drafts of the manuscript.

Requests for reprints of this article should be sentto Glenn D. Reeder, Department of Psychology,Illinois State University, Normal, Illinois 61761.

cues such as context and consensus in theattribution process.

Causal and Social Inference

Since Heider's (1958) provocative workfirst pointed out the importance of phenom-enal social causality, attribution researchershave, for the most part, proceeded in tworelated directions (Ross, 1977). The firstkind of research explores the causal judg-ments made by an observer in order to ex-plain the occurrence of social events. Kelley(1967, 1973), for example, has described theway observers decide whether an actor'spreferences and behavior are to be attributedto his or her unique internal dispositionalcharacteristics or to external factors in theenvironment. Weiner and his colleagues(Frieze, 1976; Weiner, 1974) have continuedin this vein by investigating the circumstancesthat lead observers to attribute the successor failure of an actor to alternative causalfactors such as ability, effort, task difficulty,and luck.

The second type of inquiry, which logicallyfollows from the first, focuses on social in-ference, or the process of drawing an inferencefrom observed behavior to specific character-istics of the actor. Jones and Davis (1965)sought to specify the conditions under whichbehavior is considered to be informative about

Copyright 1979 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0033-295X/79/8601-0061$00.75

61

62 GLENN D. REEDER AND MARILYNN B. BREWER

relatively stable dispositional qualities of theactor. The concept of correspondence wasintroduced in this context and discussed interms of three properties. First, an inferenceis correspondent "to the extent that the actand the underlying characteristic or attributeare similarly described by the inference" (p.223). Thus, if an actor is perceived to behavein an aggressive manner and the observerthen infers that the actor is an aggressiveperson, an inference of high correspondencehas taken place. A second property specifiedthat "an inference must characterize an ac-tor's standing as high or low on an attributerelative to the average person in order toqualify as correspondent" (p. 227) , and athird property was implicit in denning cor-respondence "in terms of information gainedthrough the observation of behavior" (p.234). Apparently, Jones and Davis perceivedthese properties to be mutually interde-pendent, but subsequent researchers haveoften limited attention to one or the otherof the three properties of correspondent in-ference. Some researchers have relied uponthe perceived congruence between behaviorand disposition as the definition of corre-spondence (Reeder, Messick, & Van Aver-maet, 1977; Trope & Burnstein, 1977), whileothers have employed the extremity property(Newtson, 1974) or the information gainproperty (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1975; Miller,Baer, & Staggenborg, 1977). As a result,there has been some confusion in operation-alizing the concept of correspondence and itsrelationship to other aspects of causal in-ference.

Jones and McGillis (1976) have recentlyrevised the theory of correspondent inference.The revised version of the theory has abroader range of application, allowing thetheory to account for dispositional inferencesbased on multiple observations of behavioras well as the single observation case. Never-theless, the defining properties of correspon-dence are not altered significantly. Further,neither the original nor the revised version ofthe theory suggests that the rules of disposi-tional inference may vary depending on thenature of the attribute to be inferred. In theschematic model of dispositional attributionthat will now be elaborated, several variations

of schematic representation are proposed asgenerally applicable to different classes ofattributes.

A Model of Dispositional Schemata

The model of dispositional attribution tobe proposed here is intended to introducegreater precision to the concept of correspon-dence and the process of social inference. Thisprocess begins with the observation of anactor's behavior and the selection, on thepart of the observer, of relevant attributesthat characterize that behavior (Wegner,1977; Wegner & Vallacher, 1977). It is as-sumed that salient properties of the observedbehavior itself are the primary determinantof attribute selection. For example, if anobserver were to witness an actor spill adrink at a party, it is likely that the observerwould make a judgment about the actor'sstanding along continua related to clumsiness.Because of time and cognitive limitations, theobserver will assess the actor's standing ononly a limited number of such dimensions inrelation to any particular behavioral episode.Of course, once a dispositional attribution hasbeen made, any number of additional char-acteristics of the actor may be inferred, de-pending on the observer's implicit personalitytheory, but the present exposition is con~cerned only with the initial attribution pro-cess associated with the behavior observed.

The particular attributes selected for judg-ment may depend not only on the type ofaction observed but also on the observer'sset. Stable individual differences in attributeselection probably exist, so, for example, aparticular observer may evaluate almosteveryone in terms of honesty-dishonesty,whereas another observer may rarely formimpressions along this dimension (Dorn-busch, Hastorf, Richardson, Muzzy, & Vree-land, 1965; Rosenberg & Jones, 1972). Inaddition, the observer's recent experience mayrender certain attributes more salient thanothers (Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977).

Once relevant attributes have been se-lected, the dispositional attribution stage ofthe social inference process begins, whereinthe observer determines whether to ascribeto the actor a specific position on the attri-

SCHEMATIC MODEL OF ATTRIBUTION 63

bute dimension based on the behavior ob-served. The outcome of this attribution stageis a joint function of two separate decisionalprocesses: (a) classification of the observedbehavior with respect to the selected attributedimension and (b) application of a set of im-plicit rules relating dispositional states toclasses of behavior.

Behavior classification refers to placementof the behavior at some point along a con-tinuum of the attribute under consideration.For example, our illustrative drink-spillingbehavior may be classified with respect todegree of clumsiness along a bipolar contin-uum ranging from extremely clumsy at onepole to extremely coordinated at the other.1

The right side of Figure 1 provides a graphicrepresentation of such a dimension. Each pointalong this continuum, symbolized as B;, rep-resents a class of behaviors perceived as hav-ing a given level of the attribute in question.

Parallel to the continuum of behavioralclassifications with respect to the attributeunder consideration is a dispositional con-tinuum, with a range of classifications iso-morphic to those along the behavioral con-tinuum, as illustrated on the left side ofFigure 1. Each point on the dispositional con-tinuum, D«, represents a level of the attributein question as a property of the actor (asopposed to a property of the actor's behav-ior). Given that an instance of behavior hasbeen classified as Ej, inferences about theactor's position on the dispositional contin-uum would then depend on assumptions madeby the observer about the probabilities thatalternative levels on the dispositional con-tinuum would give rise to Behavior B;. As

DISPOSITION

D3

D2•

BEHAVIOR

B3

B2••

defined here, correspondent inference refersto a decision that the actor's behavior andthe actor's disposition are to be classified atthe same point along their respective attri-bute continua. Thus, unlike that of Jonesand Davis (1965), the present definition ofcorrespondence does not depend on the ex-tremity of the dispositional classification.

Classification of Behavior

Since classification of an actor's behaviorserves as the initial basis for dispositionalattribution, attention must be given to thedeterminants of the perception of behavior.According to the model being proposed, theobserver classifies a particular episode of anactor's behavior with respect to only a lim-ited number of specific attribute continua,selected according to salient properties of thebehavior itself or an evaluative set of theobserver. Subjective judgments about thelocations of behavior along the selected con-tinua are undoubtedly influenced by the con-text in which the behavior occurs. Snyder andFrankel (1976), for example, demonstratedthat observers' ratings of the same videotapedbehavior were affected by prior knowledge ofthe interview setting in which the behaviorhad supposedly been obtained. Similarly,Marston (1976) found that ratings of thefriendliness of an actor's social behavior wereinfluenced by situational information regard-ing the purpose of the behavior. However,information regarding the actor's disposi-tional friendliness did not affect ratings ofthe specific act, a finding that lends supportfor the assumption made here that classifica-tion of behavior is separable from judgmentsabout the actor's dispositional characteristics.

Although behavior classification representsa subjective judgment on the part of the ob-server, it should reflect widely shared criteria

Di BiFigure 1. Parallel attribute continua.

1 Whether many dispositional attributes can ap-propriately be represented as bipolar dimensions is amatter of debate. Bipolarity is reserved here forthose traits where a greater degree of the propertyrepresented by one pole clearly implies less of theproperty at the opposite pole. Unless such mutualexclusiveness is clear, an attribute is best representedas unipolar, ranging from none or very little to avery high degree of the property under consideration.


for assessing strength and intensity of be-havioral expressions. In particular, generalexpectations as to the overall frequency ofoccurrence of a given behavior should influ-ence its classification. It is assumed that,other things being equal, the extremity ofclassification of behaviors will vary inverselywith their perceived frequency (Brewer,1977). Apart from commonly held beliefsabout the probability of occurrence of a par-ticular behavior, judgments of its likelihood(and hence its perceived extremity) may alsobe influenced by the observer's personal ex-perience and expectations. Thus, classificationof the same behavior along a given attributecontinuum may vary across individuals (oracross time within individuals) based ondifferences in adaptation level (Helson, 1964)or availability biases (Tversky & Kahneman,1973), or because of the "false consensus"effect (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977) where-by individuals tend to assume that their ownbehaviors are relatively common and mod-erate and that behaviors that deviate fromtheir own are less common.

Dispositional Inference

Once an observer has classified an actor'sbehavior (within a given situational context)along a social attribute continuum, the taskof dispositional inference begins—the processof locating the actor's position along the dis-positional attribute continuum. At this pointin the attribution process, the observer bringsinto play certain assumptions and expecta-tions, depending on the nature of the behaviorand the particular situation in which it isobserved. One basic assumption guiding theattribution process is the belief that personswill vary their behaviors, if possible, in orderto best meet environmental contingencies anddemands. Other assumptions reflect beliefsabout how an actor's dispositional character-istics influence the manifestation of particu-lar behaviors across situational contexts.These latter assumptions are incorporated inthe observer's schematic representation of theattribute under consideration.

The concept of a schema has been ratherwidely used in social psychology recently(e.g., Kelley, 1971; Markus, 1977). As Singer(1968) puts it, schemata are "pre-existing

assumptions about the way the world is or-ganized" (p. 338). For example, observersmay believe that a given effect such as suc-cess on a difficult task tends to covary withthe presence of a particular pattern of causalfactors such as ability, effort, and possiblyeven luck (Kelley, 1971), or that affectivebonds between acquainted persons tend to bereciprocal (Desoto & Keuthe, 1958). In gen-eral, a schema describes a framework or net-work of implicational relationships that arebelieved to exist between the entities in asystem.

In the present context, the term implicationalschema will be used to designate an observer'spreconceptions of how specific points along adispositional continuum (D{) are implica-tionally related to the production of behav-iors (Ej) that can be classified along thecorresponding behavioral attribute continuum.That is, the schema represents the observer'sprior assumptions about the categories ofbehavior that are believed likely to occurgiven each of the various dispositional levels.The actual process of dispositional attribu-tion, in effect, involves "working backward"through such a schema, from behavioral clas-sification to dispositional inference.2 Whilethe nature of the implicational schemata couldconceivably vary from attribute to attribute,it is likely that certain general schemata areapplicable to broad classes of attributes withsome common features. Three such general-ized schematic networks are elaborated be-low.

Partially Restrictive Schema

One feature that distinguishes some impli-cational schemata from others is the assump-

2 In this respect, the present formulation re-sembles the contingent probability (likelihood ratio)term in a formal Bayesian model, wherein £(Dt|Bj)is a joint function of pCDt) and p(Bj\Dt) (Ajzen &Fishbein, 1975; Trope, 1974). Prior probabilities en-ter the present model as a factor in the extremity ofattribute classifications, but their direct role in theattribution process is unclear (cf. Ajzen, 1977;Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Lyon & Slovic, 1976).Also, the present conceptualization does not equateattribution with a revision of prior beliefs as doesthe Bayesian approach suggested by Ajzen and Fish-bein (1975).


tion that every person occupies some fixedposition on the given dispositional contin-uum.3 For instance, the observer may believethat each person possesses some specific de-gree of "friendliness," or some specific levelof "curiosity." This dispositional level wouldbe represented as a single point on the rele-vant dispositional attribute continuum. How-ever, each such dispositional position may beimplicationally associated with behaviorsacross a rather wide range on the correspond-ing behavioral attribute continuum. Thus,regardless of his or her dispositional level offriendliness, the behavior of any individualmay be expected to be friendlier in some situ-ations than in others. Intraindividual varia-tion on the behavioral continuum is expected,but persons with different dispositional posi-tions will be expected to differ in the averageamount of friendliness they show across avariety of situations. To say that a person ismoderately friendly would mean in effect thatover a range of situations, the average levelof friendliness of that person's behavior ishigher than that of a moderately unfriendlyperson.

The assumptions described above are rep-resented graphically in Figure 2, which por-trays the set of implicational relationshipsbetween dispositions and behaviors for thepartially restrictive schema, given a bipolarattribute continuum. The presence of an ar-row connecting a disposition (D4) with abehavioral category (By) denotes that thedisposition D4 does not preclude performanceof behaviors classified Bjt that is, that p(&)\D«) > 0.*

The total set of arrows present in a schemasuch as that depicted in Figure 2 determinesthe diagnostic value of a single occurrence ofany specific category of behavior for inferringthe presence of a particular dispositionallevel. When no arrow links a given disposi-tion, Dt, and behavior, By, the occurrence ofBy precludes inferring Disposition Dt. Whenan arrow linking D« and By is present, exhib-iting a behavior classified as By does not ruleout an actor's having Disposition D<. How-ever, if By is linked with other dispositionallevels as well, none of these is precluded, andthe schema does not permit any inference tobe made with certainty. On the other hand,

BEHAVIOR

6+

DISPOSITION

D+

D

D-

Figure 2. The partially restrictive schema. (+ = ex-tremely positive; — = extremely negative; 0 = mod-erate level of disposition or behavior.)

if only one dispositional category is linked toBehavior By, the occurrence of By permitsinferring that disposition with certainty.

The thickness of the arrows in Figure 2indicates the relative, degree of strength withwhich the specific dispositions imply a specificclass of behaviors. Suppose, for example,that the schema illustrated represents thefriendliness attribute, in which case D+ rep-resents the dispositional position of extremelyfriendly, D0 represents a moderately friendlydisposition, and D_ represents an extremelyunfriendly dispositional state. Then the thickarrow linking D+ and B+ indicates that rela-tive to other dispositions, an extremelyfriendly disposition implies occurrence of ex-tremely friendly behavior more often (i.e.,/>[B+ |D+] > p[E+ DJ).5 This does not meannecessarily that an extremely friendly personwould be expected to behave in an excep-tionally friendly manner most of the time,but only that behavior of this sort would bebelieved to be more common for extremelyfriendly persons than for less friendly per-sons.

The fact that not all possible arrows link-ing dispositional categories with behavioralclassifications are included in Figure 2 indi-

3 In this context, "fixed" does not necessarily implyimmutable, but refers to dispositions that are stableover a given period of time.

4 Technically, the lower limit here should be setslightly higher than 0 to take into account thatalmost all behaviors might be possible under ex-traordinary enough circumstances. For practical pur-poses, however, very small contingent probabilitieswill be treated as equivalent to 0.

5 The overbar represents the absence of a desig-nated category.


cates that there is partial restriction in theimplicational relationships possible withinthis schema. In general, persons with an ex-treme disposition at one end of an attributecontinuum would not be expected to manifestbehaviors classified at the opposite extremeof the continuum. Accordingly, a single oc-currence of behavior that receives an extremeclassification is somewhat informative regard-ing the disposition of the actor in that itprecludes a dispositional classification at theopposite extreme. Moderate behaviors, in con-trast, are less informative about the disposi-tional position of the actor, in that undervarious circumstances, it would be expectedthat persons with a variety of dispositionalstates would manifest this kind of behavior.Note that this is not the same as saying thatonly extreme behaviors can lead to corre-spondent inference, as implied by Jones andDavis (1965), but only that correspondentinference of moderate dispositional levels mayrequire more than one occasion for observa-tion.

The degree of implicational restriction with-in the partially restrictive schema may vary,depending on factors such as the duration andintensity of behaviors observed. For instance,the type of behavior involved in producinga lengthy and detailed attitude statement maygenerate a relatively restrictive implicationalschema in which any particular dispositionallevel is assumed to allow for such behaviorsonly across a moderate range of attitude posi-tions. Brief verbal statements of attitudes, onthe other hand, may be assumed to be rela-tively unrestricted, so that a given disposi-tional level is linked to a broad range ofpotential behavior classifications.

With a schema such as that depicted inFigure 2, in which all behavioral classifica-tions are linked to more than one disposi-tional category, the information value of asingle occurrence of behavior at any levelwill be context dependent. The schema asillustrated represents the general implica-tional structure associated with a particularattribute continuum across situations. How-ever, within any specific situational context,the structure may be altered, in that thestrength of some implicational links is en-hanced, whereas others are reduced or elimi-

DISPOSITION

D+——

BEHAVIOR

Figure 3. Effect of context on the partially restrictiveschema. (+= extremely positive; — = extremelynegative; 0 = moderate level of disposition or be-havior.)

nated. The influence of context on the impli-cational schema includes the underlying as-sumption, stated previously, that actors willadapt their behavior to meet reinforcementcontingencies in the environment. Thus, ifenvironmental pressures call for behaviorsclassified B+, and B+ is within the behavioralrepertory implied by Disposition D<, then theprobability of B+ for an individual with Dis-position D4 would increase relative to otherbehaviors implied by D4 (Ajzen, 1971; Sny-der & Swann, 1976).

If the situational demands are sufficientlystrong and salient, the perceived probabilityof all classes of behavior other than behaviorsas close as possible to that demanded, or abehavior directly correspondent with the ac-tor's dispositional level, will be reduced to 0.The effect on the partially restrictive schemaof a demand for B+ behaviors is illustrated inFigure 3. Note that while some of the arrowspresent in Figure 2 are altered or eliminatedas a function of the context effect depicted inFigure 3, no arrows are added that were notpresent in the generalized schema.

Comparison of Figure 3 with Figure 2 re-veals the effect of context on changes in in-formation value of specific behaviors. In par-ticular, since the probability of (B0 D0) isreduced in Figure 3 and />(B0|D_) is in-creased, the occurrence of BO is more likelyto lead to a noncorrespondent (D_) attribu-tion in this context than in the general case,but since only one arrow leads to behaviorsclassified as B_, the occurrence of behaviorsat this level should generate a confident cor-respondent dispositional inference. On theother hand, the occurrence of behaviors clas-


sifted as B+ would not lead to correspondentinference, since such behaviors are impliedby more than one dispositional alternative(i.e., dispositions D+ and D0.

Messick (Note 1) pointed out a somewhatsurprising consequence of this pattern ofimplications. In Figure 3, one dispositionallevel, D+, is linked to a single behavior cate-gory, B+, whereas other dispositional levels,including D_, are linked to more than onecategory of behavior. Yet the presence ofDisposition D+ can be inferred with less cer-tainty than the presence of Disposition D_.This occurs because no one behavior is linkedto Disposition D+ alone, whereas'Behavior B_is linked only with Disposition D_. Messicktermed this relationship the asymmetric cer-tainty principle (Trope, 1974).

In general, with the partially restrictiveschema, the information value of behaviorfor dispositional inference will be a directfunction of the perceived discrepancy be-tween the level of behavior observed and thelevel expected (normative) for the situation.In the absence of clear situational demands,moderate or neutral levels of behavior maybe expected and, hence, relatively uninforma-tive. However, when extreme behaviors areanticipated (as in Figure 3), the occurrenceof more moderate behaviors can be informa-tive as to underlying dispositions, even withthe partially restrictive schema.

Another way of looking at the relationshipbetween implicational schemata and the in-formation value of specific behaviors is interms of the components of Kelley's (1967)model of the causal attribution process, par-ticularly in regard to the role of consensus,distinctiveness, and consistency information.Consensus information, indicating whether anactor responds to a particular stimulus asothers do, may be used to classify the direc-tion and extremity of behavior. Thus, failureto smile at a wedding may be classified asvery somber, whereas the same act at afuneral would not be. Consensus informationmay also help define the context within whicha behavior has occurred. The presence of ahigh proportion of smiling people implies ahappy occasion, which in turn determines the

expected level, on the cheerfulness dimension,of behavior in that situation.

Distinctiveness and consistency informa-tion cover multiple observations of the sameactor's behavior, being based on the varia-bility of behavior across stimuli and time,respectively. Given such information on therange of an actor's behavior on different oc-casions, the observer may be able to estimatethe average level of behavior exhibited bythat actor and, using the partially restrictiveschema, make inferences about the corre-sponding dispositional level. Consensus in-formation, on the other hand, requires onlyone occasion of observation. Deviation of anactor's behavior from consensus provides in-formation that, in effect, substitutes for mul-tiple observations of that actor's behavior.When an actor exhibits a behavior that isunusual for the situation, the observer caninfer that such behavior is relatively frequentfor that actor and, based on this implicitfrequency information, make judgmentsabout the average value of the actor's be-haviors and corresponding disposition.

Hierarchically Restrictive Schema

The second generalized schema to be elab-orated also starts with the assumption thateach person occupies some specific positionon the attribute continuum. The pattern ofimplicational relationships between disposi-tional and behavioral classifications is quitedifferent, however, from that defining thepartially restrictive schema. The hierarchi-cally restrictive schema assumes that dispo-sitional classifications at the upper extremeof a unipolar attribute continuum are notbehaviorally restricted, whereas dispositionsat the lower extreme of the continuum arebehaviorally restricted. Dispositions occupy-ing the middle ranges of the continuum areassumed to be restricted to the range of be-haviors at and below that point on the con-tinuum. This pattern of relationship is showngraphically in Figure 4. As in Figure 2, thepresence of an arrow linking a dispositionaland a behavioral classification implies that#(By |D4) > 0.

The hierarchically restrictive schema isprobably best illustrated by dispositional at-


DISPOSITION

D2

BEHAVIOR

»Dz

D

DoFigure 4. The hierarchically restrictive schema.(Subscripts 2, 1, and 0 represent, respectively, ex-treme, moderate, and very low levels of a dispositionor behavior.)

tributes involving skill or ability, where thecorresponding behavioral continuum reflectsdegree of difficulty of a performance on thatskill dimension (Reeder et al., 1977). Forany particular skill, an individual is expectedto have a relatively stable dispositional level,or aptitude, ranging from little/none to veryhigh. It is intuitively reasonable that thoseof high skill are expected to be capable ofaltering their performance across a widerange of difficulty levels, depending on moti-vation and task demands. Persons of lesserskill, however, may be expected to achieveperformances commensurate with their abilitylevel, or of lower difficulty, but are not ex-pected to achieve at levels above their apti-tude.0 Because of this asymmetry, disposi-tional attributions for poor performance willbe more context dependent than those forexcellent performance. Exceptionally goodperformance is always informative of a cor-respondent disposition, but poor or mediocreperformance can lead to correspondent infer-ence only under circumstances that provideboth motivation and opportunity for high-level performance. This representation ofability dimensions is very similar to Kelley's(1971) description of the multiple necessaryschema relating effort and ability to perform-ance outcomes.

The hierarchically restrictive pattern mightalso be invoked in the case of attributesthat relate to immorality, such as dishonesty-honesty. Suppose, for example, that D2 inFigure 4 represents a highly dishonest dis-position, D! a slightly dishonest disposition,and DO the absence of dishonesty, an excep-tionally honest disposition. Then B2, BI, and

B0 would represent highly dishonest, slightlydishonest, and nondishonest behavioral clas-sifications, respectively. The schema then re-flects the fact that by definition, honest per-sons (Do) are expected to refrain from dis-honest behaviors in any situation. A slightlydishonest disposition, on the other hand,implies both slightly dishonest and honestbehaviors, depending on the situation. Finally,the exceptionally dishonest disposition im-plies behaviors spanning the entire attributecontinuum. Thus, the observer might expecta ruthless con man to behave honestly undermost circumstances, obeying traffic lights andpaying for tickets at the theater. Yet whenhigh rewards are offered for the performanceof criminal behavior such as embezzlement,the highly dishonest person, but not theslightly dishonest or honest person, will beexpected to commit the crime.

The hierarchically restrictive schema dic-tates that the actor's dispositional positionon the attribute is determined by the mostextreme behavior the actor exhibits. Thus,although the observer may judge the conman's behavior to be perfectly honest 99%of the time, the presence of occasional ruth-less criminal behavior will insure the attribu-tion of the dishonest disposition. A singledishonest behavior is sufficient to producea confident attribution that the actor is dis-honest. Honest behavior, on the other hand,will be informative in some situations butnot others. For example, where honest be-havior is rewarded or where dishonest be-havior is not rewarded, the performance ofhonest behavior will be expected of personswith all varieties of dispositions and will,therefore, be dispositionally uninformative.Where rewards are present for dishonest be-havior, however, an honest act may be some-what more suggestive of an honest disposi-tion. In general, however, multiple observa-tions of behavior may be required before anhonest disposition is inferred with any cer-

o In the educational literature, it is interesting tonote that the concept of "overachievement" hasoccasionally been attacked as inherently contradic-tory, whereas the phenomenon of "underachieve-ment" has generally been accepted as valid.


tainty. In summary, if dishonesty is repre-sented as a hierarchically restrictive schema,contextual factors will be important deter-minants of attributions in the case of ob-served honest behavior but less so in the caseof observed dishonest behavior, because, re-gardless of the situation, the occurrence ofdishonest behavior precludes dispositionalclassification at any lower level of dishonesty.

Given the hierarchically restrictive schema,information about consensus may influencedispositional attributions indirectly by affect-ing judgments about behavioral classification.Consensus information has been demon-strated particularly to affect judgments oftask difficulty (Ajzen, 1977), and consensusinformation may, under some circumstances,lead an observer to classify a given behavioras less dishonest than would be the caseotherwise. For example, in a situation wheremoral standards are ambiguous, informationthat a majority of persons acted in an un-lawful manner might suggest to the observerthat the behavior itself was not particularlydishonest.

The effect of distinctiveness and consist-ency information on dispositional attributionwould be expected to differ depending onwhich pole of the attribute continuum werebeing considered. At the pole for which be-havioral implications are restricted (e.g., highmorality) the necessary condition for a con-fident dispositional judgment is that the ac-tor's behavior be invariably moral acrosstime and stimulus configurations (high inconsistency, low in distinctiveness). A be-havioral pattern short of consistent moralityis unlikely to produce an inference that theactor is highly moral. On the other hand, asingle highly immoral behavior, such as plac-ing razor blades in children's Halloweenapples, will likely lead to the ascription ofan immoral disposition, even if the behavioris inconsistent and highly distinctive (Birn-baum, 1973). Thus, Kelley's (1967) modelof causal attribution would be expected toapply only partially to attributes representedby the hierarchically restrictive schema.

DISPOSITION BEHAVIOR

DM

D--

Figure 5. The fully restrictive schema. (M = mod-erate or neutral; + = extremely positive; — = ex-tremely negative level of disposition or behavior;D = the absence of a stable disposition.)

Fully Restrictive Schema

The final schema to be discussed in thisarticle refers to attributes on which somepersons are judged to have stable disposi-tional levels while others are not. In thiscase, possession of a specific dispositionalposition on the attribute continuum impliesperformance of only a narrow range of be-havior that is congruent with that disposi-tion. The link between dispositional leveland behavioral classification is, thus, inflex-ible. If the actor is believed to vary attribute-relevant behaviors at different times and indifferent places, the actor is judged not topossess a dispositional position on that at-tribute at all. These assumptions are repre-sented graphically in Figure S. This schemaintroduces a new symbol, D to represent theabsence of any stable disposition relative tothe selected attribute. D is distinguished frompossession of a moderate, or neutral, stabledisposition, DM, which would be associatedwith invariant performance of behaviors clas-sified as moderate on the attribute continuum(cf. Sorrentino & Short, 1977).

Certain dispositions such as preferences,values, and personal styles may be conceptu-alized in accord with the fully restrictiveschema. For example, an observer might be-lieve that persons who are invariably neatpossess a disposition at one extreme of sucha continuum (D+ in Figure 5) and that per-petually sloppy persons fall at the oppositeend of the dispositional continuum (D_).Persons who are observed to be neat on someoccasions and sloppy on others would not beassumed to possess a dispositional positionon the neatness dimension (D).


Given the fully restrictive schema, con-textual factors will exert a powerful effect indetermining whether behaviors will lead todispositional attribution, much in the mannerproposed by Jones and Davis (196S). Whenstrong social pressures are present for a par-ticular behavior, such as keeping a tidy deskat work, the observer would expect the per-formance of this behavior by both personswho are dispositionally neat and those withno dispositional position, so such behaviorwould be dispositionally uninformative in thiscontext. If the actor were to keep a messydesk at work, however, the observer couldinfer that the actor possesses a correspondentdisposition, since the lack of a disposition(D) would imply the performance of moresocially desirable behavior in keeping withthe situation. In summary, when the fullyrestrictive schema is invoked, the perform-ance of socially undesirable behavior will bedispositionally informative, whereas a singleperformance of socially desirable behaviorwill not.

In the case of desirable behaviors, multipleobservations of the actor in different situa-tions would be required before a confidentdispositional inference could be drawn. Ifthe actor consistently performs in a particu-lar manner over multiple observations, theobserver will ascribe a disposition to theactor that is congruent with this narrowrange of observed behavior. The mode (mostfrequent) level of behavior will most likelyserve as the basis for this dispositional at-tribution. Thus, distinctiveness and consist-ency information (Kelley, 1967) are particu-larly relevant to the inference process whenthe fully restrictive schema is invoked.

As with the other schemata, consensus in-formation (Kelley, 1967) is likely to influ-ence dispositional attribution indirectlythrough its effects on behavior classification.Consensus data also provide informationabout situational constraints or the socialdesirability of a given behavior. Thus, in-formation that 9 of 10 desks in the depart-ment are impeccably neat may suggest thatkeeping a neat desk is socially desirable, and,as a consequence, neat behavior in this con-

text will be less dispositionally informativethan the one instance of messy behavior.

When the Various Schemata Will be Elicited

The three schemata described representalternative ways of conceptualizing the im-plicational relations between dispositions andbehavior. No claim is made that they pro-vide an exhaustive description of availableschematic representations, but these threecover a broad range of psychological attri-butes. The structure of each schema reflectsdefinitional properties shared by attributesof a particular type.

The partially restrictive schema is appli-cable to those traits for which correspondingbehaviors can be expected to vary in bothdirections around some characteristic level.Moderate dispositional levels are associatedwith a wide range of variation in behaviors,whereas more extreme levels are somewhatmore restricted in behavioral expression. Per-sonality characteristics that have no clearskill component—such as friendliness, curi-osity, cooperativeness—are most illustrativeof this class of attributes.

The hierarchically restrictive schema ap-plies to attributes for which variation in be-havior is restricted to a level correspondentto the actor's dispositional level or levelsrequiring less of the attribute in question.As a result, persons at the low end of theattribute continuum are assumed to be lim-ited to behaviors in the correspondent range,whereas persons at the high end are capableof behaviors across the full range of the at-tribute continuum. Traits involving skill orability provide the clearest illustration of thisschema, including dimensions reflecting socialskills, such as extraversion and leadership.It has also been suggested on conceptualgrounds, and supported by some empiricalfindings (see below), that attributes involv-ing a morality component are also repre-sented in terms of the hierarchically restric-tive schema, in that an actor's dispositionallevel of immorality is set at the level of themost extreme behavior engaged in, ratherthan at the most typical behavior.

The fully restrictive schema is distin-guished from the previous two in applying


to attributes—such as preferences and values—for which the absence of any stable dis-positional level on the part of any particularactor is a possibility. For such attributes,the presence of a dispositional level impliesa consistent characteristic orientation towarda particular object or condition (e.g., seek-ing, avoiding) with a narrow range of varia-tion of behavior. An actor who manifests awide range of attribute-relevant behaviorsacross time or situations would not beascribed a disposition within this schema.

Although an a priori relationship is as-sumed between the implicational schemataand definitional properties of specifiableclasses of attributes, a particular trait wordmay elicit different schematic representationsdepending on the type of behavior observedor the inference task involved. For example,if an observer were to be expected to inferan actor's level of artistic ability based onthe actor's brief self-descriptive statement("I paint like Renoir!"), it is likely that theinference would be based on a partiallyrestrictive schema. If, however, the observer'sinference were to be made after viewing apainting actually produced by the actor, aninference based on the hierarchically restric-tive schema would be more likely.

Review of Related Research

Among the numerous studies conductedwithin the attribution theory framework, sev-eral inconsistencies in both theory and datacan be identified. Most of these have to dowith the utilization or weighting of particularclasses of informational cues such as situa-tional context, consensus, and informationregarding the actor's past behavior. For ex-ample, many studies have supported theproposition that "in-role" behavior that isconsistent with situational rewards does notlead to confident dispositional inferencesabout actors (Jones & Davis, 1965). In con-trast to this proposition, Heider (1958)maintains that "behavior tends to engulf thefield," and several studies provide evidencethat attributors sometimes ignore or appearto give little consideration to situational vari-ables when judging an actor on the basis of a

sample of his or her behavior (Jones & Har-ris, 1967; Snyder & Jones, 1974; Reederetal., 1977).

Inconsistent findings have also marked re-search investigating the effect of consensusinformation on attributions. Kelley (1967, p.194) has argued convincingly that to the ex-tent an actor responds in agreement with aconsensus of other persons, causal attribu-tions are directed toward the stimulus en-vironment and away from intrapersonal char-acteristics. On the other hand, both theoryand data have been offered in support of thecontention that people are largely uninflu-enced in their causal attributions by knowl-edge of the behavior of others (Nisbett &Borgida, 1975).

Yet another set of diverging theory andempirical findings can be found in studiesconcerned with the effect on attributionaljudgments of behavior that is inconsistentwith an actor's past behavior. A commonfinding is that inconsistent behavior tendsto be discounted. Attribution studies on theperceived causes of success and failure indi-cate that unstable factors, such as luck andeffort, are reported (as causal factors) whenan individual succeeds after never havingsucceeded in the past or fails after havinga history of repeated success (Weiner, 1974).In contrast, research also indicates that cer-tain types of information about an actor arerarely, if ever, discounted. For instance, so-cially undesirable behavior by an actor, evenif inconsistent with past behavior, generallyexerts more powerful influence on attributionthan does socially desirable behavior (Jones& Davis, 1965; Kanouse & Hansen, 1971).In the following sections of this article, eachof these anomalies from the attribution liter-ature will be reviewed to illustrate howsuch empirical inconsistencies can be resolvedby appropriate application of the schematicframework.

Context Versus "Behavior Engulfingthe Field"

In attributional studies of "role playing,"clear context effects are generally obtainedwhen an actor provides a verbal description


of his or her standing on an attribute con-tinuum (Jones, Davis, & Gergen, 1961; Mills& Jellison, 1967). Although the informationvalue of situationally appropriate verbal be-havior for inferring the dispositional stateof the actor is perceived to be low, the oc-currence of verbal behavior that is incon-sistent (out of role) with situational pres-sures is believed to be likely only for per-sons with congruent dispositions (Trope &Burnstein, 1975).

Verbal statements that merely assert aparticular attitudinal position or the pos-session of a particular personality character-istic should elicit a partially restrictive im-plicational schema, with relatively little re-strictiveness. Any dispositional level (exceptthose at the most extreme ends of the con-tinuum) would be linked to potential be-haviors across a wide range of attributelevels. The perceived probability that anygiven actor would produce a particular levelof such behaviors would then depend heavilyon the situational demands. The effects ofcontextual factors for such behaviors wouldalso be expected to be symmetrical, in thatan actor with a given dispositional level couldbe equally likely to perform behaviors aboveor below that level, depending on situationalappropriateness.

A well-known experiment by Jones et al.(1961) best illustrates the context depend-ence of inferences based on self-descriptivestatements. In that study, observers weregiven varied information as to the job re-quirements for which a tape-recorded re-spondent was purportedly being interviewed.Based on a series of brief self-descriptivestatements, in which the interviewee de-scribed himself in ways that were either"inner-directed" or "outer-directed," the ob-server was to rate the interviewee's actuallevel of "affiliativeness" and "conforming-ness." The resulting ratings were context de-pendent; if the actor's self-descriptions wereconsistent with presumed job requirements,trait ratings were less correspondent thanwhen the actor's statements were demandinconsistent (out-of-role). The effect of con-text on correspondent inference was equiva-lent for both types of actor behavior.

In many "role playing" studies the actordoes more than merely make or endorse averbal assertion about his or her standing onan attribute dimension. Observers may watchand listen to the actor on videotape for sev-eral minutes (Miller, 1976) or read a lengthyessay prepared by the actor (Jones & Harris,1967). To the degree that the period ofbehavioral observation is of extended dura-tion, and the actor displays extensive knowl-edge or familiarity with issues or shows adegree of enthusiasm, implicational links be-tween dispositional levels and such behaviorsare likely to be more restricted than in thecase of brief verbal assertions. That is, eachdispositional level is likely to imply only alimited range of such intensive behaviorsalong the attribute continuum. The result ofthis relative constriction of implicationallinks is that context effects should be moredifficult to demonstrate, because the infer-ence from a given behavior classification toa specific dispositional position will be lesscontext dependent. Indeed, a series of studies(Jones & Harris, 1967; Miller, 1976; Snyder& Jones, 1974) indicates that when an actorwrites an essay or gives a speech, even underpowerful constraints, observers still tend toattribute behavior-consistent attitudes to theactor. Although situational demands do havesome influence on attributions in these stud-ies, the most striking effect is that behaviortends to "engulf the field" (Heider, 1958).

Whenever the partially and fully restric-tive schemata are invoked, the relative im-pact of behavior and contextual factors onattributions will depend on the extent towhich the behavior is perceived to deviate,in either direction, from situational expecta-tions. In general, the more extreme the be-havior, the more constricted the range ofalternative dispositional positions that willbe perceived as likely to have given rise to it,particularly if the behavior is evaluated asmore extreme than the situation demands.Thus, any factors that lead to classifying anactor's behavior toward one extreme or theother of the attribute continuum will pro-mote correspondent dispositional attribution,even in the face of salient situational con-straints (unless the situational demands are


perceived to promote very extreme behav-iors).

When a speech or essay has been preparedby the experimenter, it seems especiallylikely that it will be classified by observer-subjects as toward the extreme end of theattitudinal issue (e.g., Jones & Harris, 1967;Miller, 1976). However, even when essayshave been prepared by actual subjects in anexperiment, the attitude of the writer is ratedby observers as significantly higher (in thedirection of the essay's position) than theattitude the actor attributes to him- or her-self (Snyder & Jones, 1974). An explanationof this tendency of observers to rate the be-havior of others as extreme may be derivedfrom research on the "false consensus bias"(Ross, 1977). This bias refers to the findingthat individuals tend to view their own be-havior in a particular situation as relativelymoderate and appropriate to circumstancesand to evaluate behavior of others that dif-fers from their own as "uncommon, deviant,and inappropriate" (Ross, 1977, p. 188). Ifwe assume that an essay or speech preparedby another person is likely to contain argu-ments that are novel (i.e., different from theones that would be generated by the subjecthim- or herself), then the false consensusbias would operate in the direction of mak-ing that essay appear more extreme thannecessary. Once the behavior has been classi-fied as more extieme than that called for bysituational demands, application of the par-tially or fully restrictive implicational schemadictates that such behavior is unlikely exceptin the presence of a correspondent disposi-tional state.

Another line of "role playing" research(Messick & Reeder, 1972, 1974; Reeder, inpress) illustrates how context effects are al-tered when the hierarchically restrictiveschema is invoked. In the first study of thissequence (Messick & Reeder, 1972), ob-servers watched a videotape of an actor whoportrayed himself as introverted during a jobinterview. The context of the interview wasvaried so that the behavior appeared con-sistent with situational demands in some con-ditions and inconsistent with situational de-mands in other conditions. Consistent with

past research (Jones et al., 1961) observersjudged the actor to be more introverted whenthe introverted performance was inconsistent,as opposed to consistent, with situational de-mands. A follow-up study, however, did notcorroborate these findings. Messick andReeder (1974) presented observers with avideotape of an actor who portrayed him-self as extraverted during a job interview.Once again the context of the interview wasvaried so that the behavior appeared eitherconsistent or inconsistent with situational de-mands. In contrast to the previous work withintroversion, the extroverted performance bythe actor led observers to attribute a rela-tively high degree of extroversion to theactor, regardless of the situational demandvariable. In other words, attributions basedon an introverted performance were contextdependent, whereas attributions based on anextroverted performance were not.

Since context effects occurred for behaviorat one end of an attribute continuum (in-troversion) and not the other (extroversion),these results suggest that the extroversiondimension is conceptualized as a hierarchi-cally restrictive schema. Specifically, observ-ers may believe that an extroverted disposi-tion implies a wide range of behaviors alongthe continuum, including nonextroverted (in-troverted) behavior, whereas an introverteddisposition implies a very limited range ofbehaviors along the extroversion continuum.Such an implicational pattern could occur ifobservers view extroverts as more sociallyadept or skillful than introverts.

General support for this interpretation wasprovided in a questionnaire study by Reederet al. (1977). Observers believed introvertsto be less capable of adequately portraying(role playing) extroversion than were extro-verts of portraying introversion. Other resultsfrom the same questionnaire suggested thata great number of attribute continua elicitthe hierarchically restrictive schema. In ad-dition to extroversion-introversion, signifi-cant asymmetries in perceived role-takingability were found for attributes such astrusting-suspecting, relaxed-tense, and flex-ible-rigid, such that actors who possessedthe first trait of each of these attribute pairs


(trusting, relaxed, flexible) were perceivedas more capable of manifesting the oppositetype of behavior (suspecting, tense, rigid)than vice versa. As expected, the largestasymmetries occurred on attributes mostclearly related to skill or ability. A particu-larly large asymmetry in perceived role-taking ability was observed on the intelli-gent-unintelligent continuum. On a 7-pointscale, an intelligent person was rated verycapable of manifesting unintelligent behavior(M = 5.3), whereas an unintelligent personwas rated relatively incapable of manifestingintelligent behavior (M=2.3).

Because of the large asymmetry obtainedfrom the questionnaire results by Reederet al. (1977), the intelligent-unintelligentattribute was selected for further investi-gation in an experimental study. In one ofthe scenarios used in the study, observersread a two-page story about an actor namedBill who attended a Saturday-night highschool dance party. During the course ofthe evening, he invited an attractive youngwoman to go out on a date with him. Sheresponded by mentioning that she preferredeither intellectual or nonintellectual (depend-ing on the experimental condition) companyand invited Bill to talk about himself. Billresponded to this manipulation of situationaldemand by describing himself as either in-tellectual or nonintellectual. A crucial aspectof this behavioral manipulation was that theactor provided convincing evidence for hisintellectuality in the intellectual performancecondition by citing and commenting uponvarious books he had read. The results in-dicated that, as expected, the actor's intel-lectual behavior led observers to make dis-positional inferences of high intellectualityacross both demand conditions. The actor'snonintellectual behavior, however, produceddispositional inferences of low intellectualityonly when the situation demanded intellec-tual behavior. When the situation demandednonintellectual behavior, the actor's nonintel-lectual behavior produced moderate attribu-tions (near the center of the intellectuality-nonintellectuality scale). This pattern ofresults is exactly what would be expected

given the elicitation of a hierarchically re-strictive schema.

A related study (Reeder, in press) offeredadditional support for the hierarchically re-strictive schema, using an attribute dimen-sion with clear skill connotations. Observerswatched a videotape of a salesman engagedin a game of pocket billiards with a client.The actor (salesman) performed in a skill-ful, moderately skillful, or unskillful man-ner, depending on the experimental condition.Independent of the performance level, thedemands of the situation were manipulatedthrough a written scenario leading to expec-tations of a skillful billiards performance, anunskillful billiards performance, or no par-ticular type of billiards performance. Ob-servers' attributions based on the moderatelyskillful and skillful behavior were relativelyunaffected by context manipulation (i.e.,were equally correspondent in all demandconditions). The unskillful performance,however, led to attributions of low ability inthe presence of the skillful demand and at-tributions of moderate ability in the presenceof the unskillful demand.

Effect oj Consensus Information

The perceived uniqueness of an actor's be-havior is an important cue in the attribu-tional process in a number of ways. Accord-ing to Kelley's (1967) analysis of causalattribution, if an actor responds to a particu-lar stimulus in a different manner than doother actors (low consensus) the locus ofattributed causality shifts in the direction ofthe deviant actor and away from the stimu-lus. If the actor responds to a stimulus inthe same manner as other actors do (highconsensus), however, attributions of caus-ality focus on the stimulus. It follows fromKelley's analysis that if an actor succeeds ona task that others fail, the actor will bejudged to be the cause of his or her successand should be attributed high ability. Onthe other hand, if the actor succeeds on atask on which others also succeed, the taskitself will be viewed as the cause of theactor's success (the task was easy), and theactor may be attributed only a moderate


amount of ability. Studies of achievementattributions are among those that have sup-ported this predicted consensus effect. A.number of other studies, however, havefound the effect of consensus information ondispositional attributions to be weak or non-existent >(Nisbett & Borgida, 1975).

One way that consensus information maybe expected to affect the attribution processis through its influence on behavioral classi-fication. An observer may employ consensusinformation as a potent cue in estimatingthe extremity of an actor's behavior alongan attribute continuum. For example, if allan observer knows is that the actor succeededon a task, insufficient information is presentto classify the actor's behavior along therelevant ability continuum. Social compari-son (Festinger, 1954) information is usuallyneeded. For example, if the observer learnsthat the vast majority of others who haveattempted the task failed, the actor's success-ful performance can be classified as extremelyskilled, and on the basis of this extreme be-havioral classification, an extreme disposi-tional inference may follow.

Consistent with social comparison theory,it is likely that observers will utilize (ex-ternal) consensus information to the extentthat firm (internal) standards are absent.Thus, if an observer is unsure about thedegree of an attribute reflected in a givenperformance, information about the perform-ance levels of other actors is likely to be in-fluential. However, if the observer alreadyhas firm guidelines for judging the extremityof behavior, consensus information is un-likely to have much of an effect (Kelley,1967, p. 213). For example, public reactionto the Watergate scandal indicates that thedeceit of government employees is not viewedas any less despicable because it is wide-spread and not unique. Apparently, the pub-lic has a private standard by which the mor-ality of politicians' behavior is judged, andthat standard is not easily altered by con-sensus information.

When the observer possesses clear stan-dards for classifying behavior, consensus in-formation is unlikely to be influential.Miller, Gillen, Schenker, and Radlove (1973)

presented what is, perhaps, the clearest evi-dence of observers' relying on their ownstandards when judging an actor. Observerswere informed about the procedure of Mil-gram's (1963) classic study of obedience.Some subjects were shown the results of theexperiment, including information that 65%of Milgram's subjects delivered the maximumpossible shock (450 V) to an experimentalconfederate. Then all subjects were asked torate two persons who had delivered this levelof shock. In general, observers disregardedthe consensus information and gave negativeratings to the two persons. The fact that ad-ministering the maximum possible shock wasthe modal behavior in this situation did notshake observers from their preexisting stan-dards dictating that such behavior is im-moral. A similar study by Nisbett and Bor-gida (1975) also failed to find an effect forconsensus information.

When observers lack clear internal stan-dards for behavior classification, a salientmanipulation of consensus is likely to havea significant effect on attributions. Hansenand Stonner (1978) had observers view anactor (who was also a subject in the experi-ment) discriminate between pairs of toneson the basis of loudness. All subjects weretold that the actor made 7 correct discrimi-nations during the 15-trial sequence. Fur-ther, all subjects were shown a graph indi-cating that the actor's score was eithersuperior or inferior to that obtained by priorsubjects. Neither the actor nor the observeris likely to possess clear prior standards forbehavior classification in this situation. Inthis case, a strong effect of consensus in-formation was found: The actor's level ofability was rated higher by both actors andobservers when the actor's performance waspurportedly superior, as opposed to inferior,to that of other subjects.

In summary, the evidence is consistentwith the idea that dispositional judgmentsare influenced by consensus information tothe extent that a salient manipulation ofconsensus is employed and observers lackclear internal standards for classifying theactor's behavior. In addition, when observersare allowed to generate their own estimates


of the commonality of a given behavior(Ross, et al., 1977), estimated commonalityand extremity of trait inference (based onthe actor's behavior) correlate negatively(— .34). Within the present framework, theeffects of such consensus estimates are pre-sumed to operate indirectly on dispositionalattributions through their influence on be-havioral classification. Consensus informationwill be utilized to the extent that standardsfor classifying behaviors are needed. Oncethe extremity of behavior has been deter-mined, however, consensus is no longer di-rectly relevant to the attribution process,which will then be determined by applicationof an implicational schema.

Discounting Inconsistent Information

When forming an impression of an actor,observers show a tendency to discount, orattribute to temporary conditions, behaviorthat is inconsistent with information aboutthe actor that they already possess. Friezeand Weiner (1971), for example, providedobservers with information about an actorwho succeeded or failed on a task. Whenthis outcome was consistent with the actor'spast performance, observers attributed theoutcome to the causal factors of ability andtask difficulty. When the outcome was in-consistent with past performance, observersattributed the outcome to effort and luck.

In contrast to these studies, other linesof evidence indicate that a single inconsistentnegative behavior can have an unduly strongeffect on impressions (Jones & Davis, 1965;Kanouse & Hansen, 1971). A series of studiesby Birnbaum (1972, 1973) is illustrative.Observers were provided with informationabout actors who were described by variousbehaviors differing in morality. Preliminaryscaling insured that positive and negative be-haviors were equally polarized on the moral-ity scale. In one set of conditions, the actorwas described as performing either threehighly moral behaviors and one highly im-moral behavior or three highly immoral be-haviors and one highly moral behavior. Con-sistent with the findings of previous research,an inconsistent moral behavior was dis-counted by the observer: Morality ratings of

a person described by three immoral andone moral act differed only slightly fromratings given to a person described by fourimmoral behaviors. Immoral behaviors, how-ever, were never discounted in the overallimpression. A person described by threemoral behaviors and a single immoral be-havior received ratings on the negative sideof the morality scale.

It has already been suggested in discus-sion of the schematic model that for be-haviors involving morality attributes, a hier-archically restrictive schema is likely to beelicited, which dictates that immoral be-haviors are believed to be performed only byimmoral persons, whereas moral behaviorsare believed to be performed by both moraland immoral persons. It follows from theschema, therefore, that a single highly im-moral behavior will imply the presence of animmoral disposition in the actor. A singlehighly moral act, however, may (dependingupon the situation) imply a range of dis-positional classifications. Only a person whosebehavior is consistently moral in the faceof contrary situational pressures will beascribed a moral disposition. Consistent withthese assumptions, Birnbaum (1973) con-cluded that "bad deeds have an overridingimpact on the overall judgment. A personmay be judged mostly by his worst baddeed" (p. 399).

A hierarchically restrictive schema is alsoespecially likely to be elicited when disposi-tional inference focuses on attributes con-cerned with skill or ability, such that un-skilled persons are believed to be behaviorallyrestricted, whereas skillful persons are not.Since skillful behavior implies a skillful dis-position only, and unskillful behavior mayimply a range of dispositions depending onthe situation, an inconsistent highly skillfulperformance would be discounted less thanan inconsistent unskillful performance. Forexample, suppose that a previously unaccom-plished athlete were to break the world'srecord for the mile run or weight lifting.It is unlikely that observers would ignoresuch an inconsistent performance in judgingthe overall ability of the athlete. Runningand weight lifting are relatively "pure"


ability attributes, and extremely successfulperformances on these attributes are unlikelyto be viewed as "one in a million" runs or"lucky" lifts. Heider (1958) seems to haveanticipated this point, proposing that in con-trast to failure, "success even when under-stood as due to a transitory positive state inthe person, often leads to the conclusion thatthe person can do the task" (p. 95). Thisdifference in the discounting tendency be-tween success and failure should increasedirectly with the perceived skill involved inthe successful behavior. Thus, the asymmetrythat has been observed in the attributionliterature, whereby success is attributed moreconsistently than failure to stable causessuch as ability (e.g., Frieze & Weiner, 1971),follows directly from the hierarchically re-strictive schema for skill-related dispositionsand can be accounted for without recourse tomotivation biases.

Conclusions

Application of the schematic model pro-vides an integrative framework for studyingutilization of various sources of informationin the attribution process. Separating thelocus of effects into those related to be-havioral classification and those affectingdispositional inference directly serves toclarify the processes involved and to makesalient the relevance of social judgment re-search in general to social inference.

By specifying the implicational schemaemployed in a particular judgment, it is pos-sible to predict what types of informationwill carry the most weight in dispositionalattributions. Basically, each schema placesemphasis on a different aspect of the dis-tribution of an actor's behaviors across levelsof the attribute in question. With the par-tially restrictive schema, for instance, dis-positional inference requires knowledge ofthe relative frequency of occurrence of be-haviors at each level, since the actor's dis-positional level corresponds to the averagelevel of behaviors exhibited. The fully re-strictive schema, on the other hand, focusesattention on the variance of the distributionof behaviors, since dispositional inference de-

pends on evidence for a modal level of be-havior with very small variance around themode. Finally, dispositional attribution basedon the hierarchically restrictive schema relieson knowledge of the most extreme behaviorin an actor's repertory. Thus, depending onwhat schema is invoked, any information thatcarries implications regarding the relevantfeature of the actor's distribution of behav-iors will affect the inference of correspondentattributions.

In this article an attempt has been madeto specify attribute domains for which eachschema is most likely to be appropriate. Theutility of the hierarchically restrictive schemafor representing attributes involving a skillcomponent has been tested directly, and fur-ther research is needed to assess the appli-cability of other schemata to given attributesand to determine whether additional sche-mata are needed to represent the full rangeof dispositional attributes. It is clear, how-ever, that such specification will improve theprecision of existing models of the social in-ference process.

Reference Note

1. Messick, D. M. Logical aspects of social infer-ence. Paper presented at the Third ResearchConference on Subjective Probability, Utility,and Decision Making, Brunei University, Ux-bridge, England, 1971.

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Received March 22, 1978Revision received October 5, 1978 •

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a schematic model of dispositional attribution in ......of course, once a dispositional attribution...

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