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AResponsetoChalmers’MasterArgument1

MattanGriffel

NewYorkUniversity

Introduction

Anti‐physicalistssometimesarguefromcertainepistemicgapstothe

existenceofanontologicalgapinnature.Themostpromisingphysicalistresponse

hasbecomeknownasthe“phenomenalconceptstrategy”.Chalmers’(2007)“master

argument”claimstoshowthatnoversionofthephenomenalconceptstrategycan

succeed.InthispaperIarguethatChalmers’masterargumentmischaracterizesthe

phenomenalconceptstrategy.Iconcludebyproposinganalternative

characterizationofthephenomenalconceptstrategy,onethatisimmuneto

Chalmers’objections.

1.Theepistemicgaps

LetPbethecompletephysicaltruthaboutourworld:areallylongsentence

describingallthephysicalpropertiesofeveryphysicalthinginouruniverseaswell

asthephysicallawsbywhichtheyaregoverned.LetQbeanarbitrarytruthabout

1IwouldliketothankmyadvisorNedBlockforhisgenerosityandinfinitepatience,aswellasKatiBalog,DavidChalmers,DianeKlein,HarrisonMahaffey,FaridMasrour,JamesPartridge,JimPryor,TedSiderandSharonStreetforcommentsandhelpfuldiscussionofthispaper.

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consciousness2:forexample,thefactthatsomeoneisconscious,orthatIamhaving

aphenomenalexperienceofacertainshadeofred.

Mostpuzzlesaboutconsciousnessstartwiththeobservationthatthere

appeartobegapsbetweenPandQ.Let’sconsiderthreethought‐experiments:

TE13:Maryhasspentherentirelifeinsideablack‐and‐whiteroom.From

insideherroomshehassomehowcometoknowallofthephysicalfactsaboutthe

world,perhapsbyreadingbooksorbylookingoutattheworldusingablack‐and‐

whitetelevisionscreen.MaryknowsP.Butwhathappenswhenshe’sreleasedfrom

herroom?Wecantrytoimagineherreactionassheseescolorsforthefirsttime.

“Sothisiswhatit’sliketoseered!”shemightsay.Havingaphenomenalexperience

ofrednessforthefirsttime…doesthismeanMaryhaslearnedsomethingnew?

SupposeQisafactaboutwhatitisliketoseered.DoesMarynowknowQ?Ifnot,

therewasagapbetweenherknowledgeofPandherknowledgeofQ.

TE2:Azombieisahypotheticalcreaturethatisphysicallyidenticaltoa

consciousbeingbutisnotitselfconscious.Canyouconceiveofazombie?There

certainlydoesn’tseemtobeanysortofcontradiction.Considerazombieworldthat

isphysicallyidenticaltoours,butinwhichnocreatureisconscious.SupposeQisthe

truththatsomeoneisconscious.ZombieworldisaworldinwhichPistruebutQis

false.Canyouconceiveofzombieworld?Ifso,thereisagapbetweenyour

conceivingofPandconceivingofQ.

2By“consciousness”Imeansubjectiveorphenomenalexperience.Athingis“conscious”ifthereissomethingitislikebethatthing.ThisdefinitionofconsciousnesswasproposedbyNagel(1974).3TE1isavariationofFrankJackson’scaseofMaryintheblack‐and‐white‐room.

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TE3:Thenaturalsciences–biology,chemistry,physics–areallthewaysin

whichwetrytounderstandtheworldaroundus.Imaginebeinggivenanobject

you’veneverseenbefore:itlookslikeacrossbetweenastoolandabanana,plusit

canfly.Howwouldyouexplainitphysically?Youcanuseeverypossiblescientific

toolavailable.Youcouldinvestigateitsstructure:spatiotemporalfeatureslike

weight,density,composition.Youcouldinvestigateitsfunction:causalroleslike

howitinteractswithitsenvironment,whatitdoes,howitisabletofly.Now

imaginebeinggivenQ:thewayaparticularcupofcoffeesmells.Itdoesn’tseemto

haveastructure.Itdoesn’tseemtohaveafunction.CouldyouexplainQtomein

physicalterms?Ifnot,thereisagapbetweenPandexplainabilityofQ.

Eachofthesethoughtexperimentsrepresentsaparticularkindofepistemic

gap.They’recalledepistemicgapsbecauseeachofthemdeniesanepistemicrelation

betweenPandQ:arelationinvolvingwhatwecanknow,whatwecanconceive,or

whatwecanexplain.Theycanbesummarizedmuchmoreclearly(thoughmuchless

vividly)likethis:

Theknowledgegap:QcannotbededucedfromP

Theconceptualgap:PcanbeconceivedwithoutQ

Theexplanatorygap:PcannotexplainQ

2.Inferencetoanontologicalgap

Fromthesethreeepistemicgaps,somepeopleinferthatthereisa

correspondinggapinthefundamentalnature,orontology,ofourworld.Let’scall

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thesepeople“anti‐physicalists”.Anti‐physicaliststendtodisagreewithanother

groupofpeople:“physicalists”.Physicaliststhinkthattheworldispurelyphysical.

Anti‐physicalistsdonot.Anti‐physicalistsinfertheexistenceofanontologicalgapin

naturebetweenthephysicalandthephenomenal,thatis,theyinferthatthephysical

andthephenomenalaretwofundamentallydifferentkindsofthings.Thespecific

inferentialclaimananti‐physicalistwillmakedependsonwhichepistemicgapshe

startsoutfrom.Thisinferencetoanontologicalgapiseitherdirectorindirect.

Directinferencehappensonthebasisoftheexplanatorygap:ifphysicalfactscan’t

explainconsciousness,thenconsciousnesscan’tbeaphysicalfact.Anindirect

inferencehappensonthebasisoftheothertwoepistemicgaps.Forexample,ifP&~Q

isconceivable,anti‐physicalistsofteninferthatP&~Qismetaphysicallypossible,and

thereforephysicalismisfalse.

Chalmers(1996)arguesthatthiskindofaninferenceisjustifiedonapriori

groundsbecausereasonitselfentitlesustomakeit.Theideaisthat,bydefault,ifS

isconceivablethenweshouldbelievethatSispossible.Weshouldn’tunderstand

Chalmerstobesayingthisinferencewillalwaysberight.Inmanycases,nodoubt,

thiskindofinferenceleadsustothewrongconclusion.Butifwedoitcarefully,

takingallthenecessaryprecautionstoavoidmakingtheinferencewhenwe

shouldn’t,thenChalmersthinkswecanbeprettycertainthatwe’llberight(certain

enoughtoqualifyasbeingjustified).Theburdenofproof,then,liesonthe

physicalisttoprovidesomesortofindicationthattheinferencetoanontological

gapisabadone.Andifshecan’t,thenwhynotinfer?

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Argumentslikethoseoutlinedabovethatrelyoninferencefromanepistemic

gaptoanontologicalgap,arewhatChalmers(2002a)callsepistemicarguments

againstphysicalism.Roughlyspeaking,theyworklikethis:

(1) Thereisanepistemicgapbetweenphysicalandphenomenaltruths.

(2) Ifthereisanepistemicgapbetweenphysicalandphenomenaltruths,

thenthereisanontologicalgap,andphysicalismisfalse.

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(3) Physicalismisfalse.

3.Thetype­Bphysicalistresponse

Type‐Bphysicalistsaccepttheepistemicgapsbutdenyanontologicalgap.

TheyholdthatMarylacksknowledgebutnotknowledgeofanynon‐physicalfacts,

thatzombiesareconceivablebutnotmetaphysicallypossible,andthatalthough

therewillneverbeasatisfyingexplanationofconsciousnessintermsofphysical

processes,consciousnessisaresultofphysicalprocessesnonetheless.Thisview

maystrikesomeasadhoc.Ifconsciousnessisaresultofphysicalprocesses,why

thinkthattheprocessbywhichitoccursisepistemicallyinaccessible?Theredoesn’t

seemtobeanysatisfyingwaytogroundtheexistenceoftheepistemicgapsina

universethatisentirelyphysical.

Type‐Bphysicalistsfacethedifficulttaskofdenyingtheinferencefromthe

epistemicgapstoanontologicalgap.Onewaytodothisistodenythatourmodal

intuitions–intuitionsaboutwhatscenariosarepossibleornecessary–areever

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justified.Thiswouldcertainlyhelptype‐Bphysicalistsdealwiththeproblemsposed

bytheepistemicgaps,butitwouldalsorequirethetype‐Bphysicalisttodefend

somethinglikeaverystrongformofmodalskepticism,theviewthatwearenot

justifiedinmakingcertainmodalinferencestometaphysicalpossibilityor

necessity.4Evenamongmodalskeptics,fewarewillingtoarguethatourmodal

intuitionsareneverjustified.Surely,weareatleastsometimesjustifiedinmaking

modalinferencesincasesofeverydaylife,orinscience,oreveninphilosophy.We

oftenuseourmodalintuitionsasthefoundationforbeliefsaboutthepossible

consequencesofouractions.Forexample,whenIlookoutthewindowandseedark

clouds,Iformthebeliefthatitmightrain,andsoIgrabmyumbrellabeforegoing

outside.Wouldthetype‐Bphysicalistreallywanttosaythatallofourbeliefsabout

thefutureformedonthebasisofourmodalintuitionsareunjustified?Thisstrikes

measabadoption.

Whatthetype‐Bphysicalistneedstodoisdiscriminatebetweenthosecases

inwhichourmodalintuitionsarejustifiedandthosecasesinwhichtheyarenot.

Hopefully,shecanthenshowwhyourmodalintuitioninthecaseoftheinference

fromtheepistemicgapstoanontologicalgapisnotjustified.Thisisexactlywhatthe

type‐Bphysicalistattemptstodointhephenomenalconceptstrategy.

4.Thephenomenalconceptstrategy

FromhereonI’llbefocusingonthephenomenalconceptstrategy.The

discussionwillconsistofabriefoverviewofitsorigins,andareviewofsomeofthe4FormoreontheissuesofmodalskepticismseeVanInwagen’s“ModalEpistemology”(1997).

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moreprominentaccounts.ThoughforthemostpartI’llbetalkingaboutthestrategy

inbroadstrokes.Theideaistogetagoodfeelforwhatexactlyittriestodoandhow

ittriestodoit.ThatwaywhenwegettoChalmers’attackonthephenomenal

conceptstrategy,we’llknowwhattoexpectandhowtodealwithit.

Thebasicideabehindthephenomenalconceptstrategyistolocatethe

sourceoftheepistemicgapsintheepistemicrelationshipbetweenourphysicaland

phenomenalconceptsratherthanthemetaphysicalrelationshipbetweenphysical

andphenomenalproperties.Proponentsofthephenomenalconceptstrategy

providevariousaccountsofthenatureofourphenomenalconcepts,andthenthey

suggestthattheseaccountspredicttheexistenceoftheepistemicgapsbetween

physicalpropertiesconceivedunderphysicalconceptsandphenomenalproperties

conceivedunderphenomenalconcepts.Mostimportantly,theyclaimthatthese

accountsarecompatiblewithphysicalism.Ifallofthesestepsaredonecorrectly,the

phenomenalconceptstrategyshouldshowhowtheepistemicgapsarecompatible

withphysicalism.

ThephenomenalconceptstrategydevelopedoutofapaperbyBrianLoar

called“PhenomenalStates”(1990/97)inwhichhesuggeststhatphenomenal

conceptsareunlikeotherconceptsinthefollowingtwoways:(i)theyreferdirectly

tophenomenalstates(theirreferents),and(ii)theirmodeofpresentation,orwayin

whichtheypresenttheirreferent,somehowinvolvesthephenomenalexperience

itself.Subsequentaccountsofphenomenalconceptstendtodevelopeitherofthese

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twoideas,soitmakessensetoclassifythemintotwocategories:direct­reference

accountsandspecialmodesofpresentationaccounts.5

4.1.Direct­referenceaccounts

Direct‐referenceaccountsfocusonthedirectnessoftherelationship

betweenphenomenalconceptsandtheirreferents,phenomenalstates:

Onthecausal­recognitionalaccount,Tye(2003)suggeststhatphenomenal

conceptsarespecialrecognitionalconceptsthatreferdirectly.Theyhavenomode

ofpresentation.Instead,theyaretiedtotheirreferentsviaacausalconnection.

Onthedemonstrativeaccountphenomenalconceptsareasortof

demonstrative.Perry(2001)suggeststhatphenomenalconceptsare

demonstrativeswherethedemonstrativeisguidedtoitsreferentviaaperceptual

state.Levin(2007)suggeststhatphenomenalconceptsaretypedemonstratives

withnomodeofpresentationatall.

Ontheinformation­theoreticaccount,AydedeandGüzeldere(2005)suggest

aninformation‐theoreticanalysisoftherelationbetweenphenomenalconceptsand

sensoryconcepts.Theyclaimwearecognitivelydesignedtoacquiresensory

conceptsdirectlyfromourexperiences.(e.g.conceptsofcolors,sounds,shapesare

triggeredbycorrespondingexperiences).Itissuggestedthatthesesensoryconcepts

doubleasphenomenalconceptswhenweusethesamecognitivestructuresin

introspection.

5Fortheclassificationsinthissection,IammuchindebtedtotheworkdonebyBalog(2009a)

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4.2.Specialmodesofpresentationaccounts

Specialmodesofpresentationaccountstrytocapturethespecialintimacy

betweenphenomenalconceptsandphenomenalstatesbysuggestingthatthemode

ofpresentationofaphenomenalconceptinvolvesthephenomenalexperienceitself

thatthephenomenalconceptrefersto:

Ontherecognitionalaccount,Carruthers(2004)suggeststhatphenomenal

conceptsarerecognitionalconceptswithoutdescriptivemodesofpresentationand

positstheexistenceofhigher‐orderexperiencesofexperiencesthatguideour

phenomenalconceptstotheirreferents.

Ontheconstitutionalaccount,phenomenalconceptsareconstitutedbythe

phenomenalexperiencestheyreferto.Formostconcepts,itdoesn’tmatterwhat

constitutesaparticulartokenofaconcept,solongastherightkindsofcausalor

informationalrelationsholdbetweenitandtherestoftheworld.Forexample,it

doesn’tmatterwhatneuralconfigurationsconstituteaparticulartokenofthe

conceptbirdaslongastherightkindsofcausalorinformationalrelationsbetween

birdandbirdshold.However,forphenomenalconceptsconstitutiondoesmatterfor

reference:bothintermsofhowreferenceisdeterminedandhowtheconcepts

presenttheirreferents.Everytokenofaphenomenalconceptappliedtoacurrent

phenomenalexperienceisconstitutedbythatphenomenalexperienceitself.

Versionsoftheconstitutionalaccountofphenomenalconceptshavebeenproposed

by,Papineau(2002,2007),Block(2006),andBalog(2006).

Onthedistinctconceptualrolesaccount,firstproposedbyNagel(1974)and

defendedbyHill(1997)HillandMcLaughlin(1999),phenomenalconceptsand

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physicalconceptsareemployedbyindependently‐operatingcognitivefaculties,and

thereforeplayverydifferentconceptualroles.Ourabilitytosplicetogether

situationsconceivedunderseparatecognitivefacultiesintooneseeminglycoherent

situationexplainswhywecanconceiveofphysicalstateswithouttheir

accompanyingphenomenalstatesandviceversa.Asaresult,weshouldexpect

phenomenalconceptsandphysicalconceptstocomeapartepistemically,evenif

theydoinfactshareareferent.

VariousotherversionshavebeenproposedbySturgeon(1994),Ismael

(1999),Levine(2001),O’Dea(2002),andPerry(2001).

Itisarguedthatunderbothdirect‐referenceaccountsandspecialmodesof

presentationaccounts,phenomenalconceptsrefertophenomenalstatesinan

intimateandessentialmannerwithoutrevealinganythingabouttheirreferents’

naturethatlendsitselftophysicalorfunctionalanalysis,eitherbecausetheyhave

nomodeofpresentation,orbecausetheirmodeofpresentationisaparticular

phenomenalexperienceitself.Asaresult,theaccountsaboveareentirely

compatiblewithphysicalism.Furthermore,itisarguedthatthisintimaterelation

betweenphenomenalconceptsandphenomenalstatesexplainsthepresenceofthe

relevantepistemicgaps.

Ifthephenomenalconceptstrategyholdsup,itwilldealastrongblowto

anti‐physicalism.Foronething,itsmerepossibilityprovidesarelevantalternative

explanationfortheepistemicgaps,undercuttingsomeofthejustificationforthe

anti‐physicalists’inferencetoanontologicalgap.Furthermore,ifthephenomenal

conceptstrategyturnsouttobetrue(itisverifiable,afterall),thenthepresenceof

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therelevantepistemicgapswillbeentirelyexplained.Thiswouldcompletely

undercuttheanti‐physicalists’inferencetoanontologicalgap.Althoughtheanti‐

physicalistcouldstillbelieveintheexistenceofanontologicalgap–nothingabout

thetruthofthephenomenalconceptstrategyrulesouttheexistenceofan

ontologicalgap–itseemsasiftheanti‐physicalistwouldbeleftwithalmostnoway

toargueforherposition.Thetruthofthephenomenalconceptstrategywouldturn

thetidedecidedlyinthephysicalists’favor.

Aninterestingsidenote,sincetheaccountsofphenomenalconcepts

themselvestakenostanceontheontologicalnatureofphenomenalproperties,they

arealsocompatiblewithanti‐physicalism.Chalmers(2003)himselfhasproposeda

versionoftheconstitutionalaccountofphenomenalconcepts(althoughwithoutany

associatedambitiontosupporttype‐Bphysicalism).Hisaccountendsuplooking

verysimilartothephysicalistconstitutionalaccountswiththeexceptionthat

phenomenalconceptsareconstitutedbynon‐physicalstates.Inresponse,Balog

(2009a)makesagreatpoint:giventhatChalmershasendorsedaconstitutional

accountofphenomenalconcepts,thephenomenalconceptstrategysaysthatthere

arenowtwoparallelanti‐physicalistexplanationsoftheepistemicgaps.Theanti‐

physicalistsaysthattheepistemicgapsexistbecauseofacorrespondingontological

gap.Butthisexplanationendsupbeingredundant,sincethereisanexplanationfor

theexistenceoftheseverysameepistemicgapsintermsofthespecialnatureof

phenomenalconcepts.IthinkitcouldbearguedthatChalmers’adoptionofa

constitutionalaccountofphenomenalconceptsundermineshisreasonsforbeingan

anti‐physicalistinthefirstplace.

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5.Chalmers’masterargument

Chalmers’masterargument(2007)claimstoshowthatanyattemptto

provideaphysicalexplanationfortheexistenceoftherelevantepistemicgaps

betweenPandQwillendupcreatingasecond‐orderexplanatorygap.Theideais

thatevenifthephenomenalconceptstrategymanagestoexplaintherelevant

epistemicgaps–whichincludetheoriginal(i.e.“first‐order”)explanatorygap–the

type‐Bphysicalistwillnowhavetoprovidesomesortofexplanationforthesecond‐

orderexplanatorygap.IfChalmersisright,thenthephenomenalconceptstrategy

cannot,byitself,successfullygroundatype‐Bphysicalistviewconsistentwiththe

epistemicgaps.

Themasterargumentcanbedividedintotwoparts:first,Chalmers

representsthegeneralstructureofthephenomenalconceptstrategy,andsecond,

hearguesthatnoaccountofphenomenalconceptscansatisfythatstructure.

Chalmersclaimsthegeneralstructureofthephenomenalconceptstrategy

canberepresentedinthefollowingway.ProponentsputforwardathesisCclaiming

thathumanbeingshavesomesortof“key”psychologicalfeatures.These“key”

featuresarewhateverfeaturesthephenomenalconceptstrategyneedstoattribute

inordertoexplaintheepistemicgaps.Theythenarguethat:(1)Cistrue;(2)C

explainsourepistemicsituationwithregardtoconsciousness;and(3)Cis

physicallyexplicable.Ifproponentsofthephenomenalconceptstrategycandoall

this,Chalmersthinkstheywillhaveundercuttheinferencefromtheepistemicgaps

totheontologicalgap.

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Chalmers’masterargumentcombinestheoriginalargumentsforthe

conceptualgapandtheexplanatorygap.Thehardpartofhisargumentconsistsin

showingthatzombiesdonotshareourepistemicsituationwithregardto

consciousness.Oncehe’sdonethis,Chalmersposesthefollowingdilemma:canone

conceiveofazombieworldinwhichCisfalse?Ifso,thenP&~Cisconceivable,andP

cannotexplainC.Ifnot,thenP&~Cisinconceivable,andCcannotexplainour

epistemicsituationwithregardtoconsciousness.EitherCisnotphysically

explicableorCcannotexplainourepistemicsituationwithregardtoconsciousness,

andsoChalmersconcludesthatthephenomenalconceptstrategyfails.

Beforewedelveintotheargumentitselflet’sgoovertheterminologyand

someassumptionsChalmersmakes:

First,Chalmerstakesitthatour“epistemicsituation”includesthetruth­

valuesofourbeliefs(i.e.whethertheyaretrueorfalse)aswellastheepistemic

statusofourbeliefs(i.e.whethertheyarejustifiedorunjustified,cognitively

significantorinsignificant6).Onthisaccount,twobeingswillshareanepistemic

situationwhentheyhavecorrespondingbeliefswithcorrespondingtruth‐values

andepistemicstatus.It’simportanttonotethatChalmersclaimstoassumean

intuitivenotionof‘correspondence’betweenbeliefs:onethatdoesnotrequire

correspondingbeliefstohavethesamecontent.Whethersuchaviewisactually

intuitiveisapointtowhichI’llreturn.

6AsfarasIcantell,Chalmersintendstheterm“cognitivelysignificant”toapplytobeliefsnotinferablefrombeliefsaboutphysicalfacts.InJackson’scaseofMaryintheblack‐and‐whiteroom,ChalmerssupposesthatMarygainscognitivelysignificantknowledgeofwhatitisliketoseeredwhileherzombietwin,Zombie‐Marydoesnot.

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Second,Chalmersdefines“conceivability”asfollows:

Conceivability:ForanystatementS,SisconceivableiffScannotberuledout

throughapriorireasoning.7

Third,Chalmersassumesaconnectionbetweenconceivabilityand

explanation.Moreprecisely,hethinksthatthereisaconnectionbetween

conceivabilityandacertainsortofreductiveexplanation:thekindthatmakesit

transparentwhysomehigh‐leveltruthobtainsgiventhatsomelow‐leveltruths

obtain.AccordingtoChalmers:

CEPrinciple:Foranyhigh‐leveltruth,φ,andanylow‐leveltruth,ψ,ifψ&~φ

isconceivablethenψcannotexplainφ.

“ψcannotexplainφ”meansthereisnoexplanationthatmakesittransparentwhyφ

obtainsgiventhatψobtains.Thismakessense,giventhatournotionof

conceivabilityrequiresthatwebeunabletoruleathingoutapriori.Ifwecan’trule

outψ&~φapriori,thenthere’snotransparentexplanationforwhyφshouldbetrue

giventhatψistrue.

7ThisnotionofconceivabilitycorrespondstowhatChalmerscallsnegativeconceivability.Chalmerssometimesappealstoastrongernotionofconceivability,positiveconceivability,accordingtowhichSisconceivableiffoneisabletoforma‘clearanddistinct’conceptionofasituationinwhichSistrue.Formoreontheissue,seeChalmers(2002b).

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Finally,Chalmersassumesthatzombiescomewiththestandardsetof

intentionalmentalstates;roughlyspeaking,zombiescanhavementalstatesofor

aboutthings.Thismeansthatzombieshave(orrather,onecanconceiveofthemas

having)theabilitytoformbeliefsandpossessconcepts.Iwanttotakealittletimeto

considerthisimportantpoint.

OnemightobjecttoChalmers’assumptionthatanon‐consciousbeingcould

possessintentionalmentalstatesbyclaimingthatconsciousnessisnecessaryfor

intentionality.Searle(1992)arguesthatnon‐consciousmentalstatesmustbe

‘potentiallyconscious’.Inthiscase,althoughzombies’physicalbrainstatesmay

resembleours,theydon’thaveanypotentiallyconsciousmentalstates,sotheylack

intentionality.Ifzombieslackintentionality,thentheycan’tformbeliefsorpossess

concepts.

InoppositiontoSearle,Ithinktherearethreereasonstobelievethat

zombiescanhaveintentionalmentalstates.First,alloftheusualprinciplesof

psychologicalexplanationsupporttheattributionofbeliefstozombies.Presuming

thatphysicsiscausallyclosed,myzombie‐counterpartandIarebehaviorally

identical.Ifwebothsay“Iamhungry”andthenbothproceedtoopenthefridgeand

makeasandwich,ourbehaviorisbestexplainedbythefactthatwebelieveweare

hungry,believethatasandwichwillsateourhunger,andbelievethatthefridge

containstheingredientsnecessaryformakingasandwich.Explainingmyzombie‐

counterpart’sbehaviorwithoutattributingtoitbeliefswouldbequitedifficult.

Second,zombiespossessphysicalbrainstatesidenticaltoourswiththe

samekindsofcausalrelationslinkingthemtotheworld,which,asBalog(1999)

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notes,wouldcountzombiesashavingintentionalityonallthecurrenttheoriesof

meaning.OnaDavidsonianinterpretationistaccount,zombieswillhave

intentionalitybecausetheyarejustasinterpretableasconsciousbeings.Thesame

goesforsuchtheoriesastheinformationalaccount(e.g.Dretske1988),thecausal‐

historicalaccount(e.g.Kripke1972),thecounterfactualaccount(e.g.Fodor1990),

theteleosemanticaccount(e.g.Millikan1989,Papineau1993),etc.Theonlyaccount

onwhichzombiesdonotcountashavingintentionalityistheaccountonwhich

consciousnessisrequired.

Third,theredoesn’tseemtobeanyreasontothinkthatbeliefsare

necessarilyphenomenal.Itiscertainlypossibleforaconsciousbeingtoattendtoa

beliefaboutx,andtherebyhaveaphenomenalexperienceofoneselfasbelievingx.

Butifattentionwerenecessaryforthepossessionofabelief,onewouldcease

believingsomethingthesecondonestoppedattendingtothebelief.Forexample,ifI

askyouwhetheryoubelievethatthemoonismadeofcheeseandyousayno,and

thenIaskyouagaintenminuteslaterandyousayno,thenweshouldn’tsaythatfor

thosetenminutesyoustoppedbelievingthemoonwasnotmadeofcheese.Inany

case,bothChalmersandthetype‐Bphysicalistholdthatzombiescanhave

intentionalmentalstates,soletussettheissueaside.

Let’snowevaluatethemasterargument.

Chalmerswantstoshowthatzombiesdonotshareourepistemicsituation

withregardtoconsciousness.Foragivenconsciousbeingwithagivenepistemic

situation,letEbeasentenceassertingtheexistenceofabeingwiththatepistemic

situation.Ewillbemadetruebythatconsciousbeinginitsoriginalepistemic

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situation,andEwillalsobemadetruebyanybeingthatsharesthisepistemic

situation.SupposingthattheconsciousbeingconsideredinEhasatleastonetrue

beliefaboutconsciousness,thattruebeliefcanberepresentedasQ.Forexample,

theconsciousbeingmighthaveatruebeliefsomeoneisconsciousorIamhavingthe

phenomenalexperienceofacertainshadeofred.Butwhataboutherzombie‐

counterpartinzombieworld?Itisplausiblethatanon‐consciousbeingcan’thave

beliefswithexactlythesamecontentasourbeliefsaboutconsciousness,butgiven

thefactthatournotionof‘correspondence’betweenbeliefsiscontent‐neutral,

Chalmersthinkswecanneverthelesstalkofthezombie’scorrespondingbeliefs.So

theconsciousbeingwiththetruebeliefQwillhaveazombie‐counterpartinzombie

worldwiththebeliefQ.Butthezombie‐counterpart’sbeliefwillbefalse.For

example,iftheconsciousbeinghasthetruebeliefsomeoneisconsciousthenher

zombie‐counterpartinzombieworldhasthecorrespondingfalsebeliefsomeoneis

conscious.Giventhatourepistemicsituationincludesthetruth‐valuesofourbeliefs,

thetwowillnotshareanepistemicsituationwithregardtoconsciousness.Eistrue

inourworldbutfalseinzombieworld.Ifzombieworldisconceivable,theargument

abovehasmanagedtoshowthatP&~Eisconceivable.

GiventhatP&~Eisconceivable,therestofthemasterargumentisquite

straightforward.EitherP&~E&~CisconceivableorP&~E&~Cisinconceivable.Thisis

logicallytrueinvirtueofitsform.IfP&~E&~Cisconceivable,thenP&~Cis

conceivable,andapplyingtheCEPrincipletellsusthatPcannotexplainC.If

P&~E&~Cisinconceivable,sinceitisgiventhatP&~Eisconceivable,whenweare

conceivingofP&~EwemustbeconceivingofaworldinwhichCistrue.Inthiscase,

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C&~Eisconceivable,andapplyingtheCEPrincipletellsusthatCcannotexplainE.

Wecansummarizetheargumentaboveasfollows:

(1) P&~Eisconceivable

(2) IfP&~EisconceivablethenP&~CisconceivableorC&~Eis

conceivable

(3) IfP&~CisconceivablethenPcannotexplainC

(4) IfC&~EisconceivablethenCcannotexplainE

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(5) PcannotexplainCorCcannotexplainE

6.Balog’sdefenseofthephenomenalconceptstrategy

Balog(2009b)thinksthatP&~Cisconceivableandembracestheconclusion

thatPcannotexplainC.Shearguesthatevenifthephenomenalconceptstrategy

producesasecond‐orderexplanatorygap,thissecond‐orderexplanatorygap

doesn’tposeaproblemforthephysicalistbecauseitcanbeexplainedbythe

phenomenalconceptstrategyitself.Thephenomenalconceptstrategy,ifitistrue,

predictsanexplanatorygapbetweenphysicalfactsandphenomenalfacts.So,ifwe

thinkaboutCinphenomenaltermsthen,ifCistrue,weshouldexpectasecond‐

orderexplanatorygapbetweenthephysicalfactsandC.

Ithinkthisisaninterestingmove.Chalmerschargesthattheexplanatory

schemeoutlinedaboveiscircular.Balogdoesn’tdenythis.Sheacceptsthather

argumentiscircular,butdeniesthatthere’sanythingviciouslycircularaboutit.

BalogisessentiallysayingthatifCisphysicalthenCexplainsthesecond‐order

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explanatorygapbetweenPandCinawaythatiscompatiblewithphysicalism.From

thetype‐Bphysicalist’sperspective(startbyassumingCisphysical),Balog’s

circularargumentallowsthephenomenalconceptstrategytosuccessfullyundercut

theanti‐physicalistinferencetoanontologicalgap.However,fromChalmers’

perspective(assumingthattheinferencetoanontologicalgapisjustified),the

second‐orderexplanatorygapbetweenPandCwouldentailanontologicalgap

betweenPandC,therebysuccessfullyneutralizingtheforceofthephenomenal

conceptstrategy.BothBalogandChalmersareright.

Interestingly,thesituationaboveisasortofmetaphysicalstalematebetween

theanti‐physicalistandthephysicalist.Eachsidecanunseattheother,ifpermitted

onecoreassumption.Balogconcludesthatthere’sapuzzlingsymmetrybetween

bothpositions.ThisisnotaconclusionI’msatisfiedwith.

7.AttackingChalmers’masterargument

Instead,IproposeacceptingthatCcannotexplainEbutarguingthatthe

phenomenalconceptstrategywillstillwork.Inparticular,Iintendtoshowthat

Chalmers’hasmischaracterizedthephenomenalconceptstrategyand,indoingso,

constructedastraw‐manargument.

WhyshouldCexplainourepistemicsituationwithregardtoconsciousness?

Inthefollowingpassage,Chalmersclaimsthatrequiringanythinglessofthe

phenomenalconceptstrategywouldundercutitsforceinsupportingtype‐B

physicalism:

20

Recall that the strategy is intended to resist the antiphysicalist’sinferencefromanepistemicgaptoanontologicalgapbyshowinghowtherelevantepistemicgapmayexistevenifphysicalismistrue.Intheantiphysicalist’s arguments, the relevant epistemic gap (fromwhichthe ontological gap is inferred) is characterized in such a way thattruthandknowledgeareessential….Ifonecharacterizedthesegapsina way that were neutral on the truth of phenomenal beliefs, theargumentswouldnotgetofftheground.Sotruth‐valueisessentialtotherelevantepistemicgaps.Ifso,thentoundercuttheinferencefromthesegapstoanontologicalgap,thephenomenalconceptstrategyneeds to showhow the relevant truth­involving epistemic gapsareconsistentwithphysicalism.(Chalmers2007)

Inotherwords,theanti‐physicalistargumentsfortherelevantepistemicgapspose

aproblemfortype‐Bphysicalistsbecausetheyaretruth‐involving:theyare

epistemicgapsbetweenPandQwherebotharetrueofourworld.Ifwecharacterize

theargumentsinsuchawaythateitherPorQisfalse,thentheywon’tsupportthe

existenceofatruth­involvingepistemicgap.Andtheanti‐physicalistcan’tinferan

truth­involvingontologicalgapfromatruth­neutralepistemicgap.Toundercutthe

inferencetoanontologicalgap,ChalmersclaimsthatCwillhavetoprovidean

alternativeexplanationofthetruth‐involvingepistemicgaps.

HowChalmersgetsfromheretotheclaimthatCmustexplainourepistemic

situationwithregardtoconsciousnessisn’texactlyclear.Thatistosay,I’munclear

abouttherelationshipbetweenourepistemicsituationandtherelevantepistemic

gaps.Presumably,theepistemicgapsareapartofourepistemicsituationingeneral,

perhapsevenwithregardtoconsciousness.Evenso,onecouldarguethat,by

hypothesis,ourepistemicsituationwithregardtoconsciousnessincludesbeliefs

aboutconsciousnessthatareunrelatedtotheepistemicgaps,andsoshouldnot

havetobeexplainedbyC.Forexample,mybeliefthateitherIamconsciousorIam

21

notconsciousisabelief“about”consciousness(atleast,apparently),andsoispartof

myepistemicsituationinregardtoconsciousness.ButIwouldimaginethatan

explanationforthetruthandjustificationofmybeliefthateitherIamconsciousorI

amnotconsciousshouldincludethatitistrueandjustifiedinvirtueofitslogical

form.Suchanexplanationwouldthenhavetoincludefactsaboutlogicalform,

tautology,etc.There’snoreasontothinkthatCshouldhavetoexplainthingslike

logicalformandtautologyinordertoexplainthepresenceofthetruth‐involving

epistemicgaps.ThissupportstheconclusionthatrequiringCtoexplainour

epistemicsituationwithregardtoconsciousnessistoostrong.

Ontopofthat,IthinkthattherearereasonstothinkthatevenexpectingCto

explaintherelevantepistemicgapsistoostrong.First,notethattheboldedsection

inChalmers’excerptabovereads:“thephenomenalconceptstrategyneedstoshow

howtherelevanttruth‐involvingepistemicgapsareconsistentwithphysicalism.”

Thisisnotequivalenttosayingthatthephenomenalconceptstrategyneedsto

showhowphysicalfactscanexplaintherelevanttruth‐involvingepistemicgaps.But

itisequivalenttosayingthatthephenomenalconceptstrategyneedstoshowhow,

inapurelyphysicalworld,therelevanttruth‐involvingepistemicgapscanexist.

Thissecondclaimsaysnothingaboutphysicalfactsexplainingtheepistemicgaps,

whichgivesusreasontothinkthatrequiringCtoexplaintherelevantepistemic

gapsistoostrong.

Second,Chalmersemphasizesthatwhatisimportantabouttherelevant

epistemicgapsisthattheyaretruth‐involving.Considerthetruth‐involving

conceptualgap.Itwouldbetemptingbutincorrecttoexpressitas‘P&~Qis

22

conceivable,’becausethiswouldn’taccountforthefactthatPandQarebothtruein

ourworld.Wemightsaythat‘P&~Qisconceivable’expressesatruth­neutral

conceptualgap.Butwecanturnthistruth‐neutralconceptualgapintothetruth‐

involvingconceptualgapbyaddinginthetruthofPandQ.Inotherwords,the

properwaytoexpressthetruth‐involvingconceptualgapis:P&QandP&~Qis

conceivable.Ifthisisthecase,thentorequireCtoexplainthepresenceofthetruth‐

involvingepistemicgapsistorequireCtoexplainnotonlyP&~Qisconceivablebut

alsoPandQ.Notype‐BphysicalistcouldaccepttherequirementthatCexplainQ,

becausethetype‐BphysicalistholdsthatnothingphysicalcanexplainQ.Infact,it

turnsoutthattheonlywaythatCcouldexplainthetruth‐involvingepistemicgapsis

ifCcouldexplainPaswell.ButgiventhatPistheentirefundamentalphysicaltruth

aboutourworld,CcouldexplainPonlyifC=P.Thiswouldputtheproponentofthe

phenomenalconceptstrategyrightbacktowhereshestarted.

WhatI’veshownisthat,byrequiringtheproponentofthephenomenal

conceptstrategytoprovidesomeaccountthatexplainsE,Chalmershassnuckinthe

requirementthatthisaccountexplainQ.It’snowonderthenthattheproponentof

thephenomenalconceptstrategyfindsherselffacingasecond‐orderexplanatory

gap.Thesecond‐orderexplanatorygapisreallyjustthefirst‐orderexplanatorygap

indisguise.

Letusstepbackandreflectonthedialecticasitstands.

Anyargumentfortherelevanttruth‐involvingepistemicgaps,byChalmers’

ownadmission,mustappealtothetruthofPandofQ.Forexample,togettothe

truth‐involvingconceptualgap–P&QbutP&~Qisconceivable–theanti‐physicalist

23

mustfirstshowthatPandQaretrue.Hedoesthisimplicitlybybuildingtruthinto

theirdefinitions(‘LetPbethecompletefundamentalphysicaltruth…’and‘LetQbe

anyarbitrarytruth…’).

Ithinktheproponentofthephenomenalconceptstrategyshouldhaveaccess

toPandQaswell.ItistheontologicalnatureofQthatiscalledintoquestioninthe

debatebetweenphysicalistsandanti‐physicalists,notthetruth‐valueofQ.Anyone

whoacceptstheexistenceofphenomenalconsciousnesswillacceptthatQistrue.So

IproposethattheproponentofthephenomenalconceptstrategybeabletouseQas

wellinherexplanationfortherelevanttruth‐involvingepistemicgaps,solongasit’s

justthetruth‐valueofQthatisplayinganexplanatoryrole.

ThisillustratesthefinalmajorflawinChalmers’characterizationofthe

phenomenalconceptstrategy:hehasn’tdistinguishedbetweenthestrategyitself

andtheaccount,C,ofphenomenalconceptsthatitprovides.Cisnottheonlyfact

availabletothephenomenalconceptstrategy.Attheveryleast,bothPandQare

availableaswell.

8.Analternativecharacterizationofthephenomenalconceptstrategy

Inthissection,mygoalwillbetoprovideamoreaccurateandcharitable

representationofthegeneralstructureofthephenomenalconceptstrategy:one

thatbothundercutstheinferencefromtherelevanttruth‐involvingepistemicgaps

toanontologicalgapandisimmunetoChalmers’masterargument.

ProponentsofthephenomenalconceptstrategyprovideathesisC*claiming

thatphenomenalconceptsareunlikeotherconceptsinvirtueofsomedirector

24

intimateaccesstotheirreferents.Theythenarguethefollowing:(1)C*istrue,(2)

C*explainstheconceptualindependencebetweenthephysicalandthephenomenal,

and(3)C*isphysicallyexplicable.

Again,accordingtoChalmers,“toundercuttheinferencefromthesegapsto

anontologicalgap,thephenomenalconceptstrategyneedstoshowhowthe

relevanttruth‐involvingepistemicgapsareconsistentwithphysicalism.”

IcontendthatgivenC*,P,Q,andtheCEPrinciple,thephenomenalconcept

strategycanshowhowalltherelevanttruth‐involvingepistemicgapsareconsistent

withphysicalism.Andifproponentsofthephenomenalconceptstrategycandoall

this,onChalmers’accounttheywillhaveundercuttheinferencefromtheepistemic

gapstotheontologicalgap.

Notethatmyrepresentationofthegeneralstructureofthephenomenal

conceptstrategyshares(1)and(3)withChalmers’.Myfirsttaskwillbetoshow

why,onmyaccount,(2)providesthemostcharitableandaccuraterepresentationof

theroleC*issupposedtobeplayinginthephenomenalconceptstrategy.

AllversionsofthephenomenalconceptstrategyrestonanaccountC*

claimingthatphenomenalconceptsareunlikeotherconceptsinvirtueofhaving

somesortofintimateordirectrelationtophenomenalstates.Whatresultsare

variousaccountsofphenomenalconceptsthatrefertophenomenalstatesinan

intimateandsubstantialmannerwithoutrevealinganythingabouttheirnaturethat

lendsitselftophysicalorfunctionalanalysis.

IfC*istrue,thefactthatphenomenalconceptsrevealnothingabouttheir

referents’naturethatlendsitselftophysicalorfunctionalanalysiscouldbeusedto

25

defendanynumberofclaimsaboutwhatsortsofepistemicgapswillobtain

betweenphysicalandphenomenalconcepts.However,Ibelieveitwillsufficeto

showherehowC*canexplainwhatIcall“conceptualindependence”between

physicalconceptsandphenomenalconcepts,whichIdefineasfollows:

Conceptualindependence:foranyconcept,ψ,andanyconcept,φ,thereisa

conceptualindependencebetweenψandφiffthefollowingthree

scenariosareconceivable:(i)ψ&φ,(ii)~ψ&φ,and(iii)ψ&~φ.

Ithinkestablishingconceptualindependencebetweenphysicalandphenomenal

conceptsisthemostintuitivewaytounderstandtherolethattheaccountof

phenomenalconceptsissupposedtoplayinthephenomenalconceptstrategy.For

one,itstrikesmeasobviousthattheprimarygoaloftheaccountofphenomenal

conceptsusedinthephenomenalconceptstrategyistoestablishasortof

conceptualseparationbetweenphysicalandphenomenalconcepts.Ontopofthis,

givenChalmers’definitionofconceivability,whichrequiresthatonebeunableto

ruleoutascenarioapriori,thefactthatphenomenalconceptsrevealnothing

physicallyorfunctionallyanalyzableabouttheirreferentssuggestsaninabilitytoa

prioriruleoutscenariosinvolvingphenomenalandphysicalconcepts.If

phenomenalconceptsrevealnothingphysicalorfunctionalabouttheirreferents,

thentherecanbenophysicalorfunctionalbasisonwhichtosaythatascenario

involvinganytwoconcepts,onephysicalandonephenomenal,canberuledouta

priori.

26

Ihopethereaderwillbesatisfiedwithmynotionofconceptual

independencebetweenphysicalandphenomenalconcepts,whichItaketobeavery

modestconclusiontodrawfromthephenomenalconceptstrategy.NotethatIhave

assumednothingabouttheepistemicrelationsofexplanationorknowledge

betweenphysicalandphenomenalconcepts.

Mysecondtaskwillbetoprovethatthephenomenalconceptstrategy

explainsthepresenceofthethreetruth‐involvingepistemicgapsgiventhe

followingfourassumptions:Pistrue,Qistrue,C*istrue,andtheCEPrincipleholds.

(i)Theconceptualgap:PcanbeconceivedwithoutQ

Iwillrepresentthetruth‐involvingconceptualgapasfollows:P&QandP&~Q

isconceivable.GivenP,Q,andC*,thephenomenalconceptstrategycanshowhow

thetruth‐involvingconceptualgapisconsistentwithphysicalism.IfC*istrue,then

PandQareconceptuallyindependent,andsothefollowingthreescenariosare

conceivable:P&Q,P&~Q,~P&Q.Theonethatmattersforthepurposeofexplaining

theconceptualgapisthatP&~Qisconceivable.SinceitisgiventhatPistrueandQis

true,wecanconcludethatP&QandP&~Qisconceivable(i.e.therewillbea

conceptualgapbetweenPandQ)

(ii)Theexplanatorygap:PcannotexplainQ

Iwillrepresentthetruth‐involvingexplanatorygapasfollows:P&QbutP

cannotexplainQ.GivenP,Q,C*,andtheCEPrinciple,thephenomenalconcept

strategycanshowhowtheexplanatorygapisconsistentwithphysicalism.FromC*

27

wededucedthatP&~Qisconceivable.ByapplyingChalmers’CEPrinciple,wecan

concludethatPcannotexplainQ.SogivenP,Q,C*,andtheCEPrinciple,the

phenomenalconceptstrategycanshowthatP&QbutPcannotexplainQis

consistentwithphysicalism.

(iii)Theknowledgegap:QcannotbededucedfromP

BeforeIprovethatthephenomenalconceptstrategycanshowhowthe

knowledgegapisconsistentwithphysicalism,Iwillhavetoarguethatthe

knowledgegapissimplyanotherversionoftheconceptualgap.Thecanonical

argumentfortheknowledgegap,Jackson’sMaryintheblack‐and‐whiteroom,has

usconceiveofthesituationinwhichMaryisinherblack‐and‐whiteroomwith

knowledgeofP.Thenwe’retoldtoconceiveofMaryleavingtoroom,andasked

whetherMarywouldgainnewknowledgeofQ.Whichistosay:isitconceivablethat

MarygainsnewknowledgeofQ?Theendresultisthatwe’reconceivingofMaryas

havingknowledgeofPbutnotknowledgeofQ,inaworlddifferentfromourswhere

PandQalsohappentobetrue.

Howshouldwerepresentthetruth‐involvingknowledgegapinthiscase?

(Tosaveroom,let’sintroduceaknowledgeoperatorK()suchthat“K(P)”means

“onehasknowledgeofP”)Thetruth‐neutralversionoftheknowledgegapwould

be:P&Q&K(P)&~K(Q)isconceivable.Now,ofcourse,tomakethistruth‐neutral

knowledgegapatruth‐involvinggapwillrequireaddingP&Qoutsideofthe

conceivablescenario.Sothetruth‐involvingknowledgegapshouldberepresented

as:P&QandK(P)&P&~K(Q)&Qisconceivable.

28

GivenP,Q,andC*,thephenomenalconceptstrategycanshowhowthe

knowledgegapisconsistentwithphysicalism.Becausetheentirethought

experimentisconceptual,itmustbethecasethatK(P)andParebothphysicalfacts

conceivedunderphysicalconcepts,while~K(Q)andQarebothphenomenalfacts

conceivedunderphenomenalconcepts.IfC*istruethenthereisaconceptual

disconnectbetweenK(P)&Pand~K(Q)&Q,andsoK(P)&P&~K(Q)&Qisconceivable.

SogivenP,Q,andC*,thephenomenalconceptstrategycanshowthatP&Qbut

K(P)&P&~K(Q)&Qisconceivableisconsistentwithphysicalism.

(3)C*isphysicallyexplicable.Onallthephenomenalconceptstrategy

accountsreviewedinSection4,phenomenalconceptsaresaidtoreferto

phenomenalstatesinanintimateandessentialmannerwithoutrevealinganything

abouttheirreferents’naturethatlendsitselftophysicalorfunctionalanalysis.Asa

result,theaccountsareentirelycompatiblewithphysicalism.Moreover,unlike

phenomenalexperiencesthemselves,thereisnothingaboutphenomenalconcepts

attributedtousbyC*thatwouldmakethemincompatiblewithphysicalism.Some

arguethatphysicalaccountscanonlyexplaintwothings:spatiotemporalstructure

andfunctionintermsofcausalrolesplayedintheproductionofasystem’s

behavior.Whileitseemsverylikelythatexplainingstructureandfunctionwillnot

sufficetoexplainphenomenalexperience,whatmakesthephenomenalconcepts

attributedtousbyC*souniqueisthattheycanbecharacterizedintermsof

structuralandfunctionalfeatures.Therefore,unlikephenomenalexperienceitself,

thereisgoodreasontothinkthatC*isphysicallyexplicable,oratleasthasthe

potentialforfurtherscientificexploration.

29

WhatI’vejustdoneisconstructedageneralrepresentationofthe

phenomenalconceptstrategyasputtingforwardathesisC*,andshownthat(1)C*

explainstheconceptualdisconnectionbetweenphysicalconceptsandphenomenal

concepts,(2)GivenC*&P&Q,andtheCEPrinciple,thephenomenalconceptstrategy

canshowhowtherelevanttruth‐involvingepistemicgapsareconsistentwith

physicalism,and(3)C*isphysicallyexplicable.Let’snowrunitthroughChalmers’

masterargumenttomakesureitisimmune.

9.Chalmers’masterargument,reprise

ThenewphenomenalconceptstrategywithC*shouldworkforthetype‐B

physicalistandavoidChalmers’second‐orderexplanatorygapproblem.Chalmers

claimsthatnotonlydoconsciousbeingsandtheirzombie‐counterpartshave

correspondingsetsofbeliefs,theyalsohavecorrespondingsetsofconcepts

(althoughnotnecessarilywiththesamereferents).Intuitively,itisplausiblethata

zombie’sphysicalconceptsandphenomenalconceptsarenolessconceptually

connectedthanaconsciousbeing’sconcepts.

Butontopofthis,weshouldrecognizethatC*makesaclaimaboutwhat

scenariosareconceivable,andevaluatewhetherC*willbetrueofzombiesbasedon

whatisconceivabletoazombie.

First,becausebothconsciousbeingsandtheirzombie‐counterpartshave

correspondingbeliefsandcorrespondingconcepts,theyshouldbeableto

correspondinglyconceiveofthesamethingswecan.There’snoreasontothinkthat

azombiewhocanhavethebeliefQcannotalsoconceiveofP&QaswellasP&~Q.

30

Second,thenotionofconceivabilitywe’vebeenusing,whichsaysthatthe

conceivabilityofSrequiresthatthetruthofScannotberuledoutapriori,givesus

noreasontobelievethatconsciousnesswouldbenecessaryforconceivability.So

longaszombieshavecorrespondingconceptionsofthesamethreescenarioswecan

conceiveof(P&Q,P&~Q,~P&Q),I’minclinedtosaythatC*istrueofzombie‐worldas

well.

Theupshotisthattheproponentofthephenomenalconceptstrategy

respondtoChalmers’dilemmabysayingthatP&~C*isinconceivablegiventhe

assumptionthatC*canbephysicallyexplained.AsaresultC*willbetrueof

zombies.Thissaysthatzombiesmustbeabletoconceiveofthesamethingsasus,

whichtheycan.

IbelievethatIhavesuccessfullyshownhowmyrepresentationofthe

phenomenalconceptstrategyavoidsChalmers’masterargumentwhileshowing

howtherelevanttruth‐involvingepistemicgapsareconsistentwithphysicalism.My

conclusionisthattheanti‐physicalistinferencetoanontologicalgaphasbeen

undercutinthecaseofthethreerelevantepistemicgaps.

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