Running head: Sample APA Paper for Students1Sample APA Paper for Students11

Sample APA Paper for Students Learning APA StyleYour NameThe Name of the Course Your Instructors NameThe Date

AbstractThe abstract is a single paragraph in block format (without paragraph indentation) and should be between 150 and 250 words (this example is a bit short). Be sure to understand the difference between the abstract (a summary of the paper) and the introduction (an introduction to the paper). A good trick is to write one summary sentence for each major part of your paper; which should leave you with a good, four-sentence abstract. See section 2.04 of the 6th edition of the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association for additional information.

NOTE: This sample paper is meant only to demonstrate some aspects of using styles to manage headers in an APA-format document. Definition of Decision-makingDecision-making is the process of choosing among alternatives, implementing a decision, and using subsequent outcome data (the results) to shape any further decisions associated with or comparable to the earlier one. Table 10-1 presents a six-step model of organizational decision-making that includes both process (Steps 1-4) and outcome (Steps 5-6) components. It is important to appreciate that organizational decision-making often arises within turbulent, cacophonous, and high-velocity environments. At such times, the need for change is ever present. There is a lot of noise and interruptions of any given decision activity, and opportunities and problems keep streaming into or arising from within the organization.Every day we make decisions in our work and personal lives. As described above, sometimes we make decisions individually. At other times we make decisions as a member of a group. Accordingly we will examine both individual and group decision-making in organizations, and review the models of decision-making that are intended to lead to positive decisions. In general, decision-making is required when anomalous events (unexpected outcomes) come to the attention of a manager or employee compared to events that are highly repetitive and well known to the decision maker, where habit and standard procedures can be employed. To understand the anomalous events, the decision maker has to frame the situation by putting it in proper context. Then, its time to interpret the events and decide if the current problem is significantly different from those seen in the past. If different, then the decision maker has to develop a set of options and feel her or his way along modifying or changing options in response to feedback. When a plan of action is identified, it must then be implemented. (Pittinsky, 2010) The action plan must then be monitored to determine if it is making progress toward solving the original problem.Process and Outcome ComponentsAs presented in Table 10-1, decision-making consists of process and outcome components either or both of which can be used to measure the effectiveness of the decision-making. The process component includes identifying the problem, a judgment of the importance of the problem for the individual or group (if the problem is not important the process is terminated at this stage), a search for evaluation of alternatives if the problem is judged important, and the selection of an alternative to prevent or respond to the problem. The outcome component includes implementing or initiating the actions of the selected alternative and evaluating the results by some type of performance measure. (Luchak & Gellatly, 2007; Sataline, Bravin, & Koppel, 2009; Simon, 1955) In general, most organizational members are much more willing to make decisions than to implement them, because implementation can be time consuming, extensive, and labor intensive. Most models of organizational decision-making focus on the process, rather than the outcome component of decision-making. This is because outcomes can be so strongly influenced by situational forces (which cannot be controlled). As a result, they are highly variable and may be quite unpredictable. So it is difficult to fully describe and include them in a normative or prescriptive model. Every person and organization has to deal almost daily with uncertainty about the future. This exposure to uncertainty can create a sense of risk or exposure to the chance of loss or injury. Individuals and organizations frequently decide to minimize risk in important areas, which usually makes for less uncertainty.Types of DecisionsIn general, decisions can be classified as either programmed or nonprogrammed. Programmed decisions usually involve highly repetitive and routine problems in which the procedures for decision-making are well established, applied frequently, and triggered by structured or clearly defined problems that require immediate action. In programmed decision-making, the focus is on the implementation of the decision, with the first four steps highly standardized, as represented in operating manuals and standard operating procedures. Nonprogrammed decisions are rare, infrequently encountered, or unique opportunities or problems that cannot be accommodated by standard operating procedures. This type of decision is usually made by upper-level managers or self-directed work teams who go through all six steps of the decision process shown in Table 10-1. There is typically much more uncertainty involved with nonprogrammed decisions. As a result, to improve outcomes, it may be better to focus on cognitive processes, such as creativity, simulation, and perhaps the implementation of a small-scale pilot or limited-action outcome project. There are three dimensions that can be evaluated to guide the choice between a programmed or nonprogrammed decision-making process: (1.) the type of task, (2.) guidance from the past, and (3.) the typical decision maker. If the task is complex, there is usually little in the way of relevant guidance from the past decisions, so the decision is typically made by a group of upper level managers. In these situations, we are most likely dealing with nonprogrammed decision-making (Greenberg, 2011). Generally, if you are a new employee you will most likely be involved in programmed decision-making, and only after a time will you be involved in nonprogrammed decision-making and most likely you will also be in a managerial position.Individual Decision-makingIn general, most people believe that they reason clearly, exercise sound judgment, and make decisions rationally and logically. However, investigators have identified a number of systematic decision-making errors and fallacies. These have been demonstrated in controlled, laboratory research and largely confirmed in field studies and naturalistic settings. This is a selective list of the problems that are most relevant to understanding the problems (and possibilities) with corporate decision-making. Interested readers may want to consult a textbook on cognition or on the psychology of decision-making. Risk PreferencesPeople tend to avoid taking risks when the potential for gain is involved, preferring the known and predictable to the unknown (Kahneman & Terversky, 1979, 1982). In general, they do not like surprises because they assume the surprises will be negative. However, people prefer to take risks when the choice is between an inevitable loss and an uncertain loss. For example, when persons had to choose between losing $ 3,000 for certain or losing $ 4,000 with an 80% probability, 92% selected the latter and 8% selected the former, exhibiting a proneness to take risks (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). When people seek to improve what they already have and must choose between a lower-level sure improvement versus a higher-level improvement with a greater risk, they tend to select the former, reflecting an aversion to risk. However, if they are faced with losing a lower amount for certain, compared to losing a greater amount with a remote chance of not losing anything, then they will take the risk and select the latter alternative. In general, if you already have something of value to you, you will be conservative in your risk taking, whereas if you have nothing or are bound to lose, then you are more likely to take a risk. In other words, in most organizational situations, the haves are more likely to be risk averse, while the have-nots are more likely to be risk prone.Accessibility and AvailabilityPeople can only notice what is (more or less) at hand. For this simple reason, we are prone to an availability bias (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). The problem is that easily available evidence may not be relevant to making a particular (and important) judgment, but this bias leads people to believe that whats at hand is more relevant than what is not. As a result, we are prone to stop looking (because weve got all the facts we need--thank you very much). Similarly, there is also an accessibility bias. This refers to material that is familiar and already stored in our memories. The more familiar, then the more it is likely to guide decision-making. In fact, Kahneman and Tversky directed much of their most original research toward understanding the nature of intuitive judgments, which by definition are automatic and largely immune to being dissected and analyzed (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). As with other aspects of decision-making, intuition is not inherently inaccurate. In fact, at its most advanced it represents expertise. However, an over-reliance on information that is based on intuitive hunches will ultimately subvert systematic decision-making in organizations.Confirmatory BiasesWhen gathering information needed to make a decision, were likely to encounter facts that are either consistent with or in contradiction of our pre-existing preferences and opinions. Hart and colleagues (2009) conducted a meta-analysis of studies looking at the preference for either defense of current opinion (which would be highly biased), or accuracy, (which would lead to a broader survey and a consideration of a wider range of information). Overall, there was evidence of what Eagly and Chaiken (1993) called the congeniality bias: selectively attending to information that fits our own attitudes and opinion, and avoiding situations where our beliefs will be challenged. False-Consensus EffectPeople tend to overestimate how many other persons agree with their attitudes and beliefs---a judgment bias know as the false-consensus effect (Fiske, 2010; Ross, Greene, & House, 1977). For example, Wolfson (2000) found that students who used illegal drugs (marijuana and amphetamines) overestimated the prevalence of drug use in a sample of 348 participants who filled out an anonymous survey. Interestingly, this tendency is even seen when people are in the majority: they are still likely to assert that most people see things their way (Fiske, 2010). Therefore, this widespread habit may lead to more or less biased attitudes about the true prevalence of an opinion. However, Dawes and Mulford (1996) made a somewhat provocative observation: false consensus is not inherently related to the actual accuracy of the attitude or observation. In their study, they found a positive correlation between research volunteers own judgments accuracy and their degree of belief that others shared it. In other words, you may, in fact, be just about the only person who believes as you do, but that does not mean that everybody else is right. Similarly, too much emphasis on this tendency may overstate the value of having a widely shared opinion. Fifty million Frenchmen, in fact can be right or wrong. MoodThe relationship between mood and various aspects of decision-making is interesting and somewhat counter-intuitive. Forgas, Laham, and Vargas (2005) reviewed evidence on how mood appears to influence information processing. When mood is positive, then people tend to view situations in a holistic and somewhat abstract fashion-- an approach that is more suited to familiar situations, or those where careful observation is unnecessary. In social judgments, people experiencing negative mood are less prone to making the fundamental attribution error, which is under-estimating the degree to which other peoples behavior is influenced by situational factors and over-stating the role of choice and intention (Fiske, 2010). However, as Avramova et al. (2010) found, negative mood may also lead people to pay less attention to context and be selectively focused on things that they believe are central (and thus important). But as mentioned already, people in a positive mood state may have a broader and more inclusive view, and so they may end up noticing peripheral details, which may prove to be valuable when then making judgments. Taken together, these lines of research suggest that no mood state is optimal. A concrete, analytic approach (typical of negative mood) would be more useful (and less biased) when facing an unfamiliar situation. But the better attention to context that is associated with positive mood may make it less likely that important contextual details arent missed. Along with the other characteristics of individual decision-making weve reviewed, it suggests the potential utility of bringing multiple perspectives to bear on organizational decisions. As well discuss below, those are typically the ones where effective decision-making is most critical.Preventing GroupthinkAs indicated in Chapter 7, Janis (1982; 1989) suggested a number of preventive measures to avoid or minimize Groupthink. Encourage participative rather than directive leadership. Appoint a devils advocate. Invite decision-making experts to meetings who can watch for apparent Groupthink tendencies and to encourage members to explore alternative. Janis (1989) also suggested that the decision-making group could be divided into subgroups to develop different decision alternatives and that a second chance" meeting could be held after the initial consensus is reached on the preferred alternative. The appointment of a devils advocate is designed to promote an open discussion of suggested solutions, rather than to rely on one group member to criticize the dominant alternative (Cosier & Schwenk, 1990). The role of devils advocate should be rotated among group members, so no single member is perceived as the critic on all issues, and the members should be helped to understand that criticism of the dominant alternative is not to be taken personally but should be perceived as being part of the decision-making process.Another strategy to deal with Groupthink is the dialectical method. This strategy for organizational decision-making, introduced by Mason (1969) consists of a structured debate on markedly different plans during which the advocates present the assumptions of their plans and as much of the details of the plans as possible. After the debate, the group comes to a decision by voting on the basis of an examination of the assumptions and features of two alternatives. The devils advocate and the dialectical method are examples of programmed or infused conflict. Thinking alike and only agreeing can be a superhighway to hell.Group Decision-makingMost decisions in organizations are made by groups rather than individuals because it is assumed that group decision-making can promote and sustain the competitive position of the organization (Heil, 1991; Sundstrom, Demeuse, & Futrell, 1990). However, the growing reliance on group decision-making is not risk free because this process can be influenced markedly by an "agreement norm" that may restrict or suppress disagreements that may be necessary for making effective decisions (Gero, 1985; Harvey, 1974). Levine & Moreland (1991) reported that generic group norms (such as norms to prevent or minimize conflict and to regulate contact between group members and outsiders) emerge in almost every group. Groupthink and the Abilene Paradox are examples of problematic group decision-making.Recognizing the Signs of the Abilene ParadoxBased on their analysis of many high-profile cases, Harvey and colleagues (2004) proposed the following as signs that an organization is at greatly elevated risk for making a regrettable decision. 1. Managers who do not recognize and respect the importance of uncontrollable, situational factors. Another word for this is arrogance, one borne out of an over-confidence that competitors arent worth really understanding.2. Lack of conflict and debate. There can be a dangerous misperception that organizations with a unified and disciplined public face (such as IBM) have no internal conflict or debate. But as Collins (2001) found in a comparison between companies that thrived versus those that merely survived, principled, if often heated, internal deliberation is critical to good decision-making.3. Domineering leaders, and a culture that tolerates them. Charismatic leaders, discussed in 9, are often effective. But when their personality becomes too overbearing, then employees will be tense, inhibited, and ineffective. Also, critical partnerships may be strained because the leader is intolerable.4. Lack of diversity. As discussed in Chapter 6, diversity is a valuable asset to an organization. But particularly with organizational decision-making, relying on opinion leaders who all think alike is a risky proposition.5. Complacency about dysfunction. Recognizing that systems are not working is a critical first step. However, its unwise to stop there, thinking that action (and change) arent needed -- they are.6. Indifference among the ranks. When members of an organization do not care (and leadership tolerates it), then the resulting complacency nearly guarantees poor decisions, as they will be made by people who arent giving their best.7. The Great Person syndrome. While it can be beneficial for an organization to have one or a few highly visible and competent leaders, the problem with putting such people on a pedestal is that they will not also get frank and full information from their subordinates.8. The spiral of silence. An organization does not typically fall into the Abilene Paradox overnight. Rather, there was usually a process, a period when legitimate concerns were stifled. And the resulting tranquility can, in fact, be hiding the fact that the organization is at grave risk of making disastrous decisions.

Example 8.3.1, GalvanSample topic outline. Apply headers as demonstrated in the video: IntroductionEstablish importance of the topic (cite statistics on scarcity of organs).Delimit the review to psychological components of decisions.Describe organization of the paper, indicating that the remaining topics in the outline will be discussed.Individual decisions regarding posthumous organ donationBeliefs about organ donationAttitudes toward donatingCultural differencesReligious aspectsInfluence of popular mediaStated willingness to donateSummary of research on individual decisionsIn its original formulation, Groupthink is the tendency of a group to pursue and attain a premature consensus for a given decision (Janis,1972). It grew out of Janis' analytical case studies of major decision fiascoes ranging from the Bay of Pigs invasion, the escalation of the Vietnam conflict, the Watergate cover-up, the space shuttle Challenger disaster as well as flawed group problem-solving in business organizations (Aldag & Fuller, 1993; Janis, 1982; 1989). As we discussed in Chapter 7, Groupthink is an example of systems dysfunction with too much attention on the internal integration but too little consideration of external integration--things like market developments and/or feedback from customers and/or clients.According to Janis (1982) and Janis & Mann (1977) Groupthink is reflected in its symptoms. These include an illusion of invulnerability, belief in the inherent morality of the group, self-censorship (ignoring contradictory thoughts or self-doubts about the emerging decision), and self-appointed "mind guards" that shield the group from contradictory decision-related information. As Groupthink grows and the decision-making group moves toward consensus, decision-making defects begin to surface. These include the avoiding new information, the failure to re-examine the preferred choice or rejected alternatives, and developing contingency plans. Groupthink is an intuitively appealing concept. And in our experience of organizational life, much of what Janis proposed as the causal factors leading to disastrous decisions is, if at all possible, best to avoid (or to tolerate sparingly and knowingly). Also, as Tetlock and colleagues proposed (Tetlock, Peterson, McGuire, Chang, & et al., 1992), there may be limits in how psychology can be used to interpreting the historical record of any event or set of seemingly related events. This may be especially true for apparently Groupthink-driven (and disastrous) decisions made well after Janis model had been developed and publicized. In an attempt to correct for this potential bias, Tetlock et al. (Tetlock, et al., 1992) had independent raters analyze accounts of various decisions, including some that had been chalked up to Groupthink. In their analysis, group cohesiveness and situational stress did not predict catastrophic decisions. Rather, structural and procedural faults emerged as being more reliably detrimental. Using a similar methodology, Peterson and colleagues (Peterson, Owens, Tetlock, Fan, & Martorana, 1998) examined a set of decisions (some with unfavorable outcomes, others with favorable ones) made at Fortune-500 companies, such as CBS, Coca-Cola, and IBM. They found that some of Groupthinks allegedly cardinal signs (such as a lack of vigilance, cutting off discussion and debate) were seen with bad outcomes, but other Groupthink symptoms (strong and opinionated leaders, cohesion, and risk-taking) were observed when the final outcome was beneficial to the company.Abilene ParadoxThe Abilene paradox refers to the fact that organizations frequently make decisions that are the opposite of what they actually want to do thus setting out on a journey that takes them from their desired goals (Harvey, 1974). The paradox arises from failure to manage agreement (for example, when all or almost all of the decision makers agree publicly on one alternative during the decision meeting but state privately and usually expressed after the meeting that they actually preferred some other alternative). Perhaps you can remember attending decision meetings in which no one criticized or suggested alternatives to the dominant proposal. The vote is taken with complete or near complete consensus, and after the meeting people gather in small clusters in the hallway, and now indicate that they preferred some other then the just voted upon alternative-Welcome to Abilene!The inability to manage agreement rather than disagreement is the defining feature of the Abilene Paradox (Harvey; 1974). That no one goes to Abilene alone indicates that decision makers collude with each other to agree rather than risk being an outcast or separated from the group. The strategies for programmed or infused conflict discussed earlier, namely the devil's advocate or dialectical inquiry, are also appropriate for preventing or detouring from the Abilene Paradox. Other possibilities are to take a straw vote, call a brief recess, and circulate around the meeting room or in the hallways to solicit individual members opinion about the straw vote decision. Thereafter, reconvene the meeting, and if you sense a lot of private disagreement with the straw vote then take the risk of raising the potential for disagreement with the straw vote and perhaps appoint someone to play the role of the devil's advocate.The Abilene Paradox is an example of compliant Groupthink (public agreement, coupled with private individual disagreement that is expressed outside the decision-making group) as contrasted with internalized Groupthink in which the group members come to a consensus both publicly and privately, so there are no intrapersonal experiences of conflict or regret (McCauley, 1989). Furthermore, Kim (2001) proposed that Groupthink is evidence of a high-level of energy while the Abilene Paradox suggests low energy. Another way to think about their similarities and differences is presented in Table 10-2 (Harvey, Buckley, Novicevic, & Halbesleben, 2004)-------------------------Table 10-2 about here-------------------------Rationality Organizational Decision-makingIn most instances, decision-making involves perceived rather than objective measures of risk. Of the many models of how organizations make decisions, three---the rationality, bounded rationality, and the political modes are briefly discussed in this section (Browne, 1993; Harrison, 1987). Organizational decision-making involves processes described in each of the three models, so the adoption of a blended approach will lead you closer to what actually transpires than will strict adherence to one model.The rational model is a "cold" model of organizational decision-making based upon the assumptions that decision makers are entirely rational and seek to optimize or select the best or most effective alternative for a given problem (Browne, 1993). The rational model represents the ideal approach to decision-making and assumes further that decision makers (1.) have complete information about the opportunity or problem, (2.) have complete information about all alternatives and the consequences of selecting one alternative relative to any other, and (3.) make decisions solely on the basis of expectations about future outcomes rather than upon power or political considerations.In using a rational approach to decision-making, organizational members would follow all the steps presented in Table 10-1 and examine logically and analytically all the information at hand. In general, individuals and organizations aspire to make as many decisions as possible on the basis of rational considerations. However, there are many obstacles to doing so because of the nature of organizations, such as constraints on resources that limit the amount of information that can be assembled and processed by the decision-making group within a given time.Bounded RationalityThis model has been put forth as a more accurate description of how decisions are actually made in a variety of organizations (Cyert & March, 1963; March & Simon, 1958; Simon, 1975; 1976). A fundamental assumption of this model is that decision makers behave rationally within the constraints of their cognitive capabilities to attend to and define the problem and gain information about alternatives. In other words, decision makers aspire to make optimal choices but are hampered by the following two boundaries to rationality:All possible information about the problem and alternatives cannot be known within given period of time.A decision may be based upon criteria other than rational and logical evaluation of information, such as consideration of members preferences and coalitions within the organization.As a consequence of the cognitive constraints of not being able to gather and process all of the possible information about a problem and all alternatives, decision makers "satisfice" rather than "optimize" by selecting the alternative that appears good enough to solve the present problem.Since alternatives are often ambiguously defined, decision-making is primarily a process of deciding what to pay attention to and searching for information about alternatives. According to Cyert & March (1963), organizational decision-making is shaped by four fundamental forces operating in all organizations:1. Conflict arising from choice of alternative is seldom resolved or confronted, but rather only partially resolved through satisficing.2. Decision makers limit their search for alternatives to a problem by staying within the boundaries of prior or existing alternatives that they know about and thus do not add further ambiguity to the situation.3. As a result of observing the consequences of their decisions, organizations learn to modify their aspirations or goals on the basis of their own experiences and those of other organizations with whom they compare themselves.4. According to the bounded-rationality model of organizational decision-making, most decisions are made using relatively stable, routine organizational processes that operate incrementally in response to problems and serve to maintain the stability of an organization over time.Politics and Organizational Decision-MakingThe political model proposes that decisions result from bargaining by individuals or coalitions, rather than from the operation of routine organizational information gathering processes. Accordingly, decision-making is a matter of seeking a solution that is acceptable to all parties, and following a strategy of incrementalism in search of what is possible rather than what is optimal or satisficing (Lindblom, 1959; Wildavsky, 1967). An incremental approach to decision-making or inching along a step at a time limits the definition of the problem, the information-search processes, the number of alternatives, and the number of participants only to those who have a stake in the outcome and the power to block or implement the decision. According to Harrison (1987) and Browne (1993), political decision-making also usually has the following attributes: (1.) Considering only alternatives that differ slightly, marginally, or incrementally from existing policies or practices. (2.) Considering a small number of alternatives and only those with limited consequences. (3.) Continual massaging or redefinition of problem and alternatives to make the decision acceptable to all parties. (4.) Focusing upon short-term problems.As weve already discussed, its useful to think of organizations as systems. They typically contain sub-systems, or coalitions of individuals and subunits that are nested in the larger organizational system. All of these systems will be joined by formal and informal networks of affiliation and rivalry. Goals and aspirations will develop and evolve over time and make decisions based on successive and limited comparisons of alternatives. As Cohen, March, and Olson (1972) suggested in their garbage can model of decision-making organizational contexts are defined by disorderly streams of decision makers, problems, solutions, and choice opportunities for making choices are loosely coupled or linked only by their arrival and departure times within the organization. Critics of the garbage can model consider it to be too descriptive; applicable primarily to public service and non-hierarchical organizations, and focused mainly on reactive rather than proactive, decision-making (Bass, 1983; and Perrow, 1977).Central to each of the above three models is the fact that organizational decision-making is primarily a group or social process. Accordingly, we turn now to consider empirical studies of group decision-making.

Example 8.3.1, GalvanSample topic outline. Apply headers as demonstrated in the video: IntroductionEstablish importance of the topic (cite statistics on scarcity of organs).Delimit the review to psychological components of decisions.Describe organization of the paper, indicating that the remaining topics in the outline will be discussed.Individual decisions regarding posthumous organ donationBeliefs about organ donationAttitudes toward donatingCultural differencesReligious aspectsInfluence of popular mediaStated willingness to donateSummary of research on individual decisions

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