a note on the ottoman socio economic structure and its response to the balkan war of 1912

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Middle Eastern Studies

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A note on the Ottoman socio‐economic structureand its response to the Balkan war of 1912

Glen W. Swanson

To cite this article: Glen W. Swanson (1978) A note on the Ottoman socio‐economic structure

and its response to the Balkan war of 1912, Middle Eastern Studies, 14:1, 116-126, DOI:10.1080/00263207808700369

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A Note on the Ottom an Socio-Economic S tructure and

its Response to the Balkan W ar of 1912

Glen W . Swanson

In the autum n of 1912 the Ottoman em pire staggered u nder a series of military

defeats in the Balkans. A supposedly powerful and modernised Ottoman army

collapsed before the determined -attacks of Greek -Bulgarian -

Serb-Montenegrin forces, abandoned lands that had been under

Ottoman rule for centuries, and retreated to defensive positions at Catalca.

Europe pondered w ha t might develop from th e Ottoman setback, for it signalled

the beginning of the first major conflict of the twentieth century in Eu rope. T he

debacle also alerted the statesmen of the great powers to the disturbing fact

that they had neither control over Balkan affairs nor adequate knowledge of

what modern warfare involved.

At least one country, Great Britain, took immediate steps to learn more

about the effect of war on the 'sick man of Europe', and compiled an

extraordinary collection of reports that graphically described the Ottoman

economy and society under stress. The present purpose is to bring the

substance of these reports before the reader. Through critical use of these

sources, we may improve our understanding of the nature and strength of the

Ottoman empire, just prior to the First World War, and more clearly

comprehend the basic problems that a large state encounters w hen prosecuting

a war that directly affects only one of its geographic sections. In addition, by

focusing attention on the empire in its entirety, we may discover reasons and

methods for correcting the traditional Istanbul-centered approach toward

Ottoman history and revising our general views about Ottoman decline.

I

The guide for the British data collection w as a twenty-five p oint questionnaire

submitted by the British Committee of Imperial Defence to the Foreign Office.

1

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, transmitted the

Committee's request to the British ambassador in Istanbul, Sir Gerard

Lowther, who, in turn, distributed copies of the questionnaire to British

representatives stationed throughout the Ottoman empire. Of the sixteen

British diplomatic posts that responded, the embassy in Istanbul and consulates

in Izmir, Beirut, Damascus, Salonika, Adana, and Adalia submitted the fullest

reports; briefer accounts came from posts at the Dardanelles, Erzerum,

Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, Izmit, Jeddah, Alexandretta, and Rhodes.

2

To evaluate the data concerning the influence of the Balkan war on the

Ottoman empire, certain issues have been stressed and the categories of

information considered by the British have been reclassified. Major questions

include: how and to what extent did the war influence the economy; how did

society respond to the war; how did Ottoman soldiers behave; how were

aliens and non-Muslims treated; what variable factors existed; and what

conclusion may be reached about the viability of the Ottoman empire. The

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OTTOMAN SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 11 7

assessment of categories in the Com mittee's questionnaire and th e presentation

of information culled from the British reports required the construction of a

framework that classified 24 of the original 25 entries according to the three

following types of response: (1) economic, (2) military-social, and (3)

civilian-social.

3

II

The economic response varied so mu ch through out the empire that no valid

generalisation can be applied to the entire country. In Istanbul, for example,

the interruption to medium and small-scale trade and business was less than

expected because Istanbul scarcely depended on its hinterland for basic items.

Bulgarian forces sweeping past Edirne could not interdict the major supply

channels connecting Istanbul to the Black Sea, the Asiatic shore, and the

immediately surroun ding coun try. As a result, a constant supply of vegetables,

fish, meat and dairy products was available. The most disturbed urban

economic activities were transportation and large-scale business. The latter

suffered because its essentially maritime trade was carried in neutral shipping

which was adversely affected by high war risks and insurance rates. Within

the city, however, the freight system managed satisfactorily because of its

continued and unhindered use of male porters who could carry heavy loads

through the streets of Istanbul.

Trade and business activities outside the capital varied according to the type

of comm ercial relationships within a region, between the region and Istanbul,

or between the region and the Balkan battlefields. In some cities, e.g. Basra,

Baghdad, and Jeddah, the hostilities caused no commercial interruption, but in

Adana and Adalia, the w ar did produce a decline in imports to A dana and did

affect Adalia's local balance of commercial power. Only two steamship

companies plied the Adalia port: the P. Pantaleon (Greek flag) Company and

the American Archipelago Steam Navigation Company, both with

headquarters in Izmir. The war forced the Pantaleon firm to withdraw its

operations to Greece and the other company to raise its freight rates

considerably. In Damascus a depressed state of business already prevailed

when the Balkan war broke out. The conflict shattered hopes for a commercial

upturn, freight rates rose, prices fell, the pilgrimage trade to Mecca suffered,

exports were disturbed, and peasants were adversely affected because of their

need for cash which was in short supply.

The British consul in Izmir (Smyrna) described in his detailed report how

pre-war economic conditions helped determine the course of events in his city,

an important comm ercial centre in western A natolia. Just before the outbreak

of the Italian-Turkish war in September 1911a financial crisis had occurred,

owing to the collapse 'of the Bank of Mitylene, a consequence of the failure of

the Zervudachi bankers of Alexandria. As other Greek banks were reported to

be largely compromised in the Zervudachi business, there was an immediate

run on those banks which soon extended to other financial establishments.'

The result was general discredit. Commercial firms, especially import houses,

which had been trading beyond their means, found themselves suddenly

deprived of banking facilities. Moreover, gold had become scarce in Istanbul

and sizable amounts of English sovereigns had to be imported from England

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11 8 MIDDL E EASTERN STUDIES

and recoined into Turkish liras. A good deal of time was needed to meet the

demand for gold currency because

the mint could not produce more than LT 50,000 a day of which LT

35,000 went to the government and only LT 15,000 towards market

requirements. All the banks therefore at Constantinople with the

exception of the Imperial Ottoman Bank which did help the market to a

certain extent, were compelled to protect their gold and refused to buy

any paper on Europe. Exchange consequently fell heavily, especially as

the expenses incurred to import the gold and the considerable loss of

interest through the delay in coming had to be provided for.

The outbreak of war with Italy in September 1911 further weakened Izmir's

financial position. A lthough the placement of imported gold on th e market

slightly improved the situation, the import business remained listless because

the merchants, unable to find the usual credit, had to stop buying or reduce

orders. During Izmir's export season in 1912 money once more became

scarce; Istanbul had to import gold from England; the exchange again

declined. Feeling the intensifying econom ic pressure and dreading a recurrence

of the previous year's pan ic, banks were loath to part w ith the gold they had.

Izmir did receive some imported gold sent overland but still found it difficult to

obtain the currency from Istanbul or other supply centres. With the approach

of the Balkan w ar, no gold could be obtained from Marseilles because shipping

firms there refused to carry gold which the Greek governm ent had declared as

contraband and which was uninsurable. The British consul pointed out,

however, that were it not for the war, the region might have experienced a

relatively stable and prosperous period because the bountiful harvests during

the previous two years helped the district withstand the crisis quite well.

The impression that the British documents create as a whole (that each

commercial centre in the Ottoman empire had its own special relationship to

the war) applies to Beirut as well. Here the question is how to explain this

particular

entrepot s

prosperity in contrast to the economic situation in Izmir or

Damascus. The British report from Beirut contended that the city's excellent

record lay in its banking system and commercial relationships. A war in the

Balkans scarcely touched Beirut market interests because they depended more

on England, France, and Egypt than on Istanbul and European Turkey. As

distributing centre for other Ottoman provinces, Beirut managed without great

difficulty to meet its obligations because military movements hardly affected

the important railway from Aleppo and Damascus to Beirut; and unlike the

situation in Izmir, the credit base in Beirut rested in a few small houses and

four leading banks whose sound management policies prevented the economic

crisis from having the usual negative consequences. The result w as stability in

the Beirut market and relative prosperity.

Ill

Just as the above cases indicate the wide variation between regions in their

economic response to the w ar, so are there examples of diversity in wh at one

may categorise as the empire's

military-social response.

Involved here w as a

crucial issue for the Ottoman state: how to effect the reform of the Ottoman

socio-political system so that the traditional method of group identification,


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OTTOMAN SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRUCTUR E 1 19

religion, could be replaced by the newer identity of Ottoman nationalism. The

gradual w esternisation and secularisation of the last great Islamic state evoked

calls for freedom, equality, and liberty for all members of the empire. These

ringing cries sounded like excellent ideas to many subjects who had little

notion of what such terms entailed, but in time of stress the same persons who

demanded the removal of traditional ties and the adoption of western political

identifications found it difficult indeed to fulfil the new obligations placed on

them. The reaction to this dilemma is described by several consular officials.

While most Muslims accepted their military duties, non-Muslims and other

formerly exempt citizens usually shrugged off their opportunity to be equal to

the Muslim Anatolian peasant in military service, emigrated from the empire,

or sought refuge in the traditional manner of paying an exemption tax.

The British reports reveal that other special conditions and grievances also

existed. The complaint in Adalia reflected the problems encountered in the

modernisation of the Ottoman officer corps. Accustomed to the former type of

illiterate officer who had come up through the ranks, the common soldier

appeared to be reluctant to serve under the new breed of young, school-trained

officers whom he did not understand and whom he recognised to be from a

different social class. It would be interesting to learn whether or not this social

or educational antagonism prevailed elsewhere, but the other British reports

are unfortunately silent on this matter. If ill feeling between the common

soldier and the modernised officer were widespread, then it may signify the

clash between change and tradition in society. If, however, the absence of

similar information in the other British reports actually means that no such

reaction existed outside Adalia, then one must list it as an isolated case. The

issue may be resolved at some later date through intensive, co-operative

research.

It is clearly evident that soldiers from Alexandretta had their own reasons

for dissatisfaction. At the beginning of hostilities the response to mobilisation

had been prompt and willing but the hardships experienced on the march to

Istanbul were overwhelming. The British agent in Alexandretta reported that

once in the Taurus m ountains the reservists, starving and poorly clad, suffered

from the cold weather and illness.

On seeing this pitiful situation, their officers obtained from

Constantinople, the authorization to disband them , and they w ere happy

to return to their hom es. Later on w hen they we re called again to serve,

remembering their first experience, and on hearing, on the other hand,

the defeat of the Turkish army, they emphatically refused to march, and

the authorities fearing serious trouble, were compelled to cancel the

order.

Despite the problems described in some of the reports, one must note that the

Ottoman army managed to mobilise large numbers of men. These soldiers,

mostly Muslim, responded promptly to the official summons to duty.

According to the British accounts, the Ottoman troops conducted themselves

in a proper manner almost everywhere. In Beirut, Erzerum, Adalia,

Damascus, Salonika, and Izmir the British consuls reported a state of sobriety

and general discipline. Although a mutinous spirit followed by

insubordination did manifest itself among the reservists leaving Damascus for



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12 0 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

Aleppo, the general behaviour of the troops w as quite laudable. In European

Turkey the thousands of troops at San Stefano acted admirably despite the

hunger, neglect, and discomfort they experienced there. The British consul in

the Dardanelles, however, does refer vaguely to the invariable drunkenness in

his region; but the reasons for this apparently unique situation are yet to be

explained.

IV

Parallel to the economic and military-social reactions considered above was

the

civilian-social response,

described by British agents according to the

following categories: males left behind to carry on essential services; women

replacements for men called into service; crime; martial law; restrictions on

the press; censorship; popular reaction to government news about the war;

gifts and comforts to the troops; and, especially, civilian and official relations

with the non-Muslims and enemy aliens living within the Ottoman empire.

Before discussing the British findings, it would be well to keep in mind that

Ottoman society had for centuries followed the Islamic practice of tolerance

toward various groups living under Muslim rule. Whether this toleration

continued in time of stress has been a question the answ er to w hich is couched

in generalities based, too often, on extraordinary episodes, incomplete

information, or anti-Ottoman prejudice. For persons whose awareness of

Ottoman policy toward the non-Muslim and alien rests primarily on accounts

of Ottoman persecutions during the First World War, it may come as a

surprise to learn that less than two years before that great war, the Ottoman

government and society proceeded usually in a neutral and sometimes highly

commendable fashion.

According to the British reports, the treatment of aliens, including those of

'enemy' nationality, was, with a few exceptions, generally good throughout

the empire. In Adalia, even though the Greek consul's flagstaff was cut down,

the few Hellenic subjects in the district continued with their trade and business.

In Salonika the Turks generally respected the rights of foreigners. Many

subjects of the four belligerent states did leave Salonika at the commencem ent

of hostilities, but did so volun tarily. Th e British representative in Izmir 'nev er

saw nor heard of any provocation or a bad word against aliens ....' In

Mesopotamia, the Greeks in Basra were not molested; in Baghdad the Turks

and some Arabs were known for their dislike of aliens, but most of the Arabs

were considered to be indifferent in this respect. The sensitive popular mood in

some regions did demand stringent control by authorities. The Ottoman

governm ent took m easures to safeguard aliens in Beirut and employed a policy

of caution in Izmir, where aliens were placed under the protection of foreign

consulates. Unfavourable war news 'caused a revival of fanaticism' in Adana,

especially among the lower-class Muslim population, but the British consul

points out that the-population 'as a rule' did not exhibit feelings of animosity. If

absence of information indicates that nothing untoward occurred, then the

British report for Erzerum may mean that tranquillity prevailed in this town

which was inhabited by many A rm enians; the report makes no claim that the

Muslims had vented their frustration or anger on non-M uslims. In the case of

the Dardanelles, one is faced with an apparent exception and the problem of

verification regarding treatment of aliens. The British agent appears reliable


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OTTOMAN SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRUCTU RE 12 1

but one must note that his presentation often differs from the picture given

elsewhere in the empire. Perhaps conditions in the Dardanelles were

exceptional, or perhaps complete objectivity was lacking in the compilation

and analysis of information. In bureaucratic fashion, perhaps he was trying to

show for some reason the value of his office to his superiors in Istanbul and

London, for he does indicate that the situation for aliens was 'extremely bad

where there is no consular corps'.

The almost complete lack of overt antagonism toward aliens and non-

Muslims living in the Ottoman empire suggests that acts of cruelty and

intolerance were not au tomatic reactions of Ottoman Muslims in time of stress.

But this did no t mean that the fear of emotional un rest w as absent. In Istanbul,

although the influence of the war on the city's life appeared to be remarkably

small and o rdinary activities continued as usual, the B ritish' ambassador

describes in his report his impressions of the w ar 's moral effect:

... There is a general feeling of apprehension: apprehension among the

Christians of massacres by the Moslems, apprehension among the

Moslems of the entry of the Bulgars, apprehension among both of the

irruption of a defeated Turkish army. Add to this the terror inspired by

the dread of cholera and other epidemic diseases, the large influx of

refugee peasants and the enormous numbers of sick and wounded

soldiers that are constantly being brought into the city and the wonder is

that Pera [a district of Istanbul] especially with its constitutional liability to

panic, still goes about its ordinary affairs. At one moment I think there

can be little doubt that the Christian population secretly looked forward

to the coming of the Bulgars, but at present I believe that both Christians

and Moslems will be very much relieved if both armies can be kept

outside.

To curb such fears (whether actual or only imagined by the British

representatives) and to lessen the political and military danger of internal

unrest, Ottoman authorities took steps to influence civil attitudes and actions

through m artial law , press restriction, and censorship. Martial law w as already

familiar to the Ottoman empire because it had been in effect, intermittently, in

some regions since the Young Turks deposed Sultan A bdiilhamid in 1909. The

capital grew accustomed to it and was able to continue with an undisturbed

community life most of the time; the greatest application of martial law was

for political purposes, such as arresting leaders of the opposing party.

The position of the press served as another indicator of government-civilian

relations during wartime. In Istanbul restrictions on the press were strict in

theory but were executed erratically so that, other than being irritating, they

had little effect. According to the British ambassador, the reports of victory

deceived few people but became 'so fantastic' that the ministry of war warned

the press that 'any paper publishing news of non-existent victories would be

suppressed or otherwise punished'.

One might have thought that on Rhodes and in Salonika the proximity of

the Balkan or (in the case of Rhodes) the Italian enemy would have affected the

way news influenced the populace; but if there were a correlation, it was not

evident. On Rhodes, where the British questionnaire was applied to conditions

during the Italian-Turkish war of 1911-12, the British observer reported that



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122 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

press restrictions were of no concern to the Muslims who received news of the

war with Italy with apparent equanimity. During the Balkan war the local

press in Salonika was 'forbidden to publish any news whatever concerning

military movements or the progress of military operations, beyond the

officially communicated and generally purely imaginary records of victory.'

The British consul-general in Salonika goes on to describe how one group

reacted: 'The more educated Turks ... welcomed all favourable rumours with

childish credulity, followed by fits of extreme dejection on the inevitable

disillusioning.'

In the Asiatic provinces of the empire the press hesitated to criticise

government policies. In Baghdad, where telegrams were generally submitted

to the Governor-General before publication, the local newspapers often altered

the facts 'to render them favourable to the party in political power'. The

Damascus press was cautious, and in Erzerum the news was only that of

success. One m ay add that the question of governmental control over new s did

not arise in Adalia and Jeddah because no press existed in those districts.

Apparently the inhabitants of Jeddah paid scant attention to the hostilities for a

very special reason. As the principal native merchant of Jeddah told Consul

Shipley, 'The only w ar know n in the Hejaz is a bad pilgrimage. If the

pilgrimage is good it is a matter of complete indifference to the population

whether Turkey be at war or not.' Whether the information contained in it

was true or false, Shipley's report was extraordinary because the consul did

identify his source of information, bu t his action w as the exception rather than

the rule.

The failure of British agents to describe their methods of surveying public

opinion leaves us no clue about the objectivity of their research on civilian

attitudes toward the war. Their reports on this category must therefore be

treated w ith caution. It wou ld appear that apathy marked the attitude of m any

subjects. From Baghdad, Consul-General Scott writes that the Arabs in that

region believed that the war was not 'a clash of Cross and Crescent', even

though the Turks tried to convince the Arabs that it w as. In Basra, where the

small Turkish minority consisted of a few officials and their families, both

Christians and Muslim Arabs expressed 'keen interest' in the war at the

beginning, but as the Turkish reverses in the Balkans became k nown the public

interest waned . In Mosul the false news of Turkish v ictories was received with

satisfaction at first, then people 'laughed' at the Turkish attempt to conceal

defeat. Peasants in Adalia saw little connection between the war and their

personal interests and paid scant heed to it except when being called to the

colours. Then they complained. In Izmir the Muslims accepted the bad news

'with dignity and resignation'. In Beirut life remained normal, but the news of

reverses did cause general consternation because the public had been led to

believe that, whatever may have been the situation in other government

departments, the army at any rate had improved.

Although its actual attitude remains unknown, the British Foreign Office

may have been perplexed at the subjective statements made in some of these

reports. Consul-General Scott, for example, expressed his opinion that 'at

present the majority of the inhabitants of Baghdad consider the situation of

Turkey to be a hopeless one'. In Alexandretta the British representative

detected a sense 'of great depression amongst all Moslem classes who now



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consider their position as hopeless. They have lost all confidence in their

government.' Consul Shipley wrote from Jeddah: 'The war in so far as it can

be said to have influenced public feeling at all has strengthened the desire of the

population for the termination of Turkish rule in this country.' From Mosul

came the following impression: 'There is no doubt that the Christians

universally rejoiced at the overthrow of Turkey, while the Moslems were for

the most part indifferent. If they felt any ann oyance it was as Moslems and no t

as Turkish subjects.' The British agent in Basra left room for various

implications as he wrote: 'I should say that, at heart, the Arab population w as

wholly disloyal to the Turks but care is taken to study the susceptibilities of

their Turkish masters for obvious reasons.' Finally, there is the intriguing

report from Beirut: 'It was feared that the general collapse of the Ottoman

government would follow [the military disaster in the Balkans?] and an

agitation, still actively going on , was started for an Anglo-Egyptian occupation

of Syria ....' How the British consular officials were able to comprehend the

feelings of the native population is un kn ow n, b ut later research may uncover

the type of information needed to ascertain the validity of these British

statements.

Despite the apparent civilian indifference, many citizens did support the w ar

effort. The Muslim population in Istanbul did its utmost to help refugees and

the wou nd ed, but did this with little organ isation. Similar efforts were made in

the Dardanelles, Salonika, Izmir, and Beirut. Owing to the initiative of the

Beirut governor's .wife, clothing and other comforts were collected for the

troops. The Greek government, however, had listed clothing for the army as

con traban d of w ar and it was therefore difficult to ship the clothing to Istanbul

by sea because of fear of capture; the alternative, the land route, was not

considered practical. In Salonika, subscriptions were opened for the relief of

the families of men w ho had been sum mo ned to active duty, as well as for the

sick and w ounded. Ladies' comm ittees w ere formed to aid in preparing items

for the wounded at base hospitals. Not all provinces, however, contained

citizens who were prepared to volunteer help. In Baghdad no gifts or comforts

were reported to have been collected for the troops; people were asked to

donate m oney, but they did so reluctantly because of their suspicion of w here

the funds went.

To evaluate the effect of war on civilians, the British used another approach

which measured the changes in the civilian manpower system. Almost

everywhere the call to arms affected groups according to types of skill, class

standing, and religious and cultural background. In Istanbul mobilisation had

little apparent impact on the professional class, largely composed of Chris tians;

they presumably purchased exemption or otherwise evaded their military

service. The problem in the capital was with manual labour and artisans,

whose ranks had already been depleted owing to the expulsion of Italians

during the war with Italy. In Salonika, Adana, and Beirut the professional

class was scarcely touched and therefore could continue its services

unhindered. Mobilisation in Beirut and Adana affected primarily the

agricultural class which furnished most of the reserves for the war effort. As

for occupational replacements, Damascus had some women assuming the

tasks of weavers called up for military duty, but no other region reported the

necessity for females replacing men in essential services. The British consul in


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124 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

Salonika, however, was undoubtedly correct in stating that the share of

agricultural labour falling habitually to women was considerably increased.

V

However sketchy they may be, several conclusions emerge from the British

data. The reports establish that great contrasts in response to stress existed

within the Ottoman empire. The major variables in these cases were the

following: the type of relationship between Istanbul and the region; the

history and nature of the region's economic and social system ; the m ake up of

the population and attitude of various g roup s; the proximity of enemy forces

or threat of enemy action; and the specific experiences and problems of the

region.

The extent to which war influenced the economy is difficult to assess, but

some generalisations suggest themselves. The evidence concerning credit

arrangem ents, relations between Istanbul merchants and customers elsewhere

in the empire, and the strength of local banks indicates that the war itself did

not cripple the decentralised economic structure of the empire. But it did

occasionally have a negative effect when joined to a weakening economic

factor already present in that region. In many districts no interruption to

commerce occurred, and in at least one area, Beirut, there were even signs of

economic gro wth. The basically agricultural economy may have suffered from

the decrease in the male labour supply, but in the fields the wom en left behind

appear to have assumed the extra burden. Finally, the enforced requisition of

animals had little effect because the basic work unit - oxen - was not needed

for military purposes.

The occasionally ambiguous nature of the British reports hints at the

dimensions and variety of Ottoman social response to the war effort. On one

hand, British consuls comment on the general apathy to the war in the

Balkans; the inconsistency of government policies in matters of mobilisation,

martial law, trade regulations, censorship, and press restriction; the unreliable

news coverage and corresponding public reaction of disbelief or resignation;

and the desire of many non-Muslims to evade military service. On the other

hand, we are informed of the satisfactory state of discipline; the lack of any

marked increase in crime; the scant impact mobilisation had on the

professional class of civilians; and the generally positive response to

mobilisation orders. With regard to Ottoman and Muslim relations with the

non-Muslim and alien, the impression from almost all the reports is that the

Muslims showed both tolerance and resignation, which is contrary to what

one might have expected of the 'terrible Turk'.

As for the question of the Ottoman empire's viability, the tentative

conclusions are threefold. Firstly, and again contrary to popular views related

to Ottoman decline, the Ottoman state in 1912 was n ot acting as if it were in an

advanced stage of a terminal illness. Secondly, the nature of the information

found in the British reports indicates the need for more research and new

perspectives which would free us from the snares of false analogies or

unsubstantiated generalisations. Thirdly, these same reports underline the

complex nature of the Ottoman imperial structure and the task entailed in

comprehending this sprawling empire, namely, to correct the traditional

Istanbul-centred approach by including the towns and provinces outside the



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capital in historical research. Once these exhaustive regional studies are m ade,

perhaps the finding will be that the Ottoman empire survived for six centuries

largely because of its decentralised socio-economic system, a system so durable

that it permitted the empire to w eather the shock of regional w ars right up to

1913.

If this were the case, then the First W orld W ar must be regarded not as

the final light tap to a dying empire but as the unique blow in the Ottoman

dynasty's six hundred years of history, the only event that touched so many

parts of the empire at one critical moment.

NOTES

1. Public Record Office. Foreign Office, F.O.I95/2445, No.

6023,

Grey to Lowther, 5 Nov.

1912. transmitting Committee of Imperial Defence request for information on war effects;

Committee request to Foreign Office is dated 25 Oct. 1912, and is signed by M. P. A. Hankey,

Secretary, Committee of Imperial Defence. Crown copyright records reproduced by kind

permission of the Controller, H. M. Stationery Office.

2. The reports are located in P. R. O. Foreign Office embassy and consular records for Turkey

(F.O.371 /177 6 and F.0.19 5/24 45). F.0.371 /17 76 , File 429 includes two reports: No. 7937, Pera,

Lowther, transmitting report of Mon ahan, Erzeroum # 9 , 5 Feb. 1913; and No. 17974, Pera,

enclosure, report from Acting Political Resident in Turkish Arabia and Consul-General Baghdad

Major N.S cott # 2 8 8 / 9 , 17 March 1913. F.O.I 95/2 445 includes the following reports: No. 6023,

Istanbul, Lowther to F.O. #994A, 25 Nov. 1912; No. 7053, Smyrna [Izmir], Consul-General

Barnham to Lowther #150, 31 Dec. 1912; No. 7046. Beirut, Consul-General Cumberbatch to

Lowther # 8 2 , 23 Dec. 1912; No . 6859, Damascus, Consul Devey to Lowther # 6 7 . 7 Dec. 1912;

No.

6695, Salonica, Consul-General Lamb to Lowther # 170, 6 Dec. 1912; No. 6657, Adana, W.

Matthews to Lowther #46, 2 Dec. 1912; No. 6953, Adalia, Vice-Consul Keun to Lowther. 14

Dec. 1912; No. 6570, Dardanelles, Vice-Consul Palmer to Consul-General in Constantinople

Eyres # 81 , 30 Nov. 1912; No . 6712, Erzeroum, Consul Monahan to Lowther, 3 Dec. 1912; No.

7064,

Basra, Crow to Lowther #57, 13 Dec. 1912; No. 7102, Mosul, Vice-Consul Hony to

Low ther, 17 Dec. 1912; No. 6572, Ismidt, A. Amat to Lowther, 29 Nov. 1912; No. 690 0, Jeddah,

Consul Shipley to Lowther # 102, 7 Dec. 1912; No. 703 5, Alexandretta, A. Catoni to Low ther, 20

Dec.

1912; No. 7054, Rhodes, Consul-General Alfred Biliotti. 30 Nov. 1912.

3. The 25 categories have been rearranged as follows:

A. Economic Response

1. General interruption to commerce, trade and business.

2. Interruptions caused during, and after, mobilisation to communication systems (railways,

post and telegraph service, etc.), with special attention as to what extent normal transport

arrangements were upset.

3. Finance. W hether a 'mo ratorium wa s declared, how it was carried out, and its effect.

4. The extent to which enforced requisition was carried out, and how it was accepted by the

community. How the requisition of transport affected agriculture and industry.

5. How far the army was dependent on imports from abroad for the supply of war material,

such as arms, ammunition, explosives, stores, food, clothing, and how far these were supplied

by the country.

6. The policy adopted with regard to trade and financial transactions with enemy subjects, for

example, if there was any prohibition of exports during the war.

7.

In the case of a maritime state, whether there was any government gu arantee against loss of

trading vessels or cargoes.

B.

Military-Social Response

8. The response to mobilisation. Was it prompt and willing, or the reverse; in the latter case

what the reasons were.

9. Wha t special arrangements - if any - existed for securing the early return of reservists

serving abroad. What proportion of such (a) was reckoned on, and (b) actually came in.

10. Whether friction was engendered in those cases where the assumption of military rank on

mobilisation altered the existing social and civil position of individuals.

11. If lack of discipline, such as drunkenn ess, was show n by the troops departing for the front.



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12 6 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

12. The spirit displayed by soldiers returning from the front and whe ther there were m any cases

of men so returning without authority.

13.

Whether any measures were taken to prevent prostitutes going to the front and whether

many such women did reach the troops.

ivilian—Social esponse

14.

W hether the denudation of the country of military force caused an increase in crime. If so,

whether such crime was due to the fact that large sections of the population w ere throw n ou t of

employment or to the presence in the town of an unruly class.

15.

Whether martial law was proclaimed, to what extent it was enforced, and how it was

accepted.

16. Details as to restrictions placed on the press as regards dissemination of war n ews. W hether

press comments or criticisms on the conduct of the operations were permitted.

17. Details as to the measures adopted for the censorship of cables, telegrams, wireless

telegrams, telephone messages and private letters from the front and elsewhere.

18.

The spirit w ith w hich n ews, either favourable or the reverse, w as received by the

population.

19. How far loyalty w as affected by lack of success in the field when a m ember of the reigning

House was controlling operations.

20 . W hethe r national feeling takes practical shape in the dispatch of gifts and comforts to the

troops.

21 .

Whether a sufficient proportion of the male population (especially the professional class)

was left behind to carry on efficiently supply, municipal, administrative, medical and other

services essential to national life.

22 . To what extent women took the place of men in those services.

23 . Details as to the treatmen t of aliens including those of 'ene m y' nationality.

D Other

24.

[Not considered for this paper] Measures taken to ensure speedy transmission of official

intelligence to headquarters from the front in the case of naval or military operations.

25 . [Information in this category was used for the three types of response above] Any other

points which may throw light upon the influence of a state of war upon the national life and the

reverse.

Although they were of indirect aid in analysing the answers to other questions, some categories

had such paucity of information or had so little bearing on the issues, either positively or

negatively, that they w ere put aside after careful consideration. Later research in Ottoman or other

sources may warrant a review of these categories and a reinterpretation of their value. Within this

group are the following: 'whe ther a mo rator ium was declared, how it was carried out. and its

effect': how far the army was dependent on im ports from abroad for the supply of wa r m aterial :

what special arrangements existed for securing the early return of reservists serving abroad'-,

'details as to the measures adopted for the censorship of cables, telegrams, wireless telegrams,

telephone messages and priva te letters from the front and elsewhere '; how far loyalty w as affected

by lack of success in the field whan a member of the reigning House was controlling operations'.

Persons interested in comparative studies may find two other categories to be of particular

significance: 'whether any measures were taken to prevent prostitutes going to the front and

whe ther man y such wom en did reach the troops ; and whether friction was engendered in those

cases where the assumption of military rank on mobilisation altered the existing social and civil

position of individuals'. The questions revealed the invalidity of a Western-orientated yardstick

when measuring ce rtain aspects of a largely no n-W estern society. In respect to prostitutes going to

the front, this problem did not exist in the Ottoman empire because it was so foreign to the social

mores of the Ottoman military establishment. And unlike civil-military relationships in some

Eu ropean countries , the assum ption of officer rank by a m obilised reservist did not pose a social

problem in the empire because these officers w ere supplied from the active army establishment. As

Consul-General Lamb reported from Salonika. 'Under the Turkish military organization the

cadres' of reserve battalions remain en perm ane nce , and officers of the reserve consequently

do not return to civilian occupations, whilst the bulk of better-class reservists in the rank and file

habitually buy their exemption. The friction contemplated by this question consequently does not

arise in Turkey.



p r i l 2 0 1 6

a note on the ottoman socio economic structure and its response to the balkan war of 1912

Documents