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Habitat International 45 (2015) 223e230

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Habitat International

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A new megaproject model and a new funding model. Travellingconcepts and local adaptations around the Delhi metro

B�er�enice BonEHESS-CEIAS Paris, Project FP7 Chance2Sustain, France

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:Available online 6 July 2014

Keywords:MegaprojectsGovernancePlanning outcomesDelhiIndia

E-mail address: berenicebon5@gmail.com.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2014.06.0080197-3975/© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

a b s t r a c t

The practices and instruments of urban governance are rapidly changing in Delhi, a metropolitan area of24 million inhabitants characterized by strong socio-economic inequalities. The Delhi metro megaprojectand its financing mechanism through land value capture are the prism through which this paper analysesgovernance patterns at different scales. This model has led to the production of mixed-use spaces in theheart of the city, allowing for a spatial cohabitation of transport functions as well as residential, com-mercial, and economic uses, following a pattern that has been identified as one of the defining features ofa 'new generation of megaprojects' (Diaz Orueta & Fainstein, 2009). It argues that although there hasbeen significant institutional change, notably the entry of private sector actors in mega infrastructuredevelopment, careful analysis of the modalities of this mechanism reveal important aspects of continuityincluding the pre-eminence of techno-scientific planning, minimal stakeholder consultation and con-flicts in the public sphere. The Delhi metro case will be situated within the larger Indian context, whichhas been marked since the 2000s by the emergence of city-centric growth strategies with public in-vestments concentrated in large cities often in the form of public-private partnerships (Kennedy & Zerah,2008), and the importation and adaptation of international models.

© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction

This paper explores governance issues around the planning andthe management of local outcomes of mixed-use megaprojects inthe metropolitan area of Delhi. The reconfiguration of urban spacethrough large-scale mixed-use projects has been identified in theinternational literature as one of the defining features of a newgeneration of megaprojects (Diaz Orueta & Fainstein, 2009). Thepaper presents a case study of the Delhi metro, which is a testingground for a new funding mechanism for urban megaprojects thatconsists of financing part of the capital costs by capturing the landvalue, an instrument not previously used by public actors in India.This model has lead to the production of mixed-use spaces in theheart of the city, allowing for a spatial cohabitation of transportfunctions as well as residential (condominiums), commercial(shopping malls), and economic uses. The paper focuses on theappropriation and distortion of this model, borrowed from HongKong, and the interactions between planning procedures andoutcomes.

In India, the 2000s were marked by the emergence of economicdevelopment strategies centered on cities (Kennedy& Zerah, 2008)and growing awareness of the challenges involved in this policyshift, in particular with regard to the provision of infrastructure. Inthis context, policy-makers and planners in India are carefullyobserving what is being done elsewhere, taking a leaf out of in-ternational models and adopting mobile concepts. Currently,transport infrastructure in metropolitan areas with very highpopulation densities is woefully inadequate. A dozen metro pro-jects are underway and a dozen cities are preparing detailed projectreports. All these metro projects require considerable public in-vestments and substantial technological capacity, and all arebringing in foreign capital and expertise. The Delhi metro and theinstrument of land value capture is considered to be amodel for thecountry, and will be the focus of this analysis.

Delhi is a large metropolitan region with a population of 24million inhabitants, high levels of socio-economic disparities, andwith a pattern of social-spatial differentiation and residentialsegregation both at the scale of the neighbourhood and at the scaleof the metropolitan area (Dupont, 2004). Unlike Mumbai, Delhi didnot have a local train connecting it with the outskirts and hugeinvestments in transport infrastructure have been necessary,including to improve access to some intra-urban areas. In 2010,

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Delhi hosted the Commonwealth Games, a major sporting event,which acted as a facilitator for taking decisions and raising funds.

Following Altshuler and Luberoff (2003), the Delhi metromegaproject is considered 'an unusually revealing window' todiscuss governance issues and urban planning.1 The Shastri Parkproject in East Delhi was selected as a study site for this paper todiscuss the outcomes and the governance patterns of the mega-project at a local scale and in relation with its surrounding envi-ronment. The fieldwork was carried out between 2011 and 2013and combines qualitative and quantitative approaches. In-depthinterviews were conducted with stakeholders directly involved inthe decision-making processes including engineers, planners, pol-iticians at different levels (Union, State and municipal), and inter-national actors. Comparative research was conducted on metromegaprojects in two other Indian cities, Mumbai and Hyderabad.Different rounds of in-depth and semi-structured interviews ofinhabitants and local workers were conducted in the settlementsadjacent to the project, and with local stakeholders like municipalcouncillors, local politicians and project officers. Background in-formation and secondary data related to the megaproject(including maps, policy documents and related government orders,tenders, impacts assessments, costs and revenues data), and to theselected study site were collected over the same period of time.

The paper is structured in four parts: the first part presents abrief overview of literature on the politics and governance of urbanmega projects and introduces the Delhi metro and the instrumentof land value capture case study. The second part analyses thegovernance patterns of the model of spatial cohabitation of trans-port functions as well as residential, commercial, and economicuses at a metropolitan scale. The third part introduces the ShastriPark project and discusses the outcomes and trade-offs of themegaproject at a local scale. The fourth part concludes the paper bydiscussing critically the results of the case study in relation to in-ternational literature on urban megaprojects presented in the firstpart of the paper.

Politics and governance of urban mega projects

The term megaproject is more and more present in the politicaldiscourse and that of developers or investors. There appears to be agrowing consensus, arising from efforts to define and classifydifferent types of megaprojects, that suggest a transition is occur-ring, a change in the way they are planned, and the actors involved.Although megaprojects are not 'new', the academic literatureidentifies 'a new generation of megaprojects' (Diaz Orueta &Fainstein, 2009) as a framework to understand emerging trendsobserved in the production of urban space. This literature is influ-enced by concepts and theories coming from the various field ofurban studies, such as 'urban entrepreneurialism' (Harvey, 1989), orthe 'neoliberal city' (Hackworth, 2007) which explore the trans-formation of state action, new forms of privatization of planning,and changes in urban policies and their outcomes.

The first metro in India, planned in the 1960s in the city ofCalcutta, required huge investment and 'marks a great engineeringmilestone in the urban transport' of the country (Kharbanda &Pinto, 1996). The metro in Delhi was approved 30 years later. Itdiffers from the Calcutta metro particularly in the structure ofgovernance, the presence of foreign capital flows, the massivetransfer of technology, and the choice of the financial structure. Themetro in Delhi does not constitute only a network, but producesnew spaces in the core of the city, using the instrument of land

1 These questions form part of my doctoral research on metro megaprojects inIndian cities and their role in urban production and negotiation.

value capture borrowed from Hong Kong to source new revenue.There is a large literature on the transfers of expertise and knowl-edge around megaprojects, the flows of international capital andthe participation of non-local actors and institutions. This isexpressed in concepts such as 'policy transfer' (Stone, 2004), 'mo-bile urbanism' (McCann, 2011), sharing of 'best practices' (Navez-Bouchanine & Valladares, 2007) and the construction of a com-mon rhetoric of legitimation. These planning processes are notdescribed as an 'importation' of a model, but as an 'adaptation' of amodel in different local socio-economic and political contexts, withactors who mobilize different type of knowledge, normativeframes, interests and references. This implies to focus on theplanning practices and procedures, the way in which megaprojectsare conceived and implemented and the rationales put forward.Furthermore, a multi-scalar analysis of megaprojects underscoresthe fact that the relations between actors are not static, they evolveduring the different phases, which usually span a long time period,and at each change of scale (at the scale of the megaproject, themetropolitan and regional scale), the rules change and thus thepositions of power and struggles for influence between stake-holders (Crozier & Friedberg, 1977; Delaney & Leitner, 1997). Thecritical question then is how various actors, and how a project withdifferent uses (transport, residential, or commercial), and thusdifferent planning procedures and rules can constitute a system?The inherent conflicts of a megaproject have to eventually lead to aform of consensus, through different means like deliberation orlitigation.

The paper uses Barthel's (2008) definition of a 'special regime' ofmegaprojects to discuss the use of exemptions, and a supposedspecific governance structure for megaprojects in order to questionwhether the instrument of land value capture requires a powerfulagency 'well insulated from normal politics' (Fainstein & Fainstein,1983) tomanage successfully themetro project? The special regimedoes not refer only to the governance structure but also its spatialtranslations and the use of spatial tools to assert control over aspace, and to build collective action. This is linked in the literaturewith broader issues of justice, and democracy. A key considerationis the 'participation' of stakeholders and the scope for communitymobilization through formal and informal procedures and struc-tures: what kinds of spaces are open and mobilized for participa-tion? And how do people experience megaprojects in terms ofimpacts (positive and negative) and risks, including the disruptionsduring implementation and the shifting promises made by au-thorities? Examining a slum redevelopment project in Mumbai,Weinstein (2012) identifies the means by which groups within thelocal community are able to engage with power. She insists on thedifferent practices and political resources of the groups within thesame community, and thus their different possibilities and capa-bilities to negotiate in the neoliberal restructuring of urban space.This works through a complex process of organization, cooptation,patronage, exclusion, and requires situating megaprojects in spacetaking into account their cultural, political, social and economicparticularities at a very micro scale.

The Delhi metro case study and the process of land value capture

An agency e the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC) ewas setup in 1995 specifically for the construction of the metro network,planned in four major phases (1995e2006; 2006e2011;2011e2016; 2016e2021). 300 km of metro lines are to be con-structed by the end of phase 3 in 2016. The first line was opened in2002 and by 2012, more than two million people were taking themetro daily.

Implementation of metro megaprojects is associated with veryhigh capital investment costs and operation andmaintenance costs.

2 Inside the stations, a total of 41 commercial spaces have been leased out to theprivate sector.

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The demand for financial returns from political authorities andinvestors was very strong right from the time the DMRC was set up.This stimulates interest in new revenue sources. The commonlyaccepted premise shared by political and economic elites in Delhi isthat transport infrastructures like the metro enhance the value ofland and make the location of households and their activities moreattractive. In this context the DMRC was mandated by the centralgovernment to use the capital gains accruing from this attractive-ness and value enhancement of land to finance a part of the capitalcost of the transport infrastructure project. The price of land isassessed before and after construction of the infrastructure. Theincrease in land value is garnered by the DMRC by selling thedevelopment rights to land developers at a price much higher thanthe original price of the land at the time it was granted to theagency. This fund raising mechanism is used on a wide scale inAsian cities, mainly Tokyo, Shanghai, Hong Kong and Singapore. Itcreates very dense spaces where transport infrastructure coexistswith residential, economic and commercial spaces. The construc-tion of the metro infrastructure adds value to the land, whichgenerates land reserves for developers. This is the process at theheart of the Asian model of 'the city pays for the city' (Lorrain, 2011)whereby land rent is a tool for financing and planning: generatingland rent and capital gains from land development finances otherurban infrastructure. For example in Tokyo, between 30% and 75%of the turnover of private railway companies can be attributed totheir property development activities: the floor area occupancyratio of land located close to railway stations was increased, andchanges in land use for auctioned land were made easier (Aveline,2003).

In Delhi, the financing mechanism worked out in 1996 andapproved by the central government for the first phase of con-struction of the metro indicates that 7% of the total capital cost ofthe project must be generated by the property development pro-jects. For each phase, a new mandate is given to the DMRC by theMinistry of Urban Development of the central government. TheDMRC unequivocally adopted the model 'Railþ Property' borrowedfrom the Mass Transit Railway Corporation of Hong Kong. Underthis model, the development rights are sold to private real estatedevelopers for residential, commercial or economic projects on theland granted to the transport agency. In 1996 there was no docu-ment formalizing the size, the location, or the intended use of theseland parcels. The revenue generated by the property developmentprojects were initially perceived by the DMRC as just extra incomeand the Property Division was not considered to be an importantdepartment within the organization. The DMRC's mainmission is toconcentrate on the construction and operations directly related tothe transport infrastructure, and the guiding principle has beenthat the metro must primarily be financed by the government andaided by soft loans.

Even though successive mandates handed down by the centralgovernment stipulating the amount of revenue to be generatedthrough property development projects actually accounts only for asmall proportion of the DMRC's capital for each phase, an analysis ofthe revenue share from property development projects reveal thatduring some years, revenue from these projects accounted for morethan 40% of total revenue. For phase 1, the DMRC thus had thecentral government's mandate to generate 7% of the total projectcost of the metro through real estate projects (i.e. about INR 8billion, or about US$135million). This share fell to 4.35% for phase 2(about INR9 billion) and 4.50% for phase 3 (about INR16 billion). Forthe last phase about INR100 billion are to be generated through realestate projects. An analysis of the annual revenues of the DMRCsince the opening of the first line shows that the highest revenueswere between 2005 and 2009 due to the up-front paymentreceived for the residential project (90 years lease) and commercial

projects (30e50 years lease). As for the property developmentprojects outside the stations,2 21 projects are under construction orare operational of which five are residential projects (condomin-iums with high-end apartments), 15 are commercial projects(shopping malls) and one is a hotel project. An example is La Tro-picana, a large-scale residential project developed by the privatedeveloper Parsvnath, targeting upper middle income groups,located on a depot land in North Delhi. A shopping mall is beingdeveloped on the southern part of the plot.

The metro megaproject as a window to analyse metropolitangovernance in Delhi

What do governance patterns in the metro mega project dinparticular in relation to these mixed-use spacesd tell us aboutmetropolitan governance more generally in Delhi? This part of thepaper underscores the formation of an ad hoc structure of gover-nance around the DMRC, a powerful parastatal agency, whichmaintains its control over the land handed over to it and does notdevolve many functions to private actors or to the local planningagency. These governance patterns lead to conflicts and contro-versies in the public sphere for the management of public landresources, in a context where planning of housing projects remainlargely under the control of a public planning agency, the DelhiDevelopment Authority (DDA), and where new large-scale housingprojects in Delhi, like condominiums, are still very few.

Delhi is a special case regarding the status of its urban govern-ment, i.e. a distinct political and institutional trajectory, whichdifferentiates it from other cities and metropolitan regions in India.Three levels of decision-making participate in the government ofthe city: the central government, the government of the NationalCapital Territory of Delhi, and the municipal bodies. Since 1993Delhi enjoys the status of a quasi State in the Indian Union, knownas the National Capital Territory of Delhi (NCTD), complete with itsown legislative assembly and its own cabinet of ministers. Theterritory of the NCTD includes five municipal bodies: North DelhiMunicipal Corporation, South Delhi Municipal Corporation, EastDelhiMunicipal Corporation, NewDelhi Municipal Corporation andDelhi Cantonment Board. There is no political body at the metro-politan scale. The central government intervenes directly in urbanaffairs mainly by controlling the management of land, whereas themunicipal authorities have the smallest portfolios. As noted by Ruetand Tawa Lama-Rewal (2009), although institutional fragmentationand overlapping government structures are features common tomost Indian cities, it is particularly acute in Delhi.

The DDA, set up in 1957 by the central government, is respon-sible for the formulation of the Master Plan (urban developmentplan for the city) and its application. The land reserves in the city,and the degree to which the private sector is allowed to providehousing, are under the control of this agency. The DDA has beeninvolved in a process of building up a land bank since the firstMaster Plan in 1961, limiting the role of the private sector inhousing development as well as infrastructure investment (Ahmad& Choi, 2011). According to Gladstone and Kolapalli (2007) thedeliberate scarcity of DDA's land disposal in the market led to theescalation of land values, and fuelled land speculation and sprawljust outside the DDA's jurisdiction, in the satellite towns such asGurgaon and Noida. TheMaster Plan 2021 proposes to put an end tothe monopoly of the DDA, while leaving it in control of planningprocedures. The new land pooling policy (2013) involves the privatesector in the assembly and development of land, and the TOD policy

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(Transit Oriented Development, 2013) promotes redevelopmentand densification in an 'influence zone' along the metro corridorthrough more flexible land use and development rules. The prop-erty developments used as a financing mechanism for the metromegaproject were mentioned in this Master Plan, however themetro is only referred to as a means of transport, and the floor arearatio for DMRC property developments has remained very low. Forall its property developments, the DMRC is required to obtainbuilding permits and approval from the concerned local author-ities, in contrast to its operational structures (e.g. lines, stations,depots) of the metro megaproject.

This point allows us to address two issues: the first one concernsthe metro megaproject as a tool to plan new housing projects, andto influence urban planning's organizational and managerial tools.The second one relates to the position of two state agenciesinvolved in this process and with the possibilities to enjoy a 'specialregime' (Barthel, 2008). In other words, how, in a highly regulatedland market, does the DMRC use the land value capture instru-ment? Does this instrument require an exceptional governancestructure and regulatory framework?

In 1996 the DMRC was set up as a joint venture between thecentral government and the Delhi (State) government. Createdunder specific conditions, notably significant foreign capital flows,it was decided that the agency would be put under the authority ofthe Ministry of Urban Development at the central governmentlevel, and not theMinistry of Railways. External fundingwas crucialto the project and influenced the governance structure of theagency; the presence of the Central government was crucial forsecuring the loans from the Japan International CooperationAgency (JICA), which even today is the primary external actor to beinvolved financially in the megaproject. Various factors, includingthe need for investors, for transfers of expertise, the specific re-quirements of the megaprojects, and the influential role of themanaging director - an engineer seconded from the Ministry ofRailways - pushed the public agency to adopt new managerialpractices, and new norms. The demand for financial returns wasvery strong right from the time the agency was set up. All therevenue from the property developments is invested back into themetro megaproject. The rhetoric of the legitimization of raisingfunds from property development projects is based on the returnson investments and the cost of construction, and land value sur-pluses as a collateral to keep affordable ticket prices and to getlower interest debt. In 1999 a Property Division in charge of the realestate projects was set up within the DMRC, staffed by both civilservants and professional planners. Since its creation and till 2012,it was headed by an engineer drawn from the Ministry of Railways.Personnel from the private sector occupy the least significant postsin the Department, a feature shared with other departments of theagency. All the stages associated with the project (e.g. floatingtenders, drawing up lease contracts, site follow up) are decidedwithin the Property Division. This illustrates the strategy of theDMRC to control and centralize all the decisions, and the relations itmaintains with private actors.

It is important to point out that the real estate projects havenot had the same degree of success as the metro. They are at theroot of various conflicts in the public sphere and of rivalry be-tween public parastatal agencies, which at times have contradic-tory agendas for the city. A major issue that has arisen as a resultof the process of land monetization put in place by the DMRCtowards the end of the 1990s is the transfer of plots of land in theheart of the city to private actors, an action that has to beappreciated in the context of DDA's quasi monopoly over land. Theentry of the DMRC in the real estate market thus appears to havecreated an opportunity for the private sector to invest in newspaces, in very attractive locations in the city. This has also given

the private sector the possibility to interact with a new type ofgovernment actor.

In Hong Kong the property development projects are taken upnot just to complement the metro network but for bringing about aredevelopment of land and keeping in mind the perspective ofurban development (Tiry, 2003). In Delhi, in contrast, propertyprojects piggyback on the transport infrastructure, the planning isdone on a case-by-case basis, and there is no preliminary evalua-tion of the land area for the property component nor is there anylong term vision for this process of land value capture. The regu-latory framework has evolved since 1999 around the status of thereal estate component of the megaproject, and in particular aroundthe question of whether these projects could enjoy the same fiscaland regulatory exemptions as the metro. In 2008 and 2009 theMinistry of Urban Development served as arbitrator in the tensionsbetween the DDA and DMRC. It published two official documentsthat on the one hand exempted the DMRC from having to obtainauthorization from the Ministry for launching the property devel-opment projects (but the DMRC is required to obtain approvalsfrom local authorities for these projects) and on the other handreclassified property developments as an integral part of thetransport project, so as an essential tool for the viability of theproject. In effect, this was away to reaffirm the DMRC's rights in theprocess of land value capture, while at the same time distinguishingthe operational structures from the non operational ones. Externalplayers respond to the process of land value capture by applying tothe municipality for permits and authorizations. By refusing tosanction the layout plans of some commercial projects of theDMRC, the municipal authorities block projects in order to havetheir say regarding for example land tax issues for the non opera-tional structures. Ultimately, this conflict was resolved through thejudicial process and not through a process of negotiations anddiscussion between the stakeholders, which could have led to areconsideration of the regulatory framework of the real estatecomponent. The proposals made by the DMRC for changes in landuse, approvals of building controls, and other clearances have beencustomarily held up for more than 2e3 years. This underscores theuse of regulatory tools by other public actors to block the monopolyof the DMRC, not over the transport component of the megaproject,which enjoy a 'special regime' under the Indian Railways Act and avery advantageous land portfolio (land is transferred to the DMRCat very much lower rates than the market prices), but over the realestate component and its ambiguous status. With regard to themetro megaproject and the capitalisation of the real estate poten-tial of the stations and depots, public sector actors maintain fullcontrol over the process but in a competitive manner with no'sharing of the pie', i.e., the profits generated by the property de-velopments, with the transit agency, the planning agency, and themunicipalities.

In 2012 national guidelines were formulated with regard to theprocess of land value capture and the use of metro megaprojects asa tool for new planning regulation, and for advancing a new urbanpolicy at the national scale. A policy note from the central gov-ernment was sent to the secretaries of each State and all the urbantransport agencies. One of its main objectives is to generate new taxrevenues in the influence zone along the metro lines by increasingthe density of these zones with a higher floor area ratio, givingpriority to mixed land use project, including provisions to increaseproperty taxes every year, and setting up a Dedicated UrbanTransport Fund. This fund is to be created at the State, metropolitanregion and municipal levels in order to collect these new taxes,which can then be reinvested into new transport or developmentprojects.

As this illustrates, Delhi is serving as a testing ground for thecentral government, which often undertakes projects or policies on

3 According to Zimmer (2012), what is at stake with regularization, which confersa legal status to the colony, is first the supposed increase of the value of the plots,houses or flats, the accessibility of bank loans for the inhabitants, and an upgradingof the colony's public infrastructure.

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a trial basis before applying them to the country as a whole. Thesenew planning procedures remain state-led but involve varioustypes of partnerships to enable private investments from local andforeign actors. Among Indian cities, Hyderabad provides a partic-ularly compelling case for observing how these policies are beingapplied. Indeed, the participation of the private sector with landmonetization along the metro corridor is seen as having a directstake in shaping Hyderabad's future development. The latestMaster Plan for the Hyderabad Metropolitan Area includes veryflexible planning requirements (e.g. no land use restriction) alongthe metro lines. The Hyderabad Metro Rail Limited was establishedin 2010 as a special purpose vehicle involving a private group andthe State government of Andhra Pradesh. At the initial stage of themegaproject, a number of land parcels situated along the metrocorridors were selected for real estate developments. These landparcels were forcefully acquired by the State government, usingland acquisition legislation, and were handed over to private realestate companies for development. However, the project does notappear to offer significant diversity of forms and uses, and re-sembles more a market oriented strategy, a localized area for eco-nomic activities with mostly commercial properties. Contrary tothe Delhi case, city-based actors (such as the Greater HyderabadMunicipal Corporation) engage directly with the State governmentand the private interests to coordinate and facilitate the mega-project implementation.

Examining outcomes of megaprojects in terms of impacts andtrade-offs at a local scale

This part of the paper discusses the outcomes of the planningprocedures and governance of the metro megaproject focussing onthe Shastri Park project in East Delhi (see Map 1). This case study islocated in a very dense area characterized by strong socio-economic inequalities. It illustrates that at each scale the 'prob-lems' are redefined by the stakeholders, and are the site of a specificconfiguration of power relations. The process of mobilization at alocal scale implies factors such as local political culture, the for-mation of political arenas, community organization, and practicesin low-income areas. The question of the trade-offs (who wins?who loses?) demands we ask what provisions are made, by whom,to counter the direct and indirect effects of megaprojet develop-ment at the local scale, in a context where supra-local entities at themetropolitan, regional and national scales have been empoweredto regulate metro megaprojects and new planning procedures.

In November 1999 a large tract of land located on the east banksof the river Yamuna was transferred to the DMRC for a metro depotand a station, Shastri Park. Today this project includes, apart frominfrastructure directly related to the metro (station, depot, build-ings of maintenance), apartments and a training institute for DMRCpersonnel, an IT Park made up of three high-rise buildings with acapacity to accommodate 10,000 people, leased to private com-panies, and a theme park under construction. If we consider theplanning and management of project outcomes as a practice, thenthis case study reveals that in the long process of implementationof the Shastri Park project, the way stakeholders dthe supra-localentities, but also local politicians and residentsd engage with eachother is not 'insulated fromnormal politics', but rather embedded innormal politics. It illustrates the 'working of political power andauthority' as 'an account of meddling, negotiation, concession andpatronage' (Gururani, 2013).

The following description is intended to highlight at a local scaleboth the 'special regime' granted to the DMRC and the manner inwhich other public agencies make use of regulatory tools to counterDMRC's plans. Local arrangements and an instrumental blurredboundary between what is legal and illegal result from the

conflictual relationship between the agencies around the privilegesof the DMRC. Up until 2000, the banks of the river Yamuna wereconsidered to be an area where no construction activities werepermitted (cf. Alexander Follman's paper in this issue). The plansprepared in 2001 by the DMRC indicate plans for a large-scaleresidential project (condominiums), because long lease periodswith private developers for residential projects are more profitablethan short lease periods without upfront payment. Between 1996and 2003 land prices slumped due to recession (Chandrasekar &Sanghvi, 2008) and the location of the project in a risk area alongthe river bank was a disincentive for private investors. In 2003 theDMRC and the Delhi government took a decision to set up a specialeconomic zone specializing in new technologies instead of a resi-dential project. In the same year, the Yamuna Standing Committeeadvised the DMRC not to construct in the river bed, but gave a fewmonths later (after the intervention of the Delhi Government) itsapproval for a 6ha IT Park as a 'special case'. It must be noted thattwice (for block 1 in 2006 and block 3 in 2008), construction startedeven before DDA changed the land use: DMRC preferred to pay thefinancial penalties rather than yield to the deadlines imposed byDDA. Environmental NGOs have been powerless to interveneeffectively against these decisions; their actions are limited to filingcomplaints through legal channels. Two out of three buildingsconstructed enjoy the status of special economic zones and one ofthe buildings was not approved by the DDA. Today negotiations arecentered on the extension of this economic zone from 6 ha to 12 ha(the land use change for 12 hawas requested by the DMRC in 2006).

The Shastri Park project is located in close proximity to one ofthe most densely populated low-income areas of Delhi (see Map 1Gandhi Nagar and Seelampur). The status of the residential areaadjacent to the project is ‘regularized unauthorised colonies’, i.e.residential areas which did not comply with the land use classifi-cation in the Delhi Master Plan, and which were regularizedrecently.3 The basic urban services (roads, sanitation, sewerage,water) are in very poor condition. The main sources of employ-ment, which are in the informal sector (not covered by labourlegislation), are garment manufacturing and the meat trade. Thislocality and its specific environment were not taken into account inplanning the Shastri Park project. In other words, there was nomapping done of the area, no impact assessment of the residentialproject planned in 2001 conducted, and no proper access routefrom the station to the adjacent locality planned. In the followingsection, outcomes of the megaproject at a local scale, in terms ofemployment, and sharing of information on the planning processare replaced in what can be called the everyday features of themegaproject. These outcomes are inscribed in a space, character-ized by 'everyday politics of caste, class, and patronage' (Gururani,2013), which mediate in the relation between the megaprojectand its urban environment.

Close to the Seelampur metro station east of the river Yamuna,we can see thousands of jeans on the flat roof tops of the red brickhouses or hanging from the slightest space available. The textileindustry, and specifically jeans manufacturing and trade, is themain economic activity of this area. Small informal workshopsoccupy the ground floor space of the houses located in narrowlanes. In Buland Masjid colony, adjacent to the wall of the ShastriPark project (see Map 1), meat trade is spatially very visible, andeach shop has its own speciality: mutton, chicken, buffalo, etc. Atthe Seelampur station, a major French supermarket chain,

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Carrefour, has rented commercial space leased by the DMRC to theParsvnath group, a large Indian real estate firm. The large Carrefourstore offers a variety of articles that for the time being are only onsale to businessowners or those having a commercial license.4

Some local businesses frequent the Carrefour, for example FamilyS., who lives at Seelampur and has a small shop. A few chickens arehuddled together in a cage in front of the shop and are butcheredupon request from customers. The family with five children livesabove the small shop. Since they have this small shop, they wereeligible for a Carrefour card as were some of their neighbours. Theyfind that prices are not very high if products, such as rice, arebought in large quantities, and they report finding ‘all that theyneed’ there. Carrefour gives information on its web site in English,mainly targets restaurants, hotels, offices, institutions but also at-tracts such local families even though nothing has been done tofacilitate their access to the supermarket. There are no direct accessto the store from the galis (small lanes) and bazaars of the adjacentareas, and all the roads are congested. Cycle and auto rickshawswait along the highway in front of the Seelampur Station, and thenhave to steer through the cars and trucks crawling along the mainroad. Field surveys indicated that the residents of Buland Masjidhave not found employment at the Shastri Park project site, noteven low-skilled work such as security guard, gardener or house-maid, mainly because the DMRC calls on intermediaries (privatecompanies) to recruit labour for these activities.5 Only a few in-habitants of the locality, residing in a slum area, were recruited towork during the construction of the project. Employees of the ITcompanies in the very large majority travel each day to Shastri Parkfrom residential areas of North and South Delhi. However,employment opportunities for unskilled workers are visible in theimmediate vicinity of the project: there are a large number of cycle-rickshaws, auto-rickshaws and sharing taxis ferrying the metropassengers to the neighbouring residential areas. The metromegaproject at a scale of the city has increased the demand fortheses services, and particularly the informal cycle rickshaw sector(Kurosaki, 2012).

At the local level, there is great uncertainty surrounding theShastri Park project, linked to the fact that local residents havenever been involved in the planning of the project and are not keptinformed. To complicate matters, the implementation of themegaproject has been spread out over a very long time, the plan-ning has changed, the constructionwork has been delayed: there isstill uncertainty regarding the extension of the IT Park and thestructure of the theme park. Among the negative impacts of theproject, real or expected, on the surrounding areas mentioned bythe inhabitants are the pollution of the water,6 road wideningprojects to cater to the project's needs and the demolitions requiredfor this, the increase in rents, the formation of dangerous pools ofstagnant water, shrinking of land area. On the positive side, ac-cording to the residents, the wall built to separate the megaprojectfrom the locality act as protection against flooding during themonsoon period, and for owners the value of the houses and plotshave increased.7 Most of the residents consider that the mega-project has 'put on the map' of Delhi a low-income unauthorized

4 This is because Indian legislation restricts foreign ownership in distribution.5 This is characteristic of the specific functioning of labour markets in India,

whereby employers rely on intermediaries, who provide a kind of 'guarantee' forthe workers they provide; there is a widespread preference for hiring non-locals,who can not mobilise the local population in case of a dispute with the employer.

6 According to residents of the Buland Masjid colony, the pollution of the water iscaused by the run-off from the metro megaproject.

7 The metro, as a new mode of transport in the area, is not mentioned as the firstpositive impact by the residents of Buland Masjid (contrarly to the residents ofGandhi Nagar, who travel by metro more often).

colony built within notified green (protected) areas of the YamunaBanks. This also refers to the megaproject's perceived role by theresidents in the process of regularisation and change of land use:the megaproject would have influenced the eligibility of the colonyand the change in land use of vacant lands within and surroundingthe colony.8 In addition to these perceptions, how do people'severyday encounters with these projects influence outcomes?

Much has been written on the marginalisation of low-incomegroups in decision-making processes in Delhi (e.g. Chakrabarti,2008; Kundu, 2011). As Harriss (2006) notes, in Delhi the strate-gies of low-income people to secure basic services and needs relyessentially on political parties, a pattern that is not peculiar to thiscity. Public 'participation' and consultation are not required in theofficial approval process for megaprojects. A neighbourhood asso-ciation (a Resident Welfare Association, RWA9) exists in the BulandMasjid colony, the low-income locality adjacent to the metromegaproject. It was found through field research that the formalgovernance mechanisms for channelling information between thepolitical-administrative structure and the residents of the BulandMasjid colonywere not effective as ameans for sharing informationabout the Shastri Park project. To understand how knowledgeabout the project is exchanged (or retained) it is necessary toanalyse the political arena at the local level, in particular throughthe role of the traditional political leaders, the pradhans, and theirpatronage-based relation with elected politicians, notably with theMLAs (Member of Legislative Assembly of Delhi government). Thestudy area comes under two Assembly constituencies, designatedhere as the north zone and the south zone. Information pertainingto the megaproject, the spaces of uncertainty of the megaprojectand thewait and watch situation (for ex. regarding water pollution)are today being dealt with in a quasi exclusivemanner by theMLAs,in relation with the pradhans, who have an informal supervisoryrole within the community. The MLA of the south zone of themegaproject is the current minister of Urban Development in theDelhi government, thus he has the possibility of operating withindifferent spaces of interaction. Episodically, the MLAs assert theirposition in local space, for instance in reaction to conflict: the firstepisodic mobilization happened in 1999 as a result of the fact thatthe DMRC and the DDA included a part of the land occupied by aHindu temple within the boundaries of the megaproject. The de-molition of the temple walls resulted in violence, with differentreligious groups clashing with the police forces. The politicalresponse to the reorganization of space was quick: theMuslimMLAof the zone north of the project went on a hunger strike on themegaproject site as a symbolic resistance. This mobilization servedto 'institutionalize' and legitimize the role of MLAs as the onlymediators for the 'management' of the outcomes of the mega-project, in this case mostly though informal channels. Generally,people first go the pradhan when they have a complaint about themegaproject, the pradhan then relays (or not) the matter to theMLA. Thesematters tend to find a place on the political agenda onlyduring election time, which underscores the episodic nature of the‘politicization’ of megaproject development at a local scale, in

8 In 2006, in Buland Masjid, 1.7 ha of Agricultural & Water Body land use waschanged to Public and semi public facilities for the construction of a graveyard anda primary school. According to the president of the RWA of the colony, the firstdemand for the allocation of a land for a primary school was done in 1990.

9 RWAs in Delhi have existed at least since the 1950s and are usually concernedwith infrastructure and basic services in the area (a colony, a building, a street). Inthe 2000's RWAs changed 'from neutral mediums for channelling information be-tween government and neighbourhood-based citizens to political actors in theirown right' (Lemanski & Tawa Lama-Rewal, 2013). An unauthorized colony can applyfor regularisation only through its RWA. In the study area, Buland Masjid, the RWAwas formed in the 1980s.

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response to the risks and impacts directly related to themegaproject.

This example has shown that the megaproject has, on occasion,directly influenced local politics, and made episodically visible(through the mediation of politicians) some of the issues aroundwhich inhabitants mobilize. At the same time, the immediate sur-roundings of the project, the localities and the residents, remaininvisible in the formal process of implementation of the mega-project. The decision-makers involved in megaproject develop-ment interact with local politicians (the MLAs), who possess theresources and the position to channel information and negotiate.These local politicians are the means through which local residents(through the mediation of the pradhans) are able to episodicallyengage with megaproject's actors.

Conclusion

This paper argued that the Delhi metro case and one of itsfinancing mechanism, the process of land value capture, opens awindow onto urban governance more generally and allows us toengage with some questions from the literature, such as 'theentrepreneurial city', the 'special regimes', and larger issues ofjustice and democracy. The metro megaproject is the outcome of afelt need to modernise and streamline transportation in the capital.City planners and policy makers have been looking abroad andborrowing concepts like the Hong Kong's Rail þ Property model.The need for investors (mainly Japan) pushed the public agencies toadopt new practices and norms. However it is not because externalmodels provide inspiration that the ideological componentsnecessarily follow (i.e., privatisation of planning); there is appro-priation and adaptation of the model.

With regard to metro megaprojects, it was shown that the stateat the national and regional levels remains the key actor, and enableprivate investments via public agencies, which take on various

forms (joint venture, SPV). This study underscores the importantrole in urban planning of parastatal agencies like the DMRC, whichanswer to the central government. This exemplifies a technocraticmode of governance in urban planning procedures, where criticaldecisions for urban development are taken outside of electedbodies.

The process of land value capture brought to light competitionamong state agencies each with different 'visions' for urbandevelopment and different ways of planning. It was seen that theDMRC uses newmanagerial procedures and a techno-scientific wayof planning transport infrastructure and real estate, promoting theneed to 're-engineer the city'. Metro megaprojects are exerting adirect influence on planning for the city, as illustrated by the newregulatory framework linked to the production of mixed-usespaces. Delhi has served as a pilot case for other Indian cities andin 2012, this framework was institutionalized through a nationalpolicy. The political choice to create a powerful agency 'isolatedfrom everyday politics' to manage the metro was successful interms of completion of the network, allowed an easier and fasterprocess of land acquisition, and many exemptions (specifically inthe process of approvals, preferential power tariffs, and fiscalprivileges). However, the local scale analysis shows that planningpractices, and outcomes, for instance channelling information onthe impacts, can not avoid local arrangements, local negotiation,and flexibility. They can constitute a powerful technique to inscribeprivileges in a space, and to find resources in a context where theland-based value capture projects are at the core of numerousconflicts in the public sphere. For low-income people living in theimmediate vicinity of the megaproject it represents a complexprocess of local politics, where the megaproject is mediatedthrough class, caste and patronage.

Appendix. Map 1: Shastri Park project

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