The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 16 | Issue 17 | Number 3 | Article ID 5196 | Sep 01, 2018

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A New Interpretation of the Bakufu’s Refusal to Open theRyukyus to Commodore Perry

Marco Tinello

Abstract

In this article I seek to show that, while theRyukyu shobun refers to the process by whichthe Meiji government annexed the RyukyuKingdom between 1872 and 1879, it can bestbe understood by investigating its antecedentsin the Bakumatsu era and by viewing it in thewider context of East Asian and world history. Ishow that, following negotiations withCommodore Perry, the bakufu recognized theimportance of claiming Japanese control overthe Ryukyus. This study clarifies the changingnature of Japanese diplomacy regarding theRyukyus from Bakumatsu in the late 1840s toearly Meiji.

Keywords

Tokugawa bakufu, Bakumatsu, Ryukyu shobun,Commodore Perry, Japan

The Ryukyu Islands are a chain of Japaneseislands that stretch southwest from Kyushu toTaiwan. The former Kingdom of Ryukyu wasformally incorporated into the Japanese stateas Okinawa Prefecture in 1879.

From the end of the fourteenth century untilthe mid-sixteenth century, the Ryukyu kingdomwas a center of trade relations between Japan,China, Korea, and other East Asian partners.

According to his journal, when CommodoreMatthew C. Perry demanded that the RyukyuIslands be opened to his fleet in 1854, theTokugawa shogunate replied that the RyukyuKingdom “is a very distant country, and theopening of its harbor cannot be discussed byus.”2 The few English-language studies3 of thisencounter interpret this reply as evidence that

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the bakufu was reluctant to become involved indiscussions about the international status ofthe Ryukyus; no further work has been done toinvestigate the bakufu’s foreign policy towardthe Ryukyus between 1854 and the early Meijiperiod. In what follows, I compare Americansources with Japanese documents to show thatin 1854 the bakufu did not define the Ryukyusas a “country,” that is, as a state completelyindependent from Japan. More importantly, Ipoint out that during negotiations with Perry,the bakufu’s understanding of the status of theRyukyus was very similar to that of theMatsumae domain in Hokkaido, which thebakufu considered a territory under theauthority of the Matsumae clan. In short, thebakufu never used the word “country” todescribe either the Ryukyus or Matsumae andit deliberately defined its relations with thesedistant territories in ambiguous terms in orderto deter interest by foreign powers.

According to earlier studies by Japanesescholars,4 sometime between Perry’s first visitto Japan (1853/6/3 to 6/125) and his second(1854/2), the head of the shogunate’s seniorcouncilors, Abe Masahiro, drafted guidelinesoutlining answers to possible questions aboutthe Ryukyus’ political status to be used innegotiations with Perry on his return to Japan.This manual, which unfortunately lacks aprecise date, is an extremely importantdocument which shows that Abe intended toclaim that the Ryukyus were under the politicalauthority of both China and Japan. It is clearthat Abe recognized that the Ryukyuan issuewould arise during negotiations with Perry andsince bakufu officials had told Perry that theRyukyus were “very distant,” the shogunateapparently would not assert itself as acontrolling power over Ryukyu. As a result,previous studies have characterized bakufupolicy toward the Ryukyus in 1854 as a passiveone that did not significantly influencesubsequent events.

By comparing Abe’s guidelines with Japanese

and American sources relating to thenegotiations between Perry and the bakufu in1854, I show that Abe did not draft his guideimmediately before, but rather afternegotiations were held at Uraga in 1854/2.Perry’s request to give his fleet access to theRyukyus alerted Abe to the importance ofclaiming Ryukyu’s subordination to Japanduring subsequent bakufu dealings withWestern powers. While, at first glance, it seemsof minor importance to clarify precisely whenAbe drafted his guidelines, by demonstratingthat he wrote them after the bakufu’snegotiations with Perry, I am able to establish anew chronology that explains and clarifies theunfolding of events.

In addition, I argue that Abe’s response toPerry’s request marks a turning point in thebakufu’s foreign policy stance on the Ryukyusand that the guidelines he produced profoundlyinfluenced Japanese interpretations ofRyukyuan–Japanese–Chinese relations up untilthe early Meiji period. Appreciating thecontinuity in Japanese leaders’ understandingof the status of the Ryukyus from theBakumatsu forward is vital to understandingthe Ryukyuan policy of the Meiji governmentafter 1872.

Most scholars begin the process through whichJapan annexed the Ryukyus, or the Ryukyushobun (in Japanese, the “disposition” or“punishment” of Ryukyu), in 1872, too hastilydiscounting what happened before.6 It isimportant to understand this process within abroader context, particularly that in which Edoleaders, while interacting with the West,changed their designation of the Ryukyus froma country with which it maintained “diplomaticrelations” (tsūshin) to a subordinate state. Thisstudy thus frames Japan’s 1879 incorporationof the Ryukyus across a larger span of timethan previous studies, beginning with events inthe 1840s.7

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Japanese–Ryukyuan relations up until the1840s

For centuries, the small island kingdom ofRyukyu (present-day Okinawa Prefecture)played a leading role in East Asian diplomacy,particularly in relations between Ming/QingChina and Tokugawa Japan. In 1372, theRyukyus established tributary relations withthe Chinese and from the end of the fourteenthcentury until the mid-sixteenth century, thekingdom was a center of trade relationsbetween Japan, China, Korea, and other EastAsian partners.

Following its invasion by Satsuma in 1609, theRyukyu Kingdom was placed under the indirectcontrol of the Shimazu clan and, by extension,of the Tokugawa bakufu as well, while stillmaintaining its tributary ties with China. At thebeginning of the seventeenth century, astructure of power among Shuri (the capital ofthe Ryukyu Kingdom), Kagoshima (the seat ofthe Shimazu castle), and Edo (the politicalcenter of the Tokugawa shogunate) emerged, inwhich Edo recognized the Ryukyus as a foreignkingdom subordinate to Satsuma, withJapanese–Ryukyuan relations left largely inShimazu hands. Within this new framework, theRyukyus paid an annual tribute to Satsuma, inthis way playing a unique role in serving theinterests of both China and Japan.

To sum up, the Ryukyus were certainlysubordinate to Satsuma. However, since forSatsuma the islands were important preciselybecause of their close relations with China,there were also limits upon how it exercisedcontrol; therefore, during the early-modernperiod, the small kingdom was able to maintaina certain degree of autonomy.8

As for relations between the bakufu and theRyukyus, the bakufu bolstered its own prestigethrough Ryukyu’s subordination to Japan. Asearlier scholarship has clarified, the firstTokugawa shoguns (Ieyasu and Hidetada)failed to meet the diplomatic requirements

demanded by traditional Chinese protocols and,in 1621, the bakufu reversed its intention tonormalize relations with the Ming court ino r d e r t o b o l s t e r i t s o w n e f f o r t s a tlegitimation.9 Thus Japan rejected Sino-centrism and began the process of re-assessingthe hierarchical Confucian world on which itwas based.

The Ryukyuan music parade or rojigakuconsisted of fifteen or twenty musicians andwas directed by a Japanese official calledgieisei. In addition to performing when themission reached or left an importantdestination, the musicians accompanied theparade of envoys along the streets of Edo,playing Chinese and Ryukyuan songs.

At this point, in an effort to create its owninterstate order, the Tokugawa bakufu thoughtit prudent to receive diplomatic missions fromthe kingdoms on its periphery, just as Chinahad been doing for centuries. The Ryukyuanembassies (known as Edo dachi or Edo nobori)played an important function in this regard.Embassies were regularly sent from the islandsduring most of the Edo period: congratulatorymissions (keigashi) were dispatched whenevera new Tokugawa shogun was appointed, andmissions of gratitude (shaonshi) were sent uponthe enthronement of a new Ryukyuan king(eighteen such embassies were dispatchedfrom Ryukyu to Edo between 1634 and 1850).In addition, embassies from Korea10 were alsodispatched under the new interstate ordercentered on the Nihon koku taikun (“Great

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Prince of Japan”), the title that the shogunassumed in the context of foreign relationsfrom 1636.11 The assumption of this new titlemarked an important transition in bakufupolicy, whereby Japan sought a progressiveseparation from the Chinese tributary system(or world order) and the creation of a newregional order with Japan at its center.12 Thebakufu used these foreign missions tolegitimate and increase the authority of theTokugawa shoguns inside and outside Japan.

From the beginning of the seventeenth century,the Ryukyus maintained an ambiguous politicalstatus involving dual subordination to Chinaand Japan. After the Qing replaced the Mingdynasty in Beijing in 1644, Ryukyu, in accordwith Satsuma’s wishes, kept the true characterof the Japanese–Ryukyuan relationship hiddenfrom the Chinese. The Ryukyuan governmentfeared that if the Qing knew about itssubordination to Japan, it would end the Sino-Ryukyuan tributary relationship. For theRyukyu Kingdom, maintaining tributaryrelations with the Qing was essential topreserving its limited political and geographicalautonomy from both China and Japan.13 In itsdealings with the Qing, the Ryukyu Kingdomconcealed its subordination to Japan and tookgreat pains to observe all the formalitiesregulating its tributary relationship, so as toavoid adverse repercussions.14

Satsuma covertly dominated the tributary tradebetween China and the Ryukyus for its ownprofit. Therefore, the Shimazu helped defraythe costs of sending tributary missions to Chinaand on many occasions, asked the bakufu togrant them loans for such costs until the1850s.15

For its part, Chinese envoys to the Ryukyus hadlong known that the Ryukyu Kingdom wassubordinate to Japan, but they chose tomaintain the tributary relationship so as toprotect Chinese and regional security, and tofacilitate trade. In other words, the cautious

attitude of the missions helped prevent theRyukyus’ subordination to Japan frombecoming a major issue at the Chinese court inBeijing.

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After centuries under this arrangement, a newfactor entered the equation: Western powersarrived in East Asia, including the Ryukyus andJapan, prompting the bakufu to define itsrelations with the Ryukyus to the newcomers.Prior to Perry’s arrival, Japan had made everyeffort to keep the country closed to Westerncontact. In 1793, the bakufu (led by the seniorcouncilor Matsudaira Sadanobu) rejected arequest by Adam Laxman, a Russian militaryofficer who had recently arrived in Matsumae,to establish formal relations with Japan. TheBakufu stated that Japan only maintainedexternal relations that were either diplomatic(in J. tsūshin) or commercial (tsūshō) in natureand it would not consider Russian demandsunless they were presented to Japaneseauthorities at Nagasaki.

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Again, in 1805, the shogunate resisted pressurefrom the miss ion led by the Russ ianambassador, Nikolay Petrovich Rezanov, whohad recently arrived in Nagasaki, stating thatwhile Japan maintained diplomatic andcommercial relations with Korea, the Ryukyus,China, and the Netherlands, opening relationswith any other state would be in violation of thelaws issued by Japan’s ancestral founders.

18

Inthis way, the shogunate sought to reject theestablishment of new links with the Russians bycodifying Japan’s traditional foreign relations injust two ways: diplomatic or commercial.However, in 1805, the bakufu did not specifywhich countries (among Korea, the Ryukyus,China, and the Netherlands) were to enjoydiplomatic , and which were to enjoycommercial, relations with Japan.

In 1844, the king of the Netherlands, WilliamII, sent a letter to the Tokugawa shogun,Ieyoshi, asking that Japan open its ports toWestern powers. In a reply sent to the Dutch

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government in 1845, the bakufu followed thetraditional diplomatic-commercial codificationof Japan’s foreign relations established duringthe tenure of Matsudaira Sadanobu, butclarified its position by pointing out that fromancient times, Japan had maintained diplomaticrelations with Korea and the Ryukyus, andcommercial relations with Chinese and Dutchmerchants. While the bakufu would allow theDutch to continue trade relations, establishingdiplomatic relations with the Netherlands orany other state was impossible.

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In making thisstatement, the bakufu effectively declared tothe Western world that the Ryukyus were akingdom with which it maintained diplomaticrelations – without mentioning, however, thatthis kingdom had also been under thesubordination of Satsuma since 1609.

In conjunction with these events, following theOpium War (1844-1846) French and Britishvessels arrived in the Ryukyus and pressed theRyukyuan government to establish diplomaticand trade relations (an event called Gaikantorai jiken by Japanese scholars). Flatlyrefusing this request, Ryukyuan officials beganto hide their connections to Japan fromWestern visitors, fearing that the latter mightreveal the Ryukyus’ subordination to Japan tothe Chinese. Since, at that time, the French andthe British were preoccupied with other issuescentered on China, they did not press thematter further. However, after leaving thekingdom, they left behind missionaries tospread Christianity and learn the locallanguage. This situation troubled both theSatsuma and bakufu leaders, who feared thatany international crisis involving the Ryukyusmight undermine Japan’s security.

In the middle of the above-mentioned 1844-46Ryukyuan crisis (the Gaikan torai jiken), in1846/i5,20 the chief of the Satsuma retainers,Zusho Hirosato, initiated a series of meetingsin Edo with senior councilor Abe Masahiro,with the meetings aimed at resolving thesituation in the Ryukyus. Zusho put forward a

plan to allow trade between the French and theRyukyuans, arguing that France wouldprobably no longer accept a refusal from theRyukyus and that among the demands made bythe French, the trade option appeared to be theleast harmful for Japan. In addition, Zushoargued that since the Ryukyus were considereda gaihan – a fief (han) outside the Japanesepolitical system – authorizing trade with Francethat was limited to the Ryukyus would notviolate Japan’s historic foreign policy, whichlimited trade relations to Chinese and Dutchtraders, exclusively in Nagasaki.

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As the bakufuwas concerned that any conflict between theRyukyus and France would adversely affectJapan’s kokutai (“realm”), Abe tacitly consentedto Zusho’s request on 6/8.

22

In response to the 1844-46 Ryukyuan crisis, thebakufu followed protocol, and entrustedSatsuma to handle matters. More importantly,following Satsuma’s suggestion, the bakufualso chose to distance the Ryukyus from Japanthereby preventing the opening of direct traderelations between France and Japan. In thisway, the bakufu sought to use the Ryukyus as a“safety valve” to protect the Japaneserealm.23 As we will see, it was Perry’s requestto open a port in the Ryukyus that promptedthe bakufu to change its foreign policy towardthe territory.

The importance of reconsidering the dateof Abe Masahiro’s diplomatic guidelines

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Commodore Matthew C. Perry (1794-1858)

The Japan-US Treaty of Amity and Peace(or the Treaty of Kanagawa) signed onMarch 31, 1854 was Japan’s first treatywith a Western state.

Earlier studies2 4 have argued that AbeMasahiro drafted diplomatic guidelines forJapan-Ryukyu relations specifically for thenegotiations between Perry and shogunateofficials. Given that Abe’s manual is included in

the Satsuma document Ryūkyū gaikoku kankeimonjo Ka’ei 625 and that it lacks a precise date,it is likely that earlier scholars assumed that allrecords included in this volume correspondedto the Year “Ka’ei 6” (1853), as suggested bythe title.

To understand when Abe wrote this manual –which is divided into 11 questions he thoughtthe Americans might ask – it is important tonote Abe’s answer to the anticipated questionwhether the Ryukyus were subordinate toChina or to Japan. In Abe’s suggested responseto this question, he stated that because“sakidatte” (recently, the other day) Perry hadasked Japanese officials for permission to buildcoal depots in Matsumae, Uraga, and theRyukyus, his request revealed that theAmericans “were aware of the fact that theRyukyus are subordinate to Japan.” Therefore,Abe advised that Perry be asked: “Why do youaratamete (once again) ask questions related tothis matter?”26

This imagined exchange reveals two importantfacts that have not been properly assessed thusfar. First, Abe did not draft his guidelinesbefore the start of negotiations with Perry;rather, he wrote them either during orimmediate ly af ter the f i rst round ofnegotiations and, as he did so, he speculatedthat, during the next round of talks, theAmericans might again raise questions aboutrelations between the Ryukyus, Japan andChina. In addition, because Abe refers toPerry’s question about Matsumae, Uraga, andthe Ryukyus, it is clear that this document waswritten after Perry had requested the openingof those three ports.

Let us now turn our attention to the firstcontact between Perry and bakufu officials.Perry arrived in Japan on 1853/6/3 and, of hisrelations with shogunate officials, he wrote inhis journal: “The governor came on board inthe afternoon … He brought with him theoriginal order the Emperor (the shogun)

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addressed to the functionary who had toreceive me … He also said that the personappointed by the Emperor had no power toenter into discussion with me but wasempowered merely to receive the papers andcarry them to his sovereign.”27

We can deduce from this entry that Perryunderstood that the bakufu had no intention ofentering negotiations during this first contactwith the Americans. In addition, with regard tothe ceremony for delivering the AmericanPresident’s official letter to the bakufu, Perrywrote that “[a]s it was understood that therewas to be no discussion at this meeting, Iremained but a short time, taking my departureand embarking with the same ceremony withwhich I had landed.”28

During his first visit to Japan, Perry stayed onlyten days and, as is evident from his accounts,the two parties did not enter into formal talks,not even about the coal depots that Abe refersto in his guidelines. The official letter fromPresident Millard Fillmore to the Tokugawashogun included the following request:

“Our steamships, in crossing thegreat ocean, burnt a great deal ofcoal, and it is not convenient tobring it all the way from America.We wish that our steamships andother vessels should be allowed tos t o p i n J a p a n a n d s u p p l ythemselves with coal, provisions,and water … we request yourimperial majesty to appoint aconvenient port, in the southernpart of the Empire, where ourvessels may stop for this purpose.We are desirous of this.”

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However, while the American President askedfor the opening of a single port in the south ofJapan, he did not specify any port city by name.So, when did Perry actually request the

opening of Matsumae, the Ryukyus, and Uraga,as specified in Abe’s guidelines? Let us turn toPerry’s second visit to Japan to clarify thispoint.

Perry returned to Japan on 1854/1, andnegotiations with Hayashi daigaku-no-kami (theeminent bakufu official and Confucian scholarwho was appointed to confer with theAmericans) started on 2/10. During their firstmeeting, Hayashi informed Perry that althoughthe bakufu had decided to accept theAmericans’ request to provide assistance andsupplies for their vessels, it strongly rejectedthe establishment of trade relations.

The same day, Perry handed Hayashi a drafttreaty proposal, in which the Americans askedfor numerous concessions such as a MostFavored Nation clause, consular jurisdiction,and a conventional tariff regime. However, theydid not specify the name of any port city.

30

On2/13, American officials delivered a letter fromPerry to Hayashi. In this letter, Perry stressedthe importance of Japan opening as many portsto American vessels as China already had – butagain, he did not specify which ports he wouldprefer.

31

Then, on 2/16, the Americans askedbakufu officials to meet them a few days hencein Yokohama (Uraga, Kanagawa), for thespecific purpose of deciding which ports shouldbe opened.32

On 2/17, bakufu officials handed the Americanstheir own treaty proposal. In this document, thebakufu designated the city of Nagasaki as thesole treaty port and proposed that a secondport be opened after five years. In addition,bakufu sources mentioned the Ryukyus andMatsumae only to discount them: “The Ryukyuislands are very distant and the opening of itsports cannot be discussed by us. Matsumae isalso far away on the frontier, and it belongs tothe Matsumae family.”33 Perry’s version of thisstatement reads as follows: “Lew Chew is avery distant country, and the opening of itsharbor cannot be discussed by us. Matsmai

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[Matsumae] is also a very distant country, andbelongs to its prince.”34

Comparing the Japanese and American sources,it is clear that Perry and his translators turnedthe bakufu’s references to Matsumae and theRyukyus into two “countries.” In addition, it isimportant to note that bakufu officials statedthat the Ryukyus and Matsumae stood insimilar positions in relation to Edo, while alsospecifying that Matsumae was a territorybelonging to the Matsumae family. We cansurmise that given bakufu reluctance to openboth the Ryukyus and Matsumae to foreignvesse ls , i t sought to def ine them asgeographically distant territories.

Still, why did the bakufu mention the Ryukyusand Matsumae in its draft? In the last part ofthe sentence relating to Matsumae, the bakufualso stated that “konotabi” (on this occasion), itcould not easily decide about the opening ofMatsumae, and proposed that a definite answerwould be given the following spring inNagasaki, when an American vessel wasscheduled to visit.35

Thus, when the Americans asked for theopening of the Ryukyus and Matsumae, thebakufu declined to discuss the Ryukyus and,instead, proposed to give an answer onMatsumae the following year in Nagasaki.Given that no talks were held in 1853, we canassume that the Americans made a verbalrequest that the Ryukyus and Matsumae bedesignated as ports at some point during thefirst meeting of 1854, from 2/10 to 2/17. Thiscorresponds to the date of the Japanese draftproposal.

Perry and Hayashi met again on 2/19.According to Japanese sources, during theirsecond meeting, Perry asked Hayashi about theopening of “kono-chi” (this territory) – areference to Uraga or Kanagawa (where thenegotiations were held) – as well as five or sixother ports.36 It is important to point out that,based on the documents discussed thus far, this

is the first time that Perry had asked for theopening of Uraga. In response, Hayashistrongly rejected the opening of “tōsho” (thisplace, Uraga) but, at Perry’s insistence,consented to one port (in addition to Nagasaki)being made available in either northern orsouthern Japan. In response, Perry stated that asingle port was inconvenient for the UnitedStates, and again pushed for the opening ofthree or four ports, including “Kanagawa”(Uraga). Hayashi replied that the opening ofother ports apart from Nagasaki was a seriousmatter that must be carefully considered by thebakufu.

Although Perry continued to push for thenomination of ports during this secondmeeting, Hayashi pointed out that, since theletter from the American President (deliveredto the shogunate in 1853) had requested theopening of a single port, and since no specificport was mentioned, the bakufu had chosenNagasaki – fulfilling, in Japan’s view, thedemand for the establishment of a treaty port.If Perry so strongly sought the nomination ofanother port, Hayashi countered, “Why are noports specified in the letter from the AmericanPresident?”37

Perry eventually admitted that this was indeedthe case, and agreed to wait two or three daysfor the bakufu to decide which ports would beopened at their next meeting.38 Finally, on 2/26,Hayashi proposed Shimoda and Hakodate astreaty ports.

In his journal, Perry wrote of his secondmeeting with Hayashi (2/19) as follows:

“I told them that I should expect inthe course of time, five ports to beopened to the American flag, but atpresent would be content withthree, as follows: one on the islandof Nippon, and suggested eitherUraga or Kagoshima; another inYeso (or Matsumae) [Hokkaido];

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and a third in Lew Chew (Naha);and would defer all discussion withrespect to the other two until somefuture time. To this, after manyevasions, they answered that as Ipositively refused to acceptNagasaki, and having themselvesobjections to the selection ofUraga, they proposed the port ofShimoda, in the principality of Izuas one in every way suitable andconvenient, remarking at the sametime that Lew Chew was a distantdependency, over which the crownh a d l i m i t e d c o n t r o l , a n dconsequently they could notenterta in the propos i t ion.Matsumae also stood very much inthe same relation to the imperialgovernment.”39

There are discrepancies between the bakufu’sand Perry’s accounts of this meeting – such asthe number of ports that Perry asked to beopened to American shipping. Still, bothsources agree that the first time Perryrequested the opening of Uraga was on 2/19.Therefore, we can conclude that the Americansfirst asked for the opening of the Ryukyus andMatsumae between the first meeting on 2/10,and the Japanese treaty draft on 2/17. On 2/19,Perry again demanded the opening ofMatsumae and the Ryukyus. In addition, hesought Uraga.

Therefore, we can conclude that the Americansfirst demanded the opening of the Ryukyus andMatsumae sometime between the first meetingon 2/10, and the Japanese treaty draft on 2/17.On 2/19, Perry repeated his demand. Inaddition, he also sought the opening of Uraga.Since Abe’s notes specifically refer to Perry’srequest to open all three of these territories, hemust have written them after 2/19. Thus, weneed to explore a new chronology of events –one that differs from that outlined in existing

studies.

The Shogunate Debates the Ryukyuquestion

The Ryukyus’ shift from adiplomatic-type country to a“distant” territory

In a missive sent to the Dutch government in1845, the bakufu had defined the Ryukyus as adiplomatic-type kingdom. However, it becameapparent that the bakufu had shifted thedefinition of its relationship with the territory,specifically when Perry requested the openingof the Ryukyus. Although the bakufu balked atasserting official possession of the Ryukyus, itmoved from defining the territory as adiplomatic-type kingdom (“tsūshin no kuni”), todeclaring it in ambiguous terms as a “distant”territory, a designation which was very close tothe position of Matsumae. We might argue thatin 1854/2, the shogunate had already found itproblematic to define the Ryukyus as adiplomatic-type country and therefore, duringthe negotiations with Perry, it generated a new,ad hoc designation. Seen in this light, thebakufu had no intention of characterizing theRyukyus (and Matsumae) as countries or statesthat were completely independent from Japan.

Perry’s journal reveals that, during thenegotiations, bakufu officials also stated that“Lew Chew was a distant dependency, overwhich the crown had limited control.”40 Existingstudies have read this statement as thebakufu’s refusal to acknowledge any authorityover the Ryukyus.41 On the contrary, however,this is clearly the first time in the Bakumatsuperiod that the bakufu asserted some kind ofauthority (however limited) over the Ryukyus.

It is important to understand that Abe wrote hisguidelines after the bakufu presented its treaty

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draft, in which the Ryukyus were defined as adistant territory. We can infer that it wasprecisely this ad hoc, ambiguous definition thatconcerned Abe, since Perry, after reading thebakufu’s draft, commented that there was “nogood reason why the Americans should notcommunicate freely with Lew Chew, this pointis insisted on.”42 It is notable that on 3/3, Perryand Hayashi agreed to meet again fifty dayslater (1854/5) in Shimoda to discuss in detail allthe problems that might arise between the USand Japan once Hakodate and Shimoda wereopened to shipping. Thus, it is most likely thatAbe wrote his guidelines knowing that Perryand Hayashi would be meet ing soonafterwards, mindful of the fact that Perry wasknown to be persistent and would likely askabout the Ryukyus’ opening again.

The bakufu officials’ proposalfor Japanese–Ryukyuanrelations

In the new chronology that I am proposing, theU.S. request to open the Ryukyus had asignificant impact on the shogunate’s internalpolicy. Immediately after the Treaty ofKanagawa was signed in the spring of 1854,Abe drafted guidelines outlining appropriateanswers to possible questions about theRyukyus’ political status, knowing that in fiftydays, Perry was going to Shimoda for a secondround of talks. Abe’s guidelines were intendedto demonstrate China and Japan’s dual controlover the Ryukyus.

43

From Abe’s perspective, theAmerican demands threatened Ryukyus’ doublesubordination.

44

In fact, near the end of theguidelines, Abe observed that if Japan failed toclaim possession of the kingdom, theAmericans could take control of it. This is thereasoning behind Abe’s suggestion thatJapanese claims be asserted “shika to”(firmly).45

Other passages in Abe’s guidelines reflect thesame stance. In the second clause, Abesuggested that if the Americans were to furtherpress for details on the relations between Japanand the Ryukyus, bakufu officials should replythat the Ryukyus “are without any doubtsubordinate to Japan and belong to theSatsuma lord.”

Again, in the event that the Americans statedthat they had heard that the Ryukyus werecompletely subordinate to the Qing, Abe’ssuggested response, in the tenth clause, wasthat Japanese control of the Ryukyus had begun“during the Keichō era (1596-1615), when theShimazu punished the Ryukyus and subjugatedit. Despite the fact that the Ryukyus hadadopted the Chinese calendar and welcomedChinese investiture missions, the bakufu didnot make an issue of it and allowed Ryukyus’relationship with China to continue.” However,Abe suggested noting that ever since Satsumahad “mattaku” (completely) subjugated theRyukyus to Japan, Satsuma officials had residedon the islands as administrators and, whenevera new shogun was appointed, or a newRyukyuan king was enthroned, the Ryukyus“asked [permission] to dispatch missions toEdo.”

46

These statements from his guidelines show howAbe planned to assert Japanese control over theRyukyus. In addition, in the event of extendedquestioning from Perry, Abe suggested thatbakufu officials reveal not only that theRyukyus were subordinate to both China andJapan, but also that Japanese control was moresubstantial.

In the last sentence of his guidelines, Abestated that their contents expressed hispersonal view and asked a number of high-ranking bakufu officials to express theiropinions on Ryukyuan–Japanese relations.Given that Hayashi Daigaku-no-kami andTsutsui Hizen-no-kami submitted their detailedjoint report on Ryukyus’ relationship to Japan

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in 1854/4, we can assume that Abe completedhis guidelines before that date. Accordingly,Abe’s manual was clearly written between1854/2/19 and 1854/4.

In their report, Hayashi and Tsutsui cited thefact that the Ryukyus first submitted to theShimazu in the Kakitsu era (1441-1444) asevidence of Ryukyus’ subordination toJapan.47 The report continued with an accountof how the Ryukyus were a territory of theShimazu clan and, accordingly, a number ofSatsuma samurai served tours of duty in theRyukyus. The report also cited the variousRyukyuan missions to Edo as proof of Ryukyus'subordinate status. According to the report, theRyukyus were subservient to both countries –China was like the father of the kingdom, whileJapan was considered its mother. In the eventthat Western nations pressed the issue, thereport suggested simply responding that “theRyukyus are subordinate to China.”

48

This last point proved controversial. Hayashiand Tsutsui's proposal was criticized by boththe finance commissioners and the maritimedefense officials, who asserted that Ryukyu wasa l s o s u b o r d i n a t e t o S a t s u m a

4 9

T h ecommissioners submitted their objections in an1854/4 report, in which they argued that sinceSatsuma's cadastral register also included therevenues from the Ryukyu Kingdom, clearlythis meant that, “the Ryukyus were subordinateto Satsuma.” The commissioners urged theshogunate to consult the lord of Satsumabefore making any decisions about the foreignpolicy status of the Ryukyus.

50

The maritime defense officials also cited thecadastral register when they submitted theirown criticisms of Hayashi and Tsutsui'sproposal in 1854/5. They argued that it wasimportant to consider that, by this point in thenegotiations with the Western powers, theshogunate had already stated that Japanmaintained exclusive “trade relations withChina and the Netherlands, and diplomatic

relations with Korea and the Ryukyus.”Therefore, Japan could not logically claimpossession of Ryukyu after claiming onlydiplomatic ties with the territory.

The maritime defense officials stated, however,that the Shimazu handled some of the islands’affairs, and that the Ryukyuans followed ordersfrom the Satsuma daimyo. These officials alsocited various missions from the Ryukyus to Edoas proof of the kingdom's subordinate statusand argued that that the Ryukyu Kingdom was“subordinate to both countries (China andJapan),” rather than to China alone.

51

Clearly, Perry’s request that the Ryukyus beopened to American vessels prompted thebakufu to begin serious discussions of thestatus of the Ryukyus in relation to both Chinaand Japan. From these discussions, three mainproposals emerged: Abe’s suggestion that theRyukyus be designated as under the dualsubordination of China and Japan, while“firmly” asserting Japanese control; theConfucian scholars Hayashi and Tsutsui’sproposal to claim that the Ryukyu Kingdom wassubordinate to China; and the maritime defenseofficials’ assertion that the Ryukyu Kingdomwas subordinate to both China and Japan.While the stances of Abe and the maritimedefense officials were close, the two Confucianscholars suggested a starkly differentapproach, one that would effectively cut theRyukyus loose from Japan.

As we have seen, the bakufu's growing interestin clarifying its relationship with the Ryukyusarose from fears that the Americans might takecontrol of the Ryukyu Kingdom. As theygathered information and opinions aboutRyukyus’ status, bakufu officials cited a varietyof evidence – the invasion by Satsuma of 1609(which initiated Ryukyus' subordinate status),the inclusion of the Ryukyus' revenue inSatsuma's cadastral register, and the presenceof a number of Satsuma officials on the islands– as proof that the Ryukyu Kingdom was indeed

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subordinate to Japan. In addition, manymembers of the bakufu saw the kingdom’stribute-bearing missions to Edo as solidevidence of Ryukyus' subordinate status.52

The bakufu had previously defined the Ryukyusas a diplomatic-type country in a letter to theDutch government in 1845, meaning that Japancould not claim territorial rights over thekingdom in the international arena. At the timethis letter was sent, this designation was usedas a major argument against opening formalrelations with the West. However, as themaritime defense officials noted, this argumentbecame problematic in the 1850s when theinternational situation dramatically changed.The shogunate could not maintain its earlierdefinition of Ryukyus and at the same timeassert control over the territory. The bakufu’sgrowing awareness of this contradictionexplains why the shogunate thereafter nolonger defined the Ryukyus as a diplomatic-type country in the context of foreign relations.

At this point, an important clarification shouldbe made. Since existing scholarship has arguedthat Abe had drafted his guidelines beforenegotiations with Perry began (certainly beforethe bakufu submitted its draft proposal to theAmericans on 1854/2/17), it took little accountof Abe’s new awareness of Ryukyus’ strategicimportance; for the same reason, i tunderestimated how Abe’s guidelines andsubsequent discussions of the Ryukyus withinthe shogunate influenced events. Let us nowturn to the impact of the three positions on theRyukyus’ status on bakufu foreign policy.

On 1854/5/22, Abe asked the daimyo ofSatsuma, Shimazu Nariakira, to meet him at hisresidence in Edo. Abe asked Nariakira if itwould be wise to reveal to the Qing that theRyukyu Kingdom was subordinate to Japan,since Japan could not permit a situation inwhich foreigners acted freely in the Ryukyus,as they had been doing until then.53 Nariakiraagreed.

54

This exchange shows that, in the spring of1854, Abe was not only thinking of informingthe Americans of the Ryukyus’ subordination toJapan, he was also considering informing theQing about the Ryukyus’ subordinaterelationship to Japan.

When Admiral Sir James Starling arrived inNagasaki later that same year (1854/9) to signa treaty between Great Britain and Japan,British officials asked about the extent ofJapan’s borders. In response, the Nagasakimagistrate explained that “the Ryukyus are avassal state of Japan,” and “Tsushima is part ofJapan.”

55

This reply suggests that, at least onthe Ryukyus question, the shogunate embraceda foreign policy that was closer to the views ofAbe and the maritime defense officials than tothose of Hayashi and Tsutsui.

We now turn to the bakufu’s response in 1856and 1857 to the Ryukyus’ s igning ofinternational treaties. After concluding theTreaty of Kanagawa with Japan on 1854/3/3,Perry traveled to the Ryukyus and signed anaccord: the Ryukyu-American Treaty of Amityon 1854/6/17. As we have seen, even thoughPerry’s journal contained passages in which theRyukyu Kingdom was described as a “distantdependency” of Japan, Perry had alsoremarked, after reading the bakufu’s treatydraft, that there was no reason why he couldnot “communicate freely” with the Ryukyus.Therefore, when Perry signed his accord withthe Ryukyus, he recognized that the kingdomhad a certain degree of independence inc o n d u c t i n g i t s d i p l o m a t i caffairs.56 Subsequently, France and Hollandconcluded treaties of amity with Ryukyu in1855 and 1859, respectively. In so doing, theseWestern nations recognized that the kingdompossessed at least some degree of diplomaticcapacity.

But what were the bakufu’s views on theinternational treaties concluded by theRyukyus?

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In 1856/1, Satsuma sent a series of directivesto the Ryukyus in response to the treaty thatthe Ryukyu Kingdom had signed with theUnited States. According to these documents,when Satsuma informed the bakufu about thetreaty, the shogunate’s senior councilors(including Abe Masahiro) and the Nagasakimagistrate told Satsuma that, given that thebakufu had already signed a treaty with theUnited States, they did not consider the treatyconcluded by the Ryukyus as “futsugō”(inconvenient) for Japan.

57

The shogunate didnot consider the opening of the Ryukyus to be acritical issue for Edo because of the bakufu’sown treaty with the Americans. In short, thenew accord did not threaten Japan’s controlover the Ryukyus.

The reasoning behind this attitude is clarifiedin the bakufu’s reply to a Dutch request tomediate a treaty between the Netherlands andthe Ryukyus in 1857. The Dutch, who, fora lmost 200 years , had been the onlyWesterners to maintain contact with Japan, hadinformed the bakufu of their intention toconclude a treaty with the Ryukyus beforeapproaching the kingdom itself.

After carefully discussing the Dutch request,the bakufu chose not to intervene in thenegotiations between the Dutch and theRyukyuans. The bakufu told the Dutch thateven though the Ryukyu Kingdom “shitagafu”(obeys or submits) to Japan, “moto yori gaikokuno koto nite” (it had been a foreign kingdomfrom the beginning), it would be problematicfor the bakufu to instruct the territory on thesigning of a treaty.58

As this exchange reveals, the bakufu respondedcautiously to the Dutch. However, theirresponse also revealed a major inconsistency.Whereas in the 1840s, the shogunate had toldthe Dutch that the Ryukyu Kingdom was adiplomatic-type country, on this occasion thebakufu affirmed the Ryukyus’ submission toJapan. From the bakufu’s perspective, while the

Ryukyu Kingdom was a kingdom subordinate toJapan, it was not actually part of Japan.

Internal bakufu discussions about the 1857Dutch request reveal why bakufu officials werenot particularly concerned about the possibilityof the Ryukyus concluding a treaty with theNetherlands. By bakufu reasoning, even if theRyukyus were to sign a treaty with theNetherlands, it would not mean that theRyukyu Kingdom would lose (“ushinau”) itsdependence on Japan. 5 9 However , afundamental misunderstanding is evident here.While the bakufu correctly understoodinternational treaties in terms of theestablishment of diplomatic relations, it failedto grasp that, according to international law, atreaty constituted a formal agreement betweentwo sovereign states. Furthermore, since thebakufu had tacitly approved the Ryukyus’ rightto conclude treaties, it had implicitlyacknowledged Ryukyus’ diplomatic autonomy.

Four years later, in 1861/11, the bakufuinstructed its officials to mark the Ryukyus,Ogasawara, the islands east of Etorofu (in thepresent-day Kuril group), and the land 50degrees north of Karafuto (Sakhalin) asJapanese territories on maps of Japan. It isclear that the bakufu had begun to appreciatethe importance of formally demarcatingterritories under Japanese control.60 Whereasexisting studies have interpreted this decisionin light of the international situation in the1860s and unrelated to earlier bakufu policieson the Ryukyus, I believe that the decisionshould be seen within a larger timeframe, onewhich takes into account that from the springof 1854, the bakufu had already begun todefine Ryukyu as a “zokkoku” (vassal state) inforeign relations.

In sum, after Perry had asked the shogunate toopen a port in the Ryukyus, Abe Masahirobegan to view the Ryukyus’ status not only as amatter for Satsuma, but as an issue thatinvolved the bakufu as well. After the

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negotiations with Perry, Abe realized that thenew international political landscape meantthat Japan must change its foreign policytoward the Ryukyus and suggested that, shouldthe Americans inquire about it, the bakufushould “ f i rmly” assert the Ryukyus’subordination to Japan so as to preventWestern encroachment on the islands. Thebakufu’s change in approach was the result ofprobing by Western powers, as well as of itsemerging awareness of the need to preventforeigners from taking control of the Ryukyus.As a result, in subsequent negotiations withWestern powers, the bakufu sought to definethe Ryukyus as a subordinate or vassal state ofJapan that was not, however, part of Japanproper.

The bakufu’s formal definition of theRyukyus as subordinate to both China andJapan

In 1862/9, the bakufu sent an official reply to aBritish inquiry into the “contradictions” in thebakufu’s public statements on its relationshipwith the Ryukyus. The bakufu stated that theRyukyus were subordinate to both China andJapan. According to this document, the RyukyuIslands had belonged to Japan since ancienttimes; in 1609, the bakufu bestowed theRyukyus to the Shimazu, and from that time,the Shimazu had directed the islands’ generalaffairs. However, the document also assertedthat the Ryukyus had maintained diplomaticrelations with China from time immemorial, asituation which the bakufu had allowed tocontinue.

61

The document has el icited a range ofinterpretations from scholars. According tohistorian Iwasaki Naoko, this was the first timethat the bakufu declared its control over theRyukyus to a Western audience.

62

NishizatoKikō, by contrast, has emphasized that duringthis phase, the shogunate did not make a

definite statement about its suzerainity overthe Ryukyus, and did no more than admit thatthe Ryukyu Kingdom was subordinate to bothChina and Japan.

6 3

Presenting anotherinterpretation, Yokoyama Yoshinori has arguedthat by asserting that the Ryukyus belonged toSatsuma, the bakufu revealed that it did notexercise sovereignty over the islands.

Building on these earlier responses, I arguethat it is necessary to reconsider the historicalsignificance of the bakufu’s reply to Britain’squestion in light of post-1854 bakufu foreignpolicy.

We can assume that the shogunate, from adefensive perspective, hoped to containWestern interest in the Ryukyus. The previousyear, when Russia had attempted to seizeTsushima (the Possadonick Incident), thebakufu had saved the territory only throughBritish intervention, an incident that suggestedthe shogunate’s helplessness against Westernmilitary power.64

The British request for information on theRyukyuan–Japanese relationship was linked tothe Namamugi Incident, in which one ofShimazu Hisamitsu’s retainers killed a Britishmerchant, Charles Lennox Richardson, near thevillage of Namamugi on 1862/8/21, an actwhich s t i rred Br i t i sh anger againstSatsuma.

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The bakufu’s official response to theBritish inquiry signaled another significant shiftin the bakufu’s characterization of itsr e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e R y u k y u s , acharacterization designed to deflect theinterest of foreign powers.

The shogunate’s reply not only clearly assertedfor the first time that the Ryukyu Kingdom wassubordinate to both China and Japan, but it alsoprovided evidence to legitimate its claim to theislands. Also of great interest is the documentattached to Japan’s formal reply to the Britishgovernment, which has been largely neglectedby existing scholarship. In it, the long-term

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political relationship between the Ryukyus andJapan is explained in detail:

In the course of our Bunji era[1185-1190], the Ryukyu Islandsbegan [to present] gifts [to Japan].In the first year of the Kakitsu era[1441] … I t [began] to payobeisance to the same family[Shimazu], and every year offered[them] tribute … [in 1609] thedaimyo of Satsuma, MatsudairaIehisa, dispatched a militarycontingent to that island and …made their lord surrender. Fromthe time when the founder [of theTokugawa shogunate] , HisHighness the taikun [TokugawaIeyasu] praised such merit bybestowing those same islands onIehisa, the [Ryukyuan] envoys, asrepresentatives of their lord, wouldvisit Edo: [whenever] there is anew appointment of His Highnessthe taikun [the shogun] and a greatc e r e m o n y i s h e l d b y o u rgovernment on the occasion of therenewed granting [of the Ryukyus]to the same [Shimazu] family [i.e.,the reception of a congratulatorymission]. And also when a newsuccessor is appointed from thehouse of the lord of those islands[i.e., missions of gratitude].”

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The document goes on to say that whenever anew Ryukyuan lord is appointed, he receivesinstructions from the Satsuma daimyo, and thata number of Satsuma samurai residepermanently on the Ryukyus to manage theislands’ affairs. The document also states thatfrom the beginning of the Ming period,Ryukyuan envoys had been dispatched toChina, and that Edo had not prohibited theRyukyuan lord from using the Chinese calendarand receiving his investiture missions from the

Chinese emperor.67

This supplementary document providedevidence of Japan’s substantial control over theRyukyus. The bakufu, following storiesconcocted by the Shimazu, stated that theRyukyus had begun paying tribute to Satsumain 1441, although Satsuma’s control of theRyukyus actually began following the invasionof 1609. Even though the shogunate definedthe Ryukyus in terms of dual subordination,Chinese–Ryukyuan relations were depicted interms of Ryukyuan missions to China andChinese investiture missions of successiveRyukyuan kings, which the shogunate had“allowed” to continue. By contrast, Satsuma’scontrol over the Ryukyus is described in detailas a more substantive involvement. In addition,the bakufu asserted that after Tokugawa Ieyasuhad granted the Ryukyus to Satsuma, thekingdom came to be administered by theShimazu clan, and at the same time, the bakufualso claimed that this relations needed to bereconfirmed by the shogunate each time a newshogun was appointed.

This is a previously overlooked – yet important– document. We can observe a close similaritybetween its contents and reports that a numberof Edo officials submitted to the bakufu in1854, following Perry’s second visit to Japan(especially the tenth clause of Abe Masahiro’sguidelines). Therefore, we can infer that thebakufu’s 1862 reply to the British was alsobased on the private reports presented to theshogunate after the signing of the Treaty ofKanagawa. More importantly, when Westernersreques ted de ta i l ed in format ion onRyukyuan–Japanese relations, the bakufufollowed Abe’s suggestion and “firmly”revealed the subordination of the Ryukyus toJapan. In other words, Abe’s 1854 diplomaticguidelines, together with the reports of themaritime defense officials and the Confucianscholars, continued to function as importantreference points for the bakufu leaders’understanding and explanation of relations

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between the Ryukyus, Japan and China.

Thus, in 1862, the bakufu characterized theRyukyus as subordinate to both China andJapan, while also strongly affirming Japanesecontrol over the Ryukyus as a means ofresponding to the British and, by extension, toall Western powers. However, the bakufu neverrevealed to the Qing the true nature of itsrelationship with the Ryukyu Kingdom.Therefore, despite Edo’s growing interests inRyukyuan-Japanese relations, culminating in asignificant formal and detailed declaration tothe British, the disclosure of these relations tothe Qing was still a complicated issue for Edo.It is important to emphasize that, at this point,the shogunate had no intention of incorporatingthe Ryukyus under its direct rule and, in itsdealings with the Western powers, clearlystated that the Ryukyu Kingdom was not part ofthe Japanese realm.

Despite the lack of Japanese scholarship on thebakufu’s foreign policy towards the Ryukyusafter 1862, I would like to note some findingsthat have arisen from my research. It is nosecret that during the 1867 Paris InternationalExposition, the Satsuma mission asserted thatthe Satsuma daimyo was the king of the RyukyuKingdom, and effectively declared to theWestern world that their domain wasindependent of Edo. While existing scholarshipagrees that Satsuma’s policy in this area was ofdeep concern to the shogunate, no studies haveclarified Edo’s response.68 However, accordingto British and Japanese diplomatic papers that Ihave recently studied, the bakufu responded bysending the magistrate for foreign affairs,Kurimoto Aki-no-kami, to Paris, armed with acollection of documents to be translated intoEnglish and French to be submitted to therelevant European governments.69 In thesedocuments, the bakufu pointed out that theshogun was the sole sovereign of Japan andthat the lord of Satsuma was one of hisretainers. In addition, the shogunate assertedthat the Ryukyu Kingdom, while maintaining

tributary relations with China, was firmlysubordinate to Japan (the bakufu) as adominion of Satsuma. The bakufu, however,also stressed the fact that because the Ryukyushad its own king, the Satsuma daimyo could notclaim to be the Ryukyuan king. In thesedocuments, the Edo leaders repeatedly refer tothe Ryukyuan missions to Edo to demonstratethe subordinate status of the Ryukyus to Japan,as well as the hierarchical relationship betweenthe shogun and the Ryukyuan king. As I hope todemonstrate through further research, thisepisode marks the first occasion in which theshogunate submit ted documents onRyukyuan–Japanese–Chinese relations to theWestern powers on its own initiative.

The early phase of the “Ryukyu shobun” inlight of Bakumatsu-era policies

After the Restoration of imperial power, earlyMeiji policies toward the Ryukyus built on thechanges that had occurred during theBakumatsu period; this facet of the Ryukyushobun merits further investigation. TheJapanese authorities understood that within acontext of strong Western nation-states andimperialist expansion, it was imperative forJapan to settle its sovereign boundaries.Consequently, resolving the status of theRyukyus became an urgent matter.

In 1871, the Meiji government replaced theEdo-period network of feudal domains with anew system of prefectures (ken). The formerdaimyo were appointed governors of the newlocal administrations under the direct controlof the central government. Although the Meijigovernment provisionally assigned control ofthe Ryukyus to the newly establishedKagoshima prefecture, in the spring of 1872,Meiji leaders began to discuss the Ryukyus’political status in earnest. From theirdiscussions, three possible courses of actionemerged.

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One solution was proposed by the DeputyMinister of Finance, Inoue Kaoru, andpresented to the Central Board of the Councilof State. Inoue argued that in the Keichō era(1596-1615), the Ryukyus had been subjugatedby Satsuma, and from that point on, had beenconsidered a fuyō (dependency, vassal state) ofSatsuma, with the bakufu leaving generaladministration of the kingdom in the hands ofthe Shimazu. Pointing out that the Ryukyus hadbeen using the Chinese calendar, and that itsrulers had been receiving investiture fromChina, he advocated that Japan abolish the dualsubordination system, and bring the Ryukyusinto exclusive subordination to Japan toenhance the Empire’s prestige.

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A second proposal was advanced by ForeignMinister Soejima Taneomi, who also hoped tobr ing the Ryukyus into an exc lus iverelationship with Japan. However, he wasconvinced that it was necessary to realize thisgoal gradually. He proposed that, as a firststep, Meiji leaders ensure that the Ryukyuanking, Shō Tai, be appointed as ruler of theRyukyu “han” (domain). Soejima also suggestedterminating all independent relations betweenthe Ryukyus and foreign countries.

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The third suggestion came from members ofthe sain, or Ministry of the Left, who submitteda detailed, nine-point proposal urging thatJapan maintain the status quo by declaringpublicly that the Ryukyu Kingdom wassubordinate to both China and Japan. In thefirst article, the authors stated that they hadascertained that the Ryukyus had longbelonged to both China and Japan. However, inthe second article they asserted that while theRyukyus’ subordination to China was merelynominal, the Ryukyus’ submission to Japan wassubstantive and meaningful. Even though theRyukyuan kings nominally received investituremissions from the Chinese emperor, and eventhough the Ryukyus followed the Chinesecalendar, in reality, the Shimazu family hadbeen governing the Ryukyus for generations.

Not only had they sent military missions tokeep the peace and maintain order on theislands, but they had also accompanied theRyukyuan ambassadors on visits to Japan.

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As existing studies have highlighted, thesethree proposals demonstrate that from theMeiji leaders’ perspectives, the Ryukyuanquestion was largely an issue between Japanand China.73 However, these studies failed toemphasize the important connection betweenthe Meiji leaders’ understanding of tripartiterelations, and the Tokugawa shogunate’s viewof these relationships. As we have seen,following Perry’s request to open a port in theRyukyus, the bakufu began to seriously debateRyukyuan-Japanese-Chinese relations;shogunate officials (Abe Masahiro, maritimedefense officials, and Confucian scholarsHayashi and Tsutsui) defined the Ryukyus as akingdom that maintained tributary relationswith China, but that had been subordinated toJapan as a dependency of Satsuma since theinvasion and subsequent surrender in 1609.Later, the bakufu defined the Ryukyus insimilar terms in a formal letter submitted to theBritish government in 1862.

It is interesting to note that both Inoue and themembers of the sain defined the Ryukyus interms of dual subordination, while specifyingthat the kingdom’s subordination to Satsumawas the more substantial. As evidence of theRyukyus’ subordination to the Tokugawabakufu, the sain cited the fact that the Shimazuhad been governing the kingdom forgenerations, that they sent their officials to theislands to maintain order, and that theyaccompanied the Ryukyuan ambassadors toJapan – the same evidence presented in theabove-mentioned bakufu officials’ reports.Furthermore, Soejima proposed terminatingthe Ryukyus’ foreign relations – revealing arather optimistic view of Japan’s ability toassume this task, despite Ryukyus’ conclusionof international treaties in the 1850s. As wehave seen, the bakufu did not consider these

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issues as an obstacle to its control of theRyukyus, and Soejima appears to have followedthe same line of thinking.

In conclusion, while the Ryukyu shobun refersto the process through which the Meijigovernment annexed a foreign kingdombetween 1872 and 1879, a completeunderstanding of this event demandsrecognition of its antecedents in the Bakumatsuera. While most scholars date Japan’sannexation of Ryukyu from 1872 and view it asa process involving mainly Japan, the Ryukyus,and China, I argue that the Ryukyu shobunshould be investigated within a largertimeframe and from a global perspective. Sincethe Western powers that conc ludedinternational treaties with the Ryukyus in theyears 1854, 1855, and 1859 recognized that thekingdom possessed a certain degree ofautonomy, it is important to clarify why thosetreaties did not prevent Japan from annexing aforeign kingdom.

As for the bakufu’s foreign policy toward theRyukyus, I have argued that Perry’s request toopen the Ryukyu Kingdom to American vesselswas a major turning point. Abe’s guidelines andthe reports by high-ranking bakufu officials onthe relations between the Ryukyus, Japan, andChina – both of which were drafted shortlyafter the negotiations with Perry had begun –had a significant but hitherto overlooked effecton the foreign policy of subsequent Japaneseleaders up until the early Meiji era.

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PERRY Matthew C., The Japan Expedition1852-1854: The Personal Journal o fCommodore Matthew C. Perry, Roger Pineau(ed.), Smithsonian Institution Press, City ofWashington, 1968.

SMITS Gregory, Visions of Ryukyu: Identity andIdeology in Early-Modern Thought and Politics,Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1999.

SMITS Gregory, “The Ryūkyū shobun in EastAsian and world history,” Josef Kreiner, ed.,Ryukyu in World History. Bonn, Bier'scheVerlagsanstalt, 2001.

SUGIMOTO Fumiko, “Chizu, ezu no shuppan toseiji bunka no henyō,” Yokota Fuyuhiko ed.,Shuppan to ryūtsū, Heibonsha, 2016.

TINELLO Marco “Ryūkyū shisetsu kara mirubakumakki Nihon gaikō no henka: kinsei karakindai he,” Okinawa bunka kenkyū, n. 41, 2015.

TINELLO Marco, Sekai-shi kara mita ‘Ryukyushobun’, Ginowan, Yōju Shorin, 2017.

TOBY Ronald, State and Diplomacy in EarlyModern Japan: Asia in the Development of theTokugawa Bakufu, Princeton, NJ, PrincetonUniversity Press, 1984.

TOMIYAMA Kazuyuki, Ryūkyū ōkoku no gaikōto ōken, Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2004.

UMEKI Tetsuto, Shin Ryūkyū koku no rekishi,Tokyo, Hosei Daigaku Shuppankyoku, 2013.

WATANABE Miki, Kinsei Ryūkyū to Chū-Nichikankei, Tokyo, Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2012

WILLIAMS Samuel Wells, Perī Nihon enseizuikōki, translated by Hora Tomio, Tokyo,Yūshōdō Shoten, 1970.

YOKOYAMA Yoshinori, “Nihon no kaikoku to

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Ryūkyū,” Kokka to taigai kankei: atarashii kinsei-shi 2, Shin Jinbutsu Ōraisha, 1996.

Marco Tinello (https://hosei.academia.edu/MarcoTinello) is a lecturer in East Asian andJapanese history at Hōsei and Waseda universities. He is the author of Sekai-shi kara mita‘Ryukyu shobun’ (2017), and several peer-reviewed articles in Japanese. In 2015, he receivedthe first Professor Josef Kreiner Hosei University Award for International Studies, and in 2016he was awarded the 38th Okinawa Bunka Kyōkai prize (Higa Shunchō award).

marcotinello@hotmail.com

Notes1 This paper is an updated version of Marco Tinello, Sekai-shi kara mita “Ryūkyū shobun”,Yōju shorin, 2017 (Chapter 3).2 Matthew C. Perry, The Japan Expedition 1852-1854: The Personal Journal of CommodoreMatthew C. Perry, Roger Pineau (ed.), Smithsonian Institution Press, City of Washington,1968, 169.3 George Kerr, Okinawa, the History of an Island People, Rutland Vt.: C. E. Tuttle Co, 1958,330; Robert I. Hellyer, Defining Engagement: Japan and Global Contexts, 160-1868,Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center: Distributed by Harvard University Press,2009, 163.4 Nishizato Kikō, “Ryūkyū shobun-Karafuto-Chishima kōkan jōyaku,” Ajia no naka no Nihon-shiIV: chiki to minzoku, Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1992, 170; Maehira Fusaaki, “Jūkyū seiki noHigashi Ajia kokusai kankei to Ryūkyū mondai,” Higashi Ajia kara kangaeru 3: shūhen kara norekishi, Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1994, 253; Yokoyama Yoshinori, “Nihon no kaikoku toRyūkyū,” Kokka to taigai kankei: atarashii kinsei-shi 2, Shin Jinbutsu Ōraisha, 1996, 399.5 Prior to 1873 Japan used a luni-solar calendar; for the Japanese dates in this paper, I havefollowed the historiographical conventions used to express dates in the year/month/dayformat.6 Umeki Tetsuto, Shin Ryūkyū koku no rekishi, Hosei Daigaku Shuppankyoku, 2013; GregorySmits, “The Ryūkyū Shobun in East Asian and World History,” Josef Kreiner, ed., Ryukyu inWorld History, Bonn: Bier'sche Verlagsanstalt, 2001; Gabe Masao, Meiji kokka to Okinawa,San’ichi Shobō, 1979, among others.7 In this respect, Nishizato considers the Opium War (1839-42) to be the beginning ofRyukyu’s annexation to Japan, and its conclusion the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-95).Nishizato Kikō, Shin-matsu Chū-Ryū-Nichi kankei-shi no kenkyū, Kyoto Daigaku Shuppankai,2005, 799.8 To understand the early modern status of the Ryukyus vis-à-vis China and Japan, thefollowing works are of paramount importance. Tomiyama Kazuyuki has shown that from 1609,even though there were limitations on Ryukyuan sovereignty due to its subordinate status to

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Satsuma, the Ryukyus continued to exist as a kingdom, and its kings continued to receive theinvestiture from the Chinese emperor in the same way as the Korean and Vietnamese kings.(Tomiyama Kazuyuki, Ryūkyū ōkoku no gaikō to ōken, Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2004, 161).Kamiya Nobuyuki demonstrated that the Ryukyuan missions to Edo, which the Ryukyus wererequired to send throughout the Tokugawa period, were the result of a tripartite powerrelationship in which the bakufu, the Satsuma domain, and the Ryukyu Kingdom all tried toobtain an advantage (Kamiya Nobuyuki, Bakuhansei kokka no Ryūkyū shihai, Tokyo: AzekuraShobō, 1990). Watanabe Miki argues that the policy of concealing the true relationshipbetween Japan and the Ryukyus from the Qing played a key function in safeguarding theautonomy of the Ryukyu Kingdom from the interference of both China and Satsuma. On theone hand, it helped the Ryukyus to maintain tributary relations with Beijing without exposingtheir true connections with Japan. On the other hand, it also served as a barrier thatprevented Japan (especially Satsuma) from establishing direct control or influence over Qing-Ryukyuan relations (Watanabe Miki, Kinsei Ryūkyū to Chū-Nichi kankei, YoshikawaKōbunkan, 2012, 245). In my manuscript, I mentioned that while in 1846 and 1847 Satsumaordered the Ryukyu government to establish a trade relationship with the French, theRyukyus strongly resisted these orders, and, eventually, Satsuma was unable to press theissue further (MarcoTinello, Sekaishi kara mita “Ryukyu shobun,” Yōjo shorin, 2017). As forthe works of English scholars, in his Visions of Ryukyu, Gregory Smits pointed out that“Obviously early-modern Ryukyu was closely tied to both places [China and Japan], and theseties affected nearly every aspect of Ryukyuan life. It was precisely because of Ryukyu’scomplex ties with the Qing empire and elements of Japan’s bakuhan state, I would argue, thatthe kingdom was able to maintain a substantial measure of autonomy within the broaderhistorical conditions of the time.” (Gregory Smits, Visions of Ryukyu: Identity and Ideology inEarly-Modern Thought and Politics, University of Hawai’i Press, 1999, 156). In short, theRyukyus were active players and able to maintain a certain degree of self-agency, as wereSatsuma and Edo.9 Ronald Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan: Asia in the Development of theTokugawa Bakufu, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984, 64.10 The dispatch of the Korean missions was a policy initiative of Tokugawa Ieyasu, who wishedto restore official relations with the Korean court following Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s invasion ofKorea at the end of the sixteenth century. The first three embassies, dispatched in 1607,1617, and 1624, were intended to secure the repatriation of Korean prisoners captured byHideyoshi’s forces and present the Korean monarch’s reply to the state letters signed by theTokugawa shogun. From 1636, these Korean embassies were known as Chōsen tsūshinshi(communication envoys), and became diplomatic rituals of great symbolic value as well as avisible guarantee of peaceful relations between the bakufu and the Korean court. In total,Korea sent twelve embassies to Edo during the Tokugawa period.11 The title taikun used to designate the shogun was used in relations with Korea throughoutthe Edo period and with Ryukyu until 1714; in the Bakumatsu, this title was used to refer tothe shogun in the treaties signed by the bakufu with the Western powers.12 On the creation of the title of Nihon koku taikun and on Tokugawa Japan’s foreign policysee Toby, State and Diplomacy. On taikun diplomacy see Kamiya Nobuyuki, Taikun gaikō tohigashi Ajia, Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1997.13 According to Gregory Smits, after the early Ryukyu invasion by Satsuma, relations with

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China were a political necessity for the Ryukyu kingdom to survive on Japan’s periphery as aquasi-independent country (Visions of Ryukyu: Identity and Ideology in Early-Modern Thoughtand Politics, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1999, 33.14 For a detailed analysis of Ryukyu’s policy of concealing its relations with Japan see KamiyaNobuyuki, Bakuhansei kokka no Ryūkyū shihai, Tokyo: Azekura Shobō, 1990; and WatanabeMiki, Kinsei Ryūkyū to Chū-Nichi kankei, Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2012.15 Kamiya Nobuyuki, Bakuhansei kokka no Ryūkyū shihai, Tokyo: Azekura Shobō, 1990,252-254.16 Fuma Susumu, Shi Ryukyuroku kaidai oyobi kenkyū, Yōju shorin, 1999, xi~x.17 TI, vol. 7, 94.18 Ibid., 193.19 Fujita Satoru, Kinsei kōki seijishi to taigai kankei, Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 2005, 23-24.20 i refers to an intercalary month, in this case intercalary 5 Month. In the Japanese luni-solarcalendar, it was common to add an intercalary month after one of the 12 lunar months inorder to keep the solar and lunar calendars in sequence.21 1846/i5/25. DNIS, vol. 1-1, 758-59.22 DNIS, vol. 1-2, 38.23 Nishizato Kikō “Ahen sensōgo no gaiatsu to Ryūkyū mondai: Dōkō-Kanpō no Ryūkyūshozoku mondai wo chūshin ni,” Ryūkyū daigaku kyōiku gakubu kiyō, vol. 57, 2000, 49.24 Nishizato 1992, Maehira 1994, Yokoyama 1996 (see footnote n. 4)25 Vol. 38, Historiographical Institute, Tokyo University.26 RGKM ka’ei 6, vol. 38, Tokyo daigaku shiryō hensanjo. See also Samuel Wells Williams, PerīNihon ensei zuikōki, translated by Hora Tomio. Tokyo: Yūshōdō Shoten 1970, 448-449.27 Perry, The Personal Journal of Commodore Matthew C. Perry, 97.28 Ibid., 98.29 BGKM vol. 1, Tokyo Daigaku Shiryō Henshanjo (ed.), Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1910, 3-4.30 Akimoto Masutoshi, “Beikoku no tai-nichi seisaku to Nichi-Bei Washin jōyaku no teiketsu,”Kokusai seiji, 14, 1960, 24.31 TIZ, vol. 4, 608.32 Ibid., 619.33 Ibid., 621-622.34 Perry, The Personal Journal, 169.35 TIZ, vol. 4, 622.36 TIZ, vol. 4, 624.37 Ibid., 624-626.38 Ibid., 626.39 Perry, The Personal Journal, 170.40 Perry, The Personal Journal, 170.41 Kerr, Okinawa, 330.42 Perry, The Personal Journal, 169.43 Williams, Perī Nihon ensei zuikōki, 447.44 Maehira, “Jūkyū seiki no Higashi Ajia kokusai kankei,” 255.45 Williams, Perī Nihon ensei zuikōki, 449.46 Williams, Perī Nihon ensei zuikōki, 448-449.

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47 On 1634/5/4, the Satsuma daimyo Shimazu Iehisa presented to the bakufu what has becomeknown as the Kakitsu fuyō protocol. This holds that in 1441, the first year of the Kakitsu era,the daimyo of Satsuma, Shimazu Tadakuni, received an official document from the sixthAshikaga shogun, Yoshinori, that bestowed the Ryukyu Islands on the Shimazu clan. However,other than Iehisa’s seventeenth-century letter, there is no documentation to support thisnotion (Kamiya Nobuyuki, Rekishi no hazama, Ginowan: Yōju Shorin, 2009, 5). We can thusdeduce that Hayashi and Tsutsui followed the Shimazu’s fabricated account of the origins ofRyukyuan–Satsuma relations when they submitted their report to the shogunate in the springof 1854.48 Ibid., 450.49 Williams, Perī Nihon ensei zuikōki, 450.50 Williams, Perī Nihon ensei zuikōki, 450.51 Ibid., 450-451.52 With regard to the role of the Ryukyuan missions to Edo in the Bakumatsu period, I’veargued that after the arrival of Western powers in Japan, the shogunate considered theRyukyuan missions to Edo not only as a means of increasing the shogun’s prestige, but also asa practice through which it could demonstrate that Ryukyu was also subordinate to Japan.See, Marco Tinello “Ryūkyū shisetsu kara miru bakumakki Nihon gaikō no henka: kinsei karakindai he,” Okinawa bunka kenkyū, n. 41, 2015.53 During the so-called Gaikan torai jiken episode mentioned above, French and British vesselsarrived in the Ryukyus and requested the opening of the kingdom. On that occasion, theshogunate chose to treat the Ryukyus as a “safety valve,” and did not attempt to counterWestern demands on the Ryukyus. In 1853-54, Perry also visited the Ryukyus and made newdemands. Abe most likely reasoned that revealing the Ryukyu Kingdom’s subordination toJapan to the Qing would help impede Western encroachment.54 Nariakirakō shiryō, vol. 2, 462-3. Although in the spring of 1854 Nariakira agreed with Abethat, in the new international context, it would be wise to inform the Qing of the RyukyuKingdom’s subordination to Japan, it seems that this proposal came to nothing, since nodocumentary source testifies to further developments.55 TIZ, vol. 3, 99.56 In a recent monograph, Sekai-shi kara mita ‘Ryukyu shobun’ (Ginowan: Yōju Shorin, 2017),I argued that – despite the view taken by earlier scholarship that the Ryukyu shobun was anevent involving primarily Japan, the Ryukyus, and China – since the Ryukyus had concludedinternational treaties (with the US, France, and Holland in 1854, 1855, and 1859,respectively), the annexation process also concerned the Western powers who were party tothose agreements. In short, I argued that Japan’s incorporation of the Ryukyus in the Meijiperiod was an integral part of both East Asian and world history.57 ROHM, vol. 14, 522.58 BGKM, vol. 15, Tokyo Daigaku Shiryō Henshanjo (ed.), Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1972,599-600.59 Ibid., 599-600.60 Sugimoto Fumiko, “Chizu, ezu no shuppan to seiji bunka no henyō,” Yokota Fuyuhiko ed.,Shuppan to ryūtsū, Heibonsha, 2016, 231.61 Ihi nyūkōroku, vol. 1, 32.

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62 Iwasaki Naoko, “Ezochi/Ryukyu no ‘Kindai’,” Kōza Nihon rekishi, Tokyo DaigakuShuppankai, 2005.63 Nishizato Kikō, “Kanpō-dōchiki (bakumatsu Ishinki) no Chū-Ryū-Nichi kankei kōsatsuō:ShōTai sakuhō mondai to sono shūhen,” Tōyōshi kenkyū 64. Kyoto: Seikei Shoin, 2006, 50.64 Maehira, “Jūkyū seiki no Higashi Ajia kokusai kankei,” 259.65 Foreign Office, 46, Japan Correspondence, vol. 24 (67), 232-234.66 Ihi nyūkōroku daiichi, 32-33.67 Ibid., 33. As we have seen, in 1854 Confucian scholars Hayashi and Tsutsui wrote in theirreport that the subordination of Ryukyu to Satsuma had occurred in 1441; we might thereforeexpect that, in 1862, the bakufu officials also referred to this report when they drafted theirformal reply to the British government.68 Patrick Beillevaire, “Wavering Attention: French Governmental Policy Towards the RyūkyūKingdom,” Josef Kreiner, ed., Ryūkyū in World History. Bonn: Bier’sche Verlagsanstalt, 2001;Hellyer, Defining Engagement, 2009.69 Foreign Office 46, Japan Correspondence; Zoku tsūshin zenran, 416, hen nen no bu, hi no tōFutsu koku ōfuku shokan jūsan.70 Meiji bunka shiryō sōsho, vol. 4, gaikō hen, Meiji Bunka Shiryō Sōsho Kankōkai, KazamaShobō,1962, 8.71 Ibid., 9.72 Ryūkyū shozoku mondai kankei shiryō, Yokoyama Manabu seining henshū, HonkokuShoseki, 1980, dai 2 shū, dai 6 kan, jōchū, 7~9.73 Nishizato Kikō, 2005. Namihira Tsuneo, Kindai Higashi Ajia no naka no Ryūkyū heigō:Chūka sekai chitsujo kara shokuminchi Teikoku Nihon he, Iwanami Shoten, 2014.