AMiscellanyofRecent,FrequentlyCitedAppellateChildSupportDecisions

John-PaulBoydCanadianResearchInstituteforLawandtheFamily

February2016

I.IntroductionTheFederalChildSupportGuidelines1arenowalmosttwentyyearsold,havingcomeintoforceon1May1997asaregulationtotheDivorceAct.2TheGuidelinesemergedfromworkbegunbytheFederal-Provincial-TerritorialFamilyLawCommitteein1990inresponsetowidespreaddissatisfactionwiththedeterminationandtaxtreatmentofchildsupport,andwereimplementedbygovernmentwiththeintentionofhelpingparents,lawyersandjudgesset“fairandconsistent”amountsofchildsupport.3Overtheyearsthatfollowed,theGuidelineswereadaptedandadoptedbymostprovincesandterritories4forthepurposesoftheirlocaldomesticrelationslegislation,andarelativelyconsistentbodyofcaselawdevelopedinterpretingthenewregulationandaddressingtrickyissuesliketheamountofsupportpayableforchildrenovertheageofmajority,whenthepayor’sannualincomeisinexcessof$150,000andwhenparentshavesharedcustodyoftheirchildren.AlthoughtheGuidelines’goalofimprovingthepredictabilityofchildsupportawardshasgenerallybeenrealized,5thechangefromaneeds-and-meansanalysistoanalysesbasedonannualincomehasmerelyshiftedthefocusofargumentfrombudgetstoearningsandearningcapacity.Unfortunately,manycounselpracticingfamilylawpriortotheintroductionoftheGuidelinesareoftheviewthatchildsupportislitigatedmorefrequentlynowthanbefore,asaresultofthischangeinfocusandthenewemphasisonincome.Nonetheless,theGuidelineshaveproventoworkwellforthemajorityofpayorswithrelativelycommonplaceemploymentandchildcarearrangements;ingeneral,itisonlythosewithirregularorself-employmentincome,thosewithequalornear-equalparentingtimeandthoseimproperlyseekingtominimizetheirsupportobligationswhofindthemselvesmiredinargumentsaboutincome.

1FederalChildSupportGuidelines,SOR/97-1752DivorceAct,RSC1985,c.3(2ndSupp.)3ChildSupportTeam,“ChildSupportInitiativeResearchFramework:DiscussionPaper”(OttawaON:DepartmentofJustice,1998)atp.24Manitoba,NewBrunswickandQuebechaveeachdevelopedtheirownguidelinesthatapplywhenbothparentsresideintheprovince.TheChildSupportGuidelinesregulationsofManitoba(ManReg58/98)andNewBrunswick(NBReg98-27)bearacloseresemblancetothefederalGuidelines;Quebec’sRegulationRespectingtheDeterminationofChildSupportPayments(CQLR,c.C-25,r.6)doesnot.5CanadianResearchInstituteforLawandtheFamily,Phase2oftheSurveyofChildSupportAwards:FinalReport(Ottawa,ON:DepartmentofJustice,2005)

2

InthispaperIwilldigesttenofthemostfrequentlyciteddecisionsonchildsupportrenderedbyCanada’scourtsofappealinthelastthreeyears.ThesedecisionsaddresstheaspectsoftheGuidelinesmostpronetolitigation,including:ss.18and19ontheimputationofincome,s.3onadultchildren,s.7onspecialexpensesands.17ontheaveragingofincome.Inreviewingthedigestsbelow,readersshouldbearinmindtherigorousstandardforappellatereviewsofsupportorderssetoutinHickeyvHickey:6

“[10]Whenfamilylawlegislationgivesjudgesthepowertodecideonsupportobligationsbasedoncertainobjectives,values,factors,andcriteria,determiningwhethersupportwillbeawardedorvaried,andifso,theamountoftheorder,involvestheexerciseofconsiderablediscretionbytrialjudges.…Becauseofitsfact-basedanddiscretionarynature,trialjudgesmustbegivenconsiderabledeferencebyappellatecourtswhensuchdecisionsarereviewed.“[11]OurCourthasoftenemphasizedtherulethatappealcourtsshouldnotoverturnsupportordersunlessthereasonsdiscloseanerrorinprinciple,asignificantmisapprehensionoftheevidence,orunlesstheawardisclearlywrong.…”

II.CaseDigestA.CalvervCalver

2014ABCA637RetroactiveSupportandSpecialExpensesforAdultChild:DAss.2,15.1ImputingIncome:CSGs.19

Facts:Separation2003.Interimconsentorderin2004givingchildren’sprimaryresidencetorecipient,requiringchildsupportof$500permonthforparties’threechildrenandrequiringpayortoprovideannualnoticesofassessment.Divorce2006,finalordercontinuingdisclosureobligation.Payor’sincomeincreasingsteadilyfollowingfinalorder.In2013,payorlivinginKamloopsandworkinginFortMcMurray,receivingannualtravelandlivingallowancefromemployerrangingbetween$36,000and$48,000.8Payorapplyingtovary2004orderasonechildreachingageofmajorityandnotattendingschoolandpayorhavingacquiredprimaryresidenceofanotherofthechildren.Recipientcrossapplyingforincreaseinchildsupportandpaymentofspecialexpensesretroactiveto2006.Chambersjudgeimputing$18,000ofallowancetopayorinabsenceofevidenceofpayor’sactualexpensesinworkingin6HickeyvHickey,[1999]2SCR518,recentlyconfirmedinD.B.S.vS.R.G.,2006SCC37.7Availableathttp://canlii.ca/t/g332x.Cited8timesasof12February2016,accordingtoCanLII.8Amountsroundedtonearest$500hereandthroughout.

3

FortMcMurray,orderingpaymentofspecialexpensesandincreaseinchildsupportretroactiveto2006forallchildren.Payorappealingongroundsthattravelandlivingallowanceshouldnothavebeenincludedinincomeandthatretroactivesupportandspecialexpensesoughtnothavebeenawardedinrespectofadultchild.Guidelines:19. (1)Thecourtmayimputesuchamountofincometoaspouseasitconsidersappropriateinthe

circumstances,whichcircumstancesincludethefollowing:(a)thespouseisintentionallyunder-employedorunemployed,otherthanwheretheunder-employmentorunemploymentisrequiredbytheneedsofachildofthemarriageoranychildundertheageofmajorityorbythereasonableeducationalorhealthneedsofthespouse;(b)thespouseisexemptfrompayingfederalorprovincialincometax;(c)thespouselivesinacountrythathaseffectiveratesofincometaxthataresignificantlylowerthanthoseinCanada;(d)itappearsthatincomehasbeendivertedwhichwouldaffectthelevelofchildsupporttobedeterminedundertheseGuidelines;(e)thespouse’spropertyisnotreasonablyutilizedtogenerateincome;(f)thespousehasfailedtoprovideincomeinformationwhenunderalegalobligationtodoso;(g)thespouseunreasonablydeductsexpensesfromincome;(h)thespousederivesasignificantportionofincomefromdividends,capitalgainsorothersourcesthataretaxedatalowerratethanemploymentorbusinessincomeorthatareexemptfromtax;and(i)thespouseisabeneficiaryunderatrustandisorwillbeinreceiptofincomeorotherbenefitsfromthetrust.

(2)Forthepurposeofparagraph(1)(g),thereasonablenessofanexpensedeductionisnotsolelygovernedbywhetherthedeductionispermittedundertheIncomeTaxAct.

Analysis:RequirementofdefinitionofchildofthemarriageatDAs.2thatchildbeunderageofmajorityorunabletowithdrawfromparentalcontrolatthematerialtimemeansbeingunderageorunabletowithdrawattimeofapplicationforretroactivesupport.Childsupportnotintendedforadultswhoformerlyhadthatstatus.Principlesofretroactivechildsupportalsoapplytoapplicationsforretroactivespecialexpenses. D.B.S.vS.R.G.,2006SCC37 SemancikvSemancik,2011BCCA264Courtmaynonethelessmakeretroactivesupportorderforadultifpayorservedwithapplicationforsupportordisclosurewhileadultqualifiedaschildofthemarriage.Existenceofpriororderfordisclosurenotsufficient;jurisdictionunderDivorceActinvokedbyapplication.Applicationfordisclosureortoenforceorderfordisclosurerequired. D.B.S.vS.R.G.,2006SCC37

4

CourthasdiscretiontoimputeincometopartyunderCSGs.19,butdiscretionmustbeexercisedreasonably.

HawkswellvOstyn,2008ONCJ677Job-relatedpaymentsreceivedbypayorsfortravelandlivingcostsoftennotincludedinincomeforchildsupportpurposes,forreasonsincludingthatlivingallowancesarenotincomeunderGuidelinesandGuidelinesallowdeductionoftravelexpensespaidbyemployeefromincome.

McCaffreyvDallaLonga,2008ABQB183JordanvJordan,2005SKQB129O’BrienvO’Brien,[1999]NWTJNo.56(NWTSC)

Application:Discretiontoimputeincomemustbeexercisedreasonably.Decisionofchambersjudgenotreasonableas:payor’sevidenceastocostoflivinguncontrovertedbyrecipient;costoflivinginFortMcMurraynotoriouslyhigh;chambersjudgemakingassumptionsaboutcostoftravelinabsenceofevidence;and,chambersjudgesecond-guessingpayor’s“legitimate”choiceoftransportation.Payor’sincometobecalculatedwithoutimputingincomefromtravelandlivingallowance.Adultchildnotchildofmarriagewhenapplicationmadeforretroactivechildsupportandspecialexpenses.Althoughretroactiveordersmaybemadeinrespectofadultchildren,applicationfororderordisclosuremustbemadewhilechildischildofmarriage.Recipientunabletoreplyondisclosurerequirementof2006orderasDivorceActisapplication-basedregime.Nochildsupportorspecialexpensespayableinrespectofadultchild.HandyQuotes:9Testtoimputeincome“[19]Acourt’sdiscretiontoimputeincomemustbeexercisedreasonably.Inthiscaseitwasnot.”

•Travelandlivingallowancesnotgenerallytreatedasincome“[16]Severalcaseshavedeclinedtoimputeincomebasedonjob-relatedpaymentsfortravelandlivingexpenses…Variousrationalesexist:itwouldbeunjusttoattributeincomethatismeanttoreimburseapartyforcostsincurredinthecourseofemployment;theIncomeTaxActexcludesfromincomecertainbenefitsrelatingtospecialworksitesorremoteworklocations;livingallowancesarenotincomeundertheFederalChildSupportGuidelines;itwouldbeinconsistentwiththeGuidelinestoaddatravelallowancetoincomewhentheGuidelinesspecificallyauthorizethedeductionfromincomeoftravel

9Citesfromtextofjudgmentsomittedhereandthroughout.

5

expensespaiddirectlybyanemployee;andtheseamountscanbespeculativesincetheymaydependonthenumberofdaysawayfromhome.Thefactthatanemployeeneednotaccountforsuchanallowancehasbeenconsideredirrelevanttotheallowance’streatment.”

•Payorsnottobepenalizedforexpensesincurredinearninghighincome“[22]…The[payor’s]willingnesstofrequentlyabsenthimselffromhisfamilypermitshimtoearnagoodwage.Heshouldnotbepenalizedbyimputingasincomeallowancespaidtodefrayexpensesarisingfromthefactthatheworksaconsiderabledistancefromwhereheliveswithhisfamily.”

•Applicationfordisclosureasprerequisiteofapplicationforretroactivesupport“[32]…TheDivorceActisanapplication-basedregime.…Thesamecouldbesaidofanyotherapplicationtoenforceadisclosureobligation,forexample,anapplicationforcontemptofpreviouscourtordersimposingsuchobligations.Simplyput,suchapplicationsmaybepre-requisitestoanapplicationforretroactivesupport,sincewithoutthenecessaryinformationapayeewilllackthebasisforseekingretroactivesupport.”B.DecaenvDecaen

2013ONCA21810TerminationofSupportforAdultChild:DAs.15.1AveragingIncome:CSGs.17

Facts:Separation2007.Fourchildren,adultchildbroughtintomarriage;eldesttwochildrenterminatingcontactwithpayor.Trial2012.Payorfailingtodiscloseincome.Trialorderterminatingsupportforadultchild,theninfinalyearofundergraduatedegreeprogram,uponcompletionofdegree;judgecommentingthatpayorshouldnotbeexpectedtocontinuetosupportadultchild,especiallygiventhatchildrefusestospeaktohim.Trialjudgeimputingincometobothrecipientandpayor,butacceptingpayor’sprojectedearningsformostrecentcalendaryear.Recipientappealingonbasesincludingthatinsufficientincomeimputedtopayorasjudgefailingtoaveragepayor’sincomeoverpastthreeyears,andtrialjudgeerringinorderingterminationofsupportforadultchild.Adultchildenrolledinpost-graduatestudiesattimeofappeal.

10Availableathttp://canlii.ca/t/fwxgx.Cited12timesasof10February2016.

6

Guidelines:17. (1)Ifthecourtisoftheopinionthatthedeterminationofaspouse’sannualincomeundersection

16wouldnotbethefairestdeterminationofthatincome,thecourtmayhaveregardtothespouse’sincomeoverthelastthreeyearsanddetermineanamountthatisfairandreasonableinlightofanypatternofincome,fluctuationinincomeorreceiptofanon-recurringamountduringthoseyears.(2)Whereaspousehasincurredanon-recurringcapitalorbusinessinvestmentloss,thecourtmay,ifitisoftheopinionthatthedeterminationofthespouse’sannualincomeundersection16wouldnotprovidethefairestdeterminationoftheannualincome,choosenottoapplysections6and7ofScheduleIII,andadjusttheamountoftheloss,includingrelatedexpensesandcarryingchargesandinterestexpenses,toarriveatsuchamountasthecourtconsidersappropriate.

Analysis:Standingofadultchildrenas“childofmarriage”entitledtocontinuingparentalsupportunderDAs.15.1beyondonecourseofpost-secondaryeducationdependentonparents’abilitytopay.

W.P.N.vB.J.N.,2005BCCA7FardenvFarden(1993),48RFL(3d)60(BCSC)MartellvHeight(1994),3RFL(4th)104(NSCA)

CSGs.17allowscourttoconsiderparty’sincomeoverlastthreeyearswheredeterminingincomebasedonT1Line150,asrequiredbyCSGs.16,wouldnotyieldfairestdetermination.Althoughconsiderationofincomereceivedoverlastthreeyearsismandatoryinthesecircumstances,theaveragingofincomereceivedoverlastthreeyearsisdiscretionary.

S.A.N.vJ.M.S.,2011BCSC963Application:Extensiveevidencebeforetrialjudgeoffamily’slimitedfinancialresources.Responsibilityofparentstofundbeyondonedegreesubjecttoparents’financialcapacity.Trialjudge’sconclusionthatpayor’sobligationtoadultchildendswithherundergraduatestudiesnotunreasonable.Trialjudge’sreferencetolackofcontactbetweenchildandpayornotdeterminativefactorindecision.Trialjudgeconcludingthatpayorhadfailedtodiscloseincomeandconsideredpatternofpayor’sincomeoverprevioussevenyearsandacceptedpayor’sprojectedincome.Trialjudgedidconsiderpayor’sincomeoverlastthreeyearsandexercisingdiscretiontonotaverageincome.TrialjudgenotobligedtoaverageincomeunderCSGs.17(2).

7

HandyQuotes:Supportofadultchildrenformorethanonepost-secondaryprogram“[58]…Therewasextensiveevidencebeforethetrialjudgeofthefamily’slimitedfinancialresources.Whileparentsofsignificantmeansmaybeorderedtopaysupportforaseconddegree,supportforaseconddegreeisverymuchsubjecttotheparents’abilitytopay.Thetrialjudgeconcludedthat,withinthecontextofthisfamily,itwasappropriatethatthefather’ssupportobligationto[theadultchild]endwithherundergraduatestudies.Weagree....”

•Averagingincomediscretionary“[50]Section17oftheChildSupportGuidelinesprovidesthatwherethecourtisoftheopinionthatdeterminingaparent’sincomeusingtheT1GeneralformissuedbytheCanadaRevenueAgencywouldnotbethefairestdeterminationofthatincome,‘thecourtmayhaveregardtothespouse’sincomeoverthelastthreeyearsanddetermineanamountthatisfairandreasonableinlightofanypatternofincome,fluctuationinincomeorreceiptofanon-recurringamountduringthoseyears’.Thelanguageinsection17ispermissiveratherthanmandatory,allowingthecourttolookatthespouse’sincomeoverthelastthreeyearsinappropriatecircumstances.Herethetrialjudgedidactuallylookatthefather’sincomeoverthosethreeyears.Whathedidnotdowasaveragetheincomeoverthosethreeyears.Thereisnorequirementthathedoso.”C.DelichtevRogers

2013MBCA10611SpecialExpenses:CSGs.7

Facts:Separation2004.Finalorderin2007requiringpayortocontributetospecialexpenses,includingchildren’sprivateschool,danceandhockeyfeesamountingto$22,500.Recipientsuccessfullyapplyingtovaryfinalorderin2010torelocate;payorunsuccessfulincrossapplicationtoterminateobligationtocontributetospecialexpenses.Recipientrelocatingin2011,enrollingchildreninnewprivateschool.Payorsuccessfulinsecondapplicationtoterminateobligationtocontributetospecialexpensesin2012.Payor’s2011income$277,500;recipient’s2011income$5,000plus$12,000inspousalsupport.RecipientappealingongroundsincludingfailuretofindamaterialchangeincircumstancesbeforeterminatingobligationtocontributetoprivateschoolfeesandfailuretocorrectlyapplytheGuidelines.

11Availableathttp://canlii.ca/t/g25vv.Cited11timesasof9February2016.

8

Guidelines:7. (1)Inachildsupportorderthecourtmay,oneitherspouse’srequest,provideforanamountto

coveralloranyportionofthefollowingexpenses,whichexpensesmaybeestimated,takingintoaccountthenecessityoftheexpenseinrelationtothechild’sbestinterestsandthereasonablenessoftheexpenseinrelationtothemeansofthespousesandthoseofthechildandtothefamily’sspendingpatternpriortotheseparation:

(a)childcareexpensesincurredasaresultofthecustodialparent’semployment,illness,disabilityoreducationortrainingforemployment;(b)thatportionofthemedicalanddentalinsurancepremiumsattributabletothechild;(c)health-relatedexpensesthatexceedinsurancereimbursementbyatleast$100annually,includingorthodontictreatment,professionalcounsellingprovidedbyapsychologist,socialworker,psychiatristoranyotherperson,physiotherapy,occupationaltherapy,speechtherapyandprescriptiondrugs,hearingaids,glassesandcontactlenses;(d)extraordinaryexpensesforprimaryorsecondaryschooleducationorforanyothereducationalprogramsthatmeetthechild’sparticularneeds;(e)expensesforpost-secondaryeducation;and(f)extraordinaryexpensesforextracurricularactivities.

(1.1)Forthepurposesofparagraphs(1)(d)and(f),theterm“extraordinaryexpenses”means(a)expensesthatexceedthosethatthespouserequestinganamountfortheextraordinaryexpensescanreasonablycover,takingintoaccountthatspouse’sincomeandtheamountthatthespousewouldreceiveundertheapplicabletableor,wherethecourthasdeterminedthatthetableamountisinappropriate,theamountthatthecourthasotherwisedeterminedisappropriate;or(b)whereparagraph(a)isnotapplicable,expensesthatthecourtconsidersareextraordinarytakingintoaccount

(i)theamountoftheexpenseinrelationtotheincomeofthespouserequestingtheamount,includingtheamountthatthespousewouldreceiveundertheapplicabletableor,wherethecourthasdeterminedthatthetableamountisinappropriate,theamountthatthecourthasotherwisedeterminedisappropriate,(ii)thenatureandnumberoftheeducationalprogramsandextracurricularactivities,(iii)anyspecialneedsandtalentsofthechildorchildren,(iv)theoverallcostoftheprogramsandactivities,and(v)anyothersimilarfactorthatthecourtconsidersrelevant.

(2)Theguidingprincipleindeterminingtheamountofanexpensereferredtoinsubsection(1)isthattheexpenseissharedbythespousesinproportiontotheirrespectiveincomesafterdeductingfromtheexpense,thecontribution,ifany,fromthechild.(3)Subjecttosubsection(4),indeterminingtheamountofanexpensereferredtoinsubsection(1),thecourtmusttakeintoaccountanysubsidies,benefitsorincometaxdeductionsorcreditsrelatingtotheexpense,andanyeligibilitytoclaimasubsidy,benefitorincometaxdeductionorcreditrelatingtotheexpense.(4)Indeterminingtheamountofanexpensereferredtoinsubsection(1),thecourtshallnottakeintoaccountanyuniversalchildcarebenefitoranyeligibilitytoclaimthatbenefit.

Analysis:CSGs.7recognizesthatneedsoffamiliesvaryandterm“extraordinaryexpense”mustbe

9

understoodincontextofmeansandcircumstancesofparticularfamilybeforethecourt.AndriesvAndries(1998),159DLR(4th)665(MBCA)CorreiavCorreia,2002MBQB172HolemanvHoleman,2006MBQB278

Categoriesofexpenseins.7(1)areexhaustive.Onusliesonapplicanttodemonstratethatclaimedexpensesfallwithincategory.Applicantmustalsoprovidesomeevidenceofcostofexpense,includingestimateofcost.

GrahamvGraham,2008MBQB25FergusonvThorne,2007NBQB66

Applicantmustalsoshowexpenseisnecessaryandreasonable.Necessitydoesn’tmeannecessariesforlifebutexpenseappropriatetocircumstancesofchild.Courtsaresplitonnecessityofprivateschoolfees,withsomerequiringproofthatschoolisinbestinterestsofchild.Reasonablenessisoftenrootofdispute.Determiningreasonablenessrequiresexaminationofmeansofpartiesnotjustincomes;meansisinterpretedbroadlyandincludesparties’spendingpatternspriortoseparation.

HiemstravHiemstra,2005ABQB192LeskunvLeskun,2006SCC25

Decisiontorequirecontributiontoexpenseisalwaysdiscretionary.Wherecourtdeterminesamountshouldbeawardedinrespectofexpenses,contributionusuallybutnotalwaysinproportiontoparties’incomes,dependingoncircumstancesofcase.Requirementofs.7(2)toshareinproportiontoincomesisguidingprinciplenotrule.

E.K.R.vG.A.W.(1997),122ManR(2d)120(MBQB)StaplesvCallender,2010NSCA49

Lackofconsultationonincurrenceofexpensedoesnotprecludeapplicationtoapportioncostofexpense,butisfactorcourtmayconsiderinexercisingdiscretion. PepinvJung,[1997]OJNo.4606(OGD)Application:Chambersjudgecorrectlyheldthatprivateschoolfeesareonlytreatedasspecialexpenseafterconsiderationofchild’sneedsandcircumstancesbuterringinfailingtoconsiderparties’spendingpatternspriortoseparation.PerD.B.S.,12childsupportistherightofthechild,thatrightsurvivesseparationandchildrenareentitledasmuchaspossibletoastandardoflivingafterseparationasthatenjoyedbeforeseparation.Ifafamilyconsidersanexpensereasonableandnecessarybeforeseparation,expensecontinuestobereasonableandnecessaryabsentachangeaffectingcircumstancesofchildormeansofparties.

12Supra,atpara.38.

10

Onusonvariationapplicationliesonpartyseekingchange.Chambersjudgeerringinputtingburdenofproofonrecipienttoestablishthatprivateschoolfeesarequalifyingspecialexpense.Originalorderonspecialexpensespresumedtobecorrect;chambersjudgetreatingasoriginalapplicationforspecialexpenses.Appealallowedastopaymentofprivateschoolfeesasspecialexpense.HandyQuotes:Qualificationofexpensesasspecialiscasespecific“[26]Expensesareextraordinaryiftheyexceedanamountthattherequestingspousecanreasonablycover,takingintoaccounttheincomeoftherequestingspouseandanychildsupportreceived.Thus,theterm‘extraordinaryexpense’mustbeunderstoodwithintheparticularfamily’smeansandcircumstances.Iftheexpensesdonotexceedanamounttherequestingspousecanreasonablycover,thenthecourtwillconsiderthefactorslistedins.7(1.1)(b)todeterminewhethertheexpensescanstillbeclassifiedasextraordinaryinthecircumstances.”

•Testtoqualifyexpenseasextraordinary“[33] Whatmustberememberedisthattheclassificationoftheexpensesasextraordinaryisonlythefirststepindeterminingtheissueofwhethertoorderthesharingoftheexpenses.Eveniftheexpensesareclassifiedasextraordinaryandtheycomewithinoneofthecategorieslistedinthesection,thecourtmuststillbesatisfiedthattheexpensesarereasonableandnecessarybeforeorderingthesharingoftheexpenses.“[34] Indeterminingwhetherthetwo-parttestofnecessityandreasonablenessoutlinedins.7(1)hasbeensatisfied,thecourtistotakethefollowingfactorsintoaccount:

1. thenecessityoftheexpenseinrelationtothechild’sbestinterests;and2. thereasonablenessoftheexpenseinrelationto

a. themeansofthespousesandthoseofthechild;andb. thefamily’sspendingpatternpriortotheseparation.

“[35]Courtshavegenerallyconsideredthatthetestofnecessitydoesnotconnoteonlythenecessitiesoflife,but,rather,mayincludethingsthatare‘suitabletoorproperforhisstationinlifebearinginmindhisrequirementsatthetime’.…”

•Estimatesofcostofexpensemaybeused“[29] Whentheactualamountof[aproposedextraordinary]expenseisdifficulttoascertain,theexpensesmaybeestimated;however,theremustbesomeevidencetosupporttheestimationofthe

11

expenses,otherwisethecourtcannotdeterminewhethertherequestingspouseisabletoreasonablycoveratotallyunknownexpense.“

•Deferencetodiscretionoftrialjudgeonreviewnotunlimited“[48] …Ajudgedoesnothaveanunfettereddiscretiontosimplydecidethecaseonthefactsandhisorherindividualconsiderationofwhatajustoutcomeshouldbe.Thejudge,inexercisinghisorherdiscretion,mustapplytheapplicableprinciplesoflawsetoutinthestatuteandapplythoseprinciplestothefactsinamannerconsistentwiththepurposeofthestatute.…”D.FraservFraser

2013ONCA71513CalculationandImputationofIncome:CSGss.3,19

Facts:Separation2002.Interimchildsupportorder2003.Consentfinalorder2007.Payoremployedaspsychiatristduringmarriagebutlosinglicencepriortofinalorderasaresultofmentalhealthissues.Orderterminatingpayor’schildsupportobligationbutrequiringpayortodeposit$200,000fromsaleoffamilyhomeintrust,tobereturneduponhimmeetingfuturechildsupportobligationbetween2007and2010,andestablishingreviewmechanism.Between2008and2012,payorreceivingfundsfromsourcesincludingcapital,interest,socialassistance,CPPdisability,aninsurancesettlementandRRSPsof$800,000.Payorapplyingforreturnof$200,000.Chambersjudgefindingpayorsubsistingbydrawing$80,000eachyearfromcapital.Judgenotsatisfiedthatpayorunabletoworkand,givenhistoryofnon-payment,orderinglumpsumchildsupportof$281,500,forpayor’spastandfuturechildsupportobligations,basedonpayor’sabilitytoearnuntaxedincomeof$80,000,grossedupto$118,000forsupportpurposes.Payorappealingonbasisthatchambersjudgeerredinconflatingcapitalwithincomeandimputingincomewhenunabletowork.Appealraisingfurtherquestionsaboutdeterminationofpayor’sincomeandretroactiveandfuturesupportobligations.Guidelines:3. (1)UnlessotherwiseprovidedundertheseGuidelines,theamountofachildsupportorderfor

childrenundertheageofmajorityis(a)theamountsetoutintheapplicabletable,accordingtothenumberofchildrenundertheageofmajoritytowhomtheorderrelatesandtheincomeofthespouseagainstwhomthe

13Availableathttp://canlii.ca/t/g1zk0.Cited10timesasof10February2016.

12

orderissought;and(b)theamount,ifany,determinedundersection7.

(2)UnlessotherwiseprovidedundertheseGuidelines,whereachildtowhomachildsupportorderrelatesistheageofmajorityorover,theamountofthechildsupportorderis

(a)theamountdeterminedbyapplyingtheseGuidelinesasifthechildwereundertheageofmajority;or(b)ifthecourtconsidersthatapproachtobeinappropriate,theamountthatitconsidersappropriate,havingregardtothecondition,means,needsandothercircumstancesofthechildandthefinancialabilityofeachspousetocontributetothesupportofthechild.

(3)Theapplicabletableis(a)ifthespouseagainstwhomanorderissoughtresidesinCanada,

(i)thetablefortheprovinceinwhichthatspouseordinarilyresidesatthetimetheapplicationforthechildsupportorder,orforavariationorderinrespectofachildsupportorder,ismadeortheamountistoberecalculatedundersection25.1oftheAct,(ii)wherethecourtissatisfiedthattheprovinceinwhichthatspouseordinarilyresideshaschangedsincethetimedescribedinsubparagraph(i),thetablefortheprovinceinwhichthespouseordinarilyresidesatthetimeofdeterminingtheamountofsupport,or(iii)wherethecourtissatisfiedthat,inthenearfutureafterdeterminationoftheamountofsupport,thatspousewillordinarilyresideinagivenprovinceotherthantheprovinceinwhichthespouseordinarilyresidesatthetimeofthatdetermination,thetableforthegivenprovince;and

(b)ifthespouseagainstwhomanorderissoughtresidesoutsideofCanada,oriftheresidenceofthatspouseisunknown,thetablefortheprovincewheretheotherspouseordinarilyresidesatthetimetheapplicationforthechildsupportorderorforavariationorderinrespectofachildsupportorderismadeortheamountistoberecalculatedundersection25.1oftheAct.

19. (1)Thecourtmayimputesuchamountofincometoaspouseasitconsidersappropriateinthe

circumstances,whichcircumstancesincludethefollowing:(a)thespouseisintentionallyunder-employedorunemployed,otherthanwheretheunder-employmentorunemploymentisrequiredbytheneedsofachildofthemarriageoranychildundertheageofmajorityorbythereasonableeducationalorhealthneedsofthespouse;(b)thespouseisexemptfrompayingfederalorprovincialincometax;(c)thespouselivesinacountrythathaseffectiveratesofincometaxthataresignificantlylowerthanthoseinCanada;(d)itappearsthatincomehasbeendivertedwhichwouldaffectthelevelofchildsupporttobedeterminedundertheseGuidelines;(e)thespouse’spropertyisnotreasonablyutilizedtogenerateincome;(f)thespousehasfailedtoprovideincomeinformationwhenunderalegalobligationtodoso;(g)thespouseunreasonablydeductsexpensesfromincome;(h)thespousederivesasignificantportionofincomefromdividends,capitalgainsorothersourcesthataretaxedatalowerratethanemploymentorbusinessincomeorthatareexemptfromtax;and(i)thespouseisabeneficiaryunderatrustandisorwillbeinreceiptofincomeorotherbenefitsfromthetrust.

(2)Forthepurposeofparagraph(1)(g),thereasonablenessofanexpensedeductionisnotsolelygovernedbywhetherthedeductionispermittedundertheIncomeTaxAct.

13

Analysis:CSGs.3establishesbasicrulethatchildsupportdeterminedaccordingtopayor’sincome.CSGs.15providesthatincomeisdeterminedinaccordancewithss.16to20.IncomepresumptivelydeterminedbyreferencetoT1Line150underCSGs.16,howeverCSGs.19allowscourttoimputeincomeincircumstanceslistedats-s.(1).Whenincomeisimputedarationalbasismustexistfortheamountthatisdetermined.

DrygalavPauli(2002),61OR(3d)711(OCA)KowalewichvKowalewich,2001BCCA450

RRSPincomeisreportedatLine150andisthereforeincludedinpayor’sincomeforchildsupport,eventhoughtheincomeoriginatesfromcapitalandeventhoughtheRRSPaccountmayhavebeenpreviouslydividedbetweenthepartiesasfamilyproperty. StevensvBoulerice(1999),49RFL(4th)425(OSC)Courtmaytreataportionofinsurancesettlementasincome,evenwheresettlementfailstodistinguishbetweenamountsawardedforlostwagesandamountsawardedforpainandsuffering.Partyreceivingsettlementbearsonusofestablishingamountsallocatedtopainandsuffering.Courtshouldnot,however,makearbitrarydecisionallocatingsettlementproceeds.

NeufeldvNeufeld,2001BCSC1197ZoldyvZoldy,2007ONCJ24

CSGs.19(1)(e)allowscourttoimputeincometopartynotreasonablyusingownpropertytogenerateincome.

SedlmairvSedlmair(1999),3RFL(5th)294(BCSC)Application:Noevidencesupportingconclusionsofchambersjudgethatpayorabletoreturntoworkandgenerateabefore-taxincome$80,000,howeverpayor’sincomeforsupportpurposesnotnil.RRSPincomeisincomeforchildsupport.Unreasonableforpayornottohaveinvested$800,000receivedbetween2007and2010inlightofhischildsupportobligationandinabilitytofindworkmatchingincomereceivedaspsychiatrist.Payorshouldhaveatleastinvestedinsurancesettlementandsaleproceedsfromdisposalofpersonalpropertytotaling$611,000.Interestincomethereforeimputedatanannualrateof3%.Courtrecalculatingpayor’sincomeasincluding:interestincomeon$200,000heldintrust;RRSPincome;CPPdisability;imputedinterestincomefromcapital;and,imputedinterestincomefrominsurancesettlement.Payor’sincomein2013fixedat$31,000;arrearsfixedat$54,000.Arrearstobepaidfromfundsheldintrust,payorprospectivechildsupportbasedonincomeof$31,000.

14

HandyQuotes:RRSPincomecanbeincludedinincomeforsupportdespiteitspreviousequalization“[103]…TheclearwordingoftheGuidelinesincludesRRSPwithdrawalsasincomeandnospecialexceptionforRRSPwithdrawalshasbeenprovidedinScheduleIII.AlthoughIwouldacknowledgethepossibilitythatthefactsofaparticularequalization[betweenspouses]couldintheoryreachthethresholdofunfairness,Ihavenoevidenceaboutthespecificsoftheequalizationcalculationthatoccurredinthiscaseandcannotsoconclude.”

•Obligationtoinvestpropertytogeneratingincome“[117] Section19(1)(e)oftheGuidelinespermitsacourttoimputeincometoaspousewherethespouse’spropertyisnotreasonablyutilizedtogenerateincome.AsIhavesaid,inthiscase,thefatherreceivedmonies,consistingofbothcapitalandincome,inexcessof$800,000duringtheperiodbetweenSeptember1,2007andSeptember1,2010.Havingregardtothefather’sobligationstosupporthischildrenandhisinabilitytocontinuetoworkatemploymentthatwouldgenerateasignificantincomewhenhehaddonesointhepast,Iconsideritunreasonablethathewouldnothaveinvestedsomesignificantportionofthosereceiptstogenerateincomethatcouldbeusedinparttohelpsupporthischildren.”

E.GoettvGoett

2013ABCA21614ImputationofIncome:CSGss.18,19

Facts:Payoremployedbyowncompany,numberedAlbertacorporation.Separation2007.Trial2010.Payorsubsequentlytransferringinterestinnumberedcorporationtonewpartnerassoleshareholder.Payor’sincomedecliningfrom$200,000in2007to$80,000in2010.Trialorderforongoingchildsupportplusthreeyears’retroactivesupport,arrearsfixedat$91,000.Numberedcorporationorderedtokeeprecipientapprisedastopayor’sincomeandmadesubjecttogarnishmentineventarrearsaccumulate.Aftertrial,businessofnumberedcorporationtransferredtonewcompany.Payorsubsequentlyapplyingtodecreasechildsupport;recipientapplyingtoincrease.Payorclaimingcontinuingdeclineinincomewhilenewcompany’sretainedearningsincreasingandnewpartner’ssalaryincreasing.Evidenceestablishingthatpayorremainingcontrollingmindandownerofnewcompany.Chambersjudgefinding:noevidencetosupportpayor’sclaimthatbusinessslowing;nojustificationforincreaseinnewpartner’ssalary;payordivertingincome;

14Availableathttp://canlii.ca/t/fz66d.Cited14timesasof10February2016.

15

and,newcompanyusedtoavoideffectoftrialorderagainstnumberedcorporation.Orderimputingincometopayorof$80,000underCSGs.19(1)(d)andextendingdisclosureordertonewcompany.Newcompanynotsubjecttogarnishment.RecipientappealingchambersdecisionongroundsincludingthatincomeshouldalsohavebeenimputedtopayorunderCSGs.18.Guidelines:18. (1)Whereaspouseisashareholder,directororofficerofacorporationandthecourtisofthe

opinionthattheamountofthespouse’sannualincomeasdeterminedundersection16doesnotfairlyreflectallthemoneyavailabletothespouseforthepaymentofchildsupport,thecourtmayconsiderthesituationsdescribedinsection17anddeterminethespouse’sannualincometoinclude

(a)allorpartofthepre-taxincomeofthecorporation,andofanycorporationthatisrelatedtothatcorporation,forthemostrecenttaxationyear;or(b)anamountcommensuratewiththeservicesthatthespouseprovidestothecorporation,providedthattheamountdoesnotexceedthecorporation’spre-taxincome.

(2)Indeterminingthepre-taxincomeofacorporationforthepurposesofsubsection(1),allamountspaidbythecorporationassalaries,wagesormanagementfees,orotherpaymentsorbenefits,tooronbehalfofpersonswithwhomthecorporationdoesnotdealatarm’slengthmustbeaddedtothepre-taxincome,unlessthespouseestablishesthatthepaymentswerereasonableinthecircumstances.

19. (1)Thecourtmayimputesuchamountofincometoaspouseasitconsidersappropriateinthecircumstances,whichcircumstancesincludethefollowing:

(a)thespouseisintentionallyunder-employedorunemployed,otherthanwheretheunder-employmentorunemploymentisrequiredbytheneedsofachildofthemarriageoranychildundertheageofmajorityorbythereasonableeducationalorhealthneedsofthespouse;(b)thespouseisexemptfrompayingfederalorprovincialincometax;(c)thespouselivesinacountrythathaseffectiveratesofincometaxthataresignificantlylowerthanthoseinCanada;(d)itappearsthatincomehasbeendivertedwhichwouldaffectthelevelofchildsupporttobedeterminedundertheseGuidelines;(e)thespouse’spropertyisnotreasonablyutilizedtogenerateincome;(f)thespousehasfailedtoprovideincomeinformationwhenunderalegalobligationtodoso;(g)thespouseunreasonablydeductsexpensesfromincome;(h)thespousederivesasignificantportionofincomefromdividends,capitalgainsorothersourcesthataretaxedatalowerratethanemploymentorbusinessincomeorthatareexemptfromtax;and(i)thespouseisabeneficiaryunderatrustandisorwillbeinreceiptofincomeorotherbenefitsfromthetrust.

(2)Forthepurposeofparagraph(1)(g),thereasonablenessofanexpensedeductionisnotsolelygovernedbywhetherthedeductionispermittedundertheIncomeTaxAct.

16

Analysis:GuidelinesrecognizethatfairestdeterminationofincomemaynotbeasdeterminedbyreferencetoT1Line150asrequiredbyCSGs.16.CSGs.18isavailablewherecourtisoftheviewthats.16approachwouldnotreflectallofthemoneyavailabletothepartyforthepaymentofchildsupport. HilliarvStasiuk,2002SKQB377Unders.18(1),courtmayconsiderpre-taxincomeofcompanytodetermineparty’sincomeforsupportpurposeswherepartyisshareholder,directororofficerofcompany,usuallynetincomereportedinincomestatementofcompany’sfinancialstatement.Unders.18(2),tonetincomemustbeaddedpaymentsandbenefitsgiventonon-arm’s-lengthperson,withonusonpartytoestablishthatpaymentsarereasonableiftheyaretobeexcluded.

NesbittvNesbitt,2001MBCA113KowalewichvKowalewich,2001BCCA450

Whereownershipofcompanyhasbeentransferredforpurposesofavoidingchildsupportobligationandcompanyandpartyarenotdealingatarm’slength,pre-taxincomeoftransferredcompanymaybeconsideredindeterminingparty’sincometoavoidunfairnessthatwouldresultfromuseofcorporatestructuretodivertormanipulateincometoavoidpaymentofappropriateamountofchildsupport.Decisiontoconsiderincomeoftransferredcompanyisdiscretionaryastransfermayhaveoccurredforlegitimatebusinesspurposes.

BaumvBaum(1999),182DLR(4th)715(BCSC)KowalewichvKowalewich,2001BCCA450

CSGs.19providesgeneralauthorityforcourttoimputeincomewhereincomestatedatLine150doesnotrepresentincomeavailabletoparty.CSGs.18providesonemethodofdeterminingappropriateincomeforpurposesofchildsupport.

PatrickvTaylor,2013ONSC2971DicksonvDickson,2009MBQB274

Onustoestablishimputingincomeappropriateliesonpartymakingclaim.Onceestablishedthatimputationisappropriate,onusshiftstootherpartytoprovethataccumulationofretainedearningsorincurringofexpensesisreasonablegivennatureofbusiness.

JohnsonvO’Neil,2014ONSC7272CrowevMcIntyre,2014ONSC7106

Application:Trialjudgefindingpayorremainingcontrollingmindofnewcompanyandnolegitimatebusinesspurposebehindtransferofnumberedcorporation,butbalkedatapplyingCSGs.18aspayornotshareholder,directororofficerofnewcompanyalthoughapplieds.19(1)(d)infindingpayordivertingincome.

17

Asevidenceestablishingpayorremaining“defactoshareholder”ofnewcompanyandnoevidencethatconsideringpre-taxincomeofnewcompanywouldbeunfair,nobasisfordecliningtouseincomedeterminationmethodologyprovidedins.18andtrialjudgeerringaccordingly.Judgealsoerringinplacingonusonrecipienttoestablishinappropriatenessofnewcompany’sexpensesandinfailingtoextendgarnishmentordertonewcompany.Courtorderingpaymentofchildsupportonincomeof$150,000,basedonnewcompany’spre-taxincomeof$35,500,personalusebusinessexpensesof$8,000andwagesof$118,500paidtopayorandnewpartner.HandyQuotes:Piercingthecorporateveil“[12]Putsimply,whereapayoroperatesthroughacorporation,theguidelinesexpresslyprovidethatthecorporateveilcanbepiercedifthecourtissatisfiedthattheincomeasdeterminedunders16doesnotfairlyrepresenttheamountavailabletopaychildsupport.…“[13]Whenthecorporateveilisliftedinacommercialcontext,certainfactorsareconsidered:forexample,whethertheindividualexercisescompletecontroloffinances,policy,andbusinesspracticesofthecompany,whetherthecontrolhasbeenusedbytheindividualtocommitafraudorwrongthatwouldunjustlydepriveaclaimantofhisorherrights,andwhetherthemisconduct(forexamplethetransfer)isthereasonfortheloss.Thesefactorsarealsorelevant,althoughnotappliedasstringently,inthefamilycontext.…“[20]…Whereapayorhastransferredsharestoanon-armslengthpartytoavoidthepaymentofchildsupport,apurposiveinterpretationoftheguidelinesandthediscretionaffordedunderthem,particularlys19,permitsas18analysistobeundertakenbypiercingthecorporateveil.Tointerprettheguidelinesotherwiseistoallowthepayortoavoidhisorherobligationsbyemployingacorporatestructure,potentiallycreatingfraudulentconveyances,anddeprivethechildrenofthesupporttowhichtheyarereasonablyentitled.”

•Balancinginterestsofchildandactualneedsofcompany“[16]Abodyofjurisprudencehasdevelopedunders18inanefforttoaddressthefundamentalunfairnessthatarisesifaparentcandivert,manipulateorshelterincomethroughtheuseofacorporatestructuretoavoidthepaymentofadequatechildsupport.Atthesametime,inanefforttobalancelegitimatebusinessexpensesandcapitalrequirements,criteria[have]developedtoinformtheexerciseofjudicialdiscretion.Thesecriteriaincludetherolethepayorplaysinthecorporation,whetherheorsheisthesoleshareholder,thedegreeofcontrolthepayorexercises,theevidenceastotheavailabilityofretainedearningstopaychildsupport,andwhetherthoseearningsarerequiredtomanagethebusinessandensureitsongoingfinancialviability.”

•

18

CSGss.18and19workintandem“[18]...Section19oftheguidelinesaffordsthecourtadiscretiontoimputeincomeincircumstanceswherethecourtisoftheviewthattheincomeasstatedinthetaxreturnsdoesnottrulyrepresenttheincomeavailabletopaychildsupport.Section18isonemethodthatassiststhecourtindeterminingwhatisappropriateincomeforthepurposeofchildsupport.Thesectionsareinextricablylinked,designedtoworkintandem,andarenotmutuallyexclusivemeansofascertainingthatincome.”F.GouldvGould

2013SKCA3415IncomeinExcessof$150,000:CSGs.4

Facts:Separation2006.Payorremittingchildsupportof$4,000permonthpriortotrialin2011.Trialjudgefixingpayor’sincomeat$802,000,averageofincomeoverpreviousthreeyears.Trialjudgealsofindingthattableamountof$13,000“inappropriate”underCSGs.4,relyingontherecipient’sfinancialstatement,orderingchildsupportof$7,000permonthforparties’threechildren.Recipientappealingonbasesincludingthattableamount$13,000notinappropriate.Recipientalsoarguingthattrialjudgeshouldnothavereliedonherfinancialstatementindeterminingchildren’sneedsasstatementreflectedexpensesattimeoftrialbasedonpreviouschildsupportpaymentsof$4,000.Guidelines:4. Wheretheincomeofthespouseagainstwhomachildsupportorderissoughtisover$150,000,the

amountofachildsupportorderis(a)theamountdeterminedundersection3;or(b)ifthecourtconsidersthatamounttobeinappropriate,

(i)inrespectofthefirst$150,000ofthespouse’sincome,theamountsetoutintheapplicabletableforthenumberofchildrenundertheageofmajoritytowhomtheorderrelates;(ii)inrespectofthebalanceofthespouse’sincome,theamountthatthecourtconsidersappropriate,havingregardtothecondition,means,needsandothercircumstancesofthechildrenwhoareentitledtosupportandthefinancialabilityofeachspousetocontributetothesupportofthechildren;and(iii)theamount,ifany,determinedundersection7.

15Availableathttp://canlii.ca/t/fwxg3.Cited10timesasof10February2016.

19

Analysis:Courtmusthavereasontodepartfromthetableamountofchildsupport.Circumstancesjustifyingdeparturefromtableamountwillvaryfromcasetocase,howeverfactorslistedinCSGs.4(b)(ii)asrelevanttodeterminingappropriatenessalsorelevanttoinitialdeterminationofinappropriatenessandcourtmustconsiderallofthesefactors.

FrancisvBaker,[1999]3SCR250Tablespresumptivelyapplywherepayorshaveincomesinexcessof$150,000,partyseekingtodeviatefromtablebearsonusofrebuttingpresumption.“Inappropriate”meansunsuitable,evidencemustbesufficienttoraiseaconcernthattableamountinappropriate.Oncepresumptionrebutted,courtmayincreaseordecreasesupportorderfromtableamount. EwingvEwing,2009ABCA227Oncepresumptionrebutted,courtmustconsiderchildren’scondition,means,needsandothercircumstancestodeterminetheappropriateamountofsupport.Recipient’sfailuretoadduceevidenceonthesepointsmayresultinlowersupportorder.

EwingvEwing,2009ABCA227TaubervTauber(2000),48OR(3d)577(OCA)D.B.S.vS.R.G.,2006SCC37

ActualcircumstancesofchildrenarecriticaltoCSGs.4analysis;courtmayrelyoncurrentstatementofchildren’sexpenses.Childexpensebudgets,althoughdesirable,arenotmandatory.Necessityofbudgetatdiscretionofjudge.

FrancisvBaker,[1999]3SCR250Application:Purposeoffinancialstatementistogivecourtinformationuponwhichitmayact.UtilityofstatementinCSGs.4analysisdependsonhowrecent,completeanddetaileditis.Recipientreliedonfinancialstatementtodemonstratecurrentandfutureexpenses,financialstatementwasnotonlyevidencereliedonbytrialjudgeins.4analysis.Trialjudgeerringneitherinrelyingonfinancialstatementnorinfailingtoorderrecipienttoproducechildexpensebudget.Onusliesonpayortoshowtableamountinappropriate.Onceissueisraised,courtmustconsiderevidenceofinappropriatenessinitsentirety.Judgeconsideredexpensesofchildren,extractedfromrecipient’sfinancialstatement,recipient’sincome,payor’sincome,standardoflivingprovidedtochildrenatpayor’shome,andthattableamounttwiceasmuchaschildren’scurrentandfutureexpenses.Judge’sdecisiondiscretionaryandsupportable;appealdismissed.

20

HandyQuotes:Roleoffinancialstatementins.4analysis“[22]…thewholepurposeof[afinancialstatement]istoprovideevidenceuponwhichthecourtmayactifitisappropriate.Whetheritwillhavemuchorlittleweightinas.4analysisandhowusefulitwillbeinthecontextofallthes.4factorsdependsonhowcurrent,howcompleteandhowdetaileditis.“[23]Eveniftheformisnotaprospective‘budget’inthesenseofdisclosingfutureneedsofthechildren,itmayneverthelessprovidesomeevidenceoftheneedsofthechildren.…”

•Childexpensebudgetsnotmandatory“[29]Thetrialjudgeislikewisenotobligatedtoorder[aparty]toprovidea[childexpense]budget;whethertodosoisinherdiscretion.Itisapparentthatthelackofadiscretebudgetdidnothinderthetrialjudge.Shewasabletoextracttheexpensesreferabletothechildrenfromwhatshehadbeforeher.”G.GouldingvKeck

2014ABCA13816RetroactiveSupport:DAs.15.1SupportandSpecialExpensesforAdultChild:CSGss.3,7

Facts:Briefunmarriedrelationshipin1994resultinginchildbornin1995.Agreementrequiringpaymentofchildsupport,disclosureandannualreviewreached2000.Neitherpartyprovidingdisclosure.Payor’sincomesubsequentlyincreasing,payornotadvisingrecipient.Recipientapplyingforchildsupportorder,withretroactiveeffect,plusspecialexpensesforchild’suniversitycostsin2013.Payorrefusingtoprovidedisclosurepriorto2009.Chambersjudgedismissingretroactiveclaimonbasesthatpayor’sfailuretodiscloseincreaseinincomenotblameworthyandnoevidencethatchild’sneedwassignificantduringperiodwhensupportclaimed.Childsupportorderedatlessthantableamountforeightmonthsperyearwhenchildinschool.Payor’scontributionof$22,500heldtosatisfyhisobligationtocontributetouniversitycosts.Recipientappealingongroundthatretroactiveapplicationshouldnothavebeendismissedandthatchildsupportshouldnothavebeenorderedinlessthantableamount,seekingretroactivesupportfrom2009to2012.

16Availableathttp://canlii.ca/t/g6n43.Cited13timesasof14February2016.

21

Guidelines:3. (1)UnlessotherwiseprovidedundertheseGuidelines,theamountofachildsupportorderfor

childrenundertheageofmajorityis(a)theamountsetoutintheapplicabletable,accordingtothenumberofchildrenundertheageofmajoritytowhomtheorderrelatesandtheincomeofthespouseagainstwhomtheorderissought;and(b)theamount,ifany,determinedundersection7.

(2)UnlessotherwiseprovidedundertheseGuidelines,whereachildtowhomachildsupportorderrelatesistheageofmajorityorover,theamountofthechildsupportorderis

(a)theamountdeterminedbyapplyingtheseGuidelinesasifthechildwereundertheageofmajority;or(b)ifthecourtconsidersthatapproachtobeinappropriate,theamountthatitconsidersappropriate,havingregardtothecondition,means,needsandothercircumstancesofthechildandthefinancialabilityofeachspousetocontributetothesupportofthechild.

(3)Theapplicabletableis(a)ifthespouseagainstwhomanorderissoughtresidesinCanada,

(i)thetablefortheprovinceinwhichthatspouseordinarilyresidesatthetimetheapplicationforthechildsupportorder,orforavariationorderinrespectofachildsupportorder,ismadeortheamountistoberecalculatedundersection25.1oftheAct,(ii)wherethecourtissatisfiedthattheprovinceinwhichthatspouseordinarilyresideshaschangedsincethetimedescribedinsubparagraph(i),thetablefortheprovinceinwhichthespouseordinarilyresidesatthetimeofdeterminingtheamountofsupport,or(iii)wherethecourtissatisfiedthat,inthenearfutureafterdeterminationoftheamountofsupport,thatspousewillordinarilyresideinagivenprovinceotherthantheprovinceinwhichthespouseordinarilyresidesatthetimeofthatdetermination,thetableforthegivenprovince;and

(b)ifthespouseagainstwhomanorderissoughtresidesoutsideofCanada,oriftheresidenceofthatspouseisunknown,thetablefortheprovincewheretheotherspouseordinarilyresidesatthetimetheapplicationforthechildsupportorderorforavariationorderinrespectofachildsupportorderismadeortheamountistoberecalculatedundersection25.1oftheAct.

7. (1)Inachildsupportorderthecourtmay,oneitherspouse’srequest,provideforanamountto

coveralloranyportionofthefollowingexpenses,whichexpensesmaybeestimated,takingintoaccountthenecessityoftheexpenseinrelationtothechild’sbestinterestsandthereasonablenessoftheexpenseinrelationtothemeansofthespousesandthoseofthechildandtothefamily’sspendingpatternpriortotheseparation:

(a)childcareexpensesincurredasaresultofthecustodialparent’semployment,illness,disabilityoreducationortrainingforemployment;(b)thatportionofthemedicalanddentalinsurancepremiumsattributabletothechild;(c)health-relatedexpensesthatexceedinsurancereimbursementbyatleast$100annually,includingorthodontictreatment,professionalcounsellingprovidedbyapsychologist,socialworker,psychiatristoranyotherperson,physiotherapy,occupationaltherapy,speechtherapyandprescriptiondrugs,hearingaids,glassesandcontactlenses;(d)extraordinaryexpensesforprimaryorsecondaryschooleducationorforanyothereducationalprogramsthatmeetthechild’sparticularneeds;(e)expensesforpost-secondaryeducation;and

22

(f)extraordinaryexpensesforextracurricularactivities.(1.1)Forthepurposesofparagraphs(1)(d)and(f),theterm“extraordinaryexpenses”means

(a)expensesthatexceedthosethatthespouserequestinganamountfortheextraordinaryexpensescanreasonablycover,takingintoaccountthatspouse’sincomeandtheamountthatthespousewouldreceiveundertheapplicabletableor,wherethecourthasdeterminedthatthetableamountisinappropriate,theamountthatthecourthasotherwisedeterminedisappropriate;or(b)whereparagraph(a)isnotapplicable,expensesthatthecourtconsidersareextraordinarytakingintoaccount

(i)theamountoftheexpenseinrelationtotheincomeofthespouserequestingtheamount,includingtheamountthatthespousewouldreceiveundertheapplicabletableor,wherethecourthasdeterminedthatthetableamountisinappropriate,theamountthatthecourthasotherwisedeterminedisappropriate,(ii)thenatureandnumberoftheeducationalprogramsandextracurricularactivities,(iii)anyspecialneedsandtalentsofthechildorchildren,(iv)theoverallcostoftheprogramsandactivities,and(v)anyothersimilarfactorthatthecourtconsidersrelevant.

(2)Theguidingprincipleindeterminingtheamountofanexpensereferredtoinsubsection(1)isthattheexpenseissharedbythespousesinproportiontotheirrespectiveincomesafterdeductingfromtheexpense,thecontribution,ifany,fromthechild.(3)Subjecttosubsection(4),indeterminingtheamountofanexpensereferredtoinsubsection(1),thecourtmusttakeintoaccountanysubsidies,benefitsorincometaxdeductionsorcreditsrelatingtotheexpense,andanyeligibilitytoclaimasubsidy,benefitorincometaxdeductionorcreditrelatingtotheexpense.(4)Indeterminingtheamountofanexpensereferredtoinsubsection(1),thecourtshallnottakeintoaccountanyuniversalchildcarebenefitoranyeligibilitytoclaimthatbenefit.

Analysis:Parentsareencouragedtosettlefamilylawdisputes,maymakeagreementsonchildsupport.Suchagreementsaresubjecttocourt’scontinuingjurisdictiontoensurechildren’sbestinterestsaremetandadequatesupportispaid.However,ifagreementnotunconscionableandparties’intentionsandexpectationsadequatelycomplywiththelaw,courtmustrespecttheirsettlement.

DoevAlberta,2007ABCA50L.L.vG.B.,2008ABQB356

Partiestoagreementunderstrictliabilitytocomplywithagreement.Wherefailuretocomplyredoundstodetrimentofchild,courtmustenforcethoseobligationsinabsenceofunfairness.

L.L.vG.B.,2008ABQB356KobackvKoback,2013SKCA91

Parentshavefree-standingdutytosupportchildreninamountcommensuratewithincome.Wherepayorhasnotincreasedsupportasaresultofincreasedincome,courtmayorderretroactivesupport.Tobalancethepayor’sinterestinpredictabilitywithchild’sinterestin

23

properamountofsupport,courtwillconsiderexplanationfordelayinapplication,payor’sconduct,child’scircumstancesandhardshipresultingfromretroactiveaward.

D.B.S.vS.R.G.,2006SCC37Recipient’sdelaydoesnotfreepayorfromliability.

D.B.S.vS.R.G.,2006SCC37Failuretodiscloseincomegenerallyviewedasblameworthybehaviourmilitatinginfavourofretroactiveaward.Thepayor’sintentionsareusuallyirrelevant,thequestioniswhetherthepayor’sconducthadtheeffectofputtinghisorherinterestsaheadofthechild’srighttosupport.

GreenevGreene,2010BCCA595WitwickivSeifner,2013ABQB334YoungvSmith,2013ABQB521

Child’scircumstancesandneedstobemeasuredagainstthebenefitsandsupportschildwouldhavehadifsupportedbybothparents.Lossofbenefitsispresumedwherepayorfailedtopaytableamountoverlongperiodoftime.Courtmayconsiderwhetherchildbenefitedfromotherformofsupportbeyondthatwhichrecipientcouldprovidealone.Recipientisnotrequiredtoprove“significant”need.

BurchillvRoberts,2013BCCA39SwiderskivDusseault,2009BCCA461

Onusliesonpayortoestablishfactsfromwhichfindingofhardshipcouldbemade.Amereassertionofhardshipisinsufficient,noristherequirementtopaytheproperamountofsupportforapriorperiodoftime.

GreenevGreene,2010BCCA595Inabsenceoforderoragreementprovidingfordisclosure,generallimitofretroactiveorderisdateofnoticetopayor.

D.B.S.vS.R.G.,2006SCC37Application:Parties’agreementnotonlyfixedamountofchildsupportpayablebutimposedobligationsonpayortodiscloseincomeandpaysupportcommensuratewithhisincomeundertheGuidelines.Inacceptingobligations,payorcouldnotrelyonamountofsupportsetoutinagreement;payor’sobligationwasvariable.Payor’slackofillwillorbadfaithirrelevant.Recipient’sdelaynotunreasonableasshewasunawareofincreaseinpayor’sincomeandreliedonexpectationthatchangesinincomeaffectingquantumwouldbedisclosedpertheparties’agreement.

24

Payor’sbehaviourblameworthyasfailuretodiscloseincreasesinincomebreachedcontractualobligation.Blameworthyconductnot,inanyevent,requiredtomakeretroactiveorder.Child’sneedispresumedfrompayor’sprolongedfailuretoprovidesupportcommensuratewithincome.Further,childwouldbenefitnowfromretroactiveawardwhileattendinguniversity.Payorprovidingnoevidencefromwhichfindingofhardshipcouldbemade.Chambersjudgeerringinnotorderingretroactivesupport.Retroactivesupportorderedinamountof$21,500,applyingpayor’sactualincome.Appealcourtnotconsideringpotentialentitlementpriorto2009asreliefnotsoughtbyrecipient.ChambersjudgeerringinorderingchildsupportunderCSGs.3(2),asagreementmadeunderBClawandchildstillminorunderBClegislation.Prospectivesupportorderedintableamount.Chambersjudgealsoerringinlimitingpayor’sobligationtocontributetochild’sspecialexpensesandoverlookingobligationtoenforceparties’agreement.Payorfurtherobligedtocontributetoallofchild’sspecialexpensesunderCSGs.7,notjustuniversitycosts.HandyQuotes:Factorsforretroactivesupportorder“[21]Incaseswhereapayorhasnotincreasedsupporttomirrortheincreaseinhisorherincome,courtscanenforcethepayorparent’sobligationbyawardingretroactivechildsupportcorrespondingtothesupportthusowing.…TheSupremeCourtdeclinedtoimposeanautomaticlegalobligationonthepayortodiscloseanincreaseinhisorherincomethatmightotherwiserequireanincreaseinsupportpayments.Inthatcircumstance,thepayorhasacompellinginterestincertaintyandpredictabilityinreasonablyrelyingontheexistingcourtorder.Tobalancethepayor’spredictabilityinterestwiththechild’srighttosupport,D.B.S.shapedentitlementtoretroactivesupportbasedonfourfact-driven,relevant,butnon-exhaustivefactors:

1.whethertherewasareasonableexcuseforwhysupportwasnotsoughtearlier;2.theconductofthepayor,andwhetherthepayorengagedin‘blameworthyconduct’;3.thecircumstancesofthechild;and4.anyhardshipoccasionedbyaretroactiveaward.

“[22]Butonemustnotassumeotherrestrictions.D.B.S.doesnotsayanyofthesethings:

1.thatthetermsofanagreementcanbeoverlooked;2.thattheremustbe‘blameworthyconduct’toawardretroactivechildsupport;3.thattherecipientmustputforwardevidenceofsignificantfinancialneedbythechildbeforearetroactiveawardisgranted;nor4.thatthepayorcanavoidaretroactiveawardbyassertinghardshipwithoutevidenceofit.

“[23]Thechambersjudgeheldotherwiseoneachofthesepoints,andsoerredandmisunderstoodD.B.S.”

25

•Continuingobligationtocomplywithsupportagreement“[31]TherespondenturgesustoacknowledgethathedidnotknowinglyfailtoincreasesupportinaccordancewiththeAgreement;hesimply‘puttheAgreementinadrawerandforgotaboutit’.Assumingthatisso,thepointisirrelevant.Partieshaveadutytoknowwhattheyhaveagreedto.Therecanbenojustificationbasedontherespondent’signoranceoftheAgreement,theGuidelines,orhissupportobligationsingeneral.“[32]Thegeneralruleisthatliabilitytoperformcontractsisstrict.Negligenceorintenttodoharmisnotneeded.”

•Establishingblameworthyconduct“[45]Inthiscase,itisclearthattherespondent’sconductinnothonouringhiscontractualobligationprejudicedhisdaughter’srighttoreceivegreatersupport.Itwouldbenojustificationthathesimplyforgot.Hecouldnothavereasonablyassumedthathewasmeetinghissupportobligations.Indeed,theevidenceshowsthattherespondentwasawarethatheowedgreatersupporttohisdaughter,havingvoluntarilydecidedtoincreasehismonthlypaymentsto$900.00inDecember2012aftertheappellantaskedforacopyofhismostrecentpaystub.“[46]Therespondent’s[failuretodisclosehisincome],whetherintentionalornot,wasinbreachofhisobligationsundertheAgreementandwasblameworthy.Forgettingisnotadefenceinthelawofcontracts.Moreover,evenanhonestandblamelesserroronthepartofthepayordoesnotabsolvehimorherofresponsibilityforpayingthesupporttowhichthechildhasbeenentitled.”

•Establishingneed“[50]…Thechildisentitledtoastandardoflivingthatheorshewouldhaveenjoyedwhilehisorherparentsweretogether.…Withthiskeyprincipleinmind,D.B.S.saysthatthechild’scircumstancescouldbeconsideredasonefactorinthecourt’sexerciseofdiscretioninawardingretroactivesupport.“[51]Inconsideringthis,D.B.S.doesnotimposeanevidentiaryburdenontherecipientparenttoprove‘significantneed’onthepartofthechildinordertosucceedinanapplicationforretroactivesupport.Apayorparentcannotavoidaretroactiveawardbyarguingthat,despitehisorherpastdefault,therecipientparentwasabletosufficientlycareforthechildonhisorherown.“[52]The‘needs’ofthechildmustbeapproachedthroughamorespecificinquiry:didthechildreceivethesamebenefitsandsupportasifheorshehadbeensupportedbybothparents?Toanswerthisquestion,alossofbenefitsmustbepresumedwherethepayorparenthasfailedtopaytheamountofsupportrequiredundertheGuidelinesoveraprolongedperiodoftime.…”

26

H.GrahamvGraham

2013MBCA6617RetroactiveSupport:DAs.15.1SharedCustody:CSGs.9

Facts:Recipientbringingonechildintomarriage,twochildrenbornduringmarriage.Separation2006.Payorterminatingrelationshipwithstep-child.Interimsupportordersmadein2006,2008and2010,lattertwobyconsent.Attimeoftrialin2011,partiessharingcustodyoftwochildrenofthemarriage,recipienthavingsolecustodyofstep-child.Trialjudgefindingnoevidencetosupportconclusionthatpartiesboreextracostsasaresultofsharedcustody,northatrecipient’scostsdecreased.Givendisparitybetweenhouseholdcircumstances,trialjudgerequiringpayortopayfulltableamountofchildsupportforallthreechildrenwithretroactiveeffecttodateofseparation,resultinginarrearsofchildsupportof$18,000.Payorappealingsupportordersongroundsincludingthatheshouldnotberequiredtopayfulltableamountwhencustodyoftwochildrensharedandthatordershouldnothavebeenmaderetroactiveinfaceofpreviousinterimorders.Guidelines:9. Whereaspouseexercisesarightofaccessto,orhasphysicalcustodyof,achildfornotlessthan40

percentofthetimeoverthecourseofayear,theamountofthechildsupportordermustbedeterminedbytakingintoaccount

(a)theamountssetoutintheapplicabletablesforeachofthespouses;(b)theincreasedcostsofsharedcustodyarrangements;and(c)theconditions,means,needsandothercircumstancesofeachspouseandofanychildforwhomsupportissought.

Analysis:Interimorders,includinginterimordersgoingbyconsent,aremadewithoutthebenefitofthefullevidenceavailableattrialandmaynotreflecttheordersthatwouldbemadewithalloftheavailableevidence.Trialjudgesarenotboundbyinterimorders;retroactiveorderssupersedinginterimordersserveto“correct”thoseorders.

DicksonvDickson,2011MBCA26D.B.S.vS.R.G.,2006SCC37

17Availableathttp://canlii.ca/t/fzlmw.Cited8timesasof14February2016.

27

JurisdictiontomakeretroactivesupportawardsfoundinDAs.15.1.Norestrictionastodatefromwhichcourtmaydirectordertakeeffect.

DicksonvDickson,2011MBCA26D.B.S.vS.R.G.,2006SCC37

ObjectiveofGuidelinesistoavoiddisparitiesbetweenhouseholds.Necessarytocomparesituationoftheparentswhilelivingtogetherwiththeirseparatesituationslivingapart.Childshouldnotsuffernoticeabledeclineinstandardofliving. ContinovLeonelli-Contino,2005SCC63

FrancisvBaker,[1999]3SCR250Application:Trialjudgefindingthatpayornothavinglimitedcashflowandassets,andhavinghouseholdincomeninetimesthatofrecipient,excludingspousalandchildsupport.Childrenshouldnotbedeprivedofsimilarlifestylesinbothparents’homes.Trialjudgehaddiscretionandauthoritytomakeretroactivesupportaward.Absenterrorinprincipleormisapprehensionofevidence,nobasistointerferewithretroactiveorder.Trialjudgeapplyingdiscretiontofactsandnobasistointerferewithdecision.HandyQuote:Retroactivesupportorderssupersedinginterimorders“[14]Althoughnotacommonoccurrence,thereexistsampleauthoritytojustifymakingfinalordersretroactiveeveninthefaceofpriorconsentinterimorders.Thiscourthasstatedmanytimesthatthebringingofappealsofinterimordersistobediscouraged.Thatbeingso,ifthoseinterimordersdonotproperlyreflectthestateofthingswhenalloftheevidencehasbeenadducedinatrial,itthenstandstoreasonthatcorrectionscanbemade.…”I.MartinvSansome

2014ONCA1418RetroactiveSupport:DAss.2,15.1

Facts:Married1996.Agreementwaivingrecipient’sentitlementtofamilyfarmsigned2000.Separation2007,nosubsequentsupportpaymentsforparties’onechild.Proceedingscommenced2009,followingwhichpayorreceiving$420,000frommother’sestate.Childfinishingcollege2010.Trial2012,resultinginimputationofincomeof$52,000topayor,order

18Availableathttp://canlii.ca/t/g2tf7.Cited23timesasof14February2016.

28

forretroactivechildsupportbetweendateofseparationandchild’sgraduationandorderthatsupportbearinterestatrateof10%untilpaid.Payorappealingonbasesincludingthatclaimforretroactivesupportmadewhenchildceasedtobechildofmarriage,judgmentnotexplainingwhyretroactiveordermade,judgmentnotexplainingunusuallyhighrateofpost-judgmentinterest.Analysis:Inexercisingdiscretiontoorderretroactivechildsupport,courtmustconsiderexplanationfordelayinapplication,payor’sconduct,child’scircumstancesandhardshipresultingfromretroactiveaward.

D.B.S.vS.R.G.,2006SCC37Situationswhereapplicationseeksretroactiveincreaseinexistingsupportpaymentstobetreateddifferentlyfromdenovoapplicationforsupport;wherenoexistingorderoragreementandsupportnotpaid,noreasonablebasisforpayor’sactions.Insuchcases,norestrictionastodateonwhichcourtmayorderthatretroactivepaymentsbegin.

D.B.S.vS.R.G.,2006SCC37Legislationallowscourttoorderinterestbepaidinamountdifferentthanfixedpre-orpost-judgmentratesconsideringfactorssuchasparty’sconductandcircumstancesofcase.

SocietyofLloyd’svMcNeill,2003PESCTD76WildwoodCabinetsvStelorHoldings,2015NBQB83PlotogeavHeartland(2007),60CCEL(3d)216(ONSC)

Application:Attimeofrecipient’sclaimforchildsupport,childattendingcollegeandthereforeunabletowithdrawfromparents’chargeandstillchildofmarriage.Aschildqualifyingaschildofmarriage,trialjudgeentitledtoorderretroactivesupport.Payor’sconductblameworthyaschildsupportneverpaidandpayordissipatingallofmoneyreceivedfrommother’sestatewithoutbenefittochild.Needofchildworkingwhilelivingathomeandincurringstudentloansevident.Payorunlikelytosufferhardshipinlightofassetsandincome.Trialjudgenoterringinorderingretroactivesupport.Trialjudgeerringinorderinghigherthanusualinterestrateswithoutgivingreasonsfororderedrate.

29

HandyQuote:Blameworthinesspresumedwherenochildsupportpaid“[89]…BastaracheJ.’sreasonsinD.B.S.distinguishbetweensituationsinwhichthereisanexistingsupportorderoragreementandwhatissoughtisaretroactiveincreaseinsupportversussituationsinwhichtherehasnotalreadybeenacourtorderforchildsupporttobepaid.Thisisbecause,unlikethepayorwhopaidsupportinrelianceuponanexistingorderoragreement,thenon-custodialparentwhohaspaidnosupporthadnoreasonablebasisforhisactions;hekneworoughttohaveknownthatheshouldhavebeenpayingsomething.AsBastaracheJ.statedregardingcaseswherenochildsupporthasbeenpaid:

[T]hestatusquodoesnotinvolveanyexistingpaymentofchildsupport.Thisfactimmediatelydifferentiatesthepresentcontextinaveryimportantway:absentspecialcircumstances(e.g.,hardshiporadhocsharingofexpenseswiththecustodialparent),itbecomesunreasonableforthenon-custodialparenttobelieve(s)hewasacquittinghim/herselfofhis/herobligationstowardshis/herchildren.Thenon-custodialparent’sinterestincertaintyisgenerallynotverycompellinghere.…

“[91] Itisclearthatthetrialjudgeconsideredtheappellant’sconductblameworthy.Theevidencerevealedachildofthemarriagewhoneededfinancialhelp.Giventheappellant’sassetsandincome,itwasapparentfromtherecordthathewouldnotsuffermaterialhardshipasaresultofaretroactiveaward.Inallofthesecircumstances,neitherthelackofadirectexplanationwhytherespondentwaitedsometwoyearsbeforeclaimingchildsupport,orthetrialjudge’sfailuretocommentonthisfactor,isfatal.”J.SenosvKarcz

2014ONCA45919SupportforAdultChild:CSGs.3

Facts:Separation1991.Trialorderin1993requiringpaymentofchildsupportinpre-Guidelinesamount.Supportamountsubsequentlyincreasingwithchangesincostofliving.Childdiagnosedwithschizophrenia,bipolardisorder2007atage18.Recipientapplyingfordisabilitybenefitsforchildin2009,payorceasingpayments.Benefitstotaling$10,000peryearapproved2010,retroactiveto2008.Payorapplyingtovarysupport2012.Chambersjudgedismissingapplication.Payorappealing,seekingorderthatsupportobligationbereducedbyamountofbenefit.Recipientmakingpeculiarargumentthatdisabilitypaymentsbelongtochildwhilechildsupportpayments“belong”toher.

19Availableathttp://canlii.ca/t/g7djw.Cited11timesasof14February2016.

30

Guidelines:3. (1)UnlessotherwiseprovidedundertheseGuidelines,theamountofachildsupportorderfor

childrenundertheageofmajorityis(a)theamountsetoutintheapplicabletable,accordingtothenumberofchildrenundertheageofmajoritytowhomtheorderrelatesandtheincomeofthespouseagainstwhomtheorderissought;and(b)theamount,ifany,determinedundersection7.

(2)UnlessotherwiseprovidedundertheseGuidelines,whereachildtowhomachildsupportorderrelatesistheageofmajorityorover,theamountofthechildsupportorderis

(a)theamountdeterminedbyapplyingtheseGuidelinesasifthechildwereundertheageofmajority;or(b)ifthecourtconsidersthatapproachtobeinappropriate,theamountthatitconsidersappropriate,havingregardtothecondition,means,needsandothercircumstancesofthechildandthefinancialabilityofeachspousetocontributetothesupportofthechild.

(3)Theapplicabletableis(a)ifthespouseagainstwhomanorderissoughtresidesinCanada,

(i)thetablefortheprovinceinwhichthatspouseordinarilyresidesatthetimetheapplicationforthechildsupportorder,orforavariationorderinrespectofachildsupportorder,ismadeortheamountistoberecalculatedundersection25.1oftheAct,(ii)wherethecourtissatisfiedthattheprovinceinwhichthatspouseordinarilyresideshaschangedsincethetimedescribedinsubparagraph(i),thetablefortheprovinceinwhichthespouseordinarilyresidesatthetimeofdeterminingtheamountofsupport,or(iii)wherethecourtissatisfiedthat,inthenearfutureafterdeterminationoftheamountofsupport,thatspousewillordinarilyresideinagivenprovinceotherthantheprovinceinwhichthespouseordinarilyresidesatthetimeofthatdetermination,thetableforthegivenprovince;and

(b)ifthespouseagainstwhomanorderissoughtresidesoutsideofCanada,oriftheresidenceofthatspouseisunknown,thetablefortheprovincewheretheotherspouseordinarilyresidesatthetimetheapplicationforthechildsupportorderorforavariationorderinrespectofachildsupportorderismadeortheamountistoberecalculatedundersection25.1oftheAct.

Analysis:CSGs.3(1)establishespresumptioninfavouroftableamounts.Partyseekingtodeviatebearsonusofrebuttingpresumption.Evidenceavailablemustintotalsufficetoraiseconcernthattableamountinappropriate,andmustbeclearandcompellingtodepartfromtableamount.Factorsarecondition,meansandneedsandothercircumstancesofchildandabilityofparentstocontribute.Whenpresumptionisrebutted,judgemayordergreaterorlesseramountthantableamount.

FrancisvBaker,[1999]3SCR250ExceptionforadultchildreninCSGs.3(2)(b)onlyapplieswhencourtfirstdeterminesthattableapproachinappropriate.“Approach”referstos.3(2)(a)methodology;courtmaynotdepartfromapplicationofapproachmerelybecausetableamountisinappropriate.Courtmustconcludethatapproachitselfinappropriate.Thecloserthecircumstancesofchildaretothose

31

forwhomapproachisdesigned,thelesslikelythatusualGuidelinescalculationwillbeinappropriate.

LewivLewi(2006),80OR(3d)321(OCA)CanadavCanada-Somers,2008MBCA59

Disabilitybenefitsavailableforadultchildrenreflectgovernmentintentiontoshiftburdenofcaretosocietyasawholewhendisabledchildbecomesanadult,althoughpolicydoesnotimplyshiftingofentirecosttosocietyfromparents.Benefitsincludebasicneedsamountthatassistswithcostoffood,clothingandshelter.

KranglevBrisco,2002SCC9BriardvBriard,2010BCCA431

Benefitsreceivedbyadultchildcanbetakenintoaccountindeterminingappropriateamountofsupport.

MagnevMagne(1990),26RFL(3d)364(MBQB)CossettevCossette,[2003]OJNo,4923(SC)HenryvHenry,2010ONSC6990

Application:Tableapproachinappropriateasadultchild’sreceiptofbenefitsofsuchmagnitudesufficientlydifferentfromchildrenforwhomapproachdesigned.Benefitsnotanallowanceforchildtospendatowndiscretionbutintendedforspecificlivingneedsandcoupledwithreportingrequirement.Further,clearoverlapbetweenpurposesofbenefitsandamountscoveredbychildsupport.Onceonusofshowingtableapproachisinappropriateismet,questionturnstodeterminationofappropriateamountofsupport.However,insufficientevidenceofadultchild’scondition,means,needsandothercircumstancestoallowcourttomakedecision.Appealallowedandmatterremittedtotrialfordeterminationofsupportonmorecompleterecord.HandyQuotes:Testtodepartfromtableamount“[37] InFrancisvBaker,theSupremeCourtdiscussedthecircumstancesinwhichthepresumptiveTableamountintheGuidelinescanbedisplaced.Section3oftheGuidelinesestablishesapresumptioninfavouroftheTableamountandthepartyseekingtodeviatefromthatamountbearstheonusofrebuttingthepresumption.Thatpartyisnotobligedtocallevidenceandmaysimplychoosetoquestiontheopposingparty’sevidence.However,theevidencemust,initsentirety,besufficienttoraiseaconcernthattheTableamountisinappropriate.Theremustbe‘clearandcompellingevidence’fordepartingfromtheGuidelinesamount.ThefactorstobeconsideredindeterminingbothwhethertheGuidelinesapproachis‘inappropriate’andthe‘appropriate’levelofsupport,aretheconditions,means,needsandothercircumstancesofthechildandthefinancialabilityofbothparentstocontribute.Onlyafterexaminingallthecircumstancesofthecaseshouldacourtfindthetableamounttobe

32

inappropriateandcraftamoresuitablesupportaward.Todetermine‘appropriateness’,theCourtmusthavesufficientevidence.Trialjudgeshavethediscretiontodetermineonacase-by-casebasiswhetherachildexpensebudgetisrequiredandtheyhavethepowertoorderit.Whenthepresumptionins.3(2)(a)isrebutted,childsupportcanthenbesetaboveorbelowtheTableamount.”

•Purposeofdisabilitybenefits“[41]The[disabilitybenefitprogram]recognizesthatgovernment,communities,familiesandindividualsshareresponsibilityforprovidingsupporttopersonswithdisabilities.Theintentoftheprogram,asexpressedinitsDirectives,istoprovidesupportsnecessarytoenableindividualsandfamiliestoliveasindependentlyaspossibleinthecommunityandtoleadmoreproductive,dignifiedlives.“[42]Totheseends,theprogramprovidesincomesupport,healthbenefitsandemploymentsupportstopeoplewithdisabilitiesinfinancialneed.Thepolicyofthe[disabilitybenefitprogram],insofarasitappliestoadultchildrenwithdisabilities,reflectstheprincipleexpressedbytheSupremeCourtofCanadainKrangle(Guardianadlitemof)vBriscothatsocietysharestheresponsibilityofcaringforadultswithdisabilities:

ItisthepolicyoftheProvinceofBritishColumbiatoprovidecarefordisabledadults.ThispolicyisexpresslystatedintheBCBenefits(IncomeAssistance)Act,whichconfirmsinthepreamblethat‘BritishColumbiansarecommittedtopreservingasocialsafetynetthatisresponsivetochangingsocialandeconomiccircumstances’.Whenadisabledpersonbecomesanadult,theburdenofhisorhercareshiftsfromtheparentstosocietyasawhole,anditisacceptedasfairandjustthatthecontinuedburdenofcareofdisabledadultsshouldbespreadoversocietygenerally.Atonetime,itmaywellhavebeenthemoralresponsibilityofparentstocareforadisabledchildforaslongastheylived.Butforsomedecadesnow,thatmoralresponsibilityhasshiftedtoBritishColumbiasocietyasawhole,asexpressedbylegislationenactedandpreservedbysuccessivegovernments.Noevidencewaspresentedforthepropositionthatitisshamefulorwrongforparentstoacceptthebenefitsprovidedbythegovernmentwhichallowadultdisabledchildrentobecaredforunderthesocialsecuritynetworkofthestate.Greatassocialandmedicalprogressmaybe,disabilitywillinevitablystrikesomemembersofsociety,randomlyandirrationally.Itisnotimmoralforasocietytosaythatwhenthishappens,theburdenwillnotbeconfinedtotheindividualandhisfamily,butwillbesharedbysocietyasawhole.

“[43]IagreewiththeobservationinBriardvBriardthatthisstatementdoesnotmeanthattheentireburdenofcaringfordisabledadultchildrenhasshiftedtosociety.ChiefJusticeMcLachlinacknowledgedatpara.35that,undertheBritishColumbiaFamilyRelationsAct,bothparentsmustcontributeequallywhenachildcannotleavehomeandremainsachargeorburdenonhisorherparents.”

•Balancingofsupportobligationsforadultchildrenreceivingbenefits“[67] TheTableamountispredicatedontheparentsalonesharingresponsibilityforthefinancialsupportoftheirchild.Inthecaseofadultchildrenwithdisabilities,the[disabilitybenefitprogram]

33

commitssocietytosharingsomeresponsibilityforsupport.Inmyview,thismakesthes.3(2)(a)approachinappropriate,ands.3(2)(b)shouldbeappliedtoachieveanequitablebalancingofresponsibilitybetweenAntoni,hisparentsandsociety.”

•Testtoremittotrial“[74] WhileIamconsciousthatthepartieshavealreadyinvestedaconsiderableamountinthisdispute,thethrustoftheirevidencehasbeenmisdirected.Itwouldnotbefairtothem,ormoreimportantlyto[theadultchild],forthiscourttoattemptaback-of-the-envelopecalculationoftheamountofsupportunders.3(2)(b).Insuchcircumstances,itisappropriateforanappellatecourttoreferthemattertotrialsotheissuecanbeaddressedonacompleterecord.”

III.SummaryThedecisionsdiscussedinthispapersuggestthatcertainareasofthelawonchildsupportundertheGuidelines,suchastheabilitytoapplyforretroactivesupportforadultswhohaveceasedtobechildrenofthemarriage,havebeenexhaustivelyresolved,whileothers,suchasthequantumofsupportpayablebypersonswithincomesinexcessof$150,000peryear,arestillbeingdeveloped.Regardlessoftheextenttowhichthelawonchildsupporthasstabilized,however,thedegreeofflexibilityanduncertaintyprovidedbytheGuidelinesguaranteescontinuedlitigationonthesubjectbypayorsandrecipientswhofindthemselves,orwishtofindthemselves,insituationstowhichs.3(1)(a)doesnotapply.A.RetroactiveOrdersThedecisionofBastaracheJ.inD.B.S.continuestoshapethelawonapplicationsforretroactivechildsupport.Itisclearthatthechildforwhomsupportissoughtmustqualifyasachildofthemarriageatthetimetheapplicationismade,althoughanexceptionmaybemadeifthepayorwasservedwiththeapplicationforretroactivesupport,anapplicationfordisclosureoranapplicationtoenforceanagreementororderfordisclosurewhilethechildqualifiedasachildofthemarriage.ThedecisioninCalversuggeststhatsuchapplicationsmayinfactbeaprerequisiteofapplicationsforretroactivesupport.ThefactorstobeconsideredonsuchapplicationsarenicelysummarizedinGoulding,inthecontextofanagreementonchildsupport,aswellascertainfactorsthatarenotenunciatedinD.B.S.,despiteperceptionstothecontrary,includingthat:agreementsbetweenlitigantsmaybeoverlooked;blameworthyconductisnecessaryforretroactivesupporttobeordered;evidenceofthechildren’s“significantfinancialneed”isnecessaryforretroactivesupporttobeordered;and,payorscanavoidretroactiveordersbyclaiminghardshipwithoutproofofhardship.Martinremindsusthattheanalysisofblameworthinessrequiredondenovoapplicationsforretroactivesupportdiffersfromapplicationsmadewithanexistingorderor

34

agreementforchildsupport.Wherethereisnoexistingorderoragreement,payorshavenojustificationforthenonpaymentofsupport.ThedecisioninGouldingisalsoimportantforitsdiscussionoftheeffectofagreementsonchildsupport.Despitethecourt’sparenspatriaejurisdiction,thecourtmustrespectsettlementsthatarenotunconscionableandcomplyadequatelywiththelaw.However,thepartiestoagreementsaretobeheldtostrictcompliancewiththetermsoftheiragreements,andthecourtmustenforcebreachesthatredoundtothedetrimentofchildren.TheGrahamjudgmenthelpfullydiscussestheimpactofinterimdecisionsonapplicationsforretroactivesupport.InGraham,thecourtstatesthattrialjudgesarenotboundbyinterimdecisionsonsupport.Interimorders,includingthosegoingbyconsent,arenecessarilymadewithoutthebenefitofthefullevidenceadducedattrial;retroactiveordersmadewiththatevidencemayservetocorrectearlierordersmadewithoutthatevidence.Wherearrearsareowingasaresultofaretroactiveorder,theMartindecisionemphasizesthatinterestneednotbeassessedatthestandardpost-judgmentinterestratewherethatrateisnotcompulsory.Thecourtmaysetahigherinterestrateconsideringfactorsincludingthepayor’sconductandtheothercircumstancesofthecase.B.SupportforAdultChildrenThedecisionofJoyceJ.inFardenvFarden20continuestoplayapivotalroleindeterminingadultchildren’sstatusaschildrenofthemarriage.TheFardenFactors,astheyhavebecomeknown,includethechild’senrolmentinacourseofstudy,eligibilityforstudentloans,careerplans,abilitytocontributetohisorherownsupport,age,academicperformanceand,inthecaseofadultchildren,whetherthechildhasterminatedhisorherrelationshipwiththeproposedpayor.ThedecisioninDeacanemphasizesthatmereattendanceatapost-secondaryinstitutionisnotenoughtoqualifyanadultasachildofthemarriage,theparents’resourcesandabilitytocontinuetosupportthechildmustalsobeexamined,andassumeevenmoreweightwhensupportissoughtforadditionaldegreesbeyondthefirst.Whereanadultchildisfoundtobeeligibleforcontinuingsupport,thecourtmaydeterminethequantumofsupportowingunderGuideliness.3(2)(b)iftheusualGuidelinesapproachisinappropriate.Senosemphasizesthatthetestinsuchcircumstancesrequiresthattheapproachunders.3(2)(a)befoundinappropriate,notthethatthetableamountbefoundinappropriate,requiringanassessmentoftheclosenessofthesituationoftheadultchildforwhosupportissoughttothesituationsofthechildrenforwhomtheusualapproachisdesigned.Themorethecircumstancesoftheadultchilddivergefromthosechildren,thelesslikelyitisthatthetableamountwillbeappropriate.20FardenvFarden(1993),48RFL(3d)60(BCSC)

35

C.ImputingIncomeTheoptionsavailableinss.17,18and19oftheGuidelinestodetermineaparty’sincomeforthepurposesofchildsupportmaybepursuedwhenthemethodologydescribedins.16wouldnotproducethefairestdeterminationofincome,orreflectallofthemoneyavailableforthepaymentofchildsupport,asthecourtputitinGoett.ThecourtinFraserdescribedthedeterminationofincomebyreferencetoaparty’sincomeatLine150oftheT1IncomeTaxandBenefitReturn21unders.16asthe“basicrule,”andheldthatalthoughadditionalincomemaybeimputedtoaparty,arationalbasisfortheamountimputedisrequired.PatternofIncome,CSGs.17:TheDeacandecisionclarifiesthatalthoughthecourtmustconsideraparty’sincomeoverthepreviousthreeyearswherethes.16methodologywouldnotproducethefairestdeterminationofincome,thecourtisnotobligedtodetermineincomebyaveragingtheparty’sincomeinthoseyears.Theaveragingofincomeunders.17(2)isdiscretionary,notmandatory.CorporateIncome,CSGs.18:Guideliness.18allowsthecourttoconsiderthepre-taxincomeofacompanyindeterminingincomewherethepartyisashareholder,directororofficerofacompanyandtheamountdeterminedunderthebasicrulewouldnotbeexhaustiveoftheincomeavailabletothepartyforsupportpurposes.InGoett,thecourtconsidereds.18asameansofimputingincomeaspermittedbys.19(1),holdingthatthetwosections“aredesignedtoworkintandem.”ThedecisioninGoettisimportantasthecourtappliedGuideliness.18toimputecorporateincometoapartywhowasnotashareholder,directororofficerofthecompanyinquestion,holdingthatwherethetransferofacorporateinterestiseffectedtoavoidthepaymentofchildsupport,as.18analysiscanbeconductedasameansofquantifyingtheamountofincometobeimputedunders.19.OtherReasonstoImputeIncome,CSGs.19:TheCalverdecisionsuggeststhattravelandlivingexpensespaidbyemployersshouldgenerallynotbeincludedinaparty’sGuidelinesincome,especiallywheretheallowanceistaxableincomeinthehandsofthepartyortheallowancefallswithintheexcludedincomesourcessetoutins.1ofScheduleIIItotheGuidelines.Theonustoincludesuchincomeliesonthemovingparty,whomustproducesomeevidencetoestablishthattheallowanceexceedstherecipient’sactualtravelandlivingcosts.ThedecisioninFraserconfirmsthatincomemaybeimputedtoapartyfromthelostearningsportionofcourtawardsorinsurancesettlements,withtheonuslyingontherecipientto21TheT1for2015isavailableathttp://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/E/pbg/tf/5000-r/5000-r-15e.pdf.

36

establishtheamountsnotallocatedtolostearnings.Althoughsomedecisionshavecharacterizedundifferentiatedawardsorsettlementsaslostearnings,Fraseradmonishesjudgestorefrainfrommakingarbitraryallocationsofawardsorsettlementstolostearnings.Instead,incomemaybeattributedtothepartyundertheprovisionsofGuideliness.19(1)(e)whichallowthecourttoimputeincomewherepropertyisnotreasonablyusedtogenerateincome.D.IncomesinExcessof$150,000Guideliness.4allowsthecourttodepartfromtheusualcalculationofsupportunders.3wheretheparty’sannualincomeisinexcessof$150,000.Gouldprovidesahelpfulsummaryoftheanalysisrequiredbys.4andthenatureoftheevidencethecourtmusthavetodepartfromthetableamountofchildsupport.ThecourtinGouldheldthatthetablespresumptivelyapplytopartieswithhighincomes,andthatthepartyseekingtodeviate,upordownfromthetables,bearstheonusofproofinrebuttingthispresumption.Todepartfromthetables,theavailableevidencemustsufficetoraiseaconcernabouttheappropriatenessofthetableamount.Oncethepresumptionisrebutted,thecourtmustconsiderthecondition,means,needsandothercircumstancesofthechildren,andtherecipientbearstheburdenofadducingevidenceonthesepoints.Theactual,currentcircumstancesofthechildrenarecentraltotheanalysisrequiredbyGuideliness.4.However,thedecisioninGouldstatesthatbudgets,althoughdesirable,arenotmandatory,andthatthecourtmayrelyontheexpensesitemizedintheparties’financialstatements.ThisaspectofGouldshouldraisearedflagforrecipientsasitsuggestsacertaindegreeofriskiftheexpensesportionofafinancialstatementdescribesthechildren’scurrentexpenses,especiallyifthoseexpensesarelowerthantheymightbeifadifferentamountofsupportwerepaid.ItseemstomethatrecipientsdealingwithanapplicationunderGuideliness.4shouldeitheradaptthestandardformfinancialstatementtoexpressbothcurrentandprospectiveexpensesorprovideaprospectivechildexpensebudget.Eitherway,recipientsmustprovideevidenceofthethingsthechildrenarecurrentlydoingwithoutortheyriskthecourtconcludingthatthechildren’sneedsarebeingadequatelymetwithwhateversupportisbeingprovided.E.SpecialExpensesThedecisioninDelichteusefullysummarizesthelawonspecialexpenses.First,theexpensesmustqualifyas“extraordinary”becausetheyexceedtheamountthattheapplicantcanreasonablycoveronhisorherincomeandtheamountofchildsupportreceived.Eveniftheapplicantcancovertheexpenses,theexpensesmaystillqualifyasextraordinaryhavingregardtothefactorslistedinGuideliness.7(1.1)(b).Second,evenwhereanexpensequalifiesasextraordinary,theexpensemustalso,unders.7(1),benecessaryforthechildandreasonableinlightoftheparties’means.Theonustoestablishthatanexpenseisextraordinary,necessary

37

andreasonableliesontheapplicant,althoughtheapplicantmayrelyonestimatesofthecostofanexpense.Delichtealsoconfirmsthatthedecisiontorequirecontributiontoaspecialexpenseisdiscretionaryandthatthesharingofanexpenseinproportiontotheparties’incomesisonlyaguidingrule,notamandatorydirection.F.SharedCustodyTheGrahamdecisionoffersahelpfulreminderthatthediscretionavailabletothecourtunderGuideliness.9incasesofsharedcustodyistrulydiscretionary.GiventheGuidelines’overallobjectiveofminimizingdisparitiesinthelivingconditionsofthechildbetweenparents’households,thecourtneednotorderthatthepayorprovidesupportinotherthanthetablesamount.Theanalysisrequiredbys.9requiresexaminationofthecircumstancesofthepartiesandacomparisonoftheirhouseholdstandardsofliving,andtheamountofsupportpayableshouldnotdeprivethechildofasimilarlifestyleinbothhomes.22

22Thereis,however,aninterestinglineofcasesdevelopinginBritishColumbiawhichinterpretContinovLeonelli-Contino,2005SCC63asstatingthatGuideliness.9establishesitsownfactorsforthedeterminationofchildsupportwithoutanypresumptioninfavourofthetables.SeeB.P.E.vA.E.,2015BCSC2416andL.M.R.vJ.R.F.,2010BCSC363.