a messianic state_ideology rationality and eschatology in iranian politics

8/17/2019 A Messianic State_Ideology Rationality and Eschatology in Iranian Politics

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A Messianic State? Ideology, Rationality and Eschatology in Iranian Politics

10825 words including abstract and bibliography

Patrick O'Neil

University of Puget Sound

Department of Politics and Government

1500 N Warner

Tacoma, WA 98416 USA

[email protected]

Abstract: In current discussions regarding Iranian domestic and foreign policy it is often arguedthat Iran is a messianic state. Specifically, it is asserted that the Iranian regime’s ideology, asinstitutionalized through the 1979 revolution, is based on the imminent appearance of a messiah,known within Shi'ism as the Mahdi. This emphasis on end times is given as evidence that theIranian regime does not function within the same logic as “rational” states. More recently,President Ahmadinejad's explicitly messianic rhetoric was cited as proof that the regime embracesan increasingly dangerous eschatology which seeks to in fact hasten the Mahdi's return. This paper

argues instead that Mahdism is a strategy intended to institutionalize a religious nationalism thatcan serve as a powerbase for non-clerical political elites. Iranian religious nationalism is notnoticeably different from other ideologies, and is just as rational in its objectives.

Biography: Patrick O'Neil is Professor of Politics and Government at the University of PugetSound. His interests are authoritarianism and democratization. His past work focused on EasternEurope and the transition from communism. His more recent focus is on the Middle East,specifically Iranian domestic politics and foreign policy, as well as the politics of Shi'ism outsideof Iran. A secondary interest in Israel/Palestine. His published works include Revolution from

Within: The Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party 'Reform Circles' and the Collapse of Communism,and the edited volumes Post-Communism and the Media in Eastern Europe and Communicating Democracy: Media and Political Transitions. He is also the author of Essentials of Comparative Politics, currently in its fourth edition.


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In the ever-deepening tensions regarding Iran’s nuclear program, various and sometimes

contradictory arguments have been used to justify the need for sanctions and outright force against

the Iranian state and regime. One argument is grounded in traditional realist theories of

international relations. That is, that if Iran acquires a nuclear weapons capability, this will set off

an arms race in the region and further destabilize what is already a region in tumult. One could

respond that Israel has possessed (undeclared) nuclear weapons for decades without a similar arms

race, but past nuclear efforts by both Iraq and Syria indicate that this is already a very real threat.

Such arguments do not require (and largely eschew) any discussion of ethnic, national or religious

differences in the region. Rather, following the end of Cold War superpower hegemony over the

Middle East, various states in the region will rationally compete to assert their authority to become

the regional hegemon.

Within this framework, Iran’s nuclear program is no different than that of Israel, Syria or

Iraq, meant to ensure deterrence as well as extend their power over other states in the Persian Gulf

and broader Middle East. Such an arms race is fraught with risk. According to a 2012 report by

the Bipartisan Policy Center, a nuclear-armed Iran would “significantly alter the geopolitical and

strategic landscape of the Middle East, raising the likelihood of instability, terrorism, or conflict

that could interrupt the region’s oil exports.” More specifically, the authors suggest that Saudi

Arabia would most likely also seek nuclear weapons in order to counter Iran, while “an

emboldened nuclear Iran could instigate or exacerbate an uprising in Saudi Arabia’s Shiite-

majority Eastern Province, the nerve center of Saudi oil exports.” The result, the authors warn,

would be a situation “that could devolve into atomic warfare.” 1 While many scholars of

international relations assume that states are unitary, rational and risk-mitigating actors, political

and technical deficiencies can undermine effective decision-making. The Bipartisan Policy Center


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cites precisely this concern, noting “Iran’s and Saudi Arabia’s small arsenals, lack of durable

communication channels, poor civilian oversight of command-and-control systems, [and] erratic

intelligence.”2 In short, even if we can assume that Iran’s possession of a nuclear weapon would

be checked by both Israel’s nuclear deterrent and Saudi Arabia’s likely acquisition of its own

nuclear bombs, questions of internal state coherence make this a dangerous path.

And yet the dangers of a nuclear armed Iran are frequently not framed within the broad

context found in the discussion above. First, a possible arms race between Iran and Saudi Arabia

has not been at the center of international concern. Rather, attention has focused on Iran’s threat

to Israel, a county over 1000 miles away. Second, concerns over Iran’s possession of nuclear

weapons has often not been couched in terms of its regional aspirations or technical capacity to

manage such weapons, but rather in the context of the view that for ideological and religious

reasons Iran is an irrational state.

What does it mean to say that Iran is an irrational state? “Realist” theories of international

relations assume that states wish to preserve and expand their security and power in an anarchic

international environment — a rational goal of self-preservation and expansion. Yet scholars and

policymakers accept that some states may be controlled by “irrational elites.” These are not elites

whose rationality is constrained by organizational or informational deficiencies, but rather elites

whose ideological or nationalist commitments tend them toward risk-taking, even self-destructive

behavior.

In discussions of Iranian foreign policy it is a common argument that those in power are

anything but rational. Since the 1979 revolution Iran’s foreign policy has been described as

steeped in fanaticism, with the prime evidence given as the long war with Iraq. In the Iran-Iraq


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war hundreds of thousands of ill-equipped Iranian “martyrs” died as a result of the Ayatollah

Khomeini’s decision to continue the war even after Saddam Hussein sought peace in 1982 (the

war would continue for another seven years). More than the scale of casualties, the emphasis on

the martyrdom of soldiers and the war as a step toward an Islamic revolution across the region are

testimony to the fusion of religious and political fervor that drove the revolution forward. But

even this argument of Iran as a “fanatical” state contains within assumptions of strategy and

rationality. The Iranian revolution’s fanaticism is a piece of many revolutions, which are

commonly “insecure but overconfident” in their ability to export their new ideology and defeat

their external enemies.

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The perception of Iran as a fanatical state began to wane as the Iran-Iraq War came to an

end in 1989 and the death of the Ayatollah Khomeini that same year. While concerns began to

surface regarding Iran’s nuclear program in the early 1990s, this occurred alongside the growing

prominence of reformist and pragmatic elites who overshadowed the new Supreme Leader,

Ayatollah Khamenei. Hopes for greater political change however, soon went into reverse, as

reformists were driven out of the legislature and other state institutions. The election of Mahmoud

Ahmadinejad as president in 2005 seemed to represent a return to Iran’s revolutionary fanaticism.

Indeed, Ahmadinejad portrayed himself as a keeper of the revolutionary flame, and he derived

much of his support from poorer and more rural parts of the population, who were attracted by his

apparent piety and lack of corruption.

While Ahmadinejad built his domestic base of electoral support on values that emphasized

the poor and recapturing the spirit of the revolution, it was his relationship to the international

community that drew the greatest attention. The president quickly became known for his

vociferous criticism of the West and his anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic positions. Particularly


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notorious was his role in the World Without Zionism Conference in Iran in 2005, in which

Ahmadinejad uttered the notorious phrase that Israel boyad az safehi ruzgar mahv shavad –“must

disappear from the pages of time” or, in other, more menacing if misleading translations, “must be

wiped off the map.” Shortly thereafter Ahmadinejad supported Iran’s International Conference to

Review the Global Vision of the Holocaust in 2006, attended by numerous Holocaust deniers,

among them former Klu Klux Klan Grand Wizard David Duke. All of these actions made it appear

not only that Iran had returned to a more fanatical position, but that with this rhetoric Ahmadinejad

was eclipsing the power and authority of the Supreme Leader. Iran no longer seemed moving

toward what Weber termed the “routinization of charisma,” a bureaucratic regime that paid lip -

service to revolutionary values but was otherwise rational, risk-averse and conservative. Where,

then, did Iran’s ideology lie?

With the election of Ahmadinejad observers of Iranian politics began to use a largely new

term, speaking of Iran as a messianic state. In a Lexis-Nexis analysis of over three hundred global

media sources from 1979 to 1989, the term “messianic” to refer to Iran appears fewer than twenty

times. Over the last decade, however, the western media began to speak frequently of Iran in these

terms (a similar search finds the term used over two hundred times). Ahmadinejad in particular

was described as someone “gripped by apocalyptic beliefs.”4 Books began to appear with such

hyperbolic titles as The Apocalypse of Ahmadinejad: The Revelation of Iran's Nuclear Prophet

and The Nuclear Sphinx of Iran. 5 But this was not simply a case of claiming that Ahmadinejad

alone was a fanatical and dangerous leader. The president was presented by many as simply part

of the regime’s inherent “death cult” that saw its struggle against Israel and the West as part of the

coming Armageddon.6 This view differs significantly from past interpretations of Iran, which

argued that Iran may be more likely to take greater risks in order to advance its revolution and


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ideology. If Iran was not a revolutionary state in a conventional, ideological stance, but instead a

messianic state that yearned for an apocalypse, it represented a much greater danger, concerned

less its own existence than the fulfillment of its own eschatology. Or, as one observer put it, “once

Iran has the Islamic bomb, does anyone really believe they won’t use it against the U.S. and Israel,

either directly or through terrorist surrogates?”7 This view has been emphasized by the Israeli

government, which has drawn frequent comparisons between Iran and Nazi Germany, and argued

that Iran, as a messianic state, cannot be militarily deterred, and would in fact see war, even nuclear

war, as a fulfillment of prophecy. As Prime Minister Netanyahu succinctly put it, “You don’t want

a messianic apocalyptic cult controlling atomic bombs.”

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The implications of such an analysis are clearly frightening. While revolutionary states

can be risky actors on the world stage, their motives are fundamentally worldly, if utopian, and

their revolutionary ardor inevitably cools to a more conservative position. But a messianic state

of the type described above would show no such tendency. As a messianic revolutionary regime

fails to achieve its worldly goals, it may not experience the “routinization of charisma,” as Weber

put it, but an increasing reliance on prophecy and eschatology to bolster its legitimacy. Such a

state could be increasingly irrational over time, subject to differing and increasingly anxious

interpretations of end times.

We have so far laid out a widely held view (particularly among policymakers) of the

relationship between religion, ideology, and state rationality in Iran. Long viewed as an

unpredictable state bent on exporting the revolution, in recent years this view has morphed into

one that sees the Iranian leadership as a messianic cult bent on annihilation. Of course, this leads

to our central question: Is this analysis correct? In order to answer, we must first understand the

nature of messianic views within Iranian Shi’ism and the Iranian state. Second, we must evaluate


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their authority and interpretation within the state as a political force, and the extent to which they

influence domestic and international policy. Only then can we evaluate whether the fears of a

“doomsday” Iran are justified, and the implications for international relations.

Messianic Beliefs in Iranian Shi’ism

Whatever the implications, there can be no doubt that messianic views have played an important

role in Shi’ism, especially as found in Iran. In recent years the primary differences between Sunni

and Shia Islam have been repeatedly outlined for a Western audience, but it is important to

reconsider those distinctions, especially as they relate to eschatology. Shia Islam, while the

overwhelming majority faith in Iran, is a tiny minority of Muslims worldwide, estimated at around

10-15%. In addition to Iran, a Shia majority can only be found in Iraq and Bahrain, with a large

Shia population in Lebanon, and significant (if minority) populations in Pakistan, India,

Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. At its core, Shi’ism differs from Sunni Islam with regard

to leadership, as much a political as a religious concern. Upon the death of the Prophet the question

emerged of who should lead the Muslim community. Sunni Muslims assert that leadership,

religious and political, should fall to someone who follows the appropriate path (Sunna) of

righteousness. That individual can be chosen from the community, rise to that level of

qualification through his acts or, in the case of a monarchy, inherit the role. In contrast, Shi'ism

believes that the true guardians of the faith are those who descend directly from the Prophet and

his family — in particular, his son-in-law Ali and his progeny, who Shia believe were directly

designated by Mohammed and God to be his successors. The Shiat Ali, or party of Ali, thus

advocated an inherited role, but one that followed directly from the Prophet. Ali was not chosen


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to succeed Mohammed upon his death in 632, and while he did eventually become caliph in 656,

his reign would last only five years and end with his assassination.

Upon the death of Ali, his followers turned their support to his two sons, Hassan and

Hussein. As before, the argument was that as the direct descendants were intended by Mohammed

and God to uphold the Koran. And as with Ali, this position would be the minority view. Hassan

renounced his right to be caliph upon Ali’s death, and, Shia believe, was thereafter assassinated to

prevent his eventual return to power. His younger brother, Hussein, plays a more primary role in

Shia theology. In 680 he rose up against the caliphate, but facing overwhelming odds he and most

of his family were slaughtered on the battlefield at Karbala in present-day Iraq. This story of a

righteous battle in the face of certain death established for Shia the importance of martyrdom in

the cause of religious and political justice. It also established the important religious ceremony of

Ashura, which commemorates the death of Hussein.

Shi’ism at its most basic, then, is a struggle over succession, legitimacy and sovereign rule.

But while that may have been the initial conflict, the distinctions between Shia and Sunni have

grown wider and more theological over the past 1300 years. For Shia, the battle over succession

did not end with Karbala. In the immediate aftermath of the massacre Shi’ites continued to believe

that the family of Ali would be soon restored as the rightful heirs to the caliphate. A large uprising

took place in Kufa several years after the death of the Hussein, led by Shi’ite partisans who hoped

that their victory would pave the way for the return of the bloodline. However, after two years the

revolt was crushed by the Caliph of Mecca.

While the quest for temporal power essentially ended at this point, Shia continued to

follow, and increasingly venerate, the bloodline, or Imams (a term in Shi’ism that is typically


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reserved for the descendants of the prophet), who were viewed less as political claimants than

figures of reverence and religious guidance. Indeed, Shia came to believe that these Imams

possessed supernatural qualities endowed by God. The Imams are free from sin and fallibility,

possess special powers, and as such are the most exemplary of men--and the only appropriate

leaders for political and religious authority.

Following the Shi’ite uprising in Kufa there emerged the idea that the twelfth and last

Imam, Mohammad ibn al-Hassan (b. 868) was in occultation. This occultation was not simply one

of hiding or in exile, as had been the case for two centuries since the death of Hussein, but in an

absence that was created and maintained by God, protected from enemies, until a time that this last

Imam could return. This idea of occultation is similar to that of Jesus’ resurrection, and it is hard

not to draw the conclusion that ideas of disappearance and return were adopted from existing

beliefs within the other monotheistic and messianic traditions in the region, which were well

established by this point. The idea of occultation set into motion an eschatology, whereby the

twelfth and last Imam, the Mahdi (from the Arabic, meaning “he who is rightly guided”), would

return at the end of time to restore God’s rule on earth. Thus, the Shia narrative comes full circle,

emphasizing Hussein’s martyrdom, his followers’ quest to restore his bloodline, and the Mahdi’s

occultation until he re-emerges at the end of time.

This quick overview does not do justice to the complex nature of Shi’ism. However, it

does make clear the central differences between Shia and Sunni Islam, as well as the sources of

conflict between them. For Shia, majority Islam has essentially deviated from the path of correct

leadership, though otherwise they do not dispute the core beliefs of the faith. For many Sunni,

however, Shia appear to have deviated far from core Islamic beliefs, to the extent that to some they

cannot be considered Muslims. The idea of inherited infallibility that is somehow designated by


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God is absent from the Koran and runs counter to the standard Islamic emphasis on individual

emulation of the Prophet. Indeed, the emphasis on Hussein and Ali seemingly over that of the

Prophet is often viewed by Sunni Muslims as a misdirection of one’s source for guidance and

emulation. Furthermore, while in Islam there is a large literature discussing the specifics of the

end times, elaborating conditions and events akin to the Book of Revelations in the New Testament

(again, the Jewish and Christian influences are clear, down to the return of Moses and Jesus at the

end of time), Sunni Islam does not place a specific role for a messiah at the end. Rather, the idea

of the Mahdi within Sunni Islam is one of any number of individuals, unconnected to the family

of the Prophet, who emerge on a cyclical basis to renew Islam. In contrast, Shia emphasize the

single figure of the Mahdi as the Hidden Imam, descendent of Ali and Hussein, creating a much

more active role for a single actor associated with the apocalypse (again, similar to certain

millennial views of Jesus). It has been argued that this tradition is particularly strong is Iranian

Shi’ism, which itself draws upon earlier Zoroastrian beliefs regarding an apocalyptic battle

between the forces of good and evil, the latter personified by a great satanic figure (in contrast to

Sunni views of a much weaker Satan).9

The idea of a single leader in occultation and in waiting until the final age raises a number

of religious and political questions for Shia here and now. Fundamentally, the question is one of

the relationship between the Mahdi and humanity during the former’s absence from the world. In

Shia views, the Mahdi is a figure with specific religious and political sovereignty, just as with

Mohammed. In his absence there is the question of sovereignty and governance. Who is to rule

while the Mahdi is in occultation? And is the nature of that rule in any way connected to the details

of the Mahdi’s return? As is well known, one result of the Shia emphasis on the Mahdi is that

there developed the rationale for a hierarchy of clerics —Ayatollahs, or “signs of God”--who could


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develop and interpret religious law on behalf of the Mahdi. At the same time, this clerical

hierarchy remained relatively distant from state power itself, which they viewed as an area of

sovereignty that belonged only to the Mahdi himself. In the interim, a monarchy that would defend

the rights and objectives of the faith was viewed as the most appropriate relationship between

mosque and state. Questions about when the Mahdi would return were, as one author puts it,

dismissed as “unorthodox, if not heretical.”10 In short, while Shi’ism contains messianic values

as an essential component of its belief system, traditionally this did not translate into an active

preparation for or facilitation of the Mahdi’s return.

That having been said, there has remained within Shi’ism a perspective that is more

personal and activist. One facet of this is one’s personal relationship to the Mahdi. As in

evangelical Christianity, there has long been a strain of belief that the Mahdi could be reached

through visions and other practices, and that the Mahdi in turn might reach out to individuals at

given points in time. With this belief, it becomes possible to believe that one is being directed by

particular revelations from and interactions with the Mahdi — a messianic view which, in some

radical interpretations, could lead to an individual being directed by the Mahdi or to speak on his

behalf. Such mystical approaches may even lead to a realization that one is the Mahdi himself. In

Iraq, Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army clearly draws on a belief that their actions are on behalf of

the Mahdi’s return. A more extreme example would be the Iraq militant group Army of Heaven,

which was destroyed after a fierce battle with US and Iraq forces in 2007. The group’s leader had

proclaimed himself the Mahdi, and had apparently intended to march on the holy city of Najaf

during the ceremonies of Ashura, assassinate the senior clerics there (including Grand Ayatollah

Sistani), and proclaim the return of the Hidden Imam.11

Messianic Shi’ism and the Iranian Revolution


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These ideas of a personal and active relationship with the Mahdi shaped, and were shaped by, the

1979 Iranian Revolution. The general details of the revolution are well known, driven by top-

down, rapid and disorienting modernization, the corruption and opulence of the Shah, and a

growing clash between secularism and traditional religious values. The conflict between modern

and traditional forces stimulated both religious fundamentalism as well as radical Marxist views.

Most interestingly, they also gave rise to different mixtures of secular and religious perspectives.

Though a seeming contradiction, these radical and reactionary views were not necessarily

diametrically opposed to one another. Both saw a revolutionary transformation of existing social

and political structures in order to bring about institutions that were consistent with the true nature

of humanity.

In spite of the presence of Shia thought in these ideological strands, messianism played a

limited role in the discussion of revolutionary change. Ayatollah Khomeini’s most influential

work, Islamic Government (1970), argued against a passive role for the clergy in anticipation of

some distant return of the Mahdi. However, Khomeini did not conclude that the Mahdi's return

was in any way imminent or could be somehow be hastened. Rather, he asserted that in the absence

of the Mahdi, it was important for the clergy to serve in the place of the Mahdi as a religious

guardianship over the people. In short, Khomeini’s blueprint for the new regime depended on the

Mahdi's continued occultation, for his imminent return would make the Islamic Republic, and

indeed even the revolution, perhaps unnecessary.12

A different but related argument was taken by the Iranian philosopher Ali Shariati.

Shariati, who in many ways was as much the inspiration for the 1979 revolution as Khomeini,

railed against what he called “black” Shi’ism in favor of “red” Shi'ism. In his definition, “ black ”

Shi’ism was an approach to the faith that was constrained by an emphasis on mourning and the


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perceived injustices done to the faith. Shariati contrasted this with his own call for a “red” Shi’ism,

a radical belief system that emphasized social justice, class struggle, and the Imams as a

revolutionary force — a religious Marxism, if you will (though Shariati would have rejected such a

characterization).13 Shariati’s contribution was therefore to emphasize the ideological power of

Shi’ism as the embodiment of radical Islam, and to reject the clergy as reactionary in favor of an

ideological faith that put religions and political power in the hands of the masses. Shariati, who

died in 1977, could be viewed as having lost the struggle for the course revolutionary change in

Iran, but his belief that Shi’ism could be transformed (or in his view, restored) into an acti ve

revolutionary ideology resonates clearly in Khomeini’s work. It is evident that much of Shariati’s

views, while condemned as hostile to existing religious institutions, were in fact co-opted by

Khomeini, helping to create a regime that claimed to embody the true intentions of the Mahdi

through a radical political agenda with global implications. Khomeini’s work is thus in many ways

similar to other forms of political Islam that had emerged around the same time, such as Said Qutb

in Egypt and Mawlana Mawdudi in Pakistan, and is, either directly or indirectly, influenced by

those authors as well.14

In the years prior to and following the Iranian Revolution one can find various messianic

elements in play. Perhaps most striking is the public’s reference to Imam Khomeini, a title that

heretofore had been reserved for the descendants of Ali and Hussein. Whereas the state structures

articulated in Islamic Government called for a supreme leader who would serve as a deputy of the

Hidden Imam, already in the early 1970s Khomeini’s supporters began to refer to him with this

honorific. This expanded dramatically after the revolution. As Abbas Amanat notes, “a certain

semi-prophetic sanctity was also attached to the title, which was largely the work of propagandists

in the revolutionary press but nevertheless was reminiscent of the recurring messianic tradition


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deeply embedded in Iranian Shi’ism.”15 Many members of the public saw Khomeini as the sole

actor who, in the words of one 1979 Iranian public resolution, could “smooth the way for the

government of Imam Mahdi.”16 At an extreme, some were inclined to see Khomeini as the Mahdi

himself. However, we need to put such messianic tendencies in historical context. In Lebanon,

the Iranian-born cleric Musa al-Sadr became so central to the religious and political life of

Lebanese Shia that he, too, was given the honorific Imam; his disappearance in Libya in 1978

further generated parallels with the Hidden Imam.17 And specific views that religious or political

activists were perhaps the Mahdi was not confined to Iran in this period. In November 1979,

shortly after the Iranian Revolution, a large group of Saudi militants seized control of the Grand

Mosque in Mecca, led by a figure who claimed that he was the Mahdi. The resulting battle lasted

for two weeks and over two hundred militants and troops were killed.18

Revolutionary Iran, the Iran-Iraq War, and the Road to Jerusalem

Where messianic views do emerge more explicitly is during the Iran-Iraq War. When Iraq

attacked Iran in 1980, the latter faced a regime supported directly or indirectly Arab and Western

powers who feared the spread of the Iranian Revolution. Iran was hindered in its war effort by

weapons embargos as well as ethnic and political turmoil.

In the face of these challenges and consistent with the rhetoric of the regime, Khomeini

framed the war in terms of the battle of Hussein against the caliphate, a struggle of righteousness

against overwhelming odds, and martyrdom on behalf of the Imamate. This connection was easy

to make, not simply because of the historical animosity between majority Sunni and minority Shia,

but also because the very landscape of battle was that on which Hussein fought. Thus, the regime

portrayed the conflict as a symbolic and literal battle for Karbala, the taking of which was an


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important goal. As we are well aware from America’s war in Iraq, the southern part of that country

is overwhelmingly Shia (though Arab and not Persian), and contains not only important holy sites

but also the important seminary of Najaf, where Khomeini and other Iranian ayatollahs had

studied. Thus, by defeating Iraq, the Iran could liberate those lands and Shia holy places that were

long under Sunni rule, expanding the revolution to Muslims beyond its borders.

It is at this time that the most direct calls for individual martyrdom begin to appear. While

domestic terrorism and guerrilla activity had been present during and immediately after the

revolution, the use of suicide attacks or “martyrdom” missions became an important component

to the war. Perhaps best known in this regard is the creation of the Basij, a paramilitary

organization subordinate to the Revolutionary Guard (another paramilitary organization formed

around the revolution) which contained large numbers of young men and boys, who were sent into

the battlefield with little hope of survival.19 As one newspaper account from the period notes:

'''they ask for martyrdom,'' said Major Morteza Nabavi, describing how youths volunteer to walk

across mine fields to clear a path for the attack. 'This is a symbol of our victory'.''20 The quest for

Karbala thus sustained the imagery of Ashura, and promised a victory that would make right the

loss of Hussein centuries earlier. Campaigns were often begun on Shia holy days, such as the

death of the Imam Ali, and given such names as Karbala 1 (1986), at which the commander of the

Revolutionary Guard claimed that “this time we shall move forward non -stop until we reach

Karbala.”21 Although Karbala was never taken, it is worth noting that even at this late date in the

war the regime continued to sustain the argument that the war was one of liberation, rather than

defense. This was an important element of regime ideology, given that Iraq had been expelled

from its major Iranian positions, among them the major city of Khorramshahr, in 1982 (which was

taken through the use of human wave attacks). The call for liberation and the export of the


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revolution also explains Iran’s unwillingness to accept a truce and possible end to the conflict.

This was offered by Iraq already in the first weeks of the war, when Saddam Hussein realized that

his gamble “on a relatively painless advance into the neighboring country that would bring

Khomeini to his knees to sue for peace” would not be realized.22

The battle of Khorramshahr also points to a secondary, and now largely forgotten, element

of Iran’s revolutionary ideology as it related to the Iran -Iraq war. We noted that in many cases

Iranian campaigns were framed within the context of Shia holy days or holy figures, and the war

itself imagined as a battle to avenge Hussein and restore the correct path of the Imams over Shia

lands and beyond. In addition, Iraq was not only viewed as a field of battle for the past and future

of Shi’ism, or even Islam, but as a path to Jerusalem, the next stage of the revolution following the

defeat of Iraq. Iranian propaganda emphasized that the war’s ultimate objectives was the liberation

of Jerusalem, and the battle for Khorramshahr was named Operation Beit ol-Moqqaddas, or

Operation Jerusalem. Khomeini specifically claimed that the war would allow Iran to march on

to Jerusalem, and at one point even made safe passage of Iranian troops across Iraq to Israel a

condition for peace.23

It is easy to assert that the war was a part of a larger struggled toward the end times, one

that would ultimately liberate Jerusalem, where, according to some Islamic views, the final

apocalyptic battle between good and evil would take place. However, this argument was never

put forward by the regime. The rhetoric regarding Jerusalem was central to the expansive claims

of the Iranian Revolution as a means of mobilizing the public, but was just as much directed toward

an Arab audience, intended to portray Iran as the only true champion of the Palestinians and true

challenger to Israel. Then as now, Iran used the Palestinian issue as a way to bolster support across

the Middle East and overcome Sunni suspicions of Shi’ism. For Iran, the quest for Jerusalem


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remained one largely grounded in regional politics and western imperialism rather than

eschatology. Iranian propaganda never suggested that the liberation of Jerusalem would somehow

lead to the end of days or the return of the Mahdi. Rather, in the eyes of many scholars (and

average Iranians), the road to Jerusalem was largely a ploy by Khomeini to expand his regional

authority and outflank other Arab leaders. This speaks more of strategic foreign policy than

religious zealotry.24

Martyrdom and Suicide Terrorism

A final ancillary discussion should be made of the emergence of suicide bombing, which

would come to shape Middle Eastern politics for the next thirty years and is often conflated with

the Iranian regime as evidence of its dangerous “death cult” ideology.25 As we noted, martyrdom

or suicide attacks were hallmarks of Iranian military tactics against Iraq, while terrorism was also

widespread across Iran before and after the revolution, much of it carried out by ideological or

ethnic minority opponents of the revolutionary regime. To take one example, a 1981 bombing of

Khomeini's Islamic Revolutionary Party killed 73 individuals, including the chief justice and

several cabinet members. But even during the chaos before and immediately after the revolution,

there were no examples of suicide attacks carried out either by opponents of the regime or by the

regime against its rivals.

However, it is well known that the first examples of suicide bombing in the Middle East were

carried out in Lebanon in 1982-1983 by the Shia group Hezbollah (Party of God), whose name

itself came from a similarly titled revolutionary organization in Iran. Hezbollah’s actions would

come to transform the use of terrorism in the region that reverberates to this day, and its


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justification for suicide attacks were founded on the example of the Imam Hussein and the Iranian

Revolution’s call for self -sacrifice. Suicide bombing would become the core puzzle of any

discussion of terrorism in the subsequent decades, given the deeply “irrational” nature of this tactic

as viewed by a secular audience. At the same time, however, it is important to remember that the

justification for suicide bombings emerged not in the seminaries of Iran or Iraq, but among the

Shia leadership in Lebanon, drawing on their own experiences of civil war and Israeli invasion.26

Moreover, suicide attacks were used to a limited extent; after an initial rash of attacks from 1983

to 1985, they declined thereafter and were formally renounced in 1999. Although Iran has

frequently lauded suicide attacks by Hezbollah and Palestinians, it has never become a part of

Iranian state policy, unless we are to claim that the Hezbollah’s suicide terrorism is directed by

Iran. While there is some evidence of this, scholars generally accept that most of Hezbollah’s

attacks were of their own strategy and design. Even the 2012 bombing of Israeli tourists in Bulgaria

appears to have been a Hezbollah bombing where the terrorist blew himself up by accident.27

Iranians have not directly participated in suicide attacks themselves, whether in Iraq, Israel,

Afghanistan, Lebanon, the West Bank/Israel or elsewhere, and beyond Hezbollah there is no

evidence that suicide attacks are essentially a tool of Iranian politics, but rather driven by local

actors and objectives. For what is viewed as an Iranian state striving for an apocalypse that will

usher in the messiah, the absence of this tactic is striking, and suggests instead a regime with a

more conservative and pragmatic understanding of the use of force.

The Waning of Revolutionary Iran

We have argued up to this point that even at the peak of Iran’s revolutionary zeal the ideology of

the Islamic Republic only drew on messianic claims to a limited degree and in a limited context.

Never did the regime assert that the revolution would usher in the Mahdi, nor that the war with


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Iraq would achieve this outcome. Antipathy toward Israel and its control over Jerusalem, and

toward Iraq and its control over Shia holy cities, could be viewed in this light but this was never

explicit in the regime’s ideology, despite its emphasis on martyrdom.

With the end of the Iran-Iraq War, even these limited expressions fell by the wayside as

the state and society concerned themselves with postwar and post-revolutionary reconstruction.

Ayatollah Khomeini died in 1989, leaving behind no clear successor who had his legitimacy or

charismatic authority; his presumed successor, Ayatollah Montazeri, fell out with Khomeini and

was stripped of his clerical title. Power largely fell to Ali Khamenei, who had been president from

1985 to 1989, and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who was speaker of parliament from 1980 to 1989.

Khamenei was promoted in clerical rank (to Grand Ayatollah) in order to make him eligible to

replace Khomeini as Supreme Leader, while Rafsanjani was elected to the presidency (where he

served from 1989 to 1997). During this period Iran underwent a period of normalization and

pragmatism. President Rafsanjani in particular pursued a moderate course, favoring economic

reforms that sought to roll back some of the centralization and nationalization that occurred after

the revolution. Rafsanjani also favored a course of increased engagement with the west and the

downplaying of revolutionary ideology. Khamenei was far less enthusiastic about these reforms,

but at the time his position as Supreme Leader was relatively weak. Many expected that following

the death of Khomeini the position of supreme leader would become largely ceremonial, and saw

Rafsanjani’s rise to the presidency as evidence of where power would truly lie. Khamenei would,

of course, come to outflank Rafsanjani, coming to rely on his own cadre of religious leaders as

well as segments of the Revolutionary Guard.28

Khamenei’s power would not become fully evident until the presidency of Rafsanjani’s

successor, Mohammed Khatami (1997-2005), whose own reform program the Supreme Leader


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managed to thwart. Khatami, relatively unknown before his election and strongly backed by

Rafsanjani, engaged on a course of political liberalization that saw a dramatic emergence of civil

society, greater social freedoms for women, and tentative steps toward political decentralization —

all policies eventually stymied by the Supreme Leader. The postwar period was thus characterized

by a struggle over the limits to political change and whether reform represented a rejection of the

goals of the revolution. This is a standard challenge for all revolutionary regimes. Recapturing

the revolutionary moment, akin to China’s Cultural Revolution, is rarely an option. Rather, post-

revolutionary states tend to move toward increasing bureaucratization, an emphasis on

organizational loyalty (“reds” versus “experts”), and the use of patronage and cor ruption as a way

to build loyalty. Iran experienced all of these. As Khamenei managed to beat back reform,

finalized in the presidential election of Tehran mayor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005, the system

had come to exhibit the classic features of a typical clientelist authoritarian system found elsewhere

in the Middle East, with a bureaucratic elite enriched by economic ties and backed by elements

within the military to ensure domestic repression.29

President Ahmadinejad: The Rise of Religious Nationalism

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s election in 2005 was viewed by many inside and outside Iran as

a dangerous turn for domestic and international politics. Ahmadinejad was not formally the

Supreme Leader’s candidate (who refrains from directly endorsing any candidate to maintain his

image as standing above politics), though it was widely asserted by other presidential candidates,

including Rafsanjani, that individuals and organizations close to the Supreme Leader were

mobilized in support of Ahmadinejad’s campaign.30 Most notable and worrisome were charges

that the Revolutionary Guard, the paramilitary group which emerged from the 1979 revolution,

played an active role in this regard. However, it was also clear that Ahmadinejad had benefited


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from his striking contrast to Rafsanjani, whose family wealth, suspected corruption and relative

pragmatism made him appear to many as little more than a cynical opportunist. Ahmadinejad was

known for his modest background and piety, which translated into a populism that resonated with

many. Is too simple to describe the 2005 elections as one where the regime simply pre-selected

its favored candidate and then manipulated the outcome. Ahmadinejad, at least in 2005, clearly

came to power through the support of many Iranians who felt disenfranchised less by theocratic

strictures than by their difficult economic circumstances and the rising gap between rich and poor,

those connected to the system and those lacking such connections. In that sense, the new president

staked out an ambiguous place between the regime and society, given that his populism served as

an implicit critique of the status quo, including those close to Khamenei.

In addition to Ahmadinejad’s populism, another important current was his particular

relationship to Shi’ism. In contrast to the regime’s formal cooptation of the faith as an

underpinning of conservative power, Ahmadinejad spoke of the relationship between politics and

Shi’ism in more radical and personal ways. In his election campaign he spoke of his desire for a

“developed, powerful and Islamic society in Iran so that our country would become the beginning

of the justice-oriented movement of the Lord of the Age,” meaning the Mahdi.31 This hint of

eschatology deviated from the regime’s lack of emphasis on the Mahdi, except in the sense of his

absence as the regime’s justification for rule. On the contrary, what the president was tapping

into was a resurgent messianic strand that apparently had been catalyzed by the 1997 election of

Khatami and his subsequent liberalization initiatives. While supported by some high ranking

ayatollahs, this “mahdist cult” did not help legitimize the regime, but rather served as a potential

challenge. Specifically, by emphasizing the Mahdi “as an absolute sacred source of authority”

for individuals and the nation as a whole it therefore “diminished the status of Khomeini” as a


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central spiritual and political leader.32 One can see this tension as akin to the Roman Catholic

emphasis on centralized spiritual authority versus a Protestant view that emphasizes a direct

connection between the individual and the messiah.

Ahmadinejad’s role at home and abroad began to develop rapidly along several tracks. As

mentioned earlier, already within the first year of his election the president had spoken openly

about Israel’s future (or lack thereof), adding to this conspiracy theories that questioned the

Holocaust and the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks. This was combined with a more overt

emphasis on Iran’s nuclear program, framed as a source of Iranian national pride and as evidence

of the country’s technical prowess in spite of decades of sanctions. At home, while Ahmadinejad

attempted to achieve his populist goals through such areas as job creation, housing support, and

ongoing subsidies for food and gasoline, he more broadly began to frame his leadership within the

context of the Mahdi and his return.

In one example, the president associated himself with the Mahdist focus on Jamkaran, a

heretofore obscure mosque associated with a purported vision of the Mahdi in the tenth century.

As in Iraq, where the Hussein fell and (where many believed the Mahdi still lives), Jamkaran was

seen by Mahdists as a possible means through which one could communicate with the messiah as

well as have wishes fulfilled and illnesses cured. It was also thought by some that the Mahdi

would eventually return at Jamkaran itself. Long disdained by the religious hierarchy, by the 1990s

Jamkaran rose from obscurity to become one of the most important and widely attended shrines in

Iran. The Supreme Leader initially supported the growth of the shrine, perhaps as a power base

against both reformers in Tehran and rival clerics in the nearby theological center of Qom, as well

as to coopt the growing messianic current. However, upon coming to power President

Ahmadinejad became more closely associated with Jamkaran and its symbolism. Rumors had it


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that while still mayor of Tehran Ahmadinejad “put f orward the idea of building a road from Tehran

to the mosque under the pretext that when the time for his grand reappearance comes, the 12th

Imam will need it to reach the capital.”33 As president, one of Ahmadinejad’s early cabinet

decisions was to allocation $17 million for further development of the shrine.34 Jamkaran became

increasingly associated with end times writings that linked contemporary international politics and

organizations to the return of the Mahdi--not unlike the “left behind” literatur e found within

Christianity, including obsessions with Freemasons and world government. In fact, a recent

purview of a central Mahdist website finds dubbed videos on the New World Order originally

produced by American conspiracy theorists.

35

This process of “politicizing the Mahdi cult” was

increasingly associated with Ahmadinejad. According to Amanat, far less visible in these

Mahdist publications are references to Khamenei or even Ayatollah Khomeini, consistent with a

populist view that by nature questions existing political institutions in favor of charismatic action

now.36

During the course of Ahmadinejad’s first term and into his second this messianic and

populist message continued to deepen, aided by a cohort of similarly-minded individuals around

him. In 2005 the president used the United Nations General Assembly meeting as a stage to

propound these ideas, closing with the following obvious reference to the Mahdi:

From the beginning of time, humanity has longed for the day when justice, peace, equality

and compassion envelop the world. All of us can contribute to the establishment of such a

world. When that day comes, the ultimate promise of all Divine religions will be fulfilled

with the emergence of a perfect human being who is heir to all prophets and pious men. He

will lead the world to justice and absolute peace. O mighty Lord, I pray to you to hasten


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the emergence of your last repository, the promised one, that perfect and pure human being,

the one that will fill this world with justice and peace.37

Similarly, in 2006 he concluded his UN speech with a similar Mahdist reference:

Almighty God, all men and women are Your creatures and You have ordained their

guidance and salvation. Bestow upon humanity that thirsts for justice, the perfect human

being promised to all by You, and make us among his followers and among those who

strive for his return and his cause.38

Ahmadinejad's rhetoric elicited strong responses, both inside and outside Iran. Inside Iran,

there was consternation when it emerged that, in conservation with Ayatollah Javadi Amoli,

Ahmadinejad claimed that during his 2005 speech he was “surrounded by a halo of light,”

suggesting that he had been in direct contact with, if not in some way directed by, the Mahdi

himself.39 Outside Iran, some observers pointed to speeches were evidence that the president

sought to actively hasten the Mahdi’s return, placing an apocalyptic frame around the presidency

and Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Conservative American commentators like Charles

Krauthammer asserted that Iran was “arming for Armageddon” and that “this kind of man would

have, to put it gently, less inhibition about starting Armageddon than a normal person. Indeed,

with millennial bliss pending, he would have positive incentive to, as they say in Jewish

eschatology, hasten the end.”40 This is, of course, a tremendous leap of logic to argue that any

political leader who believes in the coming of a savior by extension also favors being an agent of

his return. Similar arguments were made about George Bush Jr.'s evangelical Christianity.41

Ahmadinejad's public statements were not meant to announce to the world that he was

seeking to bring the world to an end. Rather, this rhetoric was part of Ahmadinejad's populist


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campaign back home, seeking to use Mahdism as a powerbase through which he and his followers

could hold power following the end of his second term in 2013 (Iran has a two-term limit for the

presidency). The president and those around him have sought to build a long-lasting political

faction that could hold the presidency well past Ahmadinejad's second term — a long term, rational

strategy.42 We will turn to this argument next.

On closer examination the Mahdism associated with Ahmadinejad appears more

complicated than a simple emphasis on eschatology suggests. Most intriguing in this regard has

been Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, a figure tightly connected to the president through politics and

marriage (Mashaei's daughter is married to Ahmadinejad's son). Ahmadinejad has made it clear

that his preference was that Mashaei follow him as president, even suggesting that he himself

might return to the presidency once Mashaei completed his tenure, along the lines of the Putin-

Medvedev model.43 Mashaei's association with the Mahdist group is clear — some have argued

that he was one of the main supporters of the infrastructural improvements at Jamkaran. However,

his public statements and activities have been far more populist and at times clearly inconsistent

with a messianic vision of imminent global redemption. Mashaei's approach has been described

as “religious nationalist,” with a greater emphasis on the Iranian nation, pre-Islamic history, and

the potential role of Iran as a powerful state re-integrated into the global system.44

To that end, Mashaei’s continued development of Mahdism has taken several interesting

turns. In 2005 Mashaei attended a cultural event in Turkey that featured a procession of female

drummers; while a relatively tame affair, video of the event drew consternation among many

Iranian clerics.45 Elsewhere, he curiously observed that “God cannot be the fulcrum for the unity

of mankind,” which was interpreted both as an attack on the clergy as well as a suggestion of the

primacy of national identities over internationalist political Islam.46 Along those lines, in 2008


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Mashaei went much further, stating on television that “Iran is a friend of the people in the United

States and in Israel, and this is an honor.” In some translations the term “nation” was used instead

of “people,” though given his word choice— mardom as opposed to mellat --the latter is more

accurate. This drew a sharp response from other political leaders, especially those long opposed

to Ahmadinejad. Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani rejected the very notion of an Israeli people

as anyone other than Palestinians, while national television denounced Mashaei's statement as

“scandalous.” Rather than back down or clarify, Mashaei only reiterated his position, saying again

that “my statement was that we, the Iranian people, are friends of the whole wide world, even the

people of Israel and America. There is no reason for us not to be friends. I did not deny having

made this statement--and I am not denying it now. Absolutely not. I am proud of what I said, and

I will say it again a thousand times.”47 In spite of the outcry, Ahmadinejad rallied behind Mashaei.

In 2009 he attempted to appoint him first vice president. The president relented only after the the

Supreme Leader wrote directly to Ahmadinejad. Even then, the president did not respond until

“state media publicized the letter several days later amid warnings that Ahmadinejad must heed

Khamenei's wishes.”48 Mashaei's provocative comments continued. In 2010 at a conference for

Iranian expatriates sponsored by the president's office, he juxtaposed a “school of Islam” with a

“school of Iran,” emphasizing the importance of Islam within Iranian identity and concluding that

“from now on, we should promote the school of Iran for the world.” Mashaei stated that “without

Iran, Islam would be lost,” observing, as he had in past, that Iran had freed Islam from being carried

by the unenlightened (read: Arabs).49 In short, Mashaei was presenting Iran, through his Mahdist

framework, as a “normal” state with a national identity that seeks international legitimacy and is

willing to grant that legitimacy to other states in return.


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What is the future of Mahdism, at least as put forth by Ahmadinejad, Mashaei, and their

supporters? It appears to be the case that, one scholar put it “we are entering into a new stage in

the life cycle of the Islamic republic...where Iranian nationalism certainly dominates Islamic

interests and pan-Islamism.”50 Under Ahmadinejad and with Mashaei the emphasis on the

Mahdi's return has been framed as paving the way for an Iranian Islam — a nationalism that in many

ways rejects the internationalism of 1979, and echoes the similar decay of revolutionary ideologies

into nationalism in such places as the Soviet Union and China. This understanding helps makes

sense of Ahmadinejad's focus on nuclear technology, in spite of his lack of control of this segment

of the state. Consistently Ahmadinejad placed this debate within the context of national pride, not

Islamic internationalism or the idea of an “Islamic bomb.” Most illustrative, literally, in this

regard was the design of the 50000 Rial note unveiled in 2007. The reverse features the image of

Iran and the Persian Gulf (the latter clearly demarcated as such, in English, as a retort to those

Arab states that reject the name), an atomic symbol superimposed over the country, and finally, a

hadith from the Prophet to the effect that "Even if they put knowledge on a remote star, Persians

will find it.”51

Our discussion of the rise of Mahdism as a form of religious nationalism has several

implications that are worth reiterating. First, contemporary Mahdism has been not a promulgation

of the clergy, but a lay movement. Second, these ideas have been taken up by political elites who

have married them to populist rhetoric, in order to build public support and a base of power. Third,

these same elites have sought to transform this populism into religious nationalism, as both a

counterweight to the religious bureaucracy and as a way to re-found the decaying regime. These

are not the elements of an end time-focused, irrational group, but one that is instrumental and


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focused on gaining and keeping domestic power and international legitimacy. Religious

nationalism, then, is the expression of the quest for a stable post-revolutionary state.

The Battle Against the “Deviant Current”

As this religious nationalism began to grow in power within Ahmadinejad's camp, rival

political factions and allies of the Supreme Leader went on the attack. This very factionalism is

yet another piece of evidence against the argument that Iran is controlled by a monolithic political

elite bent on the apocalypse.

The first major skirmish in this battle was with the aforementioned demand by the Supreme

Leader that Ahmadinejad rescind Mashaei's appointment as first vice-president. The 2009

presidential election and subsequent Green movement weakened Ahmadinejad, who was forced

to turn to Khamenei to back his reelection (most likely through voter fraud). The president, who

in his first term seemed capable of eventually eclipsing the Supreme Leader, was now vulnerable.

Accordingly, the president's opponents went on the offensive, accusing those around the president

of corruption, much as Ahmadinejad had done of them in past. The faction around the president

was described as a “pillar of sedition” and a “deviant current.” This current was accused of

financial corruption, attempting to establish links with the US and Israel, plotting to steal the 2013

presidential elections and perhaps most telling, promoting “Iranism,” “infidel nationalism,”

fortunetelling and witchcraft. The deputy governor of the Central Bank, the director of the Islamic

Republic News Agency, a former deputy foreign minister and numerous others close to

Ahmadinejad and Mashaei were arrested.52 It appears that, at least for now, the current of religious


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nationalism promoted through Mahdism has been blunted by the Supreme Leader and his allies.

The bigger war for the future of the Iranian regime, however, is likely not over.

Conclusions

We began this paper with the question of whether Iran is a rational state, or one governed

by an ideology that was more likely to court a risky foreign policy, particularly the use of nuclear

weapons. The view that Iran is an irrational state is typically based on the argument that the

regime's revolutionary religious ideology demands the expansion of the revolution, by force if

necessary. Related to this is the more specific assertion that Shia Islam, and within it the emphasis

on a messiah or Mahdi, imbues Iranian politics with an eschatology that views the end of days as

imminent. The rise of President Ahmadinejad and his supporters, alongside the progression of

Iran's nuclear program, is seen as the inevitable intersection between religious zealotry and the

capacity for mass destruction. Iran, the argument goes, sees the end of the world as imminent, and

itself as the harbinger of this change.

In this paper we have laid out a number of elements that refute this charge. First, while the

concept of the Hidden Imam is central to Shi'ism, there has long been a strong argument within

the clergy that the eventual return of the Mahdi was not a matter for humans to attend to. Second,

Khomeini justified his vision of clerical rule specifically around the idea that since the Mahdi was

in occultation, it was necessary to build and institutionalize a new regime that could serve on his

behalf. The revolution was not portrayed as a penultimate stage in the Mahdi's return except in

the most abstract sense. Third, although messianic symbols and rhetoric were deployed during the

Iran-Iraq War, complete with the call to liberate Jerusalem, this too was framed in terms of national

defense and the desire to liberate the Palestinians, the latter a calculated decision meant to rally


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Arab support. Forth, while martyrdom operations were common in Iran during the Iran-Iraq war,

suicide terrorism has relatively little connection to Iran, belying this piece of evidence of the

regime's supposed “death cult.” Fifth, upon the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War, the major symbols

and rhetorical devices utilized by the regime to mobilize the war effort largely dissipated as some

political elites sought to normalize politics and move past the Revolution. Sixth, although

messianic views re-emerged strongly with the President Ahmadinejad and his allies, this was less

about fulfilling the destiny of Shia eschatology than building a powerbase of religious nationalism

that could rival the Supreme Leader and retain power, akin to the Putin model in Russia. Seventh,

evidence of the regime's actual hostility toward Mahdism has its attack on this faction, condemning

attempts to claim any direct connection to the Hidden Imam and branding such views as

tantamount of sorcery and heresy.

Is Iran a messianic state yearning toward an apocalypse? The evidence indicates that it is

not. To be certain, ongoing factionalization with the state can mean that its decision-making is

becoming less unitary and thus less rational. But this is an organizational problem, not a religious

or ideological one, and one that is probably exacerbated by international sanctions as resources are

closed off and insider connections become a powerful resource. International actors can do little

to improve the internal integrity of the Iranian state, beyond a “grand bargain” that reestablishes

relations between Iran and other countries, specifically the United States. However, such

normalization is not only problematic because of the nuclear issue. As the vision of a world

transformed by the Iranian Revolution has dimmed, Supreme Leader Khamenei and his allies have

only their battle against American imperialism as the remaining justification for their rule.

Ironically, then, a resurgent religious nationalism may provide the best opportunity for a

rapprochement between Iran and the west.


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1 “The Price of Inaction: An Analysis of Energy and Economic Effects of a Nuclear Iran,” Bipartisan Policy Center,

October 10, 2012, p. 21. http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Iran%20Report.pdf

2 Ibid., p. 21.

3 See Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 38.

4 Kasra Naji, Ahmadinejad: The Secret History of Iran's Radical Leader (Berkeley: University of California Press,

2008); see also Raymond Whitaker, “Mahmoud Ahmadinejad: The Nuclear Prophet,” The Independent , January 15,

2006, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/profiles/mahmoud-ahmadinejad-the-nuclear-prophet-523025.html

5 Mark Hitchcock, The Apocalypse of Ahmadinejad: The Revelation of Iran's Nuclear Prophet (New York: Random

House, 2009); Yossi Melman, Meir Javedanfar , The Nuclear Sphinx of Tehran: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the

State of Iran (New York: Basic Books, 2008).

6 Joel Rosenberg, “Ahmadinejad's Apocalyptic Address,” National Review Online, September 23, 2011,

http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/278195/ahmadinejads-apocalyptic-address-joel-c-rosenberg. Ironically, this

view mirrors that of many evangelical Christians in the US, albeit with the roles of good and evil reversed and Iran

playing the role of the Anti-Christ.

7 Ibid.

8 Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Point of No Return,” The Atlantic, September 2010.

http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/09/the-point-of-no-return/308186/

9 See Abbas Amanat, Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shi’ism (London: IB Taurus, 2009), pp. 206-07.

10 Ibid., p. 50.

11 Roger Hardy, “Confusion Surrounds Najaf Battle,” BBC News, 31 January 2007

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6313433.stm; Louise Roug and Saad Fakhrildeen, “Religious Cult Targeted

in Fierce Battle near Najaf,” Los Angeles Times, 30 January 2007, http://articles.latimes.com/2007/jan/30/world/fg-messiah30

12 Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Islamic Government . http://www.al-islam.org/islamicgovernment/3.htm

13 Kingshuk Chatterjee, Ali Shari'ati and the Shaping of Political Islam in Iran (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,

2011); Ali Shariati, “Red Shi'ism” http://www.al-islam.org/beliefs/philosophy/redshiism.html

14 Martin, Vanessa. Creating an Islamic State: Khomeini and the Making of a New Iran (New York: I.B. Tauris,

2003).

15 Amanat, op. cit., p. 193

16 “Qom Groups Call to Khomeyni to Accept Presidency,” Tehran Home Service 5 July 1979; trans. BBC Summary

of World Broadcasts, 7 July 1979.17 Fouad Ajami The Vanished Imam: Musa Al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,

1987).

18 Yaroslav Trofimov, The Siege of Mecca: The Forgotten Uprising in Islam's Holiest Shrine and the Birth of Al

Qaeda (New York: Random House, 2007).


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19 For an excellent discussion of the role of the Basij in Iran see Saeid Golkar, “Organization of t he Oppressed or

Organization for Oppressing: Analysing the Role of the Basij Militia of Iran,” Politics, Religion & Ideology vol. 13,

no. 4 (2012) 455-471.

20 John Kiefer, "In Iran’s War, Youth and Islam." The New York Times (April 7, 1982).

21 Tehran Home Service 7 July 1986, excerpted in “Revolutionary Guards Commander on Karbala 1 operation."

trans. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 9 July 1986.

22 Loren Jenkins, "Khomeini Rejects New Truce Offer, Calls for Victory; Iraq Renews Truce Offer; Khomeini Calls

for Final Victory." The Washington Post , 5 October 1980.

23 James LeMoyne, "Khomeini's Holy War." Newsweek . 26 July 1982.

24 The role of the Palestinian cause in the Iranian Revolution is discussed in detail in Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival:

How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future (New York: WW Norton, 2007). See also Trita Parsi,

Treacherous Alliance - The Secret Dealings of Iran, Israel and the United States (Yale University Press, 2007), also

Martin, op. cit, p. 72.

25 See, for example, Ali Alfoneh, “Iran's Suicide Brigades,” Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2007, pp. 37-44.

26 Daniel Helmer, “Hezbollah's Employment of Suicide Bombing During the 1980s: The Theological, Political, and

Operational Development of a New Tactic,” Military Review, July-August 2006

http://www.army.mil/professionalWriting/volumes/volume4/november_2006/11_06_1.html

27 “Bus Bombing Suspects Stayed in Bulgaria,” UPI , 7 Feburary 2013 http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-

News/2013/02/07/Bus-bombing-suspects-stayed-in-Bulgaria/UPI-70841360246052/#ixzz2KIiNbE00

28 For more on Khamenei's political objectives and worldview see Karim Sadjadpour, “Reading Khamenei: The

World View of Iran's Most Powerful Leader,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 10, 2008.

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2008/03/10/reading-khamenei-world-view-of-iran-s-most-powerful-leader/b1p29 An excellent discussion of clientelism in Iran can be found in Kazem Alamdari, “The Power Structure of the

Islamic Republic of Iran: Transition from Populism to Clientelism, and Militarization of the Government,” Third

World Quarterly, vol. 26, no. 2 (2005), 1285-1301.

30 “Iran Loser Blasts 'Illegal' Poll,” BBC News, 25 June 2005 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4622955.stm

31 Siyasat-e Ruz, Tehran, in Persian, 28 May 2005 p 2; trans. BBC Monitoring Middle East, 7 June 2005

32 Amanat, op. cit. p. 238

33 Ali Reza Eshraghi, Raha Tahami, “Ahmadinejad Promoted Shrine Draws Millions” Institute for War and Peace

Reporting, 4 May 2010, http://iwpr.net/report-news/ahmadinejad-promoted-shrine-draws-millions

34

Scott Peterson, “Waiting for the Rapture in Iran,” The Christian Science Monitor , 21 December 21, 2005http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1221/p01s04-wome.html

35 Amanat, op. cit pp 236-39; see the website www.moudood.org for some examples of western conspiracy theory

documentaries that have been dubbed into Farsi.

36 Amanat, op. cit., p. 236.


33/33

37 “Address by H.E. Dr. Mahmood Ahmadinejad President of the Islamic Republic of Iran before the Sixtieth

Session of the United Nations General Assembly New York — 17 September 2005,” Islamic Republic of Iran

Permanent Mission to the United Nations, http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/60/statements/iran050917eng.pdf

38 “Transcript of Ahmadinejad's U.N. Speech ,” National Public Radio, 19 September 2006

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6107339

39 Golnaz Esfandiari, “Iran: President Says Light Surrounded Him During US Speech,” Radio Free Europe/Radio

Liberty, 29 November 2005 http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1063353.html

40 Charles Krauthammer, “In Iran, Arming for Armageddon,” Washington Post , 16 December 2005

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/15/AR2005121501428.html

41 Joan Didion, “Mr. Bush and the Divine,” The New York Review of Books, 6 November 2003

http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2003/nov/06/mr-bush-the-divine/

42 See Robert Tait, “Ahmadinejad Floored by Bugs, Spirits and Djinns,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 06 May

2011, http://www.rferl.org/content/ahmadinejad_weakened_by_attacks_on_subordinates/24093844.html

43 Saeed Kamali Dehghan, “Who Will Succeed Ahmadinejad in Iran's Presidential Election Next Year?” The

Guardian, 7 September 2012 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/iran-blog/2012/sep/07/ahmadinejad-iran-

presidential-election

44 “US Embassy Cables: Mashaei Groomed as Possible Successor to Ahmadinejad in Iran,” The Guardian, 21 April

2011 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/246010

45 A copy of the video can be found on YouTube under the title “Quran and Drummer Women: Islam, Ahmadinejad

Style!” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kf3_5Zd-iDg (accessed 27 February 2013)

46 See “Chronology of Controversy: Who is Esfandiar Mashaei?” Irdiplomacy.com, 30 November 2010

http://www.irdiplomacy.ir/en/page/9503/Chronology+of+Controversy.html. This website appears to be associatedwith Iranian politicians in the reformist camp.

47 Channel 2, Iran, 12 August 2008. This news item can be found, subtitled in English, at MemriTV.

http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/1834.htm.

48 “US Embassy Cables,” op cit.

49 “Chronology of Controversy,” op. cit.

50 Robert Tait, “Iranian President's New 'Religious Nationalism' Alienates Hard -Line Constituency,” 18 August

2010

http://www.rferl.org/content/Iranian_Presidents_New_ReligiousNationalism_Alienates_HardLine_Constituency/21

31415.html51 “Iran's New 50,000-Rial Notes Bear Logo of Nuclear Energy,” Fars News Agency, 3 March 2007; BBC

Worldwide Monitoring, 3 March 2007.

52 See “Iran Guards Official Says Ahmadinezhad, Masha'i 'conjoined twin',” Mehr News Agency, trans. BBC

Worldwide Monitoring, 21 June, 2011; “It is the President's Turn Now,” Javan, 16 May 2011, trans. BBC

Worldwide Monitoring, 20 May 2011.

a messianic state_ideology rationality and eschatology in iranian politics

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