a land war in asia: military balance analysis of the russian federation and the people’s republic...

7/23/2019 A Land War in Asia: Military Balance Analysis of The Russian Federation and The People’s Republic of China

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/a-land-war-in-asia-military-balance-analysis-of-the-russian-federation-and 1/44

ALandWarinAsia:MilitaryBalanceAnalysisof

TheRussianFederationand

ThePeople’sRepublicofChina

StephenA.Taft

sDecember10,2012



1

The next war on land will be very different from the last one, in that we shall have to fight it in a different way. In

reaching a decision on that matter, we must first be clear about certain rules of war. Rule 1, on page I of the book of

war, is: "Do not march on Moscow". Various people have tried it, Napoleon and Hitler, and it is no good. That is

the first rule. I do not know whether your Lordships will know Rule 2 of war. It is: "Do not go fighting with your

land armies in China". It is a vast country, with no clearly defined objectives, and an army fighting there would be

engulfed by what is known as the Ming Bing, the people's insurgents.1

In 1962, General Bernard Montgomery advised the House of Lords that rules one and

two of war were “do not march on Moscow” and “do not go fighting with your land armies in

China”.2 Today, Russia and China would do as well as any to heed Montgomery’s words. In the

twenty-first century, Russia and China remain the two largest and most formidable land powers

in Asia and invading them is an even dimmer prospect than in Montgomery’s time. The Russian

Federation’s nuclear deterrent is larger and deadlier than was the Soviet Union’s when

Montgomery addressed Parliament, while the People’s Republic of China (PRC) produces

seventy times the wealth each year as when Mao Zedong “experimented with half mankind”3.

Russia and China are partners in autocracy and mistrust of the West, just as they are partners in

the armaments and energy trade. Yet fissures are finally emerging in Sino-Russian relations;

fissures which could provoke a decisive and even destructive rift between the two Eurasian

powers. A war between Russia and China remains a remote possibility, but not so remote as to

not merit a preemptive analysis of why and how it might occur. Russia is more likely to be the

instigator and the victor of such a conflict. Vladimir Putin’s Russia might be a shadow of the

giant that was the USSR, but it has a ballistic and technological edge that rest on the shoulders of

that giant. For the moment, China’s miraculous rise has not yet equipped it for a wrestle with the

Russian bear. However, China might survive the political fallout of this confrontation more

successfully than Russia, for the men in the Kremlin would have banked their waning political

capital upon an adventure on the steppes of Asia. It would not be the first time that such an

adventure proved their downfall.

1GeneralBernardMontgomery,quotedinHANSARD1803–2005,THEARMYESTIMATES

HLDeb30May1962vol241cc189-257 http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1962/may/30/the-army-

estimates#S5LV0241P0-007912Ibid.3PhraseattributabletoPaulJohnson,Chapter16titleofModernTimes:TheWorldfromtheTwentiestothe

Eighties,(NewYork:Harper&RowPublishers,1983)



2

The political rationale for a war between the Russian Federation and the People’s

Republic of China would rest upon an unraveling of what is certainly among the most important

and yet enigmatic relationships between any two nations on the globe. Russia and China are in

the midst of reversing the roles of greater and lesser power that they have traditionally held for

centuries and this change is much of what may drive the two towards confrontation. Until the

1990s, Russia had for centuries been undisputedly more influential and powerful than China.

Tsarist Russia repeatedly defeated Imperial Chinese forces, imposing “unequal treaties” and

seizing over much of Manchuria and Xinjiang for direct or indirect colonial exploitation. As

early twentieth century China crumbled into civil war and foreign invasion, an even more

powerful Russia rose from the strife of Communist revolution. The Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics (USSR) rose to become a global superpower with the largest military the world had

ever seen. In 1949, Mao Zedong’s People’s Republic of China joined the Communist umbrella of

the USSR as little more than a vassal state of its northern neighbor, dependent on Russia for

military equipment, nuclear deterrence, economic aid, and perhaps even its inception in the first

place. Although relations soured in the 1960s, culminating in the Sino-Soviet split and eventual

rapprochement between China and the United States, the USSR remained the dominant power in

Asia and an existential threat to all that Mao Zedong and his Chinese Communist Party (CCP)

had built.

Yet in the 1980s the power relationship between Russia and China began to change

dramatically. The Soviet Union buckled under the weight of its failing Communist enterprise,

eventually setting loose its empire and dismantling the Communist system and power structure.

By 1991, the Soviet Union was once again simply “Russia”, a bankrupt, disordered, and

definitively declining shadow of its former self. The political system careened through various

shades of autocracy and disorder, finally settling into an oligarchic “presidential dictatorship”

whose power players traded oil concessions for political favors. The nuclear arsenal contracted to

a shell of its Cold War high. The military became a corrupt, embittered, ill-disciplined,

underfunded, and poorly equipped mass of conscripts and nostalgic Red Army officers. Russia’s

global influence receded far behind the Iron Curtain, as liberal democracy and American

hegemony encircled Russia from Bergen to Sakhalin. As Russia spiraled into decline, China

skyrocketed to meteoric success. Economic liberalization powered the Chinese economy to

dozens of times its former size by the 1990s, creating an immense export-driven manufacturing



3

economy upon which Western service economies increasingly relied for cheap outsourced labor

and capital. With great wealth came greater technology, education, political influence, and

military power. The People’s Liberation Army became a smaller (relatively), but more

professional and better equipped force than it had been during the Cold War. China’s nuclear

arsenal began to grow into a respectable deterrent force. Between the early 1980s and late 1990s,

the alteration in Russia and China’s relative positions could not have been more dramatic. 4

At the same time as Russia and China switched places politically, their relations began to

thaw and eventually improve into what many observers saw as a peacetime alliance. Soviet

Premier Mikhail Gorbachev was present in Beijing during the infamous Tiananmen Square

massacre in 1989 trying to heal the Sino-Soviet split. During the 1990s, Russia entered a large

commercial relationship with China, selling the latter military technology, armaments, and

energy resources. Russia and China jointly penetrated Central Asia economically and negotiated

on the possibility of new oil pipelines. Russian and Chinese nuclear missiles targeting one

another were supposedly de-targeted in the 1990s. The “Shanghai Five” was founded in 1996, an

informal military alliance between Russia, China, and some of the former Soviet Socialist

Republics of Central Asia. The treaty names were revealing: “Treaty on Deepening Military

Trust in Border Regions” (1996) and “Treaty on Reduction of Military Forces in Border

Regions” (1997). In 2001, the alliance solidified into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.5

As this partnership went on, Russian and Chinese diplomats operated under a “no first” doctrine,

maintaining a semblance of diplomatic equality. Russia and China backed each other in many

diplomatic disputes with the West and respected each other’s frequent human rights violations.

Symbolically, Russia and China have presented themselves to the world as counter-models to the

liberal democracy of the United States. In the early 2000s, it would have seemed far-fetched to

imagine any armed confrontation between these two bastions of “sovereign democracy”.6

4Garnett,ShermanW.,RapprochementorRivalry?:Russia-ChinaRelationsinaChangingAsia ,(WashingtonDC:

CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace,2000),3-400;5However,theShanghaiCooperationOrganizationisnotan“alliance”intheNATOsense.AstheCenterfor

StrategicandInternationalStudiesexplains,TheSCOseemsprimarilytobeprimarilyreflectionofChinese

willingnesstosupportwhatBeijinghascalleda“healthyCentralAsianorder,”freefromanyseparatist,Islamist,or

pro-WesternforcesthatmightacttodestabilizeChina.”SeeCentralAsianSecurityTrends:ViewsfromEuropeand

Russia,Ed.StephenJ.Blank,(CenterforStrategicandInternationalStudies,April19,2011),12-13.

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1063(Accessed12/1/2012).6RussianForeignPolicyinthe21stCentury ,Ed.RobertE.Kanet,(London:PalgraveMacmillan,2011),3-221.



4

As the twenty-first century began to unfold, however, trends emerged in the Sino-Russian

relationship that raised some serious questions about the partnership’s long-term prospects. As a

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) publication said of Russia, “ for the last 15

years, the national political and military elite have been agreed that there was no conventional

military threat from China, because of improved relations. But that situation has been changing

rapidly over the last several years.”7 Under the firm, centralized leadership of Vladimir Putin, the

Russian Federation revived definitively as a great power and began to assert itself more

aggressively in its old backyard. Putin increased central control and efficiency in the bureaucracy

and military. Putin resisted Western efforts to intervene against Muslim regimes in Iran, Libya,

and finally Syria (where Russia retains a naval base). He expanded Russia’s leverage in the

energy trade, occasionally bullying former satellites such as the Ukraine with the power of the

pipeline. Putin concluded the Second Chechnyan War on more favorable terms than the previous

one and invaded Georgia in 2008 to forestall NATO expansion in the Caucasus. In the 1990s,

Russia had encouraged Chinese economic penetration of Central Asia so as to offset the West,

but in the 2000s Russia resumed its own penetration in earnest, establishing a military base in

Kyrgyzstan. In Central Asia and a number of other cases, Russian foreign policy now diverges

from what China regards as its own best interests. Russia has assumed a more skeptical policy

towards North Korea than China; the latter implicitly guarantees the safely of the Democratic

People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) regime. Russia’s emerging policy of guaranteeing the

“safety” of supposed Russian nationals in surrounding countries so as to create protectorates has

unsettled China, which reacted negatively to the Georgian intervention. Russia has reached out to

its old partner, India, so as to offset China and counter its patronage of Pakistan. Given that India

borders China, has fought a war with it, and rivals China’s population and economy, this move is

deeply disturbing to Beijing. Russia has also reached out to Vietnam with arms and nuclear sales,

eliciting some of the same Chinese concerns.8 Chinese immigration to the Russian Far East and

Chinese economic penetration of the declining region is unsettling to Russian policy-makers,

7RussianNuclearWeapons:Past,Present,andFuture, Ed.StephenBlank,(TheCenterforStrategicand

InternationalStudies,November22,2011,),462,

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=1087(Accessed12/1/2012)8Blank,Stephen.“Russia’sEverFriendlierTiestoVietnam—AreTheyaSignaltoChina?”,EurasiaDailyMonitor

Volume:9Issue:219,November30,2012,(1-2)

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_t

tnews[any_of_the_words]=china%20world&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=40184&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=c8a07ab49

45b212568d3b3341075ca7b (Accessed11/30/2012)



5

who fear that their most valuable energy provinces will be swamped by migrants from the giant

in the south.9

On the Chinese side, there are also developments which cast a pall over the Sino-Russian

partnership. The most obvious is of course that China has finally usurped Russia’s traditional

role as the greatest power in Asia. In 2011, China’s $7 trillion economy became second only to

that of the United States, grew at a rate of 11% per year, and became possessor of 10% of the

American national debt.10 China’s military budget was $120 billion in 2012, whereas it was only

$30 billion in 2000.11 By contrast, Russia’s GDP is a mediocre $1.9 trillion per annum, smaller

than the economies of many far smaller nations and is dependent more on the fluctuating price of

oil than any fundamental strength or dynamism.12 Russia’s military budget is around $70 billion,

significantly less than China’s.13

When international observers speak of an emerging rival to the

United States’ global hegemony, they invariably speak of China, not Russia. In the first decade

of the twenty-first century, China’s military-industrial complex has advanced and expanded

exponentially. In the past twelve years, China has made phenomenal progress in shipping

technology and significant progress in aerospace technology. The People’s Liberation Army

(PLA) fields significant numbers of weapon systems, such as J-20 aircraft and Type-96 armor,

9StrategicAsia2011-2012:AsiaRespondstoItsRisingPowersChinaandIndia ,Ed.AshleyJ.Tellis,TravisTanner,

andJessicaKeough.(WashingtonDC,TheNationalBureauofAsianResearch,2011),227-259.

10GooglePublicData,GrossNationalProductinPPPDollars,

http://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9_&met_y=ny_gdp_mktp_kd_zg&idim=country:CHN

&dl=en&hl=en&q=china+gdp+growth#!ctype=l&strail=false&bcs=d&nselm=h&met_y=ny_gnp_mktp_pp_cd&scale

_y=lin&ind_y=false&rdim=region&idim=country:CHN:USA:RUS&ifdim=region&hl=en_US&dl=en&ind=false

(Accessed11/10/2012)11Lash,Iacopo,"ChineseNuclearStrategy,No-First-Use,andUS-ChineseNuclearStability”,

http://www.asianarmscontrol.com/content/chinese-nuclear-strategy-no-first-use-and-us-chinese-nuclear-stability

AsianArmsControlProject,GeorgetownUniversityDepartmentofGovernment,September24,2012,(Accessed,

12/1/2012),1.12GooglePublicData,GrossNationalProductinPPPDollars,

http://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9_&met_y=ny_gdp_mktp_kd_zg&idim=country:CHN

&dl=en&hl=en&q=china+gdp+growth#!ctype=l&strail=false&bcs=d&nselm=h&met_y=ny_gnp_mktp_pp_cd&scale

_y=lin&ind_y=false&rdim=region&idim=country:CHN:USA:RUS&ifdim=region&hl=en_US&dl=en&ind=false

(Accessed11/10/2012);Diehl,Jackson,“TheComingCollapse:AuthoritariansinChinaandRussiaFacean

Endgame”,WorldAffairs,Summer/October2012Issue,http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/coming-

collapse-authoritarians-china-and-russia-face-endgame(Accessed,12/1/2012),1-14.;Aslund,Anders,“HowPutin

isTurningRussiaintoOneBigEnron”,Issue5018,TheMoscowTimes ,November21st,2012,(1-2)

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/how-putin-is-turning-russia-into-one-big-enron/471734.html

(Accessed12/3/2012).13TheMilitaryBalance,(London,Taylor&FrancisGroup,2012) ,192



6

which are comparable to mainline Russian ones.14 That China has far greater manpower

(Russia’s is in fact declining) and sheer numbers of weapon platforms such as armor is a

menacing backdrop to China’s increasing military technology.15 In 2012, a team of American

researches discovered open source indications that China’s “Second Artillery” has amassed a far

larger arsenal of nuclear warheads than was previously supposed, something on the order of

1,800 missiles in reinforced underground silos and tunnels.16 Russia is now apprehensive about

China’s nuclear capabilities and backs India’s in response. In recent years, India has replaced

China as Russia’s largest armaments client and this is no coincidence, but a deliberate choice on

the part of Russia. Finally, Chinese importation of all but the most advanced Russian weapon

systems are declining precipitously and this is partially because Russian arms dealers regard

bolstering the PLA with increasing trepidation. Russia has imposed increasing restrictions on

arms sales to China, while China has decreasing need for them in the first place. China is now an

immense arms exporter in its own right. The PLA no longer needs to import many completed

weapon systems from Russia, but only advanced individual components such as aircraft

engines.17 Russia still maintains a clear technological edge on land, sea, and air, but China is

closing the gap at an alarming rate. In sum, Russia now borders a nation with a vastly larger

population, growth rate, and manufacturing base (not to mention a larger military whose

technology is closing the gap). China is not only far closer to Russia than the US, but Chinese

leaders face few less ethical and political constraints to implementing what they see as a

secularized “mandate of heaven” to be the hegemonic power in Asia.18

In the “Great Game” of dominance over the Third World and its energy resources, Russia

also has cause to rethink its relationship with China. Russia had hoped to become an

indispensable provider of energy to China, which now imports half of its oil needs. Yet Russia

14Barabanov,Mikhail,VasiliyKashin,andKonstantinMakienko, ShootingStar:China’sMilitaryModernizationin

the21stCentury ,(Minneapolis,EastViewPress,2012),1-200.15TheMilitaryBalance,2012,184-185;StrategicAsia2011-2012:AsiaRespondstoItsRisingPowersChinaand

India,227-259.16Arbatov,Aleksey,ViktorYeltsin,AleksandrLukin,VasiliyMikheyev,andAleksandrKhramchikhim,“Prospectsfor

China’sParticipationinNuclearArmsLimitation”,Trans.AlekseyArbatov,VladimirDvorkin,andSergey

Oznobishchev,(TranslatedbytheAsianArmsControlProjectoftheGeorgetownUniversityDepartmentof

Government,WashingtonDC.Originallypublished:Moscow,Russia:InstituteofWorldEconomyandInternational

RelationsoftheRussianAcademyofSciencesNuclearThreatInitiativeFoundation,2012),28-39;AsianArms

ControlProject,GeorgetownUniversityDepartmentofGovernment,September24,2012,

http://www.asianarmscontrol.com/(Accessed,12/1/2012),17Barabanov,1-200.

18Barabanov,1-200.



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risks becoming more of an energy “appendage” to China than an energy influencer, because the

Chinese market has failed to have the hoped-for transformative effect on Russia’s own economy

and China is breaking out of reliance on Russian energy. Far East Russia continues to stagnate

and Western Russia has not prospered after Communism to the degree that China has. Moreover,

China is exploiting new markets in Central Asia and elsewhere in the Third World. In the arms

market, China is also increasingly less reliant on and more competitive with Russia. China is

more reliable and less sensitive to Western pressure than Russia is when it comes to selling arms

to anti-Western Third World dictatorships. This gives China an emerging cadre of sympathetic

despots in Africa and Asia, much as the Soviet Union once had. In Russia and China’s most

delicate borderland, Central Asia, China has pursued a devious course of action increasingly at

the expense of Russia. Rather than station troops in Central Asia, China has taken the less

threatening course of delivering hundreds of thousands of migrants works to develop the region

and has solidified economic ties with many of the nations therein, who fear Russia’s renewed

interest in dominating the region. Russian troops have gradually withdrawn from providing the

entire security of the southern Central Asian states, leaving an uneasy power vacuum in some

parts, even though Russian influence still pervades the region.19

These trends demonstrate the

Russia now has more to fear from the status-quo than China. If Russia fears that economic and

political domination by China (the reverse of the 1960s) is inevitable, then Russia will regard

China not as a valuable partner, but a potential enemy.20

A potential enemy is very far, of course, from an actual enemy. To say that Russia and

China’s strategic partnership will soon unravel into outright competition is not to say that

missiles will soon spring from their silos or that anyone will shortly be “marching on Moscow

(or Beijing)”. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization still exists on paper and in the occasional

military exercise, even if Russian and Chinese policymakers are too realist to be bound by it and

the alliance lacks the historic and cultural ties of NATO. Political events and pressures must

align in such a way as to make the risk of war a viable option. In an age of nuclear deterrence,

19CentralAsianSecurityTrends:ViewsfromEuropeandRussia ,Ed.StephenJ.Blank,(CenterforStrategicand

InternationalStudies,April19,2011),5-8.

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1063(Accessed12/1/2012).20RussiaandItsNearEastNeighbors,Ed.MariaRaquelFreireandRobertE.Kanet,(London:PalgraveMacmillan,

2012),109-280;StrategicAsia2011-2012:AsiaRespondstoItsRisingPowersChinaandIndia, 227-259;Russian

NuclearWeapons:Past,Present,andFuture, Ed.Blank,StephenJ.,(CenterforStrategicandInternationalStudies,

November22,2011),http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=1087(Accessed

12/1/2012),461-470.



8

Chinese and Russian policymakers would have forbidding strategic considerations to think

through before they resorted to violence, regardless of the circumstances. Yet there is a political

rationale brewing on the Russian side to take certain actions which could provoke war, if

counterparts in Beijing responded threateningly.

The most likely scenario which could lead to war between Russia and China would

unfold in something like the following manner. The ruling clique of the Russian Federation

comes under intense social pressure for reform, combined with an economic downturn,

combined with China achieving an unacceptable degree of influence over Russia, its former

sphere of influence, and the Russian Far East. Vladimir Putin or his successors see political

collapse, diplomatic marginalization, or both staring them in the face. In desperation, the Russian

leadership decides to boost its popularity at home and regain lost prestige in the Russian sphere

of influence by engaging in a large-scale military “adventure” in Central Asia—expecting China

to back off rather than risk war. Perhaps using friendly Kazakhstan as a stepping stone, Russia

might send large formations of troops south to the borders of China, Afghanistan, and Iran.

Russia has long provided the military security of the Central Asian nations, withdrawing

gradually through the 1990s and 2000s, but Russia retains a base in both Kyrgyzstan and

Tajikistan, as well as relatively compliant regimes in all but Uzbekistan. Russia could claim that

it was restoring order and security, so as to “protect” supposed “Russian nationals” in Central

Asia from Islamist terrorism, political instability, or even mistreatment by Chinese influences.

Such excuses have served Russia well in the Baltic countries, Georgia, and Chechnya. Russia

might also claim it was delivering a message to the West to leave Iran alone or delivering a

message to a resurrected Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Any or all of these excuses might serve

Russia as a cover (or complement) to its underlying purpose of triumphantly dismantling

Chinese influence in Central Asia and restoring its own. A sufficient number of these underlying

and stated rationales would merely have to coincide for Russia to have a powerful incentive to

intervene in this manner in Central Asia.21

It is far more likely that Russia would initiate a Central Asian catalyst for war in this

manner than that China would do so. Quite simply, time is on China’s side, but not Russia’s side.

China can expect tremendous economic growth and rising prestige for the foreseeable future,

while Russia has no future to speak of. Russia is as powerful now verses China as it can expect

21StrategicAsia2011-2012:AsiaRespondstoItsRisingPowersChinaandIndia,227-259; Diehl,1-14.



9

to ever be. Russia’s economic revival since the 1990s rests on little more than centralization and

the energy trade. There has been no genuine renaissance to restore the lost dynamism and hope

of Russia’s “Silver Age” before World War I. If Russia is to make a move with the power it still

possesses, it must do so soon or fade. As for the Chinese, the “eternal kingdom” cannot help but

feel itself to have all the time in the world with which to sit out the decline its old rival in the

north. Time is ticking for Russia.

If a Russian “adventure” on the steppes of Asia took place, there is always the distinct

possibility that it would succeed or backfire without any clash with China. Russia would be

banking on the notion that China would protest diplomatically (as would the rest of the

international community), but that China (and the United States) would be unwilling to do

anything about it militarily. In short, Russia would bet that China regarded the loss of its

influence in Central Asia to be less damaging than outright war with Russia. Fears of Russia’s

technological edge and nuclear arsenal, combined with confidence in the overall status-quo and

future economic prospects would create a powerful rationale for China to not react. Indeed, the

very likelihood of China backing off is crucial to the likelihood of Russia choosing to initiate the

crisis in the first place. Like a devious poker player, Russia would bet heavily, confident that its

opponent would not call its bluff. Yet, suppose this did not happen. Suppose by design or by

sheer bad luck amid the fog of war (and genuine fog) of the Central Asian steppes, forces of the

Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China came to blows. Perhaps Chinese leaders

would choose to initiate a counter-bluff, sending troops cautiously across the border of Xinjiang

to dare the Russians to turn back, lest they engage the world’s largest military force. Perhaps

impetuous Russian or PLA commanders would go too far, responding to real or imagined threats

out of the gloom of the Hindu Kush. War could erupt without warning, much as it did between

the United States and Mexico in 1948, when rival troops ran into each other in a barren, disputed

region of Texas. Assuming all of the above events have transpired, it is now time to consider

what would occur if Russia and China really did find themselves at war.

Few additional nations, if any, would choose to become belligerents on Russia or China’s

side in this conflict. The most likely candidates would not have much to commit to the fray, with

the possible exception of Kazakhstan. This Central Asian country is Russian-leaning and we

have already assumed that Kazakhstan would give free passage to Russian forces entering

Central Asia. Kazakhstan would necessarily be a part of the conflict in some capacity, since



10

Russian forces would have to pass through its territory. The most likely possibility is that

Kazakhstan would be deemed complicit by China and drawn into the conflict on Russia’s side.

Kazakhstan boasts a significant military force of ex-Soviet weaponry and its participation cannot

be discounted. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are home to Russian military bases and would

probably also be compelled to join the war on Russia’s side, but their forces would be negligible.

Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan would be most likely to put up some resistance to Russia’s

aggression, joining with China by default, for Russian influence over them is rocky at best.

Either way, opposing Central Asian insurgents and factions would tie down Russian forces

considerably. Turning to other possible belligerents to the east, Mongolia is sandwiched between

Russia and China, but is more dependent on Russia’s energy resources and political pressures.22

This is not to say that Russia would be able to persuade Mongolia to join the war on its side, but

it could at least forestall the possibility of the Chinese entering Mongolian territory.23 India has

an enigmatically “non-aligned” foreign policy at present, despite Russia’s courting of it, and

there is little constant in Indian foreign policy other than implacable hostility towards Pakistan.24

North Korea is unpredictable at best and leans towards China, but joining a war against Russia

would risk the survival of the regime in a game in which Kim Jung Eun has little skin. China is a

tacit protector, but the DPRK is hardly known for its altruism and regards the Chinese

Communist Party (CCP) as “revisionist” sell-outs to Capitalism. As for Vietnam, Taiwan, and

all the various countries ringing China which loosely align with the United States; these would

be unlikely to risk their survival in a clash between Asia’s greatest powers. Finally, the United

States and its NATO allies would undoubtedly wring their hands, unleashing a flood of

diplomats, peace-keepers, observers, journalists, and sound bites to ameliorate the conflict (while

quietly placing their forces on high alert). However, it is not in the West’s strategic doctrine to

22Jargalsaikhany,Mendee,“Mongolia’sVulnerabilitytoRussianFuelSupply”,EurasiaDailyMonitor ,Volume:9

Issue:214,November21,2012,


tnews[any_of_the_words]=china%20world&tx_ttnews[pointer]=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=40148&tx_ttnews[backPid

]=7&cHash=94cc421b075cf1b73a14008bf0585adb (Accessed,12/1/2012)23Mongolia’sinvolvementinthewarwouldhavetremendousstrategicconsequences,sinceitsvastairspacewould

openupandRussiaandChinawouldhaveamuchlongerbordertofightover.Thefollowingscenarioassumes

Mongoliannon-involvement.24Kumar,Vikas,“India:thewarpedhistoryandgeographyofNon-Alignment2.0”,EastAsiaForum:Economics,

Politics,andPublicPolicyinEastAsiaandthePacific ,November29th,2012,

http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/11/29/india-the-warped-history-and-geography-of-nonalignment-2-0/

(Accessed12/1/2012)



11

risk mutually assured destruction to save one great Eurasian autocracy from another. We can say

with confidence that Russia and China would fight alone, except for a handful of Central Asian

clients.

If Russia and China found themselves at war (indeed “found themselves” would just

about capture it), both countries could count on military capabilities unmatched by almost any

other nations on the globe except for the United States. To merely skim the surface of this fact,

the Russian military has a paper strength of roughly 300,000 ground forces, 2,800 battle tanks,

5,500 artillery pieces, 360 attack helicopters, 1,800 combat-capable aircraft, 66 nuclear bombers,

and 1,500 nuclear warheads (1,428 are actively mounted on 492 ground or submarine missile

launchers).25 The nuclear deterrent is supported by a sophisticated array of radar, missile defense,

satellites, and communications units.26

Behind these is the assurance of 20 million reservists,

with more to come in a crisis.27 The Russian Navy has an aircraft carrier, six cruisers, 18

destroyers, 12 strategic nuclear-capable submarines, 65 tactical submarines, and hundreds of

other amphibious, supporting, and patrol craft.28 For its part, the People’s Liberation Army fields

1,600,000 men with 7,400 battle tanks, 12,500 artillery pieces, 1,700 combat capable aircraft,

440 nuclear bombers, and 1,600-3,600 warheads (405 are actively mounted on ground or

submarine missile launchers).29 The latter are supported by a handful of satellites and modest

radar and detection capability, mostly covering the northern and western borders facing Russia.30

The Chinese Navy has only a partially operational aircraft carrier and three nuclear-capable

submarines, but 68 tactical submarines, 13 destroyers, 65 frigates, and many hundreds of

25TheMilitaryBalance2012,184-203; ,“RussianStrategicNuclearForces”TheRussianNuclearForcesProject.

http://www.russianforces.org/current/(Accessed,11/20/2012).26TheMilitaryBalance2012 ,184-203.

27TheMilitaryBalance2012,184-203.


29TheMilitaryBalance2012 ,211-242;Arbatov,34,63;ThesizeandcompositionoftheChinesenuclear

deterrentisfarmoresecretthanthatoftheRussianFederationandUnitedStates.Untilrecently,itwasbelieved

thatChinaonlypossessedamodestarsenalof240-300nuclearwarheads,asitsofficialfiguresstate.However,

numerousobserversoutsidetheintelligencecommunitiesnowseeevidencethatthePRCcouldhaveproducedas

manyas3,600nucleardevices.ARussianstudybyRussianAcademyofSciencesNuclearThreatInitiative

Foundationestimates1,600-1,800,with800-900activelydeployed.Seeformoredetails:Arbatov,Aleksey,Viktor

Yeltsin,AleksandrLukin,VasiliyMikheyev,andAleksandrKhramchikhim,“ProspectsforChina’sParticipationin

NuclearArmsLimitation”,Trans.AlekseyArbatov,VladimirDvorkin,andSergeyOznobishchev,(Translatedbythe

AsianArmsControlProjectoftheGeorgetownUniversityDepartmentofGovernment,WashingtonDC.Originally

published:Moscow,Russia:InstituteofWorldEconomyandInternationalRelationsoftheRussianAcademyof

SciencesNuclearThreatInitiativeFoundation,2012);AsianArmsControlProject,GeorgetownUniversity

DepartmentofGovernment,http://www.asianarmscontrol.com/(Accessed,11/20/2012)30TheMilitaryBalance2012,211-242



12

supporting craft.31 Official Chinese reserves only number half a million, but an almost unlimited

reservoir of manpower stands behind them.32 In the case of China, it is important to note that

China’s military capabilities are improving all the times, whereas Russia’s remain relatively

stable. If this conflict occurred even several years down the road, the statistics could swing more

favorably to China. In any case, the firepower of these two militaries is almost unimaginable. A

conclusive prediction of what they could do to each other and to human civilization if fully

unleashed is difficult to contemplate. Nonetheless, numerous caveats, qualifications, and tactical

considerations make the general parameters of a Sino-Russian war possible to discern. The likely

parameters of a Sino-Russian War shall be defined before any predictions are made as to its

outcome.

A Sino-Russian War would very likely involve the early and decisive use of nuclear

weapons, because both Russian and Chinese leaders would have powerful incentives to use

them—and use them swiftly. Nuclear weapons set a number of tight parameters on the conflict

that allow us to exclude many assets on both sides and predict the course of the war more easily.

Nuclear weapons have the potential to do one of several things. One side (more likely Russia)

could win the nuclear exchange so completely that it suffered minimal damage. This would

shorten the war, because the Chinese would have to sue for peace in short order. The

conventional conflict would only last as long as the nuclear exchange and following negotiations

went on. Another quite possible scenario could be that the Russian and Chinese arsenals were

balanced enough that each would inflict an intolerably high amount of damage on each other’s

homelands and armed forces. Both sides’ logistical and communications capabilities could be so

damaged that both fighting and negotiations would drag on painfully and fitfully on for a long

time. However, Russian and Chinese forces from far behind the front would have difficultly

becoming involved in the fighting and could be effectively excluded from the equation. Once

again, nuclear weapons would have imposed tight parameters on the conflict. This could be a

particularly problem for Russia, as we will see. Finally, nuclear weapons could escalate to the

point where the Russian and Chinese polities were completely destroyed. In this scenario, few

assets at all, other than the nuclear weapons, would need to be considered. What all these most

31TheMilitaryBalance2012,211-242




13

likely scenarios have in common is that many aspects of the Russian and Chinese militaries

would not be particularly relevant to determining the course of the conflict.

The implications are that we need only weigh a limited number of military assets and

factors in order to deduce how the war would unfold and who the likely winner would be. The

economies of both countries may be effectively discounted, (except perhaps as targets) for they

would have no time (or no logistical means) to lend their weight to the confrontation. Russian or

Chinese military forces stationed distant from the confrontation zones which could not influence

the fronts swiftly and aerially may be discounted. Thus, we may exclude the majority of Russian

and Chinese ground forces, while still including the impact of distant intercontinental-ranged

units such as ballistic submarines, aircraft, missile launchers, etc… Those vessels of the Russian

Black Sea, Baltic, and Northern fleets which lack intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)

capability may be removed from the equation, while the Russian Pacific Fleet certainly should

not be discounted. The PLA Navy could be assumed to hold a sizeable force in reserve to guard

against Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and the United States. Finally, since an early nuclear

exchange is foreseen, the capabilities and likely impact of Russia and China’s nuclear arsenals

deserve the most scrutiny of all. These many factors and qualifications make predicting the

course of a Sino-Russian War considerably easier than balancing every capability the two

powers possess.

Nuclear warfare is so untested and difficult that it is not hard to imagine any of the three

likely scenarios outlined above occurring. The nuclear chips could fall ever so slightly differently

than what the strategist predicts for nothing to be the same. Whether the Russians or Chinese

managed to inflict equal or disproportional damage on each other depends as much on chance

during the frantic, opening minutes of the conflict as it does on range, payload, and numbers. All

this analysis can do is walk the reader through what seems to be the most likely scenario, while

highlighting conditions which could lead to the others instead. On the whole, this author affirms

that the most likely scenario of the nuclear conflict would be something lying between the first

and second scenarios: that Russia felt confident enough to launch a first strike and managed to

inflict disproportionate damage on the Chinese nuclear arsenal, logistics, and command-and-

control systems, but that China’s nuclear deterrent managed to retaliate with an unexpected

number of hits of its own—dragging the conflict out or making the war far more costly to Russia

than its leaders might have expected. Russia’s arsenal has the clear edge, but that edge is not so



14

crisp and decisive as to insulate Russia from taking some serious, even intolerable, damage from

the Chinese nuclear arsenal.

The gatekeeper to all three scenarios is the justification for nuclear warfare taking place

in the first place. There have been many theorists, before and during the Cold War, who are

inclined to believe that a great power conflict could take place without significant use of nuclear

weapons. When one belligerent is a Western, Liberal Democracy, perhaps this is feasible, but the

two great Eurasian Autocracies would not likely operate with such restraint if they found

themselves at war with each other. A Sino-Russian War would involve the early and decisive use

of nuclear weapons, because Russian leaders would have doctrinal and strategic incentives to

launch a nuclear strike against China as soon as word of hostilities made its way to them.

Russian military doctrine regarding nuclear weapons is one of “first use”.33

This is in contrast to

China’s declared “no first use” policy and emphasis on minimum deterrence, which may or may

not be genuine. Russian leaders emphasize nuclear weapons, because they rightly feel that their

post-Soviet conventional defense is inadequate to defend the Motherland against a serious

opponent, such as China. In this sense, Russian thinking is similar to that of NATO during much

of the Cold War, for the roles have now reversed. Russian fears of a surprise invasion ever since

Operation Barbarossa in 1941 also play a part in this thinking.34 Clearly, the People’s Liberation

Army (PLA), with its superior numbers and immense resources, would fit the definition of a

serious opponent to be equalized with nuclear weapons. As soon as Moscow became aware that

its forces were engaged in combat with the full might of the PLA, Russian leaders would

desperately resort to their nuclear card, seeing it as the only way to even the odds against the

overwhelming numbers and conventional firepower of the PLA. Russian leaders might also be

skeptical that China would restrain itself from launching its own first strike, given that China is

the weaker nuclear power. There are many reasons to doubt China’s “no first use” policy and

mere uncertainty on this matter provides the Russians with an incentive to not take any chances.

33“AsthemostrecentRussianMilitaryDoctrineof2010states,nuclearweaponsremaintheprimaryinstrument

fordeterrenceagainstbothnuclearandconventionalattacksuponRussiaandindefenseofRussianinterests,

territorialintegrity,andsovereignty.ThedoctrinedoesnotexplicitlystatethatRussiawillusenuclearweaponsina

preemptiveattackagainstsuchthreats,ashadbeendiscussedbyseniormembersoftheSecurityCouncilinthefall

of2009,butleavesthedecisiontousesuchweaponsinthehandsofthePresidentoftheRussianFederation.”

(SeeRussianNuclearWeapons:Past,Present,andFuture ,Ed.StephenBlank,(TheCenterforStrategicand

InternationalStudies,November22,2011,),468,)

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=1087(Accessed12/1/2012).34Cimbala,StephenJ.,andPeterJacobRainow,RussiaandPostmodernDeterrence:MilitaryPowersandIts

ChallengesforSecurit y,(WashingtonDC:PotomacBooksInc.,2007),23-71.



15

As the initiators of the crisis leading to the confrontation, the Russians would have greater

flexibility to act on their strategic doctrine launch a first strike.35 Therefore, we can reasonably

assume a few key points: that one or more of the belligerents would escalate swiftly to nuclear

warfare and that Russia would have the most incentive to do so. 36

The other, even more powerful incentive for Russia to “strike first” against China is the

tactical situation between the two countries’ nuclear arsenals. There is a large tactical and

technological imbalance between the Russian and Chinese nuclear arsenals. The superiority of

the Russian arsenal is based on a combination of technology, numbers, experience, and the sheer

vulnerability of the Chinese arsenal. The Russian Federation possesses 1,092 ground-launched

warheads, 336 submarine-launched warheads, and 76 nuclear bombers.37 China has 360

operational ground-launched warheads, 36 submarine-launched warheads, and 440 nuclear

bombers.38 Russia’s numerical advantage in warheads is dependent, not on number of ballistic

missiles, but on the Multiple Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) technology, with which China has only

lately begun experimenting.39 MIRV technology allows Russia to unleash many time the

destructive firepower from the very first round of missiles that it has launched, a timing factor

which can be decisive for the first striker. Moreover, MIRV warheads disengage automatically

from their mother missile as it prepares to reenter the atmosphere, making them far more difficult

to intercept with missile defenses than single missiles. China’s modest detection and anti-missile

capabilities cannot cope with an attack of this magnitude. Worse still for China, a large portion

of these thousands of Russian missiles possess the range to target anywhere in or around China,

35Chang,Andrei,“China’sNuclearDeterrencePolicies”,KanwaAsianDefenseReviewOnline ,(December5,2012,

OpenSourceCenter),34-35.

https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_…0_43/content/Display/PRINCE/CPP20

120524787031?printerFriendly=true(Accessed12/10/2012)36CImbala,3-120;

37“RussianStrategicNuclearForces”TheRussianNuclearForcesProject.http://www.russianforces.org/current/

(Accessed,11/20/2012);TheMilitaryBalance2012, 184-203.

In2008,Russiahadinexcessof14,000weapons,including3,113strategicwarheadsand2,079nonstrategic

warheadsdeployedandanother8,000instorageorwaitingtobedismantledasof2008.However,therecent

nucleararmsreductiontreatywiththeUnitedStateshasreducedtheseevenfurtherfromColdWarhighs.

(SeeRussianNuclearWeapons:Past,Present,andFuture ,Ed.StephenBlank,(TheCenterforStrategicand

InternationalStudies,November22,2011,),462,

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=1087(Accessed12/1/2012).38TheMilitaryBalance2012,211-242;Yesin,Victor,“ThirdAftertheUnitedStatesandRussia:OnChina’sNuclear

PotentialwithoutUnderestimationorExaggeration”(TranslatedbytheGeorgetownUniversityAsianArmsControl

Project,OriginallypublishedbytheMilitary-IndustrialCourier ,May2nd,2012),4-7.

http://www.asianarmscontrol.com/content/russian-article-chinese-nuclear-potential(Accessed,12/3/2012)39Yesin,4.



16

assuming they are stationed on Russian soil or in Russian waters. It must be recalled that

Russia’s arsenal is primarily designed to target the state-of-the-art defenses and well-protected

silos of the United States. Analysts in 2008 estimated that a Russian arsenal of roughly 1,700

missiles and aerial bombs could destroy 60-80% of the American nuclear arsenal on a first

strike.40 Russia’s nuclear bombs tend to be large and deadly, capable of penetrating the United

States’ formidable Minuteman underground silos. The PRC, for reasons that shall shortly be

explained, can hardly boast the United States’ defensive capabilities. Finally, Russia has had

decades of Cold War experience in perfecting the command-and-control, targeting, and every

other conceivable factor of nuclear warfare. A successful first strike depends on these qualities as

much as sheer numbers. The Russian nuclear arsenal is a superpower’s weapon, made to fight

superpowers. Whereas China is a novice, Russia is an old hand in the dark arts of nuclear

warfare and this would provide Russia with a considerable incentive to go nuclear as soon as

possible.41

In many respects, the Chinese arsenal gives the appearance of having severe

vulnerabilities to a Russian first strike, making itself a tempting target in a Sino-Russian War.

China’s nuclear deterrent is certainly larger and stronger than, until recently, it was believed to

be. As a report by the respected (Retired) Russian General Victor Yesin, reveals, China’s Second

Artillery may have as many as 3,600 nuclear warheads (800-900 operational ones) based in

3,000-5,000 km network of tunnels known as the “Underground Great Wall”.42 Many missiles,

such as the Dongfeng 31s, can reach all of Russia. However, the manner in which these warheads

are deployed is far more important than their total number when faced with a first strike by as

large and advanced a nuclear power as Russia. The basic structure and protocol of the tunnel

facilities are so widely known in China that a team of American undergraduate researches could

discover an impressive amount of information about them from open sources.43 While vast, few

of the facilities, can properly be called “silos”, for the missiles within them do not launch from

their storage location. Instead the missiles emerge out of their tunnels onto trucks or railway cars

40Cimbala,75-82;WhileRussia’sarsenalnownumberscloserto1,500andlingersonthebrinkofsurvivability

againsttheUnitedStates,thesituationvis-à-visChinaisclearlyquitedifferent.41Cimbala,3-120.

42Yesin,2-3.

43TheresearchteamwaspartoftheGeorgetownUniversityDepartmentofGovernment’s“AsianArmsControl

Project”,whichreceivedagreatdealofpublicityforitsrevelationsabouttheChinesenucleararsenalandRussian

studiesoftheSame.Formoreinformation,seeAsianArmsControlProject,GeorgetownUniversityDepartmentof

Government,http://www.asianarmscontrol.com/(Accessed,11/20/2012)



17

and are driven to nearby outdoor locations for launch. As Professor Karber, director of the Asian

Arms Control Project, explained in lecture at Georgetown University, the best launchers often

fire from railway cars which stop on open-air gaps between the tunnels. However, this is not

necessarily a substitute for firing from sealed silo doors, for the entire outside environment of the

railway lines could potentially be rendered so irradiated that going outside the tunnels could

prove lethal for the railway crews, assuming the tracks were even still intact. Besides, many of

the Second Artillery launchers are deployed on trucks, not railway cars, for firing. Most of these

vehicular launchers cannot even operate off-road, so they must follow predictable routes to

predicable launch sites, wasting valuable time in the process. Finally, the upcoming Figure 1

shows that there are relatively few Chinese missile launchers actually deployed to strike Russia

(roughly 140). Given their lack of MIRV capability, each has little more than a single shot in the

event of an incoming first strike. This not only limits Chinese targets in Russia, but limits

Russian targets in China. In conclusion, the Chinese Second Artillery seems distinctly vulnerable

to a first strike by Russia, despite its imposing facilities.

The readiness of much of the Second Artillery is also in question, especially given that so

many of the missiles have to be moved in order to be fired and lack MIRV capability. One has to

question the readiness of a 3,000 warhead-strong arsenal which can barely muster 360 ground-

based operational warheads. Retired General Viktor Yesin states that “…some of the Dongfeng

31, 31A ICBMs are ready for immediate use with the sanction of the leadership of the country.

Given the pragmatic people the Chinese are known to be, it can be assumed that the alert missiles

are on rail-based launchers.”44 General Yesin’s study takes the Chinese nuclear arsenal very

seriously, but this language says as much by what it does not say as by what it says. Apparently

only some of China’s launchers are ever on full alert and these seem to be particularly their

longer range Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). What of the other thousands of missiles

stored in the tunnels? In the event of a first strike, presumably only missiles on full alert would

have a chance of actually preempting incoming Russian missiles before the outside environment

was rendered lethal. Yesin has unknowingly hinted at the dubious readiness of the Second

Artillery to withstand a first strike. According to a study by the Russian Academy of Sciences,

the Chinese Early Warning System (EWS) is in a similar state of non-readiness. The report

explains that:

44Yesin,7.



18

…as long as China’s strategic nuclear forces (SNFs) are in the shape that they are perceived to be in abroad, like its early warning systems (EWSs), they are too vulnerableand insufficiently effective to ensure the possibility of retaliatory operations following ahypothetical disarming attack by the US or Russia. Moreover, China’s SNFs do not have

the ability to mount a retaliatory counterstrike based on EWS information concerning aninstance of military attack.45

In other words, the Chinese Second Artillery might even “not know what hit them”, in the event

of a Russian first strike and struggle to coordinate a response. China’s readiness, warning

45Arbatov,65.



19

systems, and the ability to coordinate a second strike seem questionable.

The deployment of the Chinese arsenal also projects a less formidable threat to Russia

than the paper strength of the Second Artillery might suggest. As Figure 1 shows, assuming that

only Chinese missiles which were launched on the first round are in play, a mere 72 Chinese

strategic missile launchers could threaten targets throughout Eastern Russia and Central Asia,

while roughly another 78 launchers could target as far as Western Russia itself. This means that

Russian commanders would only really need to target around 150 launchers--with theoretically

about ten times as many warheads at their disposal.46 In other words, China’s possible 3,000

warheads is a misleadingly large figure for the numbers of missiles which would actually be in

play. The overall picture emerging is of a Chinese arsenal far from ready to withstand attack by a

first-rate nuclear power. Let us picture even a fraction of the enormous and precised Russian

arsenal launched preemptively against the Second Artillery. Let us picture the crews of Chinese

missile launchers frantically driving out of their tunnels to their makeshift launching locations as

hundreds of deadly warheads glide inexorably towards them for a mere ten to fifteen minutes. 47

The results seem dire for China: the Chinese Second Artillery annihilated or rendered impotent

in less than an hour—its endless underground missile tunnels either destroyed outright or trapped

under a ravaged and irradiated landscape, their missiles powerless in either case. Presumably the

thousands of additional Chinese warheads would be trapped in their storage facilities or on

railway carts buried by tons of collapsed concrete and masonry. At the very least, the Second

Artillery seems a ripe target for Russian attack.48

However, while vulnerable overall, the Chinese arsenal may no longer be so vulnerable

that Russia could take it out of the war without suffering some egregious losses. The Second

Artillery may well be entering a “grey area” of survivability, in which it could not exactly

survive, but could fire off sufficient missiles to cripple Russia’s political will and logistical

capabilities. The following assessment should not be taken to disqualify the past arguments as to

China’s overall nuclear vulnerability. There are merely a few qualifications which make those

46O’Connor,Sean,“PLABallisticMissilesTechnicalReportAPA-TR-2010-0802”,AirPowerAustralia:Australia’s

IndependentDefenseThinkTank,http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-PLA-Ballistic-Missiles.html#mozTocId827329

(Accessed11/20/2012)47Ittakesonly30minutesforRussianmissilestostriketheUnitedStates.

48AsianArmsControlProject,GeorgetownUniversityDepartmentofGovernment,

http://www.asianarmscontrol.com/(Accessed,11/20/2012);O”Connor,Sean.“PLABallisticMissiles:Technical

ReportAPA-TR-2010-0802”,August2010,AirPowerAustralia:Australia’sIndependentDefenseThinkTank

http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-PLA-Ballistic-Missiles.html#mozTocId925102(Accessed12/1/2012)



20

arguments less absolute and fail-safe than they might seem. One expert, Professor Karber of

Georgetown University, estimates that the Second Artillery could count on shooting off around

thirty missiles before the Russian assault had crippled its capabilities beyond repair.49 A number

of factors justify such reasoning. First of all, the Chinese have mastered the art of deception

when it comes to their tunnel openings and launch facilities. Numerous confirmed fake silos

exist, confounding the potential Russian strategist and compelling him to launch precision strikes

on far more than simply the genuine Chinese launcher bases.50 It should be remembered that

Russia would need to hold much of its 1,400 odd missiles in reserve for continued deterrence

against NATO and the United States. A less than ten to one ratio of missile to missile facility

might be insufficient when many of the missile facilities are not even genuine. A second caveat

for Russia would be the tremendous challenge of tracking all the Chinese launch vehicles in real

time using satellite coverage, when there are millions of square miles to cover and China has

demonstrated an effective anti-satellite capability. Russian intelligence would have to have

identified all the pre-survey launch sites and be keeping continuous watch on the roads and

tunnel openings. The Chinese Second Artillery may be primitive compared to Russia’s

capabilities, but its launchers and facilities are everywhere.

Secondly, the Russian deployment strategy suffers from drawbacks in the same way that

the Chinese do, although the problem is not so much lack of range as excessive range. In the

Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty of 1983, Russia and the United States eliminated their

intermediate-range nuclear missiles, relying henceforth on their long-range ICBMs.

Intercontinental missiles have considerable minimum ranges as well as maximum ranges. The

impressively high orbit needed to ensure passage to the other side of the planet precludes

returning to the atmosphere before several thousand miles have been travelled. For instance,

even the most advanced Russian ICBM, the “Topol M” SS-27, has a minimum range of 2,000

49ProfessorKarber,InterviewbyPhone,FridayDecember7,2012,GeorgetownUniversity.ProfessorKarberisthe

directoroftheGeorgetownUniversityDepartmentofGovernment“AsianArmsControlProject”.AformerDefense

strategist,heisanexpertonChinesenuclearcapabilities.50Pinkov,Andrei,“PLASecondArtilleryForceEstablishes4thDF31A”,Kanwa AsianDefenseReviewOnline

(December5,2012,OpenSourceCenter),22-23.

https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_…0_43/content/Display/PRINCE/CPP20

120531787012?printerFriendly=true(Accessed12/10/2012).



21

km.51 Given that the majority of Russian missiles are spread along the trajectory of the trans-

Siberian railroad, this sort of minimum range precludes the use (or at least accuracy) of many

Russian long-range missiles when targeting locations in China. The effective ratio of Russian

missile hits to Chinese launcher must therefore be reduced still further. There is the possibility of

more than a handful of Chinese warheads surviving (even preempting) a Russian first strike and

scoring destructive hits. These qualifications to the argument earlier should not be construed as

dismissing the overall Russian advantage, but merely to point out that the Russian advantage is

not fool-proof. The Chinese Second Artillery would have a good chance of scoring some hits,

with a significant impact on the conflict. Given that an advantage in nuclear warfare must be

overwhelming—a better than 99% success rate—to fulfill sane governments’ policy objectives,

the Chinese could lose mightily and still ruin the Russians’ day.

Discussion of the nuclear component of this scenario is not complete without the nuclear

air assets of the two sides. As stated before, China has around 440 nuclear bombers (mostly

Hong-6 and Qing-5) against Russia’s 76. This disparity in numbers would seem to shift the entire

nuclear balance sheet in favor of China. However, there are sound reasons to place the nuclear

bombers of both sides more on the tactical or even conventional side of war than the strategic

side, as well as to discount the Chinese advantage. The Hong-6 nuclear bomber is almost

obsolete, having been first deployed in 1965, and lacks any stealth or supersonic capabilities.

Given that this is China’s only long-range nuclear bomber (3,100 km), the Hong-6’s failings do

not bode well for China’s ability to hit strategic targets which its bomber wing and “the obsolete

aircraft has very poor qualities for penetrating air defenses.”52 While Russian bombers carry four

nuclear bombs, the Hong-6 carries only one. Nonetheless, improvements are underway for the

Hong-6s and, as with all of China’s military assets, vulnerability may only be temporary.53 The

Qing 5 is a more modern Chinese bomber, but has a range of only 2,000 miles. There are 300

Qing 5s and so these would be a major feature of the conflict, but they cannot serve much of a

strategic role against a country the size of Russia. This is not to discount, by any means, the

impact of the Chinese nuclear bomber fleet on the conventional battlefield or nearby strategic

51“SS-27StalinTopol-MRS-12M2RT-2PM2IntercontinentalBallisticMissile”,ArmyRecognition.com,

http://www.armyrecognition.com/russia_russian_missile_system_vehicle_uk/topol-m_ss-27_rt-2pm2_stalin_rs-

12m2_intercontinental_ballistic_missile_technical_data_sheet_uk.html (Accessed12/10/2012)52“China’sNuclearDeterrent”,GlobalAccessChinaLimited,BeijingAustralAsiaCommercialConsultingCentre,

http://www.gac-china.com/China_Insight/China_Facts/China_Nuclear/china_nuclear.html(Accessed,12/1/2012)53Yesin,8.



22

targets. That impact will be explored in detail. However, the Chinese bomber advantage seems to

affect the war on a short-range, conventional level and cannot be regarded as an effective counter

to the Russian nuclear deterrent.54

China’s deterrent has one nuclear card which could truly upset Moscow’s rosy picture.

This is China’s 094 Jin-Class nuclear submarines. There are at least four and each carries a

payload of 12 Tszyulyan-1 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) with a range of

8,000 km.55 These 48+ missiles could reach almost anywhere in Russia from their likely

deployment zone in the South China Sea. For obvious reasons, these submarines are not nearly

as vulnerable as the Second Artillery to a Russian first strike. Chinese planners are well aware of

this and so SLBMs are one of the primary nuclear assets which the PRC is working to develop.

Do these submarines throw a monkey wrench into any Russian first strike? Russian observers

seem not to think so. The Russian Academy of Sciences study bore the submarines in mind when

it expressed confidence that China could not withstand a first strike.56

Perhaps Russian

Intelligence has the Jin Class vessels closely monitored and could pinpoint them without much

difficulty during a conflict. Professor Phillip Karber, director of the Asian Arms Control Project,

stated on November 27th

, 2012 that the US Navy has the Chinese nuclear submarine fleet under

such relentless surveillance from patrol craft, that the submarines rarely, if ever, leave their home

ports in Hainan.57 The Russians cannot but benefit from this American harassment. Moreover,

some Western observers believe that the Jin-Class incorporates a great deal of Russia

technology. If so, the Russians would be as well aware as any of how to counter these weapons

and their own twenty submarines in the Pacific Ocean could do the job. Nonetheless, the Chinese

submersible nuclear deterrent should be regarded as one of those qualifications to the Russian

advantage, an area in which the Chinese would have wiggle room to score retaliatory hits. 58

As we conclude the nuclear discussion, the likely outcome appears thus: even as the very

first conventional clashes occurred on the frontiers, Russia would find itself with the enviable

advantage of being the only belligerent with any nuclear weapons to speak of—yet multiple

54Ibid.,

55Purser,BenjaminS.,andMichaelS.Chase,“WaypointorDestination?TheJin-ClassSubmarineandChina’sQuest

forSea-BasedNuclearDeterrence”,ChinaBrief,Vol.12Issue.15,(August3,2012),(1-3)

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=39729&cHash=26be3d83024416e0

dbd1eba64c05e4a0 (Accessed,11/20/2012)56Arbatov,65

57Statedinlectureduring“ConflictinAsia”,November27

th,2012.

58



23

Russian cities and key installations might have been wiped off the face of the earth. Russia

would find itself in a difficult situation. The cost on the home front would already have

outweighed any real benefits of the war. Should it retaliate against the Chinese hits and cherry

pick a few cities for destruction? Russian leaders’ interests (not to mention humanity) would

dictate restraining hemselves from excessive “city busting”, if they wished to win the peace and

survive the backlash of world opinion. A dead and irradiated China would be a far less healthy

and convenient neighbor than a (mostly) live and chastened one. For obvious reasons, Chinese

leaders would probably be exceedingly eager to sue for peace on Russian terms, as soon as they

realized that their nuclear umbrella was destroyed and at least a few Chinese cities had suffered

retaliatory destruction. The nuclear exchange would thus seem to necessitate a short war and

negotiations ensuing only hours into the very first conventional clashes.

It would seem that there is little need to consider any conventional confrontation forces in

a nuclear-dominated conflict of a few short hours. Surely a few hours of conventional warfare in

Central Asia and along the Ussuri River would seem like tragic footnotes to the awful drama of

the Second Artillery’s demise? However, it is reasonable to consider these conventional clashes

for a few reasons. First of all, peace negotiations might drag on for days, not hours. They could

even fail initially, in which case fighting would continue on a conventional level for a few weeks

until negotiations resumed. There is a good chance that the Russian nuclear strike could disrupt

the Chinese chain of command to such an extent that high-level negotiations for peace proved

impossible for some time. The Russians and Chinese could have scored extensive hits on each

other’s logistics and lines of communication. This could entail that both sides were struggling to

even control and move around their own forces, let alone communicate via “red telephone” with

the enemy capital. Alternatively, Russian leaders might cease their strategic nuclear barrage, but

still want to fight on a conventional level for some time just to see what further policy goals they

could achieve (perhaps throwing the occasional tactical nuke into the mix). The destruction of

much of China’s conventional military might be a tempting prospect for the future balance of

power. If this were achieved and Russian conventional forces gained the upper hand, then

Moscow would likely extend the hand of peace and dictate harsh terms.

On the other hand, If Chinese conventional forces gained the upper hand and trashed

Russia’s pre-war military, Moscow would likely offer peace on somewhat less harsh terms,

hinting that Chinese forces and population centers might regret it if China let such petty



24

successes go to its head. The difference between these two outcomes might seem slight, but this

is not in fact so. As said earlier, the Russian regime would have banked much of its tenuous

political capital on a casual adventure in Central Asia blown out of proportions. Russia would

probably have already lost some cities and suffered millions of civilian casualties. Most

observers agree that Russians have a high tolerance rate for suffering, provided there is a

victorious outcome. However, if Russia also lost the conventional fight decisively to China, then

domestic elements in Russia would be very discontented indeed, whatever sort of favorable

peace emerged. Millions of Russians would have died for dubious prestige and international

notoriety, even as their rulers gambled the very survival of Russia on technological wizardry.

This sort of Pyrrhic victory could very easily be the end of Russia’s leaders and the catalyst for

dramatic and inexorable social change. If the Afghanistan War in the 1980s could trigger the fall

of the Soviet Union, surely an unpopular war with China in the 2010s could do the same to

Putin’s Russia? The leaders of the Chinese Communist Party could ironically survive their

vanquishers in Moscow, if they were only permitted by the circumstances to inflict unacceptable

conventional losses on the Russian military. Therefore, the conventional aspects of this conflict

are almost as important as the nuclear for determining the political and long term ramifications

of the conflict.

The conventional balance between Russia and China would involve a more complicated

variety of factors and assets than the nuclear balance. The parameter of the conflict starting in

Central Asia, being a few days or weeks, and involving tactical nuclear weapons narrow down

the possibilities somewhat. Let us suppose that Russia’s expeditionary force into Central Asia,

Eastern Military District, and the Russian Pacific Fleet, were the primary assets on the Russian

side. We can factor in the vast majority of Russia’s air force, which would be quickly

transferrable to the front, as well as perhaps a modest amount of reinforcements from other

Military Districts over the space of several days. Let us suppose that China’s Shenyang, Beijing,

and Lanzhou Military Regions, the PLA Navy, and most air assets were the primary

conventional assets on the Chinese side. We can factor in a higher proportion of reinforcements

on the Chinese side, because China has shorter and more interior lines of communication than

Russia. Tactical nuclear weapons must be factored in, but sparingly, since we must assume that

after a few hours Russian and Chinese leaders are cut off or engaged in frenzied negotiations and

trying to deescalate the conflict. Therefore, we can presume that the conventional contest would



25

take place in a grand theatre of war running from Kashgar all the way to the seas off

Vladivostok. There are three principal fronts: the Central Asian front, the Ussuri River (or

Eastern) Front, and the naval front in the Pacific Ocean. In a military era of rapid

communications and travel, none of these fronts are entirely insulated from each other, but since

we are assuming a very short war, the Central Asia front can be considered largely in isolation

from the other two, being separated by Mongolia. Aside from these three fronts, the conventional

air war would constitute a sort of complementary, “shadow” front—its victor gaining a

considerable advantage on all of the other three. We shall now consider each of these fronts in

isolation and then draw overall conclusions.

The first front to be considered is the Central Asian front. The Russian expeditionary

force into Central Asia would probably consist of tens of thousands of troops drawn from its

Central Military Region and the forces stationed in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Only Uzbekistan

has a sizeable and organized military (50,000 troops with modest armor and artillery support) of

those likely to resist Russian aggression.59 However, Turkmenistan could pose a serious

insurgency. Additional Russian forces would be needed to guarantee the continuing compliance

of Kazakhstan, with its 1,600 tanks and 100,000 troops, although we may tentatively add the

Kazakh forces to those of Russia if we assume that the latter applied its diplomatic pressures

effectively. 60 At the same time, we can assume that the Kazakh forces would only partially and

halfheartedly engage the PLA when Kazakh leaders found themselves unexpectedly in the midst

of a great power war. Moreover, the Kazakh military lacks the Russians or Chinese’s technology

and training, of course, consisting mostly of ex-Soviet assets. The Russians would probably

commit almost the entire Central Military Region to the Central Asian adventure in order to

guarantee success. Therefore, let us assume no more than a handful of mechanized and artillery

brigades, accompanied by only modest air support.

59TheMilitaryBalance2012 ,285,291.

60TheMilitaryBalance,2012.255-256.



26

Figure2 As the Russians approach the southern portions of Central Asia, clashing intermittently

with indigenous troops, we may assume that the Sino-Russian War has begun. At least a portion

of the PLA Lanzhou Military Region has crossed the frontier and clashed with Russian forces.The Lanzhou Military Region has a long border, running from that of India over to central

Mongolia. Therefore, the Lanzhou commander would likely commit only a portion of his forces

to what he believes is a forestalling measure across the frontier. The most likely Chinese units to

be selected would be those of the Xinjiang Military District, given that the 47th

and 21st

Group

Armies are headquartered far to the rear in Shaanxi. It is reasonable to assume, however, that



27

PLA commanders would have dispatched several heavy units from the 47th and 21st to back up

the Xinjiang forces, as soon as the Russian deployment near Kazakhstan became known. This

brings the Chinese forces in the Central Asian Front to roughly four infantry divisions and a

handful of supporting brigades and regiments, plus perhaps two mechanized or armored

divisions from the armies headquartered in Shaanxi.61 As the China would be reacting to the

Russians, rather than beating up on Central Asian satellites, we can assume that they are

accompanied by heavier air support than the Russian forces. Therefore, let us assume a large

portion of the Russian Central Military Region (plus the Kazak army) against a heavily

reinforced Xinjiang Military District (plus the Uzbekistani army and allied irregulars). As Figure

2 demonstrates, the Russian force would have a serious problem on their hands. In order to

establish their new military front on the Afghan and Iranian borders, Russian commanders would

need to spread out their limited forces substantially. Even if the Russians allowed for the faint

possibility of Chinese intervention, it is unlikely that even half their total force would be

stationed along the Chinese border. Most would be engaged in overcoming the Uzbekistani

Army, seizing Tashkent, and breaking out of the Russian bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

The Chinese, having time to prepare, could hit the Russian flank along the Kyrgyzstani and

Tajikistani border. The Chinese would probably have the element of surprise, catching the

already engaged Russian forces off guard. To these geographic and tactical considerations must

be added the combination of numbers, technology, and air support if we are to determine a likely

winner on this front. Since the infrastructure of Central Asia is appalling, particularly amidst the

mountain passes bordering China, we can assume longer travel times and therefore less time for

much to happen in this theatre in a few days or weeks of fighting. Given the forces estimated for

each side, the most likely scenario is that PLA forces on the Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan offensive

would crush all opposition. We have said that the Chinese have a reinforced Group Army at their

disposal with ample mechanized units and air support for the entire front. With a defensive force

holding the line against Kazakhstan, this could amount to 40,000-50,000 men against a small

fraction of the Russian force. 62 Thus, a Chinese force that was superior to the entire Russian

expeditionary force in Central Asia would be pitted against a small fraction of the latter. The61“RegularArmyOrderofBattle”SinoDefense.com,(February13th,2009)

http://www.sinodefence.com/army/organisation/army-orbat.asp(Accessed,11/20/2012)62TheaveragePLAGroupArmyis30,000-50,000men.SeeCordesman,AnthonyH.andNicholasS.Yarosh,

“ChineseMilitaryModernizationandForceDevelopment:AWesternPerspective”,(WashingtonDC:Centerfor

StrategicandInternationalStudies,2012),48.



28

Chinese would be much closer to their supply lines and in more friendly territory than the

Russians. The sizeable Uzbekistani force guarding Tashkent could make a difference. In sum, the

Russians would be overextended, tied down, and caught off their guard by a superior force closer

to its homeland.

To these factors, we must add the “shadow” front of airpower. The Chinese Air Force

assigns at least 10 regiments of fighters and bombers to the Lanzhou Military District.

Reinforced from elsewhere, this air support complement could total at least a fifth of the entire

PLA Air Force. In that case, we would have roughly 400 Chinese aircraft against, at most, all

150 aircraft assigned to the Russian Central Military District.63 The Russian aircraft in this

theatre are proportionally more advanced, featuring MiG-31s and Su-24s against only two fighter

regiments of Chinese J-11s.64

However, this imbalance of numbers, as well as the proximity of

China’s airfields, would presumably overcome the Russian technological advantage. The

Chinese pilots also uniformly receive more hours of training per year than the Russian pilots.

Finally, we must not discount the Chinese advantage in nuclear bombers. Whether these were

employed in a strategic or tactical sense, the Chinese bombers would greatly outnumber the

Russians on any front. This would provide a terrifying distraction for the Russian Airforce and

could ruin Russian ground forces’ day in a way that the Russian nuclear arsenal could not

forestall at all. A combination of numbers, training, and proximity to home airfields would hand

the air war in Central Asia to the Chinese.

The conclusion to be drawn from this intricate interplay of factors is that the PLA would

score early successes on the Central Asian front, throwing the entire Russian southward advance

off balance. The appalling terrain might aid a Russian withdrawal northwards back into

Kazakhstan, but Chinese air power and long-range artillery could negate this factor. Having

devastated a sizeable portion of the Russian expeditionary force, the PLA could follow up with

crushing blows against the Russian forces further west or north. Easier terrain, Russian disarray,

and a steadily growing numerical advantage would probably build on each other to deliver the

entire Central Front to China in the first week or so of the conflict.

Now we move to the Eastern Front, which would run from the eastern tip of Mongolia to

the quays of Vladivostok. This is a very different front than Central Asia, for it constitutes none

63TheMilitaryBalance,2012 ,238;Chinahasatotalofroughly1,700combat-capableaircraft.

64TheMilitaryBalance,2012 ,199,239.



29

other than the historic boundary between sovereign Russian and Chinese territory. During the

Cold War, this border was enormously militarized and saw numerous clashes and skirmishes.

Russia and China already have some of their most powerful armies in position along this front.

Artillery and missile emplacements are already deployed here in force. The fighting would be

immediate and devastating, as soon as word of hostilities made its way from Central Asia and

through the belligerent High Commands. Russia’s Eastern Military District stations 1 armored

brigade, 19 mechanized brigades, 2 air assault brigades, and 13 supporting artillery and missile

brigades along this front.65 The Russian Third Air Force & Air Defense Command provides

permanent air support to the Far East of 350 fighter aircraft.66 This is a far better positioned,

armored, and all-around formidable Russian army group than any force which Moscow would be

inclined to send into Central Asia. After all, the Eastern Military District is Russia’s conventional

first line of defense against the other greatest land power in Asia. However, the Southern

Military District is reportedly the best armed and equipped of all the Russian army groups. That

the Russians cannot do the same for the District which stands against the PLA bodes ill for the

overall health of the Russian conventional military.

As for China, the Shenyang Military Region and the eastern portion of the Beijing

Military Region face the Russian border. Since highways and railways abound between the

Beijing region and the Russian border, we can effectively count the entire Beijing Military

Region as participating in the border clash within a matter of days. The Beijing and Shenyang

Military Regions possess China’s most powerful and mechanized forces. Four of the nine

armored divisions, six of the nine mechanized divisions, and six of twelve armored brigades fall

within these districts.67 In particular, the 38th Army near Beijing has entirely mechanized

artillery, state-of-the art air defense, the latest Type-96 tanks, and superior training than the

average Russian armored force.68 In effect, half of China’s armored forces and probably a large

proportion of its most modern tanks face the Eastern Front. This could amount to 2,000 Type-96

tanks and 500 Type-99 tanks, not to mention several thousand older models.69 Although only the

Type-96 and Type-99 Chinese tanks are at the level of the best Russian tanks (T-80s and T-90s),

65TheMilitaryBalance,2012,184-203.

66TheMilitaryBalance,2012, 184-203.

67Arbatov,41

68Arbatov,41-42.




30

there are only 1,500 of the latter in active service throughout the entire Russian military.70 The

mechanized and armored brigades of the Russian Far East represent about 2/3 of the total, which

suggests that only around 1,000 of these modern Russian tanks (plus perhaps 1,500 of the older

T-72 models) face the Chinese Beijing and Shenyang forces.71 In short, the Chinese have as

many modern tanks on this front as the Russians have tanks in total , while total Chinese armored

forces may outnumber the Russians many times over. If we factor in likely troop levels of

500,000 Chinese against 70,000 Russians, then the odds seem even more stacked in favor of

China, particularly when we factor in that Russian units often lack half of their assigned staff and

face severe recruitment problem—suggesting that even these Russian numbers may be inflated.72

Faced with such overwhelming numbers, there is little wonder that the Russians rely so heavily

on the doctrine of “first strike” with nuclear weapons.

Only in airpower do the Russians have the edge on the Eastern Front. Russian fighter jets

remain more advanced than Chinese ones by at least a few decades and generally serve as the

hand-me-down prototypes for the latter. Only the Chinese J-11s can compare with the typical

Russian jet and the Russians can produce fighter jet engines with ease that the Chinese are only

beginning to produce domestically.73

Moreover, the Russians could assign a large majority of

their air force to this region within hours. The Chinese would be able to deploy a somewhat

smaller proportion of the PLA Airforce, given that China faces more potential threats on other

fronts and must hold many fighters in reserve. In that case, we can assume some proportion of

1,800 superior Russian aircraft against a smaller proportion of inferior 1,600 Chinese aircraft.74

The air war could clearly go to Russia on this front in short order, although it must be recalled

that Chinese fighter pilots generally receive far more training than Russian ones.75 However,

there are reasons why this might not tip the overall balance on the ground towards Russia.

Chinese long-range artillery is in many ways more effective at long-range bombardments of

Russian positions than Chinese (or Russian) aircraft would be in their stead.76 Chinese Multiple

Launch Rocket System (MLRS) artillery are among the most powerful in the world and can hit



72ThisisassumingthatRussia’s270,000activegroundforcesandChina’s1,600,000activegroundforcesare

dividedevenlyamongstRussia’s4militarycommandsandChina’s7.TheMilitaryBalance,2011;211-242.73Barbanov,10-200.

74TheMilitaryBalance,2012, 184-203,211-242.

75Arbatov,46.

76Arbatov,44-45.



31

Russian positions throughout the region within five minutes, whereas aircraft must evade all

manner of opposing aircraft and surface-to-air defenses.77 Even if they were progressively losing

the air war over a period of a few days, the Chinese could pound the smaller Russian ground

forces into oblivion with thousands of artillery. Even if the Russian aircraft came to inflict

appalling losses on the Chinese ground forces, the 7 to 1 advantage in numbers would surely go a

long way to negate this. Aircraft cannot fight a war and gain territory on their own; they are only

meant to facilitate the forces on the ground. With the Russian armies along the Ussuri River

collapsing, the Russian air force might feel more inclined to withdraw to more distant airfields

than give way to slow attrition. Finally, it is important to bring up the Chinese advantage in

nuclear bombers again. These weapons would pose the same sort of tactical threat on the Eastern

Front as in Central Asia, distracting the Russian Air Force and wreaking havoc to Russian

ground formations and lines of communication. Whether they would swing the balance of the air

war is an open question, but they help to tilt the overall balance on the Ussuri Front in China’s

favor.

77Arbatov,



32



33

Another factor on the Eastern Front which favors the Chinese is geography. As Figure 3

shows, the Chinese numbers allow them to take advantage of the “salient” shape of Manchuria,

while the Russian lack of numbers prevent them from the sort of encirclement campaign which

the Soviets achieved so spectacularly in 1945 against the Japanese. The Russian lines of

communication are not far from the frontier and are easily broken, whether by overrunning

ground forces or by conventional or nuclear missiles. As the Center for Strategic and

International Studies explains, “…most of the population in the Russian Far East is concentrated

in a 90-mile belt of settlement from Chita in the West to Vladivostok on the Pacific with the

Trans-Siberian Railroad providing the single corridor for transregional transportation through

it.”78 This narrow and vulnerable region is both the Russian Far East’s transportation hub and the

region which China would most desire to occupy. By contrast, the Chinese lines of

communication lead directly back south towards Beijing for thousands of miles. Chinese

retreating forces would grow only stronger and more reinforced, while the Russians grew

78RussianNuclearWeapons:Past,Present,andFuture ,Ed.StephenBlank,478,



34

weaker. In reality, looking at this depiction of the relative forces, it is hard to imagine the

Russians doing much more than defending their initial positions, if not beating a hasty retreat. If

the Russians only had a decisive advantage in an asset like armor or mechanized units, they

could launch “blitzkrieg” style incursions to surround and overcome enemies through sheer

mobility and firepower. In the 1980s, this was probably more or less what the (well-endowed

with armor) Far East Soviet commanders had in mind, if war broke out with China on this front.

In the 21st Century, however, times have changed. The Russians do not even have an advantage

in heavy weaponry or armor, let alone numbers. They are up against an army many times larger

and almost as well equipped as themselves. The Russians cannot afford to be more aggressive

than absolutely necessary and on a localized level, hoping that they can avoid being surrounded

and destroyed.

To our long consideration of the conventional war, there remains only a discussion of the

naval front in the Pacific. In previous military eras, this theatre of war would be considered

almost entirely separately from the land theatres, if the time frame were a matter of days or

weeks. Naval units had little chance to impact events on land, except to deliver more land or air

units to those events. In the late 20th

Century, all of this changed forever. The development of the

ballistic missile has allowed naval units to attack each other and land units from hundreds, if not

thousands, of miles away. Victory in naval combat is more about timing, precision, and

positioning than about firepower or armor. Few ships of any class can survive an impact from the

very least of anti-ship missiles. The priority is not to survive such missiles from enemy ships, but

to evade and preempt them. This makes predicting the outcome of naval combat even more

difficult, in many ways, than the outcome of land combat, if one has little more to go off of than

pre-war fleet dispositions and forces. Nonetheless, an analysis of a hypothetical Sino-Russian

War cannot be complete without considering what would happen between the PLA Navy and

Russian Pacific Fleet, not to mention what both fleets could do to influence events on land.

The Russian Pacific Fleet stands at a clear disadvantage of quantity, if not quality, when

matched against the full might of the Chinese Navy. The Russian Pacific Fleet has 21 submarines

(3 strategic and 18 tactical), 1 guided-missile cruiser, 8 guided-missile destroyers, 23 vessels

meant for patrol and coastal duties, 8 mine warfare vessels, 4 amphibious vessels, and 15

logistics and support ships79. Bearing in mind that the PLA Navy must hold a large proportion of

79TheMilitaryBalance,2012,184-203



35

itself in reserve against Pacific rivals, the PLA Navy is as follows: one partially operational

aircraft carrier, seventy one submarines (3 strategic and 68 tactical), 11 destroyers, 65 frigates,

hundreds of patrol and coastal craft, 73 mine warfare vessels, at least 2 amphibious assault ships,

and 200 logistics and support vessels.80 The three strategic submarines on either side can be

regarded as part of the nuclear battle more than of the naval battle, since they would be busy

being targeted by nukes or targeting their own nukes. The patrol, mine warfare, and coastal

vessels can also be discounted, since neither power would have much incentive to launch

amphibious operations or move its vessels close to the enemy shoreline. After all, the Russian

and Chinese fleets are separated by the Korean Peninsula. Even if the Chinese saw it as in their

interest to attack Vladivostok from the sea, a Chinese amphibious force would have to round the

Korean Peninsula and deal with whatever formidable defenses the Russians would doubtless

have in store for them in the waters surrounding their great naval base. Given that the Russian

fleet has 8 mine warfare vessels, extensive mining of the sea routes to Vladivostok is more than

likely. Finally, the Chinese Navy only has amphibious vessels capable of carrying a regiment-

sized unit.81 Therefore, amphibious and supporting vessels may be discounted and the principal

surface combatants, such as the tactical submarines and guided-missile surface ships are the real

assets to be compared. The Chinese seem to possess a clear numerical advantage here. To be

sure, not all the Chinese frigates are guided-missile launchers and the Russian guided-missile

cruiser could probably pack quite a punch. The numbers of destroyers are about even. However,

65 Chinese tactical submarines against a mere 18 could surely make a decisive difference to the

entire equation. The Chinese would only need to win the sub-surface contest to put the Russian

surface vessels in serious danger. Moreover, the Russian navy may have superior technology, but

its vessels are often of questionable quality and durability, while those of China are often brand

new.82 Once again, the odds seem to favor the Chinese and we can put the naval advantage on

the side of the PRC. Nonetheless, this cannot be said with nearly as much certainty as the

Chinese advantage on the Eastern Front or Central Asia. Modern naval warfare is a highly fickle

80TheMilitaryBalance,2012,211-242.

81ProfessorPhillipKarber,asstatedinLectureonTuesday,November27

th,2012,GeorgetownUniversity

82Kipp,JacobW.,“ADepressingCurtainforRussianNavalPower:AdmiralSergeiGorshkovFailsHerSeaTrials”

EurasiaDailyMonitor ,Volume:9Issue:219,November20th,2012,


tnews[any_of_the_words]=china%20world&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=40187&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=05a1efed9

d0183d13d0701465ae0bab3 (Accessed11/30/2012),(1-2).



36

and untested thing. It is entirely possible that the Russian vessels have such superior missile

technology and guidance systems that the Chinese fleet would be at the disadvantage.

Nonetheless, at the very least the Russian fleet would have a lot on its plate and not be able to

influence the land battle much—a battle in which the Russians need naval support much more

badly than do the Chinese. If the Chinese navy could lend its support to the Eastern Front, this

would only make Chinese victory there all the more likely.

Now that all three theatres of conventional conflict have been surveyed, it is time to make

general conclusions about the likely outcome and implications of the conventional conflict to the

larger picture. We have assumed that Russian relative success on the nuclear front would be

accompanied by a conventional conflict of several days, if not weeks, during which the two sides

negotiate (or regain communications) and try to gain bargaining chips. The grand survey of the

conventional conflict seems to give the edge to the Chinese on all three fronts: Central Asia, the

Eastern Front, and the Naval Front. The Chinese would seem poised to make deep thrusts into

Central Asia and the Russian Far East, dealing heavy damage to Russian forces. The base at

Kyrgyzstan, Trans-Siberian communications, Vladivostok—all Russian strongpoints near the

frontier seem in danger. The Russian Transiberian Railway and attendant lines of communication

would be eliminated by nuclear, if not conventional, weaponry. Such is the nature of modern

firepower that casualties on the losing side escalate dramatically. As negotiations wore to a close,

the Russians would face the reality that nuclear success against the Chinese nuclear deterrent had

not secured them conventional success on the battlefield. As stated earlier, it is unlikely that the

Russian leaders would resort to widespread “city-busting”, even as their conventional forces fell

back in disarray. The political costs would still be too great, given that most Russian cities were

preserved. The conventional battle would never be more than an opportunity for bargaining chips

at the negotiating table. At D+14 or so, Russia would only have to escalate the use of tactical

nuclear weapons against advancing Chinese forces to unacceptable levels in order for the

Chinese to sue for peace, assuming they had not done so already. Therefore, the negotiating table

would be the place where China’s conventional victory bore fruit.

Given Russia’s virtual elimination of the Chinese nuclear arsenal, the Chinese would not

be in a particularly strong position even after conventional victories. The Russians would have

tremendous diplomatic leverage which had not existed before the war. In that sense, Russian

objectives to restore failing prestige would be achieved. However, Russia would have taken



37

some nuclear hits and the loss of the conventional war would leave the Russians even worse off.

If Russian forces, say, occupied most of Xingjian and Manchuria, having routed the PLA and

sent most of the PLA Navy to the bottom of the ocean, Russian diplomats would have a lot more

bargaining power. The Chinese diplomats could not argue with the fact that Russia controlled

Central Asia and occupied large tracks of Chinese sovereign territory—territory out of the reach

of China forever except on Russian terms. It is not hard to imagine the Russians carving out an

independent satellite Uighur nation in Xingjian. Nuclear devastation at home would not make the

Russians inclined to be magnanimous. As for Manchuria, this is more historically and ethnically

Chinese, but it would not be the first time that Russia occupied the province and solidified

economic interests there. The destruction of the Chinese Navy would change the larger

geopolitical equation vis-à-vis the United States and its Pacific allies. One cannot discount the

mediating influence of the United States, at this point. All of these factors would put Russia in a

stronger position on the ground, at the end of the war—in terms of morale as well as territory.

However, the conventional analysis suggests that all this would be reversed. China would control

Central Asia south of the Kazakh border, as well as the Russian Far East and the naval situation

in the Pacific. China would be able to exchange withdrawal from Russian and Central Asian

territory for salvaging something from the mess of losing its nuclear deterrent. Russia would

have won the war—with qualifications—but not be in a particularly stronger position

diplomatically than before the war. With its military bested, its former ally a hated foe, many of

its cities smoking ruins, its arsenal severely depleted, and nuclear notoriety, Russia would face

an uncertain and unenviable diplomatic future.

Even more importantly, Russia would face a highly uncertain domestic future. We have

already assumed that a “winter of discontent” helped prompt the Russian adventure in Central

Asia. The loss of so many civilians and young men to the most horrific destruction and to

crippling defeat on the battlefield would have a tremendous impact on Russian public opinion.

One recalls not only the Soviet war in Afghanistan, but the Russo-Japanese War, when Russian

defeat in the very same region of Asia prompted the 1905 revolution—or even World War I

itself, which led to the Bolshevik Revolution. Historically, the Russian public has never taken

kindly to its leaders losing wars and tends to reward them with more than simply a defeat at the

ballot box—given that the ballot box is generally in short supply. Historically, the Russian public

gains the sympathy of the chastened returning soldiers and topples the regime without mercy--or



38

at least exacts severe concessions out of it. The edifice of Vladimir Putin’s Russia would likely

not survive conventional defeat on the battlefield for very long, no matter how splendidly the

nuclear arsenal and Russian diplomats performed.

As for the leaders of the CCP, they might ironically emerge stronger and more popular

from the Sino-Russian War than ever before. There are few better rallying points for national

solidarity than winning battles against a hated invader—especially if the hated foe uses nuclear

weapons first. One can only imagine the public outrage towards Russia which would engulf

Chinese society at the news (no doubt officially exaggerated) of Russian aggression. Nuclear

detonations at Second Artillery sites and elsewhere throughout China would combine anger with

fear and horror. Finally, news would come in from the front of the heroes of the “people’s war”,

who gallantly drove back the Russian hordes. This news, combined with the relief of not being

wiped from the face of the earth, would almost certainly bring about jubilation throughout all of

the People’s Republic of China—seeming to deserve its name for the first time (and maybe last)

time in its history. The CCP would play up the bravery of the PLA and the adeptness of the

Chinese diplomats at the negotiating table, spicing matters with its usual heavy dose of

propaganda and spin. If the Putin regime collapsed shortly thereafter, this would only enhance

Chinese morale. To think that the CCP would not come out of this scenario looking better to its

subjects denies reason. At the same time, while the Chinese economy would doubtless have

taken severe damage from nuclear destruction, not to mention the loss of the Russian and Central

Asian market, the Chinese would have more than enough people, resources, and morale to pull

through and revive in the following years—with plenty of moral and material support from

abroad. While the war would be a pyrrhic victory for Russia, China might revive from the ashes

like a phoenix.

Looking geopolitically, the effects on the larger world of this conflict would doubtless be

tremendous and sweeping. The world economy could hardly fail to plunge into a frigid

depression, if only for a matter of weeks, as the Russian and Chinese markets effectively shut

down. Fears of escalation, economic recession, and military alerts would throw the larger

international system into disarray for quite some time. Europe would lose much of its energy

sources overnight. Far Eastern commerce and communications would be thrown into complete

and utter chaos, as international shipping fled for dear life. EMP shock waves and cyber-attacks

might roll destructively through the Internet and world communications. Nuclear radiation would



39

contaminate the environment in an unprecedented number of locations and to an unprecedented

extent. Ultimately, the greatest beneficiary of the war would, of course, be the United States.

Unscathed and rallying the global response behind it, the United States would be in a powerful

position to mediate the conflict and its aftermath, seeming like a voice of moderation and reason

against the madness of the Eurasian autocracies. The United States might emerge with almost the

level of influence it held in 1945. The United States two greatest rivals would be in a state of

exhaustion, their militaries and economies shattered for years to come. Lacking a nuclear

deterrent, the Chinese might give in to all sorts of pressure on Pacific diplomatic matters, in

exchange for American aid and sympathy. With a greatly diminished deterrent and legitimacy,

the Russians might offer up similar concessions. The rise of China would be delayed, at best.

Russia would devolve once again into diplomatic insignificance and chaos. Hopefully, the West

would be able to oversee the transition to a more just and democratic regime than after the fall of

the Soviet Union. Either way, the United States would hold all of the cards as the fires of Eurasia

died down. At the same time, the deeper humanitarian and cultural cost of the war would be

beyond exaggeration. Hundreds of thousands would die in a matter of weeks, sparking a

humanitarian crisis beyond imagining. The liberal world order, so serene ever since World War

II, would have suffered a severe blow to its confidence and sense of permanence. Even the most

insulated and affluent Westerners might well ask themselves with apprehension if this violent

disruption to the Pax Americana had only just begun.

There are many who would question the utility and motivation of this analysis. To most,

the scenario of a Sino-Russian War seems conjured more from the imagination of a B-rate

Hollywood producer than a serious or sane academic mind. There is a deep-seated human

suspicion that those who study evil are tainted by it--however detached they might think

themselves to be—and that it is far better to avert one’s eyes entirely. Perhaps the suspicion is

not altogether unjustified. After all, Western academia owes its hostile view of War Studies to

the nightmarish memory of World War I, a universal tragedy fueled as much by the jingoistic

scholarship which came before as by bullets. However, by considering the nature of future wars,

we have the possibility of forestalling them or at least of mitigating them. Russia and China are

two mighty nations who have fought one another before and show a plausible likelihood of doing

so again. If these two Eurasian empires are to break Montgomery’s rules of war and clash, the

United States has the power and the duty to pick up the pieces after them—and a bit of foresight



40

would not go amiss. The foresight this analysis offers cautiously predicts that if the Eurasian

giants fought in the way that they are most likely to, Russia would narrowly win the war, but lose

the peace. Russia would likely win the nuclear fight, but suffer catastrophic and politically

prohibitive losses. This author gives too much credit to the humanity and reason of the Russian

people to presume that the men in the Kremlin would prefer to utterly destroy the Chinese nation

rather than concede the limits of Russian power with good grace. Rather than test this generous

assumption, it is to be hoped that the leaders of Russia will learn to win the peace in peace, rather

than forfeit their rule and the lives of their people in a land war in Asia.

Samuel 1:27 How are the mighty fallen, and the weapons of war perished!

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