a "hollow army" reappraised: president carter, defense budgets, and the politics of military...

7/29/2019 A "Hollow Army" Reappraised: President Carter, Defense Budgets, and the Politics of Military Readiness

1/79

Strategic Studies Institute

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA

A HOLLOW ARMY REAPPRAISED:

PRESIDENT CARTER, DEFENSE BUDGETS,

AND THE POLITICS OF MILITARY READINESS

Frank L. Jones

LetortThe

Papers

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Visit our website for other free publicationdownloads

http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/

To rate this publication click here.
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1125http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1125


2/79

TheLetort Papers

In the early 18th century, James Letort, an explorerand fur trader, was instrumental in opening up the

Cumberland Valley to settlement. By 1752, there wasa garrison on Letort Creek at what is today CarlisleBarracks, Pennsylvania. In those days, Carlisle Barrackslay at the western edge of the American colonies. It wasa bastion for the protection of settlers and a departurepoint for further exploration. Today, as was the caseover two centuries ago, Carlisle Barracks, as the home ofthe U.S. Army War College, is a place of transition and

transformation.

In the same spirit of bold curiosity that compelled themen and women who, like Letort, settled the AmericanWest, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) presents TheLetort Papers. This series allows SSI to publish papers,retrospectives, speeches, or essays of interest to thedefense academic community which may not correspondwith our mainstream policy-oriented publications.

If you think you may have a subject amenable topublication in our Letort Paper series, or if you wishto comment on a particular paper, please contact Dr.Antulio J. Echevarria II, Director of Research, U.S. ArmyWar College, Strategic Studies Institute, 47 Ashburn

Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013-5046. The phone number is(717) 245-4058; e-mail address is [email protected]. We look forward to hearing from you.


3/79

Letort Paper

A HOLLOW ARMY REAPPRAISED:PRESIDENT CARTER, DEFENSE BUDGETS,


Frank L. Jones

October 2012

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and donot necessarily reect the ofcial policy or position of the Depart-ment of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Gov-ernment. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications

enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose clas-sied information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepre-sent ofcial U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers themto offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the in-terest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared forpublic release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code,Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not becopyrighted.


4/79

ii

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and shouldbe forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. ArmyWar College, 47 Ashburn Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013.

*****

All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications may bedownloaded free of charge from the SSI website. Hard copies ofthis report may also be obtained free of charge while supplieslast by placing an order on the SSI website. SSI publications maybe quoted or reprinted in part or in full with permission and ap-propriate credit given to the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Insti-tute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA. Contact SSIby visiting our website at the following address: www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil .

*****

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mailnewsletter to update the national security community on the re-search of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, andupcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newslet-ter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our researchanalysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, pleasesubscribe on the SSI website at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/newsletter/.

ISBN 1-58487-546-1


5/79

iii

FOREWORD

The term hollow army became a part of the Amer-ican political vocabulary more than 30 years ago, inanother election year, 1980. Highlighted by a reporterin an article about the U.S. Army Chief of Staffs con-gressional testimony concerning the scal year 1981defense budget, the term became a metaphor for theJimmy Carter administrations alleged neglect of U.S.national security by political opponents as well as dis-approving members of his own party in Congress, whobelieved him to be a liability. In the decades following,the expression broadened to a hollow force and itsmeaning expanded, serving as a way of describing thestate of ill-prepared military forces in characterizing apresidential administrations shortfall in the resourcesneeded to meet U.S. military commitments.

Today, the term remains a relevant and potent id-iom in this so-called age of austerity, with the U.S.defense budget in decline. Both the Barack Obamaadministration and its critics have used the term. Theformer to explain how its recent strategic guidanceand budget priorities will prevent the hollowing outof U.S. forces and capabilities, the latter as an epithetsuggesting that proposed budget reductions will cre-ate such a force.

In this Letort Paper, Professor Jones sets out toreexamine the existence of a hollow army but as-sessing it within the context of the Carter administra-tions defense policy, strategy and budgets, and thechallenges it faced in the early years of building anall-volunteer force. Using primary sources, including

recently declassied documents, he presents a morenuanced picture of the political dynamics at work inboth the executive and legislative branches as well


6/79

iv

as the press. He argues that the notion of a hollowarmy represented a policy argument not only among

members of the two branches of government but alsobetween political actors: the commander in chief anda service chief.

Ultimately, this is a story of how the use of meta-phor can create a dominant narrative existing for de-cades and how it is now time to regain perspective.This is especially true in the current budget environ-ment, where national interests and risk must be ex-amined soberly and rationally given the strategic andeconomic realities that the United States confronts inthe coming decade.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR. Director Strategic Studies Institute


7/79

v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

FRANK L. JONES is Professor of Security Studies inthe Department of National Security and Strategy atthe U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA. He is theGeneral Dwight D. Eisenhower Chair in NationalSecurity and currently the director of the CollegesTheory of War and Strategy course. Professor Jonesserved for more than 30 years in federal service, rstas a commissioned ofcer in the Vietnam-era UnitedStates Army and as a civilian, beginning as a Presi-dent Management Intern in 1979 with the Departmentof the Army. In 2006, he retired from the Departmentof Defense (DoD) as a career member of the SeniorExecutive Service, where he held a number of posi-tions in the Ofce of the Secretary of Defense. Theseincluded his appointment as Deputy Assistant Sec-

retary of Defense for Special Operations Policy andSupport, and Principal Director for Strategy, Plans,and Resources in the Ofce of the Assistant Secretaryof Defense for Homeland Defense. In the latter posi-tion, he led the interagency task force responsible forformulating the National Strategy for Maritime Secu-rityunder President George W. Bush and was one ofthe principal authors of the Department of DefensesStrategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support. Profes-sor Jones has published a number of articles and bookchapters on national security policymaking, homelandsecurity, and terrorism. His most recent work is InBrzezinskis Forge: Fashioning the Carter DoctrinesMilitary Instrument, published in Imperial Crossroads:The Great Powers and the Persian Gulf (Naval Institute

Press, 2012). He is the author of a forthcoming book onRobert Blowtorch Bob Komer, who is largely associ-ated with U.S. pacication efforts during the Vietnam


8/79

War and as a member of the National Security Coun-cil staff in the Kennedy administration. Komer also

served during the Carter administration as an advisorto Secretary of Defense Harold Brown for North At-lantic Treaty Organization (NATO) affairs, and lateras Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

vi


9/79

vii

SUMMARY

The term hollow army or the broader expression,hollow force, has as much currency today as it didwhen an Army Chief of Staff rst uttered the phrase 3decades ago. In this period of declining defense bud-gets, the President of the United States, the Secretaryof Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff have articulated how the newly released strategicguidance and budget priorities represent a concertedeffort not to hollow out U.S. forces. They have af-rmed their dedication to preventing the re-creationof the ragged military and disastrous deterioration indefense capability the Jimmy Carter administrationallowed to occur. Thus, more than 30 years later, theexpression continues to be as politically potent as itwas when rst spoken. However, it is also time to re-

examine the term hollow army and its meaning asthe inevitable tug of war over defense spending getsunderway.

This paper places the hollow army metaphorwithin its historical context: barely 5 years after theUnited States nally disengaged from a major war(Vietnam), a struggling economy, and an election yearin which a President was only tenuously leading inthe polls and also confronting substantial oppositionfrom elements of his own political party. In conduct-ing such an assessment, the paper argues that over theyears a specic political reading of these events hastaken hold. It is the purpose of this paper to re-readthe historical events and in doing so, come to a betterunderstanding of the domestic political and geostrate-

gic environment during Carters presidency, the U.S.Cold War strategy, and the soundness of the assertionsthat military leaders made concerning the readiness ofU.S. forces to perform their missions.


10/79

viii

In undertaking this reappraisal, the paper explainshow the term hollow army came into use. It con-

tends that the Carter administration left the defensestrategy of his predecessors, Presidents Richard Nix-on and Gerald Ford, intact, a strategy that the Armysupported, but it also points out that the Ford admin-istration increased the Armys force structure withouta commensurate increase in personnel or funding, asituation that Congress abetted. Second, it argues thatthe defense budgets of the Carter presidency hon-ored the American commitment to the North Atlan-tic Treaty Organization (NATO) as well as making asizable down payment on the Armys modernizationand readiness. What hampered the meeting of person-nel requirements was the end of the draft. Young menwere not inclined to enlist in the new all-volunteerforce. Further, there were a number of problems with-

in the Army regarding its ability to measure readinessas well as missteps in the development and produc-tion of new weapon systems. To its credit, the Carteradministration worked with the Army to improve itsrecruiting program and funded new systems consis-tent with production capabilities.

The paper underscores that Carter grappled withthese issues in a highly politically charged atmo-sphere. Existing U.S. Government documents, somedeclassied at the authors request, conrm the Con-gressional Budget Ofces 1994 conclusion that thehollow force argument was more the result of an-ecdote and press sensationalism. Further, the papermaintains that the normative assumption that defensepolicymaking is above politics, free from political con-

tamination, is idle fancy. Defense policy is an arenaof public policy with its own cultures, routines, andconstituencies. As President Dwight D. Eisenhower,


11/79

ix

who was no stranger to military culture, pointed out,every service chief wants additional resources and al-

ways will. This was certainly the case with respect tothe hollow army debate.


12/79


13/79

1

A HOLLOW ARMY REAPPRAISED:PRESIDENT CARTER, DEFENSE BUDGETS,


The term hollow army entered the political vo-cabulary at a congressional hearing in May 1980, butit soon became a term used to characterize PresidentJimmy Carters presidency with respect to the securityof the United States: nave, misguided, and disastrous.In the view of Carters opponents in both political par-ties, the President allowed Americas military strengthto deteriorate as part of a decade of neglect.1 Theconventional wisdom is that President Ronald Reaganand the Congress rectied this period of disregard,negligence, and inattention by the enactment of largedefense budgets that would ultimately lead to the dis-solution of the Soviet Union.

After Carters presidency, the term broadenedto include all the U.S. military servicesi.e., a hol-low forcean expression so expansive that it cameto mean an understaffed, underfunded, or outdatedmilitary.2Even after the Cold War ended, Americanpolitical and military leaders obsession with main-taining high readiness levels persisted, although de-fense budgets plummeted. They shuddered, com-mented political scientist Richard Betts, at the specterof hollow armed forces, the image rst invoked withdevastating political effect by General Edward Meyerin 1980 to describe the threadbare state of the Armyafter post-Vietnam budget cuts.3

The term remains pertinent as reected in the cur-rent debate about proposed Department of Defense

(DoD) budget decreases. What is happening underObama is exactly what happened under Carter afterthe Vietnam War, wrote James Jay Carafano, a Heri-


14/79

2

tage Foundation analyst, in 2010. Cutting back justmade the military hollow.4According to Carafanos

Heritage Foundation colleague Baker Spring, theBarack Obama Defense Budget would not provide ad-equate resources for the military, particularly the coredefense program, by reducing it to 3 percent of GrossDomestic Product (GDP) by the end of the decade.Further, in Springs view, such a reduced level wouldproduce holes in the U.S. defense position, includingsome mixture of an insufcient force structure, a de-cient operational capability, retarded modernization,a hollow military strategy, and likely deteriorationof U.S. security commitments.5

These assertions were enlarged a few monthslater in a paper entitled Warning: Hollow ForceAhead,published by the Heritage Foundation, theAmerican Enterprise Institute, and the Foreign Policy

Initiative. The authors claimed that the Obama admin-istrations proposed defense budget cuts would havea deleterious effect on the future of Americas armedforces and national security, creating a hollowforce characterized by fewer personnel and weap-ons systems, slowed military modernization, reducedreadiness for operations, and continued stress on theall-volunteer force. Such a modern-day hollowforce would be less capable of securing Americasinterests and preserving the international leadershiprole that rests upon military preeminence.6However,some of the strength of this argument was weakenedby passage of the Budget Control Act of 2011, in whichCongress mandated reductions in federal spending,including defense spending: $487 billion in savings

from the defense base budget over the next 10 years;more that $250 billion of those reductions in the Fu-ture Years Defense Program (scal years 2013-17).


15/79

3

Nonetheless, the potency of the hollow forcemetaphor was not lost on the Obama administration,

which recognized that defense budget reductions inthe 2012 election year would likely unleash invectivesfrom political opponents similar to what Carter suf-fered 3 decades previously. To soften any criticism asto how the scal year 2013 defense budget cuts weremade or perhaps to preclude end-runs to Congressand fractious arguments within the DoD, Secretaryof Defense Leon Panetta underscored that PresidentObama insisted that reductions in defense spendingbe driven by strategy and rigorous analysis, not bythe numbers alone.7General Martin Dempsey, Chair-man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, emphasized the col-laborative and inclusive effort of the military and ci-vilians involved in fashioning the DoDs new strategicguidance and stressed that the document had buy-in

among our senior military and civilian leadership.8

The White Houses sensitivity to this problem isapparent. In the cover letter President Obama signedthat accompanies the January 2012 DoD strategicguidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Prioritiesfor 21st Century Defense, he states, Going forward, wewill also remember the lessons of history and avoidrepeating the mistakes of the past when our militarywas ill-prepared for the future.9The DoD, however,is more transparent in its discussion of the new guid-ance. It underscored that one of its four basic guid-ing principles in formulating the strategic guidancewas to avoid hollowing out the force.10In its view,a smaller, ready military is preferable to a largerforce that is ill-prepared because resources are not

made available for training, maintenance, and mod-ernization relative to force structure.11Thus, for thecurrent DoD leadership, a hollow force is dened as


16/79

4

preserving greater force structure than can be fullyequipped or adequately trained. Consequently, its

intent in devising the scal year 2013 budget was toundertake suitable and discriminating reductions inoverall capacity and force structure, but to continuemaking the investments needed to ensure that the U.S.military remains strong, agile, and capable.12Giventhat commitment, the budget would protect resourcesfor force readiness to avoid a hollow force.13

The Obama administrations attentiveness to thepossibility of being criticized for hollowing out theforce underscores the established view of the his-torical events surrounding the Carter administrationand thus reects a particular political reading of thoseevents. However, that proposition needs to re-read.14In the 3 decades since the rst utterance of the termhollow army, it is time for a more thoughtful ex-

amination of its meaning since it (and its variant, hol-low force) has become a catchphrase in the Americanpolitical lexicon. Such an examination must take intoconsideration the political context, but other factorsas well. These elements include the domestic politicaland geostrategic environment during Carters presi-dency, the U.S. Cold War strategy during his term ofofce, and the validity of the assertions made by mili-tary leaders regarding the readiness of U.S. forces toperform their missions.

Setting the Stage.

On the morning of May 29, 1980, Samuel Stratton, aDemocrat from New York and chairman of the House

Armed Services Committees Investigations Subcom-mittee, called the subcommittee to order. Stratton, aconservative with a reputation for supporting large


17/79

5

defense budgets helpful to the businesses and mili-tary installations in his district, framed the purpose of

the hearing in his opening remarks. While the intentwas seemingly innocuous, to examine the national de-fense funding levels for scal year 1981, he laid outhis concern in a more dramatic fashion. He claimedthat the subcommittee for the last couple of yearsquestioned whether the uniformed military leaderswere actually being consulted by the President andthe Secretary of Defense and whether their advice wasbeing followed (emphasis added) in connection withthe more important military decisions being made bythe administration and the Pentagon.15 He and theother committee members maintained that Carter ig-nored the Joint Chiefs of Staffs advice, resulting in avery unfortunate situation since, if you are going tohave advisors but consistently dont take their advice,

something is radically wrong and needs changing.16

Stratton then articulated what had really prompt-

ed the hearing. The President and the Secretary ofDefense, in what was likely an unprecedented step,had written directly to the chairman of the SenateArmed Services Committee urging the Senate to de-lete many of the add-ons that had been included inthe legislation the House of Representatives had rati-ed. Stratton was particularly incensed with Secretaryof Defense Harold Browns letter. Brown contendedthat the increased funding the House Armed ServicesCommittee recommended ($5.1 billion) created a se-rious imbalance in the Presidents defense programs,places unique undue stress on our scarce economic re-sources, and jeopardizes the added military capability

we all seek.17Brown then specied the objectionableadditional items in the House defense authorizationbill. The President sent a similar letter stating his op-position to specic defense programs.18


18/79

6

Stratton viewed the content of these letters as aninsult to the House of Representatives and an attack

on the Armed Services committee. The administrationwas charging the Committee with being irresponsi-ble.19He wanted to know what advice the Presidentand Secretary had relied on to come to these conclu-sions, particularly when the President had only re-cently stated that the United States was confrontingthe greatest challenge [to its] national security sincePearl Harbor.20

Stratton then posed a series of questions to theService chiefs about the letter and the Presidents pro-posed scal year 1981 defense budget, beginning withChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General David C.Jones, followed by Air Force Chief of Staff General LewAllen, and then Army Chief of Staff General EdwardC. Meyer. Meyer would become the central gure in

this budgetary tug of war between the House ArmedServices Committee and the Carter administration.

Meyer informed Stratton that he was not awareof Secretary Browns letter until a week before whenhe read about it in the newspaper and had received acopy of the letter only recently. Brown had not con-sulted with him about its contents. Stratton then askedif it was Meyers personal opinion that the additionalfunds jeopardized the nations defense. Meyer replied,No, sir, not in the case of the Army. I have testiedbefore your committee, and others, that I think wehave inadequate funds to provide the type of Armywe need. I believe the requested funds are not exces-sive. We need more to do the things we have to do inmanpower and modernization.21

After nearly an hour of questioning by the sub-committee members present, Stratton recognizedRepresentative Gillespie V. Sonny Montgomery,


19/79

7

a Democrat from Mississippi. Montgomery was nota member of the subcommittee, but the chairman of

another Armed Services subcommittee. Montgom-ery, a major general in the Mississippi Army NationalGuard, was strongly pro-defense like Stratton.

Montgomery recounted to Meyer how he had justreturned from Fort Hood, Texas, where he had talkedwith personnel in the infantry and armored divisions.He noted that the number of tanks in each company ofthe armored division was below the authorized level,12 tanks per company instead of the requisite 17 percompany. Meyer responded that his impression wascorrect. Montgomery repeated Meyers words, Thatis correct. Meyer continued:

Right now, as I have said before, we have a hollowArmy[emphasis added]. Our forward deployed forcesare at full strength in Europe, in Panama, and in Ko-rea. Our tactical forces in the United States are some17,000 under strength. Therefore, anywhere you go inthe United States, except for the 82nd Airborne Divi-sion, which is also lled up, you will nd companiesand platoons which have been zeroed out.22

The questioning of the Joint Chiefs continued withRepresentative Robin Beard, a Republican from Ten-nessee, summarizing the subcommittees views andthe overall tone of the hearing:

I think the straw that breaks the camels back is a let-ter from the Secretary of Defense and a letter fromthe President which read like third-grade readers. Itsan insult. These letters are an insult to the Congress;theyre an insult to the military leadership; and theyre

an insult to the American people. These letters are ab-solutely, totally insane.


20/79

8

Beard then went on to question whether Secre-tary of the Army Clifford Alexander had the courage

to appear before the subcommittee in a few weeks.23

Shortly thereafter, Stratton adjourned the hearing. Ithad lasted 1 hour and 40 minutes, but it was hardlythe end of the issue.

The headline for the front-page article in the Wash-ington Post the next morning read, Joint Chiefs ofStaff Break with Carter on Budget Planning for De-fense Needs. George Wilson, who wrote the article,led with a sentence that claimed the Joint Chiefs hadbroken publicly with their commander in chief bydeclaring that President Carters new defense budget[scal year 1981] is not big enough to meet the Sovietthreat. While Wilson admitted that the Chiefs hadbeen dragooned into the battle of the budget by Strat-ton, he followed that observation with the Meyer quo-

tation, which Wilson termed the bluntest response.He further quoted Meyer as stating, I dont believethe current budget responds to the Armys needs forthe 1980s. Wilson then added another Meyer quote:Theres a tremendous shortfall in the ability to mod-ernize quickly, in response to the Soviet threat. Laterin the article, Wilson quoted Meyer as stating thatwhile forces in Europe were at strength, the units inthe United States had inadequate numbers of combatsoldiers. Meyer told the subcommittee members thatthere was a shortfall of approximately 20,000 soldiersand the nation was either going to have to go to thedraft, or an adequately resourced all-volunteer force.Today we have neither.24


21/79

9

What Does Hollow Mean?

The dictionary denition of hollow is enclosingan empty space, not solid.25The connotation was thatby 1980, the U.S. Army was an empty vessel, fragile,and when hit forcefully, would easily shatter. In theyears since Meyer uttered that term, analysts have ex-amined this issue and interpreted his statement. Oneinterpretation from the late 1990s is that Meyers com-ment referred to a lack of qualied personnel and theimbalance that existed between the number of Armydivisions and the number of personnel available toll those divisions.26 Another, more contemporary,construction is that hollow refers to a point wheremilitary readiness declines and the military lacksthe nancial resources to provide trained and readyforces, support ongoing operations, and modernize.

However, even analysts who dene the term in thisbroad manner interpret Meyers comment as stem-ming from a difference between a force that merelylooks good on paper and one that is properly staffedand trained. In their view, Meyers comment relatesto personnel shortages, that many units had insuf-cient troops. . . .27Are either of these interpretationsvalid?

The article by Washington Postwriter Wilson thatincited the political conagration presents a mislead-ing picture. Wilson quotes Meyer as stating that thescal year 1981 Defense budget did not respond to theArmys needs for the 1980s, and that a tremendousshortfall existed in the Armys ability to modernizequickly in response to the Soviet threat. However,

Wilsons quotes are from different points in Meyerstestimony. Meyers statement about modernizationwas in response to Representative Robin Beard who


22/79

10

asks the following leading question: You have a tre-mendous shortfall, do you not, in the Army procure-

ment budget? To which Meyer replies, We have atremendous shortfall in our ability to modernize theArmy quickly as I believe we must in order to respondto the threat. Here Meyer is offering his professionaljudgment regarding modernization, but he does notelaborate on why a shortfall exists with respect tothe capacity to modernize rapidly. Second, the threatMeyer refers to is ambiguous. It is a likely referenceto the Soviet threat, but that is not explicit. Even if itis the Soviet threat, it is unclear what aspect of thatthreat is of concern and in what region of the worldthis threat is considered a problem.

As indicated earlier, Meyer made his commentabout the hollow army in response to Montgomerysquestion about the number of tanks in an armored di-

vision specically with respect to a unit at Fort Hood,Texas. After he remarked, we have a hollow Army,Wilson did not include the following words from thetestimony which are important and worth reiterating:

Our forward forces are at full strength in Europe, inPanama and in Korea. Our tactical forces in the UnitedStates are some 17,000 under strength. Therefore, any-

where you go in the United States, except for the 82ndAirborne Division, which is also lled up, you willnd companies and platoons which have been zeroedout.28

In response to a follow-on question from Montgom-ery, Meyer stated that the Army has a shortfall in thenumber of personnel in the combat arms branches (in-

fantry, armor, and artillery). He then added:


23/79

11

Although from a pure numbers point of view, if youbelieve pure numbers, enlistments for the combatarms are up this year because that is where we focusedour recruiting effort. Right now, we have lled the in-fantry requirements.

This statement alone raises pertinent questions thatthe committee members do not investigate. First, whywould the Army Chief of Staff doubt the numbers ofhis own Recruiting Command? Second, did the Army

recognize that it would be thousands of personnelshort of its requirements, and, if so, why did it waituntil the current year to concentrate its recruiting ef-forts on the combat arms? Third, if it is 17,000 per-sonnel short, how did such a shortfall occur and howcould it be remedied? Further, even if there was sucha shortfall, did it mean that U.S. Army forces were in-capable of executing their responsibilities as directedin U.S. national security policy and strategy? Lastly,had the risk of having such a shortfall been examinedin view of U.S. defense commitments? To answerthese questions, it is necessary to examine Carters de-fense policy, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO) strategy, the commitments the United Stateshad made to NATO, and the Carter administrations

defense budgets to provide the resources to meetthese commitments, including such issues as forcereadiness and recruiting the all-volunteer force afterthe cessation of the draft.

Carters Defense Policy.

In mid-February 1977, less than a month after hisinauguration, President Carter directed a comprehen-sive examination of (1) U.S. national strategy, and (2)


24/79

12

capabilities (Program Review Memorandum [PRM]-10). With respect to the second component, Carter

directed Secretary Brown to examine a range of al-ternative military strategies and construct alternativemilitary force postures and programs, including theirbudgetary implications, in support of the strategies.29

Three months later in early May, Carter made hisinitial overseas trip to Great Britain, meeting rst atan economic summit with heads of G-7 and then at-tending the NATO summit.30Carter, in his address tothe other leaders at the NATO summit, issued a callfor increased defense spending by NATO members,thereby setting the character and tempo for the meet-ing and restoring vital American leadership in the al-liance, after the turbulent U.S. entanglement in Viet-nam.31

Within weeks after the NATO summit, on June

5, 1977, Brown submitted the PRM-10 Force PostureStudy. The study developed alternative integratedmilitary strategies (AIMS) in ve areas: (1) a NATO-Warsaw Pact (WP) conict in Europe (includingNATO anks and the North Atlantic); (2) operationsoutside Europe during a NATO-WP war; (3) opera-tions in East Asia; (4) peacekeeping activities and po-tential local wars; and (5) a U.S.-Union of Soviet So-cialist Republics (USSR) nuclear conict. The studyauthors made six fundamental assumptions regardingU.S. policy and the international environment: (1) theSoviet Union posed the principal threat to the securityof the United States and to its global interests; (2) theUnited States would continue to view the security ofEurope as a vital interest and would continue to par-

ticipate actively in the defense of NATO, which theWP threatened; (3) the United States would continueto regard aggression against Japan as a threat to vital


25/79

13

interests; (4) the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) andthe Soviet Union would not achieve a rapprochement

adequate to permit a sizable decrease in forces arrayedagainst each other; (5) that as long as Sino-Soviet an-tagonism endured, the United States would not needto obtain specic conventional forces to oppose a PRCmilitary threat; and (6) in an interdependent environ-ment the United States would continue to have majorglobal interests.32However, as noted by the study au-thors, the security of Europe against the WP was theprincipal aim of U.S. defense policy:

Without such a threat, U.S. military strategy would beprofoundly different. No matter what outcome mayresult from MBFR [Mutual and Balanced Force Reduc-tions], there will still remain a threat and a need forNATO military forces; and the U.S., with its strategicnuclear capability, will play a leading role in NATO.33

Further, the study emphasized that the outcome ofa conventional war in Europe depended on the deter-rent value of our theater and strategic nuclear forcesas well as the warghting capabilities of U.S. generalpurpose forcesand those of our Allies.34WP plan-ners had to consider the prospect of nuclear escala-

tion as a hedge against unexpected conventional fail-ure.35NATOs conventional force posture dependedhighly on nuclear forces designed to deter nuclear at-tacks, and NATO nuclear forces were generally con-sidered adequate for deterrence of any immediate Pactescalation to this level of warfare.36The study foundlittle to indicate that U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK)forces could not defeat a surprise North Korean attack

on South Korea, provided the Soviets and Chineseprovided logistical support only.37Although the studydid not reach any specic conclusions or recommen-


26/79

14

dations about the various alternative strategies, it wasclear that the primary thrust of U.S. military strategy

should remain the defense of Western Europe.On August 24, 1977, Carter signed Presidential

Directive/National Security Council-18, U.S. Na-tional Strategy. The directive noted U.S. advantagesin economic strength, technological superiority, andpopular political support and the administrationsdetermination for the United States to maintain anoverall balance of military power between the UnitedStates and its allies on the one hand, and the SovietUnion and its allies on the other, at least as favorableas that that now exists. To that end, it would seek tocounterbalance Soviet military power and inuencein three key areas: Europe, the Middle East, and EastAsia. Further, Carter claimed that the United Stateswould fulll its commitment to its NATO allies to

raise the level of defense spending by approximately 3percent per year in real terms along with our allies.38

In effect, Carter retained the national defense strat-egy of his predecessors, Presidents Richard Nixonand Gerald Fordone and a half warsa major warin Central Europe and a minor war in East Asia (Ko-rea).39This concept would remain U.S. strategy untilearly 1980 when events in the Persian Gulf catalyzedchanges. Thus, from the beginning of the Carter presi-dency, the focus was on winning the one and a halfwars specied in the strategy. The Chairman of theJoint Staff and the service chiefs, including Meyerspredecessor General Bernard Rogers, agreed to itsndings, especially the conclusion that the emphasisshould be on NATO. Further, the Carter administra-

tion made no reductions of the Armys force structureof 24 divisions (16 active divisions and 8 reserve divi-sions) that the Ford administration had decided on in


27/79

15

scal year 1975 nor of the number of units dedicatedto the defense of NATO. Rogers had made a decision

during his tenure as Chief of Staff to increase the num-ber of Army personnel in Europe so that they wouldbe over-strength, understanding fully that to attainthis personnel level in that theater, units in the UnitedStates would be at less than full strength.40In increas-ing the number of active component to 16 divisions,the Ford administration sought no increase in person-nel ceilings, and the Congress did not offer to fundsuch an increase. In essence, the Ford administrationadded three divisions to the Armys force structurewithout a commensurate increase in personnel. TheArmy, according to a 1977 General Accounting Of-ce (GAO) report, exacerbated this problem by inad-equately planning for this reorganization. Further, itmay have activated too many units prematurely since

units activated more than 1 year earlier still did nothave the proper mix of personnel and equipment toconduct effective training.41To compensate, the Armyincreased its combat forces by cutting back on the sup-port structure of the active component and by relyingon the reserve component to replace the sustainingcapability traded off in the active component.42 TheArmy in 1973, under then Army Chief of Staff Gen-eral Creighton Abrams, made a deliberate decision toimplement the Total Force concept by integrating thereserves into the active component. The active forcecould not deploy without calling up reserve units.Abrams held that this concept would force politiciansto call up the reserves, which President Lyndon John-son had refused to do during the Vietnam War.43

In a series of studies that the Ford administrationcommissioned during its 2 and 1/2-year tenure, it wasapparent that the deciency in Europe was not per-


28/79

16

sonnel but supplies such as ammunition, fuel, etc. U.S.Army forces in Europe did not have sufcient supplies

and other materiel to execute the wartime plan. TheNATO plan called for stabilizing a defensive line inCentral Europe, holding this position and then await-ing forces from the United States to counterattackand recover the lost territory.44Holding ground untilreinforcements arrived, however, required sufcientsupplies to sustain European forces for weeks. Conse-quently, the Carter administration increased spendingon war reserve supplies in Europe.

Carters Defense Budgets.

Carters presidential campaign pledge was to re-duce the defense budget by $7 billion and submit abalanced budget in scal year 1981. Secretary Brown,

while respectful of Carters goals, believed that thereductions should be more moderate. Shortly afterCarters inauguration, Brown and Bert Lance, Cartersdirector of the Ofce of Management and Budget, pro-posed cutting almost $3 billion from the defense bud-get that would be acceptable to the armed services,slowing the procurement of major weapons systemsbut not terminating them.45Carter accepted the pro-posed reductions, but he felt that Brown had not un-dertaken the type of budget review he had wanted.However, less than 3 weeks later, Carter submitted hisproposed revisions to the Ford administrations scalyear 1978 budget proposal, announcing the plannedincrease in defense spending has been reduced whileour real military strength is enhanced.46

As one analyst observed of the revised budget pro-posal, Ford had requested a defense budget of $123billion, $13 billion more than the previous year, or


29/79

17

an increase of $7 billion (6 percent) allowing for in-ation. Further, the Ford budget would have shown

real growth of $16.5 billion, or 16 percent, from s-cal year 1975 (considered the turning point in defenseexpenditures), most of which would have been ear-marked for investment in new military hardware andexpansion of research and development. PresidentCarters amendments to the 1978 budget would notchange this picture very much.47While the Carter ad-ministration trimmed the budget, the revised gureleft real growth at about 3 percent. Further, the Carterbudget put less emphasis on strategic nuclear weap-ons and more weight on readiness of military unitsfor combat, required better examination of the costsassociated with expensive weapons, and signaled acontinued resolve to strengthen U.S. military capabili-ties in Europe.48Carter believed that the duplication

of weapon systems among the services was costingthe U.S. Government $50 billion or more per year andblamed the Joint Chiefs and service rivalry for expen-sive hardware.49 Overall, the Carter administrationsrevised defense budget did not constitute a cleardeparture in force planning or necessarily presagefuture reductions in military spending. In effect, thenew administration had not yet articulated the direc-tion of its defense planning.50It is important to notethat the scal year 1978 budget was principally a Fordadministration nancial plan. The Carter administra-tion had a mere few weeks to review and modify theFord proposal.

Carters campaign promise to reduce defensespending went largely unfullled during the remain-

der of his tenure although critics have argued the op-posite. Their arguments, however, are based on twoquestionable claims. The rst is that Carters proposed


30/79

18

defense spending over the 5-year defense program(the DoD projects its budgets 4 years into the future

and the upcoming scal year) were less than the Fordadministrations proposal.51This is true, but it is alsomisleading. The President proposes a budget to theCongress; he is making a request. There is no reasonto assume that Congress would have merely acqui-esced to Fords request. Additionally, the only yearfor which the claim has any validity is the upcomingscal year. Funding for the future years is simply aproposal for how funds will be allocated taking ina-tion into consideration.

The second claim is that Carters defense budgetsdid not show any real growth, i.e., increases after al-lowing for ination. It is important to recall that dur-ing Carters tenure, the economy was in recession andCongress was under intense pressure (as was the Pres-

ident) by the electorate to ght ination by balancingthe budget.52 Ination was running at double digitsand was difcult to forecast with any precision; it wasdriving up the costs of fuel and the weapons in de-velopment and production, but it was also eroding asubstantial part of the increases in defense spending.53Nonetheless, in scal year 1980, Carter kept his prom-ise to his NATO allies by increasing real defense out-lays by 3.1 percent. Joseph Pechman, an expert on thefederal budget, characterized the growth as a sharpincrease in defense spending. . . .54The evidence isalso clear that the scal year 1981 budget increaseddefense spending ($8.1 billion in real terms over scalyear 1980).55

There was also little sentiment in Congress for

boosting military spending until 1980 (the scal year1981 budget), when Iranian revolutionaries tookAmerican Embassy personnel hostage in November


31/79

19

1979 after deposing the Shah months earlier, and theSoviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.

Congress reduced Carters rst three budget requests(scal year 1978-80) by a total of $6 billion.56 In ad-dressing the issue of real growth, according to theCarter administrations ination estimates, the admin-istrations proposed scal year 1981 budget request of$158.7 billion represented real growth of 5.4 percentover the $138.6 billion that it expected to spend in s-cal year 1980, after Congress passed a 1980 supple-mental funding bill the administration requested.57Inother words, the Carter administration was not onlyrequesting a budget with real growth, but it was alsomaintaining its commitment to NATO of 3 percentreal growth per annum.

The proposed scal year 1981 budget for the Army,the one General Meyer claimed was inadequate, con-

tained funding for large-scale production of severalexpensive Army weapons intended to counter the So-viet Unions numerical superiority, especially in cen-tral Europe.58These weapons included the new XM-1tank, armored troop carriers equipped with anti-tankmissiles, additional stand-alone anti-tank missiles,howitzers, and laser-guided artillery shells that couldhome in on a tank 10 miles away, production of large-scale rockets that were also designed for anti-tank pur-poses, anti-tank attack helicopters, the Hellre missilewhich the attack helicopter would carry, as well asfunding to modernize a portion of the Armys existingM-60 tanks with a more accurate gun-aiming system.59

In terms of funding readiness, another Army con-cern, Congress made substantial cuts in the scal year

1980 operations and maintenance account, the accountthat funds this activity. The DoD fought energetically


32/79

20

to protect its scal year 1981 request. However, theHouse Defense Appropriations Subcommittee had

long considered this account as packed with waste-ful programs that made it opportune for trimmingwithout damaging national defense. Its hearings onthe proposed budget indicated negligible change inits position.60

Regarding Army procurement funding, Congressreduced the requested funding for aircraft, missiles,and tracked combat vehicles for scal year 1978.61 Inthe scal year 1979 request, however, Congress addedfunding for aircraft, but reduced the funds requestedfor missiles, tracked combat vehicles, and other weap-ons. As noted by Congressional Quarterly, in scalyear 1979, essentially Carters rst budget, Congressdemonstrated no fundamental disagreement withthe administrations plans for providing U.S. forces in

Europe with more sophisticated weapons.62

For s-cal year 1980, Congress approved the Armys plannedprocurement of tracked combat vehicles with the ex-ception of the M-60 tank, which it cut by approximate-ly 75 percent and instead, added funding for modern-ization of the existing inventory of M-60 tanks.63

In view of changed circumstances in the strategicenvironment, the Carter administrations scal year1981 budget request was not an aberration in termsof maintaining U.S. military capability. For example,its scal year 1979 budget request reected its priorityto increase the U.S. capacity to conduct an air/landwar in Europe, consistent with its defense strategy ofcontributing to NATOs ability to deter a Warsaw Pactattack on Western Europe. In the view of the Congres-

sional Budget Ofce (CBO), it accomplished this ob-jective while maintaining at current levels the U.S.capacity to project power elsewhere. The funding


33/79

21

for enhancing NATO capability sought to remedy theapparent misallocation of ground forces in Central

Europe, move additional U.S. forces to Europe quicklyat a time of crisis, secure additional funding of mili-tary construction funds to preposition equipment forone division and procure equipment to improve thecoordination, agility, and staying power of U.S. forc-es. Overall, the scal year 1979 request emphasizedground forces for NATO.64

As to scal year 1980, President Carter continuedto honor the U.S. commitment to NATO to increasedefense spending by 3 percent in real terms. The de-velopment and procurement of new weapons and as-sociated facilities were the primary area where therewas signicant real growth in the 1980 defense bud-get. In the Army, the major increases were for missilesand tracked combat vehicles. Funding for missiles

increased $485 million or 63.5 percent because of ini-tial production of the Patriot Air Defense Missile andthe General Support Rocket System (GSRS) and largeincreases in the production of the Tube-launched, Op-tically-tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) antitank missileand the Roland air defense missile. Funds requestedfor Army weapons and tracked combat vehicles in-creased by 25 percent or $378 million. This increasewas largely due to the introduction of a new familyof armored combat vehicles (the Infantry and CavalryFighting Vehicles) that were now ready for produc-tion, with substantially higher unit costs than the ve-hicles they replaced. The Carter administration trebledthe number of XM-1 tanks planned for procurement.65

The scal year 1980 budget also requested funds:

(1) to accelerate the rate at which the Army coulddeploy heavy divisions (those with tanks and otherheavy equipment) to Europe; (2) to enhance the readi-


34/79

22

ness of home-based and forward-deployed forces;(3) to maintain forces for a prolonged conict (sustain-

ability) by building sizable stockpiles of materiel inEurope, a commitment the Carter administration ini-tiated in 1979; and, (4) to maintain funding for reservecomponents at its scal year 1979 level of $2.7 bil-lion since the Army deactivated some active supportunits to supply personnel for the three new divisionsand two new brigades established during the Fordadministration.66

Further, Meyers concerns were apparently ad-dressed, at least to some degree, since the scal year1981 defense budget included funds for large-scaleproduction of several expensive Army weapons in-tended to counter Warsaw Pact capabilities in Eu-rope, readiness, and recruiting and retaining a qualityforce.67 Meyer admitted in a 1988 interview that the

Army obtained a big plus up in the scal year 1981budget based on his plea to President Carter.68Thus,an examination of the three scal year budget requestsfor which Carter was responsible indicates that therewere indeed substantial increases in the Armys bud-get for modernizing the force and for ensuring it couldfulll its responsibilities as specied in the defensestrategy.

Recruiting the All-Volunteer Force.

The other major concern General Meyer mentionedin his testimony was the lack of sufcient personnel.He believed that recruiting had been made more dif-cult by Congress decision to end the Vietnam-era

G.I. bill, which contained attractive educational ben-ets. Additionally, the Ford administration made thereduction of funding for recruiting a major element of


35/79

23

its scal year 1977 budget request because of esca-lating manpower costs. For example, the proposed

scal year 1977 budget reduced enlistment bonusesfrom $72 million the previous year level of $29 mil-lion. There were also reductions to funds for adver-tising.69 General Maxwell Thurman, the commanderof the U.S. Army Recruiting Command from 1979 to1981, recounted years later that the rationale for thesedecreases was that recruiting resources as a wholewere thought to be at least adequate, if not excessive,and those became targets for cost-cutting.70

The recruiting problems that the Army confrontedwere not solely the result of funding decisions. Asearly as 1974, analysts recognized a declining civilianmanpower pool due to demographic changes as wellas new attitudes among the general population aboutmilitary service that arose with the end of conscrip-

tion in June 1973. Now, the military had to competefor qualied personnel in the marketplace and had toretain in its ranks sufcient numbers of qualied per-sonnel at a cost that the American public was willingto support.71

In 1977, a few months after Carters inaugura-tion, Lieutenant General Harold Moore, the ArmysDeputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, told senators onthe Armed Services Committees Subcommittee onManpower and Personnel, Today we have a combat-ready active force of which the nation can be justi-ably proud. Moore also stated, Furthermore, for therst time since the end of the Vietnam War, all majorcombat units achieved their personnel readiness goalsduring scal year 1976. Moore admitted that since

January 1976, there had been a downward trend inquality and that the Army was not meeting its recruit-ing objectives for nonprior service males. He contend-


36/79

24

ed, however, that the Army believed that these trendscould be reversed and that required active component

end strengths could be maintained at required lev-els over the next few years. Additionally, there wereproblems in recruiting for the reserve components.The Army had inadequate recruiting resources forscal year 1977, which needed to be rectied alongwith pay, bonuses, and benets to attract and retainpersonnel. Moore recognized as well that the successin meeting recruiting goals depended on a favorablerecruiting environment.72

In testimony to the Senate Armed Services Com-mittees Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnelin March 1978, Lieutenant General DeWitt Smith, theDeputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Moores succes-sor, indicated that there were challenges in recruitingfor the reserve components and that the recruiting

pool of males 17-24 years of age was small. Only oneout of four young men was qualied and availablefor service. He noted as well that there was a declin-ing market and a waning interest in military service.Nonetheless, the Army believes it will continue itsrecruiting success.73 Smith also addressed a salientpoint about readiness: While it is not necessary thatall our units be maintained at the same state of readi-ness all the time, a suitable number must be preparedto engage in localized conict with little or no warn-ing. The remainder of the active and reserve compo-nent forces must be maintained in a sufciently highstate of readiness to permit response to a major con-ict within the pre-attack warning time we expect ourintelligence system to provide.74 Smiths testimony

specically discussed the criticality of Army units be-ing capable of defending NATO.


37/79

25

A year later, in March 1979, Smiths successor,Lieutenant General Robert Yerks, testied before the

same Senate subcommittee that the Army had onlya small shortfall, 3,062 soldiers, below its authorizedstrength in scal year 1978. The Army was also re-questing Congress to provide a slightly higher level ofend strength in scal year 1980 over its 1979 level, butYerks noted, Signicant combat readiness and earlydeployment enhancements are programmed. Combatpower in NATO will be improved. . . .75He too stated,and referred to testimony by then Army Chief of StaffRogers, that the Total Army strength is derived froma scenario involving the defense of NATO.76

In April 1980, the picture that Yerks, now withGeneral Meyer as Chief of Staff, presented to theHouse Appropriations Committees Subcommitteeon Defense, was dramatically different. He warned

that current manpower shortages merit close atten-tion and that the scal year 1981 request reectsrecognition not only of that competitive market, butalso the need to provide a long-term remedy in addi-tion to short-term xes on existing shortfalls. Yerksstated that the active component was able to maintainits strength within 1 percent of the authorized levels,through almost 6 years of the volunteer environment.77

However, toward the end of scal year 1978, theArmy was no longer meeting its recruiting objectives.The situation deteriorated further in scal year 1979despite Army initiatives and additional funding Con-gress had provided for recruiting. Fiscal year 1979ended with Army strength of 15,444 soldiers fewerthan the congressionally authorized end strength.

Thus, this dire situation was not because of a lack offunding but rather because the market for recruitinghad changeda declining age 17-to-22 male popula-


38/79

26

tion and increased competition with the other militaryservices, civilian employers, and colleges and uni-

versities. Additionally, the Army was experiencing adownward trend in both the number of high schoolgraduates and recruits in the upper mental category, atrend in evidence since scal year 1976. Now it wouldhave to increase its accessions to compensate for theexisting shortfall and the need to bring new personnelinto its ranks, an increase of 35,000 over its scal yearrecruiting level. Thus, the Army requested increasedfunding for recruiting and legislative authority for in-creasing enlistment and reenlistment bonuses for s-cal year 1981.78But what was actually occurring wasmore disturbing than even these trends. The ArmyRecruiting Command was recruiting the least desir-able candidates, aiming to recruit 17-year-olds with-out a high school diploma, and lowering its standards

in other regards to increase volume.79

Meyer becameso distressed about this situation that in November1979, with 2 weeks of notice, he told Major GeneralMaxwell Thurman that he was being reassigned as thecommander of the oundering Army Recruiting Com-mand, which not only was failing to meet its recruit-ing goals, but suffering the ignominy of being chargedwith cheating.80The Carter administration was equal-ly concerned about the Armys failure to recruit suf-cient enlistees. A Carter political appointee in theOfce of the Secretary of Defense helped Thurman byintroducing the general to rst-rate advertising con-sultants, which Thurman appreciated.81 Thurman islargely credited with being the principal architect ofthe all-volunteer Army and developing the recruiting

campaign that eventually turned around the servicesrecruiting problems.82


39/79

27

Assessing Readiness.

General Meyer warned that a substantial numberof Army divisions were not fully capable because ofpersonnel deciencies. Journalist James Kiteld re-ported that in 1979, Meyer informed the Presidentthat only four of 10 active divisions stationed in theUnited States were capable of deploying overseas ina contingency.83In fact, the historical record indicatesMeyer brought this issue to the attention of the com-mander in chief and Secretary Brown at a November24, 1979, meeting at Camp David with the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the other service chiefs.The meeting lasted 3 hours.84

At the meeting for which there is no transcript butwhich Meyer recalled in an 1988 interview, he toldthe President and the others present that there were

adequate Army personnel to create only four divi-sions, although there were 12 divisions in the Armysforce structure. He also stated that the Armys bud-get was insufcient and had told Carter and the oth-ers, We had a hollow army. Hollow people. Hollowequipment. Hollow sustainability. Hollow quality. Ipleaded for more money. He later added in that sameinterview:

That was the only year of the 4 years of the Carter ad-ministration there was any sort of [resource increase].The last couple of years President Carter was in of-ce, because of Afghanistan, [and] Iran, were all goodyears, because from then on we got lots of money forthe defense program.85

These two sentences contradict each other.


40/79

28

What is evident from statements General Meyermade in the 1988 interview is that he was concerned

about the portion of the defense budget allocated tothe Army: What you look at then is seeing whereyou get your fair share of conventional resources.He later commented in that same interview that theU.S. Army was not receiving its fair share chance atthe resources. When he met with Carter in Novem-ber 1979, he told his interviewer, I pleaded for moremoney. Out of that budget, we did get more money.86

Surprisingly, Carter merely remarked in his diaryabout the meeting with the Joint Chiefs:

. . . in general all were pleased with what I had donesince Ive been in ofce. They thought the 81 budgetas now being discussed was adequate, and that therehad been 15 years of neglect before prior to my admin-istration.87

It is odd that such a stunning revelation regarding thenumber of capable divisions did not compel Carter tomake note of it in his diary. Whether General Meyerspecically informed the President that only a fewU.S.-based divisions were ready for deployment toEurope in response to a contingency is unknown ex-

actly, and the record remains contested. Nonetheless,President Carter, at least according to Meyers ownwords in the 1988 interview, met the Chief of Staffsplea for additional funding.

Meyers claim remains a perplexing comment.Such degradation in readiness is unlikely to havecome about in the 5 months between Meyers becom-ing Chief of Staff and the Camp David meeting. Fur-ther, if force readiness was in such a dire condition, itis a stinging commentary on his predecessors tenureto have allowed such a development and to fail to ad-


41/79

29

dress it. Overall, anecdote has once again been givencredence as persuasive, empirical evidence.88 How-

ever, the historical record does present an uneven pic-ture of the state of Army readiness leading up to theMay 1980 hearing.

In June 1978, during classied testimony beforethe House Armed Services Committees Subcommit-tee on NATO Standardization, Interoperability, andReadiness, then Lieutenant General Meyer as DeputyChief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS)gave no indication that Army forces were not capa-ble of executing its responsibilities in the defense ofNATO. The hearing transcript reads, Back here inthe States we have our combat units reasonably welloriented for the rst 30 days [of combat]. Meyer doesindicate his concern with the later deploying reserveunits as not ready to meet requirement dates, and its

principally today because of their inability to man thatforce. He reiterates later in his testimony that the ac-tive forces forward deployed and the CONUS [conti-nental United States] reinforcing forces, those that arerequired for the rst 30 days, are in reasonably goodcondition. Moreover, he is asked the question: ByD+30 how many active divisions could be in Europe?Meyer responds: With 4 to 8 days warning, we couldhave 12 to 13 divisions there.89There is no commentduring the hearing that the reinforcements from theUnited States are not ready for combat.

In January and February 1979, General Meyer, stillin his capacity as DCSOPS, and the Assistant DeputyChief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ADCSOPS),another general ofcer,90 made classied presenta-

tions to U.S. students at the U.S. Armys Commandand General Staff College and the U.S. Army War Col-lege, and in neither case did the two generals make


42/79

30

mention of readiness deciencies. Meyer states in thescript for his January presentation that manpower

levels are okay in the AC [active component], buta severe problem in RC [reserve component]. Themost important point Meyer makes concerns readi-ness reporting. He remarks that the old readiness re-porting system had been changed because it was notbelievable by reporters and readers. The ratings wereseen as too high, too many assumptions, and unrelat-ed snapshots (past vs. present vs. future). The scriptindicates that the new system eliminates causes:equipment readiness now reported against monthlyaverage, assumptions removed, motion picture overtime. Overall, the initial reaction to the new systemis positive but some xes required. Readiness rat-ings [are] lower because more things are measuredand unit authorizations have changedmost active

component units have dropped one C rating. Inother words, with the introduction of a new readinessreporting system, most units are now evaluated asless ready than previously. Recognizing this change,Meyer states that the emphasis will be on improvingthe readiness of units based in the United States thatare committed for deployment to Europe, both activeand reserve units.91

On February 1, 1980, Secretary of the Army Clif-ford Alexander and General Meyer, now as Chief ofStaff, presented the Armys posture statement beforethe House Armed Services Committee. The text madeclear that readiness measurements are not precise,but they do provide a framework for assessing theArmys strengths and shortcomings. The text also

noted that force readiness does not in itself deter-mine battleeld effectiveness, that other factors per-tain.92While both the posture statement and Meyers


43/79

31

testimony suggest there were shortcomings, neitherthe document nor Meyer raised the issue of hollow-

ness or an inability of the Army to execute its mis-sions. One of the subcommittee members mentionedthe unfavorable impact that House AppropriationsCommittee reductions in the Armys operations andmaintenance budget accounts have had on trainingand supplies, with which the general agreed. GeneralMeyer later mentioned that he was not satised withthe level of training in the Army, noting that the train-ing is spotty, that there had been progress but not tothe degree he would have preferred.93

Testifying before the House Appropriations Com-mittee, Subcommittee on Defense, 4 days later, Gen-eral Meyer reiterated that while the scal year 1981advanced the Armys capabilities, there is still con-siderable to do.94He also stated that as a member of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he was not satised that wehave sufcient air, land, or sea forces to respond to theneeds of today. Further, I do not personally believethat there are adequate land forces to meet our portionof the defense requirements today. He stated thatbudget restrictions were the reason, later observingthat Congress had a role in setting those same autho-rized personnel levels, but admitting that the Armywas having trouble meeting the current levels ow-ing to recruiting shortfalls deriving from inadequatecompensation.95Meyer also noted for the record howthe Armys budget request had been developed, con-cluding that the Armys $39.1 billion budget requestis the result of the Secretary of the Defenses and thePresidents best judgment as to the optimum use of

resources to insure the defense of the Nation. Meyerinformed one member that the budget request wasnot, in his judgment, satisfactory.


44/79

32

In a written reply for the record on what an ad-equate request would be, he stated that the amount

would be substantial, as high as six billion dollars, butthe ofcially requested amount was the best balancedprogram the Army could achieve within the FY 81Federal Budget request.96He also informed the sub-committee members, responding to a question as towhether the Army was ready to go to war today,that:

. . . right now the forward deployed units [Europe, Ko-rea, and Panama] are in excellent condition [emphasisadded]. . . . As the Secretary indicated, the later de-ploying units are less ready [emphasis added]. So, inresponding to your question, it depends on the sce-nario. There are certain shortfalls, and I wont get intodetails, that respond to specic scenarios.97

In a closed session the next day with the same sub-committee, Meyer repeated his belief the United Stateshad improved its capability for a war in Western Eu-rope, but expressed concern about contingencies inother parts of the world. However, he also mentionedSecretary of Defense Browns remark that resolvingthe imbalance between U.S. and Soviet conventional

capability required several years of adequate fund-ing.98

In late February 1980, Meyer testied before theSenate Armed Services Committee noting that thescal year 1981 budget request had been developedbefore the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and thatin his view, the Armys portion of the budget is in-adequate in several areas. However, with respect to

responding to the events in the Middle East and Per-sian Gulf, the Army, he commented, has maintained asizable unit set aside for use if needed with sufcient


45/79

33

support capability. The issue was one of how rapidlyit could deploy and here the Army depended on the

Air Forces and Navys assets.99

The general also notedthat the United States did not have sufcient forces tomeet its worldwide commitments, and that the JointChiefs of Staff had made this point consistently.100Inexecutive session, Meyer indicated that the forward-deployed units were fully capable but underscoredthat the units to reinforce NATO did not have ade-quate personnel to be at the highest level. He estimat-ed that the cost to meet all requirements adequatelywould be an additional $2.005 billion dollars in scalyear 1980 (supplemental funding) and $2.653 billionin scal year 1981, with most of the funding devotedto procuring additional new equipment.101 Meyerstestimony before May 1980 makes no mention of hol-lowness. In fact, it portrays realistically strengths and

weaknesses in the Armys capabilities without resort-ing to histrionics. Thus, the hollow army commentseems out of place; it certainly remains inconclusive,given the other testimony that a poor state of readi-ness actually prevailed.

Readiness reporting is crucial to understanding theissue of a hollow army. A review of GAO reportson the subject clearly underscores the Armys difcul-ties in assessing the readiness of its forces. As early asDecember 1977, the GAO identied several problemswith military readiness reporting:

The interpretation of readiness reporting criteria wasnot uniform; the condition of equipment was not prop-erly reported; the reporting system did not adequatelyreect capability for each mission, and the reports didnot always contain adequate information.

Additionally, the GAO stressed the inability of readi-ness reporting to relate readiness to funding require-


46/79

34

ments. While improvements were underway, furthersteps were necessary to overcome deciencies that

the audit agency had identied previously. The GAOnoted that the Army was already implementing majornew reporting procedures. A year earlier, the GAOreported that the Army had serious aws in its sys-tems for identifying the resources that combat unitsneeded.102

In 1978, GAO found that the Armys personnel re-quirements for combat units were unreliable becauseof faulty planning factors. The Army was using a sys-tem that produced unacceptable results. The GAOalso concluded that the Army recognized the problemand was trying to correct it, but the proposed solutionwould eliminate only some of the systems weaknesses.The problem persisted into 1980 when the GAO againreported that Army systems for identifying, monitor-

ing, and reporting combat units requirements werenot accurate. Consequently, billions of dollars couldhave been wasted purchasing and maintaining thewrong equipment, providing the wrong skills to sol-diers, disseminating resources to the wrong locations,and designing an Army that was not organized andequipped to meet its mission.103The GAO questionedthe validity of the reports that the Army was usingto judge its readiness, which Chief of Staff Meyer de-ned in an October 1979 presentation as training andmaintenance, not personnel levels. However, GeneralMeyer did observe that manning the Army was therst of two major challenges: all the military servic-es had recruiting shortfalls in 1979 but this could beovercome by adequate funding.104


47/79

35

Modernizing the Force.

According to General Meyer, the Armys secondmajor challenge was modernization of its combatequipment. More specically, the problem was intro-ducing the new generation of combat equipment intothe hands of the troops in sufcient quantities. Inhis view, all of the new items, which included combatvehicles, air defense systems, helicopters, radars, com-munications, and electronic warfare gear, were badlyneeded because over the preceding decade, the Armyhad lost its qualitative equipment lead to the Soviets.He contended that the elding of these new systemswould regain that advantage.105

However, the issue of modernization was not justa matter of elding new systems in sufcient quanti-ties for Army forces. The Army had made a number of

missteps in developing and producing these systemslong before the Carter administration had taken of-ce. When the Vietnam War ended, the Army begandeveloping several new systems. However, develop-ment problems disrupted the plans the Army had forintroducing them. The Army cancelled the MBT-70tank and the Cheyenne helicopter programs becauseof cost and complexity, which meant, as analystsobserved, that the Army had to virtually start overagain.106Further, the GAO in several reports identi-ed problems with several of these new weapon sys-tems. The XM-1 tanks reliability and durability hadnot been proven according to a January 1980 reportalthough procurement of the Armys rst incrementof 110 tanks had begun; doubts remained despite

modications to improve acknowledged aws.107TheGAO also voiced concerns about the Armys InfantryFighting Vehicle in a February 1980 study. It exam-


48/79

36

ined the vehicles performance in operational and de-velopment testing, noting the vehicle could not meet

the Armys ballistic protection requirements. This wasa crucial deciency since the vehicle was intended toprovide infantry units with mobility in a combat en-vironment with better armor and increased repowercompared to the existing armored personnel carrier.108

Further, in June 1980, the GAO observed that Con-gress, the military, and industry expressed concernthat many of the new weapon systems were too tech-nologically complex to permit a reasonable degree ofcondence that they would function properly whenneeded. GAO held that the sophistication of manyof the systems contributed to budget problems, in-ventory shortfalls, and a low state of readiness forcertain combat categories. GAO agreed that themilitary should seek the advantages of technologi-

cally advanced weaponry as opposed to less complex,lower-performing, or cheaper weapons. However, itbelieved that a better balance between performanceand reliability was needed. The XM-1 tank was oneof the systems cited as having reliability, availabil-ity, and maintainability problems, which could leadto readiness issues since the equipment broke downmore frequently.109Earlier that month, the GAO pub-lished a summary report of earlier reviews that identi-ed problems with other Army systems: the MultipleLaunched Rocket System needed further testing be-fore production; more critical data about the opera-tional performance of the Division Air Defense System(DIVAD) was needed before it should be produced;and the Army should consider procuring additional

existing armored personnel carriers rather than Infan-try Fighting Vehicles to improve dismounted infantrycapability.110 Although the Army wanted these new


49/79

37

systems, there were recognized technological prob-lems, and many were not ready for production before

scal year 1981. As the GAO emphasized, elding un-reliable systems would only add to readiness woes.

Some members of Congress worried about thepotential inationary impact of the planned increasein defense spending, particularly the scal year 1981increase. The CBO urged a steady buildup in procure-ments to minimize bottlenecks, promote capacityexpansion, and enlarge the number of potential bid-ders so as to lessen inationary pressures. In otherwords, a dramatic increase in procurement wouldexacerbate the already high ination rate. The largestscal year 1981 procurement program was for trackedcombat vehicles, especially the Infantry Fighting Ve-hicle, which was being procured gradually in scalyear 1981, consistent with the manufacturers produc-

tion capacity. Additional tooling investment wouldbe required to expand capacity as early as scal year1983. The CBO also emphasized that in scal years1980 and 1981, production of the XM-1 tank was ex-pected to proceed at rates consistent with Chryslerscapacity.111

In short, procurement of systems at higher rates ofproduction was not feasible. As of May 1979, manyof the new systems were not mature enough to enterlow-rate production. The earliest some would enterproduction was scal year 1979 and the latest wasscal year 1984, when development funding for the15 new systems declined rapidly. To accelerate theproduction over that same period would have re-quired about a vefold increase in their procurement

funding.112


50/79

38

Contextualizing the Hollow Army.

Army General Frederick Kroesen, who servedas Commanding General, U.S. Army Europe duringMeyers tenure as Chief of Staff, wrote an article in1999 asking the question, What is hollow? As Kro-esen notes, the denition appears uncomplicated: hol-low refers to the discrepancy between spaces andfaces in the Army structure. However, this is toosimple an answer. Kroesen states that such an assess-ment requires detailed analysis of priorities, opera-tional requirements, and the use of military personnelfor duties other than their assigned mission.113This isthe issue raised at the May 1980 hearing. Yet, it wasdealt with in a perfunctory manner. Members of thesubcommittee never asked for details or evidence, andnever asked General Meyer a crucial question about

the level of strategic risk the United States was will-ing to assume to meet its commitments. In essence,the hearing met its political intent of embarrassing theCarter administration, but shed no light on the issue.

Carters relationship with Congress and membersof his own party in both chambers was often acri-monious and sometime venomous from the earliestdays of the administration. As Julian Zelizer pointsout, in the post-Vietnam and post-Watergate era,the situation on Capitol Hill would have been dif-cult for any president regarding how well, or badly,they interacted with legislators. Legislative reformsenacted to curb presidential power were anathema tothe executive branch.114Moreover, not only had con-gressional reforms upset the power within the institu-

tion, but among the Democrats in Congress. Cartersclose advisor Hamilton Jordan stated that there was


51/79

39

no unifying Democratic consensus, no program, noset of principles on which a majority of Democrats

agreed.115

Speaker of the House and MassachusettsDemocrat Thomas P. Tip ONeill and other congres-sional leaders distrusted Carter because they believedthe Georgian, a political outsider they did not knowwell, failed to support their political interests.116Cart-er made this situation worse. His rst step after inau-guration prompted disharmonious relations when heeliminated more than 300 water projects from the lastFord administration budget. He considered these tobe congressional pork but members of both housesdeemed them critical to maintaining favor with theirconstituents.117Relations between Carter and congres-sional Democrats worsened a year later because thePresidents scal conservatism angered old-line con-gressional Democrats, who believed that the most im-

portant duty of the government, especially during aneconomic downturn, was to ease social and economicburdens, even if that meant producing budget de-cits.118

The atmosphere with respect to defense issues wasoften poisonous, especially by 1980. The May 1980 sub-committee hearing is emblematic of the House ArmedServices Committees tendency to increase defensebudget requests and willingly modify administrativeprograms, which in turn affected executive priorities.One analyst claimed that by the time of the 96th Con-gress (January 3, 1979 to January 3, 1981), even theSenate Armed Services Committee was behaving likea hostile guerrilla force [ambushing] key White Houseinitiatives.119Although the Democrats held a major-

ity on the committee, Republican Senator John Towerwith assistance from some hard-line anti-CommunistDemocrats such as Senator Henry Scoop Jackson


52/79

40

continuously chipped away at the power of committeechairman Senator John Stennis. Although he retained

sufcient inuence to support the Presidents goalson most occasions, he did not enjoy a substantial levelof control because Jackson and two other Democratsoften sided with the Republicans. One staff memberdeclared that Carters aims were out of step with thatof the committee and the Congress. The majority ofthe committee became increasingly determined to in-crease defense spending.120Senator Ernest Hollings, aDemocrat from South Carolina, weighed in as a strongsupporter of increased defense spending when he as-sumed the chairmanship of the Senate Budget Com-mittee in May 1980. He had fought with Stennis in thepast over increased defense spending and was now ina position to set the defense budget levels.121

The rise of the New Right, that is, the increas-

ing political power of conservatives also had an inu-ence on the public perception of Carters positions ondefense. In the 1976 contest for the Democratic nomi-nation for the presidency, conservatives in the Demo-cratic party supported Senator Henry Jackson, buttended to give Carter the benet of the doubt when hewas elected. However, the personal relations betweenJackson and Carter were strained due to wounds sus-tained in the primary battle between the two. Further,the Carter administration rejected the names of sev-eral centrist Democrats for appointment to positionswithin the government, with the liberal wing cap-turing the key appointments in the national securityapparatus.122 Thus whatever success Carter enjoyedwould owe very little to Jackson and the conservative

wing of the party.The right wing group, the bipartisan Committee

on the Present Danger (CPD), had the most inuence


53/79

41

in portraying Carter as weak on defense. Paul Nitze,one of the organizations founders, had expected a po-

sition in the Carter administration, but did not receiveit. Certainly, Nitzes bruised feelings may account forsome of the CPDs animus toward Carter, but Carteralso rejected the Soviet-U.S. arms control prescrip-tions that Nitze and his CPD co-founder, EugeneRostow, had advanced. A

a "hollow army" reappraised: president carter, defense budgets, and the politics of military...

Documents