a hibrid techne of the soul

7/25/2019 A Hibrid Techne of the Soul

1/17

A Hybrid Techn of the Soul?: Thoughts on the Relation between Philosophy and Rhetoric inGorgias and PhaedrusAuthor(s): Ramsey Eric RamseyReviewed work(s):Source: Rhetoric Review, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Spring, 1999), pp. 247-262Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/466154.

Accessed: 05/01/2012 11:43

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at.http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Taylor & Francis, Ltd.is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access toRhetoric Review.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=taylorfrancishttp://www.jstor.org/stable/466154?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/466154?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=taylorfrancis


2/17

RAMSEY ERIC RAMSEY

Arizona

State

University

West

A

Hybrid

Techne of the

Soul?:

Thoughts

on the

Relation between

Philosophy

and Rhetoric

in

Gorgias

and

Phaedrus

Introduction and Some Caveats

Whether

Plato coined

the

word

rhetoric,

what is

striking

is that he was

the

first to

attempt

to make it

disappear.'

My

argumentmay

well

add

some

strength

to

Schiappa's

contention that

Plato

may

have coined

the

word rhetoric

by

suggesting

that to make

something disappear,

one

would need to be

dealing

with

something

like a well-defined

object

(though entering

directly

into

the heart of

these often heated debates

is not the

focus

of

this

essay)

("Did

Plato Coin

the

Word Rhetorike?";"Neo-Sophistic RhetoricalCriticism").If Plato desires to

make

rhetoric

disappear,

as I shall

argue

he

did

at least in

the

Gorgias,

then

it

behooves

him to have a

well-articulated

arget

of

concern.

If it

is

the case that

naming

a

set

of

practices helps

to

constitute

those

practices

as an

object

domain,

then it makes sense to

suggest

that Plato

has cause to

name a

set of

practices

"rhetoric"

o as to be able to deal with

them.

A

strain

of Western

thinking

has

long

lamented the

presence

of

rhetoric,

from the

position

Descartes takes

in

the Meditations o the rise

of

positivism

and

on now to the crass materialismof

sociobiology.

Yet this

legacy,

often blamed

on Plato,may be if not a false thenat least a not wholly accurateaccusation.If

the

reading

below

is

persuasive,

then we

should

see

that what we

are

customarily

asked

to

accept

as

Plato's wholesale disdain for

rhetoric,

while

perhaps

at

the heart

of

the

Gorgias,

is not so

clearly

dismissive

by

the

time

we

get

to the Phaedrus. We have

contemporary

essons

yet

to

learn

from Plato

and

from

recognizing

that the

history

of

philosophy

and the

history

of

rhetoric

need

always

to be taken

together.

It is this lesson and not

simply

the

pervasive

accusations that

I

am

willing,

in

part,

to

attribute

o the

legacy

of

Plato

by way

of the

knowing misreading

of

Phaedrus

I offer below.

This essay argues that Plato does well in the Gorgias to perform a

philosophical slight-of-hand

that

renders

rhetoric,

if

not

invisible,

at

least

redundant. The

argument suggests

that after

the series of

exchanges

in

the

Rhetoric

Review,

Vol.

17,

No.

2,

Spring

1999 247


3/17

RhetoricReview

Gorgias

with

Gorgias,

Polus,

and

Callicles,

Plato

finds

(strangelyperhapsgiven

the

thesis that

he

coined the

word)

that the set

of

practices

named"rhetoric"

by

his

interlocutors

was not

worthy

of a name at all. This

is

the case when

rhetoric,

as

Kahn

suggests,

is taken

as an art associated with the

"noble"

endeavor

to

influence the humansoul

(psvche).

However,

the

saga

does not end with the

conclusions

of the

Gorgias.

While

I shall

argue

that

Plato

made rhetoric

disappear

n

the

Gorgias

at least from the

list

of

arts,

it

does

not

remain

out

of

sight. Universally

held to

postdate

the

Gorgias,

the

Phaedrus has

rhetoric

as its

centerpiece

and

rhetoric

s

there treated

not as

the

object

with

which one

must do

away,

rather

Plato treats

it

as

something

with

which-perhaps against

his

wishes-he must

deal. When one

reads the

Phaedrus,

one

cannot

help

but

get

the

feeling

that Plato is not

pleased

by having

to

readmit

rhetoric

to the

discussion.

Nonetheless,

in

this

dialogue

rhetoric

comes to have

an

inevitable and

necessary place alongside

(or

perhaps

even

closer)

the

highest

of

Platonic

arts,

viz.,

philosophy.

This

hermeneutic

oray

into two

of

Plato's

dialogues

begins

with the

belief,

held

by

many,

that

we

can

trace

a

change

in

Plato's

thinking

n them

as concerns

the relation between

philosophy

and rhetoric. While

it is

the

case that this

change

in Plato's

position

is noted

by

a number of his

readers,

t nonetheless

remains

that

why

and

what comes

of

this

often-recognized

change

has

not

always

been

fully

explicated.

From

what

I

see as the

attempt

in

the

Gorgias

to make

rhetoric

disappear

to

the

recognition

in

the

Phaedrus

that

philosophy

without

rhetoric's

voice leaves the

truth

mute needs

further

nvestigation.

It

remains

to

ask

how

both

serve to

further this

argument

and

also

to

clarify

its

power

to

persuade

in

an

age

that

has,

by

and

large, forgotten

Plato.

As a

way

to

begin

these

investigations,

I

plan

to read

or

more

aptly,

misread,

the

myth

of the

charioteer rom the heartof

the

Phaedrus.

Perhaps

ess than

a

reading

or

even

a

misreading,

the

following

is a creative

attempt

to retell the

story

in a

contemporary

diom,

inspired

all the while

by

Plato's

beginning.

It is

always

difficult to

approach

philosophy

and rhetoric in

Plato's

dialogues

Gorgias

and

Phaedrus.

On the one

hand,

the

popular

philosophical

conception

is

that

Plato

simply

had

a

passing

critique

of

rhetoric

but

that these

dialogues

are

really

about

ethics

and

love,

respectively,

and

that the

discussion

of

rhetoric is

only

what

the

dialogues

are

"ostensibly"

about

(Levi).

But this

is

just

a

certain

philosophic arrogance

and misses

what

twentieth-century

continental

philosophy

takes

seriously,

that

is,

the intimate relation

between

philosophyandrhetoric Johnstone;Schrag).

Jacques

Derrida,

or

example,

cautions us

against

a

too-facile

acceptance

of

a

complete

collapse

of the

concepts

rhetoric and

philosophy.

Derrida

s

asked

if

its is not

the case that "ever since Plato's

opposition

to

rhetoric

as

a

discipline,

248


4/17

A

Hybrid

Techne

of the

SoulI

philosophy

and

rhetoric

seem

to

have existed in

a

state

of

continual tension.

Why

does there

seem

to

be tension between these

disciplines?

Aren't

these

disciplines-rhetoric

and

philosophy-necessarily

bound

together?

Aren't

they

necessarily

intricately

and

completely

tied?"

(Olson

16-17).

In

response

Derrida

says:

Well,

from

that

point

of

view

I

would

be

on

the

side of

philosophy.

The tension comes

first from the fact that rhetoric

as a

separate

discipline,

as

a

technique

or

as

an

autonomous

field,

may

become a

sort of

empty

instrumentwhose usefulnessor effectivenesswould be

independent

of

logic,

or

even

reference

or

truth-an

instrument

n

the

hands

of the

sophists

in the sense that Plato

wanted

to

define

them.

So

contrary

o

what some

people

think

I

think-for

instance,

Habermas-I

would

be on

the side of

philosophy,

logic,

truth,

reference,

etc.

When I

question

philosophy

and the

philosophical

project

as

such,

it's not

in

the name

of

sophistics,

of rhetoric

as

just

a

playful

technique.

I'm

interested

n

the rhetoric

hiddenin

philosophy

itself because

within,

let's

say,

the

typical

Platonic

discourse

there

is

a rhetoric-a rhetoric

against

rhetoric,

against sophists.

(17)

If we

know

how to

listen,

then

Plato

has

some more

to

teach

us on

this

score as

we

question

rhetoric,

philosophy,

and theirrelations

(see

also

Derrida).

On

the

other

hand,

rhetoricians

often attack the

two

dialogues

without a

recognition

of the

broad

philosophical

issues

involved

in

Plato's

metaphysics,

or

they

treat his

metaphysics

as an indefensible

position

that is

dismissed

easily

from

a

postmetaphysical

standpoint.

Sharing

results

with a

certain

philosophic

arrogance,

his

latter

strategy

of

bold dismissal

(shared

also

by

any

number

of

so-called postmodernpositions) leaves much of importanceuncoveredin these

two

dialogues.

I

am interested

in

attempting

to

reinspire

Plato's

two

dialogues

from

my

metaphorical

frame

of

Plato-as-magician

(cf.

de

Romilly)

who tries

to

make

rhetoric

disappear

n the

Gorgias

and as the

resigned

but

powerful myth-maker

in the

Phaedrus

in which he

tells

of the

dangers

of

rhetoric,

knowing

now

that it

is

something

with which we cannot

do

away

(see

Curran).

Moreover,

if I

am

persuasive,

we

shall

see,

when we

get

to

the

Phaedrus,

that

we

no

longer

would

wish

for rhetoric

to

be

gone

and that

the

dangers

of

its

disappearance

utweigh

the dangers of its presence. Indeed, rhetoric becomes in Plato's Phaedrus

philosophy's

necessary

Other.

Following

Schiappa

("Neo-Sophistic

Rhetorical

Criticism")

I

shall

only

claim

for

the

unique interpretation

f Phaedrus

I

offer

at the

end of

the

essay

249


5/17

Rhetoric

Review

that

it

offers a

sense

of

organic shape

that

may

be outside

the

analytic

of facts

proper,

but

well

within

what

truths we

have

left to learn from Plato

concerning

the relationbetween

philosophy

and rhetoric.

Plato's

Sleight

of

Hand:

Philosophy

and Rhetoric

in

Gorgias

My

Plato-as-magician

reading

of

Gorgias

relies,

no

doubt,

on what one

might

call a rather

straightforward

eading

of

the text.

Enos

(Greek

Rhetoric

before Aristotle) and Benardete, for example, renderdifferent, nuanced, but

equally compelling

reads

of

the text as

they

pursue

their

particular

nds. For

my

part

in the

matter,

I shall

settle for

the rather

straightforward eading

caste

in

terms of

rhetoric's

disappearance

o

make

room for the

unique misreading

I

propose

for

Phaedrus.

Plato

opens

the

Gorgias

with

Socrates

arriving

too late to have

heard

the

demonstration

performed

by

the famous rhetor whose name

gives

the

dialogue

its title.

In

concluding

that

demonstration,

Gorgias

had

agreed

to answer

any

question put

to

him.

Socrates is

invited

to

join

in the festivities

by asking

Gorgias questionsthatget at the heartof Socrates' concerns.As Robinsonpoints

out,

Socrates often asks

questions

that

take

one

of

two

forms. Either

he asks

"what

is X?"or

he asks "is X

Y?" In this case

we

see that he

is

asking

the later

question

as he

is

attempting

o

ascertainwhether

rhetoric s an art

(techne).

Socrates uses the

analogy

of the techne of medicine

to

show how

rhetoric

fails

to

be

analogous

to this art. What

is

key

in

this

analogy

is

that Socrates

believes

that medicine is the

most

noble

techne with concern for

the

body,

whereas

in this

dialogue

the

question being investigated

is what is in

fact

rhetoric's concern. For

Socrates to

proceed,

he

needs

a firm

answer to this

question

so

that

one

can know if

rhetoric has

an

analogous knowledge of its

object

as

medicine

does vis-a-vis the

body.

Socrates

determines the

object

of

rhetoric based

on the

way

he

draws out

the

implications

of the

responses

he receives

early

in

the

dialogue.

Rhetoric

is

claimed

by

its

defenders

in the

Gorgias

to be concerned with

winning

the

conviction of

one's hearers

(Gorgias

454b

ff).

Now this telos of

rhetoric

is

ultimately

concerned

with the human

psvche

because

any

conviction one holds

or

can come to

hold,

for

Plato,

is held

in/by

one's soul. Thus he

claims that

if

the

set

of

practices

now

called "rhetoric"are

going

to be

given

the

designation

techne,

then

they

must

show,

as

medicine does with

its

knowledge

of

the

body,

its

knowledge

of the

object

of

its ultimate

concern

viz.,

the

soul.

Through

a now

famous

series of

questions

and

interrogations,

Socrates reveals

that each

of

the

interlocutor's

claims

concerning

the

benefit

of rhetoricfail to

demonstratesuch

250


6/17

A

Hybrid

Techne

of

the

Soul?

a

knowledge.

Each

in

his turn fails on Plato's

account

to

give adequate

justification

for

rhetoric'sconcern

for

the Good of their hearers'souls.

This

position

and

judgment

s,

of

course,

generated

n

light

of

Plato's

larger

metaphysical

project

(Moline).

Clearly,

it

may

be

an

open

question

as to

when

exactly

we

get

Plato's

metaphysical

system

in

his written

work,

that

is,

when

in

the difficult-to-determine

hronology

of

Plato's work do

we

get

his

theory

of the

Forms.

One

thing,

however,

seems clear in

this

respect: Something

intimately

connected

with

Plato's

metaphysics

s at work in his

critique

of

rhetoric.

His attack

on

rhetoric

s

in

every

case

buttressed

by

the

distinction between

opinion,

of

which

he

charges

rhetoric

having

as its

ultimate

concern,

and

knowledge,

which

one must have

if

he

or

she

is

going

to do

justice

to

the soul.

The notions of

the

Good,

the

true,

and the

just,

as

well

as

the relation

of these

to

opinions

and

knowledge,

give

coherence to Plato's

critique

of

rhetoric

in the

Gorgias.

Without

some

sense

of the

abiding

truth

of

the

Forms,

one

has

little

foundation from which to

make

sense

of the sustained

critique

of

rhetoric

that

Plato

gives

us in this

dialogue.

Dramatically,

Socrates is

not

the

only

one

asking questions

here. His

first

sustained

critique

of rhetoriccomes

in

answer to a

question

put

directly

to

him,

by

Polus:

Whatdoes he thinks rhetoric s? In

essence,

Polus is

asking

Socratesa

very

Socratic

question

in the

form of

the other

of

the two famous

questions

Socrates

is

fond of

asking.

Socrates

has an

answer

ready

for

Polus and it

is that

rhetoric

is no

techne

at

all;

rhetoric is he

claims

nothing

more than

a knack

(tribe).

This knack

is,

like all such

practices,

concerned

with

pleasure

as an

end

distinct

from

the Good. It is here that a returnto the earlier-discussed

analogy

with medicine

is

crucial.

Comparing

hetoricas a knack to

cooking,

the

analogy

from

medicine

again

is

the basis for

his

argument against

rhetoric. As

the

interlocutors

have set

things up,

by

asserting

that

rhetoric

is

concerned

with

producing

conviction in othersand thus in the end concerned with the soul, the

argument

s

suggested by

rhetoric'sdefendersthat rhetoricdoes

for

the health

of

the soul

what

medicine

does

for

the health

of

the

body.

But Socrates thinks

he

has shown

that

rhetoric

is not

concerned with

the Good

of

the

soul but

rather

with

pleasure.

It remains

important hroughout

hat none

of

Socrates' interlocutors

object

to the

analogy.

As

Plato

presents

hem,

they

seem

to

think that

medicine

is

a fine

example

of

the art of

caring

for

the

body.

The

point

of

contention

s,

as

we have

seen,

whether

rhetoric

is medicine's

counterpart

for

the

soul.

Indeed,

can

rhetoric occupy the place of medicine in the analogy? Socrates argues that

rhetoric

s no art

(techne)

at

all,

but

a

knack,

and

like

cooking

is to

medicine,

so

rhetoric

is to

that

techne

which is

truly

concerned

with

knowledge

of

the

soul.

Consequently,

Socrates

sets

up

the

following

set of relations:

Cooking

is the

251


7/17

Rhetoric

Review

knack and medicine

the

art

concerned with the

body,

just

as

rhetoric

s

the

knack

and some as

yet

unstated

X is

the techne of the

soul.

It

is

at

this

point

that

we must

addressthe

major questions

that arise

in

this

light

but

have as

yet

been

unanswered.

Perhaps

it

might

put

like this:

If

not

rhetoric,

hen what?

or

more

directly:

What is the art

of

the

human

soul?

Before

we

address these

critical and fundamental

questions,

we

must

first

remember

that

many

philosophers

read these concerns with rhetoricas

something

of a

ruse.

It

is

suggested

or

ratheroften asserted that

these

dramatic

moves

simply

exist to

allow Plato

to

get

at the

real

issues

of

arguing

against

hedonism

(contra

Callicles)

and

against tyranny

and

dictatorship

contra

Polus and as he does in

the

Republic).

However,

this misses

what

I

take

to

be

at

least

one of the

major

points

of

the focus

here,

and that is

the relation between rhetoric and the

soul.

Plato cannot

help

but

deal

with

questions

of

the soul when he

deals with

questions

of

rhetoric.

Furthermore,

f

this

is the

case,

then

he

must when

dealing

with

the

soul also

deal with the

Good,

the

true,

and the

just.

This,

of

course,

demands

reference to his

larger

philosophic

commitments. Thus

discussions of

rhetoric

ead

necessarily

and

ultimately

to discussions of

morality,

which

in

turn

are

grounded

n

Plato's

other

philosophical

claims. Plato

relies

on

philosophical

claims that he

develops

elsewhere in his

corpus

to build a case

against

rhetoric.

In

the

Gorgias

these

positions,

even

if

unstated,

are not

unutilized.

On

this

reading,

the issues of

justice,

tyranny,

and

hedonism

arise

because

of claims

on

behalf of

rhetoric

to

be

concerned

with

the

human

soul.

Rhetoric

and the claims

made

in its

name

are

not

ancillary

to the

dialogue,

but form a

part

of

its

center. As

McComiskey

argues

generally

and Enos

argues

specifically

with

reference

to

Callicles,

the

practices

that

Plato

may

have

just

named

in

this

dialogue

for the first

time are at that

historical

moment

making

great

and,

to

Plato's mind

detrimental,

"democratic"and

"pragmatic"

hanges

in

Athenian

culture. Rhetoricis no passing interestor ruse on Plato's part;no, he is indeed

frightened

of

rhetoric

and it

political

as well as ethical

consequences-so

much

so that he tries in this

dialogue

to

make rhetoric

disappear, eeling

perhaps

hat

if

he

could

put

it

out of

sight

he could

be at

peace.

How,

then,

does Plato

attempt

this

sleight-of-hand?

By

establishing,

to his own

satisfaction

at

least,

that

rhetoric

s not

an art

but rather

a

knack and

thus

concerned with

pleasure

as

an

end

in

itself;

therefore the

question

of

what

is

the techne

of the

good

of

the

humansoul still

stands.

What

is

the

proper

techne to deal with the human soul?

Again

we can

put

it

this way: Based on the analogy that Socrateshas utilized throughout,medicine

is

the techne of the

body

and

cooking

is

the

knack,

rhetoric

is the

knack

of

the

soul

and

something

X

is the

techne.

What Plato believes himself to have

proven

in the

Gorgias

is

that one and

only

one techne merits such

a name

vis-a-vis

the

252


8/17

A

Hybrid

Techne

of

the Soul?

soul

and that

is,

of

course,

philosophy. Only philosophy

(here

we are forced

to

think

of

Book

VII

of the

Republic,

537a-41e)

can

fulfill

the

knowledge

requirements

o deal

with

the soul.

Plato makes

it

clear

in

this

dialogue

that

rhetoric s

redundantbecause he

shows that

it

seeks

to rename

philosophy.

Yet

the name

change

is

dangerous

because the

justice deserving

of

the

soul

that

is

determined or

Plato

by

philosophy

cannot

afford the influences

of

rhetoric,

an

influence that rhetoric

claims for itself. Rhetoric's influence

is

unjust

because,

Plato

argues,

it

appeals

only

to

"flattery"

and

thus

places

pleasure

and

success

before

truth

and

justice.

On Plato's

account,

there

already

exists a techne for

dealing

with

the

affairs

of

convincing

others

in the

polis.

Furthermore,

t

already

has a name.

Even

if

Plato

coined the word

rhetorike,

it

turns

out

to

be

only

for

the

purpose

of

showing

that

the

practices

this

word

names

have

no

place

in the life of

a

polis

seeking

to

be

moral and

just.

Rhetoric

(rhetorike)

may appear

in

this

dialogue

for

the first

time,

but

only

to

disappear

because

Plato shows that on

his account

it renames a

practice

that is

truly

concerned

with the soul.

According

to

the

arguments

Plato makes

in

the

Gorgias,

rhetoric

ought

to

disappear

because

it

is

redundant

with

respect

to

the

just

dealings

with the soul.

It

is

important

o

keep

in mind that the

charge

is not that rhetoricdoes not affect the soul: In fact, it

does on Plato's

account,

and this

is

indeed

why

it

is so

frightening

o

him. Were

it

not the

case that

rhetoric

has an effect

on

the

soul,

then it

could

be

safely

ignored

and left alone.

However,

the claim

is not that rhetoric

does

not

affect

the

soul;

ratherthe

problem

is that it does

not do this well.

Rhetoric does

have

an

effect

on

the

soul,

but

it is

base and

at odds

with

Plato's desire

that

such soul-

effects be noble.

Plato ends

Gorgias

with Socrates

recounting

a

myth

of

the afterlife-

recounting

what Socrates

has heard

happens

to the soul after the

demise

of the

body. Heremy frameof Plato-as-magicianwho seeks to makerhetoricdisappear

allows

us

to see the

myth

not

only

as the basis for

Plato's

arguments

about

the

moral

manner

of

living

in

the

becoming

of

this world

(not

unlike

arguments

at

the end

of

Republic).

Beyond

this we

can

see

the

myth

as

also

a

direct

assault on

rhetoric.The

myth

makes

much

of

the

soul's

nakedness,

that

is,

stripped

of

any

of its

worldly

embellishments.

On Plato's

account,

it

seems,

when all

distractions

provided

by

rhetoric

are removed

(honors,

clothes

that

symbolize

status,

etc.),

then one cannot

hide,

divert,

or

pull

any

slights-of-hand

o

protect

one's soul. The

myth

recounts

the

story

of what

happens

after

rhetoric has

disappearedfor (the) good. If Plato fears he has not made rhetoricdisappear

from

this

world,

then

he seems

to

hold out a

hope

that rhetoric

will

surely

disappear

n the other

world.

However,

it is

only

a

hope-because

his

hope

is

based on a

story

Plato cannot

confirm;

it

is

a

story

he has

only

heard.

253


9/17

RhetoricReview

It is

clearly

the

case

that Plato

accepts

the

challenge

of

the

rhetoric,

what

Nietzsche

calls

the contest. No

doubt,

too,

this contest

is

not,

as Enos

points

out,

one in

which the

rhetors

speak

for

themselves

(Greek

Rhetoric

before

Aristotle).

That is

to

say,

Gorgias

is

Plato's artful

creation,

his

magic

show

in

which the

rhetors are

merely

props

or

characters/caricatures.

However much this fact

concerning

the

dialogue

calls certain

aspects

of

Plato's

text into

question-and

indeed it does raise

suspicions-Nietzsche's insight

seems to save other

aspects

of

the text when he

argues:

What,

for

example,

is

of

special

artistic

significance

in

Plato's

dialogues

is for the

most

part

the result of a

contest

with

the art

of

the

orators,

the

sophists,

and the dramatistsof his

time,

invented

for

the

purpose

of

enabling

him to

say

in

the

end:

"Look,

I

too

can do

what

my

great

rivals can

do;

indeed,

I can

do it better than

they.

No

Protagoras

has

invented

myths

as beautiful as

mine;

no

dramatist

such

a

vivid and

captivating

whole as

my Symposion;

no

orator

has

written orations like those in

my

Gorgias-and

now I

repudiate

all

this entirelyand condemnall imitate art.Only the contestmademe a

poet,

a

sophist,

and an

orator."What a

problem

opens

up

before us

when we

inquire

into

the

relationship

of the contest to

the

conception

of the work of

art

(37-38)

With

this

reading

of

Plato-as-magician

n

hand,

we are

now

ready

to move to

Phaedrus because

the

contest,

even

if not

the

magic,

continues there.

Why

Did Rhetoric

Not

Stay

Away?: Philosophy

and

Rhetoric

in Phaedrus

Plato

attempts

o make

rhetoric

disappear

n

the

Gorgias by

arguing

that it

is

an

unnecessary

and

unworthy synonym

for

philosophy.

While

perhaps

convincing

in

the artful context of that

dialogue,

Plato

is

not a

powerful

enough

magician

it would seem to

keep

rhetoric

rom

reappearing.

But

the

Phaedrus is of

interest because

of

other

qualities.

Indeed,

as

Schiappa

(Protagoras

and

Logos;

"Isocrates'

Philosophia") argues

with

respect

to

Gorgias

and

Howland

with

respect

to the

Phaedrus,

Plato has

a

specific target

in

mind

in

his attacks on

rhetoric.

Both

authors

suggest

that

this

target

is

Isocrates,

one

of the main

reasons

being

that this

teacher

and

contemporary

of

Plato was

using

the word

philosophy

to describe

his

teachings

and

practice.

As

Schiappaargues,

this use of

philosophy

will not do

for Plato.

As

a

consequence,

Schiappa

argues,

"[i]f

Plato

could

identify

the

'product'

of his

rival Isocrates'

254


10/17

A

Hybrid

Techne

of

the

Soul?

training

as

something

unnecessary

or

undesirable,

o much

the

better

for

Plato's

school"

(Protagoras

and

Logos

45).

My reading

is

also

supportedby

Howland's

essay

"The Attack on

Isocrates

in

Phaedrus."

Howland

argues

that we understand he

critique

n

the

Phaedrus,

such as it

is,

as

an

attacknot

only

on rhetoric

n

general

but

as

also on Isocrates

in

particular.

With

Howland-as

with

Schiappa

above-if

we

follow this

reading,

then

philosophy

is

at

stake in these

debates

about

rhetoric

and who and

what

practices

will

have the

proper

claim

to

the name

"philosophy"

s a central

and

driving

force

of

these

dialogues.

Plato seems

to

have failed

to make rhetoric

disappear

or

good

and

to have

won

for himself the

sole

right

to the name

"philosophy"

n

the

Gorgias.

I

shall

argue

that

he

attempts

o

capture

this

concept

in

the

myth

of the charioteer

n

the

Phaedrus and

again attempts

to

ease his fear of rhetoric

and

to

claim

possession

of

the name

"philosophy."

Interestingly,

here

in

the

Phaedrus,

Plato treats his

object

of

fear much

differently.

He does

not,

we

may

begin

by

saying,

attempt

any

more

magic

of

the sort

practiced

in the

Gorgias.

However,

he is

up

to

something.

Given

what

we have

just

seen

in

the

Gorgias,

we

may

well be

surprisedby

what

he is

up

to

in this work.We cannot

help

but wonder:What

happened

to Plato between the

Gorgias

and the Phaedrus?

While

we

may

never know

exactly

what

answer to

give

to that

question,

we feel

quite

certainafter

going through

he Phaedrus that

we could with

great

confidence

answer:

"something

profound."

t is

the

case,

no

doubt,

that Plato

speaks

of rhetoric in other

dialogues

that

may

well have been

written

in the time between the two

works in

question

here.

Nonetheless,

these

instances

do

not

exhibit

what we

would

call

an

epiphany-they

do not mark an

announcedand

conspicuous

change

of hearton Plato's account.

Phaedrus

begins

with Socrates

again confronting

rhetoric,and,

initially,

he

does not seem to be

any

more

pleased

with the

practices

thathave come to bear

that

name;

as we

know, however,

this

will

change

in the course

of

the

dialogue.

If,

as

we did with the

Gorgias,

we

see

this

dialogue

as

having

rhetoric

as a

part

of its

center,

then we

get

a

reading

of

Plato that

highlights

his

articulationof the

relation

between

philosophy

and

rhetoric.

Of course

this

dialogue

is about love and

the

soul,

or it is said

to

be at its

best

when it is about love and

the

soul;

but this does

not

prohibit

ts

being

about

rhetoric as well.

Furthermore,

t

may

be about love because it

is

about

rhetoric

suggesting

the same causal relation

to which I

appealed

n

my

Plato-as-magician

reading of the Gorgias. Love, of course, becomes the theme of the dialogue

between

Phaedrusand Socrates

dramatically

because it is the theme

of

Lysias's

speech

that the

young

Phaedrushas in his

possession

(with

which,

it has

always

been

my

suspicion,

he

is

on his

way

to use at the

gym).

The

question

why

love

is

255


11/17

RhetoricReview

related to

the rhetorical

theme

of the

dialogue may

not

be

quite

so

easy

to

recognize.

Love

(eros)

is not

unrelated o

the

new view

Plato

has on

rhetoricthat

he

develops

in this

dialogue.

Love

is

concerned

with the

soul and

thus

is

now

linked to

rhetoric

in

ways

that seem

to

have

been

forbidden

n

the

Gorgias.

To

keep

from

getting

ahead of

ourselves,

let

us

move

to

very

near the end

of

the

dialogue.

From a certain

hermeneutic

position,

the whole of

the

Phaedrus can

be

read

as Plato's

dealing

with the ramifications

of

the

relation

between

philosophy

and

rhetoric. This

is in

stark contrast

o the

nonrelationand

ultimate

incompatibility

betweenthe two for which Plato

argued

in the

Gorgias.

Without a

doubt,

Plato

does

not have

any

more

respect

here

for

rhetoric

per

se

nor

does

his

fear subside

in toto.

The

dangers

of rhetoricwhen

practiced

as a knack

still

haunt

him.

Yet

in

this

work,

Plato leaves

open

the

positive

possibilities

of

rhetoric. Can it be

that,

after

all,

rhetoriccan be a teche^?

Yes

and,

of

course,

no.

A

new

relation,

Plato's

coming

to

terms

with

the

necessity

of

rhetoric,

manifests itself

in

the Phaedrus.

As we

know,

rhetoric

gets

a

better

hearing

in

this work.

The voice of rhetoric

his

time is

not

represented

by

others

(or

was

it

always

misrepresented

before?

Certainly

these

are

real

suspicions

(Enos,

Greek

Rhetoric

before

Aristotle),but

speaks

(almost) for itself. At 260d she

speaks,

in

a

sense

at

least.

Socrates

says

that

perhaps

she has

been treatedtoo

roughly

(we

cannot

help

but wonder

if this refers

not

only

to

the

passages immediately

preceding

this

one

but

in the whole

of

the

Gorgias

as

well)

and

imagines

that

she

might

indeed

say:

"Whatnonsense is

this,

my good

sirs? I

do not insist on

ignorance

of

truth as

an

essential

qualification

for

the

would-be

speaker;

for

what

my

advice

is worth

I

suggest

that

he

should

acquire

that

knowledge

before

embarking

on me.

I do

emphatically

assert, however,

that

without

my

assistance

the man who knows

the

truth

will

make no

progress

n the

art of

persuasion."

Here rhetoric makes the case that without her the truth would in fact be

mute. Plato-and I

sense he

is

reluctant-comes

to

see in

this work that

rhetoric

will

not

accept

being ignored

and that it

certainly

will

not

again disappear

(indeed

it

never

had).

Plato has to find a

way

to

deal

with the

ubiquity

and

constant

presence

of

rhetoric,

he

object

of

his

fear that

now

is

face

to

face with

his

metaphysical

positions,

brought

there

by

we

still

wonder what.

The

consequences

are

greater

than

I

have

made

them

seem

because

the mute truth

s

no

truth

at all for

Plato.

Plato

suggests

that

philosophy

is a

worthless techne without

rhetoric,

and

he

puts these words into the mouthof rhetoricherself and she is left to be the first

to

say

this-as

if

Plato is unable

to

bring

himself to

say

this

directly.

We

must

wonderwhatit even means to have

a

worthless techne

and if it is

even

possible

we

get

the

feeling

that a

worthless

techne is

equivalent

to

not

having

a techne^ t

256


12/17

A

HybridTechne

of

the Soul?

all.

Why

would Plato

make

such concessions

to his

enemy?

I am

submitting

hat

such

concessions are made so that

philosophy

can

say

something.

The

voice that

philosophy

lacks,

it

gets

from rhetoric.Plato is

forced

to

make

a

place

for-even

if

not

a

peace

with-rhetoric.

Moreover,

this

place

is

next

to

philosophy,

the

very

techne that once

was

purified

from

any

infection

by

rhetoric. Next to

rhetoric-is

this even

too

far

away?

Better

to

say

entwined

with

rhetoric,

not

one

without

the other.

Read

this

way,

Plato comes

to

hold what looks

to be a

precursor

o

contemporary osition

on the relation

of

rhetoricand

philosophy.

In Phaedrus Plato comes

to

recognize

this fact of the

interdependence

of

rhetoric

and

philosophy.

Unmistakably,

Plato will not

have

this relation

forget

its

obligations

to

philosophy.

The

change

marked in his

thinking

does not

change

the

fact that this is still his

major

concern.

That is

to

say,

if

philosophy

is

mute

without

rhetoric,

it

is

still the case

that,

and here akin

to the

arguments

from the

Gorgias,

rhetoric

without

philosophy

is

a

real

danger

to

justice.

For

Plato,

this

point

is

not

to be lost on the

young

Phaedrus.

If Plato is

going

to

make

concessions to

rhetoric,

he

is

not

willing,

therefore,

o

give up

everything.

Socrates

calls on the

phantom

arguments

associated

with

the voice

of rhetoric o

persuade

Phaedrus of the

necessity

of

this relation: "Come

forward,

noble

creatures,

and

persuade

Phaedrus,

who

begets

such

lovely

children,

that unless

he becomes

an

adequate

philosopher

he

will

never

be

an

adequate

speaker

either

on

any subject"

261a).

Socrates

ends an

argument

at 269b

saying

that

practitioners

of rhetoric are

"unable

o define the

natureof

rhetoric,

and have believed

in

consequence

that

they

have discovered the

art

itself,

when

all that

they

have

got

hold of is the

knowledge

which

is a

necessary

preliminary

o it.

They

think that

by imparting

this

knowledge they

have

perfectly

discharged

the task of a teacher

of

rhetoric,

and that

the use of each

of

these

devices so as to

produce

conviction

and

the

composition

of a consistent whole is a

simple

matter which their

pupils

must

work out for themselves

when

they

come to make

speeches."

The

charge

that

rhetoric

by

itself

is

only

half a techneseems

on first

sight

to be

only

anotherslur

against

rhetoric.

Undoubtedly hough,

the other side must also

hold,

namely

that

philosophy

as

a mute

enterprise

s

only

half a

techne

at best

without rhetoric.

Admitting

to

the

former

to damn rhetoric also casts its

aspersions

on a

philosophy

that has no

voice. Plato

recognizes

that

he

cannot do

withoutrhetoric

any

more thanrhetoric

can do without

philosophy.

To this

point

this

seems

to

be the case:

Plato

recognized

that his

metaphysicsand his concerns for justice mean little in the silence of a world

without

discourse,

regardless

of how

many dangers

rhetoric

might

raise

in its

wake.

The silence that

would be

self-imposed

by continuing

his assault on

rhetoric

would be the

certain failure of

metaphysics,

of

justice,

and the Good.

257


13/17

RhetoricReviewi

Plato must

give

up

the

better

part

of

what

Derrida calls above

Plato's "rhetoric

against

rhetoric." t has come to this:

Plato realizes

that

he

must

risk

the

dangers

of

rhetoric

for

the sake

of

philosophy.

In the

Gorgias

there

was

one

technte-philosophy-that

cared

for the soul

and

a knack

that

was

unjust

in its

attempts

to

usurp

philosophy's

rightful

place-rhetoric.

I

contend

that

in

the

Phaedrus

there

is

again

one

techne,

but

now it

is

a

hybrid;

both

rhetoricand

philosophy together

are needed for

the care

of

the soul. So were we

wrong

to

characterize

Plato

as a

magician

who made

things disappear?

Does

it turn

out

that

Plato is more

akin

to

the

famous

magic

acts that saw

things

in

half and in the

finale

put

them

back

together

again?

It

seems this

image

might

better

capture

he relation of

philosophy

and

rhetoricas

it is

treated in the two

dialogues

and

that

the

grand

finale

of the

Phaedrus has

reunited he two

necessary

parts

that

make

up

the

hybrid

techne of

the soul.

Beyond

Magic: Why

the

Relation

of

Rhetoric

and

Philosophy

Demand

That

the

Noble and Base Horses

Remained

Forever

Hitched

At the

end of Book

VI

of

the

Republic,

Plato

has

Socrates

notice the

bedazzled interlocutorswho have

just

struggled

to understandthe intricate

details

of

the divided

line.

Book

VII

begins

with

Socrates

attempting

o

care

for

these looks

that

suggest

confusion

by telling

the

allegory

of

the cave

to

explicate

in

another

manner

the dense

argumentssurrounding

he Divided

Line.

Perhaps

this

rather

unconventional

reading

of the

Gorgias

and the

Phaedrus leaves some

in a

similar

condition

to

those

at

the close

of

Republic

Book

VI.

Against

the

backdrop

of

this

reading

that has

pushed

the relation of

philosophy

and rhetoric

constantly

to

the

fore,

I shall

argue

for a

strong,

but

I

hope

creative,

misreading

or

retelling

of

anotherof Plato's

famous

myths.

Rhetoric as

a

concern

of Plato's

has

always

been motivated

by

his moral concern for the soul and that these

discussions

could not but

help

deal

with

Plato's

metaphysical

positions

on the

soul. And

this,

of

course,

includes the

role

of

eros and its

relationto

the soul: "It

is

towards the soul

then

that

all the rhetorician's

energies

will be

directed"and

again

"The

function

of

speech

is

to

influence the

soul"

(Phaedrus

27 la

and

d).

We

have established hat the relation

between

philosophy

and

rhetoric

s the

concern of

Plato

in

the

Gorgias

and

the Phaedrus.

Further,

we have from

this

position argued

that

what

others

see as rhetoric's

passing

place

is

really

central

to

these

two

works. The

appearance

n

these

works of detailed

and

elaborate

discussions of moralityand justice are thus attributed o concernsfor rhetoric

and the

necessity

of

philosophy

having

a

voice.

Said

differently,

rhetoric

s

not

seen

as an

addendum

o these

discussions

of

morality

and

justice.

Plato's

fear of

rhetoric

s

inextricably

inked

to

his

metaphysical

concerns for

justice.

258


14/17

A

Hybrid

Techne

of

the

Soul?

The

myth

of the

charioteer

ells

the

story

of the

hybrid

structure

f

the soul.

The

story

recounts the

image

of

a

charioteer

who

must

guide

two

horses whose

pull

is

in

very

different directions. The

two

horses

are

said to

represent

he

two

parts

of the

soul,

the noble

and

the

base.

The

charioteer

must

bring

these

two

steeds

into

line

such

that

they

together

draw

the chariot

straight.

In

the

confrontation

with

an

object

of

beauty,

the

two

struggle,

at

odds

with

one

another,

for

the

form

the

relation

to

the beautiful

object

will

take.

(Remember

that the

sight

of

beauty

taken in

by

the senses

is the first

clue

to

the

sight

of the

eye of the mindthatdraws the soul toward the Forms.) I have suggestedabove

that

any story

aboutthe

care

of

another's

soul

might

also be read as a

story

about

the relation between

philosophy

and

rhetoricbecause

to

invoke

the

techne

fitting

of

the

soul

(philosophy),

one

only

has recourse

to

touch the

soul

by

means

of

discursive

practice

(rhetoric).

Accordingly,

then,

let

me consider

what

this

story

tells us

if

we read

it

as

the

story

of

philosophy

and

rhetoricon Plato's

account. The noble horse and

the

base horse

are

bridled

together,

and

Plato never

suggests

that

the

attempt

be

made

to

separate

hem.

They

represent

or him the

given

conditions

n which

we

find ourselves, so it is with this team and with this constitutionthat we must

deal.

What

then

follows

for

the relation between these

two horses? Let me

state

the

obvious

as I see

it

on

this

misreading

account

of which horse has the

task

of

representing

which

of

the constitutive

parts

in the

relation

between

philosophy

and rhetoric.

The noble

horse,

it

will

surprise

no

one,

is

philosophy

and

the base

horse

rhetoric.

Nevertheless,

the absence of

our

surprise

is

not

the

simultaneous

absence for

a set

of

reasons

as to

why

these

distinctions

are

made.

Plato was

clear even

in

his

concessions to rhetoric

that it

cannot have

everything

or that

it

did not still harbordangers. The base horse representsrhetoric because it is

strong

enough

to run wild and

to

drag

the noble

horse

behind

it.

Without

philosophy

as the stride of the

noble

horse,

the base horse can have its

way

and

lead

the

charioteer nto

the

irrationalities

of

flattery

as

expounded

both in the

Gorgias

and

the

Phaedrus.

The

task Plato demands from the charioteer

s

that

she

bring

her

study

and

skill to the reins and

restrain

the

base

horse while

simultaneously

bringing

the

noble horse

into

its stride. It

is,

and

this is

corroborated

by

the rest of

the

arguments

in

the

Phaedrus,

only

when

both

philosophy

and

rhetoric are

in

synchronizationand in harmonycan one be said to be on the just path. We

cannot

simply

unhitch

the base horse

(rhetoric)

because

of

the

dangers

it

portends.

If

Plato

thought

this was

possible

in

the

Gorgias,

he has come

to

realize the

impossibility

of this

attempt

n the

Phaedrus.

259


15/17

Rhetoric

Review

The

base horse

running

unrestrained

represents

the

worst

examples

of the

abuse

of discourse. Yet the noble

horse

cannot

run

alone at all. Each noble horse

needs its

grounding

in this

world.

The

noble

horse,

even

if

it is able

to

run alone

somewhere,

cannot do so

in this world. For this

world

it

needs

the

desire for the

other and

access

to

the

other

that

is made

possible

by

the

base horse

(rhetoric)

(see

White).

It needs the

strength

of

the

base horse's contact with the world

to

advance

the

chariot

to

the

other,

to

the

polis,

and to

the

chance

at

communication.

Plato

may

have wanted

an

all

noble

team of

horses,

but the

existential reality of the necessity of discourse forced him to keep the base horse

rhetoric hitched

to

the

enterprise

of

caring

for

the

soul.

For

our

contemporary

situation,

it

is Plato's

efforts

to teach the

importance

of

bringing

the two

steeds

into unison that

one

must

ultimately respect

even

if

one

rejects

the

specifics

of his

metaphysics

and the details of his

equestrian

advice.

We

gain

something

perhaps by

seeing

this

conflict near

its

beginnings.

In

What

Is

Called

Thinking, Heidegger

uncondemningly gives

Kant an

"F" for

his

reading

of

Plato,

suggesting

that

by betraying

the

history

of traditional

readings

from the

history

of

philosophy,

Kant

succeeds in

giving

us

something

new. Perhaps we need to make readings of Plato that merit failure so that we can

make

readings

of him

that

make a

pass

at

being

relevant to

twentieth-century

concerns.

In

this

respect

I

wish to read Plato two

ways:

on

the

one

hand,

with a

deep respect

for the letter of

the his texts

and

on the

other,

with

an

equal

respect

for the

spirit

that lives within them.

By misreading

perhaps

we can

put

these horses

in

a

different

pasture,

to

graze

a different terrain so

that

today

we

might

beckon

them still

with

the

line:

Come

forward,

noble

creatures,

and

persuade.

Note

'The

author has accrued

many

debts

in

the

writing

of

this

essay

and is

hopeful

that

acknowledgment

will

signal

a

recognition

of

them without

believing

such

recognition

could

by

itself

repay.

The

germ

of

this idea first

occurred

n

a

seminar

some

years ago

with Professor

Don

Burks

whose

patience

with the

thesis allowed

it to maturerather

han to

die

a

quick-even

if

brightly

lit-

death.

The work has been

encouraged

or

some time

by

Professor John

T.

Kirby,

whose insistence

that the details should be worked

out was

the

only

thing

that

kept

the

project going.

The author s

grateful

to

all those

students

who shared

the

classroom

and

with

keen

eyes

read Plato.

Lastly,

Rhetoric

Reivew

peer

reviewers

professors

Richard Enos

and

Edward

Schiappa gave

this

essay

readings

that

led

to

so

many

fine

suggestions-the

author's

understanding

f which

are reflected

on

nearly

every page-that

the

essay

now

seems

to have

been

impossible

withoutthem.

Works Cited

Benardete,

Seth.

The Rhetoric

of

Morality

and

Philosophy:

Plato's

Gorgias

and Phaedrus.

Chicago:

U

of

Chicago

P,

1991.

Curran,

Jane

V. "The

Rhetorical

Technique

of Plato's

Phaedrus."

Philosophy

and Rhetoric 19.1

(1986):

66-72.

26()


16/17

A Hybrid

Techne

of

the

Soul?

Derrida,

Jacques.

"Khora."On the Name.

Trans.

lan

Mcleod.

Standford:

Standford

UP,

1995. 89-

127.

"Plato's

Pharmacy."

Dissemination.Trans. nd Intro.

B.

Johnson.

Chicago:

U

of

Chicago

P,

1981.

63-171.

"

White

Mythology."

Margins

of

Philosophy.

Trans.

Alan. Bass.

Chicago:

U

of

Chicago

P,

1982.

Enos,

Richard

Leo.

Greek Rhetoric

before

Aristotle.

Prospect

Heights,

IL:

Waveland,

1993.

.

Roman Rhetoric: Revolution and the

Greek

Influence.

Prospect

Heights,

IL:

Waveland,

1995.

Heidegger,

Martin.

WhatIs

Called

Thinking?

Trans.

F.

D. Wieck and J. G.

Gray.

New

York:

Harper,

1968.

Howland,R. L. "TheAttackon Isocrates n the Phaedrus."Classical Quarterly31 (1937): 151-59.

Johnstone,

Henry.

"From

Philosophy

to Rhetoric and Back."

Rhetoric,

Philosophy,

and Literature:

An

Exploration.

Ed. Don

Burks.West

Lafayette,

IN:

Purdue

UP,

1978.

49-66.

Kahn,

Charles,

H.

"Dramaand Dialectic

in

Plato's

Gorgias."

Oxford

Studies

in Ancient

Philosophy

I

(1983):

75-119.

Levi,

ALbertWilliam.

"Love,

Rhetoric,

and the

Aristocratic

Way

of

Life."

Philosophy

and

Rhetoric

17.4(1984):

189-208.

McComiskey,

Bruce R.

"Disassembling

Plato's

Critique

of

Rhetoric in the

Gorgias

(447a-466a)."

RhetoricReview 11.1

(1992):

79-90.

Moline,

Jon. Plato

on

Persuasion

and

Credibility.

Philosophy

and

Rhetoric 21.4

(1988):

260-78.

Nietzsche,

Friedrich.

"Homer's

Contest."

The

Portable

Nietzsche

Selected,

Trans.,

Intro,

Prefaces,

and

Notes,

Walter.Kaufmann.New York:

Penguin,

1976.

Olson, Gary A. "Jacques Derrida on Rhetoric and Composition: A Conversation."Journal of

Advanced

Composition

10.1

(1990):

1-21.

Plato.

Phaedrus. Trans.WalterHamilton.New York:

Penguin,

1973.

.Gorgias,

Trans.Robin Waterfield.

New

York: Oxford

UP,

1994.

Robinson,

Richard. "Socratic

Definition."

The

Philosophy

of

Socrates:

A

Collection

of

Critical

Essays.

Ed.

Gregory

Vlastos. Notre Dame: U of Notre Dame

P,

1980. 61-75.

Romilly, Jacqueline

de.

Magic

and Rhetoric

n

Ancient Greece.

Cambridge:

Harvard

UP,

1975.

Schiappa,

Edward.

"Did

Plato Coin the Word

Rhetorike?" American Journal

of

Philology

111

(1990a):

460-73.

."Isocrates'

Philosophia

and

ContemporaryPragmatism."

Rhetoric,

Sophistry,

Pragmatism.

Ed. Steven. Mailloux.

Cambridge:Cambridge

UP,

1995.

33-60.

.

"Neo-Sophistic

Rhetorical Criticism

or

the

Historical

Reconstruction

of

Sophistic

Doctrines?"Philosophyand Rhetoric23.3 (1990b): 192-217.

.Protagoras

and

Logos:

A

Study

in Greek

Philosophy

and Rhetoric.

Columbia:

U

of

South

Carolina

P,

1991.

.

"Rhetorike:

What's

in

a

Name?

Toward a Revised

History

of

Early

Greek

Rhetorical

Theory."

Quarterly

Journal

of Speech

78

(1992):

1-15.

Schrag,

Calvin

O.

"RhetoricResituated

at

the End

of

Philosophy."

Quarterly

Journal

of

Speech

71

(1985):

164-74.

White,

F. C. "TheGood in

Plato's

Gorgias."

Phronesis 35. 2

(1990):

117-27.

261


17/17

RhetoricReview

Ramsey

Eric

Ramsey

is

a

philosopher

and communicationscholar

currently

eaching

courses in

the

philosophy

of

communication,ethics,

and

rhetoricat Arizona

State

University

West in

Phoenix. He

is the author of

The

Long

Path to

Nearness,

a

philosophic study

of

ethics,

communication,

and

corporeality.

P

Rhetoric

Review

Back

Issues Available

The

following

issues

ofRR

are

available

at the

single

copy

price

of

$10.00,

including

mailing:

2.1,

2.2,3.2, 4.1, 4.2,

6.2,

7.2, 8.1,

8.2,

10.2,11.1,11.2,12.1,12.2,13.1,13.2,14.1,15.2,

16.1, 16.2,

and

17.1.

All

twenty-one

back issues

may

be

purchased

s

a

group

for

only

$100.00,

including

mailing.

Vohmes

1.1,

1.2, 3.1,

5.1,

5.2,

6.1, 7.1,

9.1,

9.2,

10.1,

14.2,

and

15.1

are available

only

as

photocopies.

The

price

for each

is

$11.00,

including

mailing

Orders or

individual

back issues

must

be

prepaid

Orders

rom

departments

nd

libraries

may

be

billed

Please

write

to the address

below,

e-mail

(enos@u

rizona.edu),

or fax

(520/621-7397),

indicating

which

back

issue(s) you

would

like:

Rhetoric

Review,

Theresa

Enos,

Editor,

Depatment

of

English,

University

of

Arizona,

Tucson,

AZ

85721.

262

a hibrid techne of the soul

Documents