a framework for understanding the relationship between

ConceptPaper

AFrameworkforUnderstandingtheRelationshipbetweenRadicalisation,ReligionandViolenceH.A.HellyerandMicheleGrossmanMay2019

https://www.grease.eui.eu

Thisworkingpaperoffersaconceptualframeworkforexploringtherelationshipbetweenradicalisation,religionandviolence.Indoingsoitreviewstheroleofreligioninradicalisationtheoriesanddelineatestheemainschoolsofconceptualisingradicalisation.Theaimofthispaper–oneofthreeinaseries-istoprovideaconceptualcornerstonefortheresearchbeingconductedinGREASE,anEU-fundedprojectinvestigatingreligiousdiversity,state-religionrelationsandreligiouslyinspiredradicalisationonfourcontinents.

TheGREASEprojecthasreceivedfundingfromtheEuropeanUnion'sHorizon2020researchandinnovationprogrammeundergrantagreementnumber770640

TheRelationshipbetweenRadicalisation,ReligionandViolence ConceptPaper GREASE

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TheEU-FundedGREASEprojectlookstoAsiaforinsightsongoverningreligiousdiversityandpreventingradicalisation.Involving researchers from Europe, North Africa, theMiddle East, Asia and Oceania,GREASEis investigatinghowreligiousdiversity isgovernedinover20countries.Ourwork focuses on comparing norms, laws and practices thatmay (ormay not) proveuseful in preventing religious radicalisation. Our research also sheds light on howdifferent societies cope with the challenge of integrating religious minorities andmigrants. The aim is to deepen our understanding of how religious diversity can begovernedsuccessfully,withanemphasisoncounteringradicalisationtrends.Whileexploringreligiousgovernancemodelsinotherpartsoftheworld,GREASEalsoattempts tounravel theEuropeanparadoxofreligiousradicalisationdespitegrowingsecularisation. We consider the claim that migrant integration in Europe has failedbecause second generation youth have become marginalised and radicalised, withsometurningtojihadistterrorismnetworks.Theresearchersaimtodeliverinnovativeacademic thinking on secularisation and radicalisation while offering insights forgovernanceofreligiousdiversity.TheprojectisbeingcoordinatedbyProfessorAnnaTriandafyllidoufromTheEuropeanUniversityInstitute(EUI)inItaly.OtherconsortiummembersincludeProfessorTariqModood fromTheUniversityofBristol (UK);Dr.H.A.Hellyer from theRoyalUnitedServices Institute (RUSI) (UK); Dr. MilaMancheva from The Centre for the Study ofDemocracy (Bulgaria); Dr. Egdunas Racius from Vytautas Magnus University(Lithuania); Mr. Terry Martin from the research communications agency SPIA(Germany);ProfessorMehdiLahloufromMohammedVUniversityofRabat(Morocco);Professor Haldun Gulalp of The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation(Turkey); Professor PradanaBoy of UniversitasMuhammadiyahMalang (Indonesia);Professor Zawawi Ibrahim of The Strategic Information and Research DevelopmentCentre (Malaysia); Professor Gurpreet Mahajan of Jawaharlal Nehru University(India);andProfessorMicheleGrossmanofDeakinUniversity(Melbourne,Australia).GREASEisscheduledforcompletionin2022.Formoreinformationpleasecontact:ProfessorAnnaTriandafyllidou,[email protected]

http://grease.eui.eu/GREASE-Radicalisation,SecularismandtheGovernanceofReligion:BringingtogetherEuropeanandAsianPerspectives


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TableofContents

INTRODUCTION 4

1. DEFININGRADICALISATIONANDEXTREMISM:BACKGROUNDANDCONTEXTS 4

1.1RADICALISATION:THECONTINUINGJOURNEYOFACONCEPT 41.1.1THEROLEOFRELIGIONINRADICALISATIONTHEORIES 61.2DEFININGEXTREMISM:APPROACHESANDDEBATES 81.2.1EXTREMISMANDFUNDAMENTALISM 81.2.2EXTREMISMANDEXCLUSIVISM 91.2.3EXTREMISMANDVIOLENTEXTREMISM 101.2.4EXTREMISMANDLEGITIMACY 111.3 CRITICALAPPROACHESTORADICALISATIONANDRELIGION 121.3.1SEPARATINGIDEOLOGYFROMRELIGIONINRADICALISATIONTHEORY 13

2. THREESCHOOLSOFCONCEPTUALISINGRADICALISATION 13

2.1THEFIRSTSCHOOL:RADICALISATIONASIDEOLOGY 142.1.1.SCHOOLONE,GROUP1:IDEOLOGYASRELIGIOUSIDEAS 142.1.2SCHOOLONE,GROUP2:IDEOLOGYASPOLITICALIDEAS 172.2THESECONDSCHOOL:RADICALISATIONASSOCIALEXPERIENCE 172.3THETHIRDSCHOOL:INTERSECTIONALRADICALISATION 19

3. RELIGIONANDEXTREMISM 21

3.1RELIGIOUSEXTREMISMANDLIBERALISM 22

4. CONCLUSION:RE-ASSESSINGTHERELATIONSHIPBETWEENRELIGION,RADICALISATIONANDVIOLENCE 22

REFERENCES 25


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IntroductionThesubjectofradicalisationhasroutinelybeenaminefieldfraughtwithavarietyoftheories and assumptions, as much scholarship and public commentary attests.Differentelementsofthesetheoriesandassumptions,whichweelaborateonbelow,have deep utility for our exploration of the discursive relationship betweenradicalisationandreligion,whileothersarelessuseful.Thequestionweposeinthispaper, as we consider a conceptual framework for understanding and explainingradicalisation,iswhetherthereisanyoneconceptof‘radicalisation’thatconsistentlyhelps us understand its meanings in relation to religious formations and beliefsystems.Inturn,thisbearsonafundamentalquestionfortheGREASEproject:howdo we understand the role of religion and ideas in relation to trajectories ofradicalisationtoviolence?

1. Defining radicalisation and extremism: Backgroundandcontexts

The chief conceptual debates about how radicalisation is currently explained inrelation to religion (or otherwise) are delineated below, with reflections andcomments fromus in terms of their strengths andweakenesses.We then go on toconsider a conceptual framework that aims to be robust in its analytical value,privileges the intersectional,andcoverskeyconstructionsofradicalisationcontextsandscenarios.

1.1Radicalisation:ThecontinuingjourneyofaconceptTounderstandtheway inwhichdiscoursesofradicalisationhavebeendeployed inrelationbothtoterrorismandtoreligionincontemporarytimes,weturnfirsttotheseminalwork of ArunKundnani (2012). In this highly influential article, Kundnanibroke down conceptualisations of radicalisation to violence since roughly 2004 –somethreeyearsafter9/11–intofourcategories:- Radicalisationasacultural-psychologicaldisposition- Radicalisationasatheologicalprocess- Radicalisationasatheological-psychologicalprocess- Radicalisation as an action framework applied in policing and security

contexts.Kundani argues that each element in this typologyof radicalisationdepends for itsutilityonthe‘narrowquestion’posedbythestudyofradicalisationsince9/11:‘WhydosomeindividualMuslimssupportanextremistinterpretationofIslamthatleadstoviolence?’(2012,5).Thenarrownessofthisquestion,heasserts,wasshapedbytheneedsofcounter-terroriststrategistsandofficialstoquicklyfundandmountcounter-radicalisationoffensives,ratherthanbytheeffortto‘objectivelystudyhowterrorismcomesintobeing’through‘scholarlyunderstandingofthecausesofterrorism’(5).


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AsDerekSilva(2018)pointsout inanarticlerevisitingKundani’scritique, the firstthree categories outlined by Kundnani derive largely from the work of WalterLaqueur (1999, 2004), who argued for a new paradigm representing a shift awayfromthepoliticalandstructuralconditionsthatenableorprovokeviolentresponsesandtowardtheindividualisationofradicalisationasapsycho-socialprocess.ThiswasinextricablylinkedtoLaqueur’sconceptionofa‘newterrorism’thatcouldbedefinedas‘Islamicfundamentalistviolencerootedinfanaticism’(asLaqueurputsit,andweproblematisetheterm‘fundamentalist’lateroninthispaper),connotinganeweraoflethalitylinkedtoreligiousmotivationasitsdrivingforce.Broadly speaking, efforts to define and operationalise ‘radicalisation’ as a conceptwerepragmatic responses to thechallengeof trying todescribe,asPeterNeumann(2008,4)putit, ‘whatgoesonbeforethebombgoesoff’.Thus,fromitsinceptioninthe post 9/11 period, the ‘new terrorism’s’ concept of radicalisation – intimatelybound upwith its characterisation as Islamist or jihadist-inflected terrorism -- hasbeendeeplyshapedbyinstrumentalistratherthananalyticalorinterpretiveconcernsandperspectives.The focus on a break between the ‘new’ terrorism and the ‘old’ was critiqued byMarthaCrenshawamongst others,whopointed out that ‘a strictly “new terrorism”viewpoint is bound to overestimate the effect of religious beliefs as a cause ofterrorismandacauseoflethality’.Shearguesthatthedistinctionbetween‘religiousandnationalistorsecularrevolutionarymotivations isnotclearlyestablished’,withfewgroupsabletobecharacterisedashavingotherthan‘mixedmotives’(Crenshaw2007). Nevertheless, ‘radicalisation’ in the meaning of this term within ‘newterrorism’ analyses became a conceptual byword for attempting to pin down thepoints at which interventions in the ‘radicalisation process’ could be offered thatwould disrupt the process and turn people or groups back or away from fanaticalideologies.Thiskindof thinkingaboutradicalisation frequently involvedaconcernwithwhatisoftentermedthe‘rootcause/s’ofradicalisationtoviolence,particularlyinrelationtoIslamorIslamism,dependingonhowit isconceptualised(see,forbuttwoofmanyexamples,Veldhuis&Staun,2009;McCauley&Moskalenko,2011).The focus for radicalisationstudiesand theorisations that followed thisLaqueurianturnsoughttoexplainviolentradicalisation’s‘rootcauses’eitherintheologicaltermsor–withgreatersophisticationandcomplexity–as‘aninteractiveprocessbetweentheologicalandsocial-psychologicaljourneys’(Kundani2012,14).AsKundaninotes,thismorenuancedradicalisationtheorisingheldthat:Ratherthanreligiousbeliefsbythemselvesdrivingindividualstoviolence,thepictureisoneinwhichideologybecomesmoreextremeinresponsetoa‘cognitiveopening’,an ‘identity crisis’ or a groupbondingprocess….amore sophisticated [formulation]that addresses the interdependence of theologywith emotions, identity and groupdynamics(ibid).


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1.1.1TheroleofreligioninradicalisationtheoriesScholarship thatprivilegesonly the ‘theologicalbasis’ for radicalisation toviolence,andalsoproceeds from the ‘narrowquestion’ ofunderstanding religiously-inspiredextremistindividualsandtheirideologicalaffiliations,isexemplifiedbystudiessuchasGartenstein-RossandL.Grossman(2009).Intheirwork,‘theology’isequivalentto‘jihadistideology’.Theyunderstandtheologicallybasedradicalisationtoconsistofsixstages,allofwhichinvolvesteppedmovementtowardreligiouslyframedextremismthatultimatelyjustifiestheuseofviolence:

1. Theadoptionofalegalistic(sic)interpretationofIslam2. Trustingonlyaselectiveandideologicalgroupofreligiousauthorities3. ViewingtheWestandIslamasirreconcilablyopposed4. Manifestingalowtoleranceforperceivedreligiousdeviance5. Attemptingtoimposereligiousbeliefsonothers6. The expression of radical political views (Gartenstein-Ross & L. Grossman

2009,29)More nuanced and intersectional analyses are typified by that of Marc Sageman,whoseUnderstandingTerrorNetworks(2004)andLeaderslessJihad(2008)havealsobeen highly influential in how radicalisation is conceptualised. For Sageman, acomprehensivetheoryofradicalisationmustbebasedprimarilyonanalysisofsocialnetworks: those bonds of kinship and friendship throughwhich social influence onattitudes, orientations and behaviours is circulated and mediated. He argues thateconomic or political conditions could not be held primarily responsible forgeneratingradicalisedviolence,sincemanymoremillionsofpeoplearoundtheworldwhosufferedundersuchconditionswouldotherwisebesimilarlyradicalised,wheninrealityonlyasmallnumberofpeopleinanysettingshifttowardexplicitlyterroristideationandaction.This isnot to say that Sagemancompletelydiscounts the structural roleofpolitics,economics or ideologies in favour of the role of sociality in the production ofradicalised violence; rather, he suggests wemust ‘ask how terrorists interpret thestructuralconditionswithwhichtheyareconfrontedandhowtheyattempttoforgeacommonstruggleinresponse’(Kundani2012,14).However,Sageman’ssocialnetworkor‘bunchofguys’theoryofviolentradicalisationhas been criticised as an explanatory framework for understandingwhen andhowradicalisationoriginates,andwhy ‘violenceischosenoverothermeans’ofpursuingtransformational social change (Kundani2012,15)without resorting to theologicalmotivation.Inthisway,Kundnanisuggests,entirecommunitiesofMuslims,andIslamas a religion – particularly Salafi interpretations – have become implicated in bothradicalisationtheoryandcounter-radicalisationdiscourse.


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These assumptions around how radicalisation as a theologically based ideology ofviolencedevelopsandspreadshaveinfluencedmanysubsequentinterventionsinthefield. In response, there has been a critical counter-push towards theories ofradicalisation that privilege social-psychological and structural dynamics such associal exclusion and alienation over those of religious belief systems. This work,notably proceeding from European rather than Anglo-North American context,attempts to reposition radicalisation discourse by suggesting that radicalisation,rather than springing from theological bases, finds expression through religiousframes:itisradicalisationthatcomesfirst,notreligion.As Olivier Roy has argued, it is not so much the ‘radicalism of Islam’ but the‘Islamisationof radicalisation’ thatweneed tograpplewith. Inhis JihadandDeath:TheGlobalAppealofIslamicState(2017),RoysuggeststhatmostIslamist-attributedviolent extremists are young second-generation Muslims in majority non-MuslimsettingsintheWestor,toalesserextent,converts.Royincludesinthissecondgroupboththosewhoconvertfromotherornon-faithbackgrounds(whatFrancisandKnott[2017]term‘newMuslims’],andalsothosewhomheclassesas‘bornagain’Muslimswhoadoptamoreardentandstrictinterpretationofreligiousidentity.Neither‘new’nor‘born-again’Muslims,hesuggests,possessstrongknowledgeofIslamicdoctrineprior to radicalising and accordingly engage with and accept uncritically highlyselective interpretations of theological precepts following their trajectory intoextremistviolence.Roy’sconsiderations inthisregardoughttobetreatedwithsomenuance,however.First, the question of how ‘converts’ is defined tends to vary across the literature,withRoy’sdefinitionbeingparticularlyexpansive.Second,thewayinwhichconvertsor‘bornagain’violentextremistsareidentifiedandcountedneedstobeapproachedwithsomecaution–thefiguresonwhichtheseclaimsarebasedareestimateslargelybasedonSchuurmanGolandFlower’s(2016)policybriefshowingadisproportionatenumberof foreignfighterswhoareconverts(fromotherornon-faithbackgrounds)relative to the population distribution of Muslims in countries such as Belgium,France,Germanyand theNetherlands.Open-sourcedata thatcouldhelpconfirmortriangulatesuchfiguresishardtocomeby.Moreover,studiessuchasFrancisandKnott(2017)suggestthatintheUK,‘there’snoevidencethatnewMuslims[i.e.converts]ingeneralendupmoreextremethanthoseborn into Islam’. However, studies such as Zammit (2015), revealing that of 33terrorist convictions in Australia up to the time of his writing, 22% of the samplewereunambiguouslyidentifiedaseither‘new’or‘bornagain’Muslims(withMuslimsonlymakingup2.3%oftheAustralianpopulationasawhole)suggeststhatthereareconsiderablecountry-by-countryvariations thatneed tobeunpackedandanalysed.Theliteratureonthisissuethusremainsinconclusiveatpresent.Roy does reject the assumption that conservative Salafism should be uncriticallyequated with violent extremism, but also argues that hegemonic secularism,particularly in Europe, coupled with the denial or suppression of religiosity hascreated a space in which the desire for spiritual meaning and transcendence canmakeyoungpeoplevulnerabletoextremismsthatappealtothisgap.Theprocessof


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radicalisationoutlinedbyRoyismorealignedwiththewaysinwhichextremeformsof socialandculturalalienation in specific structural contexts findexpression inanurgetowardnihilismthatreligiousextremismsareabletoaccommodate.

1.2Definingextremism:ApproachesanddebatesThistakesustowhatweandothersmeanwhenweseektounderstand‘extremism’.We arrive at a definition of ‘extremism’ in relation to radicalisation by asking thefollowing questions: what conceptual distinctions between ‘extremism’ and‘fundamentalism’mightbeuseful?Whatistherelationshipbetween‘extremism’and‘excluvisism’? Between ‘extremism’ and ‘violent extremism’? And what role doconcepts of identity and legitimacy in how we understand extremism as both anideologicalandpsycho-socialphenomenon?

1.2.1ExtremismandfundamentalismBarkun (2003) argues that the term ‘fundamentalism’, especially when allied withnotions of ‘religious fundamentalism’, is unhelpful in describing political violenceundertakeninthenameofreligion.Barkunfindstheterm‘fundamentalism’itselftobemisapplied,noting that ithasbeenattenuatedover timeto includeanyreligiousmovementsthatclaimtorepresenta‘historicreligioustradition’seekingtopreserveand privilege traditionalist understandings of religious doctrine and interpretationagainst modernist interpretations. Making this leap, Barkun claims, ignores thespecificnuancesofhow‘fundamentalism’originateswithinasectarianschisminlatenineteenth-/early twentieth-centuryAmericanProtestantism, inwhich ‘modernists’squaredoff against ‘traditionalists’.The ‘anti-modernists’began to term themselves‘fundamentalists’(basedonaseriesofpamphletspublishedbetween1910and1915calledTheFundamentals) and established ‘parallel institutions’ such as ‘publishinghouses, religious conferences, denominational structures and educationalinstitutions’(2003,58).The traditionalist tendencies of this strand of American Protestantism during theperiodwerecharacterisedbywithdrawalandisolationisminrelationtomainstreampolitics and culture. Yet it is amistake, inBarkun’s view, to infer from this that allvarietiesofreligioustraditionalismareintentonwithdrawingfromandrejectingthebroaderculturalandpoliticaldynamics inwhich theyareembedded,andhistoricalanalyses show the futility of such an assertion. However, Barkun accepts that‘fundamentalism’isnow‘tooentrenchedinbothcommonandacademicusage’forittoberelegatedtothe‘lexiconofabandonedterms’(2003,69).EquallyproblematicforBarkunisthewayinwhich:

References to “Islamic fundamentalism” have become so commonplace indiscussionsofviolencethattheyscarcelyoccasionanynotice.…Theprevailingassociation between fundamentalism and violence, particularly terrorism,should not be regarded as self-evidently true. It is, instead, often an act oflabellingforthepurposeofcondemnation,withlittleregardforthebeliefstowhich the label is attached. ‘Fundamentalism’ itself is a construct whoserelationshiptoviolenceisextremelyproblematic(2003,57).


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He notes thatwhile essentialist arguments seeking to link fundamentalist religiousthoughttoatendencyforpoliticalviolenceincludeafocusonthingssuchasstylesofcharismatic leadership, isolationistmodes of organisation and apocalyptic religiousbeliefs, ‘for purposes of understanding the relationship between religion andviolence, it turns out tomatter relatively littlewhether a group is aNewReligiousMovementorhasemergedoutofanexistingreligioustradition’.Hegoesontonotethat it is ‘always possible to find non-violent groups that are, for example, led bycharismaticleaders,physicallyisolatedanddoctrinallyrigid’.Barkun also astutely draws attention to the ways in which fundamentalism’scharacterisationasa‘clashofcivilisations’(forexample,the1996Huntingtonthesisof a civilizational clash between ‘Islam’ and the ‘West’) elides the fact thatfundamentalismsare frequently inconflictwith ‘enemies’withintheirownreligion,as well as external to it; this was the case for competing sects of AmericanProtestantism in the19thcentury, for JewishHaredismfromthe18thcentury to thepresent, and of purist Salafism in Islam. Fundamentalism, for Barkun,may thus beextremeinrelationtoothertendencieswithinreligiousdoctrines,butitisnotalwaysand everywhere ‘extremist’ in the political sense of the term, and especially not inrelationtopoliticallyorientedviolence.

1.2.2ExtremismandexclusivismA similar argument has been made by M. Grossman et al. (2016) around therelationshipbetweenextremismandexclusivism ina systematic reviewof literaturepublished on social cohesion, community resilience and violent extremism from2011-2015.Thisresearchsuggeststhat:

Exclusivismis…anumbrella termforasetofattitudesandactions informedbytheassumptionofinequalitybetweengroupsandespeciallythesuperiority[of]one’sowngroup.Exclusivistviewpointstendtodefinegroupboundariesinrigidtermsbasedonassumedfixedsetsofvalues,traitsand‘in/out’criteria.…Exclusivismperseisnotnecessarilyharmful[butthereare]sociallyharmfulmanifestationsofexclusivism,forexampleracismandviolentextremism,thataim to humiliate, denigrate and/or harm others based on their actual orperceived membership of or identification with a particular ethnic, racial,cultural or religious group. … Exclusivist in-group and out-group dynamicsmay,butdonotnecessarily,supporttrajectoriesofextremism.(2016,4)

In this we see that exclusivism constructs what we might think of as a mode ofstructural extremism in the relationship between in-groups and out-groups alongbothverticalandhorizontalaxes:averticalaxisofsuperiorityversusinferiority,anda horizontal axis of centralism versus marginalisation, in which the exclusivist in-group locates its values and practices at the centre of its own communal socialstructures and dominance and pushes out-groups to or beyond the margins.. Thisconceptualisationofextremismdoesnotobviatethenotionthataminoritymaywellbeable todominate itsowncommunal social structureswhile remainingunable toforcetheseonothers,especiallywhenthein-groupisaminorityandtheout-groupis


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amajority. Itisalsopossibleforstructuralexclusivismstoexistalongsideofandintensionwithotherattitudes,practicesandstructures.

1.2.3ExtremismandviolentextremismHowever,thisstilldoesnotsupporttheautomaticequationofextremismwithviolentextremism.Wedefine‘violence’heretomeanphysicalviolence,ratherthansymbolic,epistemic, psychological or economic violence. It is not that these other types ofviolenceare immaterialorunimportant,and it ispossible toargue that the injuriescausedbyviolentextremismcananddoextendtosuchharms.However,the‘violent’inviolentextremismhaslongbeenconnectedtothethreatorcommissionofphysicalviolence to achieve ideologically motivated outcomes within a matrix of legal,legislativeandinstitutionalnormsandsanctions.Alex Schmid (2014) has argued that non-violent extremism and violent extremismareequivalent.Inhisview,weshouldtreatthemasthesameproblem,‘twosidesofthesamecoin’sothatextremistideologyinevitablyleadstoviolence.Butwhendoesideologybecomeaproblemofviolenceifitisneveractedupon(Khalil2014)?Manydreamofcommittingviolentactionandneveractonthisimpulse.Nordoallactsofviolence rely on extremist ideology or affect in framing their motivation. Theargument that extremismmustbe tackled inorder to combatpolitical violencehasbeentakenupenthusiasticallybyvariouspoliticalagendas,includinginanumberofcounter-extremist programs such as theUK’s Prevent, but it does not hold upwellfrom a theoretical or analytical point of view. In other words, all extremisms areideologicalatsomelevel:buttheirdispositiontoviolenceasaconstitutentfeatureofextremistthinkingandfeelingshouldnotbetakenasagiven.Inthisregard,averyusefuldistinctionbetween‘extremism’and‘violentextremism’isadvancedbyJohnBerger(2017,2018).Berger(2017)arguesthatextremismisnotalways violent and it is not always associated with non-state actors. For instance,movementsbasedondiscrimination,separatismorvoluntarysocialself-segregationdo not necessarily advocate violence, although they may evolve in that direction.Moreover,in-group/out-groupdynamicshavefuelednotonlynon-statebutalsostatepoliciesthroughouthistory,fromsegregationtogenocidetointernment.Bergerthusdistinguishesbetweenextremismandviolentextremismasfollows:

Extremism: A spectrum of beliefs in which an in-group’s success isinseparablefromnegativeactsagainstanout-group.Negativeactscanincludeverbal attacks and diminishment, discriminatory behaviour, or violence.Competition isnot inherentlyextremist,because itdoesnotrequireharmful,out-of-bounds acts against competitors (such as sabotage). The need forharmful activity must be inseparable from the in-group’s understanding ofsuccess in order to qualify. Similarly, not every harmful act is necessarilyextremist.ViolentExtremism:Thebeliefthatanin-group’ssuccessisinseparablefromviolence against an out-group.A violent extremist ideologymay subjectively


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characterise this violence as defensive, offensive, or pre-emptive. Again,inseparability is the key element here, reflecting that the need for violenceagainsttheout-groupisnotconditionalorsituational.

Berger’sdistinctionsherepointtotwoessentialcomponentsofextremism,whetheror not it is violent: in-group/out-group identity AND negative or harmful attitudesandbehaviourstowardanout-groupbythein-group,plusoneadditionalcomponentfor violent extremism: in-group/out-group identity AND negative or harmfulattitudes and behaviours toward out-groups AND non-conditional or situationalcommitmenttoviolenceagainstanout-group inordertoachievethesuccessof thein-group.Berger’s focus on the importance of in-group/out-group identity in structuringextremist ideologies and standpoints is supportedby critics such as LorneDawson(2006), who notes that ‘social identity processes, rooted in escalating tensionbetween an in-group and an out-group, probably play a key role inmotivating theturntopoliticalviolenceandterrorism’. In laterresearch,Dawson(2018)buildsonwork by Atran (2010, 2016), Cottee and Hayward (2011) and McBride (2011) tosuggest that ‘the very act of making a…new, risky and oppositional [self-categorisation] is a meaning-making action’ in which the in-group/out-groupdynamic ‘has no power to drive behaviour in the absence of the desire for greatermeaning’(Dawson2018).Inotherwords,extremismreliesforitsvalencyandimpacton a propulsion toward the construction of alternative meaning-worlds which areinseparablefromtheredistributionofidentitiesinrelationtostatusandpower.

1.2.4ExtremismandlegitimacyThisleadsthequestionofhowvarietiesofextremismcreateandsustainlegitimacyincontestablesocialandpoliticalcontexts.Bergeragain, inhis2017analysisofwhitesupremacist terrorism, offers a helpful analytical framework for thinking about therelationshipbetweenextremismanditssociallegitimation.Heproposesthatidentitymovements are always oriented toward establishing the legitimacy of a collectivegroup(onwhateverbasis ‘collective’ isdescribed),becoming ‘extreme’whenan in-group’s demand for legitimacy escalates to the point that such legitimacy can beachievedonlyat theexpenseofan out-group. This in turn sees the legitimacy of anidentity-based in-group move from situated conflicts between an in-group and anout-group – for example, over territory or recognition – to a more generalisedframing of such conflict as both historical but also future-oriented (for example,throughreligiousprophecy).Bergerobservesthatanysocialcollective–forexample,thatofliberaldemocraciesorhuman rights movements -- requires the imprimatur of legitimacy to protect itsidentity, and that this need not be unhealthy. But – especially under perceived oractualconditionsofthreatstoidentityorintegrity–theneedforlegitimacycanspiralout of control when identity-based groups turn toward extremisms that requireharmful attitudes and behaviours toward out-groups. If unchecked by internal orexternalpressures,in-groupscanescalatetheirdemandsforlegitimacyinwaysthatcrossthethresholdfrom‘healthy’to‘unhealthy’formsofextremismattheexpenseof


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others. This kind of analysis is critical because it avoids the tendency noted byDawson(2018)toreducereligion–asoneformofidentity-basedsocialcollective–tothecategoryofpersonalmotivations for involvement in terrorism,whichprivilegesthe psychological over the political and social-structural aspects of how extremistviolencemaycometobeembraced.We thus work here with a concept of extremism that draws on these analyses todefine(violent)extremisminthefollowingway:

Extremismistheefforttolegitimiseandassertthesuperiorityanddominationofan exclusivist in-group identity over other out-groups in ways that areinseparablefromproposingorcausingharmtothoseout-groups,oftenthrougha process of consistent and harmful ‘othering’. Violent extremism seeks toachievethesuccessofthein-groupbyattemptingtosubjugateoreliminateout-groupsthroughtheuseofphysicalviolencetoachievesocio-politicalchange inwaysthatarefundamentallyconstitutiveofin-groupidentity.

Below,welookathowthisdefinitionmayapplytodifferentcases.

1.3 CriticalapproachestoradicalisationandreligionThedebates canvassedherehave ledus to identify the following tendencieswithinscholarship on radicalisation and extremism. In relation to radicalisation, theanalysestouchedonabovesuggestthatradicalisationhasoftenbeenunderstoodas:

a. Amultidimensional yet coherentprocess (i.e., that variationsof the sameprocess have similar effects on a variety of people) characterised byconsistentescalation;

b. That this process has certain key affective, cognitive, behavioural andstructural attributes that are often present, such as in-group/out-groupoppositionsandexclusivistattitudesandbehaviours,and

c. That one of these key attributes involves the belief that ideology oftenplays,variously,afoundational,operationaland/orcontextualroleinmostinstances of radicalisation to extremism, and that ‘religion’ is sometimestakentobeequivalentto‘ideology’inthiscontext.

Irrespective of those disagreements, the basic frame of radicalisation being acoherent, identifiable process of escalation (whether one chooses to focus onindividual factors, alternatively, group-level factors and influences or both) isremarkably common. This simplistic way of looking at radicalisation is oftencriticised,althoughwewouldsuggestthatthesecriticismsareoftenincomplete.Yetitremainsthecasethatintheworldofmediaandpolicy,suchsimplisticexplanationsremain remarkably popular – and thus the deconstruction of such assumptionsremains continually necessary. As noted above, radicalisation is used more as a‘concept’thananempiricallygroundedtheoreticalframe(Kundnani2012).Thisistosaythatwhentheword ‘radicalisation’ isdeployed, it isnotascientific termthat isbased on empirical analysis, but a floating concept used to indicate that a specific,commonprocessofcounteringitisatwork.


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1.3.1SeparatingideologyfromreligioninradicalisationtheoryInthisregard,weagreewithKundnanithatradicalisation,whilethesubjectofmuchserious academic analysis and debate, may also be accurately described as apolemicaltoolusedtosupportorattackonthebasisofideologicalcommitmentsandconvictions.Indeed,themostappropriatewaytodescriberadicalisationmightbetodeclareitasanacademictermwhichisdeployedasapolemictoolasoftenas,ifnotmoreso,thanitisutilisedasanintellectualtoolofanalysis.Inourownapproach,werejecttheideaofasingular‘radicalisationprocess’infavourof recognising that there are in fact multiple ‘radicalisation processes’ (Hafez &Mullins,2015).Acknowledgingthismultiplicityofexperiencesandtrajectoriesisfarmore useful in trying to understand why different types of people from differentbackgroundsmaygravitatetowardsthesamegroup, ideologyorcause–or, indeed,why people from similar backgrounds and experiencesmay be drawn to differentideologies and groups for very different reasons. Similarly,we suggest that ideas –bothengagedwithandseparatefromextremistreligioushermeneutics–cananddoplayanimportantrolehere.Thequestionishow.Accordingly,weoperationalisetheconceptofradicalisationthisway:

Radicalisation may connote a variety of multi-level processes – alwayscontextual and situated -- by which people come to adopt an ideologicalframework that advocates for and drives action on the perceived need forfundamental transformational change in their existing socio-cultural andpoliticalorder.

Thisdefinitionof radicalisationencompasses thepossibility that radicalisationmaybe violent or non-violent. Arguing against critics such as Alex Schmid (2014),whoassertsthatradicalisationtoextremepointsofviewinexorablyleadstotheadoptionofviolentextremism,wesuggest that radicalisationprocessesneed tobe separatedoutfromassumptionsabouttheinstrumentalismofviolenceinpursuingaradicalisedagenda.Notallviolenceisideologicalinnature,andnotallideologies,includingthosedefinedas‘radical’,employorsupportviolence(Berger2018).

2. ThreeschoolsofconceptualisingradicalisationWithin the literature on radicalisation reviewed abovewe have sketched out threeschoolsofradicalisationtheorythatweelaborateonbelow:

1. theideologicalschool,whichcaneitherincludeordismiss‘religion’asamodeofideology

2. thesocialexperienceschool3. theintersectionalschool

In critiquing these, we conclude that we see the third school as most productive,although it requires further nuance. Nevertheless, it is by far the most


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comprehensively useful in explaining radicalisation as a complex, multi-level andmulti-systemic process across a range of individual, social, political and culturaldynamicsandenvironments.

2.1Thefirstschool:RadicalisationasideologyThe first school insists that ideology, as part of a broader process of cognitive andideationaldevelopment, is themostcrucial factor inunderstandingwhy individualsmayberadicalised.SchoolOnethendividesintotwosub-groups:Group 1: where religious ideas are held as the inspiration for or equivalent of theideologyinquestionGroup2:wherenon-religiousideas,suchasnationalismorsupremacism,areheldastheinspirationoftheideologyinquestion

2.1.1.SchoolOne,Group1:IdeologyasreligiousideasWhenwediscussGroup1inthefirstschool,wecanseethattherearethosewhomayeitherseektoholdspecificreligionsresponsible forradicalisation(for instance, theinfamousHuntingtonhypothesiswithregardstoIslam);orseektoholdaparticularinterpretation ormethodology of religion responsible for enabling and sanctioningradicalisation(usuallyreferredtoasSalafismorWahhabismwhenitcomestoIslam,though there are often problems with how these labels are used) (e.g. Silber andBhatt, 2007; Gartenstein-Ross and L. Grossman, 2009) although this view has alsoattracted significant critique (Klausen, 2008; Aly & Striegher, 2012). There are, ofcourse,otherexamplesfromotherreligiousgroups,suchasJewishextremismintheinfamousBaruchGoldsteinmassacre inHebron in 1994, or Christian extremism intheLord’sRepublicanArmyinUganda.

IslamandradicalisationWedonotseekinthispapertoproblematisetheassumedrelationshipbetweenIslamand radicalisation to violence to the exclusion of other ideas or trends that arediscussed in relations to extremism. Nevertheless, Islam has come in foroverwhelming–onemightsaydisproportionate–attentioninrelationtodiscussingradicalisation, extremism and terrorism, and we feel the need for a number ofcorrectivestobedeployedaswemoveforwardinourdiscussion.The accusation that Islam as a religious belief-system is inherently responsible forradicalisationisnonsensical;ifthatweretrue,thenwewouldfindthattherewerefarmore people in a faith group that accounts for almost 2 billion people engaged inradicalisationprocessesofdifferentkinds.Moreover, categoriessuchas ‘Salafist’or‘Wahhabist’arenotthemselvesunitarycategories,butneverthelesscontinuouslygetsmoothed out in the process of attributing causality to religion in drivingradicalisationtoviolence.

Islam,writlarge,isalsooftenblamedforbeinglessamenabletoculturalcreation,tomirror Lucien Goldmann’s (1976)meaning of the phrase, and thus impinges upon


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social cohesion. This goes against the established historical work of academics inIslamic studies, and contemporary authors such as Umar. F. Abd-Allah Lynngraf(2004). As far as these scholars are concerned, the historical Islamic tradition isrepletewith examples of cultural creativity, via an Islamic idiom,maintaining thatwhichwas fruitful in indigenous cultures, and causing them to flourish and furtherdevelop.Thus,beforeengagingfurtheronthispoint,itisimportanttodelineatehowwe consider different varieties of Islam to actually figure vis-à-vis themselves, andhowextremismthenstandsinrelationtoIslamasunderstoodbymostMuslimswhenelaboratedusingaIslamicidiom.

ThemostcontemporaryformofattemptinganinternalMuslimcommunityconsensusaround who was or was not a Muslim is the Amman Message of 2005(http://ammanmessage.com/). It is important to note: this declaration, which wassignedontobyacriticalmassofSunniandShi’ischolarsfromaroundtheworld,didnotestablishtruedoctrine.Itonlyestablishedtheminimumcriteriauponwhichonemight be considered ‘Muslim’. It is further important to note the context: thisdeclaration was a response to the anathematising that al-Qa’eda at the time wasengagedin,thatledtoscoresofmassmurdersonsectarianlines.

This ‘Amman Message’ suggests certain typologies, which we can draw upon toconstruct a preliminary typology governed by the categories of ‘mainstream’,‘aberrant’ and ‘heterodox’. We do so because, while not identical to the AmmanMessage,whichfocusesonestablishingwhatisaminimumdefinitionofnormativity,wewouldliketocreateatypologythatismorenuancedthanthealternatives,suchasthe oversimplified binarism of ‘moderate’ versus ‘extreme’. Such a typology hassignificant utility, particularly as our project goes forward, in examining differentreligioustrendsindifferentcountries.Wedonot,however,replicate thistypology–weseeitasastimulantratherthanaprescriptionforourowndiscussion.Wedoacknowledgethatthenotionthat‘extremism’isveryoftenusedtoconnoteanideologicalextensionordistortionofagroup’sbeliefsandvaluesthatconsiderstherest,(ornearlytherest)ofone’sparticulargroupasaberrantorheterodox.Thelatteris precisely what ISIS-style extremism believes with regards to Muslims, which inturn iswhatmakes it ‘extreme’ according to the vastmajority ofMuslim religiousscholars.

‘Mainstream’MuslimsThe first category of Muslims would be considered ‘mainstream’ Muslims, whichwould be sub-divided according to the different confessions of Islam: mainstreamSunnis, mainstream Shi’is, and mainstream Ibadis. Obviously, each of these threegroupingsdeemthemselves tobe ‘normative’or ‘authoritative’, in that theybelieveeachofthemselvestobevalidandcorrect,whiletheothersareseentobefollowinginvalidapproachestoIslam,eveniftheyholdothersbeyondtheirconfessiontostillbeMuslim.The terms ‘normative’ or ‘authoritative’ reflect value judgements that we are notparticularly interested in making because they presume definitive faith-based


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categories, whereas we are concerned with establishing, as far as possible, ananalytical framework that does not necessarily demand such a normative claim.However,historicalstudiesaloneshowthatthemainstreampositionofeachofthesegroups (Sunni, Shi’i, Ibadi) still continues to view the mainstream of these otherstrands tobeMuslim, even ifwrongondifferentdogmaticpoints; andeachacceptsthat historically, these comprise theoverwhelmingbulkofMuslimsworldwide andthroughtime.

‘Aberrant’MuslimsThesecondcategorywouldbe‘aberrant’.Vis-à-vistheSunniMuslimcommunity,forexample, certain types (thoughnot all) of self-described Salafiswould generally beconsidered ‘aberrant’ – that is to say,mainstream Sunniswouldgenerally considerthosekindsofSalafisthatdeclaremainstreamMuslimstonotevenbeMuslimtobethus aberrant (in Islamic discourse,mubtadi’) on crucial points. At the same time,evensuchtypesofaberrantSalafiswouldnormallybeconsideredMuslim.Thattwo-fold assessment is important, because generally, Sunni Muslims are particularlycautiousaboutengagingintakfir(theprocessofanathema),whileatthesametime,they have internal historical systems of establishing what they consider to bereligious normativity. In the past two hundred years, these have been challenged,partlyduetotheriseofdifferentSalafimovements.[ForfurtherreadingontheSalafiexample:differentmovementsthatconsiderthemselvestobe ‘Salafi’wouldfall intomainstreamSunnismorbeconsidered‘aberrant’,orotherwise(Hellyer2019)].

‘Heterodox’MuslimsFinally, the third categorywould be ‘heterodox’. As an example of this, there are anumber of extremist movements the likes of al-Qa’eda and ISIS. Indeed, theforerunnerof thesegroupsweredescribedas ‘heterodox’byMuslimscholars sincetheybeganinthe1700s.Crucially,thatappellationwasappliedpreciselybecausetheintellectualbedrockofthesegroupscondemnedbythevastmajorityofMuslims.Werecognise that thehistorical intellectual trajectoryof any ideational justification forgroupssuchasISISorAl-Qa’edaallbearthehallmarkoftheseheterodoxideas–andassuch,itisimpossibletoignoreaconnection.

Itisalsoimportanttonotethatgenerally,MuslimsandmainstreamMuslimscholarsdonotunanimouslyconsiderheterodoxMuslimstonecessarilyleaveIslamasaresultoftheirheterodoxy.Asnoted,SunniMuslimscholarshipisespeciallycautiousaboutconsideringgroupsasanathema-likegroups,preferringtofocusonindividuals.Atthesame time, historical records bear out that identifying heterodox ideas, groups,atttitudesandpractices,israthercommonplaceinMuslimscholarship.

ThiswouldbedistinctfromgroupsthatmostMuslimswouldconsidertobedeviantduetofundamentaltheologicaldivergences,similartohowthe‘PositiveChristianity’movementpromotedbytheThirdReichintheNazierawasconsideredtobeoutsideofanyrecognisedtraditionsofChristianconfession,evenbroadlydefined.


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There are some exceptions ofMuslim scholarswho do consider the heterodoxy ofgroupslikeISISandal-Qa’edatobesogravethattheyactuallytakethemembersofsuchgroupsoutof Islam. Thisremainsaminorityposition,however,andgenerallyMuslims worldwide regard them as Muslim, even while wrong, and deserving ofmartial correction (military campaigns or criminal proceedings). The fact that thisminority position exists nevertheless indicates the seriousness with whichmainstreamMuslimscholarshipviewsthisextremisttrend.Atthesametime,aswemadeclearatthebeginningofthispaper,itisimportantnottoassumeanimportanceaccordedtosuchideas,withoutactuallyprovingitassuch.Ideasmaybeusedasanexcuseafterthefact;ortheymaybeinstrumentalindrivingindividualstowardsradicalising;andmanyotherscenariosarealsopossible.

2.1.2SchoolOne,Group2:IdeologyaspoliticalideasWithinthefirstschool,asmentionedabove,thereareconsiderationsaroundreligionas the ‘idea’or ‘ideology’ that isatwork–but therearealsoconsiderationsaroundpolitical ideologies thatmay occupy the field of discussion. In this regard, ideologyand ideas become a field in which ‘political motivations’ are described as anenergising factor, rather than specifically or mainly religious ones. These aremacrosymbolic,butmacrosymbolicinawaythatdoesnotuseordrawspecificallyonareligioushermeneutic.Nationalism, anti-imperialism and other ideologies might seek to instrumentalisereligious symbolism and religious vocabulary, of course – as we saw through thedeployment of Crusader themes and motifs in the Christchurch attacker’s 2019written and visual narratives, for example. There are other examples that we candraw upon, including the ‘sovereign citizen’ extremist movement in the US, whichdenies the right of the judiciary or the legislature to decide which laws are to beobeyedinfavouroftheindividualcitizen’srighttodecidewhichtheyshouldignore.Thismovement is often characterised by racist and anti-Semitic tropes that reflectanxieties about and rejection of perceived ‘deep state’ structures run by powerfulminority elites, such as Jews. Various civil conflicts, insurgencies, inter-tribalstruggles and genocides that deploy extremist concepts of in-group identity andpower differentials to justify armed struggle – Tamil Tigers, Northern Ireland,Rwanda,forinstance–wouldalsofallintothiscategory. However,thisismarkedlydifferentthanactuallyengaging inareligioushermeneutic,which isanactual(mis)interpretation of religion. At the same time, it may well be the case that suchextremists were influenced by those who did engage in religious hermeneutics ofsomesort,andthatsuchaninfluencewascrucialtounderstandingthatinfluence.

2.2Thesecondschool:RadicalisationassocialexperienceThesecondschool’sargument iswhatwemightsummariseas thesocialexperienceschool.InSchoolTwo,socio-economicconditionsandothersocialexperiencesaretheprevailing determinants of radicalisation processes. For the purposes of ourargument, those that emphasise socio-economic conditions, in particular the socio-cultural structural issues that affect people’s social relationality, economicdisadvantageandexclusion,areallpartofthe‘socialexperienceschool’.


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Thereissometruthinthisregard,asthereisintheargumentaboutideology,butitisalsooftenproblematic.Alltoooften,thesocio-economicconditionsargumentsignorethepowerof ideas.Analytically, this second school runs the riskofmissing criticalfactorssuchasideologicaldriverswhentheyexist.Apersistentcritiqueofthe‘socialexperience’ school has involved pointing to those who radicalise to violence whocome from well-educated, socio-economically advantaged (or at least notdisadvantaged) backgrounds and who do not register on any of the commonindicatorsregardingstructuralsocialexclusion.Thisdoesnotmeanthattheydonotexperiencethekindofalienationorsenseofgrievancethathasbeensuchapervasivefeatureofradicalisationtoviolentextremism–butithighlightsthatsuchalienationand grievances may not be linked to collective and material forms of structuraldisadvantageinthewaythatthe‘socialexperience’schoolconceptualisesthis.

Moreoften,however,theanalysiswhengoingintothesocio-economicconditionsofcertainindividualslacksdepthandgranularity.Forexample,theworkofRikCoolsaet(2016)inBelgiummakesitclearthatthereareabroadvarietyoffactorsthatapplyincertaingeographieswithinBelgium,whichdonotapplyinothergeographieswithinBelgium as well. All too often, these disparate geographies are merely aggregatedtogether unnecessarily, missing key analytical points. This is important because itfocuses on the importance of granular analysis in how we build our analyticalcategoriesanddistinctions,andthewaysinwhichafocusonsocialconditionsalwaysnecessarilyinvolveconsiderationsof‘place’and‘region’aswellas‘ideas’and‘affect’.Wemight,followingtheworkofscholarssuchasJ.NicholasEntrikin(1991),thinkofthese as ‘geographies of experience’,which explore the tensionsbetweenhumanistunderstandingsof ‘place’as involvingactivesubjectivity in interpretingandmakingmeaningofsociallandscapes,sothatthe‘mutuallyconstitutivequalitiesofspaceandsociety’(Entrikin1996)restoreanunderstandingofhowsocio-structuralconditionsand individual agencyand subjectivity intersectwithin specifically locateddynamicfields of social interaction. The ‘geographies of experience’ frame in the context ofradicalisationallowsfortheorisationsofradicalisedorientations‘frombelow’ratherthan following a more super-structural, ‘grand narrative’ analytical path. It alsoallows for productive comparisons between more locally situated radicalisationprocesses that may nevertheless be animated by meaningful cross-situational ortransnationaldynamicsandfeatures.Drawing on thework done by authors such as Kwame Appiah (2018), or ZareenaGrewal (2013),aswellasCoolsaet (2016),wecanseehow important it is tobreakdown our assumptions about the uniformity of experiences before individualsbecamesubjecttoanykindofprocessthatmayleadthemtoradicalgroups.Someofthe most crucial work breaking down a lot of the lack of nuance in the ‘socialexperienceschool’ isdonebypeoplesuchasSageman(2004,2008,2017),andRoy(2017), discussed above, and Khosrokhavar (2013), whom we consider furtherbelow.


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2.3Thethirdschool:IntersectionalradicalisationSchool Three holds that social experience, such as social and politicaldisenfranchisement,exclusion,discrimination,humiliationandrejectionarealsokeydriversforradicalisationtoviolencebutrequirealignmentwithideologicalframesfortheir dynamism and force in relation to both ideation and action (Khosrokhavar2013).Khosrokhavar (2017) argues that extremist ideology is nurtured by alienating anddehumanising social experience, notably the dysfunctionality of social institutionsandlackofaccesstosocialresourcessuchaseducation,employmentandthesocialdignity these confer, particularly inWestern varieties of violent extremism. But healso focuses on the relevance of ideology’s seductions in providing perceivedantidotes to these experiences, especially the way in which ideological framesimaginatively redistribute and reorganise the power relations of those whoexperience abjection intomore satisfying future-oriented narratives of destiny andtriumph.Wesawprecisely thesedevelopmentsoccur in themarketingstrategiesofIslamicState,which–unlikeAlQa’eda–explicitlyaddressedboththesocialandtheideological in how it structured both the narrative and material dimensions of itsefforttoestablishitsnotionofacontemporarycaliphate.AsKhosrokhavar’sworksuggests, the individualexperienceof socialalienationcanproduce conditions in which humiliation, frustration and grievance prevail – allheavily affective aswell as cognitive regimes of experience. This implies that bothpush andpull factors are linked to social relations that straddleemotionaswell ascognition/ideation (Tahiri and M. Grossman, 2013; M. Grossman et al. 2016), inrelation to experiences of exclusion and ostracism (Knapton 2014), the ‘power oflove’andbonding(Borum2012),thepropulsiveenergiesofhate(Sternberg2003)oreven the disengagement from or reduction in morally-attuned states of feelingaltogether (Bandura 2004) But emotions in and of themselves require forms ofideological structuration to transform them into concrete platforms for action andsocial change,whether or not they are basedonor conceptualisedwithin religiousframeworks (which themselves frequently draw on affective as well as cognitiveenergiesofexperience).

School Three is expansive enough to recognise that while there are multipleexplanationsandpathwaysforradicalisationprocessesaspartofabroadercohesiverubric, their specific application will often differ depending on context andcircumstances.Thethirdschool, then, isonethatadmitstheutilityoftheothertwoschools, but which recognises that different cases might be better explained viadifferent schools. Another way of describing this may be what Tahiri and M.Grossman (2015) refer to as the ‘convergence paradigm’ of understandingradicalisationtoviolence,whichprivilegestheintersectionalandmultilevelnatureofradicalisationprocessesacrossideology,affect,socialstructure,socialexperienceandpolitical context. Borum (2012) offers a succinct and helpful summary of thisapproach:


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Many pathways into and through radicalization exist, and each pathway isitselfaffectedbyavarietyoffactors.Withinthis"developmental"or"pathway"approach,radicalizationisviewednotas"theproductofasingledecisionbutthe end result of a dialectical process that gradually pushes an individualtowardacommitmenttoviolenceovertime.(2012:15)

This third school genuinely recognises that there is no absolutism in relation toradicalisation processes,whether or not religion plays a role in their formation ordevelopment. Sometimes, ideology –inspired and legitimated by religious ideas,political ideas or a combination of these – provides the overriding impetus forradicalisationtoviolence.Inothercases,thepushtowardradicalisedviolencereflectsthe convergence of socially-derived grievances and motivations with ideologicalframes.Instillothers,ideologicalframesconstitutethepost-hocrationaleforarangeof individualandsocialmotivators.Suchsocialmotivationsmayarisefromstronglyheldandexperiencedemotions,whetherornottheyhaveempiricalauthority,arounddignity, humiliation, frustration, shame or pride, for example, and find their outletandstructurewithinideologicalframeworks(Khosrokavar2013,2017).Togiveanexample:theChristchurchmassacreinMarch2019.Thisdeeplycomplexeventmakes sense only if one enters into an ideological analysis of contemporarysocial conditions which then drives the violent action of white supremacism andfascism.Yetthereislittleutilityindiscussingreligionasanideologicalmotivatorfortheattacker in thisregard–except in termsof theway inwhichthereligionof theChristchurch victims themselves is used to construct an ideologically based target.Nor would social experience make sense as an analytical frame, withoutunderstanding how this intersects in specific ways with the ideology of whitesupremacisminunderstandingthismassacre.ThisisanexampleofwhatRoy(2017)meanswhenhe identifies radicalisation– in the senseof adeepneedordesire forchange, transformation and redress of grievances – coming first and then finding asuitableideationalframe,whichhereisideologicalratherthantheological.Thethirdschoolthusprovidesahelpfulanalyticalframeinthisinstancepreciselybecauseofitsinsistenceonintersectionalityandavoidanceofabsolutism.

As such, the third school is good at identifying the contextual circumstances anddrivers, and of showing that they are not especially peculiarly Islamic or evenreligious,wherethatisthecase.However,itisalsoabletoaddressthelimitationsofthe first and second schools in explaining the role of ideas – such as Islam,nationalism, communism or even hyper-masculinity (Roose, 2016) – withinradicalisation.The third school may help us explain, for instance, the demand for the role thatheterodox forms of Islamism are playing, but also why heterodox Islamism (asopposed to something else) is supplying that role. For example, Khosrokhavar hasrecently argued (2017) that radicalisation processes in Muslim-majority countriesproceed from different bases than those in the West. He suggests that in thesecountries, radicalisation is mobilised not by socially disadvantaged denizens inWesterncountriesthatstructurallymarginaliseMuslims,butbylargelymiddle-class,well-educated youth who feel alienated by what they see as corrupt(ed) Muslim


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political regimes andwho turn to heterodox forms of Islamism in order to cleanseandre-setataintedpoliticalandsocialorder.Here,thethirdschooldemonstratesitsrelevanceinsistingbyabjuringaonesizefitsallapproach,becauseKhosrovar’sexplanationmayapplytocertainindividualswhohavebeenradicalisedinsomecontexts,butnotothers.Hisexplanationdoesnot,forexample, explain why particular social classes in the Indian subcontinent arevulnerable to radicalisation processes thatmay quite different towhat he outlinesabove, for instancecertainextremist ideologies taughtataminorityofmadrasas inPakistanandAfghanistanwithwhichthemiddleclasseshavelittletonocontact.

If the role of ideology or religion is contestable within theories of radicalisationtrajectories, what then accounts for its persistence as an explanatory framework(Appleby, 2000; Schmid, 2014; Dawson 2018)? One answer to thismay lie in theearlieranalysisofferedbyKundnani:thatequatingradicalisationwithIslamisitselfanideologicalposition:onethatseeks,innon-Muslimmajoritynations,toexternalisethe threat of violent extremism and to instrumentalise radicalisation as aphenomenonconnoting ‘civilisationalclash’ratherthanoneproducedbyreluctanceto redress or remediate social and political inequalities, or by resistance tomulticulturalisminrelationtonationalidentity.

However, it is also important to acknowledge that such agendas are not deployedonlybypoliticalorsocialdiscoursesbenton(re)shapingnarrativesaboutthe‘other’– they can also be used by terrorists and propagandists themselves as a formofcamouflageor superficial justification for violent radicalisation, when in fact themotivesarebothmoreprofaneandmorebanalthanthiswouldsuggest(Roy,2010,2017). Inotherwords,thesamestrategiesoflinkingreligionandradicalisationcanserve multiple, even competing socio-political purposes, and analysis mustscrupulouslypicktheseapartandanalysethem.Especially relevant here is the importance of critiquing the difference betweenthestrategicmobilisationofreligion(byviolentextremistpropagandistsandleaders)as an attributed or explanatory pathway to/driver for radicalisation, andthefelt/experiencedmobilisation of radically altered religious states ofconsciousness/affect (byviolently radicalisedadherents andaspirants (Whitehouse2014; McDonald 2014, 2018). This leads to the question of whether a sufficientdistinctionisdrawnbetweenwhatmightbetermed‘authentic’orfeltexperiencesofreligiously inspired radicalisation, versus theirmore instrumentalmanipulation bytheleadershipcadreofanextremistmovement,sothatworldlypoliticalaspirationsaredressedup in theclothesof sacredobligation inorder tomotivateandmanagetheactionsoffollowers.

3. ReligionandextremismIn examining the conceptual relationship between religion and radicalisation, wemust also turn to the treatment of varieties of religious extremisms themselves.Religious extremisms per se historically run across virtually every major world


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religion,notjustIslam.Moreover,theirideationalorideologicalgroundingfrequentlyeither accords or does different things with religious contexts and debates thancontemporaryanalysesofIslamistextremismwouldsuggest,asDouglasPrattshowsin his comparative discussion of Islamic and Christian religious extremisms (Pratt,2010).

3.1Religiousextremismandliberalism

Religiousextremismsareoftentakentobeantithetical toparticular typesof liberalsocieties. However, religious extremisms are often tolerated precisely as part ofliberalism’s embrace of cultural pluralism and rights discourse – a positionconsistentlycritiquedbysocialconservativesasdevolving intodestructive formsofculturalrelativism(see,forexample,Trigg2011;Huntington1993).Thiscanchangewhenreligiousextremismsor‘fundamentalisms’becomecastasthreatsbecausetheyare linked to the riskorpresenceof injuriesorharms tomainstreamornormativesocial orders. In other words, liberal tolerance of religious pluralism is embracedunless certain religious beliefs, attitudes or practices are perceived as or becomeinjurioustotherightsandfreedomsofothers.Itispreciselywhenthislineiscrossedthatthetransitionfromunderstandingreligiousadherenceas‘benign’toseeingitas‘malignant’occurs,becauseitthreatenstobreakitsboundariesbychallengingliberalpluralismitself.This in turn reflects the tendency to produce illiberal responses to religious faithitself,whichisthencastasthesourceofextremistbehaviours(Barkun2003),ratherthan focusing on the convergence of multilevel factors that underwrite the actualthreats posed by the mobilisation to violence of religious extremist discourse.Religiousexceptionalism–theideathatliberalpluralistsocietiesshouldmakeroomfor exceptions to various legal or social normson thebasis of religious freedomofexpression–beginstofray.Atitsmostextreme,thisperceptionofthreatcanexpandfromobjectionstoreligiousextremismspersetoaformofradicalsecularismwhichobjects to religion itself as a counterpoint to Enlightenment-based democracy andrights-basedpluralism.Weseethisinthecaseofmoreaggressivestate-basedformulationsofsecularismincountries such as France, for example, in which any form of visible and publicreligious identity assertion is equated with social and political risk to nationalidentity, and which has developed and implemented especially harsh legislativemeasures against patently non-threatening Islamic practices; an examplewould bethebanonburkinisforMuslimwomenonpublicFrenchbeachesinthenameof‘anti-terrorism’(Quinn2016).

4. Conclusion: Re-assessing the relationship betweenreligion,radicalisationandviolence

Following the drive to complicate or dismiss the centrality of religion to violentradicalisation, some critics of religious studies havemore recently argued that weneed to re-engage with the idea that ‘religiosity’ plays a significant role in


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radicalisation to violent extremism. This argument has been advanced by Dawson(2018)inwaysthatreflectamorenuancedperspectiveonthefirstschoolwediscussabove.WeagreewithDawson’sargumentthata‘both/and’approachismorerealisticand helpful rather than an either/or’ choice in terms of selecting an analyticalframework.Dawson’stypologyforbreakingdownthesepossibleinterpretivemodelsis quite useful. As he suggests, models of the relationship between religion andradicalisationtoviolentextremismcanbebrokendownasfollows:

(1)religionandIslamaretoblame;(2)religionisnottoblame,butIslamisculpable;(3)religionistoblame,butnotIslamperse;(4)religionisnottoblame,andneitherisIslam.

Thiscoversmuchofthegroundwehavecanvassedaboveinengagingwithsomeofthe key literature in this area. However, a limitation of using this typology is thatwhen it does mention ideas, it really only specifies religious ideas. And when itmentionsreligion,itreallyonlyspecifiesIslam.Dawsonisclearlynotattemptingtobereductionisthere.Nevertheless,histypologyisneverthelesslimitedbytheempiricaldatathatheislookingat,whichhappenstoberelatedtoIslam.Thistypologyneedsto be expanded comparatively across other religious contexts for its efficacy to beconfirmed.Wedonotthinkitis‘religiosity’persethatistheproblem,sincethiswouldindicatethat religious practice of any kindmust be at play in explaining the radicalisationprocess.Butwhenweconsiderthat,whereitispresent,thereligiosityofextremistsisnecessarily linked to heterodox forms of religion – as we explain above – it isimportant to be critically specific aboutwhat kindof ‘heterodox religiosity’ plays arole in radicalisation when it does feature. Religiosity connected to heterodoxynecessarily takes on the hue of that kind of contested interpretive approach toreligion – in other words, the intensification of religious practice in reference toheterodoxreligious ideas is indeliblyconnectedto those ideas.Assuch, thiskindofreligious practice cannot be simply assumed to be as historically normative ormainstreamasnon-heterodoxformations.Toclaimthatsuchheterodoxreligiosityisjustasnormativeormainstreamasorthodoxreligiositywouldbehighlyproblematic.Accordingly, ifweadapt this typology toourown framework, itmightproduce thefollowing:1. Ideas – which may be religious, political or both – are core drivers of

radicalisationtoviolentextremism,andthereligionand/orpoliticalideologythat frames them is to blame. As an example: if extremists are Muslimsclaiming tobeenergisedby Islam, thenthis interpretativemodelwould takethis at face value and claim Islam is to blame, which we have alreadydiscounted above, and the same would hold true for ideas about racialhierarchiesasanideaincontextsofculturalsupremacismasanideology.

2. Religion or political ideology in general is not culpable per se, but specificreligiousand/orpolitical ideasare, includingheterodoxformsofreligiousor


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political interpretation.So,deeplycommittedsecularistswouldblame Islam-as-religionspecifically,asin(1),butnotreligiousideasingeneral.Evenwhenlookingatwhitesupremacism,forinstance,onecanfindanormativeformofideologythatmightlinkdistantlytothisbutisnotnecessarilyitselfextremist,suchascentre-rightwingconservatism.

3. Someheterodoxreligiousorpolitical ideasaretoblame,butnotmainstreamreligion or political ideas in general, especially in contexts where religiousideasandextremistideasareinseparable.

4. Religious and/or political ideas may not be always causative but they arealways at least enabling. In other words, ideas are used to house,contextualise and legitimate beliefs and actions that originate in othermotivations, such as psycho-social, economic or socio-structural drivers andexperiencesthatthenfindanorganisingprincipleforbeliefandactionthroughpost-hocideologicalframing.

5. Forideas–religious,politicalorotherwise–tobesalientincontextsofviolentradicalisation they must become articulated within violent extremistframeworks by demonstrating: clear exclusivism in relation to in-group andout-group identity; the desire to dominate out-groups in ways that areinseparablefrombehavingharmfullytowardthosegroupsthroughconsistentprocesses of negative ‘othering’; and either non-conditional or situationalcommitment to physical violence toward out-groups in order to achieve in-groupgoals.

While this typology requires further analysis and ‘thinking against’, we favour thisapproach for its capacity to work with multiple rather than singular analyticalframeworksthatarecontext-dependentandoftenintersectional.Differentcasesmaybring up different analytical results, and our conceptual framework ismeant to beflexible enough to capture those different scenarios and test them against theseemerging hypotheses around the relationship between radicalisation, religion,ideologyandviolence.The argument in this concept paper is thus focused on analysing and elaboratinguponthecomplexitiesofhowreligion,ideologyandextremismmay(ordo)interactdiscursively – at cognitive, affective social, political, governance and policy levels –rather thana simplisticbinarydiscussionof ‘whetherornot’ religion, ideologyandradicalisation concern each other. As such,we ourselves land on an anti-absolutistanalysis that emphasises context, confluence and convergence, and problematisessuperficial or homogenous assumptions about causality. We also assert theimportanceofideasandideologyasawayofthinkingthroughwhatnotonlypoliticalbutalso ‘religiously’-inspiredorattributedviolent radicalisationmayactuallymeanin various contexts. It is both theoretically and empirically unsound to blame anyspecific ‘religion’ or religious faith systems in general for radicalisation to violence.However, it is equally unsound to ignore the ideational and ideological meaningsassignedtoreligiously inspiredor justifiedviolencewhenviolentactorsthemselvesattributetheirintentandactiontosuchmeaningsandbeliefs.


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Following on from this, several questions arise in relation to how the relationshipbetween violent radicalisation and the governance of religion plays out in specificcountries and contexts. These questions include (but are not limited to) thefollowing:

1. Do governance of religion arrangements which are not respectful ofdiversitymorelikelytoproduceradicalisationandviolentextremism?Inthisregard, France is one example that begs further investigation, as indicatedabove,butotherexamplescouldberaisedaswell.

2. Does the presence of a certain scale of radicalisation and violent extremism

make it very difficult to sustain governance of religion arrangementswhicharenotrespectfulofdiversity?IsthataquestionwhichexplainsmorewithinEurope,orperhapshasmoreutilityinAsiaandAfrica?Thesearequestionstoexplorefurther.

3. Howsignificantare theabove factors in theproductionof radicalisationandviolentextremism(relativetootherfactors,suchasforeignpolicyorelectoralcompetition)?

TheseareallquestionsthattheGREASEprojectwillseektoaddressbothanalyticallyandempiricallygoingforward,keepinginmindthatsuchquestionsareunlikelytobeaddressed with any universal explanatory framework. The concepts and analysisoutlinedhereareintendedtoserveasacontributiontothatendeavour.

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a framework for understanding the relationship between

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