a force for and because of multilateralism:...

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A force for and because ofmultilateralism: when is the EUa multilateralist actor in worldsociety?Oriol CostaPublished online: 28 Jan 2013.

To cite this article: Oriol Costa (2013) A force for and because of multilateralism: whenis the EU a multilateralist actor in world society?, Journal of European Public Policy, 20:8,1213-1228, DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2012.760322

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A force for and because ofmultilateralism: when is the EU amultilateralist actor in world society?Oriol Costa

ABSTRACT The European Union (EU) presents a Janus-faced profile concerningmultilateralism. While in some areas it embraces multilateral institutions to a greaterdegree than other major players, in others it displays a less than unconditionalsupport. Both patterns have been accounted for, but no account has explainedwhy the EU shifts from one to the other. This article advances a reason for this bifur-cated international identity. The EU is embedded in a world society that is culturallyand normatively dense with regard to the standard of what qualifies as an actor. Inthe areas in which its actorness is further away from such a standard, the EU isimpelled to take remedial action and embrace other components of the model ofinternational actorness, like multilateral institutions and multilaterally developednorms. In order to test this hypothesis, the article examines the role of the EU vis-a-vis negotiations on anti-personnel landmines and hormone-treated beef.

KEY WORDS Actorness; anti-personnel landmines; EU foreign policy; hormone-treated beef; multilateralism; world society.

The European Union (EU) provides a neat presentation of itself as a globalplayer. In an age of enhanced interdependency, the argument goes, the EU ismultilateral internally and multilateralist internationally. The European Secur-ity Strategy (2003)1 is very explicit about the choice for multilateralism as thebasic tenet of the EU’s foreign policy. Moreover, this preference is notframed in strategic, interest-based terms, but in normative ones (Smith 2011:149). In spite of the word ‘effective’ in ‘effective multilateralism’, ‘whatcomes out from the analysis of all EU statements and documents is a strongbelief in the value of multilateralism per se’ (Blavoukos and Bourantonis2011: 7). However, what ‘effective’ does tell us is that the EU perceives itselfas supporting multilateralism as a formal institutional arrangement (as com-posed of specific multilateral institutions) and not only as a generic institutionalform (the institution of multilateralism) (Ruggie 1992: 567).

Scholars have explained this orientation in favour of multilateral institutionsin various ways. The literature that focuses on concepts such as normativepower Europe (Manners 2002), gentle power (Merlini 2001) and othersshare the view that ‘the EU is internationally different’ because of its ‘initial

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Vol. 20, No. 8, 1213–1228, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2012.760322

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telos (peace through integration), its historical developments and its currentinstitutional and normative framework’ (Lucarelli and Fioramonti 2010: 3).Others have favoured a power-based explanation, according to which theEU’s weakness vis-a-vis the United States (US) forces the Union to look fora shelter in multilateral institutions (Kagan 2002). Finally, still anotherapproach has focused on ideational factors. Jørgensen has argued that ‘inEurope, the UN [United Nations] is part of a discursive structure . . . connot-ing something positive’, and ‘international law and treaties are regarded as con-stitutive elements of international society’ (Jørgensen 2006: 11; Lucarelli andManners 2005). Nevertheless, the idea that the EU systematically holds a mul-tilateralist stance has been strongly contested. To begin with, some authorshave identified instances in which the EU seems less than eager to play bythe multilaterally agreed rules (Young 2011: 124). Also, the perceptions ofexternal actors raise doubts about the allegedly multilateralist stance of theEU, at least in some fields of international relations (Olivier and Fioramonti2010: 117).

In other words, the EU presents a Janus-faced profile. On one hand, there areareas in which the EU does embrace specific multilateral institutions to a degreewidely perceived to be greater than that of other major players (Elsig et al. 2011)and to go beyond a generic commitment to (the institution of) multilateralism.On these occasions the EU overcomes relevant conflicts of interest and shows aseemingly principled endorsement of multilateral institutions. On otheroccasions the EU seems to act just as any other actor, namely displaying aless than unconditional support for multilateral institutions (which, of course,does not imply a consistently reluctant or oppositional attitude). Both patternshave been accounted for, but no account has been yet suggested to explain whythe EU shifts from one to the other. To be sure, the EU will be more prone touphold multilateral institutions when it is better able to upload its preferencesand thus have them embodied by the multilateral institution in the first place.However, the bifurcated international identity of the EU cannot be accountedfor by solely making reference to the heterogeneous ability of the EU to act as arule-maker internationally. This article advances another, more fundamentalexplanation, and does so by tapping into the literature on world society pio-neered by John W. Meyer (2009).

According to this literature, the emergence of a densely knitted cultural andnormative world society accounts for the fact that states with ‘enormous differ-ences’ in terms of resources, traditions and needs have developed strikinglysimilar strategies and structures to deal with similar problems (Meyer et al.1997: 145). The article sustains that this argument goes some way towardexplaining the inclination of the EU to blend into the (normative and multilat-eral) environment. More to the point, it tests the hypothesis that the EU is moreprone to endorse multilateral institutions when it has an unclear, fuzzy inter-national actorness2 (Bretherton and Vogler 2006) – namely, when the limitsof the competences of EU institutions vis-a-vis those of single member statesare unclear and open to redefinition.

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The text proceeds as follows. The next section presents the main argumentsput forward in the literature on world society and explores their implicationsfor the EU as a global actor. After this, the following section spells out the pro-cesses by which the pressure for isomorphism impels the EU to endorse multi-lateral institutions under conditions of fuzzy actorness. The article then examinestwo cases: multilateral negotiations and institutions regarding anti-personnellandmines (APLs) and multilaterally agreed rules on hormone-treated beefunder the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization(GATT/WTO). The former case is one in which EU actorness was fuzzy to thepoint of being both openly disputed by several member states and constructedduring the negotiation process. The second case pertains to the field of trade,traditionally an area of relatively high EU integration and well-established actor-ness, and therefore an area in which the EU can be expected to be freer to dis-tance itself from multilaterally agreed rules. At the same time, the fact that tradeis an area in which the EU has been a highly influential rule-maker means thatwe should expect instances of EU reluctance vis-a-vis WTO rules to be bothexceptional and revealing. The final section draws some conclusions. Caseshave been selected for the limited purpose of showing the plausibility and fruit-fulness of the argument, but not to exhaustively test its scope conditions. Thetwo issue areas do not suffer from an ‘embarrassment’ of multilateral insti-tutions, and thus can shed little light upon the ways in which the latter canbe strategically used by EU-internal actors. Nor are the cases intended to testthe effects of the salience of multilateral institutions on the readiness of theEU to endorse them (Cortell and Davis 1996: 456), or the effects of differentdecision-making procedures on the validity of the argument put forward inthis text.

THE EU IN AN ISOMORPHIC WORLD SOCIETY

Worldwide models ‘define and legitimate’ agendas and behaviours in virtuallyall the domains of social life, including international politics (Meyer et al.1997: 145). There is a culturally encoded modern script of actorness fromwhich actors need to read in order (to be perceived by other actors) to be so(Jupille and Jolliff 2011: 16). That’s why ‘across radically different circum-stances . . . actors, purposes, action and organization are understood and struc-tured in identical ways’ (Jupille and Jolliff 2011: 3; DiMaggio and Powell 1983:152).

The pressure for isomorphism (i.e., for actors to adopt a set of similar or iden-tical features) affects the EU in a rather particular way. The EU is a sui generisinternational actor. Being an organization that combines supra- and intra-gov-ernmental features, the EU ‘can never look like an isomorphic Westphalianstate’. There is consequently a mismatch between the EU and the ‘standardsof actorhood instantiated by the world society’ (Jupille and Jolliff 2011: 10).This is not without costs for the EU. Failure to comply with the modernscript of sovereignty ‘calls into question an actor’s legitimacy and very identity’

O. Costa: When is the EU a multilateralist actor in world society? 1215

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(Jupille and Jolliff 2011: 10). Therefore, under conditions of fuzzy actorness, theEU will strive to establish itself as a clear cut actor, given that the ‘first “interest”or problem of the modern actor is not to accomplish prior goals of some sort,but to be an actor’ (Meyer 2009: 160). Remedial efforts will be put into place inorder to look for world-societal legitimization. The first step will be of course tospeak with one voice.

The character of the EU as an international actor is far from constant acrossthe board. Perhaps more importantly, actorness is not a binary variable thatcan either exist or not. Therefore, the mismatch between the EU andworld-societal models can be expected to be less acute in issue areas inwhich the EU has long been a well-established unit, like trade policy. In con-trast, it can be expected to be greater in issue areas in which the EU has onlypartially emerged as an international actor. The larger the mismatch betweenthe EU and the standards of actorness, the greater the remedial efforts can beexpected to be. As argued by Jupille and Jolliff, ‘the more problematic anactor’s identity, the more readily it should embrace the institutional formsprevailing in the script of modernity’ (Jupille and Jolliff 2011: 16; Meyer2009: 347).

One way to adjust to ‘meanings, norms of good behaviour, the nature ofsocial actors, and categories of legitimate social action in the world’ (Barnettand Finnemore 2004: 7) is to endorse multilateral institutions and theirnorms (both explicit and implicit). Multilateral institutions act as ‘prime carriersof world society as they themselves can be seen as the embodiment of its culturalcore’ (Drori and Krucken 2009: 15). In addition, the international sphere is alsoinfluenced by ‘the great enhancement of the centrality of disinterested’ bodies,which are ‘granted substantial authority and prominence’, and multilateral insti-tutions are often perceived precisely in that way (Meyer 2009: 127). Therefore,we should expect the EU to be particularly willing to uphold multilateral insti-tutions when its actorness is not well established. Under these circumstances,remedial efforts might lead the EU to acquire an international role at theprice, as it were, of accepting and supporting the relevant international normsin place in spite of conflicting preferences.

Obviously, the pressure of the actorness script (including international norms)upon units does not float freely. Domestic norm entrepreneurs need to push forthe kind of changes that can bring isomorphism about. At the same time, thepresence of international norms can foster the very processes by which theybecome endorsed by states or the EU. If an international player ‘neglects toadopt world-approved policies, domestic elements will try to carry out orenforce conformity’, to begin with because the roles that the EU and otheractors take on internationally create identities to which resources are allocated,thus attracting groups eager to claim the slot (Meyer et al. 1997: 160–1). Thisarticle makes the point that the fuzzier the actorness of the EU, the easier it willbe for multilateralist norm entrepreneurs to shape the decision-making pro-cesses within it, i.e., for multilateral institutions to have a stronger influenceon the EU.


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SPELLING OUT THE MECHANISMS AND CONDITIONS FORISOMORPHISM IN THE EU

International processes that trigger or reinforce internal forces have beenaddressed in the literature from a number of perspectives. Gourevitch was thefirst to use the term second image reversed to refer to these outside-in processes(Gourevitch 1978), and an institutional revision of such an approach has lookedat the influence of international institutions and norms on domestic settings(Cortell and Davis 1996; Dai 2005), including from constructivist approaches(Finnemore 1996). By tapping into these contributions, this article tries toprovide room for agency and causation within the scheme presented above.To be sure, this includes strategic behaviour by norm entrepreneurs, as ‘pro-cesses of social construction and strategic bargaining are deeply intertwined’(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 911).

Two steps need to be taken for a multilaterally developed norm (i.e., a piece ofthe script of international actorness) to influence the EU. First, an EU-internalnorm entrepreneur needs to endorse it. This is no trivial step, but the EU ‘pro-vides an unusual abundance of access points to the policy-making process forinterested actors’ (Jonsson et al. 1998: 328). The second step consists inputting together a coalition that is able to push for the international normthrough the EU policy-making process and eventually have it adopted. Andwhile the EU provides a multitude of access points, it is also a chain of insti-tutions that can act as veto points. Therefore, the adoption by the EU of aninternational norm depends basically on overcoming this second hurdle.3

This is all the more likely when multilaterally developed norms exist prior tothe EU having a position about the issue at hand. New issue areas might createthe conditions under which the boundaries of the actorness of the EU are morereadily shifted. To begin with, the endorsement of such norms can foster theexpansion of the sphere of action of the EU (or specific EU institutions)towards a new issue area. Given that the range of policies within the purviewof the EU is not clearly defined, an entrepreneur ‘may be able to expand therange of issues under consideration and with it expand the scope of Communityaction’ (Peters 1994: 20). This comes in handy when norm entrepreneurs try toget pro-integration actors to join the coalition for the endorsement of an inter-national norm. In addition, issues that are dealt with by the EU for the first timebecause they are embodied in a multilateral institution are less likely to presentwell-articulated preferences and preconceived views, making it easier for actorsto redefine their position and adopt external norms. In contrast, if internationalnegotiations start once the EU has a clear position on the issue at hand, the frag-mented character of the EU as a political system combines with less malleablestances and make the EU less prone to take an attitude in tune with the multi-lateral institution.

Critically, multilateral institutions themselves can make it easier for intra-EUnorm entrepreneurs to put together a winning coalition. They can alter the‘domestic balance’ (Dai 2005: 388) in favour of those that push the EU


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towards higher levels of conformity with a particular international norm. Thiscan take various forms. Multilateral institutions can change the behaviour ofactors participating in intra-EU decision-making processes by altering theircost–benefit calculations. For instance, the existence of multilateral negotiationscan make the case for a common EU stance more appealing. Multilateral insti-tutions can also change actors’ underlying preferences (Barnett and Finnemore2004). To take place, both social influence, rhetorical action (Schimmelfennig2001: 63) and persuasion (Risse 2000: 19) must work on actors that are at leastweakly socialized and share a common notion of what qualifies as an interna-tionally legitimate behaviour. Finally, multilateral institutions can influencethe distribution of power between domestic actors and constrain or facilitatethe expression of certain interests or ideas (Dai 2005: 366). To be sure, allthese processes can take place at once. The following situation can be seen asparadigmatic. Multilateral negotiations can create the demand for an EUcommon position; and then, if enough normative pressure can be mobilizedby norm entrepreneurs, they can also facilitate its supply by providing anobvious reference for debates in the EU. In their turn, the Commission andthe European Parliament (EP) can see this state of affairs as an opportunityto push for internationally legitimized, EU-wide policies.

To summarize, under conditions of fuzzy actorness, pressure for isomorphismtends to empower norm entrepreneurs that support multilateral institutions. Toput it differently, efforts directed at bridging the gap between reality and world-societal standards of actorness can lead the EU to take on board multilaterallydeveloped norms as a way to acquire a common stance. This is more likelywhen the issue dealt with by the multilateral institution has not yet beenaddressed by the EU.

DEGREES OF FUZZINES

Anti-personnel landmines

At the beginning of the 1990s, an informal norm began to emerge stigmatizinganti-personnel landmines (APLs), as a result of the activity of civil society, theextension of the ‘moral opprobrium from other delegitimized practices ofwarfare’ to APLs, and the gravitas conferred upon the issue by some stateswith their endorsement of the campaign against APLs (Price 1998: 628).

It was the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), created in1992, which first acted as norm entrepreneur and got the ball rolling, while pie-cemeal state-level measures reinforced its advocacy campaign. In that same yearthe US adopted a one-year moratorium on the export of APLs, which wouldfinally be made permanent (Peters 1999: 14). This decision was ‘used bymembers of the campaign to challenge others’ (Price 1998: 620). In 1993, Fran-cois Mitterrand announced that France ‘was making official its “voluntaryabstention” from the export of APL’. Belgium adopted the first ban on theuse, production, trade and stockpiling of APLs in March 1995 (Williams and


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Goose 1998: 26–7). These moves helped to make APLs a matter of inter-national image and legitimized the ICBL claims. The ICBL also used the1995 Review Conference of the 1983 Convention on Certain ConventionalWeapons (CCW) to push for the adoption of a comprehensive ban on APLs.Although the CCW Protocol II on mines, booby traps and other devices, asamended on May 1996, fell short of prohibiting these weapons (Price 1998:618), the campaign seized the opportunity to put ‘tremendous pressure on gov-ernments wary of “bad press”’ (Williams and Goose 1998: 26–2). The fact thatthe exports of APLs ceased in 1995 shows that the norm kept on gaining groundduring the first half of the 1990s.

For all the talk about EU foreign policy on APLs being an example of Euro-pean resistance to US unilateralism and a ‘true success story’,4 the EU wasunable to put together much of a common stance up until 1996. Whilesmaller countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, Ireland, Sweden) supported aban on APLs and joined the coalition of norm entrepreneurs, France wasambivalent and neither Italy nor the United Kingdom (UK) had any interestin such a move, the latter disputing also that the EU as such should beengaged at all (Price 1998: 625). To be sure, the EP raised the issue in 1992and again in 1995,5 and a Joint Action in September 1995 (95/170/ CFSP)called for the preparation of the Review Conference of the CCW. However,that Joint Action fell short of the de facto ban on exports that was alreadyinto place.

The failure of the CCW to deliver a satisfactory response to the demands ofnorm entrepreneurs (the ICBL and pro-ban states) encouraged the removal ofthe issue from what was perceived as a ‘moribund consensus-based internationalnegotiation’ (Peters 1999: 4). A core group of states that included Austria,Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Mexico, Norway and Switzerland metto promote a ban outside the CCW process, thus launching the OttawaProcess. Again, the EU did not face the negotiations with a united stance.The venue change split the EU in two camps: those that favoured the newtrack (Austria, Belgium and Ireland) and those that preferred the CCW one(the UK, France and Italy). Moreover, Belgium and Austria acted as leadersof the international negotiations, which further polarized the division withinthe EU, given the presence of recalcitrant states, such as Greece and Finland(Long and Hindle 1998: 248). Thus, for some time EU-level debates werestrained and ‘it was left to each member state to decide what course it wantedto follow’ (Long 2002: 434–5).

However, in the long run the Ottawa Process provided the EU with a differ-ent context and a normative reference point for EU negotiations. It createdmore propitious conditions for norm entrepreneurs to act, it increased theappeal for the EU to have a common stance, and it increased the audiencecosts of opposing the ban. First, the negotiations used a two-thirds majorityrule and only the 97 states that had supported the pro-ban Brussels Declaration(June 1997) could fully participate in the final conference. This allowed inter-national negotiations to gather further momentum, which empowered norm


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entrepreneurs (Long 2002: 436). Second, this also pushed the EU ‘to get its acttogether rather than miss out on an opportunity to have a say in this landmarkevent’ (Long 2002: 440). These were now highly visible negotiations on whichthe EU had to have a common position in order to be perceived as a relevantactor. In addition, the Ottawa Process forced the Council working group on dis-armament in the United Nations (CODUN) to address the issue of APLs morefrequently, which shaped the development of the debate. To begin with, owingto the fact that the issue of a ban was continuously being raised, it had to beaddressed by all member states. As a result, naming and shaming tacticscould be applied to those member states that were holding out against theban (Long 2002: 441–2). Moreover, member states faced similar trends indomestic public opinion and similar campaigns against landmines, as well asa growing international chorus. Given that there now existed a serious effortto ban APLs, the status quo seemed less legitimate and a ban with ‘no exceptions,no reservations and no loopholes’ was seen as the only acceptable game in town(Peters 1999: 21). Hence, in response to non-governmental organizations(NGO) that had raised the issue during election campaigns, new governmentsin the UK and France changed their countries’ policies. This also encouragedchanges in Italy and Spain (Long and Hindle 1998: 258). Finnemore andSikkink have described this as a ‘norm cascade’. Once the number of statesthat have endorsed a norm reaches a certain tipping point, others join morerapidly because of ‘a combination of pressure for conformity [and] desire toenhance international legitimation’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 895).

As a result, multilateral negotiations on APLs encouraged a change in thestances of states that could have vetoed any meaningful common position,enabling the EU to go beyond the lowest common denominator. The gradualconstruction of the norm to ban APLs allowed the EU to play a more activerole, which could only consist in endorsing and then promoting the norm. Inthe run up to the 1996 Ottawa Conference, the EU stressed the need toadopt an international agreement to ban APLs worldwide (96/588/CFSP).In late November 1997, on the eve of signing of the Convention, the EUadopted another Joint Action (97/817/CFSP), which prohibited the transferand production of APLs. Though less ambitious than the Convention (it didnot ban the use or stockpiling of APLs), this Joint Action did allow the EUto make a ‘proud declaration’ and ‘give the impression that [it] spoke with asingle voice’ (Long, 2002: 429). In December 1997 the EU welcomed the adop-tion of the Convention, in spite of the fact that support was not unanimousamong member states. The support for the ban eventually ‘fed into a discursivepractice’ on the part of the EU (Dover 2006: 403–10) and became a successstory, which further legitimized the stances of norm entrepreneurs and linkedtheir cause with EU international leadership. The entry into force of the Con-vention in 1999 had the same effect, by legitimizing the Commission (nearlyabsent before) in its claim to develop an ambitious, co-ordinated and consistentEU foreign policy on APLs (Commission 2000). This led to the approval of tworegulations (1724/2001 and 1725/2001) concerning action against APLs. The


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fact that both regulations were framed as a response to Ottawa illustrates howthe increase in the EU’s actorness (and in the Commission’s clout) on APLswas triggered by its embracing of the ban.

In short, the Ottawa Process facilitated the constitution of the EU as an actorregarding APLs. Those that wanted the EU to have a common position were notable to get it until multilateral negotiations produced the right circumstances,and only under the condition of accepting the international norm they embo-died. The EU had to endorse the multilaterally developed norm on APLs tobecome an actor.

Hormone-treated beef

The relationship between the EU and the WTO rules on the import ofhormone-treated beef is radically different. The European Community(EC) developed its own domestic policy in this regard well before the adop-tion of the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPSAgreement) in 1995, and the latter has had a negligible influence on theEU (Young 2012: 24). The EU has repeatedly disregarded the reputationalharm and the (symbolic and material) costs of defying international obli-gations in order to defend its approach to the issue. This has been so inspite of the fact that the WTO is equipped with rather compelling compli-ance mechanisms.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, widely publicized scandals regarding blackmarket sales of ‘hormone cocktails’ (Hanrahan 2000: 2) in Italy sparked consu-mer concerns about veal meat. These concerns led to the organization of vealboycotts in a number of EC countries, and subsequently to fears on the partof producers and policy-makers, which triggered the first ban on certainkinds of hormone-treated beef in 1981 (Roberts 1998: 386). The outbreaksof bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in British cattle during the1990s also reduced demand, and led to requests for tighter rules on (theimport) of beef meat, even though BSE is unrelated to hormones. The discoveryduring 2000 of BSE-infected cattle in a number of EU member states fed thesesame concerns, as did the establishment of links between BSE and its humanvariant, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. In other words, in the EU there is a well-established state of opinion that underpins stringent policies. This goes a longway in explaining why the policy-making has been ‘firmly entrenched’ in theagricultural policy community and supported by consumer associations,whose stances have been remarkably constant since the 1980s. Many Europeanbeef producers have become ‘fearful of doing anything, like using hormones,that would give consumers another disincentive to buy meat’ (Johnson andHanrahan 2010: 3). This also helps explain why the Directorate General I(Trade) of the Commission, usually an actor prone to play by the GATT/WTO rules, and thus a candidate for multilateralist norm entrepreneur, hasnot been able to shape the decision-making process. Veto players have beentoo hard to convince (Princen 2004: 574).


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The EC first banned the use of some growth hormones in 1981. In 1985 theban was extended to all such hormones, allegedly to protect the health of con-sumers – although a scientific working group had found that ‘they did not posespecific health risks’ (Princen 2004: 566). This inaugurated a two-decade longlitigation process. The US contested the ban before the GATT even prior to itsentry into force in 1989, but the EC prevented the creation of a panel to settlethe dispute. This led the US to impose retaliatory duties (Princen 2004: 567),though these had no effect on the EC’s position. The EC/EU would maintainits stance even after the establishment of the WTO. This is a remarkable indi-cator of the resoluteness of the EU on hormone-treated beef. To begin with, theWTO brought about the Dispute Settlement Understanding, which made itimpossible for a country to veto a request for a panel. It also brought aboutthe SPS Agreement, which codified the international norm on this matter.More to the point, the SPS Agreement requires WTO members to use a scien-tific basis to adopt import-restricting measures that address health or safety con-cerns (Article 2.2 and 5.1), or alternatively (Article 3.1) to use the ‘safe harbour’of international standards (Roberts 1998: 378) as included in the Codex Ali-mentarius Commission. The EU took an active part in the negotiation of theSPS Agreement, but it had ‘few allies’ (Skogstad 2001: 494). Furthermore, inJune 1995 the US and Canada won a vote in Codex on residue limits for anumber of growth hormones (Princen 2004: 568).

Again, this did not prevent the EU from adopting the Directive 96/22/EC,6

which reflected that ‘there was no support for lifting the bans in the [EP]’, andthat only the UK opposed them in the Council, as it had done in the 1980s(Young 2012: 30). In 1996, both the US and Canada presented a complaintbefore the WTO, questioning the 1996 Directive. In a nutshell, they arguedthat it ‘provided EC officials with a seductive solution for costly beef surplusesgenerated by the EC’s Common Agricultural Policy’ (Roberts 1998: 391). Thepanels concluded that the import ban violated the SPS Agreement: it was notbased on the Codex (violating Article 3.1), neither was it based on a risk assess-ment analysis (violating Article 5.1), and ‘it went beyond the level of protectionoffered by European regulatory standards for other substances in food’ (violat-ing Article 5.5) (Johnson and Hanrahan, 2010: 5; Princen 2004: 569). Inaddition, the Panel argued that since the EC had adopted a final ban, insteadof a provisional one, it had forsaken the possibility of defending it underArticle 5.7 (Roberts 1998: 394), which allows states to adopt provisionalmeasures while obtaining additional information.

Nevertheless, overturning the ban was out of the question (Princen 2004:569). Food safety scandals had made its support stronger among officials andconsumer groups, who enrolled virtually all EU member states (except for theUK) and institutions in vetoing the implementation of the WTO rule. There-fore, the EU appealed the ruling before the Appellate Body of the WTO, whichissued its report on February 1998 and condemned the EU ban again (Commis-sion 1999: 1–2). However, the EU took no steps to reverse it, not even on the13 May 1999, the date which a further WTO arbitration panel had established


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for the EU to bring its policies into compliance with the SPS Agreement(Commission 1999: 3). Actually, it was two days before the deadline that theCommission decided to continue the ban (Hanrahan 2000: 2). Thus, in July1999, the US and Canada were allowed by the WTO to impose retaliatoryduties. In 2003, the Directive 2003/74/EC7 was adopted, replacing previousrules on the matter. The directive banned one hormone permanently, whilefive others were banned provisionally. The EU claimed that the new Directivecomplied with the SPS Agreement. Consequently, in November 2004 itrequested WTO consultations arguing that the retaliatory measures imposedby the US and Canada had to be ended. In October 2008, the WTO AppellateBody issued ‘a mixed ruling that allows for continued imposition of trade sanc-tions on the EU by the United States and Canada, but also allows the EU tocontinue its ban’ (Johnson and Hanrahan 2010: 6).

In short, in order to maintain the ban on hormone-treated beef, the EU hasendured a long litigation process in the WTO, as well as retaliatory measures bythe US and Canada. When confronted with the choice between its approachand the multilaterally agreed rules, it has rather consistently chosen theformer. Young has argued that WTO obligations ‘had no influence on the pre-ferences of key EU actors . . . let alone on the policy itself’ (Young 2012: 30).Others had reached the same conclusion at different moments along theprocess (Princen 2004: 571; Roberts 1998: 391). The interests and normativepreferences in play have been too well established for the usual multilateralisttrade players (Directorate-General Trade) to overcome the influence of agricul-tural and consumer organizations. In addition, adjusting the (pre-existing) EUstance to the multilateral norm would have not provided the EU with anysuccess story associated with the emergence of new actor capabilities, as it didin the APLs case, given that the international actorness of the EU was alreadyestablished and uncontested. The EU did not need to endorse the multilaterallydeveloped norm to become an actor.

CONCLUSIONS

The EU, like all international actors, is under pressure to fit within a world-wide, socially constructed standard of actorness. However, the sui generis charac-ter of the EU as an international actor makes it harder for it to conform to such astandard. Therefore, the EU is impelled to take remedial action by embracingother components of the model. More to the point, it is impelled to endorsemultilateral institutions and multilaterally developed norms, particularly inthe areas in which its actorness is unclear. Ceteris paribus, the fuzzier the inter-national actorness of the EU in a given issue area, the stronger will be theimpulse to take international norms on board and the more helpful this willbe in building a common stance.

In order to test this hypothesis, this article has examined the role of the EU vis-a-vis international negotiations on anti-personnel landmines and hormone-treated beef. The data fit the basic argument. However, there are limits to the


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claims about causality. To be sure, a number of alternative explanations canaccount for the stances taken by the EU, and several scope conditions limit therelevance of the argument. The Europeanization literature has argued that dom-estic actors usually have a good deal of room for manoeuvre when coping withtop–down processes of influence, which is an argument that the world-societyliterature has been less eager to make. Research could thus focus on areas contain-ing conflicting multilateral institutions and address the ways in which EU-internal actors use them strategically. Research could also be designed tocompare whether different decision-making processes in the EU make a differ-ence in its endorsing multilateral institutions to acquire actorness, or to assessthe explanatory role of the salience of multilaterally developed norms.

Nevertheless, three arguments can still be made. First, case selection allows forthe control of institutional strength as an alternative explanation. The EU is moreready to act in accordance with multilateral institutions in the APLs case than inthe hormone-treated beef one, in spite of the fact that the WTO is betterequipped with compliance mechanisms and thus better able to change thecost–benefit calculations of parties. Second, these rules are issued by theWTO, a multilateral institution in which the EU is normally an influentialactor and thus less prone to be confronted with uncomfortable rules. Finally,there is more than just correlation in the APLs and beef cases. The APLs storyis usually presented as one of the EU pioneering international politics on thistopic. But there is a previous story that explains how the EU developed acommon stance in spite of conflicting preferences, which is basically that of multi-lateral negotiations influencing the EU. As argued, the existence of a multilater-ally developed norm (the complete ban on APLs) created the right conditions forthe EU to agree on a common position, which was quite naturally based on pre-cisely that norm. In other words, acting multilateralist was crucial for the emer-gence of the EU as an actor on APLs. It is rather revealing that similar findingshave emerged from research on the interplay between the EU and the Inter-national Criminal Court or the Kyoto Protocol, two multilateral institutionswidely (and correctly) perceived as strongly supported by the EU. According toGroenleer and van Schaik, ‘no common position was formulated before the nego-tiations on the Statute in Rome’, as ‘controversial issues such as the independenceof the Prosecutor, the role of the UN Security Council and the Court’s jurisdic-tion over internal armed conflicts, split the EU’ (Groenleer and van Schaik 2007:977). It was only during international negotiations that member states’ positionsconverged. Similarly, international climate negotiations have been perceived asinstrumental in shaping the stance of the EU on emissions trading (Skjærsethand Wettestad 2008). EU leadership of negotiations can be fostered by the adop-tion of norms developed in that same multilateral forum.

On the other hand, the hormone-treated beef case shows how the existence ofa well-established EU stance (and well-articulated preferences among EU-internal actors) and clear cut actorness capabilities has made it harder for multi-lateralist norm entrepreneurs to shape the decision-making process. Under thesecircumstances, the principled endorsement of multilaterally developed norms


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does not have the appealing side effect of reinforcing the international actornessof the EU via the acquisition of a ready-made common position prone to beperceived as legitimate internally and internationally.

This exchange (endorsement for actorness) resonates with evidence presentedelsewhere. Christou and Simpson have showed how the Internet Corporationfor Assigned Names and Numbers has shaped the EU’s approach to this issue,in part because of ‘the attempt by the latter to establish itself and exert its preferredpositions on Internet governance’ (Christou and Simpson 2012: 101). Similarly,Wetzel has argued that the EU has been forced to accept rules on access to justiceon environmental matters that it had previously rejected because it fell into a rhe-torical trap (Schimmelfennig 2001) while trying to export its acquis on access toinformation and public participation to Eastern European countries (Wetzel2012). Groenleer has stated that EU agencies often align with the goals of multi-lateral institutions to be able to act as their partner and pursue their own objectives(Groenleer 2012: 135). Finally, according to Brantner and Gowan, the relation-ship between the EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organization reflects ‘the Euro-pean Union’s tendency to use co-operation with other organizations for theenhancement and development of its own international actorness, capacitiesand strategic identity’ (Varwick and Koops 2009: 123). The EU seems to offeropenness vis-a-vis the influence of international institutions in exchange for arole in international negotiations.

In short, the EU is embedded in a world society that is culturally and norma-tively dense with regard to the definition of what qualifies as an actor. Thismakes the EU more prone to embrace multilateral institutions, widely perceivedto be legitimate, in the cases in which it is less of a standardized actor. In otherwords, multilateral institutions can foster the otherwise difficult construction ofactor capabilities for the EU precisely where it does not have them. Given thefact that ‘actors with problematic identities will be the most voracious consu-mers of global scripts’ (Jupille and Jolliff 2011: 22), the EU will be morelikely to endorse specific multilateral institutions than other major, more stan-dardized actors (like major states). This might help account for the fact that theEU is perceived on some occasions (but not on others) as a global player particu-larly prone to multilateralism.

Biographical note: Oriol Costa is lecturer of International Relations at Univer-sitat Autonoma de Barcelona.

Address for correspondence: Oriol Costa, Facultat de Ciencies Polıtiques i deSociologia, Edifici B, UAB, 08193, Cerdanyola del Valles, Barcelona, Spain.email: [email protected]

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Knud Erik Jørgensen and three anonymous referees fortheir input. This paper falls within the project EU-IANUS, ‘The EU in an


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unsettled international system: crisis, polarity and multilateralism’, funded bythe National R&D Plan of the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitive-ness (CSO2012-33361).

NOTES

1 ESS (2003) ‘A secure Europe in a better world. European security strategy’, Brussels,12 December 2003.

2 Actorness is the common word in the literature on EU foreign policy to refer to thecondition or quality of actors, although the literature pioneered by John Meyerhas used the word actorhood with fundamentally the same purpose. For the sakeof consistency, actorness is used in this article except when actorhood is part of a quo-tation. ‘Standard of actorness’ or ‘model of actorness’ are used to refer to the ideal-typecomponent that actorhood has, as opposed to the much more matter-of-fact way inwhich Bretherton and Vogler use actorness.

3 Other domestic structures set other opportunity structures. There is a bit of a paradoxhere. On the one hand, when a good number of actors play a role in decision-making,the policies and norms derived from the multilateral institution are more readilyincluded in the agenda. On the other hand, they have fewer possibilities of actuallyhaving an influence, as it becomes more difficult to build a winning coalition. SeeCortell and Davis (1996: 454) and Checkel (1997: 477).

4 Benita Ferrero-Wadtner, ‘A world without landmines’,. Speech in the EP, 6 July2005, available at http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/fr/article_4865_fr.htm(accessed 29 June 2009).

5 EP resolutions of 17 December 1992 on the injuries and loss of life caused by mines(OJ C 21, 25.1.1993, p. 161) and 29 June 1995 on landmines and blinding laserweapons (OJ C 183, 17.7.1995, p. 44).

6 Council Directive 96/22/EC of 29 April 1996 concerning the prohibition on the usein stock farming of certain substances having a hormonal or thyrostatic action and ofbeta-agonists, and repealing Directives 81/602/EEC, 88/146/EEC and 88/299/EEC (OJ L 125, 23.5.1996, p. 3).

7 Directive 2003/74/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 Sep-tember 2003 amending Council Directive 96/22/EC concerning the prohibitionon the use in stock farming of certain substances having a hormonal or thyrostaticaction and of beta-agonists.

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a force for and because of multilateralism:...

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