a fight worth remembering - ausa

The Allied landings at Normandy on June

6, 1944, remembered today as D-Day, re-

main the most recognizable campaign of

World War II for most Americans. As the

“Greatest Generation” moves on, this percep-

tion will strengthen. The lasting impact of

blockbuster Hollywood films and the powerful

mental image of a great fleet launching an inva-

sion to liberate a continent continue to domi-

nate our understanding of World War II. Next

June, there will be numerous 70th anniversary

tributes celebrating D-Day. In comparison, 70th

anniversary commemorations of the Battle of

the Bulge, the U.S. Army’s greatest victory, will

most certainly be fewer than those focused on

D-Day. What is needed is to put some perspec-

tive on the Battle of the Bulge and place it back

on center stage.

34 ARMY � December 2013

A Fight Worth Remembering

By COL Kevin W. FarrellU.S. Army retired

U.S. Army Signal Corps


The Battle of the Bulge involved a large number of American soldiers and

was arguably the most desperately fought battle in our history, yet it grows

increasingly obscure. In addition to being the largest and bloodiest battle in

American history, more than any other it demonstrated the emergent capa-

bility of the U.S. Army as it withstood the full, final offensive of a German war

machine desperate to reverse the tide in a war that had turned inexorably against

it. Although there were notable shortcomings—first, an intelligence failure second

only to Pearl Harbor and second, disastrous battlefield performances by some

December 2013 � ARMY 35

Clockwise fromleft: 101st AirborneDivision soldiersexit the town ofBastogne, Belgium,on New Year’s Eve,1944; soldiers of1st Battalion, 157thRegiment, 45th Division, man amachine gun at a roadblock nearBastogne; a Sher-man tank is read-ied to repel a Ger-man advance inthe Ardennes nearManhay, Belgium.


U.S. Army units, most notably the 106th Infantry Division—overall, this battle demonstrated that five months of contin-uous combat in Western Europe had transformed the U.S.Army into a force capable of matching the Wehrmacht on itsown terms. For the U.S. Army, therefore, the Battle of theBulge should be remembered as perhaps its greatest chap-ter in a very proud history.

Nazi Germany’s Desperate SituationBy December 1944, World War II had been raging in Eu-

rope for more than five years. Nazi Germany’s spectacularmilitary victories from 1939–1941 were distant memories.Unable to defeat Great Britain, Adolf Hitler sought finalvictory and culmination of his diabolical designs in the

east, launching the largest invasion in world history inJune 1941 against the Soviet Union. Following astonishinginitial victories, Hitler experienced his first major defeat,which occurred outside Moscow before Christmas 1941.Renewed offensives in 1942 brought Hitler’s empire to itsmaximum size, but military disaster at Stalingrad in Febru-ary 1943 permanently changed the strategic context of thewar. Germany’s July 1943 offensive, Operation Citadel, in-cluded the largest armored battle in history near Kursk,but it failed, and with it so did Hitler’s opportunity for vic-tory over the Soviet Union.By autumn 1944, Germany was clearly losing the war—it

was simply a question of when, not if. Allied armies weresteadily advancing from three directions. The Allies had re-taken North Africa, Sicily, and southern Italy in 1943, con-tinuing a slow but deliberate advance northward and cross-ing the Arno River by August 1944. On the Eastern Front,the Soviet juggernaut continued to roll relentlessly west-ward, inflicting massive casualties on the German Wehr-macht and suffering even more of its own in the process.The colossal Soviet offensive of June 1944, Operation Bagra-tion, inflicted the greatest defeat ever suffered by the Ger-man army—30 divisions annihilated—and it was punctu-ated with the attempted assassination of Hitler that July. Byany measure, Wehrmacht casualties on the Eastern Frontwere staggering: From June 1941 to May 1944, Germanylost an average of 60,000 men per month. Although the situ-ation stabilized by autumn 1944, it was obvious that a final,unstoppable Soviet onslaught was inevitable in 1945. In the west, the landings at Normandy on June 6, 1944,

changed the strategic situation further in favor of the Allies.In July, the Allies broke free from the Normandy bocage anddestroyed the Wehrmacht in France that August at Falaise. Asecond invasion in southern France, Operation Dragoon,also in August 1944, complemented the drive to the west-ern border of the Third Reich. It seemed the war wouldsoon be over. Even though Operation Market Garden—British Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery’s daringplan to end the war before Christmas through an airbornespearhead into Holland—failed, the Allied war machineappeared to be unstoppable.The dreadful strategic position of Germany was further

weakened as its major cities received daily bombing raidsthat reduced them to rubble: the Americans by day and theBritish by night. The German navy was trapped in a fewAxis-held ports while U-boats had been rendered largelyineffective through Allied advances in technology and tac-tics. The few, pitiful allies that Nazi Germany once had inEurope were all gone as 1944 neared its end. As the combined industrial and military might of the Al-

lied armies—united in purpose, confident in the justness oftheir cause, vastly improved in proficiency and fully moti-vated to stop the unspeakable horrors of Nazi Germany—steadily closed in on a shrunken Third Reich, most viewedfinal victory as just around the corner. Surrounded andalone, Nazi Germany appeared to be on its last legs. Unfor-tunately, Hitler had a vastly different strategic vision.


COL Kevin W. Farrell, USA Ret., Ph.D., is the former chief ofmilitary history at West Point. He commanded a combinedarms battalion in Iraq, and his most recent book is The Mili-tary and the Monarchy.

A German soldier carries a full ammunition beltduring the Battle of the Bulge. German armedforces on the Western Front grew to number morethan 1.3 million men in December 1944.

U.S. National Archives

Wacht am Rhein:Germany’s Last Offensive in the West

On September 16, 1944, the day before Operation MarketGarden, at his headquarters near Rastenburg, East Prussia,Hitler announced his decision to stage a major counter-attack. Despite the gross imbalance of forces in the west—55 German divisions faced 96 Allied divisions with 10 moreen route from England—Hitler believed a lack of supplies(especially fuel) and the absence of functioning deepwaterports weakened the Allied situation. He was convinced asurprise attack toward Antwerp would split the Anglo-American alliance and a major defeat would force the West-ern Allies into a separate peace. Recognizing the precari-ousness of the Allied logistics, he incorrectly believedrelations between the Americans and the British werestrained and that Americans made poor soldiers. With theWestern Front secure, “wonder weapons” (jet aircraft, su-per-heavy tanks and improved U-boats) would reinforcethe final effort to defeat the Soviet Union. The plan, deceptively code-named Wacht am Rhein

(Watch on the Rhine), depended on three great armies, twoof them panzer. Launched from the Ardennes Forest nearthe start point of the 1940 invasion of France, the 1944 planincluded an elaborate deception, Operation Greif (Griffin),with Germans dressed as Americans operating behind Al-lied lines. Fog and miserable weather would ground thevastly superior Allied airpower. Surprise was essential.Hitler assured his generals that sufficient assets would beavailable to spearhead the offensive, and he refused any re-ductions to the plan. Despite the military situation and

deep skepticism of Hitler’s generals,the Wehrmacht on the Western Frontincreased to more than 1.3 millionmen in December 1944. Three armiesadvanced westward along a 60-milefront. About 400,000 troops, 1,400tanks, 2,600 artillery pieces and 1,000aircraft faced a thin sector: four Amer-ican infantry divisions and a partialarmored division possessed some83,000 men and 400 tanks. Americanunits were either new arrivals andtherefore “green,” or were refitting fol-lowing previous hard-fought engage-ments. The Germans achieved com-plete surprise. The Sixth Panzer Army—the main

effort—attacked along a route nowknown as the northern shoulder. Ledby Hitler’s favorite commander, SSGen. Josef Dietrich, a crude but experi-enced armor officer, the Sixth PanzerArmy attacked along five preplannedroutes. With four SS panzer divisions,a parachute division and four infantrydivisions, Dietrich’s army had to ad-

vance toward Antwerp and seize important crossing pointsbefore the weather cleared and American airpower couldbe brought to bear. Virtually from the start, however, Diet-rich’s attack lagged well behind its optimistic schedule be-cause of unexpectedly stiff American resistance andabysmally poor road conditions. To the south, Gen. Hasso von Manteuffel’s Fifth Panzer

Army attacked as a supporting effort to the Sixth PanzerArmy. Manteuffel came from a long line of distinguishedPrussian army officers, making him suspect in Hitler’seyes, but the general’s extensive experience and expertiseas a tactician made him invaluable. With four army panzerdivisions and four infantry divisions, his attack route ranthrough the Belgian cities of Bastogne and Brussels, rein-forcing the drive toward Antwerp. Just below this southernshoulder of the “bulge”—the dent the German forces madein the Allies’ line—Gen. Erich Brandenberger’s SeventhArmy attacked to protect the left flank. With only four in-fantry divisions and substantial artillery, its mission wasmainly protective.

A Great Chapter of American Military HistoryDespite an initial local advantage, the German surprise

attack failed almost from the start, mainly because of de-termined American resistance. In the north, the Germanmain effort struggled against the 2nd Infantry Division, aveteran unit refitting, and the 99th Infantry Division, anoutfit that had recently arrived from the United States.Hard fighting by both divisions doomed the entire attackbecause it delayed the German timetable. American front-

December 2013 � ARMY 37

A gun crew assigned to the 217th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion read-ies the “Black Widow” 90 mm antiaircraft gun to fire at an enemy planesighted outside Bastogne. The engagement between American andGerman forces at the crossroads town lasted about one week.

U.S. Army

line units were quickly overrun, but isolated troops foughtheroically against overwhelming odds. A telling examplewas an 18-man intelligence and reconnaissance platoonfrom the 99th Infantry Division commanded by LT LyleBouck Jr., that held off the spearhead of the entire GermanSixth Panzer Army for almost a full day. Bouck’s platoonremains the most decorated platoon in World War II, andits performance reflects the best of the U.S. Army engagedduring the Battle of the Bulge. Securing the Elsenborn Ridge to protect the northern

flank of the German drive was essential to the German plan.Inspired command decisions—especially by 2nd InfantryDivision commander MG Walter M. Robertson at the twinvillages of Krinkelt and Rocherath—further impeded theGerman advance. Hard-fought battles at Trois Ponts,Stavelot and La Gleize permanently halted the northernGerman attack. By December 19, Kampfgruppe Peiper, spear-head of the Sixth Panzer Army, was surrounded as GENDwight D. Eisenhower committed the theater reserve, theelite 82nd Airborne Division. Widespread individual hero-ism, combined with outstanding leadership at all commandlevels, defeated the best the Wehrmacht could muster. In threedifficult days, the U.S. Army had met and overcome thegreatest challenge it would face during the war in Europe.The German attack to the south by Manteuffel’s Fifth

Panzer Army, though intended to be a supporting effort, metwith greater success. Manteuffel trapped most of the 106thInfantry Division, causing the greatest American defeat inthe European Theater when approximately 9,000 soldierssurrendered. Seizing St. Vith after bitter fighting and sur-rounding Bastogne, the supporting effort became the main

effort as its success surpassed that of the army to its north.Following the collapse of the 106th Infantry Division,

fierce resistance, once again combined with superb com-mand decisions, halted the German offensive along thesouthern shoulder as well. Although the Germans ultimatelyseized the vital road junction at St. Vith, BG Bruce Clarke ofthe 4th Armored Division assumed command of scatteredAmerican units—remnants of the 7th and 9th Armored Divi-sions, the 28th Infantry Division, and the sole surviving regi-ment of the 106th Infantry Division—and brilliantly con-tained the German advance. Even though the Germanscaptured St. Vith, they did not do so until December 21, fourdays later than planned. By Christmas Eve, the German ad-vance in the south was halted, and the 4th Armored Divisionrelieved the defenders of Bastogne on the 26th.The weather improved on December 23, allowing Allied

airpower to pound German positions as American rein-forcements, most notably GEN George S. Patton Jr.’s ThirdArmy, poured into the region. Victory came with a steepprice, though. The bulge was not fully cleared until earlyFebruary 1945, and Allied and German casualties incurredin reducing the salient exceeded those of the initial attack.American casualties totaled about 80,000 men, of whom19,000 were killed. German losses neared 85,000.Historical debates remain, primarily about an intelli-

gence failure that enabled the Germans to attack with com-plete surprise. Nothing, however, should diminish the factthat the Battle of the Bulge was not only the greatest andbloodiest battle in the history of the U.S. Army, but that italso was the Army’s finest battlefield performance on sucha grand scale. �


A civilian casualtypicks his way

through the rubbleof the Belgian town

of La Roche-en-Ardenne in January1945. Allied bomb-

ing raids helped liberate it from theGermans but de-stroyed much of it

in the process.

U.S. Army

a fight worth remembering - ausa

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