The Techniques and Function of the Renaissance ParadoxAuthor(s): A. E. MallochSource: Studies in Philology, Vol. 53, No. 2 (Apr., 1956), pp. 191-203Published by: University of North Carolina PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4173165Accessed: 28/08/2009 18:13Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unlessyou have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and youmay use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained athttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=uncpress.Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission.JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with thescholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform thatpromotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.University of North Carolina Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access toStudies in Philology.http://www.jstor.orgTHETECHNIQUESANDFUNCTIONOFTHE RENAISSANCEPARADOX By A.E.MALLOCH I Thoughtheimportance ofthegenrehaslongbeenrecognized, theRenaissanceparadoxhasbeengivenscantcriticalattention. Anumberofdistinguishedscholars,beginningwithR.B.Mc- Kerrow, havecontributed materialtoward abibliography,1 butno one hasyetdescribed thecharacteristic techniques oftheparadox, ortriedtoexplainwhysuchanapparently perverse literaryform shouldhaverivalledtheepigram,perhapseventhesonnet,in popularity. IMcKerrow(TheWorksofThomasNashe[London,1904-10],IV,389- 395)annotatesthepassagein" NashesLentenStuffe" whichlistsanumber ofmockencomia.ElbertN.S.Thompson(" TheSeventeenth-Century EnglishEssay,"UniversityofIowaHumanisticStudies,III,No.3[1926], 94-105)providesageneralaccountoftheEnglishparadox,andlistsa numberofEnglishtitles.R.E.Bennett("FourParadoxesbySirWilliam Cornwallis,theYounger,"HarvardStudiesandNotesinPhilologyand Literature,XIII[1931],219-240)givesanextensivelistoftitlesinhis notes.WarnerG.Rice("TheParadossiofOrtensioLando,"Essaysand StudiesinEnglishandComparativeLiterature,Univ.ofMichiganPubs.: Lang.andLit.,VIII[1932],59-74)tracesthehistoryofthemostfamous RenaissancecollectionofparadoxesthroughitsFrenchandEnglishtrans- lations,andonpp.73-74lists" BooksContainingParadoxesinEnglish." Bennett("FourParadoxes,"p.222n.)promisedanarticleon"theback- groundoftheEnglishparadox"butpresumablydiscontinuedtheproject whenRice'sarticleappearedthefollowingyear. Nashe'slistofmockencomia(Works,III,176-178)isonlyoneofmany insixteenth-centuryworks.Cf.Castiglione'sCourtier,TudorTranslations, XXIII(London,1900),123;Wilson'sArteofRhetorique,1560,ed.G.H. Mair(Oxford,1909),p.14;Sidney'sApologieForPoetrie,ed.J.Churton Collins(Oxford,1907),p.35;GabrielHarvey,"Pierce'sSupererogation," Works,ed.A.B.Grosart(1884,privateprinting),II,244-245;John Harington,TheMetamorphosisofAjax,ed.PeterWarlockandJack Lindsay(London,1927),p.8. ErasmusinthePrefacetoThePraiseofFollylistssomemockencomia byclassicalauthors.Foranaccountofthemockencomiuminancient 191 192TechniquesandFunctionoftheRenaissanceParadox Theetymologyofthewordparadoxsuggeststhedeceptiveness oftheform,and thetitlesofindividualparadoxes (ThePrayseof Nothing,AParadoxeprovingthatbaldnesse ismuchbetterthan bushie haire)promise thatappearances willbe belied.Butwe must turn toJohnDonne, a famous propounder ofparadoxes, to find the functionofthisdeceptiveness analyzed.In1600( ?)hesentthe followingletter,withsome ofhisparadoxes, toafriend: Sr.OnlyinobedienceIsendyosomeofmyparadoxes;Iloueyo & myself & themtovwelLtoscndthemwillinglyfortheycarryWththemaconfession oftherelightnes.&yrtrouble&myshame.butindeedtheyweremade rathertodeceauetymethenherdaughthrtruth:althoughtheyhauebeene writteilinaniagewhenanythingisstrongenoughtooverthrowher:if theymakeyotofindbetterreasonsagainstthemtheydothereoffice:for theyarebutswaggerers:quietenoughifyoresistthem.ifpehauncethey bepretylyguilt,ytistherebestfortheyarenothatcht:theyarerather alarfistotruthtoarmeherthenenemies:& theyhaueonlythisadvantadg toscapefrobeingcaledillthingsyttheyarenothings:therforetakeheed ofallowinganyofthemleastyomakeanother.2 Donne,inhisactofmakingtheparadoxes, intendedtodeceive timeandnottruth.Theoffice oftheparadoxes themselves isnot todeceive, butbyashow ofdeceittoforcethereader touncover thetruth.Thetruenatureoftheparadoxisrevealedwhenthe reader overturns it,justas the true nature of theswaggerer appears only when heisresisted.Andfurther, theparadoxes do notreally have naturesatall;theyare nothings.Theyexistonly withinthe antitheticalaction of the reader, and ifhe allows them(i.e., allows themanexistence),heismakinganotherparadox,viz.,That NothingIs. Donne's final caution tohis friendis itselfparadoxical, and rests uponadistinctionbetweentwokindsofbeing.3Beingmaybe predicated ofany existentthing.Itmay also signifythe truthofa statement, even when the subject of thatstatement is mere negation anddoesnotexistinitsownrightatall,e. g., " blindnessisan GreeceandRomeseeTheodoreC.Burgess,EpideicticLiterature(Chicago, 1902),pp.157-166;A.S.Pease," ThingsWithoutHonour,"CP,XXI (1926),27-42.Onp.28Peaseliststheseventeenth-centuryanthologiesof paradoxes. 2EvelynAI.Simpson,AStudyoftheProseWorksofJohnDonne (Oxford,1948),p.316. 3 SeeAristotle,Metaphysics,V,7(1017a).Cf.ThomasAquinas,Ons BeingandEssence,trans.ArmandMaurer(Toronto,1949),pp.26-27. A.E.Malloch193 affliction."Blindnessitselfhasnobeing,butthestatementabout blindnesshas.Sowiththeparadoxes.Asargumentstheydonot existatall;theyaredeliberate perversions ofarguments.Butas statementsofarguments(however perverse)theydoexist.They arenot,andyettheyare.Onthemetaphysicalleveltheyare para doxa;theyrun counter toexpectation or appearance notonly inspecific subject matter butalso asliterary form.Theytease the intellectas anoptical illusionteases theeye. IthasoftenbeensaidthattheartistislikeGod inhisactof creating, butalways withthequalification thattheartistshapes a givenmaterialwhereasGoddrawsexistenceexnihilo.Butthis qualification neednotapplytotheparadoxist, for,inasense,he toomakes somethingoutofnothing,givingutterance toanargu- mentthatisnotthere.Here,forinstance,isJohnDonneunder- taking" ADefenceofWomens Inconstancy ": ThatWomenareInconstant,Iwithanymanconfesse,butthatIncon- stancyisabadquality,Iagainstanymani willmaintaine:Foreverything asitisonebetterthananother,soisitfullerofchange;TheHeavens themselvescontinuallyturne,theStarresmove,theMoonechangeth;Fire whirleth,Ayreflyeth,Waterebbsandflowes,thefaceoftheEarthaltereth herlookes,timestayesnot;theColourthatismostlight,willtakemost dyes:soinMen,theythathavethemostreasonarethemostalterablein theirdesignes,andthedarkestormostignorant,doseldomestchange; thereforeWomenchangingmorethanMenhavealsomoreReason.They cannotbeimmutablelikestockes,likestones,liketheEarthsdullCenter; Goldthatlvethstill,riusteth;Water,corrupteth;Airethatmovethnot, poysorneth;thenwvhy shouldthatwhichistheperfectionofotherthings,be imputedtoWomenasgreatestimperfection?Becausetherebytheydeceive men.Ai enotyourwitspleasedwiththosejests,whichcoozenyour expectation?YoucancallitPleasuretobebeguil'dintroubles,andinthe mostexcellenttoyintheworld,youcallitTreachery:Iwouldyouhad yourMistressessoconstant,thattheywouldneverchange,nonotsomuch astheirsmocks,thenshouldyouseewhatsluttishvertue,Constancywere. Inconstancyisamostcommendableandcleanelyquality,andWomenin thisqualityarefarremoreabsolutethantheHeavens,thantheStarres, Moone,oranythingbeneathit;forlongobservationhathpicktcertainety outoftheirmutability.TheLearnedaresowellacquaintedwiththe Starres,SignesandPlanets,thattheymakethembutCharacters,toreade themeaningoftheHeaveninhisowneforehead.EverysimpleFellowcan bespeakethechangeoftheMooneagreatwhilebeforehand:butIwould fainehavethelearnedstmansoskilfull,astotellwhenthesimplestWoman meanethtovarie.Learningaffordsnorulestoknow,muchlessknowledge torulethemindeofaWoman:Foras Philosophyteachethus,thatLight thingsdoealwayestendupwards,andheavythingsdecline downeward; 194TechniquesandFunctionoftheRenaissanceParadox Experienceteachethusotherwise,thatthedispositionofaLightWoman, istofalldowne,thenatureofWomenbeingcontrarytoallArtand Nature.4 Themostrevealing testwhichcanbeapplied tothisargument is toattempttoparaphrase it.Theargument resistsparaphrase be- cause itsarticulatioinsare verbal and not conceptual.The argument livesonly inthe particular words oftheauthor.Remove or change thosewords, andtheargument vanishes 5;take,forexample, this passage:"...inMen,theythathavethemostreasonarethe mostalterable intheirdesignes, and thedarkest or mostignorant, doseldomest change;therefore Women changingmore thanMen, havealsomore Reason."Byusingtheconsequential " therefore" andbybalancingthetwocomparatives("more...more ") Donne isable tofabricate an argument.Butifthe reader disposes ofthosewords,hesimplyfindshimselfjugglingthelogician's undistributedmiddleterm.Sowiththispassage:"...Iwould you had your Mistresses so constant, thatthey would never change, nonotso much astheirsmocks, thenshould yousee whatsluttish vertue,Constancy were."HereDonnebuildshisargumentupon asudden switch from theintransitive tothe transitiveform ofthe verbchange.Andinthefinalsentenceofourpassage,dealing withthedispositionofalightwoman tofall,theargumentrests uponthedeliberate crossingormixingoftwometaphors.Inany paradoxical argument there isacentral pivot ofequivocation upon which twoarguments(logicallyunconnected)meet and turn.And aparadoxical argument proceeds, notby deduction, but by aseries ofsuch pivots.Hence, itisimpossible tosummarize or condense a paradoxical argunment. Alogicalargumentisdeducedordrawn outfromitsfirstprinciplesbecause itisimplicitlvcontainedin 4ParadoxesandProblemes,ed.(Geoffrey Keynes(Soho,1923),pp.1-3. 6Cf.Aristotle,"DeSophisticisElenchis,"trans.W.A.Pickard-Cam- bridge,TheWorksofAristotle,ed.W.D.Ross,I(Oxford,1928),165a: ...reasoningrestsoncertainstatementssuchthattheyinvolveneces- sarilytheassertionofsomethingotherthanwhathasbeenstated,through whathasbeenstated:refutationisreasoninginvolvingthecontradictory ofthegfivenconclusion.Nowsomeofthemdonotreallyachievethis, thou,jhtheyseemtodosoforanumberofreasons;andofthesethemost prolificandusualdomainistheargumentthatturnsuponnamesonly.It isimpossibleinadiscussiontobringintheactualthingsdiscussed:we usetheirnamesassymbolsinsteadofthem;andthereforewesupposethat whatfollowsinthenames,followsinthethingsaswell. A.E.Maclloch195 itsfirstprinciples;itcanbedrawnouttogreatlengthinex- position,butinaconclusionitcan(withequalvalidity)betele- scoped.Butthere are no first principles ina paradoxical argument. Instead,thereareanumber ofequivocations whichareconnected inacircuit.Andacircuitcannot be telescoped;itcannot even be shortenedwithoutbecomingsomethingotherthanwhatitwas before.Itisnotsurprising,therefore, tofindthattheparadoxist does notattemptafinalsummary ofwhathehassaid.Heeither commentsonthemannerinwhichhehaswritten(Donne's Biathanatos),closes withan abrupt exhortation(Agrippa'sVanity ofArtsandSciences,Montaigne's Apology forRaimondSebond), oroffers anexcuselikeFolly's:"Iseethatyouareexpectinga peroration, butyouare justtoofoolishifyousuppose thatafter IhavepouredoutahodgepodgeofwordslikethisIcanrecall anythingthatIhave said." 6 Donne's statement thathisparadoxes are nothingshas thismuch truth,thattheyonlyseemtorepresentaconceptualargument, but,infact,donot.Theyachieve andsustainthisappearance by meansofafabricatedargumentwhichconsistsofdiscretestate- mentsequivocally united.ButDonnealsosays thattheparadoxes haveanaturewhichisrevealed intheactofmeeting (or, more accurately, resisting)them.Andtheirnatureisrevealed thenbe- causetheirbeingremainsunfulfilleduntiltheybecome partofa dialecticaction.Theydonotbecomethemselvesuntiltheyare overthrown.Theyarewrittentoberefuted,andunlesstheyare refutedtheirtruenatureishidden.Thustheparadoxmaybe saidtopresentonepartinaverbal drama(trulyawordplay); theother partisnotwrittenout,butissuppliedbythereader as he tries " to find better reasons." Itiswelltoemphasizethedramaticnatureoftheparadox. Otherwiseweexhaustourselveswiththefutilequestion,Was Donne(oranyparadoxist)seriouslydefendinghisthesis?The futilequestiondeservesafrustratinganswer.Yesandno.Of course hewasjoking,butinasense hewasserious.Thequestion isfutilebecauseanaturalconditionofdramaticspeechisthat, though itproceeds from an author, itachieves a statusindependent of the author.Thedramatic author can manipulate speech without 6 Erasmus,ThePraiseofFolly,trans.H.H.Hudson(Princeton,1941), p.125. 196TechniquesandFunctionoftheRenaissanceParadox associatinghimself"personally"withit.IHecanexploitfalse- hood without becoming a liar.Hecan make untruth serve the cause ofknowledge, asJohnofSalisbury(whomDonneassociated with paradox)feltthattheauthorsoftheOldTestamenthaddone: " NametApostolus non:Quaecumque scripta suntuera sunt,ait, sed:Quaecumquescriptasuntadnostramdoctrinamscripta sunt...8 II Weknowthisdramaticstyleofdiscourseasthedialogue,but theformofdialogue withtheclosestaffinity totheparadox isthe scholasticquaestiodisputata.Liketheparadoxitperfectsthe deliberately fallaciousargument for thepurpose ofrevealing truth, thoughitdiffers fromtheparadox incontainingawritten. refuta- tion:thereader ofthedisputedquestion participatesasaudience, thereader oftheparadox as actor. Thedisputedquestion, because itsdialogue isexplicit,allows us examine indetailthedynamism ofdrawing truthfrom error, that dynamism whichjustifiestheapparent perversity oftheparadox. Andifweexamineconcurrentlytheformaldevelopmentofthe disputedquestion,wesoonfindourselvesataperiodinhistory whenthequaestiohadlostitsvigorandwaslosingitslife,and when theparadox was being re-introduced by men ofa strong anti- scholastic bias. Thedisputedquestiontookshapeandgrewasapedagogical technique, and thestoryofitsdevelopment iscomplex.9We know itabove allasthearticle,thatbasic unitofexpositioninso many 7 This,ofcourse,istheburdenofT.S.Eliot'stheoryoftheimpersonality oftheartist. 8loaunisSaresberiensisEpiscopiCarnotensisPolicratici,ed.C. C. I.Webb (Oxford,1909),II,93.Cf.alsothefollowingpassage,which(inar abridgedform)servesastheepigraphforDonne'sBiathanatos:" Inquibus siquidafideuerilongiusabest,michiueniamdebericonfido,quinonomnia, quaehicscribuntur,ueraessepromitto,sedsiueueraseufalsasint, legentiumusibusinseruire"(I,15).OneofDonne'smostinteresting ProblemsdealswithJohnofSalisbury;itdoesnotappearintheKeynes edition,buthasbeenprintedinanarticlebyMrs.Simpson," TwoManu- scriptsofDonne'sParadoxesandProblems,"RES.,III(1927),129-145. 9SeeM.Grabmann,DieGeschichtederscholastischenMethode(Freiburg imBreisgau,1909-1911). A.E.Malloch197 scholastictreatises,anditisintheworkofthemostfamous schoolman, Thomas Aquinas, thatwe willfind our examples.10 Theimmediatepurpose ofthearticleistodispeldoubt,andso thetitleofanarticleisintheformofaquestion," Whether one mancanteachanother? "(SummaTheologica,1,q.117,a.1). Thenafterthestatementofthedoubtcomes theinvariable " We proceed thus...."Thisphraseisnotmerelyadeclaration that theexpositorisleadinghisaudienceontothenextpoint.Itis ratherapromisethat" thus "doesthemindmovetodispelthe doubt.Thearticleitselfwillbeadiagram ofthemindinaction. Thearticlebeginis bysortingoutthevariousconflictingargu- mentswhich,takentogether,fosteruncertainty.Thisisthetech- nique of theCanonists and ofAbelard's Sicet Non,from which the articlederives.Firstcome thearguments foronealternative,the so-called objections: 11 Objection1.Itwouldseemthatonemancannotteachanother.Forthe Lordsays(Matt.xxiii.8):BenotyoucalledRabbi:onwhichtheGloss ofJeromesays,LestyougivetomenthehonourduetoGod.Thereforeto beateacherisproperlyanhonourduetoGod.Butitbelongstoateacher toteach.Thereforemancannotteach,butthisispropertoGod. Obj. 2.Further,ifonemanteachesanother,thisisonlyinasmuchashe actsthroughhisownknowledge,soastocauseknowledgeintheother. Butthequalitythroughwhichanyoneactssoastoproducehislike,is anactivequality.Thereforeitfollowsthatknowledgeisanactivequality justasheatis. Obj.3.Further,forknowledgewerequireintellectuallight,andthe speciesofthethingunderstood.Butamancannotcauseeitherofthesein anotherman.Thereforeamancannotbyteachingcauseknowledgein anotherman. Obj.4.Further,theteacherdoesnothinginregardtoadisciplesaveto proposetohimcertainsigns,soastosignifysomethingbywordsor gestures.Butitisnotpossibletoteachanyonesoastocauseknowledge 10 Butnotbecauseheoccupiesanyspecialplaceinthedevelopmentof thearticle,forF.A.Blancheacknowledgesthatscholarsdonotknowto whatextentAquinaskeptthecontemporaryformofthearticleandtowhat extenthemodifiedit("LeVocabulairedel'ArgumentationetlaStructure del'ArticledanslesOuvragesdeSaintThomas,"RevuedesSciences PhilosophiquesetTheologiques,XIV[1925],171-172). "1AmisleadingtranslationoftheLatinobjectiones,forthetermdoes notrefertoanargumentopposingsomethesiswhichhasalreadybeen proposed,butratheranargumentputforward,advanced," thrownout" infavourofonealternativeinthequestion.SeeBlanche," LeVocabulaire ...,"pp.177-178. 198TechniquesandFunction of theRenaissanceParadox inhim, by puttingsignsbeforehim.Forthesearesignseitherofthings thatheknows,orofthingshedoesnotknow.Ifofthingsthatheknows, hetowhomthesesignsareproposedisalreadyinthepossessionofknow- ledge,anddoesnotacquireitfromtheteacher.Iftheyaresignsofthings thathedoesnotknow,hie canlearnnothingfromthem.Forinstance,if oneweretospeakGreektoamanwhoknowsonlyLatin,hewouldlearn nothingthereby.Thereforeinnowvavycnamancauseknowledgein anotherbyteachinghim.'- Andthenfollowthearguments fortheother alternative: Onthecontrary,TheApostlesavs(1Tim.ii.7):WhereuntoIam appointedapreacheratnd anapostle ...adoctoroftheGentilesinfaith andtruth. Thisdisproportion(iiunuerically speaking 4to1)between thesic and non represents a significant modification of Abelard's technique. Abelardsimplybalanced thetwocolumnsofarguments,andby suchapresentationcalledforthadecisionfromhisreader.In theschools, two students presented thearguments and thenturned tothe magister, whoawarded thevictory toonesideortheother andoftencommentedonthemeritsoftherespective"cases." 13 Butthe contribution of themagister found itsway intothe written articleasthesectionwhichbegins," Ianswer that," andbythe timeofAquinas thissectioni, farfrom being acoda tothedispute, had become thebody ofthearticle.Thearguments nowwere the means of locating and defining the uncertainty(" Whether one man canteachanother? ")sothatthemagister, inadiscourse aslong asathousandwords,couldenunciatetheprinciplewhichwould resolve theuncertainty.Aquinas, incomposing theobjections, was infactwritingaparadox, butinsteadoflettinghisreaders find Donne's " better reasons," hewentontosupply themhimself: Ianswerthat,Onthisquestiontherehavebeenvariousopinions.For Averroes,commentingonDeanimaiii.,maintainsthatallmenhaveone possibleintellectincommon,aswasstatedabove.Fromthisitfollowed, etc.,etc. 12 ThesetranslationsfromAquinasarebyLaurenceShapcote,revisedby AntonPegis,inPegis'BasicWritingsofSaintThomasAquinas(NewYork, 1945). '3TheevolutionofthequaestioisconvenientlytracedinM.D.Chenu's Introductional'etudedeSaintThomasD'Aquin(Montreal,1950),pp. 71-77. A.E.Malloch199 Thisenunciationoftheprincipleisnotadirectanswertothe first(thesic)setofarguments;thatcomesinthefinalsection, where theprinciple isapplied totheparticular arguments inturn, andthefalsityofeachargumentexposed,oritstruthproperly delimited: ReplyObj.1.Aswasstatedabove,theteacheronlybringsexteriorhelp, asthephysicianwhoheals;butjustastheinteriornatureistheprincipal causeofthehealing,sotheinteriorlightoftheintellectistheprincipal causeofknowledge.ButbothofthesearefromGod.ThereforeasofGod isitwritten:Whohealethallthydiseases(Ps.cii.3),soofHimisit written:Hethatteachethmanknowledge(Ps.xciii.10),inasmuchasthe lightofHiscountenanceissignedtuponus(Ps.iv.7),throughwhichlight allthinasareshowntous. Despite the increasing importance of the" Ianswer " section, the article,asAquinas uses it,isstilladynamic unit.Hisdoctrine is notfoundmerelyinthestatementofthemagister,butinthe relations among that statement, the arguments which called itforth, and the replies to those arguments.Iftaken alone, the " Ianswer " statementisgratuitious;itisakindoffloatinggeneralization worthyoftheabuse whichhasbeenheapedon" abstract "scho- lasticism.14But,inpointoffact,thestatementisnotfloatingor abstract atall.Itisfirmlytiedtotheseriesofparticulars from whichitemerges(inthearguments)andtowhichitreturnsat theendofthearticle(inthereplies).Thusthemovement,the internallife,ofthearticlefollows thevery movement ofthemind informulatingandresolvingaproblem.Perhapsthissuggestion canbecarried further:thearticle,asitappears intheworksof Aquinas,isfullymatureinthatitshows aharmony ofgrammar (the" reading "oftextsinthearguments)andlogic(theratio- cinationofthe"Ianswer").Andthesetwoartsarehappily weddedtothethird,rhetoric,forthearticlecommunicatesby means ofthatvery action in which Aquinas claims(S.T.,1, q.16, a.2)thattruthistobefound,theactionofcomposingand dividing. Thedisputed question persisted for at least another four hundred years afterthetimeofAquinas, butitsdynamism, which wehave 14 ThiseffectisillustratedwellinJosephRickaby'sAquinasEthitus (London,1896)wheretheeditorhasliftedanumberofthe"Ianswer" sectionsfromtheircontext,andinsodoinghasforfeitedanentiredimen- sionoftheSummaTheologica. 200TechniquesandFunctionoftheRenaissanceParadox hereemphasized,graduallydisappeared, andbytheendofthe sixteenth century thequaestio had only a name incommon withits forebear.Itsstructure had changed altogether,asaglanceatthe worksofSuarezwillshow.15Nowthequestionbeganwiththe enunciation ofathesis,and notuntilthathad been established by aseries ofproofs was another voice heard, raisingobjections(this timeinour modern sense oftheword, asobjections againstsome- thingalready setforth). ThedifferencebetweenthisformandtheformofAquinas' question isnot merely adifference oforder or sequence.Or, toput itanotherway,thedifferenceshowshowsignificanta " mere " changeinorder canbe.Byopeningwiththespecificobjections, whichrecreatetheverysituationofdoubt("Whether.. ."), Aquinasrestrictstheapplicationofhisgeneralprincipletothat onesituation.ButSuarez,byopeningwiththeassertionofa generalprinciple,claimsforthatprincipleavalidityindependent ofanyparticular situationofdoubt.Thustheprinciplebecomes primaryanduniversal,andcanbesuperimposed toresolveany subsequent andparticulardoubt.Andsothisdifference inexpo- sitionexpandsandbecomesadistinctionbetweentwokindsof philosophy. III Thesetwokindsofphilosophydonotbelongexclusivelyto differentperiodsofhistory,forwhileitistruethatthestatic, abstract disputedquestion had become theofficial languageofthe schoolsbytheearlysixteenthcentury,thatsameperiodsawthe startlingresurgenceoftheparadoxandofotherformsofthe dialogue,whichwereintheirmannerofexpositionfarcloserto Aquinas'disputedquestionthanwasitsdirectdescendant.The verydistinctionwhichwemake between AquinasandSuarez can 16Cf."...lesDisputationesnmetaphysicae,simeritoiressoient-elles,de FrangoisSuarez,n'ontplusdecommunquelenom,enp4dagogieintellectu- elle,aveclesquaestionesdisputataeduXIIIesiecle,"G.Pare,A.Brunet,P. Tremblay,LaRenaissanceduXIIesiMcle(Paris,1933),p.132.Quotedby Chenu,Introduction,p.81.ForacomparisonseeSummaTheologica,1, q.16,a.2,andSuarez,DisputationesMetaphysicae,VIII,i,whichdeal withsubstantiallythesameproblem.Whatwasonceatruedisputehas becomeaone-manshow.Inthelaterquestiononlyonevoiceisheard,both assertingtheproofsandrieportingtheobjections.Thedifferencebetween thethirteenth-andsixteenth-centuryquaestioisthedifferencebetweenthe analogicalandtheunivocal. A.E.Malloch201 be foundwithinthesixteenthcentury itself,adistinctionbetween stylesofexpositionandhencebetweenphilosophies.Irefrain fromcallingthesetwophilosophiessystems,becausetheydiffer fromeachotherassystemfrommode.Butthenameswemay givetothemare notofgreatimportance, aslongaswerecognize theirseparateidentitiesanddistinguishbetweentheone,which relieson a givensetofprinciples, and theother, whichreliesona givenmannerofapprehending orknowing. IntheRenaissance thesephilosophies are nowhere moreclearly distinguishedthan inthe first book ofMore's Utopia, a work which was aparadox initsoriginalform.16Hythlodayeisjustifyinghis refusaltooffer advice tothekingsofEurope: " Thysscholephilosophie[philosophiascholasticalisnotvnpleasaunte emongefryndesinfamyliercommunication;butinthecounsellesofkynges, wheregreatemattersbedebatedandreasonedwythgreataucthorytye,thies thyngeshauenoplace." "ThatisytwhycheImente"(quodhe),"whenIsaidphylosophye haddenoplaceamongekinges."" Indede "(quodI)"thisscholephi- losophiehathnot;whichethinkethallthyngesmeteforeueryplace[quae quiduisputetubiuisconuenire].Buttherisanotherphilosophyemore cyuyle,whycheknowethasyewoldesayeherownestage,andthereafter orderyngeandbehauyngeherselfeintheplayethatshehatheinhande, playetheherparteaccordynglyewithcomlynes,vtteringenothyngeowte ofdeweordreandfassyon[suaspartesconcinneetcumdecoro tutatur].....n 17 More(theMore inthedialogue)here proposes athoroughlyexis- tentialphilosophy,whichneverabstractsitselffromaparticular dramaofbeing.Thephilosophyisrelative,butonlyinamost guarded sense, for(thisphilosophy wouldimply)thoughtruthis alwaysrelativetohistoricalsituation,itisnotinvalidatedinthe marchofhistory.Truthisonethroughtheages,butnotinthe apprehension ofanygivenman,whoknows onlyaccording tothe potentialitiesofthatgivenmomentofhistoryinwhichhelives."8 16 WhatweknowasBookIIofUtopiawaswrittennearlyayearbefore BookI.BookIIaloneisaclassicalparadox,aPraiseofNowhere.What MoredidinwritingBookIwastocompletethedialoguebysupplyingthe otherspeakersanddefiningtheoccasionofHythlodaye'sdeclamation. 17 TheUtopiaofSirThomasMore,ed.J.H.Lupton(Oxford,1895), pp.97-98.ThiseditioncontainstheLatintextof1518andRobynson's 1551translation. 18Anextendedtreatmentofthisthememaybefoundinarecentbook byL.S.Thornton,RevelationandtheModernWorld(Westminster,1950), 202TechniquesandFunctionoftheRenaissanceParadox Theproponent, ontheother hand,ofthatuniversalistphilosophy ("whichethinketh allthynges mete for euery place ")arrogates to himselfaneternalview,whichbytheverynatureofhuman existencecannot be his. More's philosophy isoffirst importance foran understanding of thefunctionoftheparadox,forinthesixteenthcenturythis genreiscloselyassociatedwiththeliteratureofskepticism.A basic weapon oftheskeptics isthehistoricalsurvey ofknowledge andanattendantgloatingover thediversitiesofopiniononany givensubject.19 Butsuchatechniqueisnotacurtdismissalof knowledge.Ifwebear inmindDonne's words about thepurpose ofhisparadoxes(" iftheymake yo tofind better reasons against them theydo there office"),ifwe bear inmind thesuggestion that paradoxes are one halfofadialogue, thensuch works asErasmus' ThePraiseofFolly,Agrippa'sTheVanityofArtsandSciences, andMontaigne'sApologyforRaimondSebondbecomemethods offorcingthereadertoassert(withMfore) thatknowledgeis dramatic, i. e., that itis proportional to each historical scene.20And notonlydotheseworksleadtoaconclusionthatknowledgeis dramatic; their very way ofleadingisitselfdramatic. ThispaperbeganwithaletterbyDonne,inwhichhewarns hisfriend nottotake theparadoxes attheirface value("theyare nothings ");we may conclude withananalogous passage inwhich Montaignecompares paradoxicalargumenttoself-destruction: You,forwhomIhavetakenthepains...tostretchoutmytreatise tosuchalength,willnothesitatetodefendyourSebondwiththeordinary methodsofargumentinwhichyouareeverydayinstructed,andthusyou willexerciseyourwitandlearning;forthisfinalfencer'strick[i.e.,the paradox]shouldnotbeemployedexceptasalastresource.Itisadesperate esp.pp.31-32,132-133,191-192,318.ThorntonimpliesthattheChristian alonewillremainundisturbedattherealizationthatuniversalknowledge isbeyondthepowerofanysingleman,fortheChristianbelievesthattime isredeemed. "I Forexample,Montaignejuxtaposesopinionsonthenatureofthe deity," ApologyforRaimondSebond,"TheEssaysofMontaigne,trans. E.J.Trechmann(Oxford,1927),I,512-514. 20Eachoftheseauthorsattheendofhisworkdeprecatesthefoolish questforknowledgeandrecommendsthesavingfaith.Faithalone,because itenablesmantoparticipateintheeternal,cansatisfyman'sinstinctfor theuniversal.Theseparadoxescuttwoways:theyestablishMore's relativephilosophyandtheyestablishtheuniversal" philosophy"offaith. A.E.Malloch203 thrust,inwhichyouhavetoabandonyourweaponinordertodisarmyour adversary,andasecretrusewhichshouldbepractisedseldomandwith reserve.Itisaveryfoolhardythingtoloseyourlifeinordertokill another.21 This"desperatethrust"ofMontaigne,these"nothings"of Donne, are means ofcoping with material which isapparently self- contradictoryandthereforenotamenabletothetoolsoflogic. Logicoperatesuponconcepts,whicharebydefinitionabstracts fromtheworldofexistentthings.Paradoxcontrolsandmakes intelligiblethismultipleworldmuchastwonegativeunitsin algebra, whenmultiplied,bringforthapositiveanswer.22 Thisis nottoclaimaprofoundsignificanceforeveryoneofthemany short paradoxes penned by Renaissance wits:obviously the purpose oftheparadox wasoftenmerelytoexhibitacleverlyfabricated argument.Butintheextendedparadox(suchasTheVanityof Arts and Sciences or Donne's Biathanatos)the deliberate confusions of thisfabricated argument become the means ofilluminatingwhat hasbeencalled,mostrecentlybyGabriel Marcel, themysteryof being. McGillUniversity 21 "ApologyforRaimondSebond,"Essays,II,1.Cf.Fielding'sremark onthedeceptivenessofMontaigne'smethod(JosephAndrews,II,cap.1): "...intheseinscriptionsIhavebeenasfaithfulaspossible,notimitating thecelebratedMontaigne,whopromisesyouonethingandgivesyou another...."Cf.alsoastatementofSidney's(AnApologieforPoetrie, ed.J.ChurtonCollins[Oxford,1907],p.35)inwhichhedistinguishes twokindsofparadoxandassertsthedeceptivenessofErasmusand Agrippa:" WeeknowaplayingwitcanpraysethediscretionofanAsse, thecomfortablenessofbeingindebt,andtheiollycommoditieofbeeing sickoftheplague.Soofthecontraryside,ifwewillturneOuidsverse, Vtlateatvirtusproximitatemali,thatgoodlyehidinneerenesseofthe euill,AgrippawillbeasmerryinshewingthevanitieofScienceasErasmus wasincommendingoffollie.Neythershallanymanormatterescapesome touchofthesesmylingraylers.ButforErasmusandAgrippa,theyhad anotherfoundationthenthesuperficiallpartwouldpromise." 22 ThissubjectishandledveryfullybyHughKenner,Paradoxin Chesterton(London,1948),thoughheischieflyconcernedwithparadox therhetoricalfigure,whatPuttenhamcalled"theWondrer"(TheArte ofEnglishPoesie,ed.G.D.WillcockandAliceWalker[Cambridge,19361, p.226).SeealsoWalterJ.Ong,"WitandMystery,"Speculum,XXII (1947),310-341.