a dying creed? the demographic contradictions of liberal capitalism
TRANSCRIPT
A Dying Creed?
The Demographic Contradictions of Liberal
Capitalism
The Rise of Demography
• Where does demography fit in to social theory (vs. economy, culture, politics)?
• Technology-Mortality mechanism in the past• Values-Fertility mechanism in modernity?• Demographic Transition Uneven• Ethnic differentials have had political
ramifications, but are declining• Ethnic Makeover Accepted. What about religious
makeover?• Are religious populations more resistant to
transition than secular?
Demography and Politics?
• Early Christianity, spread from some 40 converts in 30 A.D. to over 6 million adherents by 300 A.D.
• Mormon church: 40 percent growth in past century, widening fertility gap
• Evangelical Protestant growth in the 20th c. US: ¾ demographic. 'Red states' have 12-point TFR advantage over 'Blue' in 2004 election
• Implications of the liberal-democratic-capitalist 'End of History' model
Q1: Secularisation
"As this book will demonstrate:
1. The publics of virtually all advanced industrial societies have been moving toward more secular orientations during the past fifty years. Nevertheless,
2. The world as a whole now has more people with traditional religious views than ever before-- and they constitute a growing proportion of the world's population." (Inglehart & Norris 2004)
• Which will dominate: religious fertility or secularisation?
Church Attendance, 1981-2004, 10 European Countries
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
1981
1990
2004
6 'Secular' Societies, attendance
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
1981
1990
2004
4 'Secularising' Societies, attendance
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
1981
1990
2004
Attendance by age, 2004, Catholic vs Protestant Countries
0
0.05
0.10.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.350.4
0.45
0.5
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
RC
Prot
Norway
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
Norway04
Norway81
Norway90
Ireland
00.10.20.30.40.50.60.70.80.9
1
18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
Ireland04
Ireland81
Ireland90
"Conservative, religiously minded Americans are putting far more of their genes into the future than their liberal, secular counterparts…[heavily Mormon] Utah annually produces 90 children for every 1,000 women of child-bearing age. By comparison, Vermont -- the only state to send a socialist to Congress and the first to embrace gay unions -- produces only 49…Fertility correlates strongly with religious conviction" – Philip Longman, The Empty Cradle (2004)
17.53
22.23
12.82
6.356.547.1
3.683.362.2
3.06
5.71
2.751.67
3.3
5.02
0
5
10
15
20
25
t-Stat
MaritalStatus
WeeklyAttendance
Sex Education Age
Predictor
Determinants of Fertility among those over 45, in 10 European Countries, 1981, 1990, 2004
1981 (EVS)
1990 (EVS)
2004 (ESS)
17.64
22.75
12.98
3.962.61
3.37 3.953.87
2.073.68
4.74.37
2.393.56
5.25
0
5
10
15
20
25
t-Stat
MaritalStatus
WeeklyAttendance
Sex Education Age
Predictor
Determinants of Fertility in 10 European Countries, 1981, 1990, 2004, with Country Controls
1981 (EVS)1990 (EVS)2004 (ESS)
12.22
14.56
10.74
0.250.140.15
2.931.310.58 1.31
4.332.96
0.571.370.13
02468
10121416
t-Stat
MaritalStatus
WeeklyAttendance
Sex Education Age
Predictor
Determinants of Fertility, 1981-2004, 5 'Secular' Countries
1981 (EVS)
1990 (EVS)
2004 (ESS)
12.59
16.83
8.24
4.746.22
8.3
2.373.51
2.32 2.413.291.96
3.23.555.96
02468
1012141618
t-Stat
MaritalStatus
WeeklyAttendance
Sex Education Age
Predictor
Determinants of Fertility, 1981-2004, 5 'Secularising' Countries
1981 (EVS)
1990 (EVS)
2004 (ESS)
Religiosity: Spain, W. Germany, Norway, Sweden, 1981-97
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
1981
1990
1997
11.32
14.41
10.81
1.463.012.94 2.8
0.990.061.34
4.133.01
1.040.750.35
02468
10121416
t-Stat
MaritalStatus
Religiosity Sex Education Age
Predictor
Predictors of Fertility in 5 'Secular' European Countries, 1981-2004
1981 (EVS)
1990 (EVS)
2004 (ESS)
12.13
16.69
8.46
2.012.294.76
2.43.92
2.27 1.633.021.76
3.174.376.49
0
5
10
15
20
t-Stat
MaritalStatus
Religiosity Sex Education Age
Predictor
Predictors of Fertility in 5 'Secularising' European Countries, 1981-2004
1981 (EVS)
1990 (EVS)
2004 (ESS)
12.22
14.56
10.74
0.250.140.15
2.931.310.58 1.31
4.332.96
0.571.370.13
02468
10121416
t-Stat
MaritalStatus
WeeklyAttendance
Sex Education Age
Predictor
Determinants of Fertility, 1981-2004, 5 'Secular' Countries
1981 (EVS)
1990 (EVS)
2004 (ESS)12.59
16.83
8.24
4.746.22
8.3
2.373.51
2.32 2.413.291.96
3.23.555.96
02468
1012141618
t-Stat
MaritalStatus
WeeklyAttendance
Sex Education Age
Predictor
Determinants of Fertility, 1981-2004, 5 'Secularising' Countries
1981 (EVS)
1990 (EVS)
2004 (ESS)
11.32
14.41
10.81
1.463.012.94 2.8
0.990.061.34
4.133.01
1.040.750.35
02468
10121416
t-Stat
MaritalStatus
Religiosity Sex Education Age
Predictor
Predictors of Fertility in 5 'Secular' European Countries, 1981-2004
1981 (EVS)
1990 (EVS)
2004 (ESS) 12.13
16.69
8.46
2.012.294.76
2.43.92
2.27 1.633.021.76
3.174.376.49
0
5
10
15
20
t-Stat
MaritalStatus
Religiosity Sex Education Age
Predictor
Predictors of Fertility in 5 'Secularising' European Countries, 1981-2004
1981 (EVS)
1990 (EVS)
2004 (ESS)
Conclusion: Secularisation
• Variation in Patterns of Secularisation• Europe has secularised in terms of church
attendance, but not in terms of religious feeling• In Europe, more religious (Catholic) countries
are secularising faster, less religious (mainly Protestant) countries have flatlined at very low (5-10%) levels of church attendance
• USA has not secularised
Conclusion: Fertility
• After marital status, church attendance and religiosity among the strongest predictors of individual fertility
• Seems to be increasing its predictive power in secularising (Catholic) countries
• In secular (Protestant) countries, church attendance insignificant, but religiosity significantly predicts fertility
• Future Research: USA, Islamic world, demographic predictions, 2000-2050
http://www.sneps.net/RD/religdem.html
http://www.sneps.net/RD/religdem.html