A DSA/DFID High-level Policy Forum coordinated by the Institute for Development Studies and the Overseas Development Institute Workshop Report The Law Society, 114-115 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1PR 2 May 2007

Contents

Executive Summary iii Introduction 1 Keynote speakers 2 Working group summaries 5

Conflict management 5 What is China’s contribution to African development? 9 Aid effectiveness and absorptive capacity: Which way aid reform and accountability? 11 e-Africa and m-Africa: How can ICTs deliver? 15 Combating corruption in Africa: What can donors do? 17 Voice in international institutions 21 Climate change: An opportunity for Africa? 23 Civic engagement and accountability 25

Summary recommendations 29 Key messages to the G8 29

Closing discussion 31 Panel discussion 31 Concluding remarks 32

Appendix 1: Agenda 34 Appendix 2: Presentations 35 Appendix 3: Speakers’ biographies 52 Appendix 4: Background documents 53 Appendix 5: Additional resources 55 Appendix 6: Stakeholder consultation questionnaire 57

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Executive Summary The Commission for Africa reported two years ago. What has changed since? What progress has been made? What needs to be done next? The net result of a consultation with African stakeholders, two plenaries, eight workshops, and 150 participants is summed up below. Is Africa in a better state than in 2005? Yes, progress has been made on economic growth and stability. The politics are being addressed. In short, we’re optimistic. Of course, concerns remain. Particularly so in a number of specific countries such as Sudan and Zimbabwe to name but two. Did the CfA report have a lasting impact on policy? Yes, but not enough. The report has not yet been fully translated into policy. Debt relief is tangible. Political commitment in and outside Africa is real. There is recognition that governance matters. The lasting impact of the CfA has been to put Africa on the G8 radar and to awaken politicians and increasingly populations inside and outside Africa to focus on what can be done. What should the G8 do to next? A lasting, tangible G8 impact in Africa requires the G8 to continue the conversation with Africa, to deliver on the 2005 commitments (especially so aid targets), and in particular to do what the G8 does best – provide global leadership – and to do this with a focus on what we might call the ‘seven Cs’: 1. Consult: continue listening to Africa by ensuring African leaders are invited to the G8’s meetings and play a tangible role in IMF and World Bank governance thorough accountability loops such as evaluations and reviews. 2. Conflict: commit to the proposal for an international treaty to regulate small arms and weapons. 3. Climate change: lead on the post-2012 agenda and provide technical assistance to Africa to address climate change adaptation. 4. Corruption: persuade the remaining G8 members to sign up to the UN Convention Against Corruption and provide financial support to NEPAD’s African Peer Review Mechanism for effective documentation and dissemination of the APRM’s procedures, processes, findings and lessons learnt. 5. Communication technology: launch an ‘African Digital Enterprise Initiative’ to stimulate African IT sector growth and a Mobile Opportunities TaskForce (MOTForce) to harness the development potential of mobile telecoms. 6. China: provide technical assistance for Africa to evaluate aid, trade and investment from donors, old and new. 7. Civic engagement: create democratic spaces, channels, and forums for civil society perspectives to feed into the G8 preparation processes as they do at the UN.

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Introduction Professor Cecile Jackson welcomed participants and reminded the audience about the role and importance of the Development Studies Association (DSA). Simon Maxwell introduced the first plenary by summarising the ‘exam question’ for the day, which was to draw lessons from the experience of 2005 as the year of international development, including the publication of the Report of the Africa Commission, and to look forward to the G8 in Heiligendamm, Germany, in June 2007. In particular, the focus was not so much on African development as a topic in itself, but rather on the G8’s role in contributing to that objective. The organisers of the conference had commissioned a small survey of African policy-makers and others to inform the debate (see Appendix 6). The main conclusions (see Presentation 1 in Appendix 2) were that the Africa Commission Report had made an important contribution, especially in influencing donor policies; that it was still relevant; and that Africa had made good progress since 2005, especially in terms of growth; however, there was an important lag in translating growth into poverty reduction.

Simon Maxwell, ODI Director, introduced the plenary session.

Justin Forsyth and Her Excellency Lindiwe Mabuza delivered keynote speeches at the first plenary session.

Delegates networked during the breaks

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Keynote speakers The first speaker was Justin Forsyth, the UK Prime Minister’s Special Adviser on international development. He noted the remarkable coalition on international development in the UK and the progress made over the 10 years of the Labour Government. Aid had increased three times, 100% multilateral debt cancellation had been achieved, UK aid had been untied, and the UK had been at the forefront of initiatives such as the arms trade treaty. The Africa Commission (AC) had been designed to create the intellectual case for action at Gleneagles – in the same way that the Stern Report provided the foundation for work on climate change. Winning the argument was always an important first step. For example, the AC had shown that an increase in aid was valuable as part of a wider strategy, a comprehensive package. Partnership was a key idea, with both Africa and donors making contributions, and aid as only one of the elements.

Justin Forsyth, Special Adviser to the UK Prime Minister on international development

Gleneagles had been an important step. Views on its outcomes had been polarised from strongly positive to strongly negative. However, it had adopted 50 of the 80 recommendations of the Africa Commission. Many of these had had to be fought for, up to the last minute. The text had not been agreed in advance, for example on universal access to AIDS treatment. The agreement on the extra $50bn of aid for Africa was not agreed until the Friday morning, only a few minutes before the communiqué was issued. Other valuable outcomes were the agreement to multilateral debt relief, a commitment to free universal primary education, training for African peacekeepers, ratification of the Convention on corruption, and many others. There was disappointment on trade, where hopes had been high, but less progress had been made: the focus was on export subsidies, where no progress was made at Gleneagles, though there was useful wording on other aspects, for example duty and quota free access. In summation, Gleneagles ‘ticked most of the boxes’. Two years on from Gleneagles, progress had been good but mixed. The German G8 needed to maintain the momentum, and it was good that Africa and climate change were on the agenda. On the positive side, the poll findings indicated progress. Six major conflicts had come to an end (not all since 2005), though there were still major problems in Darfur and Somalia, among others. Steps towards free and fair elections had been taken in 60 different cases. Internationally, aid had gone up, though not as quickly as needed – by about $2bn p.a. excluding debt relief. 17 or 18 countries had received debt relief, which in turn had released $500m of extra resources for poverty programmes. The International Finance Facility for Immunisation Company (IFFIm) had been launched. The Global Fund had raised more than $10bn. There had been a ten-fold increase in the number of people on ARVs. The Fast-Track Education Initiative had made good progress. 26 donors had signed up to EITI. And so on. Justin referred participants to the DFID website for details of progress on specific recommendations. Some donors were off track, of course, which was why the German G8 was important. The momentum needed to be kept up in terms of campaigning. The priorities should be (a) reaffirmation of Gleneagles commitment, especially with regard to aid, with specific timetables and an arrangement for regular monitoring; (b) agreement to an education initiative to provide long-term funding of long-term education plans; (c) a big package on universal access to HIV/AIDS treatment, perhaps especially for maternal-child transmission; and (d) progress on trade, especially a development package which could be taken to the WTO. There were some signs that a breakthrough on trade might be possible, by September if not July; the gap was very small, a few billion only.

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The second speaker was the South African High Commissioner, H.E. Lindiwe Mabuza. She set her assessment of the current state of Africa in the context of colonialism (and the slave trade) and the decolonisation process. Africa’s development had been held back by being a playground for Cold War politics. Development prospects were better now than they had been for two centuries. Democracy was spreading in the continent and governance was better. Growth rates were now over 5%, underpinned by better macro-economic management, but were still low compared to development objectives. Few African countries would achieve the MDGs by 2015. More investment was needed in education particularly, including gender equality in education, and health. HIV/AIDS and malaria were particular problems. Higher growth would need more investment in infrastructure, better macro-economic management and more foreign investment. Africa’s commitment was reflected in NEPAD, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, which embraced many sectoral initiatives and also a peer-review mechanism on governance. The African Peer Review Mechanism was a flagship programme; 26 countries had acceded to the APRM and the first set of reports had been published on Ghana, Rwanda and South Africa.

Her Excellency Lindiwe Mabuza, The South African High Commissioner

Another key initiative was the African Union’s Peace and Security Commission, which provided a framework for conflict prevention, management and resolution, and provided for the establishment of a stand-by force. A third initiative was on infrastructure, which had generated new investment. Donors had established the Africa Infrastructure Consortium. The Commission on Africa and Gleneagles Summit has been influential, along with the Make Poverty History campaign. The Gleneagles Summit had provided a framework for holding governments to account for their commitments, and consolidated the achievements of the Africa Plan of Action agreed at the Cananaskis Summit. It was important to monitor commitments. South Africa called on the African Partnership Forum and the APR support unit, the G8, the EU partnership for Africa, and many others in civil society to continue their work. Priorities included: debt relief; governance; peace-keeping (including funding of AU actions); further support for the Global Fund; more and better aid, including implementation of the Paris agenda on harmonisation and alignment; trade reform; and further support to NEPAD. Germany had been active on the African agenda at the G8 and Chancellor Merkel had shown leadership in creating the psychological mood for further progress to be made. African positions needed to be included in the framework document being prepared. Summarising the two keynote presentations, Simon Maxwell identified a story line – that Africa was making good progress and one more big heave was needed. This needed discussion. There were debates about conflict, about absorptive capacity for aid, and about the continuing gap between African and Asian growth rates. In the discussion, key points made included:

• The role of the G8. It could put things on the agenda but had very little scope for generating discussions (e.g. on trade, where legal authority rested with the WTO). Expectations should be saled accordingly.

• The limited scope for a genuine trade deal, given the expiry of US Fast Track authority – although Aid for Trade had potential.

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• The need to clarify the timetable for – and securing a favourable outcome from – negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements between the EU and African countries.

• The dangers of free trade, given competition from China and India, and the possible need for African industrial development to receive protection.

• The value of monitoring, and the possibility of internationalising the new UK framework for monitoring progress towards 0.7% and also reporting on all aspects of government policy affecting developing countries.

• The possibility of leveraging additional resources from diasporas, including taxing remittances. • The importance of private sector involvement. • The value of the proposed new UN entity on gender, which the G8 should support. • The desirability of the G8 adopting a code of conduct on the ethical recruitment of health

workers, as already adopted by the Commonwealth. • The need for greater participation of African countries in the G8. • The need to provide more debt cancellation, since Africa had received only about one tenth of

the debt relief needed.

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Working group summaries See Appendix 2 for all the workshop pointpoint slides.

Conflict management Funmi Olonisakin, Kings College and Phil Vernon, Director of Programmes, Africa and Peace Building, International Alert Summary

25 countries in Africa have experienced armed conflict since 1995, which constitutes approximately 50% of all African countries. Between nine and 11 of these were still experiencing conflict. There is much evidence showing that states moving from autocratic to democratic regimes (transitional states) are more likely to succumb to armed conflict scenarios. Causal factors contributing to conflict in Africa could be inequality, stronger states in Africa and environmental factors, especially climate change, which will affect all African countries. It will not be possible to make progress on development goals unless effective responses to conflict are developed. Many cases of conflict in Africa have been dealt with by the UN Security Council over the past five years. However, the real crises are in countries where there are low intensity conflicts. The future conflict management ‘terrain’ will be very much determined by the ‘youth bulge’ in the populations of African countries, which will itself exert many potentially conflict-causing pressures on those populations, e.g. youth unemployment leading to resentment, restlessness and increased vulnerability to recruitment by warlords, etc. The policy implications of this situation are that it is absolutely necessary to sharpen and align the policy tools available to effectively meet the challenges of this new environment. Secondly, it will be necessary to look beyond current crises to longer term security and development scenarios. Report

Funmi Olonisakin began her presentation by stating that it was encouraging to see so many people from both the development and humanitarian communities coming together, as that is how she believes successful conflict management can come about. She also stated that it will not be possible to make progress on development goals unless effective responses to conflict are developed. She went on to say that there have been many cases of conflict in Africa which have been dealt with by the UN Security Council over the past five years. As such, there have been three trends in conflict management in this period (slide 1). Despite this, there has been a large reduction in conflict in Angola, and the DRC is on the verge of this. The implications for actors (slide 2) of these trends are that the AU lags seriously behind. She observed that it was also interesting to hear about conflict potentially being put on the UN agenda, but warned, however, that there is limited capacity at all levels regarding operationalisation. The implications for actors in terms of responding to conflict in Africa (slide 3) are that it is extremely difficult to be more strategic. The real crises are in countries where there are low intensity conflicts. The future conflict management ‘terrain’ (slide 4) will be very much determined by the ‘youth bulge’ in the populations of African countries, which will itself exert many potentially conflict-causing pressures on those populations, e.g. youth unemployment leading to resentment, restlessness and increased vulnerability to recruitment by warlords. The policy implications of this situation (slide 5) are that it is absolutely necessary to sharpen and align the policy tools available to effectively meet the challenges of this new environment. Secondly, it will be necessary to look beyond current crises to longer term security and development scenarios. Further

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policy implications (slide 6) include the need for a multi-track approach, which includes the military interface, and regional policy frameworks which promote a more proactive approach to common governance that includes conflicts which may not necessarily escalate into large scale armed conflicts. Funmi concluded by stating that the future crisis lies within the state, as that is where the potential for future action lies. We need to pierce the veil of sovereignty in order to address the common security challenge which faces all African and sub-Saharan African states. Phil Vernon began his presentation with the observation that the first plenary of this event had consisted mainly of listing things which have already happened or been achieved. He termed this the ‘technical approach to progress’, stating that he preferred a more ‘impressionistic’ approach, as if looking through slightly blurred glasses. He explained that he would be covering three main points in the course of his presentation:

• Tendencies/trends in conflict in Africa • Fragile states • His recommendations for higher level action

On the first point, he stated that 25 countries in Africa have experienced armed conflict since 1995, which constitutes approximately 50% of all African countries. Between nine and 11 of these were still experiencing conflict, however conflicts do not just go away and there is no room for complacency. Two interrelated trends of interest observable around conflict in Africa are factors which act as causes of conflict and Africa’s geo-strategic position within the world. Causal factors contributing to conflict in Africa could be:

• divergence between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’ within Africa (i.e. rural/urban, ethnic/religious groups).

• the growing strength of some African states. As states get stronger, there may be more of a tendency for them to go to war more often – this would be a new trend as there has not been a great deal of inter-state warfare in Africa in recent years.

• environmental factors, especially climate change, which will affect all African countries. 80% of Africans are employed in agriculture which is environmentally dependent. If this changes, there will be much loss of livelihoods, and communities consisting of large numbers of people with nothing to do living in poverty are much more likely to result in localised violence than those with the majority of their inhabitants employed.

• Africa’s geo-strategic position in the world: on this, there are three inter-related points: o The War on Terror (especially, for example, in Somalia in recent weeks) has had a

deleterious effect on the continent. The G8-led approach to combating terror is playing out like the Cold War did decades before. This puts African countries in second place behind G8 countries’ geo-strategic interests.

o The role of China in Africa – China’s grappling for Africa’s natural resources is very much playing into local conflicts within Africa. This is especially evident in Sudan currently.

o Some people (e.g. in the US) want to create a discourse around the conflict between China and the West regarding competition for natural resources, which is having a deleterious effect on Africa.

There is much evidence showing that states moving from autocratic to democratic regimes (transitional states) are more likely to succumb to armed conflict scenarios. A more descriptive term for fragile ‘states’ would be fragile ‘polities’ as this gets away from the state- or government-oriented focus of the transitional situation. Fragile means weak at managing conflict peacefully, which means that many more risky situations will be resolved by resorting to violence. This all shows that the West should handle its relationship with Africa with care, and should do so with ‘conflict sensitivity’. The G8 is not yet handling Africa with the sensitivity it deserves.

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The issue of governance has received much attention but as aid mostly goes to governments, it ends up strengthening the distortions that already exist. For example, in Uganda, there are huge amounts of G8 aid but parliaments and civil society have to strengthen themselves in ways that cannot be done primarily through the help of aid supplied from outside. It is possible to improve the judiciary but it is still impossible to ‘make’ ineffectual judiciaries effective purely with the addition of aid money. It is possible however to spend masses of aid money through the Executive, but if this is not done in a careful way, it will simply act to make the already existing power distortions bigger, giving rise to a situation which is more likely to result in armed conflict. Therefore, the G8’s focus should actually be on aid quality and outcomes, rather than its volume. The aim should be for a reduction in fragility and this should be a key focus for the G8 meeting. At the moment, aid is largely conflict-blind, which is not surprising, as most aid is seen as technical, rather than overtly political. Peace-building should be put at the heart of the G8 agenda and a focus on Africa will also focus minds. Africans should also be encouraged to improve their own polities. The ‘socialisation of China’ into the international system should also be a priority as China is very active in Africa and they do respond to certain types of pressures, e.g. if pressure is applied in a quiet but concerted way, but this can only be done if the G8 countries work together. Phil also observed that civil society needs to challenge the way the G8 engages with Africa in general, especially with regards to conflict situations and that non-violent solutions to conflicts need to be found. Discussion

Points and questions raised in the discussion included: • An overlooked element is the role of the private sector, e.g. security providers, and the

challenge of how to ensure that they conduct themselves in a responsible way on the ground. Also, in terms of the youth bulge and youth unemployment – there is a need to create an environment for investment to enable the creation of jobs. This is a particular challenge in fragile states. Also, on the role of multi-national corporations, the actions of which sometimes contribute to conflict, e.g. in DRC – how can we ensure that they do not increase the likelihood of, or exacerbate conflict?

• Quick-fix management solutions will not work with regards to the immediate security situation – the view that there has to be a military solution or chaos will reign is wrong.

• There is much to be gained from China’s involvement in Africa – there is a need to examine the motivation behind their interest, and after the havoc caused by external interference on the continent during the Cold War, this needs to be managed very carefully.

• Human rights are not optional – they are a muscular priority for a stable society and should be treated as such. Funmi replied that there was no specific reference to human rights in her Opinion, but that the current pace of democratisation in Africa cannot deal with all these concepts. For example, the recent Nigerian elections demonstrated that we cannot necessarily expect it to take a lead role in the issues affecting the continent.

• The over-emphasis on the market and on profit in our culture is deleterious. If the gains of the market are the only factor worth considering, then everything, even corruption, is open to the market. There is a need to re-emphasise ethics and to re-establish what really matters to humanity. Adam Smith’s first book was about ethics, not the market – so we need to play the market with a ethical dimension.

• Intellectually, the 0.7% aid argument is very dangerous as a basis for an aid programme, but it is required politically, otherwise the argument itself will become marginalised.

• China and the West is the new Cold War. We need multi-lateralisation not globalisation. Democracy and human rights are not essential if people are starving.

• The solutions to Africa’s problems need to come from within and need to address issues such as religion and tribalism. Funmi replied that to expect a solution to come from within Africa is a huge challenge. The ruling classes manipulate tribalism and religion, and do not deal with poverty.

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• There is a need to understand the realities of poverty, disease and tribalism. • The diaspora populations must be involved – often, they are highly qualified. • Somaliland is a great example of how a society can be created. Both speakers hinted at the fact

that the military cannot be relied upon for peace-building, but in Europe, we still recruit multi-national military teams to go to Kosovo for example. ‘Peace workers’ is an attempt to deal with issues like this in Europe. Having lots of different bits of the UN all working in Africa – is that adequate, or should African civilians also be trained?

• The Ethiopian attack on and kidnap of Chinese workers there symbolises the position China now has in Africa.

• Will Chinese involvement in Africa also include risk-taking, i.e. intervening in conflicts? • The involvement of Africans in solving their conflicts is vital. External interventions and aid

often cause more problems than they solve. Is there still a place for external intervention in Africa, e.g. through the UN, or should there be more support/training for Africans in such roles? Funmi replied that ‘conflict management’ necessarily implies the need to improve the peacebuilding capacity of Africans themselves, particularly to aid the transition from conflict to development. Previously, military capacity has been the sole focus, which is necessary in order to reach the peacebuilding stage, but is only the first step. If there was a development goal from the outset, the military approach would be different. ‘Backstopping’ has a very limited use. Even the UN is still grappling with these challenges. There is definitely still a role for external peacekeepers however, even though the reality is that non-Africans are reluctant to die for Africans. Long-term as well as short-term frameworks are needed to make this work. Phil replied that asking whether external or African interventions are the answer was the wrong question, as the solution would depend upon each individual situation.

• Right to talk about fragile states, inequities and causes of conflict, and so on. Human rights are also crucial to this agenda. What does ‘conflict management’ really mean? Is it how we help prevent conflict and broker peace afterwards? Does it involve the protection of civilians? What is the role for the UN Peacebuilding Commission, the International Criminal Court (ICC) and international justice? Asylum policy needs to be included as it cannot always support people in situ. These are all interrelated sub-agendas. Funmi replied that local justice processes are important too and these need to be faced head-on.

• Bringing development and security together needs to go further. There is still a big divide, especially with regards to the UN Security Council agenda. They need to be brought together, which will take time, but it is necessary.

• There is a need for more commitment and willingness on the part of the G8 countries to intervene.

Recommendations to the G8

Since Gleneagles, the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) has been adopted. This has to be taken into account. Africa is also a continent of fragile states. This means:

• Reducing fragility through a long-term sustainable approach as a way of achieving the MDGs, e.g. sustained youth engagement and employment, economic investment as part of peacebuilding, e.g. Darfur.

• Resolve the contradictions between the rhetoric and the geo-strategic interests of the G8 members in Africa, e.g. in Somalia.

• Expand the constituency of actors to include the African diaspora, the private sector, non-military groups, and promote the socialisation of China.

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What is China’s contribution to African development? John Humphrey, IDS and Andrew Lawson, ODI Summary

Africa likes the no-nonsense pragmatic approach adopted by China in relation to its investment. China does impose conditionality of a sort; support for the ‘One China’ policy, no criticism of China’s own human rights record and tied aid, including labour acceptance in Africa and no external criticism of its bilateral relations with other states. This is based on the premise of the Bandung Principles and China’s self perception as a fellow poor country. African states are not buying the ‘we are a poor country, too’ card and concern is mounting about cheap Chinese manufactures and labour flows. The difficulty for China is that African concerns go to the heart of Chinese policy and whilst China is sensitive to Africa (and the West’s) negative perceptions, it may find it difficult to balance good relations with national interests. As a result, there is now scope for changing China’s policies, but the biggest challenge will be to understand what is changeable and how best to pressure for change. The current OECD strategy is to pressure China to fall in line with Western practice; it is the badly behaving new kid on the block which needs a development ASBO imposed on it. Other Southern donors, such as India, may behave similarly but are not so easy to criticise. China feels it is being treated like a little brother, forced to play the game the Western way and is frustrated by its hypocrisy and over confidence in the current set of Western solutions. China would be more willing to collaborate on development issues in the right forum, for example the UN, which is not dominated by OECD countries and has more developing country representation. The growth of ‘no strings attached’ aid may defer much needed economic and political reforms. OECD-DAC members fear the growing influence of China in Africa but Andrew Lawson argues that a different perspective is needed. The OECD’s engagement strategy with China needs to be one of co-operation, not of preacher, if it wishes to encourage China’s involvement in trade and aid rule systems from which it is currently excluded. Report

Andrew Lawson began by posing the question ‘Should we worry about Chinese aid in Africa?’. He explored this question by sharing his reflections on the role of China in Africa, particularly in relation to aid flows, and the challenges China poses to OECD’s development policy on Africa. He also questioned whether China’s Aid to Africa really is growing and whether this is verifiable given the limited data available. Andrew highlighted concerns among western political leaders regarding China’s indiscriminate aid policies regardless of the democratic or human rights record of recipients. He argued for an analysis of China-Africa relations set within the wider context of China-Africa-OECD relations. He continued by talking about the impact China’s investment contracts are having on internal African development capacities, but went on to pose an alternative perspective on China’s aid policy, arguing that it could provide an opportunity for peace promotion and co-operation in the region. Andrew then outlined seven key points:

• China’s development posture is informed by the Bandung Principles, pragmatic trade and investment policy, and belief in its right to operate bilaterally without external criticism or sanction.

• There are strong historical, political and economic reasons underlying positive China-Africa relations.

• China poses a challenge to the OECD’s development policy in Africa. The unpopularity of OECD-donor community conditionality clauses contrast to the apparent indiscriminate nature of China’s investment policies. The growth of ‘no strings attached’ aid may defer much needed economic and political reforms.

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• OECD-DAC members fear the growing influence of China in Africa but Andrew argued that a different perspective is needed. China is one of several ‘new players’ and DAC member aid flows will continue to dwarf that of China.

• China still faces challenges in Africa. African states have residual worries about China’s tying of aid which increase the costs to African states but leave diminished benefits. African leaders have become tougher negotiators and China has witnessed a growing backlash against the cheap flow of labour and products following Beijing investment.

• The OECD’s engagement strategy with China needs to be one of co-operation, not of preacher, if it wishes to encourage China’s involvement in trade and aid rule systems from which it is currently excluded.

He finished by summarising steps made by the OECD-DAC to address the challenges posed by China’s engagement in Africa and whilst more is needed, they have opened avenues of dialogue. John Humphrey followed Andrew’s presentation by making some observations about China and Africa, and how China’s policy towards Africa might be influenced. He also posed the question ‘How might China change the G8’s policies towards Africa for the better?’ Reflecting on a series of roundtable events held by IDS last year, he identified two clear messages that resonated from the discussions. The first was that China is well organised in its engagement in Africa, with a clear strategy for getting what it wants. Africa, in contrast, does not have a clearly defined strategy of engagement with China, primarily because it does not have a collective view. Secondly, this sentiment gives an underlying sense of a weak African continent, fundamentally powerless and acted upon. Contesting this perception, John explored ways in which Africa can influence China and argued that China is, in fact, still feeling its way in Africa. He went on to talk about the unexpected challenges which are making its proclaimed position as an anti-imperialist power difficult to sustain.

John Humphrey, IDS

John highlighted the realpolitik of China’s interest in Africa, particularly its economic interests. He argued, however, that China is in fact becoming an important export market for Africa, already the third largest after the US and France. Quoting Stephen Chan from SOAS he said ‘it is an Africa scramble for China, more than the other way round’ (Prospect, September 2006). He continued by outlining nine key points:

• Africa likes the no-nonsense pragmatic approach adopted by China in relation to its investment and aid policies, and this is building resentment to structural tagging as adopted by the key international financial institutes (IMF, World Bank).

• China in Africa should be viewed in the broader context of trilateral relations; China, Africa and the G8. It is essential that China does not operate, and should not be viewed, in isolation.

• China does impose conditionality of a sort; support for the ‘One China’ policy, no criticism of China’s own human rights record and tied aid, including labour acceptance in Africa and no external criticism of its bilateral relations with other states. This is based on the premise of the Bandung Principles and China’s self perception as a fellow poor country.

• African states are not buying the ‘we are a poor country, too’ card and concern is mounting about cheap Chinese manufactures and labour flows.

• The difficulty for China is that African concerns go to the heart of Chinese policy and whilst China is sensitive to Africa (and the West’s) negative perceptions, it may find it difficult to balance good relations with national interests.

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• As a result, there is now scope for changing China’s policies but the biggest challenge will be to understand what is changeable and how best to pressure for change.

• The current OECD strategy is to pressure China to fall in line with Western practice; it is the badly behaving new kid on the block which needs a development ASBO imposed on it. Other Southern donors, such as India, may behaviour similarly but are not so easy to criticise.

• China feels it is being treated like a little brother, forced to play the game the Western way and is frustrated by its hypocrisy and over confidence in the current set of Western solutions.

• China would be more willing to collaborate on development issues in the right forum, for example the UN, which is not dominated by OECD countries and has more developing country representation.

John concluded that ultimately China needs Africa and will find it difficult to ignore a united African voice with a clear message. He asked how this ‘African voice’ could be defined, especially with such a diverse membership. He then initiated the discussion by asking what role the G8 should, and should not play, in helping Africa and in reflecting on its own behaviour. Discussion

The following points and questions were raised in the discussion: • There is a danger of euro-centrism in our analysis of the China-Africa relationship and much is

based on speculation. • Can there be a united voice for Africa, or indeed one view of China when it is not a homogenous

state? Perhaps individual interest groups working through appropriate multilateral forums may prove more effective.

• Is it possible to conceive of Chinese aid, resulting in infrastructure development, trained personal and expanded trade, alongside traditional DAC assistance? China’s engagement is often perceived as fair by African states as it is not paternalistic or focused on ‘donor darlings’.

• China is not the only ‘new player’ to be considered and is not only ‘invading’ Africa. A broader debate about the ‘new players’ may be more appropriate, especially as aid without ties threatens to take the pressure off internal reforms within African states.

• The G8 could rigorously support an International Code of Conduct on the governance and regulation of aid/loan agreements which all players, including the G8, must adhere to.

• The African landscape is changing rapidly and the G8 need to review their assumptions of how aid/trade works and how it could bring China into the fold in a meaningful way.

• The G8 could support Africa in holding China and other players to account, to ensure proper appraisal of projects and cope with the challenges posed by globalisation.

Key messages to the G8

• The rise of ‘new players’ in the global economy changes the African landscape – the G8 must continually review its commitments.

• These new players, not just China, highlight the importance of trade and investment as well as aid.

• All investors have blind spots. The G8 should support Africa’s capacity to assess the performance of all donors and investors, G8 and non-G8.

• China merely highlights the need for improved global regulation on corruption, trade and investment issues. This applies to the G8 as well as the new players.

Aid effectiveness and absorptive capacity: Which way aid reform and accountability? Paolo de Renzio, ODI and University of Oxford, and Christopher Adam, University of Oxford Summary

Figures from the DAC show an overall fall in aid levels in 2006 compared to 2005, although aid to sub-Saharan Africa (excluding debt relief to Nigeria) has risen slightly. A number of G8 members have been unable to convince domestic constituencies that fulfilling the 2005 commitment to double aid is a

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priority. Scaling up is not happening for two proposed reasons: concerns about absorptive capacity and worries about governance in aid recipient countries. Donor anxiety about absorption is pervasive and has contributed, in part, to the slower than expected increase in aid since 2005. This reflects a general expression of concern about giving aid; not necessarily about this specific macroeconomic issue. Nevertheless, we are at a point where we know what the main challenges are and what to do about them. Report

Paolo de Renzio began by contrasting two quotations from Kofi Annan, an aid advocate, and Bill Easterly, an aid sceptic. Last month, Annan said ‘The commitment is that by 2010 there will be an additional $25 billion dollars for development assistance. In 2005 we did very well. In 2006 we are sliding a bit, and unless we step up and make available about $5 billion dollars a year moving forward, we will not meet that target. [...] The global economy is growing and we should seize this unique opportunity to try and push forward our efforts to get Africa on the right track.’ On the other hand, at the end of last year, Easterly claimed ‘The theory that the end of poverty will be achieved by an aid-financed big push has been around since the 1940s; its repeated failure has led most students of this history to abandon it.’ Who is nearer the mark?

Paolo de Renzio, ODI and University of Oxford.

Paolo presented figures to answer the question ‘Is scaling up really happening?’. Figures from the DAC show an overall fall in aid levels in 2006 compared to 2005, although aid to sub-Saharan Africa (excluding debt relief to Nigeria) has risen slightly. He argued that a number of G8 members have been unable to convince domestic constituencies that fulfilling the 2005 commitment to double aid is a priority. He went on to ask why scaling up is not happening and proposed two reasons: concerns about absorptive capacity and worries about governance in aid recipient countries. There are four elements to arguments about absorptive capacity:

• Concerns of donors about macroeconomic management of aid flows in recipient countries; • Government capacity to use resources effectively; • The impact of aid on domestic institutions. Would scaling up undermine government

accountability to domestic constituencies? • Donors behaving in a fragmented way, for example, not providing predictable flows of aid.

On governance, three factors are key:

• Worries about poor governance are making donors uncomfortable; • The examples of Ethiopia and Uganda have seriously undermined donors’ approaches to aid

and ‘good governance’; • The African Peer Review Mechanism is making slow progress.

Paolo went on to pose the question ‘How can we arrive at recommendations for the G8?’ and set out the four ‘aid narratives’ that exist at the moment. He contrasted the views of Jeffrey Sachs, Bill Easterly, Hilary Benn and George W. Bush. Sachs argues for an externally driven ‘big push’ using initiatives such as the Millennium Villages project and technical assistance. In contrast, Bill Easterly argues for ‘letting things happen’, minimal external resources and building on what works in countries. Hilary Benn would like to see a ‘big push’ but based on internally driven processes, with donors working with country systems and strengthening domestic institutions. George W Bush wants initiatives like the Millennium Challenge Corporation to channel funds to countries but then allow things to happen without a donor ‘push’.

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Paolo said that he stands somewhere between Benn and Easterly, and agrees with their common focus on internally driven processes and providing the right incentives for local institutions. He went on to discuss the tensions that surface in aid accountability, arguing that there are two critical questions: accountability to whom and accountability for what. Donors are accountable domestically but there is a growing recognition that they need to be accountable to recipients. As for what aid is trying to achieve, there is tension between focusing on development outcomes (via MDGs, vertical funds) and on long-term institution building. If the focus is the former, what do we do after 2015 when the MDGs are supposed to have been reached? He concluded with questions for discussion:

• There are important knowledge gaps that need to be addressed. We know more on the macroeconomic side of aid and on aid fragmentation, but we need to know more about sector specific bottlenecks and long term institution building.

• Aid modalities (and therefore aid quality) are at least as important as aid quantity in determining aid’s impact.

• (Additional) aid should focus on strengthening (or at least not undermining) country systems and institutions.

• The predictability and pace of scaling up are at least as important as the availability of additional aid flows.

• Can multilateralisation address accountability tensions? • How can we keep the public on board?

Christopher Adam began by stating that the issues around the macroeconomics of scaling up aid flows are well known and articulated in the Commission for Africa Report. There have been several conferences held, and papers and policy briefings published. He said the issue of aid absorption is serious but it is not a ‘show stopper’. However, he argued, donor anxiety about absorption is pervasive and has contributed, in part, to the slower than expected increase in aid since 2005. This reflects a general expression of concern about giving aid; not necessarily about this specific macroeconomic issue. Nevertheless, he said we are at a point where we know what the main challenges are and what to do about them. Responses do need to be country-specific but some general lessons can be learned. He recapped the central issue: that ideally aid will be spent and absorbed as this is the developmental rationale for its provision. He said the question is ‘How much and how quickly?’. If flows are too large or too rapid, quality of spending may decline, the distortionary effects of aid flows are magnified (e.g. ‘Dutch disease’ / competitiveness problems) and fragile governance structures may be put in jeopardy. He argued that the macroeconomic objective of aid is to maintain medium term stability. Most actors agree with this aim, not just the IMF. In practice, this entails identifying a rate (and form) of spending that maximises the developmental impact of spending but entails a path for absorption which is credible in its respect for medium-term fiscal sustainability, does not jeopardise short-run macroeconomic stability and strikes a balance between public and private sector activities. Christopher went on to identify four lessons:

1. There are no general prescriptions. The severity and nature of absorptive capacity constraints, and hence capacity to scale up aid, are very country specific. They depend on structural characteristics (markets), initial macroeconomic conditions, governance and implementation capacity, and the composition and volatility of aid flows.

2. All macroeconomics is micro. Key factors are labour market constraints, credit markets, tax structures, domestic resource mobilisation, and coherent fiscal and monetary policy coordination especially when aid flows are volatile.

3. Credible commitments are important. Two factors are involved: donors are unable to credibly pre-commit to long-term funding and recipients are unable to credibly commit to adjusting

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spending to fluctuations in external finance. This raises the risk of the private sector seeing expected future financing gaps and holding off from investing.

4. Learn from commodity booms. Aid increases have been overtaken by the scale of primary commodity booms. A key question is what we can learn from the management of resource booms. A key difference between commodity booms and high aid flows is that commodity booms occur independently of governance and capacity, whereas increasing aid flows occur in a context of peer review and dialogue which could help management. The case of Chile provides valuable lessons on the economic issues of managing resource booms (in this case, high copper prices).

Christopher concluded with the policy implications for donors. He recommended that donors:

• make longer, more credible and more stable commitments; • support greater flexibility in macroeconomic management of aid flows; • engage with international finance institutions on development of coherent macroeconomic

strategies for scaling up; • learn from the evidence on commodity price booms.

The presentations were followed by a wide ranging discussion which was synthesised into four key messages to the G8. Discussion

The following points and comments were made: • The events in Ethiopia and Uganda in 2006. It was argued that it is a myth that these countries

were ever models of good governance. They were presented this way to justify the way aid was given. Only the donors were surprised when governance ‘went wrong’.

• The need for donors to take responsibility for monitoring the impact of new aid modalities on civil society.

• The need to be realistic about pushing for better aid. Data collection and research takes time. • Recent focus groups in the UK have suggested that the UK electorate prefers the Government to

provide project based aid, not General Budget Support. • The focus on aid management needs to shift from a donor perspective about aid management

to a recipient perspective about public financial management. • The G8 should not keep shifting its attention to new issues as they come up; continuity is

important when trying to solve problems. • Strategies need to be identified at country level. • Project based direct investment has more impact than General Budget Support. • Aid should not be earmarked, or, if it is, it should be earmarked for large infrastructure. • Aid recipient governments are accountable to donor governments rather than their domestic

electorate. • Why not give direct grants to individual households? • It is crucial to build public debate about aid in recipient countries and the media has an

important role. Working with parliamentary systems is key. • How useful are the MDGs? Do they distort accountability and spending? The G8 should work to

make the MDGs part of the solution. • The current debate about aid is too apolitical. The ‘War on Terror’ will have huge implications on

development in the Horn of Africa and is distorting aid. The G8 should look at the military budgets of the poorest countries.

• How can the public debate become more informed and more plural? How can more people in recipient countries critique the situation?

• The G8 need to manage expectations about what can be achieved with aid. • How much of the current high level of African growth is simply due to high commodity prices?

Should aid in fact be given counter-cyclically to commodity-deficit countries suffering from high prices?

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• Community level partnerships between Wales and Uganda are proving successful and involving a wider range of people in the aid debate.

• Budget support needs to be long-term and engage with governments. Key messages to the G8

• Provide more credible, longer term commitments. • Deliver aid through modalities that strengthen domestic institutions and accountability. • Recognise the governance challenges African countries face and support domestic

accountability actors. • Manage expectations in donor countries about what aid can realistically achieve.

e-Africa and m-Africa: How can ICTs deliver? Richard Heeks, IDPM, University of Manchester and Abi Jagun, IDPM, University of Manchester Summary

ICTs are not going to save the world but there is a belief that they will be a fundamental force for change in private, public and civil spheres of African development. We need a change in donor approaches to ICT. There is a need to move beyond a focus on delivering rural telecentres, which have not been particularly successful. A new priority should be to link ICTs to urbanisation in Africa, through an ‘African Digital Cities Initiative’. The Initiative would focus on ICT production, by supporting the large number of ICT enterprises being created in Africa that are not getting much support from traditional investment sources. Report

Richard Heeks started by outlining a history of the use of information and communications technologies (ICTs) for development in Africa:

• 1960s to 1990s: activity was concentrated on the use of IT for data processing in the public sector;

• Late 1990s to early 2000s: a period of great hype around the possibilities for the internet to deliver development;

• Early to mid 2000s: accompanying the internet dot.com crash, there was widespread disappointment and withdrawal from e-agendas for development.

He characterised the current phase as one of hopeful realism and new priorities. There is an understanding that ICTs are not going to save the world, but a belief that they will be a fundamental force for change in private, public and civil spheres of African development. He went on to outline some of these priorities. First, he noted the importance of getting ICTs back on the donor agenda, especially as leaders in Africa are increasingly interested in ICTs and there is increasing usage of the internet in Africa. Next, Richard argued for a change in donor approaches to ICT. He said that there was a need to move beyond a focus on delivering rural telecentres, which have not been particularly successful. A new priority should be to link ICTs to urbanisation in Africa, through what he termed an ‘African Digital Cities Initiative’. Richard suggested some further links that could be made between ICTs and development by donors, including:

• Anti-corruption activities, with e-procurement systems, greater information from government to citizens, and more transparency.

• Growth and exports through e-commerce. He pointed out that a recent World Bank report has found that higher levels of internet access are linked to increasing levels of exports in a country

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and also noted a concern that non-intervention on e-commerce in Africa might allow Northern firms to increase penetration and market share in Africa.

Richard went on to outline his recommendation for an ‘African Digital Enterprise Initiative’. He sees this Initiative as less about consumption of ICTs, which has been central to most initiatives in the area so far, but has had limited developmental impact. Instead, he saw the Initiative as focusing on ICT production, by supporting the large number of ICT enterprises being created in Africa that are not getting much support from traditional investment sources. This could be through:

• outsourcing IT goods and services, both in a traditional sense and through a ‘social outsourcing’ model, where IT services are outsourced to social enterprises, empowering people and improving livelihoods; and/or

• an IT Fair Trade system. Richard summed up his priorities for the G8 in two areas, the support of entrepreneur-led (more than scientist-led) innovation mechanisms and developing an enterprise focus for Africa’s ICT agenda. Abi Jagun started her presentation by outlining the major growth in the use of mobile phones in Africa, a continent where more people have access to mobile than wired telephony. She said that this growth, the highest in the world, does not appear to have had major developmental impacts and this offers some priorities for the G8.

• Supporting the creation of ‘Open Digital Economies’ to facilitate investment in, and growth of, Africa’s digital economies. She argued that they should support and extend ongoing reforms in Africa; work to deepen the regulatory capacity of governments and increase their commitment to the development and application of an African digital infrastructure. This infrastructure would include development of software, content, and transmission capabilities that are accessible to all (i.e. in the right languages, cheap and easy to deploy).

• Next, she argued for the creation of a global collaborative ‘Mobile Opportunities TaskForce’ to harness the development potential of mobile devices. This would consolidate and map the impact mobiles are having on Africa and the future they are helping to create. Africa needs its own experiences understood, not just the application of experiences from other places – for example, understanding and taking advantage of the shared model of accessing technologies. Outputs from this task force would identify initiatives and support enabling environments for innovation.

In conclusion, she stated that the G8 should be sustaining growth in mobiles, by applying a broader approach to infrastructure, supporting innovation and understanding the sector as it stands. Discussion

Topics raised as part of the discussion included: • The importance of young people in pushing the adoption of ICTs forward. People felt that the

mismatch between Northern and Southern attitudes to the opportunities offered by ICT is key here, as it is often the young who are most open to the opportunities but find that there are no resources on offer to support them in taking these up.

• The argument for ICT’s role in reaching the Millennium Development Goals is not made as strongly as it could be. Though use of new technologies is one of the MDGs, ICTs can fit into other MDGs – for example the goal of education for all. This, however, would require a broader conceptualisation of ICTs than exists at present.

• The importance of ensuring donor strategies on ICTs are less ‘top-down’ and more ‘bottom up’, so that the development potential of new technologies, such as mobiles, can be realised.

• Potential strategies that could benefit Africa in developing a manufacturing base for ICTs. The idea of Northern companies ‘mentoring’ African companies was raised, as was the possibility of developing micro-enterprise through initiatives such as technology zone clustering enterprises.

• It was noted that the growth in mobile phones occurred without G8 involvement and that much of the future development of ICTs in Africa depends on users and businesses there, not

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Northern governments. It was, however, countered that taking advantage of the development potential of ICTs through social or other initiatives, would require NGO/donor involvement.

• An additional priority for the G8 suggested by one participant was to ‘increase the size of the pipes’ going into Africa – in other words, increasing broadband capacity, so that it can join the internet community, as there is not much hope of this for a continent still dominated by dial-up connections.

Combating corruption in Africa: What can donors do? Alina Rocha Menocal, ODI and Heather Marquette, International Development Department, University of Birmingham Summary

The widespread prevalence of corruption undermines efforts to improve governance. Governance is primarily the responsibility of African countries and people, but it is argued that there is a role for donors to play, particularly in supporting internal reform processes. Donors need to differentiate between a) corruption perpetuated by the poor against the poor; b) corruption that takes place in all countries; and c) the systematic rape of a country by its leaders and/or outsiders. Civic education plays a significant role in changing the political culture of a country, particularly in relation to corruption. It can be used to convince the public not to engage in corrupt activities and also to challenge the corrupt activities of others. Donor support to civil society is fundamental if done effectively. Concrete actions for the G8 include: continue the momentum of Gleneagles and more explicitly embrace the goals established there; recognise the primacy of governance reforms and political institutions in achieving ‘Growth and Responsibility’; ensure the remaining four G8 members ratify the UN Convention Against Corruption immediately; support NEPAD’s APRM; provide support for the effective documentation and dissemination of the APRM’s procedures, processes, findings and lessons learnt. Report

Alina Rocha Menocal introduced the session by exploring reflections on dos and don’ts for donors in combating corruption in Africa. She began by highlighting the significance given to governance in the Commission for Africa and its pivotal role in enabling reform in all other areas of development. Alina also emphasised the vicious circle African states are subject to:

• Widespread prevalence of corruption undermines efforts to improve governance;

• Improved governance is essential to reduce the scope of corruption.

Alina went on to talk about the CFA’s recommend-dations at the international level to overcome this vicious circle. These include the strengthening of existing multilateral initiatives such as the NEPAD Peer Review Mechanism and endorsement of international anti-corruption conventions. Whilst offering concrete recommendations about tackling corruption and promoting good governance at the international level, Alina went on to argue that the CFA falls short by failing to offer country level recommendations for tackling corruption. Alina supported the CFA assumption that governance is primarily the responsibility of African countries and people, but argued that there is a role for donors to play, particularly in supporting internal reform processes.

Alina Rocha Menocal, ODI, presenting to the Combating corruption in Africa working group.

Alina then shifted the focus of her presentation to look at opportunities for donor engagement in supporting good governance and anti-corruption initiatives at the country level, whilst also highlighting

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those actions which donors should avoid. An important point emphasised by Alina was the recognition that not liking corruption and being able to do something about it are two very different things. Key dos and don’ts for donors

• Avoid dogmatism in the fight against corruption. Whilst burdensome, particularly for the poor and marginalised, not all forms of corruption are equally corrosive and have, in some instances, not proven insurmountable obstacles to development, as China and Vietnam demonstrate.

• Adopt a ‘principled pragmatic’ approach with context specific strategic interventions that do not impose overly idealised standards in anti-corruption measures.

• Engage with local political processes and societal structures rather than relying on narrow technical solutions to corruption and poor governance.

• Recognise the challenges and opportunities posed by democratisation processes. Assumed benefits of democracy do not emerge naturally and Africa has seen the emergence of many ‘hybrid regimes’ in which corruption has become more prevalent or at least more visible.

• Support long term holistic approaches to anti-corruption which focus on accountability and transparency.

• Support vertical and horizontal accountability mechanisms. • Continue to support civil society, media entities, judicial reform and the rule of law but do not

neglect parliaments and political parties as they too can play a crucial role. • Adopt a united and more coherent approach in encouraging Freedom of Information laws in

Africa in line with internal advocacy structures. • Publish more explicitly information relating to aid distribution and utilisation. • Ensure systematic monitoring and evaluation of anti-corruption and good governance initiatives

to improve practices and share lessons. Key messages to the G8

• Continue the momentum of Gleneagles and more explicitly embrace the goals established there.

• Recognise the primacy of governance reforms and political institutions in achieving ‘Growth and Responsibility’.

• Ensure the remaining four G8 members immediately ratify the UN Convention Against Corruption.

• Support NEPAD’s APRM. • Provide support for the effective documentation and dissemination of the APRM’s procedures,

processes, findings and lessons learnt. Heather Marquette followed by presenting some of the findings of her 10 years of research and field work on donors and anti-corruption work. Heather indicated that her experience repeatedly exposed the same ‘big’ issues among a range of multilateral and bilateral donors and their tackling of corruption which she defined in her ‘seven big issues for donors’. Heather started by summarising these issues for donors in fighting corruption, emphasising the need for political sensitivity in donor support for what are essentially internal initiatives. She then went on to expand each area in detail before asking what the priorities and challenges are for the G8. 1. What priority should corruption have for donors?

• Donor priorities in fighting corruption: the level and corrosiveness of corruption varies in different country and contextual settings.

• Donors need to differentiate between a) corruption perpetuated by the poor against the poor; b) corruption that takes place in all countries; and c) the systematic rape of a country by its leaders and/or outsiders.

2. How can we measure political will to fight corruption?

• There is no common definition of ‘political will’.

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• There is a need for extensive, in-depth qualitative political analysis and country specific knowledge.

• Donors often suffer to achieve this knowledge base because of the frequent rotation of staff. • It is difficult to identify country level champions particularly as states do not always behave in a

predictable and logical manner. 3. What role can women play?

• It is possible to challenge the assumption that an increase in the number of women in public office will reduce corruption.

• Research has demonstrated that women are just as likely to be corrupt. It is in fact their limited exposure to corruption networks that limits their apparent involvement.

• Heather argued that wider participation strategies are potentially undermined when women’s participation is used as an anti-corruption strategy.

4. What role does culture play? (Using religion as a ‘proxy’ for culture)

• Despite the re-emergence of culture studies, the definition of ‘culture’ remains contentious. • Economics-led literature argues that there is a correlation between corruption and religion, with

different religious groups proving more corrupt than others. • This type of research needs greater attention because it has serious implications for

development policies. • Heather highlighted DfID’s research on the subject in India and Nigeria as a current example.

5. Can civic education be used to fight corruption?

• Civic education plays a significant role in changing the political culture of a country, particularly in relation to corruption.

• It can be used to convince the public not to engage in corrupt activities and also to challenge the corrupt activities of others.

• However, donors often fail to recognise the significance of civic education. One-off campaigns and poorly designed and delivered educational programmes can be more detrimental than no education at all.

• Adversely, civic education can also undermine trust in all institutions which can be dangerous for emerging democracies, for example, where fledgling institutions need to garner public support.

6. What role should civil society play?

• Donor support to civil society is fundamental if done effectively. • Comprehensive and inclusive strategies which engage a wide range of civil-society actors,

working collaboratively through broad based social movements can be highly effective. • However, in reality, social movements have not emerged around corruption – why is this the

case? Using Transparency International as a case study, it is possible to demonstrate the limitations of international organisations in fostering in-country social movements.

7. What should donors do when corruption is uncovered?

• It is fundamental that corruption is at the top of the agenda. • Donors need to be committed to an honest and systematic approach to sanctions, even if this

results in the cutting of aid or suspension of projects. • Donors also need to be more open about alternative possibilities when sanctions are not the

appropriate mechanism for dealing with corrupt practices. Heather concluded by emphasising the significance of corruption and its continued presence. Referring to one of the more positive actions of Wolfowitz, she argued that now corruption is at the top of the agenda, public debate is urgently needed to unbundle the issues.

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Discussion

• There should be an emphasis on governance and corruption in the G8 discussions, and the messages of the CFA on governance should be taken fully on board.

• There should also be an emphasis on accountability and transparency. • Debate on whether any level of corruption is acceptable, regardless of different levels of

corrosiveness. • Belief that African mechanisms for Africa should be supported. • It is essential that UK and other G8 countries rigorously support efforts to repatriate looted

assets. Ratifying the UN Convention against Corruption is not enough; violators need to be prosecuted, even if it is G8 country multinationals.

• It is often the poor and marginalised who suffer when corrupt regimes siphon off aid money and increase the aid debt.

• Donors/rich nations have the most control over their own actions rather than over the actions of others, and therefore should assume responsibility over their own behaviour in the fight against corruption by addressing the supply-side of the problem.

• Is there unequivocal research evidence proving the correlation between improved governance and a decline in corruption?

• Donors are very hypocritical both in terms of their own behaviour and also their differential treatment of countries struggling with corruption.

• Different types of corruption need defining. • The Asian miracle provides a clear example of where, despite high levels of patronage, fiercely

effective governance mechanisms can lead to development and economic growth. • Need to look at the governance practices of the G8 themselves and end a tolerance at home for

corruption. • An improvement in infrastructure could lead to a decline in corruption and should be

prioritised. • The G8 have the power to set an example on the supply side by signing the UN Convention

against Corruption as well as other international agreements and rigorously enforcing them. • The G8 should enter into a partnership with African states to encourage, help and support

governments using existing mechanisms including NEPAD’s APRM. • The G8 can help ensure that African governments are accountable to their people, for example,

by focusing aid on education (although corrupt people are often educated too!). Key messages for the G8

• To have the G8 set an example to tackle corruption on the supply side by ensuring, amongst other things, that the four remaining G8 members (Canada, Germany, Japan and Italy) ratify the UN Convention against Corruption immediately.

• It is not enough to have members ratify such conventions; members must also demonstrate commitment by providing adequate resources and giving real teeth to competent authorities to fully implement their commitments. Past corrupt practices such as loans knowingly given to corrupt dictators should not be overlooked.

• Donors, on their own, cannot tackle corruption in country. Rather, they should see their role as supporting ongoing internal processes for reform. The German G8 must therefore emphasise the central role of governance and institutions; and should send a strong signal in support of governance and political reforms intended to increase accountability and transparency at the country level.

• The G8 needs to set an example by publishing at a more systematic level information on aid, including amounts and how it is meant to be spent, and making this information publicly available. This should also include how and when sanctions for corrupt practices should be applied in a way that is transparent and consistent.

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Voice in international institutions Simon Burall, ODI and Jeff Powell, Bretton Woods Project Summary

African voices are missing in the G8 and the Bretton Woods Institutions. Their governance structure does not reflect the world today. Most of the IMF’s income comes, in fact, from poorer not richer countries. In 2002, 75% of contributions to the IMF came from debtors compared to 25% from creditors. Whereas Africa and the developed nations have almost equivalent shares of the global population, African countries have only 6% of votes at the World Bank, compared to developed nations’ 46%. African countries make up only 20% of the Security Council compared to 40% for the developed nations, each of which also has a veto. The G8 should acknowledge that its membership is too narrow; make the G20 the main forum for discussion of global economic and other public good type issues; open global dialogue beyond the G20 to address genuinely global issues; strengthen parliaments and civil society organisations to engage in global public policy debates; and ensure sufficient access for both parliamentarians and civil society actors at global policy forums and within global organisations. Report

Simon Burall covered four areas in his presentation: • Africa’s lack of voice at inter-governmental fora; • Why this is important; • The implications for key global public goods discussions; • What the G8 can do.

He argued the African voices are missing in the Bretton Woods Institutions, set up 60 years ago, when the world was very different. Their governance structure does not reflect the world today. He then presented some contrasting figures. Whereas Africa and the developed nations have almost equivalent shares of the global population, African countries have only 6% of votes at the World Bank compared to developed nations’ 46%. African countries make up only 20% of the Security Council compared to 40% for the developed nations, each of which also has a veto. Simon used the example of climate change to illustrate his point about the imbalance in representation at fora where decisions are made about issues that will affect Africa (and other developing regions). A two degree rise in temperature would vastly reduce the area of land in Uganda suitable for coffee cultivation. Coffee is a key cash crop, yet Uganda is not adequately represented at fora where it could influence decisions on climate change action. He asked which is the best forum for discussing issues such as climate change. The Security Council has been challenged on its mandate to deal with this issue. Discussions end up being about legitimacy and this weakens any resolutions made. He concluded by asking what is it realistic to expect the G8 to do and argued that the G8 should:

• acknowledge that its membership is too narrow; • make the G20 the main forum for discussion of global economic and other public good type

issues; • open global dialogue beyond the G20 to address genuinely global issues; • strengthen parliaments and civil society organisations to engage in global public policy

debates; • ensure sufficient access for both parliamentarians and civil society actors at global policy

forums and within global organisations. Jeff Powell began by saying that the main issue is democracy at the World Bank and IMF, and that it is now the case that most of the IMF’s income comes, in fact, from poorer not richer countries. In 2002,

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75% of contributions to the IMF came from debtors compared to 25% from creditors, showing a complete reversal of the ratio in 20 years. He outlined four areas of recommendation:

• Chairs and shares • Leadership selection • Board transparency/accountability • Policy space

He argued first that basic votes are not enough and that the current proposal to triple basic votes is a red herring. It would, in fact, decrease developing countries’ share of votes, if it is accompanied by proposed reforms to the quota formula. He then went on to summarise various proposals about the formula by which votes should be allocated. The US and EU positions actually see a decrease in developing country representation; while the G24 position sees an increase for developing countries, though the smallest countries may see losses. The proposal by David Woodward for the G24 gives weight both to population and the one country, one vote principle. He then outlined the Bretton Woods Project position. They argue for a ‘state-weight double majority’. This multiple majority is a decision rule that requires the achievement of two separate majorities for a resolution to be accepted. It increases the incentive for coalition-building. He pointed out that international institutions, such as the European Union, the GEF, and the other MDBs already use double majority voting systems. On leadership selection, Jeff quoted DFID: ‘The practice of picking the heads of both institutions based on nationality should end – presidents should be chosen on merit.’ On board transparency and accountability, he argued three points:

• Establish a committee of the Board of Governors to review performance of the Executive Board. • The Executive Board should design a process of assessment of the Managing Director. • Transparency policies are needed based on presumption of disclosure, strict exemptions and

independent appeals procedure. Board transcripts should be available after six months, not the current 10 years. It has even been suggested that meetings should be broadcast. There is no need for such a high level of secrecy.

On policy space, Jeff reminded the audience of the G8’s 2005 communiqué: ‘we agreed that poor countries must decide and lead their own development strategies and economic policies’. Discussion

The following points were discussed: • The 10 year rule on releasing transcripts and the need for developing country civil society to put

pressure on their governments to provide information about what they say at inter-governmental meetings.

• How are developed countries supposed to create change in the South? Via conditionality? Via independent organisations such as Panos building capacity in specific areas (in this case the media)? By strengthening parliaments?

• The breadth of the G8 mandate. • The breadth of a G20 mandate. • The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and its role as a vehicle for countries to decide their

own priorities. • Questioning what the Bretton Woods Institutions are really for now, given that they were

created 60 years ago. • The IMF should not be involved in low income countries at all. It’s original mandate was to

assist during balance of payments crises, not with structural problems.

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• How governance structures at the IMF and World Bank affect development and governance in developing countries.

• Political will to reform at the Bretton Woods Institutions may be low but at the moment the IMF and World Bank are dependant on developing countries for financing and this is a good opportunity to push for reform.

• The IMF should be disbanded and the World Bank should take over some of its functions. Group exercise

Participants discussed the messages they would send to the G8 in two groups. These were then summarised into four messages for the G8. The following points were made:

• The G8 should stop meeting. • Leadership should come from the G24 or BRICs. • The IMF should be more of a credit union with the only members being borrowers. • Should effort be concentrated on reform or on something more radical? • G8 legitimacy and expansion – expansion would increase African countries’ representation. • Citizens need to know what their governments are saying at inter-governmental meetings. • China’s influence on Africa.

Key messages to the G8

• Leadership at the World Bank and IMF • Consult on governance • Proper oversight of Executive Board and staff • Greater transparency

Climate change: An opportunity for Africa? Dr. Tom Mitchell, IDS, John Magrath, Oxfam GB and UK Working Group on Climate Change and Development, and Dr. Henny Osbahr, Tyndall Centre and University of Oxford Summary

The G8 communiqué at Gleneagles in 2005 called for the need to slow, reverse and make substantial cuts in greenhouse gas emissions. It also called for some specific actions to work with a range of organisations and countries on clean energy and other related areas, but offered no clear rhetoric on climate change adaptation options. The rhetoric of climate change also talks of a perpetual disaster for Africa. Conditions may get better for some and using this possibility may provide a better starting point for making climate change adaptation an integral part of the development agenda. Climate change is having a real impact on livelihoods. There are changes being seen by farmers, with greater extremes in temperature and precipitation, changes in growing seasons and increasing unpredictability, all of which make it harder for them to plan and prepare. Report

Tom Mitchell introduced the workshop by summarising the events of the past G8 communiqué at Gleneagles in 2005, which called for the need to slow, reverse and make substantial cuts in greenhouse gas emissions. It also called for some specific actions to work with a range of organisations and countries on clean energy and other related areas, but offered no clear rhetoric on climate change adaptation options. Tom stated that the rhetoric of climate change also talks of a perpetual disaster for Africa. But, he said, conditions may get better for some and using this possibility may provide a better starting point for making climate change adaptation an integral part of the development agenda. John Magrath began by stating that he does not see the problems associated with climate change as strictly related to climate change but more to increasing variability, i.e. changes in existing local

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environment. This means that climate change can not be separated from the other environmental stresses that are being discussed. The major issue John raised is that climate change is having a real impact on livelihoods. He sees these as serious and believes there is a danger of crossing climatic thresholds, past which the changes cannot be reversed. As an example, John looked at the changes being seen by farmers, with greater extremes in temperature and precipitation, changes in growing seasons and increasing unpredictability. This makes it harder for them to plan and prepare. He continued by outlining ways in which farmers are adapting to this unpredictability, through changing crops and planting times for example. He noted, however, that it is easier for the better off to adapt than poor people, as they have better access to education, money and knowledge, and have higher expectations. John argued that adaptation is not just about farmers coping, there are many mechanisms in which people in Africa will do this, including migration, labour markets and others. He believes that responses to climate change need to maximise flexibility – climate change is not an excuse not to tackle poverty – in fact, quite the opposite. Public services and safety nets are very important in helping people cope with increasing vulnerability. John finished by outlining some key areas of importance and opportunity for climate change and development policy-making: agriculture; water food storage; weather forecasts (and communication of these); energy, the support of a pastoralist economy; and drought/disaster planning and relief. He also outlined constraints for policy-making, including poverty, choosing priorities and creating capacity for action, and the need for co-operation. As a final point, John stated a belief that climate change adaptation is more a subject for justice than for aid. If Northern countries are responsible for a changing climate and Africa will deal with the consequences, there is a strong argument that the ‘polluters pay’. Henny Osbahr presented research from the ADAPTIVE Project, looking at how diversity can create opportunities. This project sought to understand patterns in response strategies – who bears what risks and how do these lead to different livelihoods responses. The project found that there was a need for improved tools to carry out climate change data analysis and recognise how changes in the climate can lead to changes in livelihoods and common forms of response at a local level. Some other needs found were:

• better assessment of resilience; • reinforcement of support networks and flexible organisation; • promotion of multi-level institutional involvement in initiatives; • development of special themed projects; • improve communication; • better understanding of heterogeneity of stakeholders at a local level.

Henny concluded by arguing that this showed a need for supporting integrated action on adaptation to climate change. Discussion

Some points raised in the discussion included: • There is a need for headline grabbing messages to feed into the G8 but these are difficult to

create, due to the complexity of options available. • Little information around the potential effects of climate change or how to deal with them are

disseminated to the ground level, and many could benefit from better provision in this regard. There was a recommendation to use national meteorological services to provide better climatic information.

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• How to fund adaptation and in particular, the idea of justice as opposed to aid for adaptation. Does this mean that the funding of adaptation would be separate to existing aid mechanisms? If so, how much would it cost and how exactly would it be funded? Is it politically viable? There was also discussion about whether adaptation funding should be channelled through communities or at a national level.

• The effect migration, as a response to climate change, could have on the world – it is already an acutely politicised issue and could be even more so in the future. The question was asked ‘Do we encourage people to stay or help them move elsewhere?’.

• There was some agreement that the G8 need to act to meet existing commitments to mitigation promises in order to be able to interact with African leaders on adaptation.

Civic engagement and accountability Adrian Wells, ODI Summary

The G8 Action Plan from 2005 contained much on civic social engagement, but the Paris Declaration itself was largely silent. Civil society could be regarded as agents of accountability, however, strengthening support for civic engagement is not always forthcoming. PBRS acts to reduce it, but the Africa Commission report and DFID’s 2006 White Paper reinforce it. Civic engagement must begin with mutual accountability around aid flows and the impacts of aid architecture on African civil society. There is a critical need for access to information, where donor processes privilege external over domestic accountability. The current aid architecture favours elite groups over civil society at the grass roots and with broad membership. There is a need to fund multi-stakeholder processes through diverse experimental portfolios of civil society partners. It is questionable whether changes in the aid architecture can support this. Much more work is needed on the development of channels and democratic spaces, e.g. the media, private-sector and diaspora associations, the justice sector and (in particular) parliaments and political party development. There is a risk of excessive expectations of civil society as agents of accountability and the ability to scale this up, bordering on social engineering. Accountability emerges slowly and unevenly, requiring a long-term strategic perspective. This in turn requires systems to track changes in the political environment and the development of democratic spaces. Donors need to be honest about their roles as political actors and about their responsibilities, not to simply pass political risk on to civil society which may be very vulnerable in some contexts. Report

Adrian Wells started by explaining that the G8 Action Plan from 2005 contained much on civic society engagement, but that the Paris Declaration itself was largely silent. So to what extent can and should donors play a role in this domain? (slide 1). Adrian explained that civil society could be regarded as agents of accountability (slide 2). Rights-based approaches to development encourage civil society to play a more active role in political advocacy. It can also act as a counterweight to both the state and how donors support this agenda. Strengthening support for civic engagement is not always forthcoming, however (slide 3). PBRS acts to reduce it, but the Africa Commission report and DFID’s 2006 White Paper reinforce it. There is a lack of donor vision with regard to strengthening civic engagement (slide 4). Donors are not well coordinated and they tend to focus on skilling up for advocacy rather than helping citizens to relate to the state. Support to civic engagement is often seen as ‘political’ (slide 5) and DFID’s White Paper emphasises the importance of politics.

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There are many unknowns in terms of the implications of working with politics (slide 6). Can we make the same assumptions about politics in fragile states? Donors are not well equipped to work politically (slide 7). It is a difficult balancing act and there is much political risk. Regarding politics and harmonisation (slide 8), Adrian asserted that politics increases harmonisation, as do social movements. However not all donors are sufficiently flexible in their funding of civic engagement strengthening programmes as they often exclude marginalised groups. Regarding next steps from here (slide 9), Adrian suggested that there were two possible options:

• Enhancing the rules of the game for civic engagement (whereby donors’ expectations should be lowered).

• To back specific intermediary groups. Adrian asserted that if donors are to work politically with civil society (slide 10), they must understand the concept of ‘voice’ better; relax their administrative rules; and understand their diplomatic weight with regard to intermediary groups. Discussion points (slide 11) include: the assumptions; who to work with; civic action versus political partying; the rules of the game versus backing intermediary groups; and the required changes in the aid architecture system. Discussion

Points and questions raised in the discussion included: • Government versus citizens – civil society is citizens organising themselves to demand services

but what about trade unions, private companies, associations and non-government-delivery citizen-related groups? Who should be involved and what should their responsibilities be? Adrian replied that the involvement of other groups such as these would indicate a move beyond elite NGOs, but who makes the choices about who to speak to and how legitimate they are?

• 38% of people in the UK do not vote and Africa does not have homogenous problems. A Western-centric approach or solution to the problem may therefore not be appropriate. There are many external influences being exerted on citizens, so there is a need to look more holistically at the problem(s), involve the diaspora, etc.

• Donors are politically engaged whether they like it or not. Resources are a political entity. • Many concepts were addressed in the presentation, such as accountability, citizenship and

civic engagement. These could all be analysed separately, however the context is also very important. Civil society in Africa includes more than just NGOs. In addition, there are many different forms of civic engagement, many of which are invisible to us. It would be sensible to find out more about such existing processes first and build on what is already there. If existing processes need to be strengthened, then at least we are starting with the problem to build a corresponding appropriate (rather than generic) solution. Everyone is accountable to someone or something.

• The Africa Commission report acted to strengthen institutions of state in developing nations, but globalisation weakens governments both internationally and domestically. Who are we talking about with regard to civic engagement? Governance cannot be improved by one solution only. Lack of voice is the most important thing. UK NGOs do not give developing country citizens a voice, only the elites who are their counterparts – who they work with, etc. There are other ways of improving democracy, e.g. via radio/broadcasting.

• There is a reason for concern about donors engaging with the elite technocracy. It would not be desirable to have donors determining the politics of civil society. Media development is also very important in order to give a number of groups a voice.

• Most social movements of the last 20 years have depended on funding from donors (e.g. womens’ groups, HIV groups, etc.), but it depends upon what terms the resources are provided.

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For example, who are they accountable to? There is a need for increased accountability and transparency of donor processes.

• Regarding budget support, donors are unable to find other funding mechanisms for civil society.

• This is a complex debate and it is necessary to define the concepts being referred to, e.g. the media provides space for debate, but how well equipped is it? What about the accountability of donors themselves?

• Current thinking is to get civil society to hold governments to account for the money they are given by donors, which relates to aid effectiveness. Donors are changing the shape of civil society at the moment, but most small NGOs are being excluded due to a lack of donor flexibility.

• Who monitors civil society itself? This should be done by donors. • How can people on the ground hold their governments to account if the donors do not? • Civil society should also monitor donors to hold them to account, as well as governments. • Donors work with markets forces to decide which NGOs will survive and which will not. • Are Northern governments ‘good’ governments? Maybe the term ‘good enough government’

should be adopted instead. • Is it true that anything that can be done to promote better citizenship is necessarily good? There

are many nuanced questions regarding who should support what, who and how, e.g. what about youth?

• Donors such as DFID should be accountable to the tax payers whose money they spend. • In Uganda there is a funding opportunity to bring issues in a specific sector to court which tests

the sectoral law on a case which matters to people. Massive societal change will only come about through leadership. If developing countries are flooded with general budget support, this may have an impact on the education system, which may mean that politically astute people emerge who can lead the country in the future.

• Regarding the transparency of aid, it is impossible to know what the aid flows are and therefore impossible to track it. There is no certainty on figures for aid given to British NGOs either. If this is not possible here in the UK, how can we expect to do it in Africa?

• Small NGOs in Africa do not have the capacity to hold donors to account as well as their own governments. It would help to bring governments and donors into one forum to initiate policy dialogue, such as that which is currently happening on general budget support. There is a need for Northern NGOs to help to cultivate a strong civil society in the South and for a more facilitating environment to be established, especially for womens’ groups. 80% of funding from DFID’s governance and transparency fund is going to be for ‘local civil society’ so this may help.

• Working with parliaments is also important. The German government works a lot with think tanks, for example.

• Is/should educational institutions be part of civil society and should Northern NGOs be encouraging this? Should Southern NGOs be enabled to do this?

• There are different forms of space, e.g. gifted, taken and stolen space. It is necessary to actively take power from the people who have got it but we do not necessarily know how to, so how can we expect weak African civil societies and NGOs to?

• Donors’ processes privilege external accountability over domestic accountability. Recommendations to the G8

• Civic engagement must begin with mutual accountability around aid flows and the impacts of aid architecture on African civil society. There is a critical need for access to information, where donor processes privilege external over domestic accountability.

• The current aid architecture favours elite groups over civil society at the grass roots and with broad membership. There is a need to fund multi-stakeholder processes through diverse experimental portfolios of civil society partners. It is questionable whether changes in the aid architecture can support this.

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• Much more work is needed on the development of channels and democratic spaces, e.g. the media, private-sector and diaspora associations, the justice sector and (in particular) parliaments and political party development.

• There is a risk of excessive expectations of civil society as agents of accountability and the ability to scale this up, bordering on social engineering. Accountability emerges slowly and unevenly, requiring a long-term strategic perspective. This in turn requires systems to track changes in the political environment and the development of democratic spaces.

• Donors need to be honest about their roles as political actors and about their responsibilities, not to simply pass political risk on to civil society which may be very vulnerable in some contexts.

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Summary recommendations

Key messages to the G8 Aid

• Provide more credible, longer term commitments. • Deliver aid through modalities that strengthen domestic institutions and accountability. • Recognise the governance challenges African countries face and support domestic

accountability actors. • Manage expectations in donor countries about what aid can realistically achieve.

China

• The rise of ‘new players’ in the global economy changes the African landscape – the G8 must continually review its commitments.

• These new players, not just China, highlight the importance of trade and investment as well as aid.

• All investors have blind spots. The G8 should support Africa’s capacity to assess the performance of all donors and investors, G8 and non-G8.

• China merely highlights the need for improved global regulation on corruption, trade and investment issues. This applies to the G8 as well as the new players.

Conflict Since Gleneagles R2P has been adopted, this has to be taken into account; Africa is a continent of fragile states. This means:

• Reducing fragility through a long-term sustainable approach as a way of achieving the MDGs, e.g. sustained youth engagement and employment, economic investment as part of peacebuilding.

• Resolve contradictions between rhetoric and geo-strategic interests of the G8 members in Africa, e.g. in Somalia.

• Expand the constituency of actors to include African diaspora, private sector, non-military, and promote the socialisation of China.

ICT: e-Africa and m-Africa

• Renew ICT commitments as part of a wider Science, Technology and Innovation Agenda. • Support ‘Open Digital Economies in Africa’ to overcome policy and infrastructural barriers. • Launch an ‘African Digital Enterprise Initiative’ (ADEI) to stimulate African IT sector growth. • Initiate a ‘MOTForce’ to harness development potential of mobile telephony growth.

Climate change

• Fulfill existing commitments to reduce emissions and agree an international framework beyond 2012 to ensure no more than two degree Celsius rise in temperature above pre-industrial level.

• G8 member nations to reduce their emissions by 3% year on year from now. • Fulfill existing commitments made at WSSD, UNCCD, UNFCCC, etc., and agree annual progress

report from all G8 nations. • Climate change adaptation should be integrated within all national development mechanisms

by 2008 (CfA recommendation to be achieved by 2008). Civic engagement and accountability

• Civic engagement must begin with mutual accountability around aid flows and the impacts of aid architecture on African civil society. Critical need for access to information, where donor processes privilege external over domestic accountability.

• Aid architecture favours elite groups over civil society at the grass roots and with broad membership. A need to fund multi-stakeholder processes through diverse experimental

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portfolios of civil society partners. Questionable whether changes in the aid architecture can support this.

• Much more work is needed on the development of channels and democratic spaces – the media, private sector and diaspora associations, the justice sector and (in particular) parliaments and political party development.

• A risk of excessive expectations of civil society as agents of accountability and the ability to scale this up, bordering on social engineering. Accountability emerges slowly and unevenly, requiring a long-term strategic perspective. This in turn requires systems to track changes in the political environment and the development of democratic spaces.

• Donors need to be honest about their roles as political actors and about their responsibilities, not to simply pass political risk on to civil society which may be very vulnerable in some contexts.

Corruption

• To have the G8 set an example to tackle corruption on the supply side by ensuring, amongst other things, that the four remaining G8 members ratify the UN Convention against Corruption immediately.

• It is not enough to have members ratify such conventions, they must demonstrate commitment by providing adequate resources and giving real teeth to competent authorities to fully implement their commitments. Past corrupt practices such as loans knowingly given to corrupt dictators should not be overlooked.

• It is generally agreed that donors on their own cannot tackle corruption in country. They must see their role as supporting ongoing internal processes. The German G8 must therefore emphasise the central role of governance and institutions, and should send a strong signal in support of governance and political reforms intended to increase accountability and transparency at the country level.

• The G8 needs to set an example by publishing information on aid, including amounts and how it is meant to be spent, and making this information publicly available. This should also include how and when sanctions for corrupt practices should be applied in a way that is transparent and consistent.

Voice in international institutions

• Leadership at the World Bank and IMF • Consult on governance • Proper oversight of Executive Board and staff • Greater transparency

See also the powerpoint slides in Appendix 2.

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Closing discussion

Panel discussion Charles Abugre, Head of Policy and Advocacy, Christian Aid “Aid dependency shapes and distorts the incentive structure within which governments function… it also distorts confidence in people’s own ability to solve their problems. It’s really at the heart of the accountability crisis at the moment.” “We should be suggesting to the G8 to consider doing two things which were also both mentioned in the Africa Commission report. One is support countries’ governance in developing countries, especially Africa… to focus the resources that flow out of the countries. The second thing that was in the Africa Commission report was about conditionality. Many of these countries cannot use aid usefully if they do not have the space to experiment and to spend.” “The new buzzwords are ‘investment’ and ‘environment’. This investment/climate framework basically has a mechanism for using ratings and standards as a means of forcing policy choices in one direction. Until we confront conditionality and imposed choice of policies as embedded in the aid system, aid will continue to be a destructive force and not a useful one.” Owen Barder, Director of Global Development Effectiveness, DFID Owen Barder would like the German G8 to focus on “those issues which the rich world needs to address in its own policies and its own activities that create the conditions for the developing world to lift itself out of poverty. Issues like climate change mitigation, issues like the trading system.” “If you’re serious about affecting the G8 agenda, we should be talking about Japan now, not Germany… it’s too late to put things on the agenda. Japan is the agenda we can now affect.” “It’s all very well here in the UK having agreement between the government, parliamentarians and civil society academics about what will happen, but when I go and talk to civil society organisations in other G8 countries they’re nowhere on the same page as we are and the other G8 governments are not under the same pressure as our government is to take action on these things. If you really want to make a difference on the G8 agenda you need to be talking to your counterparts, your colleagues in the other G8 countries and gently getting the pressure on.” Hugh Bayley MP “The single most important word for me in the aid report was the word ‘credible’. Credible long-term commitments from donors. What would make those commitments more credible would be if the governments of the donor countries felt more accountable (a) to the parliaments of their countries, and (b) to the public of their country.” “The only way we can hope to exercise any leverage over Chinese policy is by seeking to strengthen the points over which we have common interests… perhaps we ought to have a G9, or a G10 with India, or hold a separate event in which the world’s largest economies, and not just the largest western economies, meet. We have to engage with them, so my word with China would be ‘engage’.” “On conflict I agree with all the proposals from the groups, but the one thing that I think was missing and ought to be there would be to try and get more energy and determination behind the efforts for an international treaty to regulate small arms and weapons.” “India has almost got to capacity with the number of people with good enough English to do telephone services to the UK… there are huge numbers of English speakers in the same time zone as the UK in Africa, but they can’t provide similar services because their telephone infrastructure is too poor. So,

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investing in the infrastructure is necessary , but that won’t happen unless there are more liberal regulatory regimes.” “The G8 countries are more engaged with [climate change] than the development agenda. So I think building links between the two is important. For instance, by weaving into national development strategies of G8 countries a climate change dimension.” “The DFID White Paper last year put much greater emphasis on governance in general and building the capacity of parliaments in developing countries to hold their governments to account in particular.” On corruption, “the single most important bullet point [during toady’s corruption working group presentation] was persuading the G8 countries to ratify the UN convention.” Richard Dowden, Director, Royal African Society “Nigeria is one of the big two in Africa and has immense power and influence on the continent. The fact that it now has a virtually illegal government has enormous implications for the whole democratic process in Africa. Having said that, the main thing is capital flight – the area where it happens most is from corruption.” “Britain’s offshore tax havens, which are still, despite promises, certainly not being dealt with. Bringing back the money I think is very, very important.” “Now, 80-90% of the work that can be done in London can be done as easily in Africa. This is compared to 50% five years ago, and 20% 10 years ago. Nigerians have not discovered this. I couldn’t find a single radio station or journalist using the mobile technology to report back, live, what they were seeing on the ground. I still don’t know why that is. Hence, the immense amount of violence, rigging, theft of ballot boxes going unreported until it was in the newspapers the next day.”

Concluding remarks For the closing plenary, Lawrence Haddad, IDS Director summarised the messages to the G8. Africa is changing fast

• Growth is historically high, investment from China is sweeping the continent, it has all sorts of environmental assets the rest of the world wants, and Africans are more confident and are more leveraged due to the interests of new investors.

• But Africa remains fragile. Growth in Africa is not yet translating this into large poverty reductions. The recent ‘elections’ in Nigeria provide an example of how hard-fought permanent change really is. Some of the fragility is due to G8 action – examples include greenhouse gas emissions, weak G8 governance of arms, narcotics and capital, and the unpredictable delivery of low quality aid.

Concluding remarks by Lawrence Haddad, IDS.

• The picture of Africa painted by the Commission for Africa is already out of date. Honour your past commitments

• Reaffirm your intent to deliver on your commitments at Gleaneagles and St Petersburg. If this does not happen, trust will be eroded along with the new partnerships with Africa (NEPAD, EU-AU etc.) that depend precisely on such trust.

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• Setting aside debt relief, aid levels to Africa have increased by $2bn, with the target of a $25bn increase by just 2010. Even if the 2006 increment doubled in each of the next three years aid increases would not reach $25bn.

• Take the responsibility to protect seriously, and be sensitive to the tradeoffs between the actions of G8 Ministries of Defence and the actions of G8 Ministries of Development.

• Fulfill your commitments to climate change. • Get Doha going again.

Consider adopting some new initiatives

• Other G8 countries to adopt legislation similar to the UK International Development (Reporting and Transparency) Bill introduced by Tom Clarke, MP, requiring the UK to report regularly and fully on the progress it has, or has not, made on meeting the Gleneagles commitments.

• Find ways to support civil society in the G8 and in Africa to hold leaders to account – especially on trade.

• Support private public partnerships in Africa and elsewhere to develop new energy and adaptation technology for Africa. Africa may have a comparative advantage in developing some of this technology, technology that could be transferred to the G8.

• Establish a mobile (telephone) opportunities task force, similar to the Digital Opportunities Task Force to look for additional ways to support the role of ICTs in African development.

• Establish funds in addition to Gleneagles to support climate adaptation efforts in Africa. • Revise the governance of the multilaterals – from the way the leaders are selected to the

accountability of staff and Boards – the G8 has to lead in this domain if it expects to influence others.

Change the way you think about and behave towards Africa

• Deliver aid so that it does not undermine African institutions. • Review your assumptions about exactly what aid can do given the rapidly changing African

landscape – Chinese investment has reminded us about the key role that trade and the private sector must play in Africa’s development.

• Do not pursue the MDGs at the expense of Africa’s medium term resilience. Sometimes resilience has to come first. Start thinking about how you can support development post-2015.

• In your own minds, link climate change and African development. If the models are to be believed, climate change will result in threshold effects, irreversibility, and feedbacks that will radically re-write African water, soil and agriculture maps.

• Treat Africa as part of the global community – not as an item apart. Chinese and Indian engagement with Africa has helped to globalise Africa – both in reality and in perception. If things go wrong in Africa, it spells trouble for the rest of the world. Africa’s success affects the chances of success in a wide range of global endeavours – whether economic, political or environmental. If things go right in Africa, lots of things that the G8 cares about (climate change, security, national identity, energy) will become easier.

Evolve the G8 process

• Become more inclusive. Some think the G8 is on the road to becoming an anachronism. How can the G8 deal with global issues when it represents a smaller and smaller share of the global economy, and less and less control over global welfare? African issues are global issues. Emerging economies are likely to form their own G-group. The M20 of Finance ministers from leading economic countries was set up in response to the infectious financial crises of the 1990s – do not wait for a global crisis to evolve the G8 to a bigger group (a ‘GN’), a group which can support the more representative but less agile UN.

• If such a GN is not possible, work more with multilaterals and regional bodies (African Development Bank, NEPAD, AU, Africa Partners Forum) in preparation for summits.

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Appendix 1: Agenda 2 May 2007 The Law Society, 114-115 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1PR

0930 Welcome from Cecile Jackson, President Development Studies Association

Plenary 1: keynote speakers, questionnaire headlines and discussion Justin Forsyth, Special Adviser to the UK Prime Minister on international development Her Excellency Lindiwe Mabuza, The South African High Commissioner Chair: Simon Maxwell, ODI

1100 Coffee break

1130 Parallel working groups (session 1) a) Conflict management Funmi Olonisakin, Kings College and Phil Vernon, Director of Programmes, Africa and Peace Building, International Alert b) What is China’s contribution to African development? John Humphrey, IDS and Andrew Lawson, ODI c) Aid Effectiveness and Absorptive Capacity: Which way aid reform and accountability? Paolo de Renzio, ODI and University of Oxford, and Christopher Adam, University of Oxford d) e-Africa and m-Africa: How can ICTs deliver? Richard Heeks, IDPM, University of Manchester and Abi Jagun, IDPM, University of Manchester

1300

Lunch

1400 Parallel working groups (session 2) e) Combating corruption in Africa: What can donors do? Alina Rocha Menocal, ODI and Heather Marquette, International Development Department, University of Birmingham f) Voice in international institutions Simon Burall, ODI and Jeff Powell, Bretton Woods Project g) Climate change: An opportunity for A rica? Dr. Tom Mitchell, IDS, John Magrath, Oxfam GB and

f

UK Working Group on Climate Change and Development, and Dr. Henny Osbahr, Tyndall Centre and University of Oxford h) Civic engagement and accountability Adrian Wells, ODI

1530 Tea break

1600 Plenary 2: feedback from groups and panel discussion Owen Barder, DFID Director of Global Development Effectiveness Larry Elliot, Economics Editor, The Guardian Hugh Bayley MP, Chair of Africa All Party Parliamentary Group Charles Abugre, Christian Aid Head of Policy and Advocacy John Mugabe, NEPAD Science and Technology Secretariat Chair: Lawrence Haddad, IDS

1715 Concluding remarks Lawrence Haddad, IDS and Simon Maxwell, ODI

1730 Drinks Reception

A DSA/DFID High-level Policy Forum coordinated by the Institute for Development Studies and Overseas Development Institute.

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Appendix 2: Presentations Presentation 1: Simon Maxwell – Stakeholder consultations

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Presentation 2: Funmi Olonisakin – The future of conflict management in Africa

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Presentation 3: John Humphrey – China, Africa and the G8

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Presentation 4: Andrew Lawson – Should we worry about Chinese aid to Africa?

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Presentation 5: Paolo de Renzio – Aid effectiveness and absorptive capacity

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Presentation 6: Christopher Adam – Absorbing aid inflows: some macroeconomic considerations

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Presentation 7: Richard Heeks – ICTs and Africa: Enterprise, innovations and the G8

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Presentation 8: Abi Jagun – e-Africa and m-Africa: How can ICTs deliver?

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Presentation 9: Simon Burall – Voice in international institutions

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Presentation 10: Jeff Powell – Options for democratising the World Bank and the IMF

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Presentation 11: John Magrath – Climate change and Africa, an NGO perspective

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Presentation 12: Heather Marquette – Donors and corruption in Africa: Priorities and challenges for the G8

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Presentation 14: Summary of recommendations for the G8

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Appendix 3: Speakers’ biographies Justin Forsyth Justin Forsyth is Special Advisor to the UK Prime Minister on international development. He is an expert on issues of poverty and development having been actively involved in campaigning on poverty and injustice for 20 years. Justin was formerly Campaign and Policy Director for Oxfam, one of the largest development organisations in the world. He worked for Oxfam for 13 years in a variety of roles. Her Excellency Lindiwe Mabuza Her Excellency Lindiwe Mabuza has been High Commissioner for the Republic of South Africa to the UK since 2001. Prior to that she was High Commissioner to Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam as well as Ambassador to the Philippines from 1999 to 2001. She was Ambassador to Germany from 1995 to 1999. During the 1980s she represented the African National Congress in Scandinavian countries and facilitated the opening of African National Congress offices in Denmark, Norway and Finland. Owen Barder Owen Barder is Director of DFID’s Global Development Effectiveness Division. Previously he was a Senior Program Associate at the Center for Global Development in Washington DC. He is a former private secretary for economic affairs to the UK Prime Minister, and was Director of Information at the Department for International Development. Larry Elliot Larry Elliott is the Economics Editor at The Guardian newspaper. Hugh Bayley Hugh Bayley is a Labour MP and has been a member of the International Development Select Committee since 2001. He is also a member of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, and chairs the Westminster Foundation for Democracy. Charles Abugre Charles Abugre is Head of Policy and Advocacy at Christian Aid. He trained as a development economist and taught development studies at the University of Wales, Swansea. Before that he was a development activist in Ghana and many parts of Africa and Asia, co-founding and leading the Africa secretariat of the Third World Network and the Integrated Social Development Centre (ISODEC). He has worked as a researcher, consultant and campaigner in a wide range of fields including health and reproductive rights, international trade and development aid. John Mugabe John Mugabe is an advisor on science and technology to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development. He is a former Executive Director of the African Centre for Technology Studies (ACTS), a science policy research think tank based in Nairobi. He has helped to establish the African Forum on Science and Technology for Development (AFSTD), an organisation which provides members of NEPAD and the African Union with science and technology policy advice.

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Appendix 4: Background documents Stakeholder consultations An e-consultation about progress in Africa since the Commission for Africa in 2005, about the lasting impact and continuing relevance of the Commission, and about their priorities for the 2007 G8. www.odi.org.uk/events/G8_07/CFA_Stakeholders_Consultation.pdf Gleneagles Implementation Plan for Africa March 2007 Update. www.odi.org.uk/events/G8_07/background_docs/070302%20(March%20Update)%20G8%20Gleneagles%20Implementation%20Plan%20for%20Africa_P1.pdf Commonwealth Code of Practice for the International Recruitment of Health Workers. www.odi.org.uk/events/G8_07/background_docs/Commonwealth_Code_of_Practice.pdf

Aid effectiveness and absorptive capacity: Which way aid reform and accountability?

The Macroeconomics of Doubling Aid to Africa and the Centrality of the Supply Side by Tony Killick and Mick Foster, Development Policy Review vol 25 no. 2, March 2007. www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-7679.2007.00365.x Paved with good intentions? The role of aid in reaching the Millennium Development goals by Paolo de Renzio, African Affairs Briefing, November 2006. www.odi.org.uk/events/G8_07/background_docs/Aid%20and%20MDGs%20-%20African%20Affairs.pdf What would Doubling Aid do for Macroeconomic Management in Africa? by Mick Foster and Tony Killick, April 2006. www.odi.org.uk/publications/briefing/bp_april06_doubling_aid.pdf Macroeconomic challenges of scaling up Aid to Africa: A Checklist for Practitioners by Sanjeev Gupta, Robert Powell, and Yongzheng Yang, International Monetary Fund, 2006. www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/afr/aid/2006/eng/aid.pdf Pity the Finance Minister by Peter S. Heller, IMF Working Paper, September 2005. www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2005/wp05180.pdf Scaling up versus Absorptive Capacity: Challenges and Opportunities for Reaching the MDGs in Africa by Paolo de Renzio, ODI Briefing Paper, May 2005. www.odi.org.uk/publications/briefing/bp_may05_absorptive_capacity.pdf Doubling aid will only work if we double deployment efforts by Paolo de Renzio, 10 January, 2005. http://business.guardian.co.uk/story/0,,1386480,00.html

ICTs and Africa: Enterprise, innovations and the G8

ICTs and the MDGs: On the Wrong Track? by Richard Heeks, eAfrica Briefing 5, 2007, Development Informatics Group, University of Manchester. www.odi.org.uk/events/G8_07/background_docs/heekseAfricaBriefing5MDGs.doc Foundations of ICTs in Development: Pushing and Pulling by Richard Heeks, eAfrica Briefing 4, 2007, Development Informatics Group, University of Manchester. www.odi.org.uk/events/G8_07/background_docs/heekseAfricaBriefing4Pull.doc

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Overestimating the Global Digital Divide by Richard Heeks, eAfrica Briefing 3, 2007, Development Informatics Group, University of Manchester. www.odi.org.uk/events/G8_07/background_docs/heekseAfricaBriefing3Divide.doc Social Outsourcing of IT Services by Richard Heeks, eAfrica Briefing 2, 2007, Development Informatics Group, University of Manchester. www.odi.org.uk/events/G8_07/background_docs/heekseAfricaBriefing2Social.doc Offshoring to Africa by Richard Heeks, eAfrica Briefing 1, 2007, Development Informatics Group, University of Manchester. www.odi.org.uk/events/G8_07/background_docs/heekseAfricaBriefing1Offshore.doc

Voice in international institutions

Bridging the democratic deficit: Double majority decision making and the IMF by Peter Chowla, Jeffrey Oatham and Claire Wren, One World Trust and Bretton Woods Project, February 2007. http://brettonwoodsproject.org/doc/wbimfgov/DoubleMajority_IMF.pdf Reforming the international aid architecture: Options and ways forward by Simon Burall and Simon Maxwell with Alina Rocha Menocal, ODI Working Paper, October 2006. www.odi.org.uk/publications/working_papers/wp278.pdf IMF reform: What happens next? by Lauren Phillips, ODI Opinion, September 2006. www.odi.org.uk/publications/opinions/75_imf_reform_sept06.pdf?

Climate change: An opportunity for Africa?

KEY8 for G8 Eight Tyndall Centre discoveries for changing the landscape of climate policy, July 2005. www.odi.org.uk/events/G8_07/background_docs/key8forg8.pdf

Combating corruption in Africa: What can donors do?

The Creeping Politicisation of the World Bank: The Case of Corruption by Heather Marquette, International Development Department, University of Birmingham in Political Studies 2004, vol 52, 413–430. www.odi.org.uk/events/G8_07/background_docs/Marquette_politics_of_corruption_at_WB.pdf Getting to Grips with Politics: Political Analysis at the World Bank and DFID by Heather Marquette, International Development Department, University of Birmingham and Zoë Scott, Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, University of Birmingham. www.odi.org.uk/events/G8_07/background_docs/Marquette_%20Scott_donors_political_analysis.pdf Whither Morality? Disciplinary Secularism in the Political Economy of Corruption in Developing Countries by Heather Marquette, International Development Department, University of Birmingham and Gurharpal Singh Department of Theology and Religion, University of Birmingham. www.odi.org.uk/events/G8_07/background_docs/Marquette_Singh_political_science_corruption_secularism.pdf

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Appendix 5: Additional resources

Links

Powerpoint presentations

http://www.odi.org.uk/events/G8_07/presentations.html

Podcast

www.odi.org.uk/podcasts.html or www.odi.org.uk/dsa/podcast.mp3

Blogs

Is Tony Blair’s legacy on Africa at risk? Simon Maxwell explains why this year’s G8 provides a last opportunity to persuade the most powerful leaders in the world to deliver on their promises. Posted 8 May, 2007. http://blogs.odi.org.uk/blogs/main/archive/2007/05/08/2748.aspx A more careful approach to scaling up is called for How and when scaling up happens is likely to be as important as how much additional aid is actually given. Posted 8 May, 2007 by Paolo de Renzio. http://blogs.odi.org.uk/blogs/main/archive/2007/05/08/2749.aspx Eldis G8 and Africa Commission blog Africa after the Africa Commission: what priorities for the German G8? http://community.eldis.org/g8/

Press release

Can Angela Merkel deliver Tony Blair’s legacy on Africa? www.odi.org.uk/events/G8_07/press_release.pdf

Expert Opinions The future of conflict management in Africa Funmi Olonisakin, Director, Conflict Security and Development Group, King’s College London. www.odi.org.uk/events/G8_07/opinions/olonisakin.pdf China, Africa and the G8 John Humphrey, IDS. www.odi.org.uk/events/G8_07/opinions/humphrey.pdf Aid effectiveness and absorptive capacity: Which way aid reform and accountability? Paolo de Renzio, ODI and University of Oxford. www.odi.org.uk/events/G8_07/opinions/de%20renzio.pdf e-Africa and m-Africa: How can ICTs deliver? Richard Heeks, Development Informatics Group, University of Manchester. www.odi.org.uk/events/G8_07/opinions/heeks.pdf

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Combating corruption in Africa: what can donors do? Alina Rocha Menocal, ODI. www.odi.org.uk/events/G8_07/opinions/rocha_menocal.pdf Voice in international institutions Simon Burall and Lauren Phillips, ODI. www.odi.org.uk/events/G8_07/opinions/burall_phillips.pdf Climate change: An opportunity for Africa? Tom Mitchell, IDS. www.odi.org.uk/events/G8_07/opinions/mitchell.pdf Civic engagement and accountability Adrian Wells, ODI. www.odi.org.uk/events/G8_07/opinions/wells.pdf

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Appendix 6: Stakeholder consultation questionnaire

AFRICA AFTER THE AFRICA COMMISSION: WHAT PRIORITIES FOR THE GERMAN G8?

STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS

2 MAY 2007

1. THE CONSULTATION This document summarises the findings of an e-consultation of stakeholders. The consultation was conducted between January and April 2007. We asked about progress in Africa since the Commission for Africa (CfA) in 2005, about the lasting impact and continuing relevance of the Commission, and about their priorities for the 2007 G8. We contacted five groups of stakeholders: African governments, CSOs, academic researchers, business and donors. We received replies from 70 people of which 55 were based in Africa, the remaining 15 had an interest in African but were not based in Africa. The proportions of each stakeholder group in the total replies are detailed in figure 1.

Figure 1.

Respondents to Consultation

05

101520253035

Donors

CSOs

Busine

sses

Resea

rchers

African

Gov

ernmen

ts

%

2. THE HEADLINES There was a surprising amount of consensus in the consultation. The lasting impact and continuing relevance of the Commission were perceived to be:

• A cash injection (in terms of new resources, especially so debt relief); • A political awakening (in terms of the commitment of politicians inside and outside Africa but

also a sense of rising “political literacy” of African populations); • Real progress (in terms economic growth and stability); • Unfinished business (in terms of a perception that poverty reduction is lagging behind growth).

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Overall the opinions of stakeholders were as follows: Is Africa in a better state? Yes. Is progress in Africa likely to continue? Yes. Is economic growth contributing to poverty reduction? Not yet. Did the CfA report have a lasting impact on policies of donors and African governments? Not yet as fully as it could. Is the CfA report still relevant within and outside Africa and to your organisation? Yes, very much. 3. DETAILED FINDINGS 3a. Progress since 2005 Stakeholders were asked whether they thought Africa was in a better state, whether they were optimistic about the future and whether growth was pro-poor (see figures 2-4). Respondents, generally, had positive perceptions about progress in terms of economic growth and economic stability (and – generally – on political stability too). However, without exception, there was a perception that progress on growth was not matched by progress on poverty reduction. There was a perception that recent growth is focused in too few sectors and creating too few jobs. In short, growth is strong but it is perceived as not pro-poor. To quote one respondent, “growth is doing a bad job”. Further, respondents noted there has recently emerged a polarisation across Africa between progress in mainly Northern and Southern African countries, but turmoil in a number of countries in Eastern and Western Africa (respondents noted Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe for example).

Figure 2. Africa is in a better state now than it was in 2005

05

10152025303540

Stronglyagree

Slightlyagree

Neither agreeor disagree

Slightlydisagree

Stronglydisagree

%

Figure 3. African progress (however you have defined it) is likely to continue

05

10152025303540

Stronglyagree

Slightlyagree

Neither agreeor disagree

Slightlydisagree

Stronglydisagree

%

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Figure 4. Economic growth is contributing significantly to poverty reduction

05

10152025303540

Stronglyagree

Slightlyagree

Neither agreeor disagree

Slightlydisagree

Stronglydisagree

%

3b. The lasting impact and continuing relevance of the CfA Stakeholders were asked whether they thought the CfA report has had a lasting impact on donor and African governments policies, and whether the CfA is still relevant to debates in and about Africa and still relevant to the work of their organization (see figures 5-9). The perception is that the Commission mattered and still matters. However, because (as intended) the Commission had had a defined ‘shelf-life’ there was some confusion over follow-up structures. One recurrent issue of concern was the extent of implementation of the CfA Report. Opinion was divided but many felt the report had not translated into policy among African governments and donors. The tangible impact of the Commission was seen as debt relief. The intangible impact was political commitment in and outside Africa. The tentative addressing of politics in Africa, via a governance lens was seen as important. It was strongly felt that the Commission has focused the world’s attention on Africa and Africa on itself. In doing so it had awaken politicians inside and outside Africa. To quote one respondent, “the CfA, no doubt, has changed the thinking of many opinion leaders in Africa. Many are waking up from their slumber – initiating policies that reflect the Millennium Development Goals… …It has also provided for a global awareness”.

Figure 5. The CfA Report has had a lasting impact on donor policies

05

1015202530354045

Stronglyagree

Slightlyagree

Neither agreeor disagree

Slightlydisagree

Stronglydisagree

%

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Figure 6. The CfA Report has had a lasting impact on African governments

05

10152025303540

Stronglyagree

Slightlyagree

Neither agreeor disagree

Slightlydisagree

Stronglydisagree

%

Figure 7. The CfA Report is still relevant and appropriate in Africa

05

1015202530354045

Stronglyagree

Slightlyagree

Neither agreeor disagree

Slightlydisagree

Stronglydisagree

%

Figure 8. The CfA is still relevant to the ongoing challenges and international debates in and about Africa

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Stronglyagree

Slightlyagree

Neither agreeor disagree

Slightlydisagree

Stronglydisagree

%

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Figure 9. The CfA work is still relevant to the work of my organisation

05

10152025303540

Stronglyagree

Slightlyagree

Neither agreeor disagree

Slightlydisagree

Stronglydisagree

%

3c. Priorities for the G8 in 2007 and the drivers of positive change Stakeholders were asked in which areas can the G8 be most useful. We asked respondents to vote on a number of issues on a scale of 1 (low priority) to 5 (high priority). We then calculated a weighted value. The top priorities were growth, governance, poverty reduction and agriculture (see figure 10). Respondents were asked who are the people or organisations most likely to bring about positive change in Africa and what contextual factors are the primary drivers and impediments to positive change in Africa. The internal drivers of positive change identified most often were AU and NEPAD, progressive elites and faith groups. External drivers commonly identified were China, the donors (notably the UK in particular), and African diasporas. Contextual drivers of positive change were thought to be improving education, “political literacy” and interest in citizenship as well as new technologies and new medias such as mobile technologies. Contextual impediments identified were corruption, high levels of existing inequality, HIV/AIDS and cultural/traditional attitudes to calling African leaders to account.

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Figure 10.

P riorities  for the G8 in  2007

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350

E conomic  growthGovernance

P overty  reductionAgricultureE ducation

C apac ity‐buildingInves ting  in people

Infras truc tureTrade

Trans parency  P rivate s ector role

Debt reliefHealth

C limate changeS c ience and technology

P eace and s ecurityA id

Leaders hipInequality

E nergyAfrica's  role  in  Int Community

Absorptive capac ityImpact of  India and C hina

C ultural  is s ues  Other

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ANNEX: Questionnaire: Africa after the Africa Commission

Please rank as follows: 5 - strongly agree; 4 – agree; 3 – neither agree nor disagree; 2 – slightly disagree 1 -

strongly disagree

1. Progress since 2005

Since 2005, progress in Africa has been mixed (for example, there is a new government in Liberia, there is hope

for a peaceful presidential transition in Nigeria and there have been elections in DRC, but Darfur remains in crisis

and the situation in Somalia gives cause for concern). We realise that ’Africa’ means many things to many people,

but given your perspective, please respond to the following statements and questions:

(a) Africa is in a better state now than it was in 2005

( ) 1 (strongly disagree)

( ) 2

( ) 3

( ) 4

( ) 5 (strongly agree)

(b) What is the key indicator of progress you are using to answer this question? (e.g. growth, stability, economic

management, openness)

(c) African progress (however you have defined it) is likely to continue

( ) 1 (strongly disagree)

( ) 2

( ) 3

( ) 4

( ) 5 (strongly agree)

(d) Economic growth is contributing significantly to poverty reduction

( ) 1 (strongly disagree)

( ) 2

( ) 3

( ) 4

( ) 5 (strongly agree)

Any comments?

2. The lasting impact of the Commission for Africa

The Commission for Africa and the ‘big push’ for Africa in 2005 was, in essence, a political project led by the UK

as Chair of the G8. Some proposals were accepted at the G8 or at that year’s UN Summit, but others made less or

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no progress. Overall, the Commission for Africa Report:

(a) has had a lasting impact on donor policies

( ) 1 (strongly disagree)

( ) 2

( ) 3

( ) 4

( ) 5 (strongly agree)

(b) has had a lasting impact on the policies of African governments

( ) 1 (strongly disagree)

( ) 2

( ) 3

( ) 4

( ) 5 (strongly agree)

(c) is still relevant and appropriate in Africa

( ) 1 (strongly disagree)

( ) 2

( ) 3

( ) 4

( ) 5 (strongly agree)

(d) What is the most significant change it has brought about?

Any other comments? 3. The continuing relevance of the Commission for Africa (a) The Commission for Africa is still relevant to the ongoing challenges and international debates in and about Africa

( ) 1 (strongly disagree)

( ) 2

( ) 3

( ) 4

( ) 5 (strongly agree) (b) The Commission for Africa work is still relevant to the work of my organisation

( ) 1 (strongly disagree)

( ) 2

( ) 3

( ) 4

( ) 5 (strongly agree)

(c) What aspect is most relevant?

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4. Priorities for the G8 in 2007

The G8 can be most useful if it commits G8 countries to specific actions in the following areas*:

Strongly disagree Strongly agree

Absorptive capacity of aid recipients 1 2 3 4 5

Africa’s role in the int’l community 1 2 3 4 5

Agriculture 1 2 3 4 5

Aid (quantity and quality) 1 2 3 4 5

Capacity-building 1 2 3 4 5

Climate change 1 2 3 4 5

Cultural issues 1 2 3 4 5

Debt relief 1 2 3 4 5

Education 1 2 3 4 5

Energy 1 2 3 4 5

Governance 1 2 3 4 5

Economic growth 1 2 3 4 5

Health 1 2 3 4 5

Impact of emerging India and China on Africa 1 2 3 4 5

Inequality 1 2 3 4 5

Infrastructure 1 2 3 4 5

Investing in people 1 2 3 4 5

Leadership 1 2 3 4 5

Peace and security 1 2 3 4 5

Poverty reduction 1 2 3 4 5

The role of the private sector 1 2 3 4 5

Science and technology 1 2 3 4 5

Trade 1 2 3 4 5

Transparency and accountability 1 2 3 4 5

Other? 5 Drivers and impediments to change (a) In your opinion, who are the people or organisations most likely to bring about positive change in Africa? Please list 3 internal to Africa

1 …………………………………………………………………………………………

2 …………………………………………………………………………………………

3 …………………………………………………………………………………………

Please list 3 external to Africa 1 …………………………………………………………………………………………

2 …………………………………………………………………………………………

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3 …………………………………………………………………………………………

(b) In your opinion, what contextual factors are the primary drivers and impediments to positive change in Africa? Drivers

1 ……………………………………………………………………………………….

2 ……………………………………………………………………………………….

3 ……………………………………………………………………………………….

Impediments 1 ……………………………………………………………………………………….

2 ……………………………………………………………………………………….

3 ……………………………………………………………………………………….

6. Do you have any other comments? Thank you for your time and participation.

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