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A DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF TECHNICAL RATIONALIN FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of Graduate Studies
of
The University of Guelph
by
MUNYA G. KABBA
In partial fulfilment of requirernents
for the degree of
Master of Arts
July, 1998
O Munya G. Kabba, 1998
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ABSTRACT
A DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF TECHNICAL RATiONALITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION.
Munya G. Kabba University of Guelph, 1998
Coordinator: Facuity of Graduate Studies
The Thesis is a discourse analysis of legal and market rationalities for environmental protection. These technical rationalities stifle communicative freedom and deforrn environmental discourses. Their validity and legitimacy are problematic because they are not based on the discursive democratic will formation of citizens.
To effectively conduct the analysis, the study adopts the theory of communicative action. This theory enables the analysis of validity claims and deformations of discourse. Using the notion of universal pragmatic, the study assesses the validity (tnith, rightness, sincerity and legitimacy) of these rationalities. The idea in universal pragmatics is that any communication oriented to reaching mutual understanding involves making claims that what is said is true, right and sincere. To explore the dogma or ideology in these rationalities, the study assesses the extent they
impede ideal speech situations, communicative settings free of constraints.
This Study reveals that market and legal rationalities for environmental protection detach environmental issues from practical and normative considerations. They do this by manipulating language or using technical languages of the market (money) or law (power). In this way, they maintain the status quo. Deformations of environmental discourse fragments environmental consciousness. This, in tum, promotes social pathology, a social control mechanism that maintains relations of domination and induce fatalism. Accordingly, democratic will and opinion formation in environmental discourses promote environmental consciousness and gives democratic legitimacy to environmental policies.
Acknowledgments
First of al1 I thank Jesus Christ for his guidance and protection. I also express my
sincere gratitude to al1 who supporteci me through this process. I am grateful to Professor
Glen Filson for his meaningful advice and Professor George Dei for his critical reading of
the manuscript. I also thank Professor Osabu Kle and Professor William Christian for their
instructive comments on the Thesis. Finally, I thank Professor Phidd for reading and
commenting on the Study.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
. . ...................................................................................................... List of Tables and Figures II
........................................................................ Chapter 1: Introduction ........ ..... 1
Chapter 2: The State of The Debate and The Framework for Discussion ............-...œ..œ....12
Chapter 3:Coordinating Environmental Protection Through the Market ......... -..*m**..--œ-~m*mm22
Chapter 4: Coordinating Environmentai Protection Through the Legal System ..........-... .46
Chapter 5: Conclusion .................................................................................................... ..76
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES
Figure 1
Graph Representing Costs and 8enefis of Pollution Control .............--.....-..-..-.--.-...... ..24
Table 1 * . * Radicalization of Discourse .......... ...~..~.......................................................-..............1 7
CHAPTER ONE
Background. Tedinical rationality for environmental protection, such as pollution tax,
tradable permits, and legal decisions are becoming dominant policy instruments for
environmental protection.' Dominant, though, these policies have not induced control or
reduction in environmental pollution? The question that mmes to mind is: wtiy do these
ineffective technical approaches continue to infom official environmental protection?
In mng to answer this question, this study explains the discursive processes through
which theses policies emerge. Meaningful discursive participation of the public is often
absent in the formation of technical environmental policies. Concems, opinion and will of
citizens affected by pollution do not shape these policies? Even when citkens do participate
in state-sponsored policy discourses, they often achieve lWJe since these discourses are
often mere 'public relations campaigns? They do not provide scope for communicative
freedom. Communication in these discourses are predominanüy stiategic interaction
(manipulation)? Also, systemic distortions characterize these technical discou rses.6
See Bruce G. Doem, The Politics of Risk: The Identification of Toxic Substances in Canada. (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1982), p. 3.21 - 3.23; also see Rachelle D. Hollander, "Expert Claims and Social Decisions," in Deborah Mayo and Rachelle D. Hollander, (Eds.) Acceptable Evidence: Science and Values in Risk Manaaernent, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991 ), p. 16
2 CNN Newswotld, January 18,1997.; also see Uoyd Robertson of Canadian Telbision (CW) and Mark Daley of City TV, They announced that pollution in Ontario is worsening according to the Ontario Medical Association. May 1 2-1 3, 1 998. 3 The econornic rationali& of structural adjustment excludes the will of people and ignores their suffreing. See Piers Blaikie, Terry Canon, lan Davis, and Ben Wisner, At Risk: Naturâl Hazards. People's Vulnerabilitv. and Disasters. (New York: Routledge Publishing, 1994). pp. 39 - 40. 4 To gain m a s support and loyalty for its one-sided policy actions, the state sponsors discourses in which it invites citizens to participate. Such discourses coerce ordinary citizen and constrain their communication. See ~ a v i d ~ e l d and John B. Thompson, aber mas: Critical Debates. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, l982), p. 5. 5 Jurgen Habermas, "A Reply to My Criticsn in David Held and John B, Thompson (Eds.) in Habermas: Critical Debates. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982), p. 264. In such a discourse, one of the participants deceives others regarding their being sincere and true. This covert strategic behavior is manipulation. For instance, in legal procedures legal experts exercise strategic power by intimidating or coercing ordinary citizens. 6 Jurgen Habermas, "A Reply to My Criticsn in David Held and John B. Thompson (Eds.) in Habermas: Critical Debates. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, t982), p. 264. Here, at least one of the participants in discourse deceives her or himself regarding the fact that he or she is behaving strategically. They may only have adopted an attitude oriented to reaching understanding. For instance, in cost benefit opinion surveys citizens respond to questionnaires thinking that by choosing certain options they will achieve they will protect the environment. However, by participating in the survey they are, in fact, lending mass loyalty and legitimacy to the state's positions in these surveys.
Ordinary citkens cannot express their views or form their will because of threats or faise
promises.
Constraints on technical discourse violate citjzens' rights, their freedom of speech
and their nght of participation. These impediments, in tum. block &kens' chances to purçue
and realize welfare and ecdogical rights? In short, inhibitions to citizens' communicative
freedom impede their reaîization of substantive democracy.
Once subjected to the framework of technical rationality, citizens cannot examine
environmental conflids rationally. It becomes difficult for them to talk about nomabive or
practical concems because of legal terminologies, mathematical formulas and equations that
characterize technical discounes. These technical languages cornplkate the issues and
fnistrate citkens, inducing them to inesponsible attitudes to pollution. In the end, technical
rationdies depoliticize the cMI society or organimtions of concemed ciüzens. The resutling
fatalism rneans only large scale disasters will gain attention. Considering this danger, an
urgent need exists to invesügate this pathological state.
A) The Statement of the Problem. A 'ttilemma of paradoxes' is associated with the
operation of technical rationality for environmental protection. First, it is a dangerous irony
for mmmunities to be fatalistic about Me-threatening pollution. Second. technical
environmental policies do not punue the health of people and ecosystems. as they are
supposed to do. Yet, they are rapidly gaining cunency globally and nationally. Third.
existing technical rationalities for environmental protection encourage a kind of public
participation' that stifles discursive opinion and will formation. In the end, experts do not
base policies on the will of citizens.
To explain these paradoxes, the study focuses on certain questions. How and Why
do environmental policies that ignore the integnty of the ecosystem continue to dominate
official environmental protection? How does technical rationality impede cornprehensive
form of reason - truth, legitimacy and rnorality - in environmental protedon? How do
techniml environmental rationalities (market and legal) depoliocize the political pu biic
~phere?~ What systemic functions do technical environmental policies serve?
7 See Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Noms: Contributions to a Discourse Theorv of Law and Democracv. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996). Ecological rights and welfare rights have a derivative status- They are realized whenever society create conditions for exercising subjective liberties and political autonomy (right of participation). 8 The public sphere cornes into existence whenever individuats corne together to interrogate both their own interactions and the wider relations of social and political power within which they are always and already embedded. In this autonomous association, citizens can
The purpose of the Study is to show that technical environmental pdicy decisions are
democratically illegitimate and la& tnith-vaJidit# The study critjcally a n a m the tnrtti-
validity of technical environmentai discourses and explains how the functional imperatives of
the çystem drive them. Two subproblems define the task of the research. The first
subproblem entai'ls a critical examination of implicit val idi daims of market rationari and
how L stnicturally deforms communication. In this anaiysis. the researcher reveals the
ideological manipulation of communication structures in market rationaMy for environmental
protecti'on.
The second subproblern explores how legal rationality deforms communication
structures in environmental protection. The legal discourse, exarnined here, abstracts and
redefines an environmental problem-situation systemically. In short, the study explains how
the system, an authoritative state and a penmsive economy, suppress the punuit of a
genedkable (shared) inter& par exdlence, 'O eco logical integ nty.
B) Tenets of The Study. The main thesis of this study is that technical economic and legal
rationality for environmental protection serve the interest of state and economy more than
comrnunities. To mnfirrn this thesis, the study elaborate three tenets.
First, technical (market and legal) rationalities for environmental protection,
lack objective (tnith), normative (morality), subjective (sincerity) validity.
Second, these rationalities M e the participation and democratic will
formation of citizens.
Third, legal and market rationalities for environmental protection protect the
status quo rather than health.
If these pdicies do not focus on health, then their legitimacy and validity are in question.
Thus, a citizen's unpolitical stance toward such policies that lad< validity suggests social
discuss how they should live and act collectively. See John Dryzek, Discursive Democracv: Politics, Policv and Political Science. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990 ), p. 37. 9 See Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theorv of Juraen Habermas. (New York: Basil Blackwell Inc., 19û4). Tnrth-validity refers to the implicit claim to rightness, truth, sincerity and legitimacy of a policy or statement. 10 See John S. Dryzek, Rational Ecoloav: Environment and Political Economv. (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987), p. 204
pathology, a kind of social control." The Shi* adopts an appropriate frarnework to analyze
this ideolog ical control .
C) AnaîytÏcal Framework. A pollution policy is acceptable if it reflects the concern of al1
that are at risks.12 Environmental policies are not valid if they fail to protect the health of
ecosystems and people. By failing to protect the health of people and ecosystems,
technical rationalities for environmental protection illustrate a tension between facticw and
validity.13 A gap exists between their validity (their daims to be bue, right and sincere) and
their fadcity (their failure to addres the needs for edogical health). For instance,
proponents of pollution tax daim it proteck the ecosystern, but in reality it protects fimis. (See
Chapter 3.2).
To understand the tension or gap between the idealizing daim of experts policy
action and their operational reality or effed requires an appropriate anaiyticd frameworkl*
Such a framework must distinguish fa-, noms and values inherent in environmental
pdicie~.'~ To do this, the study adopts the Theory of Communicative Action. This Theory
'recommends itsetf for the anaiysis' of idealizing daims of technical rationality for
environmental protection because it 'situates the idealizing character of validii in concrete
11 Social pathology is a mechanism of social control. It occurs when the state ideologically masks social issues to reduce public awareness of existing conftict, its extent and ramifications. See Jurgen Habermas, The Theorv of Communicative Action: Volume 1 1. Lifeworid and Svstem :A Critique of Functionalist Reason, Translated by Thomas McCarthy. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987), p. 229.
12 See Rachelle D. Hollander, "Expert Claims and Social Decisions: Science, Politics and Responsibility" in Deborah G. Mayo and Rachelle D. Hollander (Eds.) Acceptable Evidence: Science and Values in Risk Manaqement. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1 Wl), p. 162 - 8. 13 The tension between facticity and validity refers an idealizing situation in which factual generation of enforceable policies, laws or legitimate orders (facticity) conflicts with their daim to deserve recognition (validity). See Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Noms: Contributions to a Discourse Theorv of Law and Democracy (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996). 14 A framework is an ideational structure with systematic set of relationships for organizing a study. See Philip Babcock et al, Webster Third New Dictionarv. (Springfield, Mass.: G and C Mernan Company Publishers, 1971), p. 902. 15 Distinguishing facts and imposed idealizations or values in social relations can serve to reveal the ideotogiwl rnask on social issues. See Roger kasperson and Knsti Dow, "Development and Geographical Equity in Global Environmental Change: A Framework for Analysis," in Richard A. Berk (Ed.) Evaluation Review: A Journal of Amlied Science Research. (Catifornia: Sage Publications, vol. 15, no. 1, Feb, 1991), p. 151.
~ontexts."~ 'Instead of assuming that specific decision making systems [like market or
legal discourses for environmental protection] and value systems @ike economic efficieccy as
goal value of environmental protection] as definitely given, we must invesügate the suitability
of these systems for fulfilling their tasks.'" A belief systern such as eamomic efficiency that
fails to protect the environment yet continue to inform policy orientations is an ideology. In
this study, ideologies are 'those belief systems which can maintain their legitimacy despite the
fact that they could not be validateci if subjected to rational dis~ourse.''~ A policy like
pollution tax gets adopted in market dismurses because experts systematicaliy deform these
discourses. (See Chapter 3.3).
Communication action theory enables one do a critique of ideol~gy.'~ This critique of
ideology takes as its frarnework the model of the suppression of genemltzable or shared
interest2O Coorâinating environmental protection, for instance, through demand and supply
mechanisms M e s the communicative ability of ordinaiy citizens. As citizens cannot
participate in these discourses propedy. they cannot pursue ecological integnty. The
languages of these discourses prevent communicative investigation of the issue. T d a y the
main problem of language has replaced the problem of consciousness; the transcendental
critique of language supersedes that of wnsciousness."' Explaining the level of
environmental consciousness is possible by analyzing inhibitions to communicative action.
Thus, technical discourses for environmental protection can ideologically manipulate
environmental consciousness. To do this explanation, the theory provides a guiding
question:
How would the members of a social system, at a given stage in the development of productive forces, have collecfjvely and bindingly interpreted their [environmental] needs (and) which noms [expected behavior] would they have accepted as justifieci if they could and would have decided on the organimtion of social intercourse throug h discursive will-formation, with
16 See William Rehg, "Translator's Introductionn in Jurgen Habermas Between Facts and Noms: Contributions to the Discourse Theorv of Law and Democracv. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996), pp. xi-xvi. 17 See Jurgen Habermas, Theorv and Practice. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1 974), p. 274 18 See David Held, Introduction to Critical Theorv. (Berkeley: University of California Press, l98O), p. 256. 19 See Jurgen Habermas, Leaitimation Cnsis. ( Boston: Beacon Press, 1 9X), p. 1 13. 20 Ibid, pp. 1 1 1 - 1 17; A model is an intellectual construct for organizing, evaluating and interpreting data or social phenomena. See Jack C. Plano, Robert E. Riggs, and Helenan S. Robin, Dictionarv of Political Analvsis, (California: ABC-Clio Inc., 1982), pp. ï 7 - 78. 2 1 See Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theorv of Juraen Habermas. (New York: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1984), p. 273.
adequate knowledge of the limiting wndions and function imperatives of their
This question infers a cornparison. We can compare technical discourses for environmental
protection with ideal communicative situations that do not inhibit interiocutors. This
comparison serves to reveal structural deformations of technicd environmental discourses.
The guiding question involves the notion of universal pragmatics and the ideal speech
situation. Universal pmgrnatics m. help us invdgate the validity of technical rationality.
The idea in univeml pragmatics is that people who act communicatively (to agree) raise
chims and suppose that they can vindicate (or redeem) these claims if others question them.
To the extent that decision makers for environmental protection aim at reaching
understanding, they must raise claims that their policy decisions are me, rnorally right,
legitimate and sincere? Thus, an act of communication or discursive policy making invoives
p i t i n g implicit practical and theoretical claims that are assumed redeemable. Analysis of
technical environmental discourses entails aççessing the extent they establish conditions for
mutual understanding and rational (uncoerd) argumentation.
The idea that every genuine act of communication aims at reaching understanding or
agreement involves a normative dimension formalized in the notion of ldeal Speech Situation.
A consensus or decision attained under an ideal speech situation is a rational consensus.
Rational communicative situations becorne the uitimate criterion to decide the ttuth of
statements or the correciness of nonnsF4 To say that an environmental policy is valid (tme,
rnoraliy correct, or sincere) is to imply that it is a rational consensus that results from a
rational discourse. Without rational discourse a consensus is not rational. In tum, a policy
decision that is not a rational consensus is not valid.
This mode1 of a critique is grounded in a normative standard - the ideal speech
situation - 'inherent in the very structure of social action and lang~age'.~~ We anticipate an
ideal speech situation in al1 acts of communication aimed at reaching understanding. It is not
arbitrary, though it is rarely, if ever approximated in actual speech situations. This ldeal
serves as a standard for critique of systemically distorted communication. Where
communicative situations of legal and market discourses clearly violate an ideal speech
situation, the genuinenes and legitimacy of decisions resulting frorn them is questionable.
--
23 See Jurgen Habermas, Le itimation Crisis. ( Boston: Beacon Press, 1975 & /? 113- See David Held, lntroduzon to wmai 1 heorv. (Berkeley: University of a ifornia
Press, 1980), p. 333. 24 Ibid, pp. 254-7. 23 Ibid, p. 256.
Strategic actions (threats, lies or decemon) in dismurse represent 'derivatives' of
action oriented to reaching agreement. These communicative f o m are 'derivatives'
bacause they 'suspend' or 'put out of play' certain vaiidity daims. lnterlowtors aim to further
their interests rather aian pursue mutual understanding. As dl true communications invobe
'the anticipation of a form of life in which tnnh, freedom and jusüce are possible,' the Ynith of
a statement is linked in the last anafyçis to the intention of the true Iife." Violation of th*
fundamental ideal of speech, therefore, constitutes ideological manipulation.
An environmentad policy that emerges in technical discourses with deforrned
communication structures is an ideology. As language is the medium of ideology and human
life, 'one can analyze it 'to reveal the universal structure of sociocultural life? language is
the key distinguishing characteristic of human He. Since we cannot hiliy understand
lang uage independently of mm munication proceses, the analysis of ideological
manipulation through language must focus on communication structures. The Theory of
Communicative Acüon can be instnidive for understanding expert (market and legal)
rationalities and their research fhdings? This framewodc, therefore, can enable one explain
ideology in technical rationalities for environmental protection.
A social theoty critical of ideology c m , therefore, identify the nomative power built into the institutional system of a çociety only if it starts from the model of the suppression of generalizable interests and compares normative struckrres [values and inmons] existing at a given time with the hypothetical state of a system of noms, ceteh panbus, discursively."
The study explains the ideological nature of technical dismurses for environmental protection
by: (a) cntically examining their implicit validity daims (tnith, rightness, and sincerity); and (b)
assessing the communicative rationality of these discourses in light of an ideal speech
situation. This analyocal mode in the study, is therefore, a pure critique."
26 See David Held, Introduction to Critical Theorv. (Berkeley: University of Cal ifornia Press, 1980), p. 345. 27 Ibid, p. 282. This critique of ldeology uses an ldeal Speech Situation as evaluative standard to assess the openness and communicative freedorn of real discourses. 28 See John S. Dryzek, "Critical Theory as a Research Program", in Stephen White (Ed.) The Cambridae Cornoanion to Habermas, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 97. The Theory can enhance understanding of findings in social inquiry or disciplines. 2 9 See Jurgen Habermas, Leaitirnation Crisis. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), p. 113. 30 Ibid, p. 30. Pure critique is the assessrnent of real discourses or social interaction against an hypothetical evaluative standard, an ideal speech situation. The latter is a discursive situation where social actors can express their views and interests as equals and can oppose views. If real discourses deviate from ideal speech situation, then their consensus are not valid.
D) Organization of Study. The organization of a study is the methodology by whidi one
make the meanings of data ~Iear.~' Here, the data nicludes market-based environmental
policies and facts from legai environmental delibemtions and related literature. These date
was collecteci by means of inte~ews. The researcher inteMewed an official (a chairperson
at the IMlCO Appeal Hearing in Guelph) at the Environmental Appeal Board and the Director
of Guelph University's OPlRG (Ontario Public Interest Research Group).
Elaborations of the arguments are done rnainly in Chapten three, four and five.
Chapters one and two are concerneci mainly with organizational or meoiodological matters.
In chapter one, the researcher outlines the nature of the thesis. This includes the
background and statement of the problem, the organization of the stuciy, tenets or thesis of
the study. It also contains the analyücal framework, the sape and significance of the study,
and the objectives.
Chapter two is an attempt making the mode of discussion more comprehensible.
The chapter defines the "state of the debate" in section 2.1. It outlines the views of
proponents and opponents of techniml rationality in public policy formation. Section 2.2, is
an elaborate outline of the framework for the discussions. Market and legal rationalities
create a product (environmental policies). Environmental policies is seen as a products of
understood here as an interaction between system ic forces and the resources of the
liieworld or domain of communicative action. Section 2.2 outiines what is meant by practical
and theoretical analyses in the study. Also, it delineates the idea of the radicalization
(absolute freeing for criticism) of dismurses. In this study, the researcher critically examines
daims to buth and morality in the logic of tnith (theoretical discourse) and in the logic of
morality (practical discourses). (See sedon 2.2).
To employ the madel of the suppression of generalizable interests fruitfully, the study
adopts certain assumptions. These assumptions sewe to organize discussions. One such
assumption in Chapter three states: conflicts [the virtual opposition of systemic and citizens'
interests] 'can come about only within the categories of the interpretative system obtaining at
that specifc historical time; at such time, action oriented to noms gives way to interests
oriented action? Market discourses such as cost benefit surveys are 'interpretative
systems' that create only ewnomic spectacles through which citizens can see pollution.
Within market discourses, a pollution act is not a violation of right or inappropriate behavior.
3 1 See Paul Leedy, Practical Research: Plannina and Desicin. (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1980), p. 71 3:! See David Held, Introduction to Critical Theon/. (Berkeley: University of Califomia Press, 198O), p. 346.
Chapter three confimis the hypothesis that hidden interests exists in technical
rationaiiies for environmental protection (such cost benefit suweys, pollution tax and
tradeable pemits) even though there is no manifest conflict." One can remstnict aiese
hidden interests to create consciousneçs even in cases where no manifest conflict e~ists.~"
Accordingiy, the researcher outlines market-based environmental policies such as pollution
tax, tradable permits and cost benefit valuation - in sedon 3.1.
The researcher reveals the hidden inter- in aiese policies by, first, anaiyzing their
truth-validity (M, morality and sincerity) to reveal their ideological content in section 3.2. In
section 3.3, the researcher tests the 'colonization of Iifeworld thesis. This test involves
examining how the econornic or market rationalii for environmental protection sofles
communicative freedom to prevent cÏüzens frorn debating the problems rationally.
In Chapter four another assumption plays an organizational function. This
assumption states that conflicts conceming action oriented to institutionalized noms anses
only when the consensus governing the distribution of opportunities for satisfying needs
break d o ~ n . ~ ~ From this assumption, the researcher discusses the legal-bureaucratie
deliberations for reçoiving the International Malleable Company's (IMICO) pollution protests.
The resulting deliberations were set up to reach soma kind of consensus on the distribution of
ecological resources or needs for environmental protection. Section 4.1 is a cntical outline of
the background of the IMlCO (International lron Malleable Company') pollution saga in
Guelph City.
Chapter four is a direct confirmation of the empirical assumption that interests that
actually emerge in conflid situations can coincide sufficiently with interests that the same
parties would express if they were to enter rational discourse. Viewç expressed eadier in the
anti-IMICO protest prior to the deliberations for resohnng the protest would have been similar
if the latter did not inhibi the communication potential of parties. Chapter four shows how
discourses within the legal bureaucratie system suppressed the pursuit of the shared or
public interest (ecologiml integnty) that citizens expressed in the anti-IMICO protests. This
suppression took series of stages or fonns.
In section 4.2, the study focuses on the validity of the arguments in the legal
discourse. This section outlines how the legal system entertains technical arguments and
views that conflict with the reality of the pollution problem-situation. Section 4.3. again, tests
3 3 See Jurgen Habermas, teaitirnation Crisis. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975). p. 114. 34 See David Held, Introduction to Critical Theoiy. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980). p. 347. 3s Ibid, p. 346.
the Yhesis of intemal colonkation of the lifeworld.' This test explores how legai-bureaucratie
procedures 'internally colonize' or dominate citizens' communication.
Chapter fnre is a summaty of the thesis and a highlight of the findings. It summarizes
how technical (legal and market) rationaMies defom environmental discourses and
consciousness. These constraints hinder the scope for criücal self refiedon (the awakening
of consciousness) because ideologically distort the reality of the envÎronmental problem. TO
the extent that a comrnunity can recognize '*bel in the proffered interpretations does the
analyücally proposed intetpretation (analysis in the study] becomes an actual wnsciousness'
and the interests to free themselves from these ideologicai submergence can become
citizens' interest." In short, legal and market discourses prevent m e n s from
understanding environmental reality, and so, they are ideological mechanisms.
In section 5.2, the researcher posits few critical theorems that stem from critical
insights derived from the discussions. Based on these insights, the researcher recommends
few ways to improve environmentai protection discourse.
E) Scope and Significanœ of Shidy. This study is a pure critique.= It analyzes how
the resolution of environmental conflicts in market and legal discourses deviate from the
ideal speech situation. It is a normative inquiry that addresses the communicative
anomalies of technical environmental discourses to reveal their ideological nature.
The study uses a model of democracy. In this model, public policy discourse is
democratic if it allows citizens the freedom to form their will and opinion discursively.
The will of the people should shape environmental policy, accordingly. Superiority of
this model stems from its capability to explain why people should or should not accept
instruments of governance or policy. A policy gains its validity and legitimacy from the
substantive contributions of those it affects. Without this contribution, environmental
policies become a mere inconspicious impositions on affected citizens.
36 Habermas cited in David Held. Introduction to Critical Theorv. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 348. 37 See John S. Dyzek, Discursive Democracv: Politics. Policv and Political Science. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 30. The pure critique here entails assessing the extent of communicative rationality or rational discourse in rnarket and legal rationaMies for environmental protection.
F) Objectives. 1) The main objective of the study is to demystify the social pathology
constitutive of technical environmental pr~tect ion.~~ The study aims to explain public
fatalism amid increasing pollution and the pervasiveness of technical orientation in
environmental protection that ignore health.
2) It also aims to show that constraints on discursive opinion and will formation in
environmental discourses impede critical environmental consciousness. Through a non
coercive discoune people can test the rightness, truth, truthfulness of expert judgments
and can differentiate dogmas from consensual world views. lnhibiting the
communicative ability to do this tests limits possibilities for environmental awareness.
3) Furthemore, the study aims to illustrate how the suppression of citizens'
capacity to pursue ecological integrity in technical environmental discounes constitutes
a 'legitimatory dilemma.' On the one hand. the question to consider is: Will citizens
continue to recognize the legitimacy of policy decisions (or consensus) that ernerge from
deformed state-sponsored environmental discounes? On the other hand, can citizens
free themselves from the ideological or technocratie consciousness these discourses
immerse them in to assert their politically autonomy. These questions address a
potential crisis of legitimation that inheres in systemic manipulation of public discourse.
4) The study aims to place technical environmental discourses in the
contradiction between dernocracy and capitalism. lnherent in capitalism, is the tendency
to maintain unpolitical class rule that keeps unfair practices out of sight or public debate.
Dernocracy. on the hand, demands that the will of people, which may mean opposing
unfair practices. become the basis for policy. Putting technical environmental discourse
in this contradiction or tension can reveal: a) why states favor technical discourses; and
b) how states gain m a s loyalty for their ineffective policy decisions.
38 See Jurgen Habermas, The Critical Theow of Juraen Habermas. (New York: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1984). p. 89.
CHAPTER TWO
THE STATE OF THE DEBATE AND THE FRAMEWORK FOR DISCUSSIONS
This Chapter does two things. First, it delineates the state of the debate on
technical rationality for environmental protection. Second, it describes the framework
within which the researcher conducts the discussions-
Technical rationality is the dominant framework for environmental protection at
the international level. Recommendations in Bruntland Commission, (World
Commission for Environment and Development), Montreal Protocol and RIO convention
illustrate this fact. Technical assistance plays a fundamental role in these regimes.
On the other hand, technical orientation in environmental protection has come
under serious opposition. One major argument against it is that it limits participati~n.~
It excludes the public and its outcome often ignore health. Exclusion of the public make
thern revert to fatalism as in the 1960's.~ Environmental concern in the 1990's is
dwindling as pollution is intensifying? Why?
2.1 State of The Debate. Technical economic rationality is the dominant framework for
environmental protection at the international level. Industry 2000 (1987). Montreal
Protocol, (1 989) and Rio Surnmits (1 992)" are international environmental agreements
that strongly support technical rationality for environmental protection. By ratifying these
international environmental treaties, states proliferate technical orientation. Pollution
taxes, tradable permits and environmental laws have their origin in international morality.
Aside, this technical orientation for public policy has met with opposition.
Opponents see market approaches as a danger, an irony and tool that marginalize
affected communities. Herman Daly and John Cobb (1989) argue that the economic
technique of discounting environmental resources is 'anti-rational' because it
3 9 See Murray Bookchin, Toward an Ecolo_ciical Society. (Montreal: Black Rose, 1982), p. ; Paul Shrivastava, "Organizational Myths in Industrial Crisis: Obfuscating Revelation," in Stephen Robert Couch and 3. Stephen kroll-Smith (Eds.) Communities at Risk. (London: Peter Lang Publishing Inc., 1991), p. 265. 40 See Robert Paehlke, "Environmentalism Without Apocalypse" in Environmentalism and the Future of Proqressive Politics, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 1 - 13. 4 1 CNN Newswotld, January 18,1997. 42 "Industry 2000: Panel on Sustainable Industnalization" in The Worîd Commission for Environment and Develooment- , 1987, p 9. The panelists consider economic efficiency an imperative for al1 societies. Montreal Protocol propagates a similar argument in Article 2 under 'control measures' and in article 4, subsection 8 under the notion of 'industrial rationalization'; Also see Stephanie Meakin, Rio Summit: Summarv of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Deveio~ment. (Ottawa: Canada Communication Groups Publishing, 1992).
'rationalizes' the destruction of species? If market rationality puts life-forms at dsk,
then it cannot be rational.
Infonning environmental protection by market principles is ironical because these
same principles are largely responsible for present environmental problems?
According to Murray Bookchin (1 980), these technical approaches are tools of adaptation
par exceiience that only serve promote the 'productivïst c~l izat ion. '~ They maintain the
status quo.
Another opposition against technical rationality in policy formation is that it hinders
public participation. Elsewhere, Murray Bookchin (1 989) argued that 'human domination
of humans gave rise to the idea of dominating nature (the environment)? Bookchin
claimed that social relations of domination caused the domination or degradation of the
environment. Even with public participation, Bruce Doem (1993) contends, consensus
formation in environmental conflict resolution is difficult. ENGOs (Environmental Non
Govemmental Organizations) oppose market agents who always try to lobby any t h e
and at al1 levels." Despite the frustration posed to public participation in technically
oriented discourses, Schumacher (1 974), urges individuals to strive for inclusion
continually. He states:
One way or another, everybody will have to take sides in this great conflict . . . It is widely accepted that politics is too important a matter to be left to experts. Today the main content of politics is economics, and the main content of economics is technology. If politics cannot be left to experts. neither can economics nor technology. The case for hope [the suMval of communities] rests with ordinary people."
His warning is particularly valuable as experts' or technical rationalities often pursue
interests that are different with those of cornm~nities.~~ For John Dryzek (1989),
advocacy for public control or substantive influence in environmental protection discourse
is essential because this matter involves our life-support base, the integrity of
43 See Heman Daly and John Cobb, For Our Common Good: Redirectinq the Economv Toward Cornmunitv. the Environment and Sustainable Future, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989), p. 155. 44 See Piers Blaikie, Terry Cannon, lan Davis, and Ben Wisner, At Risk: Natural Hazards, Peo~fe's Vulnerabilitv. and Disasters, (New York: Routledge Publishing, 1994), pp. 39-40. 4 5 See Murray Boockchin, in Towards an Ecoloclical Societv. (Montreal: Black Rose, 1980), p. 280. 4 6 See Murray Bookchin, Remakina Societv, (Montreal: Black Rose, 1989), p. 44 47 See Bruce Doern, Green Di~îomacv. (Ottawa: Renouf Publishing Company Ltd., 1993), p. 87. 48 See E. F Schumacher in Smatl is Beautiful, (London: Abacus Press, 1 974), p. 131 -2. 4 9 Ibid, pp. 131-2.
ecosystems. The latter is a shared or a generalizable interest par excellen~e.~~ Jurgen
Habermas (1 975) strongly advocates that ordinary individuals should take up political
discourse? Without substantive public involvement in policy discourse, public policy will
becorne stnctly oriented to experts' points of view.
2.2 The Framework for Discussions. To explicate 'real abstractions' of society we
must rationalize the lifeworld - critically examine validity claims - and analyze power
and money to keep the paradoxical nature of their interference in sight? The
interference of power and money into the socio-cultural domain (the Iifeworld) takes the
form of domination. A strong state inconspicuously imposes its 'independent' logic and
will on citizens in discourses that impose constraints on communicative freedom. The
contextual framework the research uses to explain technical rationality focuses on how
systemic forces dominate the political will formation of citizens in the domain of
communicative action or the lifeworld-
A) The Lifeworld constitutes 'taken-for-granteds, unshaken convictions that participants
in communication' draw on to interpret the validity of information cooperatively. It is the
consensual knowledge, culturally transmitted and linguistically organized stock of
interpretive patterns of rnembers of society. The lifeworld is the transcendantal
(intuitive) site where speakers and hearers rneet' and 'reciprocally raise claims that their
utterances fit the world (objective, social, or subjective realities).' From this site citizens
'criticize and confirm their validity claims, settle their disagreements, and arrive at
agreements." The lifeworld embodies knowledge that symbolizes the cultural
understanding of society.
In communication, participants draw upon the resources of the lifeworld, the
cultural stock of knowledge, to understand and agree with each other on issues and
values. An example of a lifeworld segment or 'consensual knowledge' is the view that
money is a measure of value. Accordingly, experts believe they can use money to value
environmental resources.
50 See John Dryzek, Rational Ecoloqv: Environmental and Political Economv. (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989) p. 204. It is our life-support system and the basis of the economy. 51 See Jurgen Habermas Leaitirnation Crisis. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975). n See Jurgen Habermas, The Theorv of Communicative Action: Volume 11. Lifeworld and Svstem :A Critiaue of Functionalist Reason. Translated by Thomas McCarthy. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987), p. 378. 5 3 Ibid, pp. 124-6.
Yet. the belief that money is a true rneasure of value is problematic in
environmental protection. Questioning the validity of this economic belief brings it into
disrepute. It, at once, ceases to be consensual knowledge. It becomes a dogma. An
environmental policy based on an economic dogma is not valid. This discredited
'lifeworld segment' becomes a knowledge 'field in actual need for mutual
unde~tanding.'~ This investigation or critical inquiry entails examining implicit validity
claims of truth and moraiity.
Critical Anaiysis of lmplicit Validity Claims. 1 n this analysis, expe rience or CU lture cannot
make a daim valid or correct. We cannot ground a claim from experience. We
establish facts and state of affairs only in rational discourse, where we corroborate, test
or provide rational grounds for validity claims of reality." When a claim, implicit or
explicit, becomes questionable, we must test its validity in discourse. For instance, an
argument that pollution is the opportunity cost of economic progress implies a
questionable truth and moral daim one must test by rational argumentation. This
premise is questionable because it implicitly trivializes health. It becomes a mere
presupposition whose validity we must test? Consequently, a problematic prernise
becomes a sentence- in need of justification. We test questionable assertions in
theoretical discourse and problematic noms in practical discourse.
Theoretid Discourse. We test hypothetical truth claims in the logic of theoretical
d isc~urse.~ In the 'logic of truth,' we conduct theoretical discourse to settle objective
claims about the world rationally." Theoretical discourse uses cannons of induction to
examine truth claims. Canons of induction are 'hierarchy of concepts and
considerations' or 'elements in a structure of arguments.'" They enable scrutiny of
implicit truth claim by explicating data, a theoreticai warrant, and the world view backing
a problematic truth daim or assertion. This is a process of induction.
54 See Jurgen Habermas, teqitimation Crisis. (Boston: Beacon Press, 19751, p. 123. 5 5 See David Held, Introduction to Critical Theorv, (California, Berkeley: University of California, 19801, p. 342. S 6 Ibid, pp. 340-1. 57 See Thomas Mccarthy, The Critical Theory of Juraen Habermas. (New York: Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1984), p. 296. 5 8 Ibid, p. 299 5 9 Ibid, p. 343
For example, consider the statement 'cost benefit suweys (CBA) can establish
the value of environmental resources." The data on which experts base this statement
is a respondent's choice of $5 among other survey options that explores a reasonable
cost to see a park. What warrants the analysts is the geeeral laws or moral principle
justifying the claim. Warrant links data and conclusion. The warrant surveyors use to
rnake such an assertion is the econornic theory that money is a measure of value. On
the warrant of this theory, the experts claim to measure the true value of environmental
resources. The final stage of the logic of truth is backing. Backing concems the
consistency of a statement to existing world view. Since everyone uses money to buy
and sel1 (trade) goods, environmental economists believe money can measure the value
of environmental resources. Unlike truth claims, we examine moral validity or rightness
in practical discourse.
Practical Discourse. Practical discourse enables us to test the moral validity of
probiematic norms, the intersubjective binding reciprocal expectations of behavior." We
test moral validity by means of the 'universalizability principle' presupposes that:
Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a discourse. Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever. Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into discourse. Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires, and needs. No speaker rnay be prevented, through intemal or external coercion, from exercking his right as laid down?'
Freedom and equality in debate characterize practical discourse. The rightness of a
nom is a procedural matter. In practical discourse selfish views are not important only
shared interests have preeminence. It serves to exclude noms or interests that are
selfish, private or particular. For instance, profit maxirnization cannot gain a consensus
in practical discourse because this discourse functions to establish shared interest.
However, if one cannot speak about the truth and morality of social problem
without constraints, threat or fear, then there is no practical discourse. A consensus is
rational if no strategic action occurs in practical discourse. Strategic action causes the
60 Thomas McCarthy, The Cntical Theorv of Juraen Habermas. (New York: Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1984), p. 313. "Sec Donald Moon, "Practical Discourse and Communicative Ethics" in Stephen White (Ed.) The Cambridae Com~anion to Habermas. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 149.
self-deception of interloc~tors.~ Thus, we test moral validity of an action or view
through rational or unconstrained argumentation.
Testing the validity clairn of truth or morality requires that citizens adopt increasing
levels of reflection or can 'radicalize' speech. To ensure that reasons and consensuses
result from the force of the better argument, discourse must be radicalized.
Radicalization of Discourse. To test the validity of norms effectively, social actors should
assume higher levels of reflection in argumentation by questioning cultural standards.
No view or knowledge is a given or is sacred. In radicalized discourse, social actors can
assume levels of meta-theoretical and meta-political or ethical critiques to question
cultural traditions or epistemological frameworks.
Table 1 Represents Levels of Reflection or the Steps in the Radicalization of Ar~ument. (
Adapted from David Held, "Reformulations of the Foundations of Criticai Theory" in
Introduction to Critical Theorv. (Berkeley: University of California, 1980).
Table 1: Levels of Reflection in Discourse
II grounding 1 theoretical explanations 1 Theoretical Justifications II
r -
STEPS IN
RADICALIZATION acts
L
THEORETICAL
DISCOURSE staternents
In a meta-theoretical critique, an actor can scrutinize or establish the need to
modify original conceptual or episternological frameworks. For instance, a person can
question whether rneasuring the value of environmental resources in money is possible.
We subject our 'consensual knowledge' - or lifeworld to critical review? Knowledge got
substantive lang uage
criticism self-ref lection
62 See Donald Moon, 'Practical Discourse and Communicative Ethics" in Stephen White (Ed.) The Cambndse Cornpanion to Habermas. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 149. 63 See Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theorv of Juraen Habermas. (New York: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1984), p. 308.
meta theoretical
critique of knowledge
Metaethical / meta-
political formation of rational
critical will
through culture and traditions must be placed under scrutiny to test their truth, or moral
correctness.
At the meta-political or meta-ethical level, we reflect on 'the dependency of our
need structures on the state of our knowledge and power? For instance, the public can
refuse to accept that market values should be the legitimate starting poinh or guidelines
in environmental discourse. The community in question should decide what
environmental goal values or objectives and needs they ought to want and want to accept
in a practical environmental discourse. Only then is it possible to have a meta-political
critique. Without the freedom to radicalize speech, social actors cannot do metacritique.
Without scope for meta-critical levels in discourse, the consciousness of
participants is still 'dogrnatically enslaved' or 'ideologically frozen.'" Failure to reach this
level means that certain problematic cultural noms or social practices are immune from
scrutiny. ln effect, their criticisms are still inadequately critical and not yet meaningful.
Only their capacity to scrutinize cultural notions or epistemological frameworks can
participants in discourse fully free themselves from ideological illusions or idealizations.
Radicalization of discourse enables freedom from dogmas (prevalence of
problernatic beliefs) and induces critical consciousnes~.~~ Thus, constrains in technical
environmental discourses (such as the legal and market) that impede the scope to
scrutinize existing cultural traditions and value systems hinder critical environmental
consciousness. Resistance to meta-theoretical and meta-political critiques show that
certain forces influence communication structures. The study will explain how social
power (the effect of money and influence in society) inhibits the radicalization of speech to
rnaintain ideological views or dogmas.
B) Life world and System Interaction: Colonization of the Life world. Understandi ng society
as an interaction in which system (economy and state) dominate the socio-cultural domain
in discourse overcomes the limited view of society as exclusively a socio-cultural domain
or l i fe~or ld .~~ This broader perspective can help us understand how the system
64
6 5 Ibid, McCarthy, 1 984, p. 31 7. Ibid, McCarthy, 1984, pp. 77-78.
66 Ibid, p. 88. A critically conscious person understands the ongin or motivation behind a nom. That person has gained insight into the origins of ideological manipulation. 67 See Jurgen Habermas, Theow of Communicative Action. Vol. Il. Lifeworid and Svstem: A Critique of Functionalist Reason.Trans.Thomas Mccarthy. (Boston: Beacon Press, l98?), p. 150.
manipulates world views, entangles citizens and shapes their consciousness It enables
one to recognize that sometimes an 'alien authority' lurks behind the cultural symbolism or
values imposed in public discounes. One can then explain market rationality for
environmental protection as a conscious systemic design that places the pollution
problem within the system domain. Policy decisions or consensuses that result from
technical discourses fraught with inconspicuous systernic constraints are decepü~e.~
On the other hand, understanding society as an interaction of system and lifeworld
overcomes the moral limits of an exclusive perspective of society as a system. The
systems perspective of society considers normative concems out of date in politics." It
transfomis a11 questions of truth into questions of how the system must fun~tion.'~
System approach is 'conceptual imperialism,' where every issue or question focuses only
on how the system must function or control its environment to maintain equilibrium?'
Nevertheless, society is not a nom-free sociality, driven by instrumental action
only. State policies are legitimate only if they result from a consultation with citizens
those policies affect. To make policy behind the backs of subjects and without
addressing their concerns cannot ensure social stability.
Unfortunately, technical environmental discourses stifle ideal speech situations
ans so prevent critical examination. They deny citizens their communicative freedom.
This domination is 'the colonization of society's lifeworld.'" Like colonial masters coming
into a social system, experts assimilate ordinary citizens to their will and relieve
themselves of the need to justify their actions, their positions or validity daims." They
can do this in discourses that constrain communicative potential. If experts make value
judgements and value-laden prescriptions in technically-oriented environmental
68 Ibid, pp. 149-50. 69 See Jurgen Habermas, "Normative Content of Modernity" in Philosoohical Discourse of Modernitv, Trans. by Federick Laurence. (Mass.: MIT Press, 1992). 70 Questions in system analysis are oriented to function not rnorality. Examples are: "What evidence is there that the capitalist world economy functions in this fashion?," and 'Why does the deveIoprnent of the capitalist world-econorny function in this fashion?' See Terence K. Hopkins, Immanuel Wallerstein and Associates, 'Cyclical Rythyms and Secular Trends of the Capitalist World-Economy: Some Premises, Hypotheses, and Questionsn in World Svstem Analvsis, (London: Sage Publications, l982), p. 106, 7 1 See Jurgen Habermas, Leaitimation Crisis, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), pp. 5 - 6. 7 2 See Jurgen Habermas, The Theon, of Communicative Action: volume 11. Lifeworid and Svstem :A Critiaue of Functionalist Reason , Translated by Thomas McCarthy. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987), p. 355 7 3 See Jurgen Habermas, Theon, of Communicative Action. Vol. II. Lifeworid and Svstem: A Critiaue of Functionalist Reason.Trans.Thornas Mccarthy. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987). pp. 355 & 367.
discourses, citizens cannot challenge their validity. In the end, citizens are relieved of
their environmental responsibility to examine the tnith. moral rightness and sincerity of
decisions or solutions that detemine their destiny. On the other hand, experts are
relieved of the need to justify or ground their policies.
Environmental policies that emerge in these discourses are products of the
relations of domination between the system and l i fe~orld?~ They emerge out of
systemically deformed discourses.
Political decisions that reflect the existing organizational principle of society ipso facto do not admit of rational consensus. They could not be justified in a general and unrestricted discussion of what, in the iight of present and possible circumstances, is in the best interest of al1 affected by them. Therefore, the stability of the capitalist social formation depends on continued effectiveness of legitimations that could not withstand discursive examination. The problem, in short, is how to distribute socially produced wealth inequitably and yet legitimately?
Failure of communities to express their will on ecological integrity induces their fatalism.
Systemic deformations of communicative action are mechanisms that depoliticize
environmental protection so that citizens cannot question systemic contributions to this
negative state of affairs. Public fatalism is a logical result of systemically-induced
fragrnented consciousness that prevents citizens from synthesizing the nature, extent and
effects of social issues in political conflicts."
Despite their 'participation,' citizens cannot challenge systemicaHy-given
understandings or orientations. They are involved in alienated modes of talk. Public
fatalism over pollution is a social pathology measured 'in relation to the contradictions in
which communicatively intermeshed interaction can get caught because deception and
self-deception can gain objective power in an everyday practice reliant on the facticity of
validity claims.'" Citizens lose their 'objective power' of critical self reflection because of
constraints the system imposes on their communicative action. State-sponsored
- 7 4 Ibid, pp. 150-1, 161-4. Society comprise interaction of lifeworld (intersubjective reciprocal communicative exchanges) and system integration (power and money). We rnust evaluate communicative action and interpret them within this interaction context. ' See Thomas McCarthy, The Criticai Theow of Jumen Habermas, (New York: Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1984), p. 358.
n See Jurgen Habermas, Theorv of Communicative Action. Vol. II. Lifeworid and Svstem: A Critiaue of Functionalist Reason.Trans.Thomas Mccarthy. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1 987) p. 378.
environmental discourses immerse citizens in a technocratic consciousness that
fragments their environmental consciousness.
In short. communicative Action Theory adequately conceptualizes societal
interaction. It enables a better explanation of the present trilemma in environmental
protection: public fatalism, ineffective policies, and increasing pollution. Communicative
Action Theory can enable one to assess contributions and limitations of other theories or
forms of reason." This tool of analysis is 'vital for making sense of bodies of knowledge'
and 'liberating them from self-rnis~nderstanding.'~~
Summary Mere pewasiveness of technical rationality does not make their validity
unquestionable. If such rationalities lead to environmental policies that fail to protect the
ecosystem, they are not valid. The lack of public opposition to these rationalities
suggests the operation of mechanisms of ideological domination. Individual and social
pathologies are deformations arising from dominations in discoune that alter and
fragment public consciousness."
Communicative constraints hinder criticisrn of problematic claims and rational will
formation. This impedes critical reflection. 'Critical self reflection brings to
consciousness the determinants of a self formative process of cultivation and spiritual
formation that ideologically detemine a contemporary praxis of action and conception of
the ~orld'.~' It leads to insight that makes the unconscious aspects of reality conscious.
Thus, critical reflection causes analytic insights to intervene in life. The next chapter
discusses market environrnental discourse.
78 See Jurgen Habermas, Theorv of Communicative Action. Vol, II. Lifeworid and Svstem: A Critique of Functionalist Reason. Trans. Thomas McCarthy. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987), p. 375. 79 See John S. Dryzek "Critical Theory as a Research Program" in Stephen White (Ed.) The Cambridae Com~anion to Habermas.( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 111. 80 See T hornas McCarthy, The Critical Theorv of Juraen Haberms, (New York: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1984), p 89 8 1 Ibid, p. 89.
CHAPTER THREE
COORDINATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION THROUGH MARKET
MECHANISMS.
This Chapter deals with the first subproblem of the Research: It explores how market
rationality for environmental protection ignores health, fragments environmental
consciousness and stifles substantive democracy. In this chapter, the researcher argues
that market-based environmental protection lacks tnith-validity (truth, morality and
sincerity). Furtherrnore, the study holds that this rationality suppresses the pursuit of
ecological integrity whiles maintaining conditions for the matenal reproduction of ~ o c i e t y . ~ ~
Nonetheless, technical market rationalities for environmental protection, such as pollution
tax and tradable penits, are becoming popular officiai policy instruments." To illustrate
these arguments the researcher organizes the chapter into various subsections.
Section 3.1 outlines market rationalities for environmental protection, cost benefit
surveys, tradable permits and pollution taxes. Section 3.2 is a critical examination of
questionable or problematic implicit validity daims of these rationalitie~.~ In section 3.3,
the researcher examines how market rationality manipulates symbolic reproduction
(mutual understanding through communicative action or sociation). In effect, technical
market rationality is seen here as an ideological tool that manipulates environmental
awareness to maintain business as usual.
To properly assess the ideological nature of this rationality, it is essential that the
study clarifies the assumptions leading to those judgment~.~~ First, the study
presupposes that the purpose of environmental policies is to control pollution, protect the
ecosystem and protect human health. Any environmental policy-decision that does not
make this a priority is questionable or suspect.
A second assumption is that the ecosystem is a shared or public wealth.
Ecosystems provide raw materials that serve as basis for production activities. Also, the
82 Material reproduction of society is the creation of social integration not by the rneans of symbolic reproduction or intersubjective communicative understanding but by power and influence. 83 See Bruce G. Doem, Politics of Risk: The Identification of Toxic Substances in Canada. (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1982), p. 3.23 ; also see John Dryzek, Rational Ecolo~v: Environment and Political Economv. (New York: Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1987), p. 56. 84 This analysis consists of testing the validity (truth and rnorality) claims implied in poiicy decision, See David Held, Introduction to Critical Theorv, (Berkeley: University of California, 1980), p. 342. 85 See Paul D Leedy, Practical Research: Plannina and Desim. (New York: Macmillan, 1974)- pp. 55-56. .
ecosystem sustains life forms through homoeostatic stability of resilience and resistance
to assure steady and quick recovery from stress? These functions (nature resources)
and products (natural resources) the ecosystem provides are our shared wealth.
The third assurnption is methodological. It States:
It is meaningful and possible to reconstruct (even for the normal case of noms recognized without conflict) the hidden interest positions of involved individuals or groups by counter factually imagining the lirnit case of a confiict between the invoived parties in which they would be forced io consciously perceive their interests and strategically assert them, instead of satisfying basic interests, simply by actualizing institutional values as is nonnally the case?
This assumption enables the researcher to explore dernand and supply mechanisms for
environmental protection as an imposition and justification of economic orientation.
Through market discourses the system 'strategically assert' its interests [maintaining the
conditions of material reproduction of society]. It does so 'by actualizing institutional
value' of economic efficiency as the goal value of environmental protection. This
rationality intervenes into symbolic reproduction. Though these policies seern conflict-
free, they ernbody fundamental conflicts. Against these assurnptions, the researcher
discusses cost benefit surveys, pollution taxes and tradeable permits.
Cost benefit analysis (CBA) ascertains the value of environmental resources in
monetary ternis. Environmental economists use this information to assess the cost of
environmental damages and to compare costs and benefits of controlling pollution. They
use this assessment to understand the value of ecological resources and then to
formulate pollution taxes and tradable permits.
86 See John Dryzek, Rational Ecoloav: Environment and Political Economv,(New York: Basil Blackwelll989, Inc., ) p. 35. The ecosystem sustains lifeforms by processing waste matter, providing carbon sink, and regulating temperature extrernes. 87 See Jurgen Habermas, Leaitirnation Crisis. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), p. 114.
3.1 An Outline of Market-Based Environmental Policies: A) Cost Benefit AnalyHs.
B) Pollution Taxes and Permits and Tradeable Permits.
A) Cost Bene fit Analysis in Environmental Protection: Cost bene fit analysis , in this
context. invohres the use of money to compare cost of pollution control with the econornic
benefits of such a con t ro~ .~ To do this cornparison. analysts assess the necessity to
control pollution in relation to the econornic benefits a fimi derives.
Figure 1: The diagram represents a lypical environmental economist's graph showing
costs and benefits of pollution. (Adapted frorn Sharon Beder, 1995). The vertical axis
represents pollution control expenditure. At the control expenditure M, the benefits of
pollution control are at E. lncreasing pollution control expenditure frorn M to M' above the
optimal control expenditure O lead to E'. a decrease in the benefits of poltution control.
Thus, the increase in spending over the optimal level decreases the benefit of pollution
from E to E'. Optimum benefit occurs at the optimum level of expenditure. It is a point.
where the marginal expenditure for pollution control, MPC and the marginal benefits of
controlling pollution. MC€ intersect. Appropriate pollution control in market rationality
depends on econornic consideration of firms. According to this logic, environmental
protection is adapted to the imperatives of the economic system. For environmental
3 Y See Alan Porter et al. A Guidebook for Technokoqv Assessrnent and Impact Analvsis. (New York: North Holland Publishers, 1980). p. 255.
economists, ecosystems' protection depends on a firm's financial capability rather than
health considerations.
Cost benefit surveys discover the cost of pollution by calculating the use and
bequest values of environmental resources. Experts derive 'use value' from what they
believe people would pay to consume environmental resources? 'Bequest' value is the
value of the environment in the future. Environmental economists use the technique of
discounting to calculate the future value of environmental resour~es.~~ They expect their
surveys to yield valid information about the future value of environmental resources.
For example, some surveys reveaied that $93.2 million per annum as the value of
a preserved Colorado Forests? Using tourist visits and recreational utility, surveyors
assessed the annual value of a forest in Scotland as 1.7 million pounds sterling. Experts
use a simiiar method to discover the value of Jemez rnountains in New Mexico. They
use $1.85 to $2.59 payments for a day's visit to assess this va~ue.~' Environmental
econornists believe surveys can reveal the value of environmental resources.
In calculating the bequest or future value of environmental resources, experts
consider 5% as the 'reasonable rate' of di~counting.~~ Others prefer 3%.'= However,
most see 5% as a 'reasonable compromise sol~t ion. '~ In the analflical framework of this
study, such a 'compromise solution' on a shared or generalizable interest such as
ecological integrity is problematic. This argument is elaborated in section 3.3C.
88 See Michael Jacobs, The Green Economv: Environment, Sustainable Development and the Politics of the Future, (London: Pluto Press, 1991), p., 197. 8 9 See Herman Daly and John Cobb, For the Common Good: Redirectina the Economv Toward Communitv. the Environment and Sustainable Future. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989), p. 1 53. 90 OP. Cit., Michael Jacob, 1991, p. 203. 9 1 Ibid. 92 See Herman Daly and John B. Cobb For the Common Good: Redirectinq the Economy Toward Communitv, the Environment and Sustainable Future. (Boston: Beacon press, 1989), p. 154 93 OP. citl, Michael Jacob, 1991, p. 200 94 cit., Daly and Cobb, 1989, p.157 OD.
B) Poliution Taxes and Tradabie Permits as Disincentives to PdIutem. Proponents claim
pollution taxes and tradable pemits increase a fimi's financial burden and so they can be
disincentives. These policies 'intemalize' pollution in corporate balance sheets as debits.
Until now, these costs were 'extemalized' or ignored as costs of p roduc t i~n .~~ The state
levy's pollution taxes for environmental damages. Tradable permits are right-based
charges because, through them, the state gives firms the right to pollute at stipulated
Ievels.
Proponents of pollution tax and tradable permits claim to pursue economic
eff ic ien~y.~ This efficiency is based on the pnnciple of pareto optimalityg7 According to
this principle, an efficient state of affairs occurs where at least one person is better off
without worsening the condition of anyone. The pareto criterion has become the basis
for setting legal environmental standards and environmental resource pricing.' Thus,
experts use it to establish a firm's optimal expenditure for pollution control.
Optimal expenditure is the point where the marginal spending for controlling
pollution is equal to the marginal benefits of pollution control. Proponents use cost and
benefits of these payrnents to decide optimal pollution cont ro~.~~ It is economically
counterproductive, according to the proponents, to spend beyond the optimal price.
Therefore, pollution tax and permits hinge environmental control on a polluter's spending
capability rather than the welfare of communities or ecosysterns' health.
Environrnental economists employ pollution tax at various stages of the production
chah. They levy effluent taxes at the waste disposal stage of production. User taxes
apply at the extraction stage. Product charges apply at the consurnption stage as
consumer tax.lW In short, experts employ pollution charges at every stage of production.
9 5 See Michael Jacobs, The Green Econornv: Environment, Sustainable Develo~ment and the Politics of The Future, (London: Pluto Press, 1991). p. 138. Nowadays, pollution is often included in the balance sheets of firms. 96 See Donald VanDeVeer and Christine Pierce (Eds.) Environmental Ethics and Poiicv Book: Economics. Ethics and Ecoloov , Califomia: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1994). 298 97 See Myrick Freeman III, "The Ethical Basis of the Economic View of the Environmenr in Donald VanDeVeer and Christine Pierce (Eds-) Environmental Ethics and Policv Book: Economics. Ethics and Ecology, (Califomia: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1994), p. 31 1. 98 Ibid, p. 31 1. 99 See Sharon Beder, "Changing the Earth: The Promotion of Price-Based Measures for Pollution Control" in R. Cotanza (Ed.) Ecoloaical Econornics. (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1995), p. 51. 100 Ibid, p. 52.
Experts use a resource depletion quota to decide pollution le~els.'~' They
allomte pollution rights or perrnits through the process of 'grand fathering' which takes
into account the current waste discharge levels of a firm.lm Fimis can aucb'on or seIl
their extra or 'surplus' permits to othen who cannot easily abate pollution.'03 Proponents
of these policies daim permits can guarantee the achievement of pollution targets? In
this market rationality, pollution control depends on a f in 's ability to purchase extra
permits and the total pemits the state sells.
3.2.A. Thematizing Criticizable Truth-Validity (Objectivity, Normativity and
Subjectivity). Before critically examining this technical rationality, the researcher will
outline their questionable implicit claims to truth and problematic claims to morality.
lmplicit claims of market-based environmental protection are questionable. Expressing
costs and benefits in monetary units or scale, according to the experts, is desirab~e.'~~
Environmental economists daim that monetary calculations reflect the value of the
environment. They argue that it is a rational and objective approach to coordinate
environmental protection through markets than by direct govemment reg~lation.'~
Proponents of this method believe government should support them it enable them to
correctly compare the costs and benefits of proje~ts. '~~ Finally, the surveyors also
assume that respondents voluntarily consent to the trade in environmental resources.
These assumptions are questionable.
Furthemore, environmental economists daim it is economically inefficient for firms
to spend beyond the optimal price. They also daim to use pollution charges and permits
to achieve efficient allocation and just distribution of environmental resources within the
'O' See Michael Jacobs,The Green Economv: Environment, Sustainable Develo~ment and the Politics of The Future, (London: Pluto Press, 1991). pp. 139-1 40 102 Ibid, p. 141 103 See Dick Frey, "Can the Market Work for the Environment,?" in Environmental Views, (Edmonton: Alberta Environment, Faii, 1992). 104 012. a., Michael Jacobs, 1991, p. 142. 105 See Hennan Daly and John B. Cobb For the Common Good: Redirectina the Economy Toward Communitv. the Environment and Sustainable Future. (Boston: Beacon press, 1989), p.152. 106 See Michael Jacobs, The Green Economv: Environment. Sustainable Development and the Politics of the Future, (London: Pluto Press, 1991). p. 196. ' O 7 See Steven Kelman, "Cost Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critiquen in Donald VanDeVeer and Christine Pierce (Eds.) Environmental Ethics and Policv Book: Economics. Ethics and Ecoloriv, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1 994, pp. 325 - 9.
sustainable scale of the ecosystem.'* In effect, they hinge the control of environmental
pollution on a polluter's spending capability rather than on cornmunity welfare. Is it
morally right to base environmental protection on soma firms spending position?
Proponents of pollution taxes and permits also believe these polbies can enable the state
achieve pollution targets. Is this true?
One can 'redeem' or justify these problematic validity claims in d i s c o u r ~ e . ~ ~ ~ We
test the validity of knowledge claims through rational argurnentati~n."~ Under conditions
of rational discourse, we can examine the objective (truth), normative (morality) and
subjective (sincerity) validity of market rationalities. In this examination or justification
one often finds validity daims closely relate to each other or overlap.
For instance, when one makes a validity claim, one rnay also be inferring another
validity claim. 'It seems as if the radically difFerentiated moments of reason . . . point
toward a unity - not a unity that could be had at the level of world views, but one that
might be established this side of experts cultures, in a non-reified communicative
everyday practice." " Accordingly, a distortion of objective reality would usually imply a
distortion of normative reality, simultaneously.
For instance, if experts claim that demand and supply calculation of
environmental resources is true, they may also be implying that they are morally right. If
we discover that an environmental policy is not morally right, it is also usually possible to
find that the same policy may lack truth and sincenty. Thus, the rightness and truth
validity of technical market rationality will be examined closely.
1) Adapting Environmental Protection to Economic Development Lacks Trvth-Validity.
The claim that firms will clean their pollution if charges are equivalent to benefits of
controlling pollution, is problematic. Any spending to control pollution beyond the optimal
level is unnecessary, according to this logic. This rationality puts importance on a firm's
profit position more than on the protection of ecosystems and communities. "Meaning
'O8 See Hennan DaIy, "Allocation, Distribution, and Scale: Toward an Economics that is Efficient, Just, and Sustainable" in EcoloaicaI Economics. (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1992). p. 185- 187. 109 David Held, Introduction to Critical Theorv, (Berkeley: University of California, 1980 p. 340. ''O Ibid, p. 339. i i 1 See Jurgen Habermas, Theorv of Communicative Action. Vol, II. Lifeworid and Svstem: A Critique of Functionalist Reason. Trans. Thomas Mccarthy. (Boston: Beacon Press, l98ï), p. 398.
can neither be bought nor coerced'.'12 Oniy discursive guarantees through rational
opinion and will formation can ensure that f i n s will get the necessary condemnation of
their activities to force them to desist from abusing the ecosystem.
We can ensure an ecosystem's regenerative capacity if citizens can resist
attempts to degrade it. Mere monetary payments by firms for pollution do not necessanly
protect the ecosystern. A pristine or protected ecosystem can sustain the health of
communities through home os ta si^.'^^ It can moderate temperatures to suit and sustain
living things. It acts as carbon sink that regenerates the ecosystem. These
homoeostatic processes maintain the stability of the ecosystem, not the profit that firms
make. Citizens should defend the operation of these processes from damage. To place
importance on a firm's profit position, while ignoring the ecosystem's Iife-sustaining
functions, distorts the objective reality of environmental problems and solution.
II) Market-Based Environmental Policies Lack Normative Validity. To justify the use of
economic efficiency or development as goal value of environmental protection is also an
attempt to justify economic culture. The cultural market value of profit maximization is
not a shared interest. Environmental policies based on such a rationality lack moral
validity. Culture is a mare 'stencil' that shapes needs."' It is not always morally correct.
A cultural justification of economic rationality for environmental protection is insufficient.
We cannot Say that, since economic culture runs the world, we must decide everything
(including environmental protection) by this culture. Culture must meet reality ha l f~ay."~
Economic rationality or profit maximization has caused massive industrial disasters.
One cannot claim normative or moral validity of market-based environmental
policies merely because they are consistent market values or culture. To test their moral
validity: one must subject market rationality to a dialogical test question: Would citizens
mutually discursively agree that a market maxim or profit maximization should regulate
I I 2 Habermas (1 987) cited in William Outhwaite, Habermas: A Critical introduction.(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1994). p. 1 17. '13 See John Dryzek in Rational Ecoloqy: Environment and Politicai Economv. (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987). p. 204
SeeNancyS.Love.WhatLefiofMarx?inStephenwhite(Ed.)TheCambridcie Cornpanion to Habermas, (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1995), p. 60. 115 See Georgia Warnke "Communicative Rationality and Cultural Valuesn in Stephen White (Ed.) The Cambridcae Cornpanion to Habermas. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 129.
the protection of their ec~system?"~ A procedural democratic test for valîdity, based on
rational communication, requires that al1 those affected must actively agree in discourse.
The culturally-based presupposition that individuals have or will agree to the use of
market values in the environmental protection is a fallacy.
Another problern is that market orientation cannot create a moral disincentive for
firms to stop or reduce pollution. If a fim can pay pollution charges or buy extra permits.
that firm may be less motivated to stop polluting. Thus, these policies do not necessarily
act as a moral disincentive to pollute.
Legal issuance of the right to pollute implies that pollution is inevitable and that it
is a necessary part of economic development. Pollution is treated under this market logic
as the opportunity cost of economic development. This economic reasoning is morally
problematic. For one thing, the legalizing of polluting activity also entails decriminalizing
the activity, providing a de facto legitimacy for it.
Ill) Market Environmental Discourse Falsifies the Objective Reality of People. Cost
benefit surveyors consider people as consumers only rather than citizens. The experts
see people as 'passive wanters' and 'locations at which wants (or preferences) may be
found.'"' One cannot expect people at risk of pollution or who suffer pollution hazards
merely to adopt a consumer orientation to pollution. Solution to this problem cannot be
reduced to mere monetary compensations or tax payments. Mereiy, citizens respond to
a one-directional communication in these suweys. Such responds or data do not
represent the rational opinion and will of citizens because they do not result from rational
argumentation or discourse. In effect, cost benefit suweyors falsely treat peopfes'
responds as expressions of the will to sell or pay for environmental reso~rces."~
Beliefs become the willingness to pay or sell. The analyst, essentially, transforms
econornic statements to normative statements of preferences.
116 See Kenneth Baynes, "Democracy and the Rechtsstaat Habermas's F a m a t und Gettunfin Stephen white (Ed.) The Cambridge Corn~anion to Habermas, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 995), p. 233. 117 See Mark Sargoff, "At the Shnne of Our Lady of Fatima or Why Political Questions are not All Economicn in Donald VanDeveer and Christine Pierce (Eds.) Environmental Ethics and Policv Book: Economics. Ethics and Ecoloav. (California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1994), P. 322. 118 See Joseph R. Desjardins, Environmental Ethics: An Introduction to Environmental Philosoohv. (California: Wadsworth,l992), p. 60.
30
The analyst treats al1 value judgernents as nothing but staternents of preferences. attitudes or emotions, in so far as they are value judgements . . . [Experts] suppose always, that This is righr and what we ought to don are equivalent to "1 want thisn and "this is what I prefef . . . value judgements are beyond criticism if, indeed. they are nothing but experiences of personal preferences, . . . what counts is how much they are willing to pay to satisfy their wants.' lg
Surveyors transform normative statements into subjective attitudes and preferences. For
instance, respondents may choose $20 among survey options as the amount they believe
they can pay to visit Algonquin Park. An analyst rnay clairn that this $20 is the amount
the respondent is willing to pay to preserve the park. To use this datum to make policy,
is to imply that monetary valuation of environmental resources is morally right. Citizens'
responds to survey questions cannot represent their political will. To use the survey to
decide is, therefore, a falsification.
This falsification shuts out the view that in a public matter like pollution people are
more likely to act as citizens or persons-in-c~mmunity.'~~ Their protest at tangible
degradation illustrates their orientation as citizens. Protests show that people are
concern about pollution risks and would want to talk. They exists as a response to
. . .a reification of communicatively structured domains of action that will not respond to the media of money and power. The issue is not primarily one of compensation that the welfare state can provide, but of defending and restoring endangered ways of life. In short, the new conflicts are not ignited by distribution problems but by questions of having to do with the grammar of forrns of life.12'
People are more likely to protest in defense of their environment. As public actors or
citizens, people's actions are geared to defending correct ways of life and opposing
'endangered ways of life.' 'There is nothing more natural than hurnanity's capacity to
conceptualize, generalize, relate ideas and engage in symbolic communication.''* To
'19- See Mark Sargoff, "At the Shrine of Our Lady of Fatima or Why Political Questions are not All Economic" in Donald VanDeveer and Christine Pierce (Eds.) Environmental Ethics and Policv Book: Economics. Ethics and Ecolow. (California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1994), p. 320. 120 See Heman E. Day and John B. Cobb Jr.. For the Common Good: Redirectina the Economv Toward Communitv. the Environment. and a Sustainable Future.(Boston: Beacon Press, 1989), p. 169-70 121 See Jurgen Habermas, Theorv of Communicative Action. Voi- II. Lifeworld and Svstem: A Critique of Functionalist Reason. Trans. Thomas McCarthy. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987), p. 392. 122 See Murray Bookchin, Philoso~hv of Social Ecoloav: Essavs on DiaIectical Naturalism. (Montreal: Black Rose Press, 1990), p. 161.
ignore the public role of citizenship, political opinion and will formation, is to sacrifice this
duty of citizenship for the 'psychology of the cons~rner."~ Sacrificing citizenship or
political nature of social actors on the 'altar of consumerism' is a crime against
dernocracy.
As consumers or privately oriented people, they cannot act so that their will shape
govemment action. For such state-sponsored discourses to project an exclusive
consumer stance or posture of a community at risk may even imply that no conflict or
disapproval exists conceming environmental pollution. Thus, a distortion of normative
reality occurs when the state assumes that people are willing to trade their environmental
resources. Such a Yrade' concems their very life-support system, the ecosystem.
Accordingly, if citizens do not show concern about pollution, it is because market
rationality for environmental protection eliminates their chance to understand and
scrutinize the issues. This lack of discursive participation stifles their self reflection (or
awakening of their consciousness). Their failure to question pollution is a sign of
ideological domination or social control. Opposition is kept latent, because citizens
exercise their political autonomy, their right to participate in policy discourse,
inadequately. Thus, the system arbitrariiy fonns the will of citizens, manufacture m a s
loyalty by engaging them in some form of one directional talk or survey. In this way, the
system legitimizes its policy action without gaining citizens true consent.
iv) The Trading of Ecological Resources Involves Falsification. In pollution tax there is a
distortion of tnrth. Proponents falsely assume that private and public transactions are the
~ a r n e . ' ~ ~ We should distinguish environmental costhenefit surveys, pollution tax and
permits in operation and method from pnvate transactions. As public interest, the
ecosystem should be subjected to monetary exchange only after the state gains the true
approval or agreement of the public. Such approval or consensus can result from
reciprocal intersubjective exchange of reason-given and response. The proposa1 should
undergo elaborate public scrutiny for any agreement or consensus to be rational.
123 See Mark Sargoff, "At the Shrine of Our Lady of Fatima or Why Political Questions are not Al1 Economic" in Donald Vandeveer and Christine Pierce (Eds.) Environmental Ethics and Policv Book:: Economics. Ethics and Ecology, (Califomia: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1994) p. 31 6-1 7. 124 See Steven Kelrnan, "Cost Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique" in Donald Vandeveer and Christine Pierce (Eds.) Environmental Ethics and Policv Book:: Eccnomics. Ethics and Ecoloav. (Califomia: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1994, p. 333.
Regarding pollution, citizens are bound to behave differently as they would in
private matters. 'There is a highly personal sphere of Iife in which we think very
differently from the habitua1 rationality we exercise in Our practical (social or public)
affairs.'lZ5 Treating the trading of public resources of the ecosystem as a private
transaction is, therefore, a distortion of objective reality.
Another distortion of truth is the failure of the surveys to differentiate the selling
and buying, or paying and receiving of money for environmental goods. Contrary to the
market surveys, the amount people will pay to preserve their environment is different from
what they will like to be compensated for its destruction.126 'Available evidence suggests
most people would insist on being paid far more to assent to a worsening of their situation
than they will be willing to pay to improve their situation.'ln The higher value of the
former is due to the psychological state of knowing that one is gMng up a right? Thus.
the fact that they are surrendering their ecological right will make citizens require higher
payments or compensation for environmental degradation. The failure of cost benefit
surveyors to differentiate the amount people are willing to pay from what they would be
willing to receive makes such surveys a fallacy.
A third problem concerns the question of volition. Proponents assume that
people voluntarily participate in the trading of environmental resources.'" This is not
true. An exchange is voluntary, if those involved give their willing consent and if they
stand to benefit from such invo~vement.'~~ In the sunreys, experts merely approach
people with questionnaires that are one directional communication, from experts to
people. People merely choose from options predesigned and presented to them by
experts.
Also, pollution taxes and permits that are based on these surveys do not always
provide benefits to communities. The public does not benefit from pollution tax revenues
125 See Murray Bookchin, Philoso~hv of Social Ecolow: Essavs on Dialectical Naturalisrn. (Montreal: Black Rose, 19901), p. 166. 126 See Steven Kelman, "Cost Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critiquen in Donald VanDeVeer and Christine Pierce (Eds.) Environmental Ethics and Policv Book:: Economics. Ethics and Ecolociv , California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1 994, p 332, 127 Ibid, Kelman, 1994, p. 332,. 12' Ibid, p. 332-3 129 See Donald Vandeveer and Christine Pierce (Eds.) Environmental Ethics and Policv Book:: Economics. Ethics and Ecoloav , California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1994, p. 299. 13 0 Ibid, p. 300
or gain adequate compensation from pollution tax revenues.13' Often, the state retums
these revenues to firms as subsidies.lY As a result, it is a fallacy to assume that people
voluntary become involve in or stand to benefit from market transaction of ecologid
resources.
W) Distortions in the Economic Determination of the Assimrïative Capacity of the
Ecosystem. A major theoretical distortion is evident in the discounting of environmental
resources to decide future sustainable scale of the ecosystem. Scale is the assimilative
capacity or the physical volume of the throughput. It is the flow of matter energy from the
environment as raw material and back to it as waste? To decide the future value of the
environment requires adequate knowledge of the sustainable smle.
In market rationality experts speculating the future state or scale of the ecosystern
entails equating environmental resources to money in the Bank. The ecosystem's value
is written off or discounted. Unlike money in the Bank, pollution effects are often elusive
because they are latent and often manifest often after they become chronic.'" Thus,
discounting cannot determine the sustainable scale of the environment in the future.
Another theoretical fallacy is in experts' cfaim to properly allocate and distribute
environmental resources according to sustainable scale. They allocate environmental
resources by dividing ecological resources between different uses. They distribute these
resources by sharing them among different users.
Yet, this economic rationality abstracts from scale in two ways.lU First. the
experts falsely assume that environmental sinks and sources are infinite, creating a
tendency to expand scale. Such expansion is not a problem if sinks are infinite.
Nevertheless, the increasing occurrence of 'dead' or destroyed ecosystems around the
131 See Sharon Beder, "Changing the Earth: The Promotion of Price-Based Measures for Pollution Control" in R. Cotanza (Ed.) Ecoloqical economics: A Journal of Ecoloaical Societv for Ecoloqical Economics, (Amsterdam: Elsevier, vol. 16, 1995), p. 54; also see Joseph R. DesJardins. An Introduction to Environmental Philoso~hv.(Califomia: Wadworth Publishing, 1992). p. 64. 13 2 See Michael Jacobs ,The Green Economv: Environment. Sustainable Develoment and the Politics of The Future, (London: PIuto Press, 1991). p. 137. 13 3 See Herman Daly, "Allocation, Distribution, and Scale: Toward an Economics that is Efficient, Just, and Sustainable" in Ecoloqical Economics. (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1992), p. 185- 6. 13 4 See Walter Rosenbaum, Environmental Politics and Po!icv. (Washington: C. Q. Press, 1991 0, pp. 144-7. 13 5 See Herman Daly, "Allocation, Distribution, and Scale: Toward an Economics that is Efficient, Just, and Sustainabten in R. Cotanza (Ed.) Ecoloaical economics: A Journal of Ecolociical Society for Ecoloaical Econornics, (Amsterdam: Elsevier, vol. 6, no.3. 1992). p 186 - 9.
world show that sinks are finite. The ecosystem has limits to its regenerative capacity.
Second, the realization that ecosysterns* scale is limited led to misinterpretations. Policy
makers began considering finiteness of scale to mean it is total.
Sale has become important because the economic subsystem has grown to the point where its physical demands on the ecosystem are far from trivial. Since scale can no longer be considered infinitesimal, its dismissal now rests on the [distorted] view that it is total?'
To consider scaie total means experts can now caicuiate it maihematicaiiy. Experts
arbitrarily assume that the total pollution they allow through pemits or pollution taxes are
equal to the assimilative capacity or regenerative capacity of the ecosystem.
Consequently. they allocate and distribute peni ts and taxes arbitrarily.
In practice, they merely subsume scale under allocation and di~tribution.'~ It is a
fallacy for experts to consider the total pollution rights as the sustainable scale of the
environment. Doing so puts the cart before the home as experts will be sharing or
dividing (allocating and distributing) the assimilative capacity before knowing its tnie
quantity. Consequently, the notions of allocation, distribution and scale in market
raiionality for environmental protection consist of theoretical fallacies.
The discussion above shows that market-based environmental policies are
ideological abstractions ihat inhibit correct understanding of environmental problems.
'Ideologies are effective socio-political weapons' to 'distract people from gaining a clear
understanding of their problems."" As an ideology market rationality 'shuts out other
intelligent versions of reality,' such as moral viewpoints and opinions. providing only
'spectacles' of economic reason to see the environmental problem.'" Ironically,
economic rationality has caused major environmental destructions around the world. An
example is Ozone Depletion. To use economic rationality to coordinate environmental
protection not only serve to exclude practical viewpoints, it also seives to justify this
13 6 See Herrnan Daly, "Allocation, Distribution, and Scale: Toward an Economics that is Efficient, Just, and Sustainable" in R. Cotanza (Ed.) Ecoloaical Economics. (Amsterdam: Elsevier, vol. 6, no.3, 1992). p. 187. L3 7 lbid. 13 8 See Anton Allaha, 'Manufacturing Legitirnacy: Ideology, Politics and Third Worfd Foreign Policy," in Richard Swift and Brian Tomlinson, (Eds.) Conflicts of Interest: Canada and the Third World. (Toronto: Between The lines, 1991), p. 297. 13 9 Ibid, p. 297. Also see Robert C. Paehlke, "Environmentalism Without Apocalypse" in Environmentaliçm (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1989), p. 5; For a positive definition of Ideology, see Terence Bal! and Richard Dagger, ldeals and Ideoloaies: A Reader. (New York: HaperCollins Publishing Inc., 1 Wl), p. 1 - 2.
reasoning and corporate degradation of the ecosystem. Thus, market rationality cannot
be the collective ethic or an acceptable goal value for environmental protection.
We must show how market reason have come to dominate environmental
protection- Economic values inform environmental protection because they emerge frorn
systemically manipulated market discourses. Market rationality for environmental
protection, therefore, comprises 'deceptive consensuses about beliefs and norrns which
are considered valid and adequate in a ~ociety.' '~ These deceptive policies are the
products of systemically manipulated discourses,
3.3, A. Market-based Environmental Policies 'Colonire the Lifeworld'. The
discussions, so far, reveal the ideological abstractions in market rationality for
environmental protection. An analysis of implicit validity daims of market environmental
rationality cannot provide adequate answers. It cannot explain the reason for market
rationality for environmental protection. Market rationality 'serve(s) to conceal as well as
to legitimate the very distortion of communication which makes a non-enforced, that is, a
"rational" consensus about beliefs and norms imp~ssible."~' To elaborate this argument,
the researcher investigates the 'language game' or manipulation of communication
structures in market environmentai discourse.
Questions guiding this investigation are: How would citizens have interpreted their
environmental needs if they had the chance discursively to form their opinion and will?
Which values or norms would they have found justifiable if environmental discourses
allowed rational discursive will formation? In responding to these questions, the
researcher aims to show how deformations of communication cause market-based
policies for environmental protection.
For instance, citizens can only interpret their environmental needs in terrns of
econornic efficiency because the cost benefit surveys that f o m the discourse provides no
scope for rational argumentation. Through market rationality, therefore, the system
penetrates the communicative domain or lifeworld of environmental discourse to undercut
citizens' ability to decide or interpret their environmental needs.
Understanding systemic penetration of the Iifeworld through these discourses
involves testing the 'colonization of the lifeworld thesis.' The colonization of the life world
140 See Albrecht Wellmer, "Communication and Emancipation: Reflections On the Linguistic Tum in Critical Theory" in John O'Neill (Ed.) On Critical Theory. (New York: The Seabury Press, 1976), pp. 255-6, IJI Ibid, Wellmer, p. 256.
thesis states that, as subsystems of economy and state become increasingly cornplex,
they penetrate ever deeper into the syrnbolic reproduction (discursive solidarity and
mutual understanding) of the Iife world." The thesis serves to explain how systemic
media of money and power function to suppress shared ecological interest. Through
market rationality for environmental protection, subsystems of state and economy deform
communication for environmental protection to assert or impose their values in
communication structures.
Presently, the section will explain how distorted communication in market
environmental discourse 'colonizes' or 'subordinates the lifeworld' or communicative
action of citizens. They are as follows: 1) the environmental opinion sumey. 2) the use
of utilitarian philosophy in environmental protection discoume; 3) introduction of an
economic notion of 'value' in environmental protection; and 4) discounting of the future
value of environmental resources. Through these processes, the system suppresses the
publics' capacity to pursue the integrity of their ecosystem discursively.
Manipulations in these processes occur by treating the shared or generalizable
interest of ecdogical integrity as a particular interest. On the other hand, market-based
envi ronmental discourses 'overgeneralize' economic development as a universal goal
value, raising this private interest to the status of a public interest. This act blurs the
difference between a particular economic interest and the shared interest of ecological
integrity. Once at par, environmental protection becomes a matter of choosing between
values of economic development and ecological integrity. Thus, technical market
rationality confuses values with facts by transforming particular interest to a shared or
universal one. Cost benefit surveys, utilitarian orientation discourse, discounting and the
ideological use of the value economic efficiency serve to distort the reality of
environmental problems.
A) Cost Benefit Survey Makes Pollution a Private Matter. Experts use these surveys to
decide the value of environmental resources. These surveys are pre-designed and
unilaterally created instruments analysts use to perpetuate the view that environmental
resources are commodities. They deny citizens the scope to consult with each other
adequately or give their explicit consent on these rnatters. In effect, the instrument
fragments environmental consciousness, since people cannot question the one-sided
142 See Jurgen Habermas "Normative Content of Modernity" in Philoso~hical Discourse of Modemix (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1992). p, 367.
37
econornic reality experts present to them. Surveys allow 'minimal and highly constrained
invitations to think through responses to open-ended question^."^ Surveys Jack the
scope for rational opinion or will formation. Implied economic values in the suiveys are
not open to scrutiny. Cultural traditions dictate or pre-decide which validity claims, when,
where, for what, from whom, and to whom must be accepted. The more they do this the
l e s participants in discourse can have the possibility of making explicit their positions and
examining the potential grounds on which they base their yesho position^.'^
The survey denies respondents the scope to debate the moral rightness of valuing
and trading environmental resources by means of money. Communication inhibitions
immunize the econornic orientations from scrutiny. The survey inconspicuously 'spread
the gospel' of market rationality for environmental protection.'" Since the surveys
present only the economic view, economic reason is exalted to a universal nom.'"
Respondents enter the survey discourse inhibited because of 'niles' shaping the survey
monologue. In effect, citizens' participation in these defomed discourses lands them
legitimacy, enabling the system to gain mass loyalty for its one-sided positions in surveys.
Furthenore, without rational discursive argumentation, critical self reflection or
the awakening of environmental consciousness cannot occur. Moral environmentai
consciousness can emerge through the exercise of interactive cornpetence,
'intersubjective reciprocal reason-given and response."" Only then will people begin a
process of critical self reflection. Without an expression of their will and agreement,
market surveys become acts of domination of the political public sphere.
As they do in the suivey, experts have no legitimate right to interpret, confirm or
define the environmental needs of the public. Only citizens themselves can do so.'"
Enlightenment of political will can becorne effective only within the rational communicative
sociation of citi~ens.''~ Their consciousness should occur in their thoughts and actions
143 See John Dnpek, Discursive Democracv: Politics. Policv and Political Science, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, IggO), p. 160 144 See Jurgen Habermas, Theorv of Communicative Action. Vol. I Reason and The Rationalization of SocieN trans. Thomas Mccarîhy. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984), p. 70.
See Steven kelman, "Cost Benefit Analysis" in Donald VanDeVeer and Christine Pierce (Eds.) Environmental Ethics and Policv Book:: Economics, Ethics and Ecoloav , California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1994), p. 330. 146 See Jurgen Habermas, Theow of Communicative Action. Vol. II. Lifeworid and Svstem: A Critique of Functionalist Reason. Trans. Thomas McCarthy. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987, p. 94. 147 See Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theorv of Jurqen Haberrns, (New York: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1984), p. 352. ''13 Ibid, p. 29, 149 See Jurgen Habermas, Toward a Rational Societv. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), p. 75.
not above their heads or behind their b a c k ~ . ' ~ ~ Since this is what the surveys do, they
are mere justifications of economic values and relations of domination.
As a tool for protecting powerful interests, systemic forces rneticulously shape and
guide the structure and questions of ~urveys.'~' One can also cal1 this phenornenon
Yinancial-intellectual comple~."~~ Systernic forces cannot provide the necessary research
funds for a survey if it does not support their interest or position. The suwey becomes a
means for justifying preestablished positions of financiers.'" In practice, govemments
and f ims often sirnply agree on a 'predetemined coefficient' in setting environmental
standards? By inhibiting the communication of normative concerns. cost benefit
surveys exclude the need for substantive justification.'" The resulting depoliticization of
the public sphere sewes to legitimize one-sided govemment policy action. Thus, cost
benefit environmental surveys can be inconspicious impositions of systernic values that
serve to maintain relations of domination.
8) Utiliarianism Stifles Communicative Rationalization of Environmental
Protection. Utilitarianism is the philosophical basis of economics and, therefore, of the
market environmental rationality.lS6 This ethics justaies the pursuit of any activity that
maximizes satisfaction or economic eff icien~y.'~ Through utilitarianisrn, individualisrn or
the pursuit of rational self interest gains an intellectual foothold.'" Application of demand
and supply mechanisms in environmental protection is a theoretical justification of the
pursuit of the goal value of economic efficiency in environmental protection. Technical
market rationality transposes individualism, the pursuit of rational self interest, into the
150 Ibid, 1970, p. 75 L51 See Joseph R. Desjardins, An introduction to Environmental Philoso~hv. (Califomia: Wadsworth Publishing, 1992), p. 8 152 See Joel Samoff, "FinanciaI lntellectual Cornplex" in Chris Allen, Jan Burgess, Colin Stoneman (Eds.) Review of African Political Economv. (London: Merlin Press, 1990). p. 72. L53 ci& Desjardins, 1993, p. 9. 154 See Michael Jacob, Green Economv: Environment, Sustainable Develo~ment and the Politics of the Future, (London: Pluto Press. 1991). 155 See Jurgen Habermas. Theorv of Communicative Action. Vol. II. Lifeworld and Svstem: A Critiaue of Functionalist Reason. Trans. Thomas McCarthy. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987), p. 345. lS6 See Donald Vandeveer and Christine Pierce, Environmental Ethics and Policv Book: Economics. Ethics and Ecoloqy (Califomia: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1994), p. 298,339. Also See Michael Jacobs, Green Econornv. (London: Pluto Press, 1991). p. 201. 157 Ibid, Vandeweer and Pearce, 1994, pp. 298 & 339. It is a minority position among moral philosophers. 158 See David Held, Introduction to Critical Theorv. (Berkeley University of Catifornia, 1980), p 67-8
domain of environmental protection because this view is prevalent in today's society.'"
With the economic rationalization of society, maximization of self-satisfaction has become
the goal and objective rationality of society in al1 spheres.
However, the utilitarian logic is a one-sided and narrow rationalization. It applies
to productive forces and extends the power of technical control - instrumental action. It
does not focus on structures of the lifeworld (domain of communicative action) to which
acting subjects belong. In the domain of communicative action, rationalization signifies
emancipation, individuation and communications free of domination.lW Marketkation or
the instrumental rationalization of environrnental protection inhibits the possibility for
communicative rationalization. Coordinating environmental protection by utilitarian logic
uncouples the process of the need for justifying truth-validity (truth, morality, sincerity and
legitimacy).
By applying utilitarian ethics in environmental protection, experts infer the daim
that pursuit of rational self interest in this policy area is morally correct.
Value orientations are institutionally required of actors to become more and more general and formal in the course of social evolution . . . The further motive and value generalization advance, the more communicative action gets detached from concrete and traditional normative behavior patterns . . . With the generalization of motives and values, space opens up for subsystems of purposive rational action. The coordination can be transferred over to delinguistified media of action (money and power)."'
Generalizing the pursuit of private satisfaction in environmental protection stifles the
scope to distinguish what is public and what is private. Generaliu'ng private self-interest
in al1 spheres of life, including environmental protection puts the pursuit of private self
interest at par with the shared interest of ecological integrity. This leads to moral
relativi~m.'~ Environmental protection becomes a matter of choosing between two (a
true and false one) moral universals or principles: to pursue private self interests painted
as a universal norm or to favor ecosystems' protection. This utilitarian orientation
159 See David Held, Introduction to Critical Theorv. (Berkeley: University of California, 1980), p. 66-7 '"O See Albrecht Wellrner. "Communication and Emancipation: Reflections On the Linguistic Tum in Critical Theory" in John O'Neill (Ed.) On Critical Theow. (New York: The Seabury Press, 1976), p. 246; also see William Outhwaite, A Critical Introduction, pp. 78-79 161 See Jurgen Habermas. Theorv of Communicative Action. Vol. II. Lifeworld and Svstem: A Critique of Functionalist Reason. Trans. Thomas McCarthy. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987), pp. 180-86. Value generalization facilitates purposive rational (instrumental) action, an action oriented to the success of system functioning and the material reproduction of society. 162 See John Dryzeck, Discursive Democracv. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). p. 82.
transforms environmental protection into a matter of personal accommodation and
adj~strnent.'~~ In the end, value generalization of economic efficiency in environmental
discourse serves to privatize ecosystems' protection.
Also, using the utilitarian logic in environmental discourse obliterates the
distinction between manipulative and non-maniputative social relations.'" To see
environmental protection as a private issue of monetary payment or relative moral
concern can cause people to cede their responsibility as citizens. Market coordination of
environmental protection 'connects(s) interactions [environmental discourse] in space and
time into more and more complex networks that no one has to comprehend or be
responsible for.''= Since only environmental economists can calculate the utility or
satisfaction curves in this technical rationality, they virtually exclude citizens.
Yet, the only justification experts can give for excluding citizens is that they lack
the necessary skills or technical knowledge to participate. In short, techniques or
instrumental rationality falsely justify relations of domination. The very rationakation (the
instrumental) that emerged with modemization has now turned parasitically on the
communication domain to stifle it.
Rationalization [the generalization of technical economic rationality] is not emancipation. The growth of productive forces and administrative efficiency [environmental economists and their formalization and techniques of calculating environmental pollution] does not of itself lead to the replacement of institutions based on force by an organization of social relations bound to communication free of domination. The ideals of the technical mastery of history and liberation from the quasi-natural forces of social and political domination, as well as the means for their realization. are different.'66
The penetration of instrumental reason (or the utilitarian logic) in environmental protection
displaces communicative reason which embody the potential for freedom from ideology.
163 lbid, p- 322. 164 See Steven kelman, "Cost Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique" in Donald Vandeveer and Christine Pierce (Eds.) Environmental Ethics and Policv Book: Ethics. Economics and Ecolosiv. (California: Wadsworth Publishing, 1994), p. 323. 165 See Jurgen Habermas, Theow of Communicative Action. Vol. Il. Lifeworld and Svstem: A Critiaue of Functionalist Reason. Trans. Thomas McCarthy. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987), p. 184. To be responsible, protectorç of the environment mu& be able to fom their will and critically refiect on the systemic interpretations of their environmental needs. They can not do so in the surveys. " See Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theow of Jumen Habermas. (New York: Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1984), p. 36.
C) Discounting Manipula tes Environmental Consciousness. Usual iy , p roponents of
cost benefit analysis consider 5% discount rate a 'reasonable compromise solution' for
discounting future environmental resources. Is such 'compromise' a conscious
agreement between experts and person's at risks? Is discourse possible in the
discounting process? Discounting involves complex mathematical calculations by which
experts decide the rate they consider as a reasonable compromise solution.
Discounting is an ideological forrn of justification that manipulates environmental
consciousness. To be valid, a compromise in policy action should rneet two conditions.
First, the com prom ise should result from a discourse situation that ref lects balance of
power among participants. Second, the interest under negotiation must not be a
generalizable interest. It must be particular.'" Where these conditions do not hold,
'compromise' is essentially an act of balancing interests or bargaining.
In bargaining each person accepts solutions for their own different reasons. In
bargaining, the 'discursive chain of rational will formation would snap' if participants try to
apply the discourse principle of rational argurnentation.lB8 The force of the better
argument does not exist in bargaining since positions can gain credibility because of the
prestige and influence of those holding them.
Discounting of future environmental resources do not meet the conditions for true
compromise. They exclude the voice of future and present generations as the technical
nature of the process does not allow citizens to take part in the process. This elaborate
mathematical calculation of discounting 'technicizes' the environmental matter. The
validity of this exclusive market technique is not open to scrutiny.
Also, as the 'reasonable compromise solution' is over the shared interests of
environmental resources, it is a pseudo-compromise. Limiting discourse and common
understanding, discounting becomes an ideological form of justifi~ation.'~~ Discounting,
in short, is a way of making environmental protection technical so that ordinary people
cannot participate in the process. In this rationality, the system stifles the communicative
potential of citizens.
16' See Jurgen Habermas, Leoitirnation Crisis. (8oston: Beacon Press, 1975), p. 11 2. la See Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Noms: Contributions to a Discourse Theon of Law and Democracv (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MfT Press, 1996), p.166.
Using a statistic to represent complex social and political phenomena like pollution is reductionist and distorts reality. See John Dryzeck, Discursive Democracv. (Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 63 - 66.
D) The Economic Notion of Value Obscures Fact and Distorts Reality. Another
ideological manipulation in environment protection discourse is the introduction of the
market notion of 'value' into it. lntroducing the market notion of 'value' in environmental
protection is misfeading. It creates a false impression that the true value of the
ecosystem is under consideration. 'From a pragmatic view. surely it would be more
fruifful to try to meet economists on their own chosen ground,' value.ln Yet, this
expectation defused anti-market opposition and made environmental groups 'rnimics of
the dominant apparatus.'17' It led to self-deception of radical environmental groups.
They thought the notion of 'value' would establish a common linguistic wavelength for
them and systemic forces in environmental discourse.
Nonetheless, "value" for environmental economists is no more than a 'device' that
'merely allows us to predict the rate at which various things will exchange for one
an~ther. ' '~ It refers to monetary valuation. For a view that professes to consider
'value.' environmental economists neglect of the ecosystem's life-support functions is a
travesty. The economic notion of value is limited to monetary consideration. Thus,
environmental economists' notion of 'value' can only fragment environmental
consciousness. Understanding the environmental protection in terms monetary
exchange rather than biological functions of homeostasis is reductionist and a distortion.
Summary: This chapter shows the Jack of validity of market rationality in environmental
protection. Economic rationality in environmental protection ignores the imperfections of
market system, such as uncertainty and creates conditions for moral hazards.'"
Economic rationality is a limitation of conceptual t h 0 ~ g h t . l ~ ~ It considers everything in
relation to profit. Economists seem unwilling to accept the rational limits of their logic.
Pollution taxes and permits are adjustrnents that economists make to the market system
to Save face, without restructuring basic economic t h e ~ r y . ' ~ ~
170 See Robert E. Goodin, Green Poliücal Theorv, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992)' p. 21. L71 See David Held, Introduction to Critical Theory. (Berkeley: University of Catifornia, 1980), p. 69. 17' See Robert E. Goodin, Green Political Theonr, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1 992), p. 21. 173 See Sharon Beder, "Changing the earth: The Promotion of Price-based Measures for Pollution Control (vol. 16) Ecoloqical Economics: Joumai of A ~ ~ l i e d Social Science Research. (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1995). p. 57. 174 See Herman Daly and John B. Cobb For the Common Good: Redirectina the Economv Toward Communitv. the Environrnent and Sustainable Future. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989), p. p. 41. 175 Ibid, p. 37.
The major reason for using this rationality is political. To treat environmental
resources as commodities serves to make environmental discourse economic. This
mode of talking about pollution is consistent with the capitalist organizational principle, the
depolicization of the public sphere.lm
. . .economy organized in the form of markets is functionally intermeshed wth a state that has a monopoly on power ..A (shows) how it (the system) gains autonomy as a piece of nom-free sociality over against the lifeworld.. .Money rnakes possible not only deworlded [without reference to objective, normative and subjective reality or worlds] forms of interaction, but the formation of a functionally speciaIized subsystem that articulates its relationships to the environment (a sociocultural domain) through money ..At conditions decisions for action on the basis of 'demand and supply' effective for coordination without recoune to lifeworld.. . Power is assimilated to money.ln
As market environmental policies are norm-free, they are logically convenient for the state
to adopt l 'capital [is to] continue(s) to expand under political prote~tion."~~ Economic
rationality reduces the 'expenditure' and 'risks of disensus' likely to occur in an open
environmental disco~rse. '~~ It is a 'relief rnechanisrn' that eliminate problems that may
'overburden the communicative infrastructure' for environmental protection.'*
To protect the relations of domination, or avoid debate about it, the system moves
environmental conflict to the market domain. Here, it can easily 'uncouple' environmental
coordination' frorn morality, truth or sincerity.
Political decisions that reflect the existing organizational principle of society ipso facto do not admit of rational consensus. They could not be justified in a general and unrestricted discussion of what, in the light of present and possible circumstances, is in the best interest of al1 affected by them. Therefore, the stability of the capitalist social formation depends on continued effectiveness of legitirnations that could not withstand discursive examination. The problem, in short, is how to distribute socially produced wealth inequitably and yet legitimately.'8'
L76 See , Jurgen Habermas, "Normative Content of Modemity" in Philoso~hical Discourse of Modernitv, ( Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1 992). p. 352. 177 Ibid, pp. 349-352 '" Thomas McCarthy,"Complexity and Democracy: Seducement of Systern Theory," ldeals and Illusions: On Reconstruction and Deconstruction in Contem~orarv Critical Theow (Mass.: MIT Press, 1991 ), p. 163. 179 See Jurgen Habermas, Theon! of Communicative Action, Vol. II. Lifeworld and Svstem: A Criticrue of Functionalist Reason. Trans. Thomas McCarthy. (Boston: bacon Press, 1987), pp. 181-4. 100 Ibid, p. 378. 181 See Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theow of Juraen Habermas, (New York: Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1984), p. 358.
Market environmental policies only serve to legitimize existing system of inequitable
distribution of ecological resources - disproportionate corporate degradation of ecological
resources. The unfair privilege accumulation and distribution of ecosystems' wealth or
resources occur due to firms' use of a more than proportionate share.
A 'system in crisis provides options determined only by the logic of politics
adjusted to system imperatives of economy and state."" It shuts out comprehensive
rationality (truth, morality and sincerity), placing technical rationality over and above public
opinion and ~ i 1 1 . ' ~ ~ Merely, society 'increasingly functionalizes its citizens [use them as
respondents to surveys] for vanous purposes but pnvatizes them [deny them political
autonomy] in their con~ciousness."~ Chapter four examines legal rationality for
environmental protection.
182 See Jurgen Habermas, "Normative Content of Modemity" in Philoso~hical Discourse of MordemiW. ( Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1 992). p. 356. 183 Ibid, p. 362 184 Habermas cited in William Outhwaite, Habermas: A Critical introduction. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 7.
CHAPTER FOUR
COORDlNATiNG ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTlON TNROUGH THE LEGAL SYSTEM.
Chapter four discusses how the legal-bureaucratic system (The Environmental Appeal Board
and Ministry) suppressed the pursuit of the shared or generalizable interest of ecological
integrity. The shared interest of Guelph community was expressed in its protest against the
International Malleable lron Company (IMICO) to clean up its pollution. They failed to pursue
this shared interest because the matter was 'resolved' in legal-bureaucratie procedures.
To elaborate this view, the researcher organized the chapter into three main sections,
4.1, 4.2 and 4.3. Section 4.1 is an outline of the background of lMlCO and a description of
the discourse. Section 4.2 is a critical examination of the legal arguments. These arguments
led to a systern orientation and redefinition of the problem-situation. In section 4.3, the
researcher shows how the system denied citizens their communicative freedom. The second
part of this section explains the democratic violations in this legal discourse. The system
selectively employs (exclude themes from discourse) to gain mass loyalty for its 'thinly'
legitimated action for environmental protection.
4.1- The IMICO Envifonmental Conflict and The Discursive Sefting. This section outlines
the background of the IMlCO pollution saga and delineates the discourse for resohnng it.
Before starting the discussions, stating the assumption is essential. This will help put the
discussions in their proper context.
The researcher conducts the discussions on the assumption that: Interest
constellations of parties involved [at the lMlCO hearings], which they reveal in cases of conflict
[the anti-IMICO protests], coincide sufficiently with the interests that would have to find
expression among participants if they [protesters or the aggrieved Guelph public] were to enter
practical dis~ourse.'~ According to this assumption, citizens would have voiced the sarne
interests they expressed at anti-IMICO protests at the IMlCO hearing if the hearing was a
practical discourse.lM If the practiml and social concems of the protesting community did not
Yind expression' in the hearings, then the legal discourse could have inhibitad communication
flow. This methoâological assumption foms the basis for the discussions.
lS5 See Jurgen Habermas, Leciitimation Crisis, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975). p. 1 14. 186 Practical discourse enables participants to examine the validity claims of rnorality because it contains rational discursive conditions that do not constrain people. See Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theorv of Juraen Habermas. (New York: Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1984), p. 31 3.
Background of the lMlCO Saga international Malleable lron Company (I MICO) established
operations in Guelph Ontario from 191 2 to 1989. Its site, covering 5.32 hectares, is at 200
Beveriy Street In 1989, the company suddenly dedared bankruptcy. Its owner, lan Carver,
abandoneci it At this time, the public was intensive@ protesthg the Company's pollution. lan
C w e r owned the m p a n y before it ceased operations. Many other acton were a d a t e d
with the Company.
The Bank of Montreal held mortgage on the property. It spent $300,000, to clean up
the site, partiaily.'87 Yet, the legal systern claimed it cannot order the Bank to clean up the
pollution.'" Likewise, the Ministry of the Environment and Energy transporteci tramformers
and capacitors from the site to a storage tank to 'reduce the risk of fires and vandalism.""
These partial dean ups mise çome questions. Were the Bank and Ministry acknowledging
responsibility or were they just trying to be good citizens? Were they fulfilling their obligation
to reduce the danger their action or inaction could have caused? Did the Bank's lending
policy put the cornmunity at risk? Can one completely absolve the Ministry of responsibility?
These practical questions were peripheral in the hearings.
Also, this study addresses the faimess of the state's apportioning of responsibilii for
the pollution. Legalty, Mr. Long became the owner of the property because he purchased it
for one dollar.lgO Responsibility for cleaning the pollution shifted to Mr. Long because of this
purchase. Legal recognition for the purchase introduced a new orientation in the
deliberations. Subsequent sections will elaborate this point.
Acüvities of lan Carver, the original owner of IMICO, his directors and managers,
caused the pollution. In the publics' view, the Company should be responsible because their
activioes contaminateci the site.t9' The IMlCO owner çdd the property to Mr. Long amid
public protests that they should clean the site. The public then turned on Mr. Long. This
causeci him to 'donate' the property to the Church of the Universe in December of 1993. The
187 See Thomas Mccarthy, The Critical Theon/ of Juraen Habermas. (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1984), p. 5. 188 See John Swiagen, Knox M. Henry, and John A. Jackson, 'Church of the Universe v. Director, Ministry of Environment and Energy," Environmental A D D ~ Board. (Toronto: Environrnental Appeal Board, August, 29, 1995), p. 1. la9 Ibid, p. 1. 190 "IMICO Purchase Threatens Clean Up Plansn in Guelph Tribune, vol. 9, no. 1, January, 1994. 191 See Joe Mets, "Angry Neighbors have IMlCO Solutionn in Guel~h Mercurv, August 10, 1991. See John Swiagen, Knox M. Henry, and John A. Jackson, "Church of the Universe v. Director, Ministry of Environment and Energy," Environmental Ameaf Board,(Toronto: Environrnental Appeal Board, August, 29, 1995), p. 3.
legai system considered al1 those who at anytime owned the property to be responsible for the
poilution. Thus, Mr. Long and the Church were legally responsible for the pollution.
In Juiy 1994, the Director of the Ministry of the Environment and Energy issued a
Clean up Order to the Church of the Universe, lan Bullack Carver, president of IMICO, a
contractor called Guy who sahmged scrap and disposeci of waste from the site, and Mr.
Long.'" In effect, the Order fragment& responsibility for the pollution.
The Church appealed the Director's Order to the Environmental Appeal Board.lgl As
an agency of the Ministiy, the Environmental Appeal Board, organized hearings to confirm,
alter, or revoke the Ministry's Order. The heanngs were tribunals set up to review the
Director's decision. In the hearings, the Church seerns to bear the responsibility.
In this chapter, the researcher will analyze the legal arguments and structural
deformations of the legal discourse. This will show how the system suppressed the
community's pursuit of ecdogical integrity. In this analysis, the researcher fowses on certain
questions. For example: Why would the legal system recognize changes in the ownership of
the property (IMICO) that was under conflict? How did such recognition introduce systemic
orientation in the mattef? Did legal recognition of the sale of the property and the donation of
the property obstmct justice? Discussions will show that changes in the ownership further
complicated the problem.
ii) Legal Bureaucratie Processing of The Political Matter: The Board mainly conducted the
Appeal hearings or review as legai proceedings, that is, by means of law. Law is a system of
knowiedge, legal propositions and interpretations that are dense or condensed in technical
language. It is also a system of action charactemeci by legal fomalities and pr~tocds. '~
This study refers to communications oriented by law as the law. Law-based proceedings
'transfomi' communications from ordinary language into its 'special codes of power-steered
administration and money-steered economy' to make them 'cornprehen~ible'.'~~
In this transforming a m , however, the language or communication processes of
law can ignore practical considerations. The legal deliberations transfomed the simple
192 See John Swiagen, Knox M. Henry, and John A. Jackson, "Church of the Universe v. Director, Ministry of Environment and Energy," Environmental A ~ ~ e a i Board,(Toronto: Environmental Appeal Board, August, 29, 1995). 193 See Andrew Bruce, "IMICO Clean Up Order Being Ignored" in Guelph Mercunr, Decernber, 1993, p. A4. 194 See Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Noms: Contributions to the Discourse Theorv of Law and Democracv. Translated by William Rehg. (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996) p. 91. lg5 lbid, p. 81.
matter of IMlCO pollution into a cornplex technical matter. Many people became responsible
for a pollution caused by one fim. As a technical legal matter, the hearings becarne the
exclusive domain of legal experts. Only legal experts can capably discuss the matter.
Consequently, a common sense matter Iike pollution was transfonad into a 'depoliticked'
technical matter in which reaçonable and conœmed citizens cannot participate.
Yet, the law is an order that belongs to the lifeworid and is set up to fulfil the function
of social integrati~n.'~~ This rneans a potentiai çocially disintegrative issue like IMlCO can ba
deal with by the law. As a process that belongs to the lifeworld, that is, involves
communicative action in which truth-vaiidity of actions are established, the l MC0 deliberations
fell short- It denied rational discourse.
The Environmental Appeal Board's hearing did not encourage communicative adion,
the sape to examine practical reality. It was not a politicai discourse, that is 'geared for the
justification of noms and policies' and 'dernands the inclusion of al1 those affe~ted."~' At this
level of discourse, people can realize substantive democratic wiil formation. The hearings
exduded the bulk of those affected (neighbors and the axnmunity) and its Rules of Pracüce
inhibited rational discourse.
The hearings were a legal di~course.'~ As a legal discourse, the hearings examined
whether the Director's Order was consistently or appropriately applied according to the
provisions of the necessary environmental acts and codes. In doing this. the chairperson had
discretionary powers like those of a j ~ d g e . ' ~ ~ Its chairperson can charge participants for
contempt of its proceedings. To participate meaningfully, participants must have a lawyer or
agent with legal training. Records show that witt~out lawyers, ordinary people hardly get
rulings in their f a v ~ r . ~ Its decision is binding and, therefore, has the force of law. The
hearing was, essentialfy, a review of the Clean up Order. The Board's hearing was, therefore,
a legal discourse although it was a court proceeding.
However, issues in the IMlCO matter were essentially political. They concem a
review of govemment action and strained cMI relations. Resohnng the matter by political
discourse would have been appropriate. Evident in the protests, were citizens' attempts to
196 See Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Noms: Contributions to the Discourse Theorv of Law and Democracv. Translated by William Rehg. (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996) pp. 80 -81 . 197 Ibid, p- 226. '* Legal discourse is a level of discourse in which experts try to apply legal noms or rules to resolve a problem. 199 See Environmental A~peal Board: Rules of Practice.(Toronto: Environmental Appeal Board, 1996), p 4, Section 1.4, 1.6, & 1 .f 4. 200 In an interview 1997, the Chairman of the Board, revealed that legal representation is highly essential to assure that the 'system' can 'understand' a parties position.
decide whether they want an environrnentally clean and responsible Society. Partially, then,
the anti-IMICO protests undeday an 'identity politics,' one in which the community tri& to
constnrct their identity or environmental needs. Irnpliciüy, they aimed to forge a consensus
on how to regulate the use of their shared ecological resources. Such a task implies the
making of norms, intersubjectiveîy binding reciprocal expectations of behavior.
Since norms regulate legiümate chances for the satisfacüon of needs (including
environmental needs), nom creation is a justice issue?"' It involves the adoption of behavioral
standards that are fair and acceptable to al1 memben of community. Yet since a decision
can hardly be good for al1 - an ethical conception of politics - the pursuit of justice should define
lMlCO proceedings. Justice, in this study, is defined by procedural fairness. All those
affected and participating in discourse must have a fair chance to take up rational
argumentation.
In this chapter, the researcher assesses communication structures of the heanng
against faimess as defined by a procedural (discursive) conception of dernocracy.*
According to this notion, the will of ciüzens must inform policy decisions. In effect, assessing
the communicative raüonality of IMICO hearings will invoive comparing these hearings with an
ideal speech situation. To show how the hearings deviated from rational communicative
situations, the researcher explores certain questions: Was the Board truly independent of the
Ministry or was it acting at the Ministry's behest? Were the hearings democratically
constituted and conducteci? Was the Ministry's Order open to unconstrained discursive
justification? Why did the govemment choose a predominantiy legal discourse rather than a
political one?
The state's choice of legal discourse or juridifications enables it to control citizens.
Juridication is-the tendency toward an observable increase in formal (or positive, M e n ) law
in modem s o ~ i e t y . ~ Transferring the problern to the Board's tribunal made it easy for the
legal system to vindicate the Director's Order.
The juridification of social situation-definitions means introducing into matters of economic and social distribution an if-then structure of conditional law that
20 1 See Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theorv of Juraen Habermas. (Boston: Politiy Press, 1984), p. 31 3.
see See Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Noms: Contributions to the Discourse Theorv of Law and Democracy. Translated by William Rehg. (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996). 283. 3 3 See Jurgen Habermas, Theorv of Communicative Action. Vol. II. Lifeworld and Svstern: A Critiaue of Functionalist Reason. Trans. Thomas McCarthy. (Boston: Beacon Press), p. 357.
is foreign to social relations, to social causes, dependencies and needs. This structure does not, however, allow for appropriate, and especially not for preventive, reacüons to the causes of the situations requiring compen~ations.~
Juridification of the IMlCO resolution, enable the system to tailor the matter so that it can
resohre it easily. The system subjects the matter to fiolent abstraction' 'so that it can be
dealt with admini~tratively.'~ Juridification of the lMlCO affair made it easy for the state to
impose its point of view or exclusive orientation on the deliberations.
4.2. Legal Redefinition of the Problem Situation and Function of the Legal Discourse.
A) Legal Arguments Served to Redefine the Problem-Situation. The arguments and actions
recognized and debated in the proceedings virtually sewed to redefine the IMlCO problem
situation. The legal recognition of an untrue statement that the "propetty poses no threat to
any onen made the problem technicaL2= PCB's found at the IMlCO site are well-known
risks to humans. Effluents fmm the Plant spewed into public rivers of Speed and Eramosa.
To contend that PCB contamination is not harmful opened scope for technical legal debate.
It leads to a waste of time merely to prove a lie. The law's focation with such a lie under the
guise of beign 'naivete' can be distractive.
The law can adopt such 'naive' posture and can be 'sophisticated' at the same tirne
because its inclusive reasoning procesç enables it to do so with impunity? Movement
between such naive and sophisticated postures is a conscious mechanism the legal system
uses to subvert procedural justice.= If by some legal technicality experts can show that
the substance is not harmful, then the panel can rule that no pollution occurred at the site.
Such a fafse argument also 'crowds out' the chance to attend to normative
considerations seriously. It crowds out time to deal with questions of the right to pollute
public property and violate ciüzens' welfare. In the end, such arguments orient the
resolution to legal technicalities rather than practical questions.
2w See Jurgen Habermas, Theorv of Communicative Action. Vol. II. Lifeworld and Svstem: A Critiaue of Functionalist Reason. Trans. Thomas McCarthy. (Boston: Beacon Press), p. 362. Habermas cites Reidegold, "Vollzugsdefizite," 205 Ibid, pp. 362-3. 206 See John Swiagen, Knox M. Henry, and John A. Jackson, "Church of the Universe v. Director, Ministry of Environment and Enerav." Environmental Ameal Board. (Toronto: Environmental A D D ~ Board, August, 29, 1995). p. 9. 207 See Frank Pearce, "Corporate Rationality as a Crime" in Emer Killean (Ed.), Studies in Political Economv, (Ottawa: Carlton University Press, no. 40. Spring, 1993). 208 Justice in this study refers to the procedural fairness in communication. It is the establishment of communicative conditions that enable assessrnent of objective, normative and subjective realities.
Another action that served to redefine the matter was the legal recognition of the
dubious sale of the controvenial property. Selling a property that is under contention can
be an attempt to obstruct justice. The legal system's recognition of this deal can hinder the
chance to focus effectively on the true polluter. To issue Mr. long the Clean up Order
because he 'purchased' it from the real polluter is not right. The sincerity and truth of this
transaction are questionable. Likewise, legally considering the Church owner and so
responsible for the pollution is also questionable. For the Board's chair to recognize this
donation puts the validity of the whole process in question. Thus, legal acceptability and
recognition of these arguments and actions show a lack of sincerity, moral rightness and
truth of the proceedings.
Legal recognition of these transactions distracts participants from closely focusing
on the actual polluting act~ty. Since many people were now responsible, the hearings
cannot focus on the actual actMty of the real polluters. Ail those setved the Order became
polluten with fragments of responsibility. The practical question one should ask is whether
several actors caused the pollution. Why did the system hold many people responsible for
it? In effect, synthesis of the problem became difficult for citizens because of these
bureaucratic arguments that redefined the problem-situation. Legal recognition of the
change of ownerships served to reinterpret the reality of the IMlCO problem-situati~n.~
When one redefines a problern-situation, themes or ideas, plans or strategies also change.
Situations do not get "definef in the sense of being sharply delimited. They always have a horizon that shifts with the theme. A situation is a segment of the lifeworld wntext of relevance that is thrown into relief by themes and articulated through goals and plans of action; these contexts of relevance are concentncally organized and become increasingly anonyrnous and diffused as the spatio-temporal and social distance growsFO
The legal system diffused the matter and made it anonymous by increasing the
'spatio-temporal and social distance' of the deliberation.
First, subjecting the matter to the Board's tribunal removed it from the public sphere
into the domain of system, the state-sponsored hearings. In this legal domain, the social
209 See Jurgen Habermas, Theow of Communicative Action. Vol. Il. Lieworîd and Svstem: A Critiaue of Functionalist Reason, Trans. Thomas MccCrthy. (Boston: Beacon Press), p. 131. A 'Situation' represents a segment of the lifeworld delimited or defined by a theme. The latter consist of aims and interests of participants in discourse. It shapes a plan for resolving problems. 210 See Jurgen Habermas, Theow of Communicative Action. Vol. II. Lifeworld and Svstem: A Cdtiaue of Functionalist Reason. Trans. Thomas McCarthy. (Boston: Beacon Press), pp. 123-3.
and pradical reality gets distanced as the problem situation gets redefined in a legal-
bureaucratic manner. lnstead of foarsing on health and social impacts, the legal
procedures focused on ownership and how this causes responsibility.
Second. the hearings' focus on fragmented responsibilities puts a temporal distance
on the deliberations. The deliberations concentrated on the fragmentation of
responsibilities because the ownership transactions were more recent than the original
polluüng actMty by IMICO. By shifting focus to these recent occurrences, the system
created a temporal distance between the polluting act and the resolution mechanism. In
doing so, the legal system changed the themes, plans and goals of debate. Thus, the
system shifted the horizon of the problem-situation to help its administrative redefinition, that
is, making many people responsible for the negative actMty of IMICO.
Third, resohnng the matter through the Toronto-based Environmental Appeal Board
increased spatial distance between the problem-situation and the resolution mechanism.
The Board's chair is not part of the community and was not directly affected by the problem.
The chairperson, therefore, can adopt practical orientations only to a limited degree.
In short, subjecting the IMlCO problem to the legal discourse of the Board created
'spatiotemporal and social distance' of the problem-situation. Transferring the resolution of
the matter to the Board cconcentrically organized' the resolution process away from its
immediate setting. In short, the juridification redefined the matter to suit systemic
orientation and solutions.
li) The legal -bureaucratie Procedure as a Structural Functional Tool. Once shifted to the
technical legal-bureaucratic domain, the IMlCO matter took on an abstract 'foreign' f o n or
redefinition. For instance, the hearings apportioned responsibility for the pollution not by
polluüng action but on ownership. Also, the proceedings focus less on community health.
Its major focus was on revoking or confirming the Ministry's Order. Whether such a focus
leads to the cleaning of the site or the protecting of community's health, remains a
secondary matter. Whether the Order was justifiable or dernocratic is systemically
irrelevant.
The systemically imposed focus or orientation serves a depoliticizing function.
Focusing mainly on IMICO's polluting acüvities can bring into question the role of those that
financed those activities, the Bank. Any attempt to question the action of powetful interests
can unleash serious legal battles between a cash-strap state and financially strong market
forces. In fact, this situation is less likely, 'since an economy organized as market is
functionaliy intermeshed Wh a state that has a monopoly on p~wer.~" For the state to
subject the subsystem of economy to lifeworfd scmny is to risk exposing its own silence or
improper action. It can also risk opening questions about the legitimacy of ifs Order.
The need for system integration takes priority over the need for genuine social
integration. As the system cannot destroy itself by creating scope for rational discussions.
This may lead to a questioning of itç logic. It penetrates the lifeworld or distort
communication structures by assigning only a "passive rolen to the vulnerable domains of
lifeworld By redefining the problem-situation [abstracting the matter from its
objective, normative and subjective worlds or realiÏ], the system prevents exposing the lack
of val idi of its one-sided action or Order.
Without scope to rationalize (thematize and critically examine) the problematic
validity of the govemment's action or decision, citizens cannot expose the dogma or
ideological nature of this action. Consciousness of social injustice, class conflict and
ewloitation inherent in the IMlCO problem cannot come to the fore. The legal
communication frarnework helps to reanange and redefine the matter so that practical
questions of domination, inequality and social injustice do not enter discussions. Thus, this
legal discourse becomes a systernic tool to proted relations of domination that caused the
problem in the first place.
A class structure shifted out of the lifeworld into the system loses its historically palpable shape . . . the more the class conflict that is built into the society through private economic form of accumulation can be dammed up and kept latent, the more the problems come to the fore that do not directly violate interest positions ascribable on a class specific basis.'13
The juridifimtion of lMlCO controversy, thus, eliminated a situation ütat couid Yrigger
reactions by privileged groups' and 'class ~onf l ic t .~ '~ In the interest of maintaining the
organizational principle of capitalism. 'unpolitical class rule,' the system rnust elirninate
potentially explosive normative questions by inhibiting communication potential. The legal
discourse helps the state achieve this goal. Driving the IMlCO deliberations is the sutvival
211 See Jurgen Habermas, "Normative Content of Modemity" in Philoso~hical Discourse of ModernitvTwelve Lectures. Trans. Frederick Laurence. (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1992), p. 349. 212 Ibid, p. 356. 213 See Jurgen Habermas, Theorv of Communicative Action., Vol. II. (IBoston: Beacon Press, 1987) pp. 348 - 9.
Ibid, pp. 347 - 8.
imperative of economy and stateF5 It is, therefore, 'natural' that the principle of 'unpolitical
class rule' would shape the conduct of IMlCO deliberations.
4.3. Juridification as Intemal Colonization: A Discourse analysis of the Mediatization
of the Lifeworld. This section examines how the Iegal system prevents rational
communication through the restrictive appeal process of the Board. Communicative
restrictions excluded scope for expressing moral-practical and social views. In such
circumstances, the outcome of the process was bound to rack moral-practical and social
relevance. In the IMlCO process, the outcome was the desertion of the polluted site. Such
an outcome is a failure of the legal system, an icon of modemization.
An impairment or failure of an idealization of modemization is an opportunity to test
the thesis of intemal colonization of the lifeworld. The legal system, (the Ministry of the
Environment and Energy and the Environmental Appeal Board) are icons of modemization
that failed to resolve a modemization problem, pollution. This failure presents an
oppottunity to test the Thesis of lntemal Colonization of the lifeworld. Here, the test involves
showing how the legal system used strategic action (coercion and threats) to manipulate
discourse and so fail to resolve a modernization problem?16 Constraints imposed on
citizens' communication prevented their adoption of practical orientation and considerations.
In tum, this resulted in a decision that lack practical social relevance.
lntemal colonizations of the lifeworld are inconspicuous mnstraints placed on the
structure and flow of communication. It causes social pathology: the fragmentation of
consciousness about a social problem to prevent synthesis of reality."' It is a mechanism
the system applies in social conflict situations to defuse them and to gain m a s loyalty.
The system can produce m a s loyalty for its thinly legitimated one-sided actions,
such as the Order, in a positive and seledive manner. Positive production of mass loyalty
occurs when the system makes good on social welfare programs. Selectively, the system
produces mass loyalty by excluding themes and contributions from public discussion as in
the IMlCO deliberations. The politîcal system accornplishes this exclusion by a
sociostructural filtering of the public sphere, through bureaucratic deformations of public
215 See Jurgen Habermas, "Normative Content of Modemity in Philoso~hical Oiscourse of Modemitw Twelve Lectures, (Translateci by Federick Laurence), (Massachusetts: MIT Press Cambridge, 1 9W), p. 356. 216 Strategic power is the power by a political actor to employ action that leads to realization of his or her interests at the expense of others. 217 See Jurgen Habermas, Theorv of Communicative Action., Vol. II. (IBoston: Beamn Press, 1 987) p. 355.
communication structures or through manipulative control of communication flow? The
previous section showed how systernic redefinition of the problem-situation excluded
themes. The system can also exclude themes by means of psychological threats to
participants in discourse. Presently, the researcher will show how the legal system put
'procedural constraints' and 'limitations' on the communication of participants.
The activities of the prehearing can deform communication structures, manipulate
communication flow and exclude people and themes. The Board's chairperson closely
supervises prehearing actMties. Fundons of the prehearing are to identify eligible parties,
define and formulate issues. Also, it scrutinizes applications for party status and decides
the format of procedures. It orders disclosure of evidence, including identification and
exchange of documents. Furthemore, it decides the weaknesses of evidences and the
order to present them. It sets dates, simplifies matters and even seMes some issue^."^ It
is ai the prehearing stage that the system marginalizes and eliminates the bulk of
community. Discussions will show how the prehearing can: a) sociostnicturally filter access
to deliberations; b) bureaucratically deforrn communication structures; and c) manipulatively
control the flow of communication. The researcher conducts these discussions under four
headings: i) foreclosure of debate; ii) equalization of Information; iii) agenda manipulation;
and N) the elimination of embarrassing i s ~ u e s . ~
i ) Foreclosure of the Debate. Simply, foreclosure means restncting the bounds or range of
discussions before talk even begins. To understand how the Board's hearings can
foreclose debate one should consider its mandate. It states:
. . xannot usurp the Director's function of deciding which of the perçons should be issued an order and which should not. The rnost the Board can do is limit the liability of a person to whom an Order has been issued if it appears the Director's failure to issue an order has imposed an excessive burden on that per~on.~ '
21s Ibid, p.346. 219 See Rule 6 of "ûther Preliminary Hearingsn in Environmental Aweal Board Rules of Practice.(Toronto: Environmental Appeal Board, 1996), pp- 29-30 & pp. 2-3. 220 For a discussion of these four terms see John S. Dryzek, "Critical Theory as a Research Programn in Stephen white (Ed.), The Cambridge Com~anion to Habermas, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 108. 22 1 See John Swiagen, Knox M. Henry, and John A. Jackson, "Church of the Universe v. Director, Ministry of Environment and Energy," Environmental Ameal Board. (Toronto: Environmental Ameal Board, August, 29, 1995.
Under such a mandate, the Board's hearing can only decide the adequate level of 'burden'
the Order imposes on a party. lnitiating a hearing to consider the Directors one-sided action
or Order implies a daim that it is valid or deseMng of recognition. Through the Order, the
Director unilaterally decided who was responsible. The issue of whether the Oder is
legitimate cannot aise in the hearing because such a concem is outside the Board's
mandate. The Board cannot annul or cancel the Director's Order.
Aiso, because of this mandate, participants cannot consider certain topics or
questions. For instance, the hearing cannot deal with questions such as Why were non-
poliuters and the real polluters apportioned the same responsibility for the pollution?" The
'most the Board can do is limit liability' where it 'appears' the Directon Order imposed 'an
excessive burden.' Only in determining the excessiveness of 'burden' may participants
mention the Bank or other actors. Mandate limitation makes it posçible to avoid practical
concems of the Bank's responsibility in financing an actMty that caused the pollution.
Since the Order did not name the Bank of Montreal, questions of its culpability cannot anse.
The culpability of the Bank (holder of mortgages on the property) became a peripheral issue
because it is not part of the Board's mandate. In effect, the mandate restricted the
communicative f low of certain views.
Also, the hearing cannot focus on the Ministry's accountability for failing to take
action against the Bank. In the Board's hearing, citizens cannot oppose the legal systems'
decision to recognize the dubious sale and gift transaction of the controversial property. All
these limitations on communicative action are possible because of the mandate. Thus,
delimitations on the Board's mandate provided a pretext for excluding practical and social
considerations.
For al1 its public display of 'concem' for ecological destruction, the state's hearing
was merely geared to deciding the consistency of the Order with the law or environmental
protection acts. The Board's chairperson ensured that the hearings were within this state-
imposed mandate. Thus, one can view the hearings as a selective mechanisrn the state
uses to gain mass loyalty for its 'thinly legitimated' decision or Order.
Nonetheless, to prevent certain arguments. views or issues from entering
deliberations because of mandate limitations is undernocratic. Decisions from such
deliberations do not represent the discursively formed opinion and will of citizens. The
process did not examine the truth, rightness and sincerity of certain actors and their
arguments because of social power (the effect of the influence of powerful forces). This
makes the process and its decisions Rivalid. In effect the deliberations 'particularizeâ' the
discussions, that is, made it the arena for discussing only the topics allowed by the state.
Considering the Board's subordinate position to the Ministry and its powerful position
in relation to the public, one is left with the question of whom the Board serves? Despite its
claim to being independent (or neutral), the exclusion of certain practical questions and
people makes its proceedings bias. Since the state's view of the problem, formalized in the
Order, shaped the deliberations, the hearings seem to favor the system. Thus, the mandate
foreclosed the debate and irnposed a sole systemic orientation.
ii) IdenMication of Parties and timibng Applications is mainly done at the prehearing stage.
The Board's chairperson holds the final word about who can be a party. ldentifying people
as parties and limiting applications restricts access of citizens and themes citizens can
present at deliberations. Disclosure of evidence, academic qualification, and other
personal information required by these applications can threaten and intimidate citizens that
are not highly educated. The Board makes it quite dear that evidence from experts cames
more respect.
Also, disclosing anti-systemic views in trying to fulfil the condition for becoming a
party can induce self deception or m n discourage citizens. If parties reveal information that
poses a threat to systemic interests they may fail the Boards 'test' for party status. On the
other hand, if they fail to mention a position at the prehearing stage, they cannot do so later
in the hearing. The prehearing, therefore, constrained citizens communicatively. An
actMst stands little chance to be a party. In reality, the Board's powers to decide who can
be a party and which applications are good, restrict access. In effect, the system 'privatized'
the deliberations so that only a few people can be a part of it.
iii) Distinguishing Witnesses and Parties. The Board's power to distinguish Wtness' and
'party' prevents access of the bulk of the pollution affect. We usually cal1 a witness to
confirm a viewpoint or fact. Usually, witnesses are not main parties to a conflict. The
Board's power to distinguish witnesses and parties enables it to label certain people as
witnesses, making thern peripheral actors in the matter. When a person becomes a
witness, the law implicitly denies that person a level of involvement and scope to express
themselves. They see hem as people who are supposed merely to confirm evidences or
corroborate a story. Distinguishing rnembers of a community affected by pollution from a
party arbitranly stifles their communicative freedom. This inhibits the communicative flow of
reasons or views of some members of the cornmunity.
Furthemore, the procedures require that witnesses present a Witnesses Statement
to the Board before their presentation. In it the Board requires that witnesses present full
statements of their interests, the nature of their evîdence, skill and qualif i~ation.~ In oiis
statement, the witness must reveal information about their qualifications and training to be
considered credible or taken seriously. These requirements can make a witness feel
inquisitive. They can also intimidate them. Their personal integnty and level of education
corne under attack. If one lacks technical training, one cannot be a credible witness. Such
w-tnesses have no guarantee that the heaing will take them seriously.
However, since IMlCO effluent spewed into the Speed and Eramosa Rivers that
provide public recreational facilities, the pollution endangers the whole comrnunilyPJ Any
community member who contacts these rives is at risk. Also, since the aquifer undemeath
the site was mntaminated, people with wells in the Guelph area were at r i ~ks .~ " Generally,
since the pollution affects public rivers, wells and the air, any person living in Guelph was at
risk and, therefore, should have access to the hearing as a party.
Members of the public should have the chance to exercise their political autonomy,
their right to participate in the hearings discursiveiy because the pollution affects them.
'Those affected' are people whose interest the foreseeable wnsequences of a policy
decision touch. The policy of distinguishing citizens equally affected by pollution into
witnesses and party is unfair. Such practice limits the communicative freedom and full
presentation of reasons of some of those affected. Since a person is a Guelph resident that
person must be a party and should become a party if he or she wants.
This distinction hindered the access to the hearings of neighbors to the site. These
people were in immediate proximity to the site and so were more exposed to pollution risk.
In the Board's Notice to Owners and Tenants Nearbv IMICO, it stated that individuals can
'participate at the hearing if they have a genuine protestemB The Board did not decide
'genuine protest,' by geographical proximity or vulnerability to pollution risk. Genuine protest
means whatever the Board's Chair decides.
T n - See the description of Witness Statement, Environmentai Appeai Board: Rules of Practice. (Toronto: Enviromental Appeal Board, 1997,. p. 35. 223 See Susan Dunn, "Notice to Owners and Tenants of Nearby Lands" in Environmental A ~ ~ e a l Board.(Toronto: Environmental Appeal Board, 1995), p. 16. 224 John Swiagen, Knox M. Henry, and John A. Jackson, "Church of the Universe v. Director, Ministry of Environment and Energy" in Environmental Ameal Board. (Toronto: Environmental Appeal Board, August, 29,1995), p. 17. 225 See Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Noms: Contributions to the Discourse Theorv of Law and Dernocracv. Translated by William Rehg. (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996), p. 107. 226 See Susan Dunn, Notice to Owners and Tenants of Nearbv Lands: Environmental A~peal Board.(Toronto: Environmental Appeal Board, 1995), p. 1
However. in as far as neighbon and the rest of the community were at risk, they do
have a genuine protest. By excluding them, the legal system redefined the issue as a
particular one, one for a few people who are accorded the right to participate. In short, this
distinction transforrns the shared interest (emlogical and communrty health) to a particular
one, for those few persons that satisfy the Board's criteria.
B) Agenda Manipulation: The prehearing's power to decide the order of presenting
evidences can eliminate evidence. It can also make evidences insignificant by putting them
at the bottom of the agenda. As stress increases toward the end of deliberations,
participants can eliminate issues that they have put at the bottom of the agenda or give
them insufficient attention. ln this way, these issues cannot get debated properly.
Reducing the chance to discuss certain questions effectively makes the development of
certain themes impossible.
C) Equaliang Information. The prehearing deals with the disclosure, identification and
exchange of documents to equalize information to al1 parties. This practice is fair only if it
does not filter off or eliminate certain views. Legally, the Board could eliminate significant
evidences or issues under the pretext that they are irrelevanl or irrational. 'Filtering'
inational vie= or 'reasons' is the legal function of the strong public, the 'parliarnentary'
procedures in the legal system.= Yet, if disclosing evidences at the prehearing leads to
their elimination before full discursive examination, then disclosure can be a mechanism for
restricting access of themes and opinions. Not every significant concern can enter the
discourse. For instance, if witnesses present evidences that are different from what they
revealed in their Witness Staternents, the Board can refuse to hear tham.= Essentially,
therefore, disclosure serves as an instrument to monitor the deliberations and eliminate
arguments or themes that are potentialty explosive or anti-system. Through this means,
the systern prevents the emergence of issues that may embarrass it.
D) Eliminating Embarrassing Issues occurs through the Board's exercise of its power to
identify weak evidences. The chairperson's power to decide solely that evidence is weak
227 See Kenneth Baynes, "Democracy and the Rehtsstaat: Habermas's Faktizitat und Geltung", in Stephen White (Ed.), The Cambridae Com~anion to Habermas. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). p. 21 6. 2 8 See the Witness Statement, Environmental Ap~eal Board: Rules of Practice. (Toronto: Envirornental Appeal Board, 1997), p. 36. See Rule 7.4 (5)-
and to eliminate is not right. Criteria for identifjing weak evidences should be the tasks of
al1 participants' in practikal discourse. We can correctly judge evidence as weak oniy after
it is presented and assessed in practical discourse.* The sole power of the Board to
decide that evidence is weak violates principles of practical discourse or rational
argumentation. Thus, identifying an evidence as weak before subjecüng it to rational
discursive examination makes the Board's process communicatively inational.
Also, the prehearings a c t ~ t y to decide the advantages or disadvantages of filing
witness statements and deciding the length of hearings can eliminate signifiant concems.
The decision or consensus that declares a witness statement necessary can be legitimate if
made in rational (unconstrained) discourse. Agreements under constrained discourse are
not rational consensuses." Through rational discourse, decisions gain substantive
democratic legitimacy because they result from rational consensuses, the will of those
affected. Until witnesses can file their statements and until al1 in discourse can critically
examine these statements, a decision to judge a statement weak is arbitrary, premature,
and democratically iliegitimate.
Since the prehearing deliberated on and eliminated certain issues or reshaped them,
it manipulates or sets the direction of the whole deliberations. Mandate restriction and other
inhibitions in the hearing process created conditions for systematic deformation of
communication structures. Systernically imposed inhibitions on the communicative freedom
of those affected leads to the colonization of the lifeworld.
Strategic Action of the Board Mediatized the Lifeworld. The system provided discursive
possibilities as a response to the demands of anti-IMICO protesters. Yet, the state intemafly
dominated the communication structures by inhibiting participants' freedom of
communication. These inhibitions on the structure of communication are 'mediatization of
the lifeworid.'
Mediatization of the lifeworld refers to an "interference" phenornena . . . (that) takes effect on and with the structures of the lifeworld; It is not one of those processes that are available as themes within the lifeworld, and, thus, it cannot
229 See Jurgen Habermas in L- (Boston: Beacon Press, Publishing, 1975). 230 Rational consensus is the ultimate criterion for establishing truth. The settlernent of tnith daims depends on rational argumentation of al1 in discourse (not on experience or correspondences with lingustically naked reality). Thomas Mccarthy, The Critical Theorv of Juraen Habermas. (New York: Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1984), p. 304.
be read off from the intuitive knowfedge of rnembers . . . (however) there are indications of it in the formal conditions of communicative action?'
Mediatization is a systemic intervention that 'takes effect on and with structures of the
lifeworid', the domain of communicative action.= Unlike market surveys that impose the
theme of economic efficiency in environmental protection, this intervention inhibits the
conversion of nonverbal to verbal expressions, the conversion of motives into words. They
inhibit the potential for communication at the hearings because of structural constraints on
communication.
The systern often resorts to this kind of colonization (domination) of the lifeworld
when it is inevitable that it can only settle certain issues through public discussion. For
instance, anti-1 MICO protesters vehementiy opposed the Church's bid to 6agro-cleanse' the
site and opposed Mr. Long's offer to bioremediate the soi1 on the IMlCO site.= Unlike,
pollution tax or permit policies of environmental econornists, an intersubjective reciprocal
discursive exchange was the demand of the anti-IMICO protesters. At this potentially
explosive stage of social conflict, the state cannot gain m a s loyalty by merely appealing
direcüy to economic values or technology. To arrest such a socially deteriorating situation,
the system rnust allow sorne form of talk.
Under such a pressure, the system cannot do without 'consensus-dependent
coordination of action since syrnbolic reproduction of the lifeworld is at stake? The state's
use of an environrnental tribunal is politically expedient. The state opted for legal
discourse because in this framework it can allow talk but insulate its interests frorn scrutiny
or jeopardy. To stabilize the social order, therefore, the systern immunizes itself from
criticism through the restrictive legal discourse. The strategies in this mediatization of the
lifeworld are value jurisprudence and scientization of public opinion and politics.
23 1 See Jurgen Habenas, Theonr of Communicative Action. Vol. Il. Lifeworld and Svstem: A Cntiaue of Functionalist Reason. Trans. Thomas McCarthy. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987). p. 186. 232 Ibid, Jurqen Habermas, 1987, p. 1 84-1 96. 23 3 The community refused Mr. ~ong's bid to bio-remediate the soil. They also objected to agrocleansing of the IMICO site as the church suggested. See John Swiagen, Knox M. Henry, and John A. Jackson, "Church of the Universe v. Director, Ministry of Environment and Energy," Environmental Ameai Board. (Toronto: Environmental Appeal Board, August, 29,1995), p. 21.
234 Ibid, p. 196.
42b The Ffearing as a Tod of Syaem Maintenance: Value Jutispnrdiençe and the
Scientkation of Public Opinion and PoIiu'cs. A) Value Jurkjmdence. Orienti ng IMlCO
deliberations to values (econornic ownership) rather than noms (considerations of the
inappropriateness of polluting behavior) makes these deliberations value jurisprudence.
The board's chairperson tries to ascertain the aspirations or values of the various acts for
protecting the environment 'as they see it.' He brings the meanings of these acts to bear
on the pollution question under c~nsideration.~ We term a value-oriented discourse of
this sort value jurisprudence. It involves a practice in which a judge or chairperson tries to
ascertain systemic values and apply hem to the problem under deliberation. The task of
the hearing was to review the Director's Order to see if it accords with statutes like the
Environmental Protection Act, the Environmental Bill of Rights and Clean Water Act that
empower it? Questioning the meaningfulness of these Acts is beyond the Board's
mandate.
In fact, the Board's Chairperson has discretionary powers to prevent the expression
of certain evidences if he or she believes they threaten social stability. In as far as the
Boards' proceeding 'adopts the doctrine of objective order of values and bases its decision'
on a kind of 'moral realism', the risk of irrational ruling increases. Functionalist arguments
gain the upper hand over normative ones, so that only rights can be Yrurnp' in the
argumentation garne in the end? Value jurisprudence abuses the right of participation of
citizens and can cover up the abuse of welfare rights inherent in corporate pollution.
The functional orientations that drove the review aimed at achieving social stability or
nomalcy. The review discarded the violation of the comrnunity's right to health and safe
environment. In effect, the hearings transfomed what should have been a 'nom-oriented'
(normative} discourse into an economic discourse, one about ownership and monetary
transactions. Transfoming a rights violation issue into an issue of goods made the matter
one of choosing between values. This opened moral relativism. A moral stance on the
issues became a matter of individual preference, of what values appeal to a party.
Yet, the pursuit of one value (social stability) or over another (ecological integrity)
resists logical conceptualization. No rational standard exists for bringing values into
transitive order with other values rather than rational discourse. Weighing takes place
2'5 Ibid, p. 258 See Your Guide to Environmental Appeal Board. (Toronto: Environmental Appeal Board
1996), p. 1 ; also see Rule 14 of the Enviromental Appeal Board: Rules of Practice. (Toronto:, Environmental Appeal Board, 1 W6), p. 61. 237 See Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Noms: Contributions to the Discourse Theorv of Law and Democracy. Translated by William Rehg. (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1 %6), pp. 259 -260.
arbitrarily or unreflectively, according to customary standards and hierarchiesPe The
decision to focus on ownership rather than rights violation can be a rational choice of
principle only if it were made in a rational discourse. Rights violation approach is more
irksorne for the system while the economic ownership approach merely sets discourse
within existing relations of domination.
However, competing values. weighted as for costs and benefits cease to orient
discourse when participants take the deontological character of basic rights serious~y.~
An adjudication oriented by principles has to decide which claim and acüon is appropriate.
What works for the system so that it maintains its equilibrium, is what the system would
prefer. If valuedictated action or jurisprudence serves this airn, despite its denial of
participants to make this choice, the state will adopt it. The state's survival imperative,
therefore. dictates its preference for value jurisprudence.
B) Scientization of Public Opinion and Environmental Poliocs. Another mechanism that
mediatized the discourse structures is the 'scientization of opinion and politics.' Making the
language of the hearing scientific or technical led to inconspicuous domination of citizens.
The discourse transformeci the cornmon sense pollution matter into a technical one. Moral-
practical questions become technical ones. lnstead of asking whether IMlCO effluent
spewed into the public rivers, the hearings focused on whether PCB's are harmless? This
manipulation serves to falsify reality, justify experts' interest in domination and represses
another class's partial need for eman~ipation.~~~ Focus on technical questions
incapacitates citizens from adequately participating. The scientization of politics and public
opinion occur when society and state become irrationally dependent on expert judgrnents in
policy f~rrnation?~'
More significantly, scientization carries the false assurnption of 'scientism.'
Scientism considers scienlific or technical knowledge as non-problematic reflectjons on
reality. This assumption is misleading because the technical or opinion knowledge that
gains unreserved respect 'serves in the end, merely to conceal preexisting, unreflected
social interests and prescientific decisionsa@ Scientisrn helps to conceal the fact that
23 8 Ibid, p. 256. 239 See Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Noms: Contributions to the Discourse Theorv of Law and Democracy. Translated by William Rehg. (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996), p. 260. 240 Ibid. p. 111.
See Jurgen Habermas, Towards a Rational Societv: Student Protest. Science. and Politics. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1974), p. 63 - 66. 242 Ibid. p. 59.
scientific or technical rationality can generate decisions to support particular interest2u
This assumption prevails at the hearings.
The hearings did not take evidences of non experts seriously. The Board's Rules of
Pracüce stress technical qualification of messes as the criterion for credibility of evidence.
Lay witnesses can only state facts based on their physical senses. The panel may count
their evidence unreliable. 70 give opinion evidence a person must have specialized
education, training and experience that qualify hirn or her to reliably interpret scientific or
technical information or to express opinions about matters for which untrainad or
inexperienced persons cannot provide reliable opinion^.'^^ By inference, a credible
witness in the Board's language must be an expert or technician. A witness must show
substantial qualification before the Board can allow that witness into the deliberations?
Thus, the assumption at the hearing was that only experts can give reliable evidence about
the IMlCO pollution.
Further technicization or scientization of the hearings is evident in the structures of
communication. A witness mnnot undertake argumentation. The task of witnesses is not
to be involved in argumentation but rather to simplify their technical knowledge for public
understanding? Advocacy is left to counsel. This communicative inhibition of ordinary
people manipulates the flow of communication. Only legal counsel have communicative
freedom. WAesses and ordinary parties are undemocratically inhibited. It is, therefore, a
fallacy and deception for the Board to claim that its 'hearing is a public process' and that its
decision must 'involve the public intere~t.'~" In short, this communicative restriction
deformed the discourse.
The Board's restrictions on the presentation of evidence and the 'scientization' of
evidence prevented citizens from criticizing the values of this legal institution. Guelph
citizens perceived the conduct of the legal experts or agents, the Board's Chair, and the
Directors' Order as value-neutral. In turn, the legal experts pretended they can provide
value-free rational judgments?@ Scientization of the lMlCO hearing, or the 'technicization'
of the communications led to manipulation, deception and self-deception of participants.
243 See Thomas Mccarthy, The Critical Theow of Juraen Habermas, (New York: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1984), p. 41. 2 4 4 See "Guideline for Technical and Opinion Evidence" in Enviromental Ap~eal Board: Rules of Practice. (Toronto: Environmental ApeealBoard, 19977, pp. 1 & 2 . 245 Ibid. p. 4 2 4 6 Ibid. p.6. 2 4 7 Ibid, pp. 6 and 3.
See Rachelle D. Hollander, "Expert Claims and Social Decisions: Science, Politics and Responsibility" in Deborah G mayor and Racheile D. Hollander (Eds.) Acceptable Evidence: Science, Values in Risk Management, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). p. 169,
Thus, we see language in action, as not just a means of communication that mediates
people's experience of the world but as 'also a medium of domination and social p o ~ e r . ~ ~
Language manipulations 'scientized' the opinion and pollcs of the IMlCO deliberations.
The technical nature of the language medium at the hearing made rational
discursive will formation impossible. Law prevented citizens from raising practical
questions and validity concerns. For al1 its elaborate fomal procedure, the hearings were
unilateral constructions of the legal system. Thus, the lMlCO deliberation was a public
relations ~arnpaign.~ Through it, the system aims gains m a s loyalty for its Order.
The statesponsored hearings are discourses that the functional imperatives of
system drive. They serve to depollicize the public sphere and enable the system to
selectively (by excluding themes) gain m a s loyalty for its thinly legitimated one-sided
The state apparatus is said to be functionally specialized in attaining collective goals via the medium of binding decisions or power. Central to its task in advanced capitalist societies is that of complementing the market and. when necessary, Ming the functional gaps therein. This it rnust do while preserving the primacy of private investrnent and the dynarnic of capital accumulation . . . There is, Habermas maintains, an "idissotuble tensionn between these two principles of societal integration: capitalism and democracy. For the normatke sense of democracy entails that "the fulfilment of the fundional necessities of systemically integrated domains of action shall find its limits in the integrity of the Iifeworid," where as specifically capitalist growth dynamics can be preserved only if "the propelling mechanism of the economic system is kept as free as possible from lifeworld restrictions as well as from demands for legitimation directed to the administrative ~ y s t e m . ~ '
These opposing principles or imperatives of democracy and capitalist social formation clash
head-on in the public sphere. The system cannot afford to provide scope for democratic
will formation on the pollution matter. To do so is to risk opening issues of class domination
and social inequality that characterize capitalist social formation.
249 Habermas cited in William Outhwaite, Habermas: A Critical introduction,(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 1994), p.25. m Such public relations campaigns prevent citizens from organizing themselves to communicate with one another as they would want. They only give a semblence of state concem while their true aim is to gain mas loyalty for one-sided govemment action. David Held and john Thompson, 'Editors' Introductionn in David Held and John B. Thornpson (Eds.) in Habermas: Critical Debates. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982). p. 5. 3 1 See Thomas McCarthy, ldeals and Illusions: On Reconstruction and Deconstruction in Contem~orarv Critical Theorv. (Cam. Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1991), pp. 162-3.
'Political decisions,' such as the Directors Order, that 'reflect the organizational
principle [unpolitical class nile] of society ipso facto do not admit of rational consensuses.
This Order is not 'in the best interest of al1 affectad by them.' Through such decisions, the
state maintains the 'stability of the capitalist social formation' by adopting 'legitirnations that
could not withstand discursive examinati~n.'~ In short, the real function of the hearing
was to deal with the fundamental dilemma of capitalism: how to distribute wealth
[ecosystem resources] inequitably yet legitirnately [Wh mass loyalty].
Yet, in substantive procedural democracy, people should be encouraged to 'encircle'
the 'fomally organized political system' 'with r e a ~ o n s . ' ~ Participants must have the
freedom to give reasons or orient their actions to 'universal principles of justice and
s~lidarity. '~~ Since the hearings allowed only an exclusive focus on the Director's Order,
citizens cannot focus on socially relevant or practical questions. In this way, the system
created a disproportion behnreen consciously grasped (manifest) and objectiveiy posed and
resolved prob le rn~.~~~ The one-sided orientation and other constraints on communicative
freedom mean the output, decisions or consensuses at the heanngs did not represent the
will of the people. Consequenüy, the hearings were undemocratic, bias and unfair.
4.3. The Hearings Violates Principles of Neutrality, Human Rights and Democracy.
This study considers the hearings undemocratic. The hearings deviated from the
'deliberative' model of procedural democracy as defined by the theory of communicative
action. According to this Theory, 'an ideal procedure for discussion and decision making
establishes an intemal connection between pragmatic considerations, compromises, and
discourses of self-clarification and justice.- This 'discourse theory of democracy
corresponds to the image of a decentered societyqn The model serves as a critical
standard for assessing the extent IMICO proceedings were democratic.
Substantive democratic will formation in environmental conflict resolution would
require that the will of the people shape environmental policy decisions. According to this
= Jurgen Habermas, Leaitirnation Crisis. (Boston: Beacon Press,1975), p. 11 3. 2 5 See Kenneth Baynes, "Democracy and the Rehtsstaat: Habermas's F a W a t und Geltungn, in Stephen White (Ed.), The Cambndae Cornpanion to Habermas. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 21 7. ::: m. Cit., Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Noms. 1996, p 97-98. 2% See William Outhwaite, Habermas: A Critical Introduction. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 146. 257 See Jurgen Habermas, Setween Facts and Noms: Contributions to the Discourse Theorv of Law and Democracy. Translated by William Rehg. (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996), p. 301.
study, citizens can only realize their will: a) Ï f they have access to decision making centers;
b) if such participation enhances the exercise of their right to discursive opinion and will
formation; and c) if their discursively formed opinion and will shape policy decisions. In
short, the realization of democracy or the will of most of the people is possible if the legal
insütutional framework can transfomi communicative power of citizens into administrative
power or binding policies. Procedural democracy is about transfoming the communicative
power, the power that 'anses between people M e n they act together.- Legal exercise of
state power must be based on the intuitions of justice embodied in communicative power.
Transformation of citizens' communicative power to administrative power occur when the
will of the people inform policy decisions.
Law can be the medium to transfomi communicative power of citizens into
administrative p o ~ e r . ~ ~ The final decision of lMlCO deliberations and the Order are not the
will of the people because they did not emerge from rational deliberaüve politics. At the
heart of procedural substantive democracy is deliberative politics.
A deliberative practice of self detemination can develop only in the interplay between, on the one hand, the parliamentary will fornation institutionalized in legal procedures and programmed to reach decisions and, on the other, political opinion building in informal circles of political ~mmun ica t i on .~
In deliberative politics, the presumption is that we form public opinion on the bases of
adequate information and relevant reason~.~' A 'good part of normative expectations' in
deliberative politics rest with the weak public (members of the public or affected
communities). They have the 'capacity to perceive, interpret and present social problems in
a way both attention-catching and inn~vat ive. '~~~ Their practical and normative
considerations, in tum, can emerge if the structure of linguistic communication encourages
rational argumentation.263 The weak public, non system controlled m a s media and
organized protesters, should take up informa1 opinion and will formation without compulsion.
?58 See William Outhwaite, Habermas: A Critical Introduction. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1 994), p. 1 42, ~9 Ibid, p. 142. 260 See Kenneth Baynes, "Democracy and the Rehtsstaat: Habermas's FaMiUtat und Geltung," in Stephen White (Ed.), The Cambridae Cornpanion to Habermas. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 995), p. 21 6. 261 Ibid, Baynes, 1995. 262 Ibid, pp. 216-17 26?4 See Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Noms: Contributions to the Discourse Theorv of Law and Dernocracv. Translated by William Rehg. (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 96-7.
Only then m n deliberative politics ex i s t . A democratic or fair decision can only emerge
throug h the f low of relevant information in rational discourse. Accordingly, relevant reasons
cannot reside in the sole ethical interpretations of the Board or the Ministry but in rules of
rational argumentation.
Complementing the process of infonnal opinion and will formation is the decision
making function of the 'strong public' in deliberative politics. To fulfil the division of labor
betvueen the weak and strong publics requires that conflict resolution should make a way to
decide democratically. The strong public or parliamentary decision making procedures play
an important part at this stage of deliberative politics. 'Filtering' irrational views or 'reasons'
is the legal function of the strong public,' the legal ~ y s t e m . ~ The absence of informal
opinion formation in the IMlCO deliberations means no interplay or democratic division of
labor between the weak and strong public existed. The weak public's or protesting
community's communicative reasons did not infom the decision making process or
parliamentary procedures.
Without their united action, citkens cannot generate communicative power.
Without transforming communicative power (citizens discursively fomed will) into
administrative power or policy decisions, realizing substantive democracy is impossible. If
the law, as a systern of actions and interpretations, cannot encourage citizens to form their
will and transfomi it to binding decisions, then is not legitirnate.
'At no level of the decision process can the political power simply legitimate itseif
through the law it has enacted . . . [but] by procedural [discursive] guidelines present in the
constitution and also by the cuvent will of the people that precede legislative action.lZB6 A
legal decision derives its binding force from its pos i t~ ty and its daim to legitimacy or appeal
to shared conviction.267 Legal decisions cany implicit daims or normative assumption that
if political actors or citizens challenge them, their creators can justify thern. Without fair
procedural discursive possibilities, the law is democratically illegitimate. A violation of
substantiva dernocratic conditions puts the legitimacy of law into question. In short, there
is no autonomous law without realized democracy.
264 Ibid, pp, 307 - 8, 265 OR. Cit., Kenneth Baynes, 1995, p. 21 6. 266 See Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Noms: Contributions to the Discourse Theorv of Law and Dernocracv. Translated by William Rehg. (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996), p. 262 267 See William Outhwaite, Habermas: A Critical introduction. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1 994), p. 140.
The Volabon of Human Righs. The Substance of Democracy is the practice of the nght to
Communicative Freedom. The Board daims participants have the nght to 'take position,
make decisions and enter into a memorandum of agreement.- Yet, to merely to state in a
document that ciüzens have the right to express their view is different from realin'ng this
right. Mere documentation of rights is not meaningful. Rights are 'expressions of
connectioness' and a 'forni of social cooperation' that members of wmmunity should
real ize. To be meaningful ind~duals must mobilize the sanction connected with their
nghts. This is possible only if they c m freely get to an independent and effectively
fundioning body that decides disputes impartially. State institutions must not Slock citizens'
nght to 'equal legal protection,' 'equal daim to legal hearing, and 'equal treatment before the
law? Real practices of these rights give them meaning.
The legal communication framework of the hearing denied ordinary citirens the
scope for discursive opinion and will formation. Due to these inhibitions, they could not
realize their nghts to a healthy environment or welfare. The 'social basis for the realization
of the system of rights is made up of . . . the communication flows and mediatized
influences which emerge from the cMI society and the political public sphere and are
transfoned, via democratic processes, into communicative p ~ w e r . ~ ' Only the legal
experts effectively patticipate in debate. Evidence by non-experts do not receive serious
recognition. The mere claim by the Board to provide discursive rights was, therefore. a
The 'substance of human nghts (then) resides in the fona l conditions for the legal
institutionalization of those discursive processes of opinion and will formation in which the
sovereignty of the people assumes a binding charader.- Since, the deliberations stifled
the communicative freedom of those present, it impeded private autonomy, the exercise of
subjective libetties of equality before the law, freedorn of association and legal protection?
If talks of "then system of rights mean anything, then, it refers to the points witere the vanous explications of the given self understanding of such
268 See Susan Dunn, Notice of Prehearinci: Environmental Aweal Board. (Toronto: Environmental Appeal Board, 1 994), p. 2. 269 See Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to the Discourse Theorv of Law and Democracv, Trans. William Rehg. (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996), p. 88. " O Ibid, p. 125. ni Habermas is cited by Outhwaite. a. Cit.. Habermas: A Critical Introduction. 1994, p. 148. 272 See Jurgen Habermas, Between Fa& and Norms: Contributions to the Discourse Theorv of Law and Democracv. Trans. William Rehg. (Massachusetts: MiT Press, Y996), p. 104. 27 3 Ibid, pp. 122-3.
pracüce converge . . . the system of rights do not exist in transcendental purity . . . If a person is entitled to a right, then she [he] has a conesponding daim to X [that right] and can assert this claim against other per~ons.~'
In short, Guelph citizens could have asserted their right to a clean environment effectively if
they had the chance to express their concems.
ii) Impartiality or Neutralïty of Dismurse is the Practice of Communicative Freedom. The
review of the Director's Order or decision was unfair because the parties cannot undertake a
'complete assesment of claims based on conflicting interests in the light of similar
conflicting princip~es.~ In the IMlCO matter, the ewnomic principle of ownership and the
state's interest of political stability, on the one hand, conflicteci with the principles of social
justice and the community's ecological interest, on the other. The forma1 precision or
legality of the Director's Order conflicts with the community's need for a substantive
deliberation. Choice of principle is fair if it is done from a moral point of view, 'by the
universalizabiity of inter est^.'^ Deciding a principle to guide discourse any other way is
arbitrary and impartial.
The faimess or impartiality of a deliberative process is a moral issue. A deliberation
becomes fair or impartial if it can approximate the level of moral discourse. In a moral
discourse, everyone affected by a nom can articulate their views publicly and be visible as
unrepresented individu al^.^ Reasons that legithate a decision must 'harmonize with
moral pnnciples of universal justice and so~idarity.'~ A nght decision emerges through
rational discourse and this decision must have 'substance' or practical relevance.
"Rightness" means rational acceptability supported by good reasons. The validity of a judgment is certainly defined by the fact that its validity conditions are satisfied. Whether these are satisfied, cannot be clarified by direct access to empirical evidence or to fa& given in an ideal intuition, but only discursively, precisely by way of justification that is carried out with arguments. Substantial reasons can never "compeln in the sense of logical inference or conclusive evidence . . . Hence, there is no "natural" end to the
274 Ibid, pp. 129-130. "5 See William Outhwaite, Habermas: A Critical Introduction. (Stanford, California: Stanford Universty Press, 1994), p. 138-9- 276 Ibid, p. 138. 277 Add Alex Honnet, The Other Justice: Habermas and the Ethical Challenge of Postrnodemismn in Stephen White, Cambridae Com~anion to Habermas. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 302. 278 See Jurgen Habermas, Behiveen Facts and Noms: Contributions to the Oiscourse Theorv of law and Democracy. Translated by William Rehg. (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996), p. 99.
chah of possible substantiai reasons; one cannot exclude the possibility that new information and better reasons will be brought f ~ r w a r d . ~
The rïghtness or correctness of the hearings is in question.
First, the deliberations were preoccupied with an Order assumed to be morally right
simply because they emerge frorn the 'correct' formal action of the Ministry. Second. the
hearings cannot be right because they deny the 'possibility that new information and better
reasons can be brought fonnmrd' other than those in a witness's or party's ~ t a t e m e n t s . ~
The Board's denial of new evidence is an exercise of strategic power.
Only through a 'cwperativa search for truth,' without coercion or threat, can one
'ideally close the rationality gap' between, ' ind~dual substantial reasons set out in
argument' and the 'unconditionality of the daim to the single nght dec is i~n.~ ' Otherwise,
this inhibiting condition on new reasons becomes a de facto conclusion of argumentation
and lacks legitimacy.
The distance between the social relevance and substance (validity) and the legal
precision (facticity) of the law would be reduced if the moral principle of universalization
(Pnnciple U) govern deliberations. Pnnciple U states that only those actions are valid to
which al1 those possibly affected could agree as participants in rationai d i s ~ u r s e s . ~ ~ ~ The
deliberations were not a rational discourse. Its consensuses are not rational agreement.
Thus, lack of applying the moral principle of universalization, makes the IMlCO deliberations
impartial or bias.
Neutrality is the 'priority of justice over the good, and hence, the fact that questions
of the good life recedes behind questions of justice.- A 'neutral dialogue' requires a
higher levei 'justice discourse, where participants can examine what lies in the equal interest
-39 a &t Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Noms. (Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), p. 226. 2 8 6 "A party rnay not cal1 a witness to testify to matters not disclosed in the witness statement without the consent of the Board, which may be on any conditions the Board considers appriopriate." See Rule 7.4 (5) Environmental Board: Rules of Practice. (Environmental Appeal Board, Toronto: Canada). p. 36. 2 8 1 Op. Cit., Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Noms, 1996, p. 227. 2 8 2 Op. Citt, Kenneth Baynes, "Factiaat und Geltung", 995, p. 208. 283 See Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to the Discourse Theorv of law and Democracv. Translated by William Rehg. (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996), p. 309. This is not to say Mat ethical questions should be bracketed out of political discourse generally for then such a 'discourse will forfeit its power to rationally change prepolitical attitudes, need interpretations and value orientations.'
of al1 concemed?" In the end, one can trace the neutrality principle back to the universal
rule of argumentation, that is, the Universalization Pnnciple of unconstrained discourse. A
discourse that violates neutrality is bias. By impeding citizens' capacity to fom their will,
the deliberations upset the chance to make citizens wiN the basis of decision,
iii) Democracy as the Ptactïce of Communicative Freedom. Furthe more, the deli be rations
are undemocratic because they violated the democracy principle. This principle operates
complementarily with the Universalization Prhciple (Principle U). It States that only those
judicial statutes may claim legitimate validity that can mset with the agreement of al1 legal
consociates in a discursive law making processes that, in turn, have been IegaIly
constituted?
Yet, the Chair of the Board can annul a person's right of participation. It can do this
if a penon fails to attend the prehearing to advise of his or her interest.= Also,
membership constiMing the hearing is of questionable legality since not al1 those directly
affected were present or represented at the hearing. These absented people do not have
the opportunity to express their agreement with the Board's decision. Since the hearing
prevented cornmunity members from attending, the hearings violated the Democracy
principle.
lnherent in the Democracy pnnciple is the right of equal participation in-discursive
opinion and will formation. Exercising this right implies the exercise of political autonomy,
the making of legitimate law? lmpeding citizens' participation or making of law violates the
democracy principle. Excluding the bulk of the cornmunity aJso means denying their
communicative freedom. Without their participation. atizens cannot defend their ecological
integrity. In the end, one can amibute the socially irrelevant decision whose outcorne was the
abandoning of the poltuted site to the exclusion of citizens.
284 See Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Noms: Contributions to the Discourse Theorv of law and Democracy. Translated by William Rehg. (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996), p. 311. t a s See Kenneth Baynes, "Democracy and the Rehtsstaat: Habermas's FaMizitat und Gekung", in Stephen White (Ed.), The Cambridcie Cornpanion to Habermas. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 208. 286 See Susan E. Dunn, Notice of Pre-hearinq: Environmental Appeal Board(.Toronto: Environmental Appeal Board, 1994), p. 2 287 Habermas introduced the right of participation as a fourth category of right in addition to traditional "subjective liberties," He named the latter "enabling rights." For example, rights to freedorn of speech, conscience and association. The rights to legal protection, due process, are subjective liberties that secure private autonomy of citizens. However, he believes, subjective liberties cannot properly impose limitations on the legislator's sovereignty. 00. cit., Kenneth Baynes, "Faktliitat und Geltung," 1995, p. 21 1.
Once a moral or natural person has been uncoupled from the legal system, there is nothing to stop jurisprudence from conce~ng rights dong purely functionalist lines. The domne of rights hands on the baton to a systems theory that ri& itself by rnethodological fiats of ail normative considerations.*
An essential complernent to fair juridifcation of relationships is universal ciozenship,
which foms the core of political participation." Wiiout the right to defend their interest,
ciüzens cannot expect to receive deasions that protect their interest. Violation of the
dernocracy principal by M i n g the right of participation, in tum, leads to the violation of the
right to welfare? Guaranteeing citizens' right of political participation (political autonomy) will
ensure that they can pursue the protection of their welfare.
The Board's review of the Ministry's Order ought to be about 'unblocking stoppages in
the dernocratic process.' This entails eliminating dl constmint on discursive opinion formation
so that those affected can realize their participatory rights?' WWout the appropriate
procedural conditions for a democratic genesis of binding decision, the decision is not
legitimate.
In short, the realization of dernocracy or the will of most of the people is only possible
in institutional frameworks that transform mrnrnunicatbe power of citizens into administrative
power. In the IMlCO affair, the law failed as a medium by which communicative power is
transformed into administrative power. It failed to transform the rational will of the people
(communicative power) to a socially relevant environmental decision (administrative power) . In short, as the law ignored the will of those affected, it was undemocratic.
Summary. Strategic action characterized the ~ e a r i n g . The Board's chairperson has the
power to limit access and to manipulate the prehearing and the entire deliberations.
Participants with views threatening to systemic interests will not reveal them for fear that the
system will deny them access. This psychological threat induces selfdeception. Citizens
See Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Noms: Contributions to the Discourse Theow of Law and Democracv. Translated by William Rehg. (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 19961, p. 87. 289 Ibid, p. 75. 290 The right of welfare is derivative. We experience this nght when we realize Our subjective liberties. Because the community did not exercise their participation right, the could not realize their right to welfare, a cleaned IMICO site. Thus, failure to exercise political autonomy or right of participation stifles the realization of ecological and welfare rights. ''' Ibid, pp. 262-265.
Strategic action is employed when a party induces the cooperation of others in negotiations by threats and promises, See Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Noms: Contributions to the Discourse Theorv of Law and Democracy. Translated by William Rehg. (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1 996). p. xvii
cannot 'radicalize' discourse. The Boarci's strategic power prevented raüonal d içcour~e.~
Exercise of strategic action M e s democratic will formation. making the IMlCO hearing,
undemocratic.
The system opted for legal discourse to resolve the IMlCO situation because this
discourse makes systemic domination unrecognized and easy. It defused the political
tension of the IMlCO pollution by redefining the matter bureaucratically. Mandate limitation.
diiclosure, agenda manipulation, eliminated of themes ensured the systerns close monitoring
of discourse.
The hearing was done 'behind citizens' backstt and ço lack legitimacy. We cannot
reduce the problem of legitimacy (social relevance and acceptability) to inefficient regulatory
outputs or policies. Rather, the legitimacy problem stems frorn 'disturbances in the
democratic origins of 1aw.- The rnanner in which we make law detemines its legitimacy.
Law does not rnerely mediate conflict between social actors but also steers 'a difficult
path between negaüvely discriminatory approach. which ignores the way factual inequalities
limit the freedom of indviduals and patemalism which overlooks the limits of freedom resulting
from state action undertaken to compensate for these m e inequalitiesa It can be a tool
of domination.
In this study, the law has an intemal connection to communicative presuppositions and
procedural conditions of legislative process. The legiümacy of law is based on quality of
discursive democracy.
293 Ibid, p. 107. 294 See William Outhwaite, Habermas: A Critical Introduction. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 199). p. 148. "' Habermas cited by William Outhwaite, Habermas: Critical Introduction. (Stanford, California: Stanford Universrty Press, 1 994), p. 151.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
Market and legal rationalines for environmental protection function as systemic tools that
deform discourses. Their language media render environmentai issues difficult to understand
and so fragment environmental wnsciousness. These technical rationalines perpetuate
idedogical domination oirough systernic deformation of discourse. They serve to mver the
injustice of corporate pollution and so hinder potential for environmental protesis.
Poliocal decisions that reflect the exisüng organizational principle of Society ipso facto do not admit of rational consensus. They could not be justifieci in a general and unrestricted discussion of what, in the light of present and possible circumstances, is in the best interest of al1 affected by them . . . Rie problem, in short, is how to distribute socialiy produced wealth inequitably and yet legitimately?
Syçtem-sponsored market and legal discourses, such as state environmental tribunais
and cost benefit environmental suiveys operate to resolve this dilemma: To legiümate the
inquitable distribution of ecological resources. Occurrence of crisis or social instabilii
depends on the extent that these systemic dismurses c m resohre this dilemma: the unfair
(disproportionate) distribution (m isuse or abuse) of ecolog ical reçources by fimis. A
distribution question has now become a question of 'grammat or tdk, by which the state
prepares the matter for administrative treatrnent
'Administrative p rocessing ' of cycl id economic crises Pi ke environmental pdlution]
produces a 'bundle of crises tendencies,' that, from a genetic point of view, represent a
hierarchy of crises phenornena that are shifted upward from below (the ewnomic base).'
This displacement causes a tendency toward a legitimation crisis." To prevent citizens
reading social injustice into the pollution problem, the state allows only alienated fom of talk.
Thus, the administrative handling of pollution defuses the potential for crisis.
Crisis tendencies are not immediately located in the economic sphere but in the sociocultural sphere; they do not direcüy concem the reproduction of the material conditions of life but the reproduction of reliable structui-es of intersubjectnhty . . . Pressures for legiümation would be rernoved by "uncoupling" the sociaiization proces from noms that require justifcation.
296 See Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theorv of Juraen Habermas, (New York: Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1984), p. 358. 297 See Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theorv of Jur~en Habermas. (New York: MIT Press, 1984)~. 359.
Legitimation cnsis offers an insightful anaiysis of contemporary of its endemic problems and prospective fate?
An economic problem takes the complexion of a dernocratic problem. In the end. averüng a
crisis depends on the extent the system can manipulate proceses of democmtic will and
opinion formation.
'The structure and status of the crisis argument have now changed' because the
contrdiction in advancd capitôlisrn has 'changed itç fom'. Contradiction 'ruw appears as
the depoliticization of the masses coinciding with the progressive politickation (in the sense of
party political and pariiamentary incorporation) of çociety ilself.- Society 'increasingiy
funcüonalizes its ciüzens for various purpoçes, but privatizes them in their ~ n ~ o u s n e s s . ~ ~
The system used ciozens to deliberate on its predecided policy decision (Order or
suwey questionnaires). As discussions show, the system uses a set of strategies to achieve
this transformation. First, the state makes a decision or takes a position (as in a survey
questionnaire or the Clean up Order). Second, it tries to gain m a s loyalty for its position by
engaging citizens to talk on its onesided positions or decisions. These decisions, however,
merely reflect existing relations of domination. Third, to ease the burden on communication,
the state redefines the matter. For instance, ecdogicai resources bewme comrnodities or
responsibility for pollution is based on ownership rather than people's polluting behavior or
acovity. This systemic redefinioon violently abstracts pollution problem 'so that it can be deah
with admini~tratively.~'
However, the administrative bodies conducting these discourses are not the problem.
The Yyranny of societal powerç,' at whose behest experts act, is the real problem, rather than the 'self-prog ramming bu reaucracy.' 31-12 Systern-sponsor& discourses prevent
communicative rationalizaüon of &te actions - the critical examination of problematic validity
daims. Thus, one can no longer say that a crisis %II" ocwr but that it "could" occur: The
possibility of crisis occurrence depends on how 'well' the subsystem cm use its administrative
apparatus to deform discourse to protect the status quo.
'" See Jurgen Habermas, Leaitirnation Crisis, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), pp. 359-60 299 See William Outhwaite, Habermas: A Critical Introduction, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1994) p. 6. ' O 0 Ibid. p. 7. 301 Jurgen Habermas, Theorv of Communicative Action. Vol II Lifeworld and Svstem: A Criticiue of'Functionalist Reason. Trans. Thomas McCarthy. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987), p., 362-3. 302 See Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Noms: Contributions to the Discourse Theorv of Law and DemocracvCV Translated by William Rehg. (Massachusetts: MiT press, 1996), p. 275.
In short, the legal and market discourses function to defuse a uregulatory trilemma."
They serve to prevent possible social disorganization and aMI disobedience. These
discourses prevent citizens over stretching of the legd system. Also, they eradicate
situations that wîll undermine the normative foundations of the political system? These
discounes achieve norrnalcy by depoliticking Society. This is the criticai surnmary of
the discussions.
The study analyzed data on the legal proceeding and arguments (in Chapters four)
and markets based environmental policies (in Chapten three). These rationalioes perpetuate
ideological domination. Using the notion of universal pragmatics, the researcher
reconstnictç the implicit theoretical and practid daims of experts in these rationalities The
study messes the ideology of these rationalities b y a) criücally examining their daims in
t ans of tnith, morality and sincenty; and b) assesing the extent these rationalioes stifle the
ideal speech situation (unconstrained communicative setang). Technical rationalities for
environmental protection are ideologies.
In Chapter one, the researcher described the study as a normative inquiry organized
to reveal the ideology of technical environmental diswurses. Chapter two elaborates the
normative framework for the discussions. It establishes the &te of the debate and
elaborates communicative action theory as an appropriate tool for normative analysis.
Chapter three is a critical discussion of market rationalîty for environmental protection.
In Chapter four, the study illustrates how power (the legal discourse) defomed the structure
and flow of environmental dismurse. Market and power media serve to maintain relations of
domination rather than protect the ecosystem or people.
Chapter fve is a critical summary of systemic mechanisms that constrain
environmental discourse. The study summarizes its findings. From these findings, it
suggests ways to reduce systemic deformations of environmental protection discourse.
These suggestions are intended as ways to overcome the deformation of envÏronmental
discourse. As a cntical inquiry, the study has revealed the forces causing this paradoxical (or
pathological) situation and how to overcome it?
3 O3 See William Outhwaite, Habermas: A Critical Introduction. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. t 47. 1°' See John S. Dryzek, "Critical Theory as Research Program," in Stephen White (Ed.) The Cambridcle Cornpanion to Habermas, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 99.
5.2) Findings: Technical (Market and Legal) Rationaliües for Environmental Protection:
lack truth-validii lead to excessive patemalism; serve to protect systemic interest;
ignore heaith and welfare; lack democmtic legiamacy; and impade moral
environmental Development. These technical rationaiities recreate the simple reality of
environmental problems as a technical matter. 'Technical reason' eliminates possibilities for
comprehensive reason (focusing on truth, morality and sincerïty) in d i~course.~~ This
dimination resuits from the transformation of a simple environmental reality to a technical one.
Technical discourse, therefore, serves ideological functions that perpetuate unrecognized
domination.
Today domination perpetuates and extends itçelf not only through technology but as technology, and the latter provide the great legiomization of the expanding political power, which absorbs ail spheres of culture. In the universe, technobgy provides the great rationafikation of the unfreedom of man and dernonstrates the technical imposçibility of being autonornous . . . Technology rationality, thus, protects rather than cancels the legitimacy of domination and the instrumentalist horizon of reason opens on a rationally totalitarian so~ ie ty . '~~
Citizens do not oppose the outcorne of the legal deliberations, the abandoning of a polluted
site. Likewise, they mnnot question the state's trading of environmental reçources. These
states of affairs emerge because the structure and conduct of these technical discourses
fragment consciousness. Even when their objective experience may show that expert
remedies are inadequate, the fact they are expert remedies will make citizens acceptable to
ciüzens. The technocratie consciousness spread by technical discourses makes synthesis of
environmental issues difficult. It eliminates the need for emancipation from dogmas because
it is difficult to detect manipulation.
1) Market Rationa/ity Substitutes Consistency for MoMy. Demand and supply coordination of
environmental protection is an imposition of economic rationality. It involves elevating the
private interest of economic efficiency to the status of a generalized and universafized nom.
Once transfoned into a shared interest, experts can Vien pit economic efficiency or profit
maxirnization against oie shared interest of eailogical integrity. Environmental discourse
305 Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theorv of Juraen Habermas. (New York: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1984), p. 22- 306 See Herbaert Marcuse "From Negative to Positive Thinking: Technological Rationality and the Logic of Dominationn in One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideotow of Advanced Industrial Society. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964). pp. 158-9.
becornes a matter of moral re lat iv i~m.~~~ By equating economic efficiency to ecological
integrity, they open environmental disawrse to 'relaüvist' and 'subjeCfMst' viewpoints. To put
economic efficiency and ecological welfare at par is to imply that the former is also an
imperative for This over generaiization of the utilitarian ethic is problematic.
An ethic developed dong imperatives Iines . . . leave room for the posçibiti of moral argument . . . and permits onîy deductive arguments . . . (that) neither produces new information nor contribute anylhing to the truth-values of its components. Moral argumentation is limited to two tasks: analytically testing the consistency of value premises and ernpiricaliy testing the reliability of goals selected f rom value perspectives.308
Imposition of economic efficiency as goal value of environmental protection eliminates the
need for grounding or justification. it also implies falsely that citizens have wnsented to the
economic arrangement of environmental protection.
However, any consent that ariçes from systemically distorted communications such as
cost benefit surveys is not genuine. Deformed discourses serve to conceal as well as
legitimate the very inhibitions that make a rational consensus impossible. Experts seem to
have claimed legitimacy for economic efficiency on the basis of its consistency with the
dominant economic culture. In these surveys, communicative rationalization of economic
efficiency is impossible. Testing the valiciity of market goal value should be in the question:
Can everyone discursivefy agree that market goal value should infomi environmental policy?
lt should not be in the question: Are environmental policies consistent with the cultural
dominant practice of the market? Thus, the justification of market-based policies for
environmental protection is onfy possible through communicative rationalization.
ii) Market-RationaMy in Environmental Protection Reinforces the Fusion of State and Market
Interestsr It renders the Public Sphere Vulnerable. Communicative Action Theory holds that
'an economy organized in the fom of markets is functionaliy intermeshed with a state that has
307 See Kristin Shrader Frachette, "Reductionist Approaches to Risk," in Deborah Mayo and Rachelle D. Hollander (Eds.) Acceotable Evidence: Science and Values in Risk Management, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 238. To equate the life-support functions of the ecosystem with the private interest of profit is a moral hazard. This act trivializes ecosystern's functions and promotes apathy over pollution. 'O8 See Jurgen Habermas. Leaitmation Crisis. (Boston: Beacon Press. 1975). p. 106.
monopdy on powecoa4 The state no longer mereb 'sewres general conditions of production'
but 'is now activeiy engaged in fi."' State and econorny inter- have cwlesced.
Pollution taxes and pennits put the fusion of state and economy at a higher level.
Pollution taxes provide revenues for the state that can boost itç adrninistraüve rationality.
These revenues enable the state to provide social amenities and prograrns that, in tum, boost
m a s loylty to it? As a means to manufacture mass loyalty, pollution taxation is likely to
remain a favored state instrument for environmental protection.
Wowever, this market transaction creates a new societal structure.
A state based on taxation is just as conçtihrtive for the new mode of production as the emergence of the capitalist enterprise. Money has structure-forming effects only when it becomes an intersysfemic medium of interchange . . . Complementary environment. take shape as . . . the state apparatus is connecteci up with production via the yield from taxes . . . the state apparatus become dependent upon the media-steered subsystem of the economy; this forces it to recognize and leads. among other things, to an assimilation of power to the structure of a steenng medium: power becornes assimilated to rn~ney?~
As the state becomes increasingly dependent on pollution taxes, power becomes placed ever
more in the service of money or market forces. Pradca,i consideration of pollution becomes
secondary as the fate of communities and ecoçystems become sealed by pollution tax and
permit policies. The state's dependency on corporate taxes may even lead to environmental
de regulation.
An environmentally deregulated economy becornes the logical result of a society
dependent on pollution tax revenue. This reinforced relationship between state and economy
ma@ communities wlnerable. This dependent state will view any atternpt to radicalize
environmental discourse as an affront to its survn/al.
On the contrary, imperatives of state suMval didate economic rationari for
environmental protection. These citizens cannot rely on these dismurses to protect their
welfare and ecological rights. Their increased wlnerability. means they must strive for
309 See Jurgen Habermas, "Normative Content of Modemity" in Philoso~hical Discourse of ModerniWTwetve Lectures. Translated by Frederick Laurence. ( Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1992), p. 349. 310 ' m. Cit., Leaitirnation Crisis, 1975, p. 36. '" See John S. Dryzek, Discursive Democraw, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 78. 3 12 See Jurgen Habermas, Theorv of Communicative Action. Vol. II. Liieworld and Svstem: A Critique of Functionalist Reason. Trans. Thomas McCarthy. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987), p. 171.
political discourse, democratic participation and the exercise of their rational argumentation to
pursue ecological integrity.
ifi) Smclural Violence Leach to Phpical Violence. Market and legal environmental discourses
prevent individuais from entering communication or using communication media to organize
themsehres. They impede the development of the public sphere. Restrictions on
communicative freedorn leads to structural violence: 'distortions . . . in the fomal condiions
of communicative action in such a way that the interaction of the objective, social and
subjective worklç gets prejudged for participants in a typical fa~hion.'~'~ Such inhibitions
discourage m e n s from participating in systemic discourses to defend their interest. In
effect, they inconspicuously force ciüzens to cede their right of legitimate law making (the
exercise of their political autonomy) to experts.
As the outcorne of IMlCO Hearings and the practice of pollution taxes and penits
show, experts do not aIways defend public interest. An interest in domination drive technical
rationalities for environmental protection rather than an interest in mutual understanding.
These raüonalities protect systemic interests rather than communrty heaith. By silencing
those affected, legal and market rationalities for environmental protection promotes the
decriminalkation of pollution and e~danger Iives. Thus, structural violence, in the end,
muses physiml violence. Only through collective secunty by way of rational discursive
guarantees can communities protect the ecosystem.
D) Excessive Patemalsm impedes the Purnuit of Shared Interest. It Subsfitutes Objecis for
Subjects. Deliberative politics requires a division of labor between state parliamentary
procedure and a community's scope for discursive will and opinion The funcüon
of the strong public (decision-making system) is to Klter' reasons and make decisions. On
the other hand, the 'weak public' or the infonnally organized public sphere should identify and
interpret social problems to reflect preferences that are cornplex, informed and future-oriented.
To achieve deliberative polics, these two publics must work to transform citizens' will into
decisions.
However, by posing as patron of cummunity, the Ministry and the Board offset this
necessary democratic requirement In this self-assumed patron position, the Board stifled the
3 U See Jurgen Habermas, The Theow of Communicative Action. vol. II (Boston: Beacon Press, 1 987) p. 187. 3 1 4 See Kenneth Baynes, "Democracy and the Rehtsstaat: Habermas's FaMizitat und Geltung", in Stephen White (Ed.), The Cambn'dae Cornoanion to Habermas. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 995). p. 21 6.
public's capability to question the mnduct and accountabilii of systemic forces. Also, as
patron, the Miniçtiy was able to ward off questions about the justification for or validity of its
Order. Consequentîy, excessive patemaiism Mies communicative rationalkation and inhibits
the pursuit of ecological interest.
E) Legaliiy is not Legilrnacy: it Can Substitufe a Means for An Cnd. Despite the application
of 'correct' legai procedures for resolving the IMICO matter, the outcorne was the
abandonment of the site. The deliberations (a means) failed to protect the welfare (end) of
the community. A legal decision that merely foaises on procedures and disregards the social
relevance of the decision's outcome has quesüonable legiomacy. Such a decision embodies
a tension between facticity and validity, that is, mat the decision clairns to do and what 1
actuaily does.
The fundamental misconception of decisionistic legal theory - which is itseif subject to the suspicion of ideology - is that the validity of legal noms could be grounded on decisions and only decisions. But the naive validii daims of noms of action refer (in each case) at least implicitly to the possibility of discursive foundation. This unconstrained normative validity is baseci on the supposition that the nom could, if necessary, be justifieci and defended against critique315
This shidy cannot find justification for the legal decision whose outcorne was the virtual
abandoning of the polluted site. The hearing's outcome was an abandonment of the polluted
site and so it rnerely camed out the putposes of the systern, to defuse the protest. The
procedure, the decision and the ou tme lacked 'practical consideration' for the community's
welfare? It lacked rational discursive foundation. Thus, the validii of a situation is
problematic because they hindered ideal speech situations.
To be legitimate, the law must reflect the interests of al1 legal consodates in a
discursive law making process. People should have the scope to express their interests3"
A legitimate law or legal decision must be sodaliy relevant. "ûniy democratic procedures of
political will-formation can, in principle, generate legitimacy under conditions of a rationalized
lifewodd with highly ind~duated members, with noms that have become abstract, positive,
3 15 See Jurgen Habermas, Leaitirnation Crisis (Boston: Beacon Press, 1 W5), p. 101 3 16 See Jurgen Habermas, Towards a Rational Societv ( Boston: Beacon Press, 1974), p. 51 57. 3 17 Kenneth Baynes, "Democracy and the Rehtsstaat: Habermas's FaMizitat und Geltung", in Stephen White (Ed,), The Cambridoe Cornpanion to Haberrnas.(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 995), p. 208.
and in need of To consider correct kgal procedure as legitirnacy shnnks
legitirnacy to legaiity, making 'arbiiriness an The legai discourse could have
therefore, been legai but it was not legitimate.
What seems to satidy the community was that the state responded to their protests,
Abe, trough procedures of alienated communications. For the systern, the legai deliberations
were relevant because they saved it possible em banassrnent and possible intra-systemic
conflict. The state could have been forced to reexamine its relationship with the economy.
For the communQ, the end or desire, was cleaning the pollution. They did not realize this aim
foaised on procedures rather than the end or outcome.
9 Technical Rationalities lmpede Demucracy and Moral Environmental Developmenf lt
Subsfitutes Effaèncy for the Stiared Interest. These rationalities deform public consdousness
by impeding the freedom of citizens to defend or pursue their interest? The exercise of
communicative competence, intersubjective processes of reason-given and reçponse
promotes procedural democracy and moral consci~usness.~' To the extent that normative
validii daims can be confirmeci in rational communication, we establish principles of
democratic will-formation in the modem state? Since market and legal rationalities impede
possibilities for communication they are undemocratic. Exercise of communicative
competence places a person under the imperaüves of consciously processing social conflicts.
They gain insight in this democratic exercise as they awaken their consciousness through the
capacity to question the validii of implicit claims.
Political wnflicts such as the IMlCO saga, present unique opportunities for the
development of moral environmental consciousness. lnherent in environmental conflicts is
the moral question: Is it right or morally correct to accept an economic development that
violates people's right to health and their ewsystem's integrity? To answer negatively is to be
moraliy good. To ignore the pollution nsk of economic development is to be immoral. This is
'le See Jurgen Habermas, The Theow of Communicative Action. vol- ll (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987) p. 344. l 9 See Jurgen Habermas, Leaitirnation Crisis. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), p. 30. 320 See Tracy B. Strong and Frank Andreas Sposito, "Habermas's Signifiant mer" in Stephen White (Ed.) The Cambridue Cornoanion to Habermas. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, t 995), p. 163. 321 See Mark Warren, "The Self in Discursive Democracy" in Stephen White (Ed.) The Carnbn'd~e Cornpanion to Habermas. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 171 - 2. ' Op. Cit., Jurgen Habermas, 1987, p. 96.
why pditics (social relations under conflid and the attempts to resdve them) has the unusual
quality of making demands on the moral cornpetencies of ind~duak?
Someone who has acquired the interactive cornpetence of a certain level will forrn a moral consciousness of the same level to the extent that his motivationai structure (social and communicative setting) does not hinder hirn from holding on to structures of evecyday action under stress.
Ïhus, a horaliy good person holds the interactive cornpetence acquired for wnflict-poor
situations even under stress . . . instead of avoiding them ~ n s c i o u s l y . ~ ~ A moral person is
one that is socially responsible.
IMlCO legal discourse frustrated citkens because it impeded their communicative
freedom. This frustration caused them to relinquish their moral responsibility to than m e for
participation in the talks. Public fatalism is a neglect of social responsibility, and an
opportunity to develop moral environmental ~on~ousness. Moral environmental
consciousness that results frorn seif reflection (awakened consciousnesç) is gained from
discursive argumentation and rationalization of action. Resulong analytic insights, then,
induce a person to adopt responsible environmental attitudes.
Critical consciousness occurs only throug h linguisticaily produced intersubject~ty.~~~
It is an indication of the stability of general interactive ~ompetence.~ To hold on to one's
social or environmental responsibility means to strive for the right of participation and
communication in environmental discourse. Thus, stifling citizens' communicative
wmpetence, as in technical discourses, hinder the potential for moral environmental
development.
Technical (legal and market) rationalities in environmental protection: la& truth-validi
adapts society to the funcüonal imperatives of economy and state; impedes environmental
consciousness; endanger hurnan and ecological health; transfomi structural violence to
physical hazanls; treat people as objects by denying them the use of their communicative
competence; lack dernocratic legitimacy and suppress the pursuit of ecological integrity.
These anomalies wnstitute social pathologies that stifle the critical reflection of citizens,
fragments their environmental consciousness while protecting systemic interest
323 Mark Wanen, m e Seîf in Discursive Dernocracy" in Stephen White (Ed.) The Cambridm Com~anion to Habermas. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 177 324 See Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theorv of Juraen Habermas, (New York: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1984), p. 353. ' See Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theorv of Jurqen Habermas, (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1984), p. 80 & 354. 326 Ibid, 1984, p. 352 - 3.
A society that has substituted means for ends, consistency for tmth, technique for vittue, efficiency for the human good, quanüty for quality, and object for subject . . . is literally design for no other purpose but suMval on any terms. . . in which adaptation becornes an end in itsetf."
Systemicall y induced communicative defornations serve to adapt society and environmental
protection to the functional imperatives of state and economy. Legitjmmng a system that
distributes socially produced wealoi inequitably is the real agenda of these dis course^.^^^ Thus, the systern constairts discotirse to maintain the status quo.
At this juncture, the study can now respond to the guiding question of the research:
How woukl individuais coliectiveiy interpret their needs (of environmental p rotedon), which
noms would they consider justifiable if they wuld and had decided noms in a rational
communicative setting- The discussions and findings suggest a clear answer. If m e n s
had the opportunrty to discursiveiy fom their opinion and will without coercion, in the IMlCO
hearings or in cost benefit environmental suweys, they would pursue the ecological integnty.
5-2A The Emancipatory lnterests of the Study. By impeding discursive possibilities,
technical rationality stifles evolutionary leaming processes that result from communicative
cornpetence." Technical market and legal rationaliies impose certain value systems such
as legal noms and economic efkiency on citizens. These systemic rationahes inhibit
citizens' ab i l i to interpret their environmental ne& and reality.
Systemic belief systems (legal noms and economic efficiency), nevertheles, provide
legitimacy for state environmental policies. Such belief systems become dogmas or
ideologies. To emancipate oneseff from ideological perceptions of environmental protection,
one must transcend the diçtorted communications that create these beliefs systems. We must
subject these defonned discourses to rationalization or critical examination. Tfoday the main
problem of hnguage has replaceci the problem of consciousness; the transcendental critique
of language supersedes that of consdousness."' The critique of ideology requires that
327 See Murray Bookchin, Towards An Ecoloqical Societv. (Montreal: Black Rose Press, l98O), p. 279 - 85. 328 See Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theorv of Juraen Habermas, ( New York: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1984), p. 358. 329 See Jurgen Haberma, Leqitimation Crisis. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), p. 113. 330 See Jurgen Habermas, Theorv of Communicative Action. Vol. II. Lifeworld and Svstem: A Critique of Functionalist Reason. Trans. Thomas McCarthy. (Boston: Beacon Press, l987), p. 314. By exercising the ability to give reasons and question value judgrnents, people can leam more, become conscious and concem about their social problems. 331 See Thomas McCarthy, The Cntical Theorv of Jurqen Habermas. (New York: Basil Blackwell lnc., 1984), p. 273.
&kens engage in critical refledion and cnticism. It is through cnticai reflection that one can
unmask ideological relations of domination.
This [Emancipatory] interest aims at reflection on oneself . . . Self reflection brings to consciousness those determinantç of a self formative process of cuiüvation and spiritual formation which ideologicaliy detemines a contemporary praxis of action and conception of the wodd . . . Setf reflection leads to insight due to the facî that what has previously been unwnçcious is made conscious in a manner rich in wnsequences: analyüc insights intervene in iiie?
A citizen that participates in structurally defonned discounes 'cm only comprehend itseif as a
product of things [existing relations of domination] around itQp This social pathology
assumes the fom of deformations in communication. lnterest in aitering this situation is
simultaneously an interest in enlightenmentap< Ciizens are on the road to enlightenment as
soon as they can form their opinion autonomously and can reject preconceived ideas.
They gain consciousness as soon as they realize that their pre discourse opinions are
objects 'molded in wnnection with a staged display of, the manipulative propaganda of aml
publicity in the seMce of the system? Such an understanding enables them to conectly
situate themselves in this antagonisrn of system and lifeworld. Dogmas, deception and self-
deception become clear. 'Since critical reflection undemines the dogmatic character of both
a wodd view and a fonn of He, cognitive proceçç coincides with a self-formative process:
knowing and acting are fused into a single act.'= Awareness of the ideological manipulation
of communication leads ta an insight that translates into the need for discursive freedom.
The theory serves primanly to enlighten its addresses about the position which they occupy in an antagonisüc s d a l system, and about the interests of which they become conscious as objectively their own in the situation. Oniy to the extent that the organized enlightenment and counsel lead to the target group recognizing itseif in the proffered interpretations does the anaiyticd proposeci interpretation become actual consciousness, and the objectively altributeci interest situation the interest situation of a group capable of action?
'j2 See Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theorv of Jurqen Habermas. (New York: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1984). p. 89. 333 Ibid, p.89. Dogmatism is present whenever we are unaware of our autonomy and when we believe in things for their own sake or because they are supported by objects. 334 Ibid, p 89. 335 See William Outhwaite, Habermas: A Critical Introduction. (Califomia: Stanford University press, 1994), p. 7. 336 Habermas cited in Thomas Mccarthy, The Critical Theorv of Juqen Habermas. (New York: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1984). pp. 89-90. 337 See Habermas cited in David Held, Introduction to Critical Theorv. (Berkeley: U. of California Press), pp. 347-8.
The explanation of technical environmental rationality awakens environmental consciousness.
Even though they show no manifest wnflict (or are not opposeci), technical environmental
discourses embody antagonism: They impede discoutse while pretending to allow it.
State-sponsored discourses merely perpetuate unrecognized relations of domination that
exists in the brader society where systemic forces discourage discursive opinion and will
formation. If addressees or audiences of the study can recognize their position in this
explanation, then they will be enlightened. In short, this study is a theoretically grounded
advocacy for rationai environmental discourses.
This aforernentioned critical sumrnary is a set of criücal theorems or claims generated
from the discussions. These theorems can stand up to scientific discourse. Applying these
theorems to environmental protection discourses provides a way to test them. B a d on these
claims, the researcher makes few suggestions for improving environmental protection
discourses.
5.2, B Suggestions to Emancipate the Public in Consciousness Defoming Discourses. To be
critical, a theory must create self reflection in its audience. It must give a true account of
their problems and point to ways for adequate relief? Considering its emancipatory
interest, the study awakens understanding of technical environmental rationalities. The
study explores systemic forces causing this paradoxical situation: public fatalism amidst
pollution, continuity of ineffective environmental policy actions, and public participation
without meaningful change. Finally, this study will show how cornmunities can overcome
these forces.
Since deformations in environmental consciousness stems from communicative
deformations, it is logical that one should seek remedies in the domain of
comrnuni~ation.~~ Accordingly, the study suggests few ways to improve environmental
discourse to reduce unrecognized systemic domination in environmental protection.
The suggestions include institutionalizing practical discourse for environmental
protection; creating environmental dismurses with a balance perspective (public and expert)
where every opinion is taken seriousk the need to undertake a periodic discursive analysis of
338 See John Dryzek, "Critical Theory as Research Program," in Stephen white (Ed.) Cambridae Com~anion to Habermas. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995)). p. 99. 339 Democracy is not a fix type of organization but concrete circumstances and institutional arrangements that assure that political decisions are based on the agreement of al1 affected by them. See Jurgen Habermas, The Critical Theorv of Juraen Habermas. (New York: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1984), p. 332.
outcornes of environmental policies and deciçions; the creation of dernocraticaliy constjtuted
mediation processes that can consider questions of noms, rights. shared inter- and can
apply communicative ethics; and the need to adopt decentralized deliberative frameworks.
L) Joint Perspectives in Environmental Research for Effective Findings.
Communities should work with researchers in selecting method, identifying questions and
analyzing data? As the discussion show, technically conducted allow only certain kinds
of questions. Cornmunities cannot leave their interests to experts since public interest is
not always similar to the interests of experts. Only a collective search for tmth can
expose the limits of expert rationality."' Societies should exercise collective
responsibility in resolving social problems to assure their continual s u r ~ i v a l . ~ In the
case of disagreements over ethical perspectives, the pursuit of the shared interest should
take preeminence. The policy research framework should be inforrned by practical or
normative concerns of local citizens.
ii) Periodic Review of Environmental Policy Prevent Long Tem Ecological
Disasters. Latent and chronic effects of pollution still delude experts because they manifest
slowly. This lack of information means environmental policy (particularly pollution policy)
is made under high degree of uncertainty and ignorance? The need to publicly assess
these policies exist? The public must periodically review and refine thern? Caution
should guide this review so that these policies are considered tentative, on a trial and
error run. Citizens rnust change them when they found them faulty and unacceptable.
Reviews should occur in the framework of ideal speech situations, where social
actors can express new concems, insights and experiences without fear or constraints.
A review is meaningful if the experiences of those at risk inform debates? Such a
340 See Jenny Cenrinsky, "Participatory Research: An Alternative Approachn in Comrnunitv Participation in Research, (Ottawa: International Deveiopment Research Center, 1 991 ), p. 35. 3 4 1 See Rachell D. Hollander, "Expert Ciaims and Social Decisions: Science, Politics, and Responsibility" in Deborah G. Mayo and Rachelle D. Hollander, (Eds.), Acce~table Evidence: Science and Values in Risk Manaaemenb (New York: Oxford University Press, 1 991 ), p. 168. 3 4 2 Ibid, Hollander, 1991, p. 162. 343 See David Collingridge Social Control of Technolocrv. (London: Open University Press, 1 980). 344 See Ronald N. Griere, "Knowledge, Values, and technological Decisions: A Decision Theoretic Approach," in Deborah G. Mayo and Rachelle D. Hollander (Eds.) Acceptable Evidence: Science and Values in Risk Manaclement. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991 ). p. 188. 345 See Kristin Shrader-Frachette, "Reductionist Approaches to Risk," in Acceptable Evidence: Science and Values in Risk Management, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 241. 346 See Kristin Shrader-Frachette, "Reductionist Approaches to Risk," in Acceptable Evidence: Science and Values in Risk Management, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991 ), p. 241.
review can then become effective means to correct problems of tentative environmental
policies.
Iii) lnstitutionalizing Democratic and Moral Principies fur Practimi Environmental
Discourse. Institutionalizing principles that enable social actors to pursue ecological
protection is necessary?' To make environmental discourse meaningful, citizens must
pressure the government to institutionalize principles of democracy and universalization.
Some see public policy such as environmental policy as a simple matter of balancing
competing values and i n t e r e ~ t s . ~ ~ ~ This is not right. All those affected should agree as
participants in rational discourse to make environmental policies valid? Any forum for
resohnng the matter should be democratically constituted. Those affected should be
proportionally represented in the forum. Only then can such a forum daim to embody the
Dernocracy pr in~ ip le .~~~ Institutionalizing these principles make participants capable
stewards for environrnental protection.
Institutionalizing these principles enable local citizens to inform and orient
discourses to rights or norms rather than values of economic interests. The control of
environrnental resources by the local poor often leads to successful environmental
protection Therefore, citizens should strive for the institutionalization of the
universalization and democracy principles to ensure rational environmental discourses.
IV) Fair Meâiation to Assure Relevant Policy Decisions. Mediation is a process of
settiing disputes through a mutually acceptable mechanism under the aegis of a third
party? A mediator identifies and even selects parties where they are not self selecting. As
seen in Boards Chainanship and in the design of suwey questionnaires, the exercise of
strategic power by experts can deform discourse. Thus, citizens should have a part in the
mediation of environmental discourses.
347 Here, institutionalization is not making 'certain substantive orientations binding,' but rather the opening of new structural discursive possibilities for rationalizing action. See Jurgen Habermas, Theorv of Communicative Action. Vol. II. Lifeworld and Svstem: A Critique of Functionalist Reason. Trans. Thomas McCarthy. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987). p. 314.
348 See James L. Creighton , The Use of Values: Public Participation in The Planning Process," in Gregory Daneke, Margot Garcia and Jerome Priscolli, (Ed's), Public Involvement and Social Impact Assessment. (Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), p. 152-1 57
349 Ibid, Kenneth Baynes. "Dernocracy and the Rehtsstaat: Habermas's F a m a t und Geltung", in Stephen White (Ed.), The Cambridqe Com~anion to Habermas. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 208. 350 See Kenneth Baynes,), p. 208. 351 See Michael Jacobs, Green Economv: Environment Sustainable Development and The Poliics of the Futu-, (London Pluto Press, 1991). p. 136. ' John S. Dryzek, Discursive Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) pp. 45 46,48 & 96.
According to the principle of Dernocracy, those at risk of the pollution should
participate in discourse. Since communities are directly affected by environmental
pollution, they should be part of a cornmittee of mediation. They are self-selecting but
chosen by the community to represent them. A democratic constitution those to be
involved in discourse must be based on proportional representation. The mediation
comm ittee will facilitate the representation process and moderates deliberaüons. This
prevents a group of people exercising strategic action. These rewmmendations can
irnprove environmental discourses, making them dernocratically legitimate.
In concluding, the study shows that environmental conflicts make clear the
contradiction between the capitalkt social formation and democracy: unpolitid class rule
versus discursive will formation. It is a problem less Iikeiy to go away since technology is
less likely to biorernediate pollution or reverse certain pollution impacts. Increasingly,
people are more likely to synthesize the facade of technical environmental discourses.
Thus, the state is likely to support defomed environmental discourse to deal with this
contradiction.
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