a critique on advaita vedanta

7/27/2019 A CRITIQUE ON ADVAITA VEDANTA

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A CRITIQUE ON ADVAITA

VEDANTA

Dr. M.PRABHAKARA RAO, Ph.D9C, BLUE BEACH ROAD

NEELANGARAICHENNAI 600 041


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A CRITIQUE ON ADVAITAVEDANTA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter Page

1. Introduction 3

2. A Critique on Brahman-Realization 9

3. A Critique on the Concept of Jiva 21

4. Brahman-World Illusion in Advaita Vedanta: A Critique 40

5. Eliot Deutsch on Levels of Being: A Critique 57

6. Inconsistencies in the Brahmasutra and Sankarabhasya: 71With Special Reference to the Competence of Sudra

7. Moral Imagination and Character 84Development in Ancient India

8. Concluding Remarks 108 9. Notes and References 114


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CHAPTER - I

Introduction

Advaita Vedanta has been explained in two major methods, namely,1) Drsti srsti vada and 2) Srsti drsti vada . We will not deal with the firstmethod in this research project. The second can be found in the Vedantasutras of Badarayana vyasa. Sankara, the great commentator on theVedanta sutras , opines that Vyasa has established in the Vedanta sutrasthat the unqualified non-dual Brahman alone is the ultimate reality. Theworld that appears is only illusion and the consciousness that isconditioned by ignorance, namely, jiva , who is responsible for the life in

the physical body, is none other than the unqualified non-dual Brahman.The author of the Vedanta sutras had to bring out the concepts, such as,Brahman, Isvara , kutastha , jiva , maya , avidya , caitanya , jada , srsti ,karma , etc., while explaining the srist drsti vada . Though the ways of explanations given by Vyasa and Sankara seem to be convincing, some of the basic elucidations of the fundamental concepts appear to bequestionable. We will make an attempt in this research project to exposesome of those concepts which seem to be disputable.

The whole analysis of srsti drsti vada seems to be standing on theconcepts of jada and consciousness. Sankara holds the view that all that isseen inclusive of our body is inert ( jada ) by its very nature. For him, the

Jada is exact opposite to the nature of consciousness. It is theconsciousness by which the inert body is able to act on the things ( visaya ).When the consciousness leaves the body then the body is declared dead.Again when the consciousness enters another body then it is acknowledgedas getting birth. While the consciousness enters the body at the time of birth or leaving the body at the time of death, the consciousness isconceived by Sankara as a bit of consciousness conditioned by individual

ignorance ( avidhya ). Such individual consciousness ( jiva ) is addressed aslocated in the space of the heart. Then Sankara explains the illusoriness of the inert body separately and declares that the inert body cannot bedetermined either as existing or non-existing.


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Vyasa and Sankara had to maintain the two categories, namely, theinert and the Consciousness, till the end of the inquiry and finallydenounce the inert world and body. The birth or creation of the inert bodyhas been explained in order to sustain the inertness of the world and body.When the inertness of the world is maintained then its creation,development and dependence needed to be organized. Since the pureConsciousness alone is accepted as the only reality, the Advaitins had toexplain how the inertness, which has opposite nature to the Consciousness,is created in the Consciousness. The creation of the inert in theConsciousness by itself sounds like creation of darkness within light byitself. Such contradictions in the explanation of srsti drsti vada are possiblebecause the entire analysis of srsti drsti vada mostly depends on the humanperceptual limitations. If man cannot perceive consciousness in anythingthen it is declared to be inert by the Advaitins. Non-perceptibility of

something should be addressed as unknowable but not as non-existence of the same. Like wise many concepts in the srsti drsti vada had to face manycomplications and ultimately left the inquirer ( jignasu ) in utter confusion,for the truth of the Appearance ( drsya ) is dismissed as different from thatof Consciousness. We will make an attempt in this research project toanalyse and examine some of the major concepts of Advaita Vedanta inorder to expose the disputable concepts.

This research project is organized in eight chapters. The first isIntroduction. The second chapter is: A critique on Brahman-realization.Considering that the Upanisadic statements relating to Brahman- Atmancan only be taken as hypotheses, an attempt is made in the second chapterto examine whether Brahman-Realization is possible or not. It is arguedthat the existence of Brahman lies in the possibility of experience of Brahman. As the Sruti text limits the possibility of Brahman-knowledgeonly Through Mind, an inquiry is directed to evaluate theEpistemological Analytic. Since the experience of Nityajnana(atman ) assuch without adjuncts is not possible in common human experience, it isshown that the revelation of atman is possible only in the form of

Antahkarana akhandakara vrttijnana . As advaitns argue for the falsity of the objects of all vrttis in three states of experience, it is argued that theobject of the antahkarana akhandakara vrtti, that is, atman is also false.The falsity of the atman is maintained through several arguments such as:The Metaphysical Analytic, The Experiential Analytic, and The Analysisof knower. Further, it is argued that Advaita Vedanta begins with a


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hypothesis and ends with the same unconfirmed. On the basis of thearguments, it is concluded that Brahman Realization is not possible.

The third chapter is: A Critique on the Concept of Jiva . In the thirdchapter, I have attempted to bring to light the inherent contradictions in theAdvaitic concept of jiva .

Sankaras concept of jiva is grounded on the following assumptions:

a) Jiva is a result of Isvaracaitanya s identifying Itself withthe antahkarana .

b) The reason for such identification is aviveka .

c) Isvaracaitanya directly presents Itself in the living being as jiva and hence jiva is anadi .

d) At the time of srsti, Brahman transformed Itself partly intothe world and also entered into the living being as jiva.

In this chapter I have argued against the above mentionedassumptions and thereby established the untenability of the advaiticconcept of jiva. In particular I have tried to establish that the antahkarana is by itself sufficient to explain the conscious nature of the living body.Thereby I have also indirectly disproved the so called essential identity of

jiva and Brahman. I have substantiated my arguments by the relevantscriptural texts.

The fourth chapter is: Brahman-World Illusion in Advaita Vedanta:A Critique . This chapter aims at evaluating the position of the Advaita onthe three levels of reality. It attempts to prove that world cannot be anillusion on non-duality and world of duality cannot be sublated by the

knowledge of Brahman. In the same place, it will be shown that non-dualexperience can be an illusion on duality of the world and the wakingexperience can sublate the non-dual experience.


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The evaluation is done in the following manner. It will be shownagainst Advaita, that world is not an illusion on Brahman from thefollowing arguments, namely, (i) there is no proper illustration to explainthe world as an illusion, and (ii) world cannot be sublated by non-dualexperience. Later, it will be argued that non-dual experience can be anillusion on dual world and the same can be sublated by the knowledge of waking experience. Further it will be shown that the cause of duhkha issubject illusions. Then, it will be established that an ontological sublationof the world by non-dual experience, which implies physical disappearanceof the world, is not required to attain moksa. Finally, it will be argued thatnone of the four varieties of experience stands for the paramarthika sattaand therefore, the ultimate reality cannot be determined in AdvaitaVedanta.

The fifth chapter is: Eliot Deutsch on Levels of Being: A Critique.An attempt is made in this chapter to show that the Advaita Realityadmitted by Eliot Deutsch cannot be the ultimate reality. In order toestablish the same, three arguments have been raised against the concept of three levels of being, advocated by Eliot Deutsch, namely, (1) Realitycannot subrate Appearance, (2) Appearance subrates non-dual mentalexperience, and (3) Unreality cannot be a level of reality.

An examination of the criteria of the ultimate reality is conducted inthe first argument. It is shown that the concept of subration cannot beapplied to Reality as long as one believes that Reality is a trans-mentalexperience. This point of view is also supported by the argument that if non-duality is a trans-mental reality then the same cannot becommunicated to the other states of experience due to lack of communicating instruments within non-duality. Further it is pointed outthat if non-duality is a trans-mental experience then the requirements of subration namely, (i) the subrating judgment, and (ii) the subrated

judgment cannot be formed while one is in the trans-mental non-dualexperience. All these arguments go to prove that Reality cannot subrate

Appearance.

Secondly, it is argued that the Reality explained by Eliot Deutsch,does not stand for the definition of the ultimate reality and the same issuitable for the definition of Unreality. Then the opinion of Eliot Deutschon the unsubratability of Reality has been dismissed. Later, it isestablished that application of the concept of subration is possible only to


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the memory of non-dual mental experience while one is in the state of Appearance. It is shown that the memory of non-dual mental experiencecannot subrate Appearance either while one is in non-duality or inAppearance. In the same place, it is argued that appearance can subrate thememory of non-duality while one is in the state of Appearance because of the possibility of the formation of the subrating and subrated judgments inthe Appearance. Also, it has been established that the concept of threelevels of being and the concept of subration in Advaita Vedanta cannotdetermine Reality as the ultimate reality.

Lastly, the significance of the classification of three levels of realityin Advaita Vedanta has been explained in order to show that unrealitycannot be a kind of reality and the same cannot be included in the conceptof three levels of reality.

The sixth chapter is: Inconsistencies in the Brahmasutra andSankara Bhasya : With Special Reference to the Competence of Sudra . Anattempt is made in this chapter to expose some inconsistencies in theformulation of Brahmasutras and Sankaras Commentary in relation withthe competence of Sudra to acquire Brahman knowledge through the Veda .

This chapter is organized in the following parts:

1. Introduction

2. Sankara's Opinion On Sudra's Competence

3. A critique on the criterion of the caste and Upanayana

4. A critique on the incompetence of born Sudra for knowledge throughthe Veda .

5. A Critique on the Authorship of Sutras and Bhasya on

Apasudradhikaranam

In the second part Sankaras arguments against the competence of Sudra are briefly analyzed. In the third part, Sankaras view on castedetermination, namely, caste is determined by birth is encountered.Referring to the Sruti texts, it is shown that the view adopted by Sankara isuntenable. It is established that caste is not determined by birth but only by


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ones qualities. It is revealed that a Sudra may be eligible for upanayana .The fourth part shows that all human beings along with Sudras and womenmay also be qualified for Brahmajnana through the study of the Vedanta .In the last part it is exposed that Vyasa and Sankara may not have authoredthe Apasudradhikaranam and bhasya on the same respectively.

The seventh chapter is: Moral Imagination and CharacterDevelopment in Ancient India. This chapter is divided into three parts: 1.Introduction, 2. Moral Imagination and 3. Character Development. Theconcepts of changeable and unchangeable morality are explained in theIntroduction. In the second part it is established that liberation is thehighest human goal and the practice of the unchangeable morality formsthe foundation for liberation. Definitions of good and bad actions are alsoexplained in the same place. In the third part the process of achieving thestable happiness has been elucidated. The influencing factors of both goodand bad actions are exposed. Later the methods of moral practice areclassified. In the method of moral practice for individuals, the practice of sila , truth speaking, non-violence, non-expectation of others property,non-stealing, non-adultery or complete restraint from sex with otherwomen and refraining from consuming liquor have been explained. Thepractical aspects of the same are also discussed here. In the method of moral practice for individuals getting educated, the traditional moralpractice, the targets and achievements in the four quarters of life are

explained. Finally the methods of moral practice for elderly or uneducatedindividuals and the same for individuals after retirement are also explained.

Finally in the last chapter, that is, Concluding Remarks, we havementioned about our views on the duality. Among the chapters mentionedabove the 2,3,4,5 and 6 th are published in the JICPR , India and the 7 th ispublished by RVP, the Catholic University of America, USA.


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CHAPTER - II

A Critique on Brahman-Realization

INTRODUCTION

The philosophical pursuit in ancient India can broadly becategorized as follows:

(i) Pursuit based on the belief in the existence of self ( atman ) or Reality;

(ii) Pursuit based on disbelief in the existence of self; and

(iii) Pursuit that disagrees with both belief and disbelief in the existence of self.

Almost all orthodox Indian philosophical systems and some of theheterodox systems share the view of the first category. However, eachsystem disagrees with the other in defining self ( atman ).1 Among thesesystems, some (for instance the Carvaka school) define the self as physicalmatter, some as vital breath ( prana ), some as mind ( manas ), some asbuddhi and some (for instance Advaita Vedanta) as Pure Consciousness.They also differ among themselves in the identification of the number of realities. For instance, Gotama in his Nyayasutras says that there aresixteen categories while Vyasa in his Brahmasutras maintains that there isonly one Reality called Brahman.

Sri Sankaracharya clearly defines Brahman as unqualified PureConsciousness- the one and only non-dual Reality without a second.According to him, Brahman can be experienced. He reiterates thatpersonal experience is the only valid means apart from verbal testimony

(sruti ) to realize the existence of Brahman. Hence an attempt is made inthis paper to examine whether Brahman-realization is possible throughpersonal experience or not.


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ARE STATEMENTS RELATING TO BRAHMAN- ATMAN HYPOTHESES?

Most of the Upanisad s begin with an inquiry into the Reality fromthe unknown Brahman to the known world, in order to establish the oneand only non-dual Reality called Brahman. It is also stated in theUpanisad s that Brahman- Atman can be experienced. 2 Brahman- Atman andstatements related to the same may be considered in three ways in AdvaitaVedanta. They are: (i) as logical propositions, (ii) as objects of faith and(iii) as hypotheses. If Brahman- Atman is a logical proposition, thenthe whole of Advaita Vedanta becomes a logical exercise to establishBrahman- Atman . Logical establishment of Brahman- Atman does not leadone to Brahman experience. Therefore, the logical method to establishBrahman- Atman is not discussed in this paper.

If Brahman- Atman is an object of faith and if it remains as an objectof faith then one cannot have Brahman-experience because one requireshaving faith only in such a thing which cannot be experienced. Thus, theonly method left to establish Brahman- Atman within the fold of humanexperience is to consider the statements related to Brahman- Atman ashypotheses. Sankara seems to accept Brahman- Atman , that is, non-dualityas hypothesis. 3 Vidyaranya also appears to hold the same view. 4 Thus,there is ground to consider Brahman- Atman and its related statements ashypotheses.

Brahman, Atman and the statement, namely, This atman isBrahman, are basically conceived as hypotheses in Advaita Vedanta.These hypotheses are based on three important premises, namely:

(i) There is Brahman 5 from which everything comes forth;

(ii) There is atman 6 by which everything is known; and

(iii) This atman is Brahman. 7

Some of the hypotheses as set out in the Vedanta texts may bepresented as follows: (i) In the beginning there was Brahman alone, oneonly, without a second. 8 (ii) All this is Brahman. 9 Based on suchhypotheses, Sankara opines that, from the Realization of Brahman follows


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the highest human objective (namely, liberation). Therefore, one shouldundertake a deliberation on Brahman. 10

It may be stated that any hypothesis gains credibility if sufficientevidence is produced in its favor. For instance, one may not believe in thestatement: There is a ghost in the room, even if it has been made by agenius or a pious person who hails from a great tradition until it isestablished with an experiential proof. Similarly, the hypothesis, There isBrahman from which everything comes forth, etc., needs to be establishedwith practical realization. Thus one should examine whether suchBrahman-Realization is possible or not.

The question Is Brahman-Realization possible? arises in thefollowing contexts:

(i) When one treats the statements related to Brahman as hypotheses;

(ii) When one questions the Sruti texts after a thorough investigationregarding the possibility of Brahman experience;

(iii) When one finds oneself in Anubhavagata sandehah regardingBrahman after overcoming Pramanagata sandehah, Prameyagatasandehah, and Viparitabhavana by attaining the eight-fold practices; 11 and

(iv) When one does not find experiential proof of Brahman.

In other words, if Brahman is to be Real, then one should experiencethe same.

THE STAND OF ADVAITA VEDANTA REGARDINGBRAHMAN-REALIZATION

Sankara holds that, since knowledge of Brahman culminates in

experience and it relates to an existing entity, the Vedic texts, personalexperience, etc., are taken as possible valid means for Brahman-knowledge. 12 He is also of the opinion that, the knowledge of Brahmanmust be determined by the thing (that is, Brahman) itself, since it isconcerned with an existing reality. 13 The Sruti text also states thatThrough mind alone the self is known 14 and not by any other means.Brahman-knowledge is possible only through mind and personal


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experience is accepted as valid means to it. Therefore, one must trace thepossibility of Brahman-Realization within the fold of EpistemologicalAnalytic. 15

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL ANALYTIC

According to Advaita Vedanta, human knowledge is broadly dividedinto two kinds, namely, Nityajnana and Vrttijnana. Nityajnana is atman. Itis Pure Consciousness. It is Bliss Infinite. It should be known throughmind alone. 16 Since Advaitins argue that Nityajnana is the basis for allvarieties of knowledge, it is the objective of the hypothesis. If the existenceof Nityajnana is proved through Vrttijnana , then it becomes Real;otherwise, it is only an unproved presupposition. In order to examinewhether realization of Nityajnana is possible through Vrttijnana, one must

analyse all kinds of Vrttijnana to find a suitable vrtti for the revelation of Nityajnana .

Analysis of Vrttijnana

Vrttijnana may be divided into two categories: (i) Avidya vrttijnanaand (ii) Antahkarana vrttijnana. Avidya vrttijnana is further subdividedinto (i) Avidya khandakara vrttijnana and (ii) Avidya akhandakaravrttijnana . Examples for Avidya khandakara vrttijnana are knowledge of illusory objects such as snake on a rope and dream objects. Example for

Avidya akhandakara vrttijnana is Bliss in Deep Sleep. 17 Since Avidyaakhandakara vrttijnana has some relevance in the forthcoming arguments,is may be necessary to discuss the same in detail at this stage. The Avidyaakhandakara vrtti is formed in Deep Sleep because of the absence of objects of knowledge (known generally in Waking and Dream). 18 The stateof Deep Sleep is called Anandamaya , that is, endowed with an abundanceof Bliss, because at the time of Deep Sleep, the mind is free from themiseries of efforts made on account of the states of mind being involved inthe relationship of subject and object. Advaitins believe that this is not

Bliss by itself because it is not Bliss Infinite. 19

Similarly, Antahkarana vrttijnana is of two types: (i) Antahkaranakhandakara vrttijnana and (ii) Antahkarana akhandakara vrttijnana .Further, Antahkarana khandakara vrttijnana may be subdivided into (i)

Antaranga antahkarana vrttijnana and (ii) Bahirgata antahkaranavrttijnana . Examples of Antaranga antahkarana vrttijnana are happiness,


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etc., and of Bahirgata antahkarana vrttijnana are table, chair, etc.Advaitins believe that atman as such cannot be revealed in all the saidvarieties of vrtti except in the Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti .20 Since thesubject matter of the present paper is confined to Brahman-Realization anexamination of the object of the Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti isattempted below.

According to the Advaitins, the object of the Antahkaranaakhandakara vrtti is atman itself and it is presupposed as the only Reality.They also believe that atman alone is real and the rest of the objects of anyother vrttis are unreal. For them, atman is Bliss Infinite. In order to find ananswer to the question Is Brahman-Realization possible? one should ask the Advaitins: How can one believe in only the reality of the object of the

Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti , while the other object of all vrttis are

rejected as false? This question leads one to inquire into the argumentsgiven by the Advaitins for the falsity of the objects of all other vrtt is. Oneneeds to verify whether the same arguments are applicable in the case of the object of the Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti . Since Advaitins believethat atman is Bliss Infinite, one should also find out the reasons for theblissful nature of Deep Sleep in order to examine whether the same reasonsare applicable in the case of the blissful nature of Antahkaranaakhandakara vrittijnana .

ADVAITINS ARGUMENTS FOR THE FALSITY OFOBJECTS OF WAKING AND DREAM

(a) Sankara holds that the objects in the states of Waking and Dreamare perceived. He argues that as the objects perceived to exist in Dreamare illusory, so also are the objects perceived in the Waking state. Since thecommon feature of the objects of both Waking and Dream experience isbeing perceived, they are said to be illusory. 21

(b) It is argued that the objects of both waking and Dreamexperience are illusory because they are associated with the subject-objectrelationship. 22

(c) It is said that all objects in Waking, as in Dream, are imagined. Itis pointed out that the internal mental vrttis , whether in Dream or inWaking, are thought to be unreal. Gaudapada in his Mandukyakarika


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reiterates the unreality of the objects of waking and Dream which the self merely imagines. 23

EXPERIENCE OF ATMAN IS FALSE

(a) If being seen is the common factor, based on which the objectsof Waking and Dream are proved to be illusory, then the question thatarises is: Is the object of the Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti seen or not?If the object of the Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti is seen, then the logicapplied for the falsity of objects of both Waking and Dream also applies tothe object of the Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti and consequently theatman becomes illusory. If the object of the Antahkarana akhandakaravrtti is not seen, then how can one determine that the object of the

Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti is atman ?

(b) One should realize that, since the object of the Antahkaranaakhandakara vrtti is seen, there exists a subject-object relationshipbetween the seer and the object of the Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti . If one argues that there is no subject-object relationship between the two,then the question arises: If the object of the Antahkarana akhandakara vrttiitself is the seer, then how can the seer see himself being separated in the

Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti by himself? In case it is argued that theseer is different from the object of the Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti ,then one cannot say that the object of the Antahkarana akhandakara vrttiis atman , which is supposed to be the basis of knowledge.

Since the subject-object relationship has to be accepted in the caseof Antahkarana akhandakara vrttijnana , the object of the Antahkaranaakhandakara vrttijnana , that is, atman , becomes illusory on the basis of the argument given by the Advaitins to falsify the objects of Waking andDream.

(c) It is said that all objects of mental vrttis are imagined and,

therefore, are illusory. Similarly, it can be argued that, since the Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti is also a mental vrtti, the object of the Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti must be imagined. Therefore, the objectof the Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti is said to be illusory. Thus, it can beascertained that the realization of the atman is not possible.


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BLISS IN DEEP SLEEP AND ANTAHKARANA AKHANDAKARAVRTTIJNANA

It is said that the akhandakara vrtti in Deep Sleep is formed byavidya whereas in the case of Antahkarana akhandakara vrttijnana , theakhandakara vrtti is formed by the antahkarana itself. The Bliss in DeepSleep is the result of the absence of objects and for the same reason Blisscan be experienced even in Antahkarana akhandakara vrttijnana . It has tobe reiterated that the Bliss in both cases is experienced by non-dualitycaused by the absence of the objects and not by the presence of the non-dual object. Therefore, confirmation of the experience of atman based onthe experience of Bliss can be ruled out. Thus the reality of atman stillremains a doubtful proposition. The idea that the object of the

Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti is false may be supported by the following

arguments.

THE METAPHYSICAL ANALYTIC

According to Advaita Vedanta, avidya has two innate powers: (i) theconcealing power and (ii) the projecting power. In other words, avidyanecessarily conceals reality at its causal level and when it comes to theeffect level, that is, antahkarana level, it not only conceals reality but alsoprojects falsity. That means the specific characteristic of the antahkarana is to project falsity after concealing reality. Now it can be argued that, if atman is revealed in the Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti , then atmanbecomes a false projection of the antahkarana , because the antahkarana necessarily conceals reality and projects unreality. In other words, theantahkarana always projects false objects, and since atman is revealed bythe Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti , it is said that atman also can be a falseprojection and, therefore, necessarily unreal. Advaita Vedanta does notoffer any reason to accept the reality of the only projection of theantahkarana , namely, atman in the Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti . Itmay be a case of the logic of convenience because when the Advaitins

found non-duality in Antahkarana akhandakara vrttijnana , they tried toaccount for the object of the Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti as atman , thatis, the objective of their proposed hypothesis. On the other hand, when thesame logic is put forth in a different way, it can be said that Deep Sleep isconditioned by cause alone - a state of non-apprehension ( agrahanam ) of reality; and Waking and Dream states are conditioned by both cause andeffect - states of misapprehension ( anyathagrahanam ).24 Deep Sleep is


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said to be the causal state - the state of avidya , in which one does not knowthe reality. When avidya gives rise to its effect called the antahkarana inWaking and Dream states, these states become the states of both non-apprehension and mis-apprehension. Now it can be argued that, if Wakingand Dream are called the states of both non-apprehension and mis-apprehension of reality because of the function of the antahkarana , thenfor the same reason the state of Antahkarana akhandakara vrttijnana alsocan equally be called the state of both non-apprehension and mis-apprehension of reality. Thus, the mis-apprehended object of the

Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti , that is, atman , becomes false.

THE EXPERIENTIAL ANALYTIC

The whole of human experience in Advaita Vedanta is divided intothree states, namely, (i) Waking, (ii) Dream, and (iii) Deep Sleep. Oneshould know the activity of the antahkarana in the three states of experience in order to evaluate the reality of the object of the Antahkaranaakhandakara vrtti . The activity of the antahkarana can be described asfollows: The antahkarana in Waking state functions externally through thesenses; it conceals turiya and projects all duality. When it retires fromWaking state and withdraws itself to the Dream state, it not only concealsturiya but also projects the duality of internal mental images. When itwithdraws from this activity of projecting duality, it merges into its cause,that is, avidya in Deep Sleep. There it withdraws all its dual projectionsbut yet it conceals turiya . Similarly, it can be argued that when oneintroverts ( antarmukhatva ) ones antahkarana , as its natural course theantahkarana withdraws its projection of duality. When one forces theantahkarana to surpass Deep Sleep to form the Antahkarana akhandakaravrtti , then it naturally projects non-duality due to the absence of objects.The only difference between the Deep Sleep state and the state of

Antahkarana akhandakara vrttijnana is that in Deep Sleep there is onlyconcealment of turiya whereas in the state of Antahkarana akhandakara

vrttijnana , there is not only concealment of turiya but also false projectionof non-duality.

The reasons for such non-dual projection in the state of Antahkaranaakhandakara vrttijnana are as follows: (i) It is natural for avidya to project akhandakara vrtti in Deep Sleep due to the absence of objects. Any statebeyond Deep Sleep cannot be of duality for the same reason, that is,


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absence of objects. (ii) Since the antahkarana does not have any object inthe introversion beyond Deep Sleep, it naturally projects non-duality, as itscause projects in Deep Sleep. The projection of non-duality in the

Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti should necessarily be a case of projectionof falsity because of the natural characteristics of the antahkarana toconceal reality and project falsity.

If this argument is not acceptable to an Advaitin, then he shouldsubmit the reasons for the failure of the antahkarana in projecting falsityonly in the case of Antahkarana akhandakara vrttijnana . Such reasons arenot found in Advaita Vedanata, because any reason that applies for thereality of the object of the antahkarana akhandakara vrtti also applies forthe reality of the objects of the other antahkarana vrttis . Consequently,any reason for the reality of the object of the Antahkarana akhandakara

vrtti makes the whole world real. If this argument is acceptable, then theobject revealed in the Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti , that is, atman ,becomes a fase projection as the antahkarana does in both Waking andDream states. Alternatively, if the atman is held to be a real objectrevealed by the antahkarana , then the objects in Waking and Dream stateswere also to be regarded as real as such.

ANALYSIS OF KNOWER

The knower of Waking, Dream and Antahkarana akhandakaravrttijnana is defined as follows:

(i) In the Waking state the knower is defined by Advaitins asConsciousness conditioned by the antahkarana .

(ii) In the Dream state the knower is Consciousness conditioned by theantahkarana .

(iii) In the state of the Antahkarana akhandakara vrttijnana the knower isConsciousness conditioned by the antahkarana .

The above definitions reveal that the knower is the same forWaking, Dream and Antahkarana akhandakara vrttijnana . Advaitins saythat in the three states, namely, Waking, Dream and Deep Sleep, the oneand the same object of experience appears in threefold form as the gross,


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the subtle and the blissful. 25It is so because experience of the three states isonly different forms of thoughts or ideas and hence unreal. Similarly, theobject of the Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti can also be called a meremanaspandanam and hence unreal. As Bliss in Deep Sleep is equated withan unreal mental vibration, the Bliss in Antahkarana akhandakaravrttijnana also can be equated with a mental vibration which is unreal.Since the objects of the knower of Dream and Waking are proved to befalse, the object of the Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti can also be declaredas unreal on the same grounds. Thus it may be argued that since theknower is the same for Waking, Dream and Antahkarana akhandakaravrttijnana , the object of the Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti is also false.

EXPERIENCE OF ATMAN IS NOT POSSIBLE THROUGH

JAHADAJAHALLAKSANA

Position of Advaita Vedanta

The Advaitins claim that one attains the revelation of atman throughthe Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti by contemplating on the great Vedicsentences such as, That thou art, etc. According to them when one usesthe method of ubhayalaksana to the words That and Thou in the greatVedic sentence, That thou art, one attains Antahkarana akhandakaravrttijnana . The antahkarana akhandakara vrtti can destroy onesignorance of Brahman-Atman.

Critique

The object of the Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti cannot be acceptedas real when one thoroughly inquires into the process of

jahadajahallaksana . When the vacyartha of the word tat which is in theform of avarana , that is Maya , the adjunct of Isvara and the vacyartha of the word tvam , which is in the form of viksepa , that is, the antahkarana ,

the adjunct of jiva , are destroyed, then there remains only PureConsciousness. The process of the application of jahadajahallaksana maybe symbolically presented as in the following flow chart. 26


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1. [C.A] = a 2. [C.M] = I~ A ~ M

_________ _________

C = a C = I_________ _________

a = I

C = Pure ConsciousnessA = avidya a = atman ~ = annihilation of

M = Maya

I = Isvara [.] = conditioned by

Now, one can raise the question, how, once all adjuncts areremoved, how can the Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti , which is a productof the adjunct, come into existence? In other words, since the adjunct of

jiva , that is, antahkarana is removed, how can the destroyed antahkaranaagain form the akhandakara vrtti ? Thus, it is meaningless to say that therearises the Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti after cessation of theantahkarana .

Another argument may be given by questioning the purpose of the Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti . One cannot say, as Advaitins do, that thepurpose of the Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti is destruction of ignorance,because ignorance is destroyed already by the annihilation of theantahkarana. According to Advaita Vedanta the destruction of ignoranceand Realization of Brahman take place simultaneously. Then how canagain the Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti , a product of ignorance, arise and

destroy the ignorance of Brahman? It is not reasonable to say thatignorance is destroyed - once by jahadajahallaksana , once by avarananirakarana and again by the Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti . Thus,Sankara clearly declares that the scriptures do not seek to establishBrahman as an entity referable objectively. 27 Even Ramakrsnadhvari, theauthor of the Sikhamani Vyakhya on the Vedanta Paribhasa of Dharmarajadhvari, is of the opinion that siddhanta cannot be established


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through the method of jahadajahallaksana .28 Therefore, the revelation of atman in the Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti is not possible through

jahadajahallaksana .

DECLARATION OF MADHUSUDANA SARASVATI

In support of the arguments against objectivity of atman in the Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti , Madhusudana Sarasvati , in the firstchapter of his Advaitasiddhi says that Brahman revealed in vrtti issopadikam and cannot be pure. 29He reiterates that pure atman cannot bethe object of vrtti. 30

BRAHMAN-REALIZATION IS NOT POSSIBLE

Scriptural statements such as where mind cannot comprehend,31

where speech returns with mind, 32 one will not return, 33 and Smrtistatements such as where one goes and never returns, 34 etc., reveal thatBrahman-Realization is possible only after destruction of ignorance. Inother words, Brahman-Realization is possible only when the antahkaranais destroyed. Therefore, it can be argued that Brahman cannot be revealedin the Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti . At the same time, it can also beargued that, since Brahman is realized after the annihilation of theantahkarana , its validity purely depends on the Sruti , that is, on theproposed hypothesis and not on personal experience. It can be said sobecause the verification of Brahman-Realization is not possible since theSruti text states that One will not return, etc., to explain the process of Brahman-Realization. Thus, it is clearly established that Advaita Vedantabegins with a hypothesis, and ends with the same unconfirmed.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

On the strength of the above arguments and analysis it is concluded

that Brahman-Realization is not possible.


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CHAPTER III

A Critique on the Concept of Jiva

1. INTRODUCTION

Based on their conceptions of jiva (individual self), 35 the Indianphilosophical systems can be categorized 36 as follows:

(i) The systems which believe in the existence of the individualself distinct from the body.

(ii) The system which believes that there is no individual self distinct from the body.

(iii) The system that believes in the non-existence of permanentand unchanging Individual self.

Almost all orthodox Indian philosophical systems share the view of the first category. However, each system disagrees with the other indefining the individual self. The systems of the first category can beclassified into two:

(a) The system that believes in the identity of the individual self with the Supreme Self.

(b) The systems which believe that the individual self is notidentical with the Supreme Self or God. 37

Advaita Vedanta holds the first of the above views and the rest of the orthodox systems share the view of the second category with somedifferences among themselves. The present paper confines itself to acriticism of the Advaita Vedanta view of the individual self. My criticism

ultimately aims to establish the thesis that neither Brhamacaitanya nor Isvaracaitanya can be the source of Jivacaitanya and that theantahakarana is itself sufficient to explain the conscious nature of theliving being.


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1.1 Importance of the Concept of Jiva in Advaita Vedanta

The concept of Jiva is one of the most important concepts in AdvaitaVedanta, because, it is the foundation for the other Vedic concepts such askarma , rebirth, moksa , etc. Without Jiva the Vedic injunctions andprohibitions become useless. 38 In other world, if the concept of Jiva asconceived by the advaitins is proved wrong, then the other Vedic conceptsmentioned above, at least in their advaitic interpretation, will have to bedismissed.

2 SANKARA ON BRAHMAN AND JIVA

According to Sankara, the essential nature of Brahman isConsciousness having potentiality to wish ( kama ),39 to will ( eksata ),40 and

to think ( Iksata ).41

Before the first creation there was Brahman alone andthe above texts under reference state that Brahman wished to become manyand created the multitude. The Chandogya Upanisad states: There wasExistence alone before creation. It willed to become many and created allthe elements. 42 Here the word willed implied that such thinking was notthere earlier in the Existence. According to Sankara, Brahman whilebecoming many has not transformed entirely. For, he says: TheUpanisads prove both the facts for Brahman - the non-transformation of Brahman as a whole and partlessenss. 43 The Upanisad states that aftertransforming into the bodies, He entered into the living beings as the

Jiva .44 It is to be noted that the upanisadic verses do not explicitly mentionwhether Brahman transformed Itself into the bodies partly or wholly. ButBrahmans entering into the living beings would not have been possible if It had transformed Itself entirely into the bodies. Hence we have toconclude that a part of Brahman transformed Itself into the bodies and itwas only the remaining untransformed part of Brahman which entered intothe hearts 45 of the living beings.

Sankara is of the conviction that the individual self is in its essence

Brahman Itself. Brahman, says Sankara, somehow gets Itself entangledwith the adjuncts such as intellect etc., and as a consequence falselyassumes individuality. According to Sankara, the Supreme BrahmanItself, which while remaining immutable, appears to exist as an individualsoul owing to association with limiting adjuncts. 46 This view is supportedby the text, The Self is indeed Brahman, as well as identified with theintellect, the manas (mind), and the vital force, with the eyes and ears. 47


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For Sankara the text Assuming the likeness (of the intellect), it movesbetween the two worlds (this and the next), shows that even while goingto another world, there is no dissociation for the Self from the intellect. 48 According to him, the soul assumes the likeness of the intellect itself, foronly that is near at hand. 49 The Brahadaranyaka Upanisad states: Desire,resolve, doubt, faith, want of faith, steadiness, unsteadiness, shame,intelligence and fear all these are but the mind. 50 Badarayana also says,But the soul comes to have such appellations because of the dominance of the modes of that intellect. 51 For Sankara also, desire, dislike, happiness,sorrow, etc., are the modes of intellect. These modes constitute theessence or chief factors in the attainment of the state of transmigratorinessby soul. 52

Explaining further the relationship between the antahkarana and

Brahman which results in the assumption of individuality by Brahman,Sankara says: This internal organ, constituting a conditioning factor forthe Self is variously spoken of in different places as the manas 53 (faculty of thinking), buddhi 54 (faculty of knowing), vijnana 55 (cognition or egoism),citta 56 (feeling or memory). 57 In spite of being a non-dualist, Sankaraparadoxically admits of the existence of a second entity, namely, theantahkarana in addition to Brahman. He says it must of necessity beadmitted, that an internal organ of this kind does exist , for unless that organis admitted, there will be the contingency of either constant perception ornon-perception. 58 The text, It thinks as it were, and shakes as it were 59 implies according to Sankara that the consciousness does not think byitself, nor does it move; but when the intellect thinks it seems to think, andwhen the intellect moves, it seems to move. 60 Sankara is of the view thatthe connection of the soul with the intellect has but false ignorance at itsroot. 61 He says: This connection with such limiting adjuncts as theintellect does not cease so long as the identity of the Self with Brahman isnot realized. 62 Later in this paper, I will be exposing the inherentcontradictions in such views of Sankara regarding Brahmans assumptionof individuality.


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3. THE RATIONALE BEHIND SANKARAS CONCEPT OF JIVA

According to Sankara, the absolute Reality, namely, Brahman, isone without a second. 63 Brahman is non-dual, attributeless, unfragmented,homogeneous and unconditioned Reality. Sankara felt that the existence of Brahman can be established by the actual realization of It by man. 64 Sankara could not find any method or reason for the direct revelation of Brahman to Itself. Therefore, he brought out the concept of jiva , whichaccording to him, is Brahman conditioned by adjuncts such asintellect. 65He tried to establish the identity between Brahman and jiva byusing the formulae such as I am Brahman, That thou art and Thisatman is Brahman.

Sankara identifies Consciousness in the living body with Brahman.66

Brahman-consciousness when individuated becomes jiva and is distinctfrom the body. 67 This position led Sankara to establish the finiteness of theinfinite, conditioning of the unconditioned, parts of the partless andindividuation of the universal Brahman. 68 Advaitins put forward theories 69 such as (i) Kalpana vada , (ii) Abhasa vada, (iii) Pratibimba vada , and (iv)

Avaccheda vada as valid explanations to justify the identity of theindividual consciousness with Brahman. In spite of their rigorous rationalarguments, the Advaitins could not establish these theories without seekingthe role of birth. Sankara suggests one to have faith in thebeginninglessness of the individuality of Consciousness and creation of the universe. 70 The proof of the existence of Brahman being onlyrealization of Brahman, Sankara recognized the need for faculties of realization like intellect, physical body, etc., without which Brahman-realization is impossible. 71 According to him, it is not possible forBrahman to have all these faculties by Itself. Therefore, there is a need toconceive of Brahman which is unconditioned to be conditioned as theindividual self possessed of the faculties of realization so that it can realizeitself as identical with Brahman.

The advaitins must necessarily maintain that Brahman individuatesitself into the jivas . Advaita Vedanta requires this in order to establish theexistence of Brahman. For, Brahman cannot reveal Itself to Itself and as amatter of fact, it may not be necessary for Brahman to reveal Itself toItself. Without the individual self, the idea of the existence of Brahman


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becomes only a matter of faith which can never be known by man by anymeans such as realization, save through the Upanisads .

Now, in the light of the foregoing, it is necessary for one to examinewhether the advaitic concept of individual self could stand the test of bothreason and experience. Especially so, due to the vulnerability of theconcept of the beginninglessness of the contact between Consciousnessand intellect which is based on mere faith. That the concept of jiva inAdvaita Vedanta is riddled with contradictions can be shown in thefollowing arguments.

4. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE CONCEPT OF JIVA INADVAITA VEDANTA

4.1. Sarvajnatva of Isvara Vis a vis Avivekatva .

According to Sankara, jiva is a complex of both the Identifier andthe Identified. The Identifier is Isvaracaitanya 72 and the Identified is theinternal organ ( antahkarana ). Sankara neither calls Isvaracaitanya per seas jiva nor the antahkarana by itself as jiva . Jiva comes into existenceonly when Isvaracaitanya identifies itself with the antahkarana . Thisidentity is caused by ignorance ( avidya ).73 Avidya is in the form of non-discrimination ( aviveka) between the real nature of the Identifier and thatof the Identified. Sankara is of the view that jiva gets liberated from suchignorance only when it realizes its original nature as identical with that of Brahman.

It is stated that avivekatva is the cause of jivatva. 74 If this be so,whose aviveka is this? 75 Does it belong to Isvaracaitanya or theantahkarana ? It cannot belong to the antahkarana 76 because theantahkarana is the Identified. It is itself a product of avidya. It is materialby its very nature and therefore, not capable of possessing aviveka. Alternatively, one should accept that aviveka belongs to the Identifier, that

is, Isvaracaitanya. One may now ask the question, Is it possible for Isvara , who is omniscient ( sarvajna ) and self luminous ( svayamprakasa ),to possess such avidya which is in the form of aviveka? It appears that it isnot possible. 77 For, even though the Upanisads state that after creating thebodies and the antahkaranas, Isvaracaitanya enters into the cavities of thehearts of living being, 78 we could still ask, When did Isvaracaitanya getentangled with avidya ? Did Isvaracaitanya possess avidya before entering


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the cavities of the hearts of living beings? It cannot be so. For if non-discrimination existed in Isvaracaitanya before It entered into the heartsof living beings then Isvara cannot be called omniscient ( sarvajna ) andever liberated ( nityamukta) since He would not have been able todiscriminate Himself from His own creation. It would not have beenpossible for Him to enter deliberately and specifically into the cavities of the hearts of living beings. Further, Isvara should have identified Himself with His creation indiscriminately and become attached to the createduniverse. Thus, Isvara would become a baddha , that is, a limited agentand as a consequence, would have lost His nityamuktatva . Furthermore, if

Isvara had aviveka before entering into the living beings, then He cannotbe all knowing ( sarvajana ). For, aviveka refers to lack of discriminatoryknowledge, and it would be contradictory to say that sarvajna Isvara doesnot have, knowledge of discrimination.

Due to the above mentioned reasons, the advaitin will have to takerecourse to the alternative view, namely, that Isvaracaitanya could possessavidya only after entering into living beings. This view too is beset withproblems. For, one may ask: How will sarvajna Isvaracaitanya suddenlyget possessed of avidya on entering in to living beings? Upanisads speak of the association of the intellect and Isvaracaitanya even while jiva goesto the other world. 79 They do not expressly mention that Isvaracaitanya gets entangled with avidya only after entering into the bodies. It impliesthat such association of avidya with Consciousness existed even before

Isvaracaitanya entered into the bodies of the living beings. However, Ihave already proved above that it is impossible for Isvaracaitanya topossess avidya before entering into the bodies of the living beings. If avidya cannot exist either in the Isvaracaitanya or antahkarana , thenwhere does this aviveka come from? According to Sankara, avidya cannotalso exist on its own. Therefore, the very existence of avidya isimpossible. Further, without aviveka it is not possible for Isvaracaitanya to identify itself with the antahkarana and without such identity, jivatva of

Isvaracaitanya is impossible. Alternatively, setting aside the concept of

aviveka , if one wants to believe in the Advaita view that jivacaitnaya isidentical with Isvaracaitanya and is distinct from the body, then one has toaccept that Isvaracaitanya deliberately identifies Itself with theantahkarana and becomes jiva. If jivatva is due to Isvaras deliberateassumption then liberation ( moksa ) for jiva cannot be left to its own choiceand efforts. It will have to depend on Isvara. Such a position will not be


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acceptable to Sankara. All these arguments go to prove that the advaitinsconcepts of jiva and avidya are unsustainable.

4.2. Anaditva of Srsti and Jivatva

According to Sankara, Isvara makes use of the merit and demerit of jivas in order to achieve variety in creation. 80 But, it is only after the firstcreation, depending on the diversification into bodies, etc., that merit anddemerit arising out of work ( karmaphala ) could be possible. For, one canperform karma only in this world and it is possible only after the firstdiversified creation. However, Sankara takes karmaphala as the cause of the diversified creation. This position leads to the fallacy of mutualdependence, namely, it is only after creation that results of work,depending on the diversification into bodies, etc., could be possible, and

the diversification into bodies could be possible only due to the results of work. Sankara, tries to resolve this problem by saying that, the defect,namely, the fallacy of mutual dependence, arises only if transmigration hasa beginning. He explains that the transmigratory state has no beginningand therefore, there is nothing contradictory for the fruits of work and thevariety in creation to act as cause and effect to each other on the analogy of the seed and the sprout. 81

Sankara gives the reasons for the beginninglessness of thetransmigratory existence. One such reason is, had it emerged capriciouslyall of a sudden, then there would have been the predicament of freed soulsalso being reborn here, and also the contingency of results accruing fromnon-existing causes, for the differences in happiness and misery wouldhave no logical explanation. 82 Sankara argues that if creation is conceivedas beginningless, then, the fallacy of mutual dependence does not ariseeven as in the case of the seed and the sprout, and hence there will be nodefect. 83 In other words, Sankara cannot offer a logical explanation forcausality between karma and srsti without seeking recourse to faith in thebeginninglessness of jiva and srsti. Faith, because Sankara cannot

rationally prove the anaditva of jiva and srsti . That the state of transmigration has no beginning is only an assumption made by Sankara.Perhaps Sankara was forced into the assumption of the anaditva of transmigratory existence for filling up a gap in his arguments. Unless theconcept of anaditva could be rationally proved, other concepts in AdvaitaVedanta cannot be explained.


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Now one may raise the question as to what Sankara means bysaying that the transmigratory existence is anadi ? Does he mean that jiva and srsti do not have a beginning at all? Or does he mean that thebeginning of the first creation is not known because of innumerable pastcycles of creation?

Sankara appears to believe that jiva and srsti do not have abeginning at all. 84 But, it is contradictory to say that jiva and srsti do nothave a beginning. For, according to Sankara, everything other than jiva has origination 85. But the whole of creation, namely, srsti , originated fromBrahman. Logically speaking, whatever is created should have abeginning. Therefore, srsti also must have had a beginning. As for the

jiva , Sankara holds the view that it has not been created. For, he thinksthat jiva is nothing other than Brahman. For Sankara, jivas non-creation

must also imply its beginninglessness. Even if one were to accept thisview of Sankara on jivas anaditva , one cannot, yet, accept his view onsrsti. For creation necessarily implies a beginning.

If anaditva can be denied of srsti, then one is also compelled to re-examine its tenability in respect of jiva . According, to Sankara, jiva is acomplex of the unoriginated Brahman and the originated 86 adjunct, that is,intellect. Jiva, while in transmigratory existence cannot be identical withBrahman. If jiva is identical with Brahman always in all levels of existence, only then jiva can be accepted as beginningless. But once thisview is accepted, then one cannot differentiate jiva from Brahman. Therewill then be jivatva for Brahman which, according to advaitins cannot be.Therefore, the advaitin needs to separate jiva from Brahman.Beginningless Brahman cannot become jiva unless there is an adjunct andany adjunct must have a beginning. Since, an originated adjunct isinvolved in jiva, and un-originated Brahman cannot become Himself a jiva without adjunct , jiva must have a beginning.

If Sankara still argues that jiva has no beginning because texts speak

of its eternality, 87 then he has to accept that Brahman has been eternally inthe form of jivas. It implies that it is only the universe which undergoesthe process of creation, sustenance and destruction. This position appearssimilar to the Samkhya philosophy and, therefore, it cannot be acceptablefor Advaitins. Also, it is illogical to say that there exists an un-originatedsoul which has as its ingredient an originated adjunct, namely, intellect.Thus, one must accept that jiva must have a beginning.


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The other view, namely, that jiva and srsti are anadi because the

beginning of the first creation is not known due to innumerable past cyclesof creation, is also not convincing. For, the Upanisads clearly describe thedetails of the first creation. It is stated in the Chandogya Upanisad that inthe beginning, before creation, there was only Existence, one without asecond. 88 This statement implies that there was at least one instant,namely, before creation, when Brahman existed as It was without anyqualities such as the merit and demerit of the jivas . Another statement,namely, It thought why cant I be many and created-, 89 shows that therewas a state of Brahman without creation and then creation began withakasa, etc. Thus, even according to the Upanisads, creation must have hada beginning. It follows from this that jiva , whose coming into existencedepends on the created antahkarana , must also have a beginning. The

advaitins argument for anaditva of creation and jiva is thus proved tostand on flimsy grounds.

4.3. Partless Non-dual Brahman and Partial Creation

According to Sankara, at the time of first creation Brahman hadtransformed partly into the universe. 90 For he says, The Upanisads proveboth the facts for Brahman the non-transformation of Brahman as a wholeand partlessness 91. But, this position of Sankara is fallible. For, if Brahman is one, non-dual and partless and It wished to become many,then It must have transformed Itself completely into this universe.

Against the arguments for a total transformation of Brahman increation, Sankara contends: Do not bring those things within the range of argumentation which are beyond thought. The nature of a thing beyondthought consists in its being other than the thing within Nature. 92 Butwhile Sankara thus criticizes the other philosophical systems forrationalizing the existence of metaphysical entities, he convenientlyignores his own prohibitive injunction and brings all metaphysical

concepts into the fold of reasoning. If any philosophical stand is irrationalthen one should reject the same. Sankara claims that all the other systemsmaintain irrational philosophical positions, and so, he rejects them all.Similarly Sankaras own philosophical position, namely, partlessBrahman gets partly transformed into universe is also irrational andtherefore, should be rejected outright.


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Just because Sankara states that is possible for Brahman to havepartial transformation while being partless, one need not accept it. For it isan open contradiction. If an advaitin insists on the power of Brahman tohave partial transformation, then, he should accept the fact that Brahman isnot partless. To say both that Brahman has partial transformation and isalso partless is, again, a blatant contradiction.

4.3.1. Entry of Untransformed Brahman into the Bodies

If an advaitin says that Brahman had completely transformed Itself into the world, then nothing would remain of It and hence Its entering intothe cavities of the hearts of living beings as jiva would be renderedimpossible. With this, all the identity formulae such as, I am Brahmanwould also become absurd.

Alternatively, if it is contended by the advaitin that only one part of Brahman got transformed into the world and that remaining part, in itsentirety, became the jivas ,93 he can yet be questioned. For, this position assuch implies that the whole creation stands divided into two basiccategories, namely, (i) World; and (ii) Consciousness in the body ( jiva ).This categorization appears similar to the well-known dualism of Kapila inhis Samkhyasutra. However, to be in the same group with Kapila must beanathema to the advaitin. For, a major portion of Vedantasutra devotesitself to refuting Samkhya view by making Samkhya philosophy as theprime wrestler (pradhana malla).

The above arguments have proved that Sankaras faith in the partialtransformation of partless Brahman is unreasonable and, therefore, to berejected. There will not arise any question regarding the untransformedBrahman after creation, because, such a view is nonsensical andimpossible. Further, since the concept of jiva in Advaita Vedanta is basedon such an impossible untransformed Brahman, one can reject the same.

4.4. Brahmacaitanya is Not the Source of Jivacaitanya.

In Advaita Vedanta, jiva , could be understood in two ways: (i) Non-functional; and (ii) Functional. As non-functional, jiva is defined asConsciousness conditioned by avidya ( Avidya avacchinnacaitanyam

jivah ). As the functional, jiva is defined as Consciousness conditioned bythe antahkarana ( Antahkarana avacchinnacaitanayam jivah ). One can


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understand from the advaitins definitions of jiva as non-functional andfunctional that there are three principles in it: (i) Caitanya, (ii) Avidya and(iii) Antahkarana .94

Advaitins believe that Jivacaitanya is identical with Brahmacaitanya. For, in the process of creation Brahmacaitanya directlyenters into the bodies as Jivacaitanya .95 The advaitins view that

Brahmacaitanya is the source of Jivacaitanya can be criticized as follows.

4.4.1. Thinking Capability and Caitanya: An Argument

Consciousness ( caitanya ) in Advaita Vedanta needs to beunderstood from two perspectives: (i) Jivacaitanya ; and (ii)

Brahmacaitanya. Competency for thinking is very essential for

Consciousness in Advaita Vedanta. For, as the pure Brahman,Consciousness cannot create the universe and become many withoutthinking. As jiva, Consciousness cannot enjoy jivatva without thinking.The argument here is: Since, according to Sankara, Jivacaitanya and

Brahmacaitanya are identical; their thinking modalities should also be thesame. If there is any difference between the thinking capabilities of

Jivacaitanya and Brahmacaitanya , then jiva and Brahman cannot beidentical. Further, if the difference in the thinking capabilities of jiva andBrahman can be established, then it will strengthen my later argument(referred to in the section: Is the Direct Presence of Brahman Necessary toMake a Human-body Conscious?) that the conscious antahkarana obviatesthe necessity of Brahmans entering into the bodies to make themconscious. Let us now examine whether the thinking capabilities of jivaand Brahman are the same.

The thinking potentiality of jiva is proved by the fact that it isrevealed in ones personal experience. The Upanisads also speak aboutit.96 The non-functional Jivacaitanya (Prajna ) can be identified with thestate of deep sleep ( susupti) , whereas the functional state of the same is

identified with the states of waking ( jagrat) and dream ( svapna) . It is saidin Advaita Vedanta that susupti is the cause and the functional states arethe effects. 97

As pure Jivacaitanya , jiva cannot think or act in his non-functionalstate ( susupti ). This state is defined as Consciousness conditioned byavidya . When avidya gives rise to its effect, that is, the antahkarana , jiva


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starts thinking and acting. This shows that jiva in its pure state, beingdevoid of the antahkarana cannot think or act. Avidya in susupti is said toconceal the real nature of Jivacaitanya and in the functional state, it notonly conceals the real nature of Jivacaitanya but also projects the falsemultitude to the jiva.

Now, let us examine the thinking potentiality of Brahmacaitanya inorder to see whether it is identical with that of Jivacaitanya. As in the caseof jiva , there are two states of Brahmacaitanya : (i) Brahmacaitanya after

pralaya or before creation; and (ii) Brahmacaitanya at the time of creation.The first state is a state of non-function and the second a state of function.In other words, the first one is a state of non-thinking and the second, astate of thinking.

The advaitins say that even as Jivacaitanya has avidya, Brahmacaitanya too has its inherent power called maya. According to theadvaitins, maya cannot conceal from Isvara His true nature as

Brahmacaitanya. 98 It is accepted by the advaitins that maya is a commonfactor to both Brahmacaitanya and Isvaracaitanya. But, unlike in the caseof the Jivacaitanya , a material product like antahkarana is not spoken of inthe case of Isvara to explain His thought to create. We can now raise thequestion: What is it that makes Isvaracaitanya to think and create? Theanswer cannot be that it is maya. For, maya was associated with the pureBrahman, even before creation.

One should observe that in the case of Jivacaitanya, avidya is thecause and antahkarana, the effect of avidya is instrumental for thinking.There is difference in form between avidya and antahkarana , for , avidya isthe inherent power of Caitanya and antahkarana is the product of subtleelements. 99 In the case of Brahmacaitanya, for It to become many,thinking is a sine qua non . But in spite of maya being accepted as Itsinherent power the production of an instrument to think like theantahkarana in the case of jiva, is not mentioned in the Upanisadic texts.

Brahman should, therefore, remain the same in both the thinking and non-thinking states. That is B rahmacaitanya in Its non-functional state hadunchanging Consciousness with unchanging maya and in Its functionalstate also has the same unchanging Consciousness with unchanging maya .In other words, both the states of Brahmacaitanya are not different fromeach other.


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It follows that, in Advaita Vedanta, one can only maintain: Either Brahmacaitanya is in constant non-function which leads to theimpossibility of creation ( srsti ) or Brahmacaitanya is in constant functionwhich leads to the impossibility of dissolution ( pralaya) . In the case of the

jiva , avidya gives rise to antahkarana , resulting in thinking. But in thecase of Brahman, maya does not give rise to any such instrument. YetBrahman (as Isvara ) thinks and creates. This proves the fact that

Brahmacaitanya is different from Jivacaitanya. Such a position may alsolead to a further conclusion, unpalatable though it may be to the advaitins,that Brahmacaitanya is not the source of Jivacaitanya.

4.4.2. Argument from the Inherent Power of Caitanya

The advaitins argue that Brahmacaitanya is identical with

Jivacaitanya . But, whereas maya , the power of Brahman only projects theuniverse in the case of Brahman, with jiva , the corresponding power of avidya , both conceals the reality as well as projects the apparent world. If Brahman and jiva are identical this should not be so. The question to beanswered now is why does the concealing power of maya not operate inthe case of Brahman?

If advaitins accept the influence of the concealing power of mayaon Brahman, then Brahman becomes ignorant like jiva and loses Hisomniscient power. If they say that the concealing power of maya does notexist at all, then jiva must always be considered to be on par with Brahmanand to possess omniscient power. Jiva loses his alpajnatva and becomesever liberated. If they say that the concealing power of maya emerges dueto the Brahmacaitanya s wish to enter into the cavities of the hearts of living beings, then it becomes a deliberate move to become jiva andtherefore, there will not be any need for liberation. The position, namely,emergence of the avaranasakti of maya only in jiva is untenable becausean advaitin should explain the reason for its suppression in the case of

Isvara . Such reasons are not found in Advaita Vedanta. Therefore, maya

and avidya , the inherent powers of Brahmacaitanya and Jivacaitanyarespectively, must be construed to be different.

If an advaitin claims that maya and avidya are different from eachother, then Brahmacaitanya and jivacaitanya become different andtherefore, cannot be identical. For, Caitanya is non-dual, and maya as itsinherent power can also be only non-dual. Hence it cannot be accepted


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that It acquires a different inherent power all of a sudden. If avidya , whichcannot have existence apart from Jivacaitanya , is different from maya ,which cannot have existence apart from Brahmacaitanya , then

Jivacaitanya must be different from Brahmacaitanya . Therefore, it has tobe accepted that Brahmacaitanya cannot be the source of Jivacaitanya .

4.4.3. Isvaracaitanya is Not the Source of Jivacaitanya.

Brahman is defined 100 as Consciousness ( Drk ) associated with maya. Similarly, Isvara is defined 101 in Advaita Vedanta as Consciousness ( Drk )conditioned by maya . These definitions imply that the difference betweenthe two lies only in the conditioning by maya. Before entering into themain question of whether I svaracaitanya is the source of Jivacaitanya, it isnecessary for us to get a proper perspective of the nature of maya and how

it conditions Brahmacaitanya.

Is maya a separate entity? According to the advaitins maya is not anindependent and separate entity. Maya is said to be the inherent power of Caitanya . It is said by the advaitins that maya is indefinable either as sat or as asat. Since maya is perceived in the form of the universe, it cannot beasat and since it is sublated by the knowledge of Reality, it cannot be sat.Therefore, maya is said to be sadasadanirvacaniya.

Now, if we can establish that the role of maya when it is with Isvara is different from its role in the case of the jiva , then the fundamentaldifference between Isvara and Jiva would stand proved. We can, thenextend the argument to prove that Isvaracaitanya is not the source of

Jivacaitanya.

What was the ontological status of maya when Brahman gottransformed into Isvara ? Was maya asat , sat or sadasadanirvacaniya ?Since there was nothing apart from Brahmacaitanya before the advent of

Isvara or before the creation of the universe, maya could not have been

there. This position may lead one to infer the non-existence of mayabecause of the non-appearance of the multitude. But one has to infer theexistence of maya from the above position, for the reasons such as: (i)Brahman becoming Isvara implies the existence of maya in Brahman; and(ii) Creation of the universe from Isvara also implies the existence of maya in Isvara. Even when Brahmacaitanya exists in the form of

Isvaracaitanya, maya continues to exist, even though Isvara , as


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sarvajnatman, is not affected by it. Thus maya cannot be asat, but canonly be sat . If it is sat, then it cannot be sadasadanirvacaniya.

When maya is accepted as sat , then a problem arises. If maya isaccepted as a separate sat apart from Brahmacaitanya , then the non-dualityof Brahman suffers. Hence, maya cannot be accepted as a separate entityby the advaitins. Then, what is the ontological status of maya whenBrahman got transformed into Isvara? At the best one can say that maya isthe power of Caitanya . Thus, when this power of Caitanya is in a staticcondition then Caitanya is called Brahman and when it is dynamic, thenCaitanya is called Isvara.

In the light of the foregoing discussion about Brahmanstransformation into Isvara through the conditioning by maya, let us now

enquire into the advaitins version of the process of creation, namely, thecoming into being of the world and jivas. I shall be showing that theadvaitins account is riddled with contradictions.

According to the advaitins, Isvaracaitanya first got transformed intothe universe and later entered into the living beings as jivas. This impliesthat a part of Isvaracaitanya became the world when another partremained untransformed and that this untransformed part later becamethe jivas. But to talk of I svara in terms of parts, should, in the first placebe blasphemous to the basic advaitic tenet of a partless Isvara.

The advaitin, in order to avoid the above difficulty, must accept thatthere was simultaneous creation of universe and jivas. This position goesagainst the upanisadic statement, according to which Isvara entered intothe bodies after creating them. The advaitic interpretation of theUpanisads implies that the untransformed Isvaracaitanya would remainstatic for some time, because, until there was creation of bodies, thequestion of Isvaracaitanyas gaining entry into the bodies would not arise.Such untransformed Isvaracaitanya must be viewed as Brahman with

static maya. This position leads to the conclusion that Brahman is not non-dual. Further, since Brahman with static maya could be associated onlywith the state prior to creation, the advaitins view leads to the absurd andcontradicting position of accepting creation and non-creation at the sametime in one and the same Reality. A total transformation of Isvaracaitanya is also not possible. For that would leave the world and the jivas withoutan Isvara. The above arguments, by disproving the advaitins version of


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creation, have, in effect also established the fallacious nature of theirtheory that Isvaracaitanya is the source of Jivacaitanya.

4.5. Is the Direct Presence of Brahman Necessary to Make a Human- body Conscious?

The advaitic view regarding the presence of Brahman in a livingbeing could be proved erroneous through a more radical argument. Weshall now argue that for explaining the consciousness in a living being, thepositing of the direct presence of Brahman in it, is redundant.

The advaitin supposes that, that which is created is insentient and isnot conscious. 102 But in the case of a living being, inspite of its beingconstituted by a body, which is insentient, we find that it has awareness.

This strange combination of sentience and insentience in one being israther puzzling. Yet, to explain this by the direct presence of Brahman inthe living being, as the advaitin does, is not acceptable. An examination of the process of creation would reveal to us why this is so.

According to Sankara, Brahman, in the beginning created ether(akasa ) from out of Itself. Brahman, as consciousness, having thepotentiality to wish, had wished to create ether in the beginning. ForSankara, Brahman had not completely transformed into ether. Thereremained a portion of Brahman untransformed. This makes ether as notall-pervasive. 103 Then, the subsequent process of creation, namely, creationof air, etc., could not have been out of the untransformed portion of Brahman after creation of ether, because, as per Sankaras view, thatportion of Brahmacaitanya was required to make jiva after creation. Andthere was no other portion of Brahman left behind to create air, etc.Hence, the further process of creation could not have been effected byBrahman. The Upanisad 104 too states that the further process of creationoccurs from ether itself. In the Chandogyopanisad , it is stated that firewilled . Similarly in the Taittiriopanisad it is mentioned that from ether,

air is produced. Such upanisadic statements reveal that the subtle elementssuch as ether or fire had capacity to wish and create . If sentience isattributed to Brahman only because of Its having the potentiality to wish and create 105 then, for the same reason, such sentience should beattributed to the elements such as ether, etc., also.


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An advaitin may object to the above and say that the words,namely, ether, etc., do not denote the elements but refer only to the deities.But we can still ask him to explain whether these deities are created ornot. Even if they are deities, the above argument for the conscious natureof the products of Brahman holds good because, these so called deities arealso created from Brahman and have competence for willing andcreating .106 The advaitin must, therefore, concede that the role of Brahman in creation begins and ends with the creation of ether. Further, inthe Taittiriya Upanisad and Chandogyopanisad it is mentioned that ethercreated air, air created fire, 107 fire wished to create water, water wished tocreate earth. 108 These verses clearly show that all the subtle elements wereconscious because they had potentiality to wish and create .

Sankara opines that the senses and mind are created by the

elements.109

Since the internal organ is created by the conscious elements(food) 110 it must also be of the nature of consciousness having thepotentiality to wish and create . In other words, any product in theprocess of creation, at least at its subtle level, should be conscious innature. This, in its turn leads to the necessity of accepting the following:

(i) Some kind of conscious materialism; and

(ii) The conscious internal organ itself is sufficient to makea living body conscious and conduct all activities.

Let us now examine the first of the above positions. As we haveseen already, in the process of creation all subtle elements ought to beconscious. The Advaitins account of further creation after the creation of five elements is not much different from that of the Carvaka system,because advaitins believe in the theory of pancikarana which advocatesthe combination of the five elements. Carvakas also believe in the idea of combination of elements in the process of creation. But, the moreimportant point is that the advaitin who always swear by the Srut i, must, as

already shown above, accept that there is no need of Brahman in theprocess of creation after the coming into being of ether. But, by such anacceptance, the advaitns almost fall in line with the Carvakas who do nothave any place for Brahman at any stage in creation.


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Conscious nature of elements necessitates the acceptance of theview that the conscious internal organ itself is sufficient to make a livingbody conscious and conduct all activities. Since the internal organ is theproduct of conscious elements, it also has to be conscious with thepotentiality to create and wish, it itself is sufficient to make a living bodyconscious. If this position is accepted, then, the advaitins notion of thedirect presence of Brahman in the living body can be discarded.

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The arguments in the foregoing section have established thefollowing conclusions which go to prove that Sankaras concept of jiva is

untenable:

Aviveka as the cause of the coming into being of the jiva has nolocus. It cannot exist either in Isvaracaitanya or in the antahkarana . Norcan it exist on its own. It cannot also be accepted that Isvaracaitanya deliberately identifies Itself with the antahkarana and becomes jiva . For,this makes the concept of moksa in Advaita Vedanta absurd.

The anaditva of jiva and srsti advocated by Sankara is also notacceptable.

Sankaras account of srsti speaks of Brahmans transforming Itself partially into the world and also entering into the hearts of living beings.This view has been refuted on the grounds of impossibility of partialtransformation of Brahman.

Neither Brahmacaitanya nor Isvaracaitanya can be the source of jivacaitanya . This is due to an essential difference in the nature of jiva and Isvara.

There is no need to assume the presence of Brahmacaitanya in the jiva to account for the latters conscious nature. The antahkarana itself could be the ground for consciousness in jiva. For, the antahkarana is notinsentient as held by Sankara. Rather it is conscious by itself.


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ABBREVIATIONS

Text Abbreviation

(1) Sri Sankaragranthavalih, Brahmasutra Bhasya SSBB

Samata Books, Madras, 1983.(2) Sri Sankaragranthavalih, Bhagavadgita Bhasya

BGSB Samata Books, Madras, 1983.

(3) Isadidasopanisadah,(Ten principal Upanisads with Sankarabhasya)Sri Sankaracaryagranthavalih, Prathamo BhagahMotilal Banarsidas, Delhi, Reprinted, 1992

Chandogyopanisad CUP Brhadaranyakopanisad BUPKathopanisad KUPTaittiriyopanisad TUP

Mundakopanisad MUPPrasnopanisad PUP

Mandukyopanisad Gaudapadakarika MGK Aitareyopanisad AUP

(4) Bellamkonda Ramaraya kavi, BV Sri Sankarasankarabhasyavimarsah ,Published by Kavita Venkatasubrahmanyasastri,Sri Ramakavitagranthamalasampadakah,Narasaraopet, Guntur District,Andhra Pradesh, India, 1953

(5) Bellamkonda Ramaraya kavi, VS VedantasangrahahPublished by Kavita Venkatasubrahmanyasastri,Narasaraopet, Guntur District,Andhra Pradesh, India, (Sadharananama samvatsaram).


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CHAPTER - IV

Brahman-World Illusion in Advaita Vedanta: A Critique

1. INTRODUCTION

The inquiry into the three levels of reality ( sattatraya vicara ) is oneof the methods in Advaita Vedanta to establish nirguna Brahman as oneand only non-dual reality. Depending on the concept of sublation, 111 Advaitins categorize reality 112 into three levels, namely, (i) Empiricalreality ( Vyavaharika satta )113 , (ii) Phenomenal reality ( Pratibhasikasatta ),114 and (iii) Absolute reality ( Paramarthika satta )115 . Advaitins alsorefer to another category, namely, Absolute non-existence ( tuccha ),116 only

to show that none of the three levels of reality is absolute non-existent.But tuccha is neither accepted as a kind of reality nor as one of the threelevels of reality in Advaita Vedanta.

Advaitins describe the appearance of the empirical reality as anillusion on the absolute reality. For, the empirical reality, according tothem, can be sublated by the knowledge of Brahman. Advaitins try toillustrate the same in terms of dreams and illusions. There is anincompatibility between the explanation of the illustration and that of theworld illusion in Advaita Vedanta. While knowledge of the gross objectssublates the knowledge of the dream objects, the falsity of the lesser realityof the dream objects is determined in waking experience, that is, in higherreality. Also the dream objects disappear when sublation takes place.

Contrary to the dream sublation, in the case of Brahman-worldillusion, the falsity of the lesser reality of the empirical world has to bedetermined while one is in lesser reality itself. When world gets sublatedby non-dual experience, the world will not disappear and it continues toexist. That is to say that, according to Advaitins, world has to be realized

as an illusion while one is in world illusion itself. How can an illusion berealized as an illusion while one is in the same illusion? It cannot be. Thusthe position of Advaita on three levels of reality needs to be examined.

This paper aims at evaluating the position of the Advaita on thethree levels of reality. It attempts to prove that world cannot be an illusionon non-duality and world of duality cannot be sublated by the knowledge


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of Brahman. In the same place, it will be shown that non-dual experiencecan be an illusion on duality of the world and the waking experience cansublate the non-dual experience.

The evaluation is done in the following manner. It will be shownagainst Advaita, that world is not an illusion on Brahman from thefollowing arguments, namely, (i) there is no proper illustration to explainthe world as an illusion, and (ii) world cannot be sublated by non-dualexperience. Later, it will be argued that non-dual experience can be anillusion on dual world and the same can be sublated by the knowledge of waking experience. Further it will be shown that the cause of duhkha issubject illusions. Then, it will be established that an ontological sublationof the world by non-dual experience, which implies physical disappearanceof the world, is not required to attain moksa. Finally, it will be argued that

none of the four varieties of experience stands for the paramarthika sattaand therefore, the ultimate reality cannot be determined in AdvaitaVedanta.

2. WORLD CANNOT BE AN ILLUSION ON BRAHMAN

2.1 There is No Proper Illustration to Explain World as an Illusion

Advaitins hold the view that the appearance of the world is anillusion on Brahman. They try to substantiate their view by saying thatworld can be sublated by the knowledge of Brahman, just like dream getssublated by waking experience. Sublation is taken by the Advaitins as acriterion to determine the absolute reality of Brahman and the falsity of theworld of duality. In order to explain the process of sublaition between theworld and Brahman, Advaitins take the cases of illusions and dreams toapply the same to the Brahman-world illusion. Can the process of sublation in dream and waking be applicable to the case of Brahman-world illusion? It necessitates one to analyze the application of sublation in

different cases of illusions.

Let us explain, first, the Brahman-world illusion in order to findwhether there is any similar illusion. If a similar illusion is not availablethen the sublation of world by brahmajnana will be regarded only as faithof the Advaitins and not a reality. It will be shown in the following


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arguments that none of the processes of sublation, not only of dream butalso of the other illusions, can be applicable to Brahman-world illusion.

2.1.1 Brahman-world Illusion Explained

Sankara admits that before the realization of the identity of theindividual self with Brahman, the world exists as it is. 117 So long as onedoes not attain brahmajnana , one believes that the duality of the world isreal. Thus the conviction of any person before Brahman-realization

a critique on advaita vedanta

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