a critical examination of mav safety standards by patricia kierans

Accessibility Must Always Include Safety:

A Critical Examination of Modified Accessible Vehicle

Safety Standards

Patricia M. Kierans Master’s Student, Critical Disability Studies

York University Contact: [email protected] 647-‐801-‐4908

Executive Summary

Antiquated safety standards for Modified Accessible Vehicles (MAVs) are in desperate need of overhaul to ensure safety for everyone on the road, and this presents a great opportunity for the Federal Government of Canada. As accessible vehicles are used with growing frequency as taxis due to provincial accessibility legislation, the Federal Government can determine and set the standard for MAV vehicles to bring them up to the same strict safety requirements for non-‐modified OEM vehicles. This will show to the world that Canada remains a leader in universal accessibility, and will maintain high safety standards that are synonymous with Canadian products and services. People with disabilities deserve to have safety and accessibility in all aspects of their lives. Enforcing safety in this crucial area of transportation will go a long way towards protecting a significant but often overlooked community.

At present, Canadian legislation regarding safety standards for MAVs is almost

nonexistent, and this void puts the public at risk. Safety testing after modification for accessibility purposes rests on the modifiers themselves. There are no requirements that ensure that a modified vehicle be able to withstand the same battery of crash tests as every standard Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) vehicle. The modifications by their very nature are known to affect some safety features, but, to date, the relative safety of these vehicles when compared to their unmodified counterparts is untested.

Public ignorance of this situation is becoming potentially dangerous; as Toronto

converts its taxi fleet to accessible vehicles, the number of people riding in modified accessible vehicles is increasing daily: it is no longer a matter of a ‘small population’ (i.e. people with mobility impairments) being at risk. The time has come, therefore, to determine whether these modified vehicles are ‘safe enough’ for every passenger.

ACCESSIBILITY MUST ALWAYS INCLUDE SAFETY

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Introduction

With Toronto adding accessible taxis to its fleet, the public should not have to compromise between safety and accessibility. Each newly designed and created Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) vehicle comes with an array of safety features to keep drivers and occupants secure. Each vehicle sold in North America has every inch of its body tested against the rigors of a vehicular crash, and the resultant safety ratings for each angle, speed, and point of impact are publicly listed. This public consciousness of vehicle safety has made for better car companies; the first car to get a five star all-‐around safety rating set the trend, and other companies quickly followed suit. Safety data is available (depending on make and model) dating back to 1995 on www.iihs.org, so it is possible to see how an older car performed during crash tests.

For individuals with mobility impairments (MIs) who use a wheelchair or scooter,

using an OEM vehicle can be difficult, as this requires the individual to transfer out of their wheelchair or scooter into the vehicle, and to store the device in the trunk or cargo area. The only OEM vehicle suitable for accessible use, and that currently exists, is the MV-‐1, which was designed to incorporate a ramp, grab bars, and the necessary safety hooks to which a restraint harness can be attached. The alternative to the MV-‐1 is a Modified Accessible Vehicle (MAV), typically a minivan that has been modified from its original state. This modification can be extensive, and is done with little to no governmental oversight, which may potentially endanger the lives of any occupant.

As much as the able-‐bodied public can see about OEM vehicles they are about to

purchase, people with MIs and their families are left with almost no objective safety evaluation when purchasing a MAV. As the structural safety of after-‐market conversions is not regulated by any Federal agency in the United States or in Canada (Exemption from the Make Inoperative Prohibition, 2001; Canadian Standards Association, 2004), once the vehicle leaves the factory floor it is not tested again by an objective third part, regardless of the type of newly installed equipment. This could be as mundane as a new car battery or a new brand of tire, street-‐racer modifications, or the exhaustive conversion process that occurs to make vehicles accessible to individuals with MIs. The laws regarding after-‐market modifications remain the same regardless of the degree and breadth.

Both Canadian and U.S. laws and regulations are closely intertwined when it comes

to vehicle safety; the Canadian safety standards rely almost exclusively on American motor vehicle safety parameters (Transport Canada, Document CL9203(E), 2015, p.1). There is a vital urgency to bring this matter to the attention of the federal and provincial governments; where before politicians might have dismissed MAV safety as affecting too few people, Toronto is currently in the process of converting its entire fleet of taxis into


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accessible vehicles. This will affect countless individuals who use these taxis, both able-‐bodied and with MIs. The general public at large might not agree that vehicles that are less safe should be used, when safer options are available.

The goal of all taxis being accessible is truly laudable, attainable, and will make

Toronto more accessible than ever before. Already, 290 accessible taxis are sharing the streets of Toronto (Toronto City Council, 2014). Customers view MAV taxis as equally safe to OEM taxis, though scientific testing has not corroborated this. Quite simply, no impartial testing has been done on MAV vehicles, whose results are available to the public. It is therefore imperative to establish a baseline and gather concrete data. Only then can changes to the industry be made, if necessary, to improve the safety for everyone on Canadian roads.

The modifications done on MAV vehicles will be covered to outline why safety

standards are crucial to ensure universal safety and accessibility. The relevant Canadian and American regulations will be examined to get a comprehensive view of how much, or how little, oversight and consumer protection is afforded, and the impact these regulations have on vehicle safety and on the public. Recommendations will also be made based on the current state of these regulations, and will cover what can be done, and by whom, to improve MAV safety standards.

Modifications

There are two ways to make a vehicle accessible for people with MIs: installing a ramp exiting from the side of the vehicle (side-‐entry), and putting a ramp through the cargo area (rear-‐entry). Toronto’s city buses utilize a side-‐entry method, wherein passengers can either walk or roll onto the bus from the same entrance. Toronto’s WheelTrans buses use a dual-‐entry system, which allows the driver to choose the safest method of embarking passengers.

There are several vehicles that are most commonly converted for private/taxi use:

the Dodge Grand Caravan, the Toyota Sienna, and the Ford Transit Connect. The Dodge and Toyota are both minivans. In the case of these two, several fundamental modifications must be made. To accommodate the height of an individual in a wheelchair or scooter in a rear-‐entry vehicle, the rear of the vehicle is lifted and the floor is dropped (Photos 1, 3). The relevant undercarriage (transmission, gas tank, axles, etc.) is shifted forward to accommodate a ramp that cuts through the rear bumper (Photo 2). The ramp itself can either slide into the dropped floor (when used for cargo purposes), or be folded up to lie against the trunk when an occupant is seated in the accessible area (Photos 4, 5). The Ford is a hybrid cargo/passenger vehicle that already meets, or almost meets, the height


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requirements for an accessible vehicle. The rear of the Ford is not raised from its OEM state, providing a lower, and more accessible, ride for passengers as well as decreasing the exposure of the gas tank (Photo 6).

In a side-‐entry vehicle, the conversion is more subtle: to hide the dropped floor and

raised body, additional panelling is added to the sides of the vehicle (Photo 7). Fundamentally, however, the floor must still be dropped and the body lifted to accommodate the increase in height. In the case of the Dodge and Toyota, the most common ramp style is a manual-‐folding ramp: instead of sliding into the undercarriage, it flips to stand upright beside the passenger (Photo 8). The ramp is required to have a safety lip on both sides – this protrudes towards the passenger, and the ramp itself aligns with chest height for a typical passenger (Photo 9).

In the case of a side-‐entry MAV, the second sliding door must be wide enough to

allow a person with an MI to exit the vehicle to the left, as the ramp itself blocks the exit on the right. This poses a problem in the event of a crash to the left side of the vehicle; a passenger is unable to make use of the left side of the vehicle to exit, and is equally unable to use the right side due to the ramp. The passenger would then have to shift to the front of the vehicle to exit through the passenger’s side. In the event of an impact on the right side of the vehicle, no data is available at this time to show how the ramp might impact a passenger sitting beside it. Though bolts hold the ramp in place during normal operation, in a crash, it is theoretically possible that the ramp would be forced towards the restrained passenger. Resulting injuries are unknown and untested at this time.

In side-‐entry models, the gas tank is more exposed than in OEM vehicles, as it has

been moved to be directly below the cargo area, and many modifiers have placed safety guards that extend down from the rear bumper (Photos 10-‐14). There is no publicly available data to show whether these safety guards are sufficient to protect the gas tank during a rear-‐end collision. One video on YouTube, showing a company-‐sponsored rear-‐end collision test with a 2002 modified side-‐entry Grand Caravan, showed the vehicle’s rear half crushed by a collision of 80 kph (50 mph) (syncrobismol2, 2007). The resultant gas leak emptied the entire gas tank, and might have led to the conflagration of the vehicle (Photos 15-‐17) (syncrobismol2, 2007).

Canadian Regulations

ON 611

Ontario’s Highway Traffic Act, Regulation 611, covers Safety Standards Certificates, inspection schedules and requirements for accessible vehicles. This includes both passenger vehicles (such as minivans or the MV-‐1) and accessible buses, that have either


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been designed or modified for accessibility purposes (Safety Inspections, 2004, p. 8). All inspections are done based on the standards outlined by the National Safety Council’s Standard 11B (Safety Inspections, 2004, p. 8. Small exemptions include: changes to wheels and brakes as outlined in Section 3, items 3-‐5, though brake systems must be inspected regularly (Safety Inspections, 2004, pp. 28-‐30). This regulation ensures that only a qualified inspector is responsible for evaluating the brake system, and prevents any fraudulent ‘inspections’ from being accepted (Safety Inspections, 2004, p. 29; Canadian Council of Motor Transport Administrators, 2014, p. 78). As a general accountability measure, the government keeps a tight hold on who can certify accessible vehicles once they are in use. However, unseen structural issues that are only visible if the vehicle is dismantled are not covered in this inspection, issues which could greatly compromise the vehicle’s overall safety.

ON 629

Ontario’s Highway Traffic Act, Regulation 629, concerns accessible vehicles used as taxis. It includes guidelines for the dimensions and locations of various accessibility features, such as grab bars, high-‐traction flooring and the location of a first aid kit and fire extinguisher (Photo 4: note fire extinguisher).

Section 3 (1) (e) states that the vehicle must “have an interior that is free of any

sharp projections that may constitute a hazard to passengers” (Accessible Vehicles, 2013, p. 2). While a highly logical requirement, there is no mention of whether a ramp that is folded and secured upright within the passenger cabin would constitute a ‘sharp projection’.

NSC St. 11

Canada’s National Safety Council’s National Safety Code Standard 11 covers maintenance and inspections of commercial vehicles within Canada. The goal set forth by this standard is to “ensure that all commercial vehicles are subject to a systematic, regular preventive maintenance program” (Canadian Council of Motor Transport Administrators , 2014, p. 12). Though the requirements of this standard cover all functioning aspects of a vehicle, it does not examine the structural integrity of the vehicle prior to being put into service.

C.R.C., c. 1038

C.R.C., c. 1038 is the consolidation of Motor Vehicle Safety Regulations for Canada. It covers the general safety requirements of any vehicle, as well as safety marks, and steps to be taken if a vehicle is altered.


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A vehicle is designated as ‘altered’ if a company’s modifications either change the weight of the vehicle or if modifications are more extensive than cosmetic. This includes any modifications made to a vehicle to install a ramp, increase headroom, and generally make the vehicle accessible to a person in a wheelchair or scooter. After recalculating the weight of the vehicle according to subsection 5(2), a second compliance label must be attached stating by whom the vehicle was altered, the date of completion, and the vehicle’s weight and type (if different from the original compliance label) (Motor Vehicle Safety Regulations, 2015, p. 44).

There is no mention of the modified vehicle having to comply with the requirement

for front and rear protective devices, i.e. bumpers (Motor Vehicle Safety Regulations, 2015, p. 231). There is also no requirement for an interior trunk release (Motor Vehicle Safety Regulations, 2015, p. 266), despite an occupant now sitting within the cargo area of the vehicle and potentially needing to escape. Though the restraint system used for wheelchairs and scooters is such that the people with an MI are unlikely to be able to release it themselves, there should be some chance for them to exit from the rear of the vehicle in the event of a collision.

D409

CSA-‐D409-‐02 (Standards), a National Standard of Canada set by the Standards Council of Canada, stipulates safety regulations required for “motor vehicles […] designed and manufactured, or converted, and equipped for the purpose of transporting persons with physical disabilities” (2004, p. 1). The Standards cover the physical dimensions and requirements regarding grab bars, contrast within the vehicle, as well as the technical specifications and requirements for the vehicle’s engine and body. Many of these regulations are similar to what would be seen in the standards for an OEM vehicle, though accessible vehicles are required by law to have a first aid kit and a fire extinguisher on board (Canadian Standards Association, 2004, p. 12-‐13). There is only one reference to the government testing a representative vehicle (of the many which will be sold): in the case of power lifts to permit a person with an MI to board, the lift must support 408 kg for 2 minutes without any sign of failure (Canadian Standards Association, 2004, pp. 14-‐15). However, these power lifts are rarely used on vehicles outside of accessible buses. D-‐409-‐02 is a crucial piece of the puzzle in overall vehicle safety due to the following clause:

4.2 Modifications It is the responsibility of the party making any modifications to the vehicle for any purpose, after its manufacture and certification, to ensure compliance with all the provisions outlined in the applicable Regulations under the Motor Vehicle Safety Act. (2004, p. 4)


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This clause bears striking similarity to the U.S.’s National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s regulation concerning modified vehicles. Though the American regulation only covers specific modifications that would make an OEM vehicle accessible, D-‐409 covers all types of modifications and puts the responsibility for meeting all safety requirements squarely in the hands of modifiers.

Canadian Import Safety Standards

Import 5.4 & CL9203(E)

Transport Canada, a federally regulated body that covers national transportation and safety, is responsible for laws concerning the importation of vehicles. Section 5.4 of the Canadian Vehicle Importation Regulations covers importing vehicles produced after 2008, as many brands do not have manufacturing facilities within Canada. Section 5.4 is relevant only for vehicles “in stock condition as delivered from the original manufacturer” (Transport Canada, Section 5.4, 2014, p. 1), i.e. un-‐modified in any way other than small changes required to bring the vehicle into full conformation with Canadian safety requirements. Typically, this includes very minor modifications to the vehicle. Any necessary modifications must be performed and documented by a retailer authorized by the original brand before the brand’s company can obtain final clearance.

Canada relies on the United States’ safety standards for imported vehicles. To meet

requirements as a “U.S. specification vehicle”, it must be “designed, built, tested and certified by original equipment manufacturer (OEM) to meet all applicable U.S. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSSs)” (Transport Canada, Document CL9203(E), 2015, p. 1). Outside of modifications specifically required to make the vehicle comply with Canada’s safety standards (e.g. daylight running lamps, etc.), no other kind of modification can be performed on a vehicle if it is to be imported into Canada. This does not include vehicles that have been converted for accessibility, or otherwise, at facilities outside of Canada, and whose modifications drastically alter the integrity of the vehicle.

One accessible vehicle falls under the auspices of Import 5.4: the MV-‐1 made by

Mobility Ventures LLC (2014). The engineers at Mobility Ventures integrated all accessible features into the MV-‐1’s design. Thus, the MV-‐1 in stock (OEM) condition already has a ramp, safety grab bars, minimum interior height, and safety restraints built in to accommodate wheelchairs and scooters. The ramp, a side entry slides under the vehicle, keeping exits free during a collision. These features have not been installed by a third party, thus the MV-‐1 meets the American FMVSS as well as Canada’s amendments. Meeting the FMVSS automatically requires the MV-‐1 to pass every possible crash test.


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Import 5.5

Transport Canada’s Import Regulation, Section 5.5, concerns the importation of vehicles “modified to meet the needs of physically challenged individuals. Modifications may include: raised roof, lowered floor, specially designed adjustable driver seat, hand controls, power lift, etc.” (Transport Canada, Section 5.4, 2014, p. 1). This section relies on American standards, outlined below, whereby modifiers self-‐certify the vehicles.

American Standards

OEM vehicles are thoroughly designed and tested for crashworthiness. However, MAVs do not undergo this design or testing, as the priority rests on accessibility rather than safety. At fault is the U.S. government, which relinquished all oversight of specific vehicular modifications in the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s ruling, regulation 49 CFR Part 595. Up until the ruling, the modifier of any accessible vehicle had to apply on behalf of each individual customer to the NHTSA for permission to make accessibility modifications. The delay in obtaining permission, due to the overwhelming number of applicants, led many companies to modify vehicles without authorization. This transgression meant the companies did not receive guidance on safety standards and techniques. This remains an issue as the NHTSA admits to difficulties in efficiently distributing safety information to modifiers.

The Agency proposed for this rulemaking to exempt: “modifications that made the

original equipment inoperative, but either did not appear to lead to a degradation of safety or all methods available to accommodate the needs of the disabled occupant rendered the original equipment or feature inoperative” (Exemption from the Make Inoperative Prohibition, 2001, p. 5). The use of the word “appear” in this legislative document is cause for alarm: it shows that the NHTSA does not have data to support its claim that modifications don’t lead to safety degradations. There is no current push to fill this knowledge gap by running tests or soliciting information from scientific studies. Instead, the NHTSA seems satisfied with its assumption that the MAVs “appear” to be as safe, or almost as safe, as OEM vehicles.

Comments were solicited by the NHTSA and were included in this ruling, to help

explain the context of their decisions. There was significant concern expressed by the Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety, the disability advocacy group Access to Independence and Mobility, and vehicle modifiers, that the ruling would not provide “significant, on-‐going monitoring of vehicle modifications” (Exemption from the Make Inoperative Prohibition, 2001, p. 5). The NHTSA was also urged by the University of Virginia Automobile Safety Laboratory to implement studies to determine if any modifications pose an undue risk to safety, though it conceded that gathering “real world


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injury data” to correlate levels of risk would be almost impossible (Exemption from the Make Inoperative Prohibition, 2001, pp. 5-‐6). Though the percentage of vehicle accidents involving a MAV may be small, it does not preclude dangerous flaws in today’s modified vehicles.

Ultimately, the NHTSA claimed to have assessed the decrease in safety that each

type of modification incurs, and, in most instances, they decided that there was no “significant loss of safety” (Exemption from the Make Inoperative Prohibition, 2001, p. 9), without qualifying the term “significant”. Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety noted that granting blanket exemption for specific modifications “does nothing to assure disabled occupants that their vehicles will be altered properly and safely, that modifiers will make only those changes permitted by the exemption and will certify their work, or that future purchasers will be informed that the safety equipment has been rendered inoperable” (Exemption from the Make Inoperative Prohibition, 2001, p. 9). The NHTSA acknowledged during the proceedings that “a substantial number of vehicle modifiers ‘do not possess sufficient knowledge of the standards to judge whether a particular modification may affect a vehicle’s compliance with the standards’” (Exemption from the Make Inoperative Prohibition, 2001, p. 9). Advocates also stated:

“… nothing in the proposed rule provides any assurance that the list will be read, understood, and correctly applied by modifiers, that modifications will be limited to only those portions of the standard that are exempt, that the modifications will be properly performed, or that the disabled driver will know what specific items of equipment were modified, in what way, and the extent to which these modifications may affect operating safety and vehicle crashworthiness.” (Exemption from the Make Inoperative Prohibition, 2001, p. 9)

This ultimately provides a challenge for the NHTSA, by claiming that by this ruling,

they “relinquishes [sic] fundamental oversight responsibilities at a time when effective oversight of vehicle modification is becoming more pervasive and more important” (Exemption from the Make Inoperative Prohibition, 2001, p. 10). The NHTSA looks at standard vehicles more stringently than ever before, constantly raising the bar on minimum safety requirements in order to save lives. However, with this ruling, it became, and remains, more lax with standards for MAVs.

To properly test a vehicle for safety, dozens of the same vehicle are required, which

may be an unaffordable option for smaller modifiers. At the same time, the government has not stepped in and taken ownership over the safety of MAV testing. Their inaction turns a blind eye to a vulnerable population. The government rightly sets the standard of


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automobile safety, though, at the moment, it does not go to any great length, to protect the more physically vulnerable occupants in MAVs in Canada and the United States.

Implications for the Public

City of Toronto Accessible Taxicabs

MAVs, whose safety is untested, are being driven around North America. The percentage of MAVs currently on the road is so small that the University of Virginia Automobile Safety Laboratory claimed it was unable to glean “real-‐world injury data… to accurately determine the level of risk involved in vehicle modifications” (Exemption from the Make Inoperative Prohibition, 2001, pp. 5-‐6). Toronto may now begin tabulating this ‘real-‐world injury data’; as of July 1, 2014, Toronto’s City Council issued 290 accessible vehicle licenses (Toronto City Council, 2014), with a view to eventually having a fully accessible fleet of taxis.

It is clear from the above laws that the true level of safety of modified accessible

vehicles is unknown. The government does not crash-‐test MAVs, nor does it require them to be tested by an objective third party. Thus, the public can only rely on the integrity of each modifier to create the safest MAV possible.

General Safety of these Vehicles

As I related in my paper “The Double Standard in Accessible Vehicle Safety” (Kierans, 2015, pp. 9-‐11), I visited Shoppers Home Healthcare, a distributor of BraunAbility MAVs, in December of 2014 to ask them directly about the safety of the MAVs they produce. I spoke with the lead salesman, Rob Simon, in an effort to clarify exactly what safety testing is done on these vehicles. He informed me that BraunAbility was able to (self) certify the conversion of a new OEM model within a few months of that model becoming available to the general public, and subsequently mass-‐produced the converted results. As the 2015 Dodge Grand Caravan had come out in July-‐August 2014, by December, a rear-‐entry modified Grand Caravan was already for sale by Shoppers. This short turn-‐around implies the use of similar, or identical, methods of modification that may not take into account subtle changes to the vehicle’s design each year.

I attempted to ask how different modifications might affect the integrity of the

vehicle during a crash, but Mr. Simon did not go into specifics. Instead, he explicitly asserted that each new MAV undergoes the same 32 crash tests that are performed on OEM vehicles. Knowing the U.S. and Canadian weak requirements for certifying MAVs, I asked where I could find this crash test data, either online or in print form. Mr. Simon did not know himself, but speculated that the crash test data could be found “somewhere on the


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web” or on the IIHS.org website for crash test ratings (personal communication, December 1, 2014).

Though I searched online, I was unable to find these “32 crash test results”. I then

followed up over the phone with the IIHS: they told me that they had not, and did not, crash test or certify any MAVs, as the applicable US laws place the responsibility for crash testing on the modifier (personal communication, December 3, 2014). I contacted BraunAbility directly, but neither a customer service agent nor her manager could tell me what (if any) crash tests or safety tests are done on BraunAbility MAVs. She further stated that none of the employees she knew were aware of which crash tests are done, and if the vehicles passed or failed any of those tests (personal communication, December 3, 2014).

Extent of Inadequate Oversight

Placing the certification of MAVs in the hands of modifiers has led to a void of safety information. Though modifiers may in fact take every precaution and constantly improve the modifications to ensure that MAVs are as safe as OEM vehicles, there is no publicly available data to support or refute this. The NHTSA’s public confession that MAV modifications do not “appear” to lead to a degradation of safety, or that some safety features had to be removed to allow the vehicle to be made accessible (Exemption from the Make Inoperative Prohibition, 2001, p. 5), implies that the U.S. and Canadian governments are aware that MAVs are less safe than OEM vehicles. Despite this, MAVs are imported, sold, and used by individuals with MIs, their families, and, increasingly, the general public.

Instead of MAVs being used almost exclusively by individuals with MIs, and their

families, Toronto’s accessible taxi fleet ferries passengers across the city, mostly in MAVs (not the OEM MV-‐1). The issue of ‘relative safety’, which has long been reluctantly accepted by the disabled community (for lack of better options), is now thrust upon a public that is unaware that the ‘relative safety’ of MAVs is inferior to OEM vehicles. While an individual with an MI who purchases a MAV is given a general idea of the changes made to the structure of the vehicle, the general public is not conscious of these facts when they hail a MAV taxi. They are therefore unaware that they may face an increased risk of injury in the event of a collision, and that ignorance should be considered unacceptable by our government.

Before the introduction of the MV-‐1, it appeared that the only option for making a

vehicle accessible was to modify its structure significantly and possibly compromise safety features. However, the MV-‐1 proves that an accessible vehicle does not have to compromise any safety regulation, and can be crash tested to OEM vehicle standards. A vehicle is now available that is both accessible and safe.


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Recommendations The Federal Government, if it is unable to solicit disclosure of crash test data from

modifiers or the donation of MAVs for crash testing, could involve an objective third party to run a full OEM crash test panel. These results would then provide a baseline for comparing the safety of MAVs to that of OEM vehicles. If serious discrepancies appear in the data, the federal government can then take steps to regulate modifiers to address these issues.

The City of Toronto allows both MAV and OEM accessible vehicles to be used as

taxis. Though forcing drivers to immediately sell their MAV vehicles is unreasonable given the monetary investment, the City can take its cue from whatever data the federal government gathers. The City of Toronto has significant leverage at this current time: as there are concrete deadlines to phase out all non-‐accessible taxis in favour of accessible models, there is a great financial incentive for all modifiers and accessible OEM companies to offer the safest model possible. If the City chose, it could require that MAV modifiers produce their safety data or face being removed from the list of approved accessible vehicles.

Conclusion Currently, the Canadian and American legislations don’t sufficiently regulate the

safety of MAVs to the extent that they regulate OEM vehicles. The general public is unaware of the lack of crash-‐test data surrounding MAV vehicles, and they should be made aware of safety shortcomings, which create and affect liability issues for the government and taxi companies. The lack of testing puts everyone in a vulnerable position, not just the vulnerable wheelchair-‐ or scooter-‐bound populace. Making accessible taxis sustainable should include safety measures through testing and tangible results. It’s better to address the issues of safety at the beginning of the initiative to ensure the success of the program long into the future. A gathering and release of crash test data from MAVs will maintain or raise their threshold of safety. This will align MAVs with OEM vehicles, ensuring safety for all.


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References “Accessible Vehicles,” R.R.O. 1990, Regulation 629 Ontario Highway Traffic Act. 2013 ed. Retrieved

from http://www.ontario.ca/laws/regulation/900629 “Exemption from the Make Inoperative Prohibition,” Title 49 U.S. Code of Federal Regulation, Pt 595.

2001 ed. Retrieved from http://www.nhtsa.gov/cars/rules/adaptive/Inoper/Index.html “Motor Vehicle Safety Regulations,” C.R.C., c. 1038. 2015 ed. Retrieved from http://laws-‐

lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/C.R.C.,_c._1038/FullText.html “Safety Inspections,” R.R.O. 1990, Regulation 611 Ontario Highway Traffic Act. 2014 ed. Retrieved

from http://www.ontario.ca/laws/regulation/900611 (Braun Customer Service, personal communication, December 3, 2014). (IIHS Customer Service, personal communication, December 3, 2014). (R. Simon, personal communication, December 1, 2014). Canadian Council of Motor Transport Administrators. (2014, October). National Safety Code

Standard 11 Part B. Retrieved from http://ccmta.ca/en/home/item/national-‐safety-‐code-‐standard-‐11-‐update-‐2014

Canadian Standards Association. (2004, October). D409-‐02: Motor Vehicles for the Transportation of Persons with Physical Disabilities. Retrieved from http://shop.csa.ca/en/canada/accessibility/cancsa-‐d409-‐02-‐r2012/invt/27014802002

Kierans, P. M. (2015). Evolution and Stagnation or: How the Stagnant Double Standard in Accessible Vehicle Safety Caused my Activist Positions to Evolve. York University, Toronto.

MOOvin VIDEO. (2013, June 16). Triple S Mobility Wheelchair Vans are a cut above the rest!! [YouTube Video]. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k3mU1_3Y4sY

Savaria. (2014, April 10). How Wheelchair Vans Are Made. [YouTube Video]. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D8Od9mne6Gw

syncrobismol2. (2007, July 19). Braun Braunability Entervan wheelchair van failing N.H.T.S.A Fuel Integrity Crash Test! [YouTube Video]. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=css25cMG9-‐0

Toronto. City Council. “City Council: Licensing and Standards Committee – Meeting 26: LS26.1 The Taxicab Industry Review – Final Report.” (Amended and Adopted Feb. 19, 2013). Retrieved from http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2014.LS26.1

Transport Canada. (2014, October 31). Vehicle Import Compatibility (Admissibility) list for vehicles purchased in the United States -‐ Section 5.4 -‐ Multipurpose Passenger Vehicles (MPV) Manufactured After September 1, 2007 (Vans, Mini-‐vans and Sport Utility Vehicles). Retrieved from http://www.tc.gc.ca/motorvehiclesafety/safevehicles/importation/usa/vafus/list2/Section5_4.htm

Transport Canada. (2014, October 31). Vehicle Import Compatibility (Admissibility) list for vehicles purchased in the United States -‐ Section 5.5-‐ Disabled Access Vehicle Conversion. Retrieved from http://www.tc.gc.ca/motorvehiclesafety/safevehicles/importation/usa/vafus/list2/Section5_5.htm

Transport Canada. (2015, July 24). Document CL9203(E) Before You Import – Explanations on Mandatory Compliance. Retrieved from www.tc.gc.ca/motorvehiclesafety/safevehicles/importation/usa/vafus/list2/explanations.htm


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Photo 1: MAV being built: lowered floor framework (MOOvin VIDEO, 2013)

Photo 2: Finished rear entry Dodge Grand Caravan, showing lowered floor (Savaria, 2013)


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Photo 3: Raised rear end of vehicle

Photo 4: Interior of Ford Transit Connect MAV, showing ramp in cargo position (flat on floor); also note fire extinguisher


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Photo 5: Dodge Grand Caravan rear entry MAV, showing ramp in passenger position (note safety sides protruding towards passenger)

Photo 6: Ford Transit Connect rear entry MAV: note rear of vehicle not raised


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Photo 7: Added side panelling on Dodge Grand Caravan MAV

Photo 8: Position of side entry ramp during operation

Door extended down


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Photo 9: Side entry ramp locked in place: note safety lip protruding towards passenger

Photo 10: Side entry Toyota Sienna: shot of rear configuration

Safety panel protecting gas tank; attached by visible bolts

Fuel Tank

Muffler


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Photo 11: Close-‐up of fuel tank on Toyota Sienna MAV

Photo 12: Fuel Tank on used side entry MAV


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Photo 13: Close-‐up of fuel tank on used side-‐entry MAV

Photo 14: Fuel tank guard on Dodge Grand Caravan MAV


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Photo 15 (syncrobismol2, 2007)

Photo 16 (syncrobismol2, 2007)


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Photo 17: Note fuel puddle (syncrobismol2, 2007)

a critical examination of mav safety standards by patricia kierans

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