a complete analysis of plato s philosophy of humor

8/8/2019 A Complete Analysis of Plato s Philosophy of Humor

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A Complete Analysis of Plato's Philosophy of Humor

Jonathon D. Jones

Plato: Phi 5410

April 15, 2005

13300 Village Park Drive

Apt. 1070

Southgate, MI 48195


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Introduction

In this paper, I will answer four questions. First, what was Plato's theory of humor?

Second, how was this view different from ordinary Greek thought on the topic? Third, what was

Plato's own experience with humor? Finally, if he thought humor was immoral or undesirable,

then why did Plato use it in his own writing? While the first is my primary interest here, the

others seem to be very important in understanding Plato's thought. By answering the middle two

questions, I put Plato's thought into its historical, societal, and biographical context instead of

reading it as existing in a void. By exploring the final question, an apparent inconsistency, I will

show that Plato cannot have had an entirely negative view of humor, and indeed that he had a

place for it in philosophical discussion and writing. Answering these questions together allows a

broader and deeper understanding of Plato's thought than trying to answer the first question by

itself would permit. I will answer these questions in order: first, I shall give a preliminary account

of Plato's philosophy of humor. Then, I will look at the way ancient Greek culture dealt with

humor. Third, I will examine Plato's interaction with comedy, and finally explore why Plato used

humor himself. By doing so, I hope to present a more complete account of his thought. Before

any of that, however, I'll explain why Plato's philosophy of humor is important.

Some people may think that humor and comedy is, for Plato, just another category of

poetry, and of little interest by itself. I'm focusing on humor for three reasons. First, Plato seems

particularly troubled by comedy - it has features that make it distasteful over and above those of

poetry in general. Second, some of Plato's criticisms with poetry as a whole seem to really be

directed at (and a reaction to) comedic poetry. It wasn't epic or tragic poetry, after all, with which

philosophy had been quarreling, but Aristophanes and other comics. Third, Plato's theory and


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criticism of humor is not only concerned with comedy as presented by comedic plays, but with

non-poetic laughter and ridiculousness as well. He is sharply critical of buffoonery, for instance,

which was not restricted to poetry. Of course, these three statements must be supported, and I

will do just that - I will show that Plato thought comedy was worse than other types of poetry,

that some of his criticisms of poetry in general were really about comedy in particular, and that

his thoughts on humor extended beyond the realm of poetry. For the most part, I will do this in

my preliminary account of Plato's philosophy of humor, the exception being that I will address

the causal relation between the comic poets and Plato's criticisms of poetry in the section about

his experiences with these poets. Once this is done, it will be clear that a proper account of

humor takes us beyond poetry, and is of interest in itself.

A Preliminary Account

John Morreall describes Plato's views this way: "What we laugh at, in Plato's view, is

vice, particularly self-ignorance, in people who are relatively powerless. Our amusement is a

kind of malice toward such people, he thought, and this should make us wary of amusement, but

so should the fact that amusement is an emotion in which we tend to lose rational control of

ourselves."1 This account captures three distinct thoughts Plato had about humor. First,

ridiculousness is self-ignorance in the weak. Second, laughter is malicious. Third, laughter is in

some sense opposed to rationality. Let us look more closely at each of these points.

Plato discusses the first point in thePhilebus (48-50). He says there that, for a person to

be ridiculous, she must have two features. First, she must be ignorant of herself in some way.

1 Morreall 10.


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This can take three forms: she may be ignorant about her wealth, physique, or virtue. Plato thinks

that people are most commonly mistaken about their virtue; they imagine themselves more

virtuous people than they really are. Within this realm of virtue, people are most likely to be

ignorant about their lack of wisdom. It is noteworthy that Socrates, in theApology, claims to be

trying to remedy just this sort of ignorance - he claims that he has been trying to get people to

recognize that they lack wisdom (this idea will be important later). Now, at this point Plato has

divided up the various classes of self-ignorance, but he has another division in mind as well

(which is the second feature of the ridiculous). He divides all these ignorant people into two

groups: those who are able to retaliate against their mockers, and those who cannot. Only this

latter group he calls 'ridiculous.' The strong, on the other hand, he calls 'formidable', 'hateful', and

'ugly' (49B-C). Now, it may seem odd that Plato thinks a person's ridiculousness depends in part

on her ability to retaliate - how does this ability make them any less funny? Plato answers that it

is because ignorance in the strong is harmful to everyone around, whereas a weak person's

ignorance is harmless. He seems to also think that this applies even to people in plays, which

presumably refers to characters who are strong yet ignorant. He doesn't really explain why it is

harmful here, but perhaps it is this: We'll see later that Plato is concerned with poets presenting

bad role models. Between the weak and the strong, we would pick the strong as a role model, so

if these strong are ignorant, that would send the wrong message. If this is his meaning, he must

be thinking of the "strong" in a wider way than a mere ability to retaliate. Perhaps strength here

has something to do with political strength or strength of personality - something to do with the

amount of respect people hold for the person. In any event, a politically weak, disrespected

person is, indeed, more likely to be laughed at. With these concerns addressed, we now have his

definition of 'ridiculous': weak ignorance.


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Plato's second issue is that laughter at the ridiculous is malicious. Actually, this needs

some qualification. Plato sees malice as a delight in the ills of another, except that this applies

only to one's friends. As he says, "And to delight in our enemies' misfortune is neither wrongful

nor malicious" (Philebus 49D). So, laughing at one's enemies for being ridiculous (ridiculing

them) seems to be just fine (although, as we'll see, there may be other problems with laughter).

But ridiculing one's friends is wrongful and malicious - Plato condemns such behavior rather

strongly here. We ought not to laugh at the delusions of our friends. Again, this seems to apply

equally well to the stage and normal life, although it is not clear who would count as a friend or

enemy on the stage. Is it the character, or the actor himself, or both at whom we should not

laugh? That is, my friend may be playing the role of my enemy - can I laugh? What if my enemy

is playing the role of my friend? Either way, any particular comedy is unlikely to be acted

entirely by people who are enemies to the spectators, and the actors are also unlikely to be

playing only people who are enemies to the spectators, so perhaps it is unnecessary to determine

who precisely in the play it was wrong to laugh at - by laughing, we have probably wronged

someone.

Note that these first two issues he raises are not about comedy necessarily, but rather

laughter in general, so we have already seen how Plato's conception of humor goes beyond the

scope of poetry (of which comedy is a part). It is also clear that the malicious nature of humor

applies to comedic poetry, whereas it would not appear in, say, tragedy, so this is a feature of

comedy about which Plato is critical above and beyond any criticism he makes about poetry in

general. Thus, I have already shown that the first and third statements I gave as reasons for

studying Plato's philosophy of humor are, in fact, supported. That being said, let us return to the

third issue in Morreall's account of Plato.


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This last point is that laughter opposes rationality. Actually, this is not so much a

criticism of laughter or comedy specifically, but emotion and poetry in general. Plato describes

the effect of poetry in hisRepublic, writing, "it waters and fosters these feelings when what we

ought to do is to dry them up, and it establishes them as our rulers when they ought to be ruled, to

the end that we may be better and happier men instead of worse and more miserable" (606D). In

other words, the more we watch poetry, the more our emotions take over which, to Plato, is a

very bad thing - it is our reason which should rule the soul. Because of this effect of making us

more emotional, Plato bans from his ideal city all poetry except "hymns to the gods and the

praises of good men" (607A), lest pleasure and pain become lords of the city. Magnanimously,

however, he does provide that if lovers of poetry are able to show that it is "not only delightful

but beneficial to orderly government" (607D), he would allow it back into the city. That is, if

poetry were able to prove itself valuable, it would have a place in his ideal city. This is important,

and we will return to it when we evaluate Plato's own comedic writing.

Morreall, of course, does not cover all of Plato's philosophy of humor in his short

account; there is some more to be said. There are three things in particular that I want to address

about Plato's theory: first, another objection of his that focuses on our tendency to imitate what

we see; second, Plato's ban on jesting in hisLaws; finally, his thoughts on the playful nature of

written philosophy.

In plays (and any other sort of imitative activity), characters are frequently portrayed who

are less than exemplary. Unfortunately, we tend to take pleasure in these characters and their

flaws; we even love the charactersfortheir flaws. We enjoy watching characters do things we

would never do, and get vicarious joy out of it. This applies equally well to tragedy or comedy,

and certainly continues to be true today - one need only think of a modern-day soap operas and


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talk shows (e.g. Jerry Springer) to see examples of just this sort of love for the worst of society.

But, Plato warns us, such enjoyment is not without its price, for "what we enjoy in others will

inevitably react upon ourselves" (Republic X606B). In other words, you become what you see.

These flawed characters become role models for us, which is obviously a bad thing. This is why

Plato only wants poetry about gods and good men in his ideal city - they are much better models

for behavior. Earlier in theRepublic, Plato had decided that the only poet allowed would be an

"unmixed imitator of the good" (397D), that is, "the more austere and less delightful poet and

taleteller, who would imitate the diction of the good man" (398B). But such a poet would,

necessarily by Plato's account, not be funny - the flaws of a person are humorous, not the virtues.

So it would seem that if Plato is allowing some poetry into his city, it certainly isn't comedy.

Now, as far as humor is concerned, this imitative effect is not limited to comedic plays -

when we laugh and take pleasure in buffooneries even in private, we move more towards

becoming comedians and clowns ourselves. So even if a person were unconcerned about the fact

that laughter at ridiculous friends is malicious and wrongful, she should still be concerned lest

she become ridiculous and laughable herself. That is, she shouldn't laugh, not just for the good of

others, but for her own good (although Plato may not have seen these as very much different).

This argument is still often used against various media (e.g. violent movies), and the empirical

evidence seems at this point to be inconclusive. Hence, even if Plato is wrong about this

psychological claim, it is still very much a live question and not easily dismissed.

Much of Plato's objection to humor and laughter in theRepublic is really about the

guardians - it is they who are supposed to be ruled by reason, after all. In theLaws, he is more

concerned with general rules of behavior for all citizens. He bans "defamatory words" altogether,

no foul names or scoffing. These things are all very likely to bring about strong passions (spite


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and hatred), which he likens to a poison which turns us to wild beasts and costs us "the better

part of [our] dignity" (Laws XI935B). Indeed, he even seems to think that such passion is a form

of lunacy. Instead, in disagreements we should listen to our opponents, and then present our own

side without such rudeness. But what about when we are not arguing or angry - may we jest

merely in sport? Plato allows this, but only under a licensing system. The comedian must get

permission for any particular piece of satire from the minister of juvenile education, and without

such permission the comedian will be "declared a bad citizen and a lawbreaker" (936B) if she

performs it or trains anyone else to do so. This is not quite an outright ban on jesting, but it is

surely very restrictive. It also effectively keeps ordinary citizens from engaging in any sort of jest,

for who else but professionals would get such a license? It is also interesting that the person in

charge of licensing is primarily involved in education. Perhaps children are most likely to be

affected by such things, or perhaps it is simply that any such jesting must be tame enough that

even children would be able to watch it without corruption. Either way, in MPAA terms, Plato

has restricted his society to watching G-rated material.

The final point I wish to make in this preliminary account of Plato's philosophy of humor

is about the playful nature of written philosophy. Two quotes from thePhaedrus get his point

across well. First, he notes that if a man "has knowledge of what is just, honorable, and good . . .

it won't be with serious intent that he writes them in water or that black fluid we call ink" (276C).

Also, he thinks "that a written discourse on any subject is bound to contain much that is fanciful,

that nothing that has ever been written whether in verse or prose merits much serious attention"

(277E). Here, then, he is cautioning readers not to take their reading too seriously. Indeed, he

believes that the only role of a written work is to remind the writer and reader of things they have

already learned, and to provide intellectual recreation. Now, I'm not sure that these remarks can


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be taken as allowing jesting into a written work, but it is at least clear that such a work needn't be

taken literally and seriously. We will return to this point when discussing Plato's own use of

humor and comedy. Unsurprisingly, given his own reservations about the significance of the

written word, I think this is as far as Plato's writing can take us in describing his thoughts on

humor and comedy. That being the case, let us now turn to the thought of his culture, so that we

may know from whence his attitudes came and how much of his thought is original.

Ancient Greek Humor

To understand Plato's attitude towards comedy and humor, it is useful to look to the

culture in which it was developed. Plato lived from about 428 BC until about 348 BC, and so his

culture was that of fourth and fifth century ancient Greece. He was also an aristocrat, and the

particular views of his class no doubt affected Plato's thought. Finally, it is important that

although Plato was Athenian, he was also well-traveled. So while his ideas were probably

primarily influenced by his own city, he had plenty of exposure to the cultures of others, and it

would be too quick of us to narrow our sight merely to Athens. Keeping these thoughts in mind,

then, I will now examine ancient Greek conceptions of humor.

According to Jan Bremmer's essay, "Jokes, Jokers and Jokebooks in Ancient Greek

Culture," humor was rather different in Plato's day. While we engage in teasing and joking

almost constantly, for the Greeks "the occasions for laughter and mockery were not those of

everyday life but those of conviviality and festivity."2 Comedies were only performed at religious

festivals for Dionysos, and certain other religious events provided most of the other occasions for

2 Bremmer 13.


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mockery. Dionysos and Demeter were the gods associated with these events, and they were

"closely associated with reversals of the social order and both occupied an 'eccentric' position in

the Greek pantheon."3 Thus, humor mostly appeared in unusual contexts, and had a particular

time and place where it was appropriate. Comedy, humor, and mockery were certainly not

commonplace. This may seem odd to the modern reader, but consider our own tradition of April

Fool's Day. On this day, it is appropriate and expected to play pranks on one another of such a

nature that, if played at a different time, would seem at best odd and probably considered quite

rude. In much the same way, Halloween allows us to scare one another in various ways which

would be strange in everyday life. It is clear that we, too, reserve certain forms of entertainment

for special occasions.

Now, there were also non-religious events where humor would appear, which were the

symposiums. These were large dinner parties that Athenian aristocrats would hold, and by Plato's

time uninvited humorists would appear at the table.4 While the Greek word isgelotopoios,

literally 'laughter-producer,' I will follow Bremmer in referring to such a humorist as a 'buffoon.'5

These buffoons were there to provide laughter for their host, who would in return give them

food. They would flatter the host and make jokes and imitations, as well as comparisons. These

buffoons were mostly of lower classes - the aristocracy would have been invited to the dinners as

guests rather than needing to invite themselves and earn their food through laughter. A notable

exception was a group called 'the sixty', who were evidently part of the upper class (and one of

whom, Bremmer notes, was a well-known politician). But Bremmer concludes that this group

was likely formed to "shock the existing social order,"6 and I see no reason to think otherwise.

3 Bremmer 13.4 Bremmer 14.5 Bremmer 11.6 Bremmer 15.


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That this shock value was possible means that aristocratic buffoons were the exception, rather

than the rule, so it is clear that buffoonery was mostly a lower class occupation.

Plato's time brought a change in attitude toward this type of humor. Bremmer sees two

developments in fourth century Greece. "First, buffoonery became less and less acceptable to the

upper class as an expression of humour. Secondly . . . insulting others with jokes also became

less acceptable."7 Greek humor was moving away from jokes and toward more refined "wit," and

Plato was right there in the middle of this shift. It is hardly surprising, then, that he too would

find buffoonery and insulting humor to be unbecoming. It should be noted that Plato does not

make this distinction between jokes and wit, at least not in his written work. However, his

student Aristotle does make such a distinction. But he doesn't just categorize them; rather, he

sees one as more appropriate than the other, writing: "Some jokes are becoming to a gentleman,

others are not; see that you choose such as become you. Irony better befits a gentleman than

buffoonery; the ironical man jokes to amuse himself, the buffoon to amuse other people."8 Now,

we cannot travel backwards from Aristotle to Plato's thought, but this at least shows that by the

time of Aristotle, irony had progressed into a significantly preferred position over buffoonery.

One last historical/cultural note is important. In Sparta, "the young could attend the

Spartan messes in order to get accustomed to mocking without buffoonery and to endure being

mocked. However, when a Spartan could no longer tolerate being mocked, he could ask the

mocker to stop, which he immediately did."9 This seems rather close to Plato's own

recommendation in theLaws as quoted earlier. There, Plato allows jesting without malice or

intent to harm: jesting in sport. Plato's thought here seems like a more refined version of the

7 Bremmer 20.8 Rhetoric 3.18, as quoted in Bremmer 20.9 Bremmer 21-22.


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Spartan practice, and since Plato was quite familiar with Sparta, it seems likely that this is not

mere coincidence. Indeed, a Spartan is one of the main characters of the book! This, then, helps

to explain part of Plato's thought.

What we have seen is that humor had a very defined place in Greek culture. It existed

mostly at festivals and aristocratic dinner parties. Athenian aristocracy was turning away from

humor as it had been presented in the past, with its focus on insults and mockery, and moving

toward refined "wit." This undoubtedly had an effect on Plato, and we certainly see this attitude

against insults and mockery throughout his thought on humor. Whether his aristocratic

background strongly influenced his thought is, of course, debatable, but we at least have one

explanation for how his thought came to be.

The Old Quarrel Between Philosophy and Poetry

It would be difficult to present a complete discussion of Plato's thought about comedy

without at least mentioning his observation that "there is from of old a quarrel between

philosophy and poetry" (Republic X607B). He gives two examples of the sort of thing poetry has

said about philosophy: "such expressions as 'the yelping hound barking at her master and mighty

in the idle babble of fools,' and 'the mob that masters those who are too wise for their own good,'

and the subtle thinkers who reason that after all they are poor" (Republic X607B). Robert Brock

explains that these passages are probably comic, and that it is clear that Plato thinks of this

quarrel as "essentially a matter of comedy attacking philosophy."10 Although the Pythagoreans

were against laughter (Pythagoras himself reportedly never laughing),11 I will focus on the poetic

10 Brock 40.11 Bremmer 21.


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side of the quarrel. In particular, I will look at the two most relevant interactions between poetry

and philosophy to Plato's thoughts: personal attacks on Plato from his contemporaries, and

Aristophanes' Clouds.

Brock tells us that Plato himself was the victim of comic attacks.12 A few things are

noteworthy about this. First, the comics were not simply making fun of the way he looked, or

other trivialities. Rather, they were sophisticated enough to attack his doctrines, like "the

immortality of the soul, . . . the absolute nature of the good, . . . the difference between belief and

knowledge,"13 and so on. Additionally, he was not the only philosopher ridiculed at this time. The

Pythagoreans and Plato were the most frequently mocked, but the Stoics, Cynics, Presocratics,

and others were also victims. Thus, Plato would have good reason to think that philosophy in

general was being attacked by poetry.

In his Clouds, Aristophanes presents a very negative picture of Socrates. What is

important here is not so much what Aristophanes actually says or did, but what Plato's Socrates

blames him for doing. In theApology, Socrates complains that he has been slandered by certain

people, especially playwrights, who have set the city against him. The only one of these people

he names is Aristophanes, saying "You have seen it for yourselves in the play by Aristophanes,

where Socrates goes whirling round, proclaiming that he is walking on air, and uttering a great

deal of other nonsense about things of which I know nothing whatsoever" (19B). The play he

describes is the Clouds, and Socrates thinks that this is what has made him so unpopular. Since

this speech is during a trial in which Socrates becomes convicted and sentenced to death, it

seems quite reasonable to think that Plato blames Aristophanes for the unjust killing of Socrates.

Since the Clouds is a comedy, this connection alone would seem quite sufficient to set Plato

12 Brock 41.13 Brock 41.


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against comedy, for he has seen first-hand the corrupting influence it can have.

Plato puts Aristophanes and Socrates together in his Symposium, and they appear to be

friendly. Leo Strauss explains their relationship this way: "Far from being an enemy of Socrates,

Aristophanes was his friend, but somewhat envious of his wisdom."14 Brock uses the Symposium

to come to the conclusion that Socrates and Plato were forgiving of the comedic attacks against

them.15 However, I see a more explanatory issue: if Aristophanes and Socrates were friends, as

Plato represents them, then Aristophanes comes out quite badly in Plato's later account in the

Philebus. Recall that Plato says there that laughing at one's enemies is one thing, but laughing at

your friends is malicious and wrongful. If Socrates and Aristophanes were friends, then, Plato is

indirectly accusing him of being malicious and wrongful. His attitude towards Aristophanes,

then, provides some reason for Plato's later thought about the particularly bad act of ridiculing

one's own friends.

Despite this negative attitude toward Aristophanes, Plato is not necessarily immune to

his influence and ideas. Indeed, some of Aristophanes' reasons for creating comedy might help to

explain Plato's own use. Strauss explains that Aristophanes is "concerned with concealing vice,

i.e., with depriving vice of its attraction by ridiculing it,"16 specifically, "defending justice against

Socrates' attack on it by presenting Socrates as ridiculous."17 We will see later that Plato can be

seen to be doing just this sort of thing - presenting various ideas and people as ridiculous as a

way of combating them. So Aristophanes may be both a positive and negative influence on Plato.

If my (and Brock's) analysis of this quarrel is accurate, it would seem that, rather than

poetry, Plato thinks there is a quarrel between philosophy and comedy. This makes sense, for it is

14 Strauss 5.15 Brock 42.16 Strauss 5-6.17 Strauss 6.


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unclear how philosophy would be portrayed badly in an epic or tragic poem. Socrates certainly

wasn't slandered by these other sorts of poetry. Thus, I think it is reasonable to think that much of

Plato's problem with poetry in general is, in fact, a reaction against comic poetry specifically.

This concludes my remarks on Plato's experience with comic poets, so let us now look at his own

use of comedy and humor.

Plato's Use of Comedy and Humor

Plato's own use of comic techniques, as well as actual comic dramas, is nicely

documented by Roger Brock in his essay, "Plato and Comedy". I will examine some of the more

interesting (and clear) examples, but first I will provide a list of the types of comedic devices

Plato uses (each of which is developed and detailed in Brock's account). Plato directly quotes

from Aristophanes' Clouds, and makes allusions to a variety of comedies.18 Some of the words

Plato uses were more commonly found in comedic works, and some were normally reserved for

such use.19 He "indulges freely in word-play,"20 including puns and running jokes, as well as

coining his own words (sometimes obviously for comedic purposes). He has philosophic jokes,

comic imagery, even whole burlesque dialogues.21 Farce, parody, and satire can all be found in

his writings.22 He even appears to use some of the actual ideas of the comedy of his day (for

instance, conceptions of popular Athenian politics).23 What this shows is that Plato is well

acquainted with the comedy of his day, and uses humor in various forms throughout his works.

18 Brock 42.19 Brock 43.20 Brock 44.21 Brock 44-45.22 Brock 45-46.23 Brock 47-48.


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But this cannot be explained simply by assuming that he wrote like this as a young man, before

he was quite as critical of comedy. After all, Brock makes numerous citations to comedic

passages of Plato in works that are generally thought to have been written later in his life, and

indeed there are plenty of such passages in theRepublic, one of his main anti-comedic works (for

instance, at 545D-E, where he pokes fun at Homer). So it cannot simply be a case of shifting

views, and we must look for our solution elsewhere.

Of course, a mere list gives the reader little appreciation for Plato's humor, so let us look

at an example from theEuthydemus. This passage is certainly comedic:

You say that cutting up and skinning is proper for the cook? Did you admit that or

not?

I did, said I, but spare me please.

It is clear, then, he said, that if someone butchers the cook and cuts him up and

boils and roasts him, he will be doing his proper job, and anyone who forges the

smith and pots the potter, he does the proper job too.

O Poseidon! I said. Now you put the finishing touch to your wisdom! (301d)

Whether the passage is funny will, perhaps, depend on the reader, but the argument is

plainly ridiculous. The last line is the typical Socratic response to ridiculousness - irony. If none

of Brock's citations were convincing, one thing is beyond doubt - Plato's Socrates uses irony

constantly. Now that it is firmly established that Plato does use humor, I am ready to investigate

why he does so.

An obvious answer might be that Plato wanted to make his writing entertaining. But I

don't think that that has much explanatory power - the entertainment value of his writing just

doesn't seem to concern him that much. These works are primarily philosophical, and intended to


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help the reader to gain knowledge (or at least to reject her false beliefs). Adding humor to a piece

of writing takes a good deal of work, and it seems to me that if Plato was willing to put that

much effort into it, he must have thought it would serve some philosophical or pedagogical

purpose. That is, I think he added humor primarily to assist the reader, and any entertainment

value it might have was of lesser concern. At any rate, we have taken his works as

philosophically interesting for a very long time, and so appeals to the literary merit of his humor

are less than satisfying - we want to know if there is anything philosophical going on. I will show

that his humor does indeed serve a philosophically useful purpose.

The quote fromEuthydemus is instructive. As we noted, Plato presents a view as

ridiculous, and then Socrates is ironic. By doing this, Plato is able to show that the argument is

wrong-headed in some way. He is saying something like the following: "If you hold this view,

you shall be ridiculous." Socrates' irony is useful because he isn't directly mocking anyone, but it

is still just as clear a statement to the reader that the view, person, or argument about which he is

being ironic is absurd. Now, this may seem like Plato is appealing to the insecurity of the reader,

who surely will not want to be ridiculous. I think Plato is doing more than warning - he really is

presenting a view with his humor. But instead of telling his reader that a view is incorrect or

arguing for its falsity, he insteadshows how it leads to absurdity and ridiculousness. This, I think,

is a very effective technique, and when done right it can be quite convincing. Indeed, what Plato

is doing can be seen as a more entertaining version ofreductio ad absurdum (which, of course,

had not been formalized yet).

This explanation doesn't cover all of Plato's uses of humor, but it does illustrate one of the

more common pieces of humor he uses. William Chase Greene details many of the other ways in

which Plato uses humor to drive home certain points or for other philosophical purposes, but


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there is not the space here to write much about it.24 One of his remarks shows the sheer amount

of humor to be found: "On almost every page of Plato is inscribed a ridicule, sometimes

courteous, sometimes veiled, often outspoken, of Plato's adversaries."25 That he is ridiculing

"adversaries" will become important in a moment, but for now we simply note that there are

many examples of philosophically meritorious humor, and certainly lots of ridicule, in the works

of Plato.

This gives us some reason why Plato might want to put humor into his work (because it is

philosophically useful as well as entertaining), but we still need to know why Plato thought he

could. After all, didn't he think comedy and laughter were bad things? There are two defenses I

think are appropriate here: first, I will take another look at Plato's theory of the ridiculous in the

Philebus; second, I will re-examine Plato's remarks about the reintroduction of useful poetry.

As we have seen, Plato thinks that people are ridiculous especially when they have false

beliefs about their own knowledge. Thus, humor can help to highlight such a person; as Brock

puts it, "it is in the nature of comedy to expose pretension, including the false claim to

knowledge, on the stage and in life."26 This is related to the earlier philosophical reason for Plato

to want to use humor, but there is more to remember from thePhilebus - it is only malicious and

wrongful to laugh atfriends. But Plato doesn't laugh at his friends in his dialogues - rather, he

ridicules his adversaries. In any case, since many of the opponents of Socrates in the dialogues

were dead, it is unclear how much harm could really have come to them through ridicule. And

since his dialogues are not plays, there will be no actors to laugh at either. Thus, the moral issue

can be resolved - no friends are hurt.

24 See Greene's article, "The Spirit of Comedy in Plato."25 Greene 66.26 Brock 40.


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But what of the political issue? Surely Plato wouldn't want to ban his own books from the

ideal city, would he? I think not, and luckily he provides an escape. For, as he said, if poetry is

able to present itself as useful, it can be readmitted. If I am correct in asserting that many (if not

all) of Plato's uses of humor have philosophical merit, such humor would clearly be useful. And

if they are useful, then there seems to be no problem in allowing them into the city. Thus, I think

Plato is able to resolve this issue as well. Indeed, this makes a third possible useful purpose for

Plato's poetic language - he can hold these works up as examples of just the sort of poetry which

could be allowed back into the city.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have done four things. First, I have given a preliminary account of Plato's

thought, based solely on his text. Second, I have shown the ways in which his thought can be

seen as a function of his culture. Third, I have looked at the personal experiences of Plato and

shown why he would particularly dislike comedy. Finally, I have given an account of Plato's own

use of humor and used this to interpret some of what I wrote in the preliminary account. I have

tried, as much as possible, to explain Plato's motivations for his various remarks about humor

and for his using it in his own work. All of this together, then, provides what I hope is a clear and

complete analysis of Plato's relationship with humor and comedy.


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Works Cited

Bremmer, Jan. "Jokes, Jokers, and Jokebooks in Ancient Greek Culture."A Cultural History of

Humour. Ed. Jan Bremmer and Herman Roodenburg. Cambridge: Polity, 1997. 11-28.

Brock, Roger. "Plato and Comedy." 'Owls to Athens'. Ed. E. M. Craik. Oxford: Oxford

University, 1990. 39-49.

Greene, William Chase. "The Spirit of Comedy in Plato."Harvard Studies in Classical

Philology 31 (1920): 63-123.

Morreall, John, ed. The Philosophy of Laughter and Humor. Albany, NY: State University of

New York, 1987.

Strauss, Leo. Socrates and Aristophanes. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1966.

a complete analysis of plato s philosophy of humor

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