a comparative analysis of seven asian anti-corruption agencies

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171 THE ASIA PACIFIC JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION VOL. 31, NO. 2 (DECEMBER 2009): 171-195 Benchmarking for Excellence: A Comparative Analysis of Seven Asian Anti-Corruption Agencies Jon S T Quah Anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) have been established in many Asian countries to tackle the problem of corruption. However, with the exceptions of the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau in Singapore and the Independent Commission Against Corruption in Hong Kong, many Asian ACAs have been ineffective. What criteria should be used to evaluate their effectiveness? After analyzing the functions of the ACAs in India, Hong Kong, Macao, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea and Thailand, this article recommends that their performance should be benchmarked according to 22 indicators. It concludes that benchmarking provides an ACA with an objective method for evaluating its performance by comparing it with the performance of more effective ACAs. Benchmarking also enables an ACA to improve its performance by introducing reforms to remove the weaknesses exposed by comparison with more effective ACAs in other countries. Introduction Corruption is perceived as a serious problem in many Asian countries today according to Transparency s International 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). The most common response in these countries is the establishment of anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) to combat corruption. However, according to Pope (2000: 104), ACAs have been more often failures than successes. What criteria should be used to evaluate their effectiveness? This article addresses this question by suggesting several criteria for benchmarking the performance of Asian ACAs. The article is divided into five sections. The first section defines benchmarking and identifies its rationale. The second section discusses the advantages of establishing ACAs. The third section focuses on the different types of ACAs and describes the functions of these ACAs: the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) in Singapore; the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in the Hong Kong SAR; the Commission Against Corruption (CCAC) in the Macao SAR; the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in India; the Korea Independent Commission Against Corruption (KICAC) in South Korea; the National Counter Corruption Commission (NCCC) in Thailand; and the Tanodbayan or Ombudsman in the Philippines. These seven ACAs are selected for

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THEASIAPACIFICJOURNALOFPUBLICADMINISTRATIONVOL.31,NO.2(DECEMBER2009):171-195

Benchmarking for Excellence: A Comparative Analysis of

Seven Asian Anti-Corruption Agencies

Jon S T Quah

Anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) have been established in many Asian countries to tackle the problem of corruption. However, with the exceptions of the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau in Singapore and the Independent Commission Against Corruption in Hong Kong, many Asian ACAs have been ineffective. What criteria should be used to evaluate their effectiveness? After analyzing the functions of the ACAs in India, Hong Kong, Macao, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea and Thailand, this article recommends that their performance should be benchmarked according to 22 indicators. It concludes that benchmarking provides an ACA with an objective method for evaluating its performance by comparing it with the performance of more effective ACAs. Benchmarking also enables an ACA to improve its performance by introducing reforms to remove the weaknesses exposed by comparison with more effective ACAs in other countries.

Introduction

Corruption isperceivedasaseriousprobleminmanyAsiancountriestoday according to Transparency ’s International 2008CorruptionPerceptionsIndex(CPI).Themostcommonresponseinthesecountriesistheestablishmentofanti-corruptionagencies(ACAs)tocombatcorruption.However,according toPope (2000:104),ACAshavebeen “moreoftenfailures thansuccesses.”Whatcriteriashouldbeusedtoevaluate theireffectiveness?ThisarticleaddressesthisquestionbysuggestingseveralcriteriaforbenchmarkingtheperformanceofAsianACAs.

Thearticle isdivided into five sections.The first sectiondefinesbenchmarkingandidentifies itsrationale.ThesecondsectiondiscussestheadvantagesofestablishingACAs.The thirdsection focuseson thedifferent typesofACAsanddescribes the functionsof theseACAs:theCorruptPractices InvestigationBureau (CPIB) inSingapore; theIndependentCommissionAgainstCorruption(ICAC)intheHongKongSAR;theCommissionAgainstCorruption(CCAC)intheMacaoSAR;theCentralBureauof Investigation (CBI) in India; theKorea IndependentCommissionAgainstCorruption(KICAC) inSouthKorea; theNationalCounterCorruptionCommission(NCCC)inThailand;andtheTanodbayan orOmbudsman in thePhilippines.ThesesevenACAsareselected for

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comparativeanalysistoillustratetheirdiversefunctionsandalsobecauseoftheiravailablepublishedperformancedata.Thefourthsectioncomparestheirperformanceaccordingtoseveralindicators.Theconcludingsectionrecommends thatAsianACAs shouldbenchmark theirperformanceaccordingto22indicators,asbenchmarkingenablestheirpoliticalleadersandpolicy-makers toassess theireffectivenessandmakethenecessarychangesforimprovingtheirperformance.

Benchmarking: Meaning and Rationale

TheoriginsofbenchmarkingcanbetracedtoJapanesebusinessfirmswhichvisitedothercountries inthe1950stobenchmarkthebestorganisationsfromwhichtotransfertechnologyandbusinesspracticestothemselves.These Japanesecompaniesdescribedwhat theydidas “industry tours” insteadofbenchmarking.Theprocessofthetoursinvolvedthesefoursteps:researchingpublisheddatatoidentifythebestorganisations;contactingtheorganizationstoscheduleavisit;visitingtheorganizationsandcarefullyselectingpertinentdata;andreturninghomeandadopting(withrelevantadaptations)thelessonslearnttogainacompetitiveadvantage(Harrington&Harrington1996:29).

Theapplicationofbenchmarkingtomeasurebusinessperformanceintermsofcost/salesandinvestmentratiosduringthe1950sencouragedcompanies in theUnitedStates to identify their own strengths andweaknessesbycomparingthemwiththoseoftheircounterpartswithintheindustry.Thegrowthofcomputertechnologyinthe1960sand1970sfurtherspurredtheapplicationofbenchmarking(Kozak2004:9).Xerox’s success inreinventing itself throughbenchmarkingresulted in therecognitionofbenchmarkingasan important toolofcontinuous improvement forAmericancompaniesinthe1980s.Benchmarkingisnowemployedintheautomotive,education,health,medicine, telecommunications, transportand tourism industriesand is recognised internationallyasaqualityimprovementtool(Kozak2004:9-10).

Inhiscontentanalysisof11widely-useddefinitions,Kozak (2004:7) found that “all thesedefinitionshave a common theme,namely:the continuousmeasurement and improvementof anorganization’s performanceagainstthebestintheindustrytoobtaininformationaboutnewworkingmethodsorpracticesinotherorganizations.”ThemostusefuldefinitionforthisarticleisSpendolini’s(1992:9)definitionofbenchmarkingas “acontinuous,systematicprocessforevaluatingtheproducts,services,andworkprocessesoforganizationsthatarerecognizedasrepresentingbestpractices for thepurposeoforganizational improvement.”Here,benchmarkingreferstotheprocessofevaluatingtheeffectivenessofAsianACAswiththeobjectiveofimprovingtheirperformance.

Whatistherationaleforbenchmarking?Internalbenchmarkingrefersto“two-waycommunicationandsharingopinionsbetweendepartments

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withinthesameorganizationorbetweenorganizationsoperatingaspartofachain indifferentcountries” (Kozak2004:10). Incontrast,externalbenchmarkinginvolves“acomparisonofworkwithexternalorganizationsinordertodiscovernewideas,methods,productsandservices.”Externalbenchmarkingenablesanorganisation to improve itsperformancebymeasuringhow itperforms, comparing itwith its competitors, anddetermininghowthelatterhaveachievedtheirperformancelevels.Thus,externalbenchmarkingprovidesanorganisationwith“opportunitiesforlearningfromthebestpracticesandexperiencesofotherswhoareattheleadingedge”(Kozak2004:11).

This article focuses on external benchmarking to compare theperformanceofsevenAsianACAsonthebasisofseveralindicators.Rose(2005:35)contends thatbenchmarkingprovidespolicy-makerswithatoolforevaluatinganationalprogrammeandenablesthemtolearnaboutsuccessfulprogrammesinothercountries.Thus:

The intentionof benchmarking is constructive: to evaluate aprogramme’sperformanceby ameasure independent of theopinionsofpolicymakers . . .Evaluatingaprogrammeagainstabenchmark standardwill showwhether, or towhat extent,satisfaction is justified. Insofaras the resultsarepositive, theprocessendorsesthepredispositiontoignorewhatisdoneabroad.Butinsofarasbenchmarkingshowsthataprogrammeproducingdomesticsatisfactionisnotsosuccessfulasothersevaluatedbythesamestandard,benchmarkingcanstimulatepolicymakerstoadoptimprovementsbylearningfromcomparablecountriesthatdodobetter.

In short, the advantage of benchmarkingAsianACAs is that itidentifiesthoseineffectiveACAsandencouragesthemtoperformbetterbyemulatingthebestpracticesoftheirmoreeffectivecounterparts.

Rationale and Advantages of ACAs

ACAsarespecialisedagenciesestablishedbygovernmentsforthespecificpurposeofminimizingcorruptionintheircountries.Meagher(2005:70)definesACAsas“separate,permanentagencieswhoseprimaryfunctionistoprovidecentralizedleadershipin[such]coreareasofanti-corruptionactivity...[as]policyanalysisandtechnicalassistanceinprevention,publicoutreachand information,monitoring, investigation,andprosecution”.Nichollsetal(2006:476)observethatanACAhasfouradvantages:reducedadministrativecosts;enhancedpublicprofile;concentrationofexpertise;andreduceduncertaintyoverthe jurisdictionbyavoidingduplicationofpowersandwork.TheUnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime’sAnti-CorruptionToolkit(2004:89-90)hasidentifiednineadvantagesofanACA:

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ahighdegreeofspecialisationandexpertise;ahighdegreeofautonomyto insulate it fromcorruptionandotherundueinfluences;separatenessfromtheagenciesanddepartmentsthat itwillbe investigating;a“freshstart” whennew,andthusfreefromcorruptionandotherproblemsthatmayaffectexistinginstitutions;considerablepubliccredibility;establishedsecurityprotection;political,legalandpublicaccountability;clarityintheassessmentofitsprogress,successesandfailures;andswiftactionagainstcorruptionastask-specificresourcesareusedandofficialsarenotsubjectedtothecompetingprioritiesofgenerallawenforcement,auditandsimilaragencies.

Themost importantadvantageofcreatinganACAis that it sendsapowerfulsignal to thecitizens in thecountry that thegovernment iscommitted to fighting corruption (UNODC2004: 90).However, thisinitialadvantage iseroded if thegovernmentdoesnotdemonstrate itscommitmentbyproviding theACAwith sufficient legalpowersandadequatehumanandfinancialresources.Also, thegovernmentshouldprovide theACAwithoperationalautonomyso that itcan investigateanyone,regardlessofstatusorposition.AlloftheoperationaladvantageslistedabovewillcountfornaughtifthegovernmentdoesnotsupporttheACAbyallowing it tooperate independentlyandbyproviding itwithadequateresourcesforperformingitsfunctionseffectively.

Types and Functions of Asian ACAs

Types of ACAs

Table1showsthat16ACAswereestablishedinAsiabetween1952and2006,fromtheCPIB’sformationinSingaporeinOctober1952tothecreationoftheIndependentAuthorityAgainstCorruption(IAAC)inMongoliainDecember2006.

Thereare several typesofACAsdependingonwhether theyareconcernedwithcombatingcorruptionsolely,orwiththeperformanceofmanyfunctionsincludinganti-corruption;onwhethertheir jurisdictionislimitedtothepublicsectoronly,ortoboththepublicandprivatesectors;andonthenatureoftheiranti-corruptionfunctions.Table2summarisesthefeaturesofthesevenACAswhichareanalysedbelow.

Functions of CPIB

DuringSingapore’scolonialperiod, theBritishauthoritiesreliedontheAnti-CorruptionBranch(ACB)oftheCriminalInvestigationDepartment(CID)intheSingaporePoliceForcetocurbcorruption.Thiswasaseriousmistakeforthreereasons.First,theACBwasasmallunitofonly17menwithadifficulttasktoperform:theeradicationofcorruptioninthecivilservice.Second,astheCID’stopprioritywastodealwithseriouscrimes

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Table 1Anti-Corruption Agencies in Asian Countries

Country Anti-corruption agency Date established

Singapore CorruptPracticesInvestigationBureau

October1952

India CentralBureauofInvestigation

April1963

Malaysia Anti-CorruptionAgency October1967

HongKongSAR,China IndependentCommissionAgainstCorruption

February1974

BruneiDarusalam Anti-CorruptionBureau February1982

Philippines Tanodbayan*(Ombudsman) May1988

Nepal CommissionfortheInvestigationofAbuseofAuthority

1990

SriLanka CommissiontoInvestigateAllegationsofBriberyorCorruption

November1994

Pakistan NationalAccountabilityBureau November1999

Thailand NationalCounterCorruptionCommission** November1999

MacaoSAR,China CommissionAgainstCorruption December1999

SouthKorea KoreaIndependentCommissionAgainstCorruption***

January 2002

Indonesia CorruptionEradicationCommission December2003

Bangladesh Anti-CorruptionCommission May2004

Bhutan OfficeoftheAnti-CorruptionCommission January2006

Mongolia IndependentAuthorityAgainstCorruption December2006

*TheTanodbayanwasoriginallyestablishedbyPresidentFerdinandMarcos in July1979.As itwasineffective,itwasreorganisedwhenPresidentCorazonAquinoissuedExecutiveOrderNo242on24July1987.TheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanbecameoperationalon12May1988.**TheNCCCwasrenamedtheNationalAnti-CorruptionCommission(NACC)on15July2008.***TheKICACwasmergedwiththeOmbudsmanandtheAdministrativeAppealsCommissiontoformtheAnti-CorruptionandCivilRightsCommission(ACRC)on29February2008.

likehomicide,thetaskoffightingcorruptionreceivedlowerpriorityastheACBhadtocompetewithotherbranchesforlimitedresources.Third,theACBwasineffectivebecauseoftherampantpolicecorruptionincolonialSingapore(Quah2007:14-15). InOctober1951,aconsignmentof1,800poundsofopiumworthS$400,000(US$133,330)wasstolenbyagangof

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Table 2Types of Anti-Corruption Agencies in Seven Countries

Anti-corruption agency

Functions Jurisdiction Location

CPIB,Singapore Investigation,preventionandeducation

Publicandprivatesectors

PrimeMinister’sOffice

ICAC,HongKongSAR,China

Investigation,preventionandeducation

Publicandprivatesectors

ChiefExecutive’sOffice

NCCC(NACCfrom15July2008)Thailand

Inspectionofassetsofpublicofficials,investigation,preventionandeducation

Publicsectoronly

Senate

CBI,India Anti-corruption,economiccrimesandspecialcrimes(organisedcrimeandterrorism)

Publicsectoronly

CentralVigilanceCommission

CCAC,MacaoSAR,China

Anti-corruptionandombudsman

Publicsectoronly

ChiefExecutive’sOffice

OmbudsmanPhilippines

Anti-corruption,ombudsman,prosecution,discipline,andpublicassistance

Publicsectoronly

HouseofRepresentatives

KICAC(ACRCfrom29February2008),SouthKorea

Anti-corruption,ombudsmanandadministrativeappeals

Publicsectoronly

OfficeofthePresident

robbers,whichincludedthreepolicedetectives.AspecialteamappointedbytheBritishcolonialgovernmenttoinvestigatetherobberyfoundthatcorruptionwaswidespreadespeciallyamongthosepolicemeninvolvedinprotectionrackets(Quah2007:16).

TheopiumhijackingscandalmadetheBritishauthoritiesrealisetheimportanceofcreatinganindependentACAthatwasseparatefromthepolice.Accordingly, theACBwasreplacedwith theCPIB,whichwasformedasthefirstAsianACAinOctober1952,toperformthesefunctions:receivingandinvestigatingcomplaintsconcerningcorruptioninthepublicandprivatesectors; investigatingmalpracticesandmisconductbypublicofficers;andexaminingthepracticesandproceduresinthepublicservice

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tominimizeopportunitiesforcorruptpractices(CPIB1990:2).Aspartofitspreventivefunction,theCPIBisalsoresponsibleforscreeningcandidatesselectedforpositionsinthecivilserviceandstatutoryboardstoensurethatonlythosecandidateswithoutanytaintofcorruptionormisconductareactuallyappointed(RepublicofSingapore1994:638).

Functions of ICAC

ThesamestorycanbetoldinHongKong,whichwasunderBritishrulefrom1841to30June1997.FollowingSingapore’sexperience,theACBoftheCIDintheRoyalHongKongPoliceForce(RHKPF)wasalsoresponsibleforcurbingcorruptionfrom1948to1971,whentheACBwasupgradedtotheAnti-CorruptionOffice(ACO),whichwasalsoineffectiveintacklingtheextensivepolicecorruption.Theescapeofacorruptionsuspect(ChiefSuperintendentPeterFGodberon8 June1973) to theUnitedKingdomangeredthepublicandunderminedtheACO’scredibility.Consequently,theGovernor,SirMurrayMacLehose,wascompelledbypubliccriticismtoaccept theBlair-KerrCommission’srecommendation toestablishanindependentACA,separatefromtheRHKPF,tofightcorruption(Quah2003:137-140).

UnliketheCPIB’s investigativemodel, theICACisdescribedas the“universalmodel”becauseof its three-prongedstrategyof focusingoninvestigation,communityrelationsandprevention(Heilbrunn2006:136).TheICACwasformedon15February1974to “rootoutcorruptionandtorestoreconfidence in theGovernment” (Wong1981:45).TheICAC’s raison d’etre is toperform“atrinityofpurposecomprisinginvestigation,preventionandeducation.”The ICAC’s “three-prongedapproach” is critical fordeveloping “anewpublic consciousness” and is reflectedin itsorganisationalstructureof the threeDepartmentsofOperations,CorruptionPrevention,andCommunityRelations(ICAC1989:28-29).

Functions of NCCC/NACC

Section19of theOrganicActonCounterCorruptionBE2542 (1999)identifies thepowersanddutiesofThailand’sNCCC(ONCCC2006a:10-11).TheNCCC’sfirstfunctionistoinspectandverifythedeclarationoftheassetsandliabilitiessubmittedbypoliticiansandcivilservants.OfficialswhofailtodeclaretheirassetsormakefalsedeclarationsarereportedtotheConstitutionalCourtbytheNCCC.Thosefoundguiltyareremovedfromtheirpositionsandbarredfromholdingpoliticalofficeforfiveyears.

TheNCCC’s second role involvesmaking recommendations onpreventingcorruption to theCabinetandothergovernmentagencies;enhancingtheintegrityoftheofficialsandpublicbyorganisingcontests,meetingsandseminarson fightingcorruptionamong thepeopleandcivilservants;andfosteringcooperationamongthepublicbyconducting

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seminarsoncounteringcorruptioninBangkokandtheotherprovinces.TheNCCC’s third function is to suppress corruptionby taking

disciplinary action against corrupt politicians and bureaucrats. Itinvestigatescorruptioncomplaintsagainstpoliticiansandcivilservants,andtheSenatehasthepowertoimpeachthemforhaving“unusualwealth,” orforcommittingcorruption,malfeasance,orabuseofpower.Section58empowerstheSenatetoinitiatetheremovalfromofficeofpoliticalleadersandseniorbureaucratsforsuchoffences.Section59specifiesthattheSenatecanalsoinitiatetheimpeachmentofcorruptpoliticiansandbureaucratsif itreceivesarequest that issupportedbyone-quarterof theHouseofRepresentatives,or if thecomplaint issignedby50,000membersof thepublic(ONCCC2006a:23).

Functions of the CBI

InApril1963,thegovernmentofIndiacreatedtheCBIbyincorporatingtheDelhiSpecialPoliceEstablishmentasoneofitssixdivisions,namelythe InvestigationandAnti-CorruptionDivision. InFebruary1964,anEconomicOffencesWingwasaddedtotheCBI(CBI2008:2).Tomeettheincrease in thenumberofsecuritiesscamcasesandeconomicoffenceswiththeliberalisationofIndia’seconomy,theCBIwasreorganisedin1994andthreeinvestigationdivisionswereformed.First,theAnti-CorruptionDivisionwasestablished todealwith casesof corruptionand fraudcommittedbypublic servantsofall centralgovernmentdepartments,publicsectorundertakingsandfinancialinstitutions.Second,theEconomicCrimesDivisionwasformedtohandlebankandfinancialfraud;import,exportandforeignexchangeviolations;large-scalesmugglingofnarcotics,antiquesandculturalproperty;andsmugglingofothercontrabanditems.ThethirddivisionistheSpecialCrimesDivision,whichdealswithcasesofterrorism,bombblasts,sensationalhomicides,kidnappingforransom,andcrimescommittedbythemafiaorunderworld(CBI2008:3-4).

Functions of CCAC

Toenable theCCAC to combat corruptionmoreeffectively,Macao’s LegislativeAssemblyenactedtheOrganisationalLawoftheCCAC(LawNo10/2000)on14August2000togivetheCCACpowersofdetention,search,seizureanduseofweapons;andits investigatorsarealsogiventhestatusofcriminal investigationpoliceofficers(CCAC2007:12).TheCCACperformsfourfunctions:preventingactsofcorruptionandfraud;investigatingcrimesofcorruptionandfraudcommittedbycivilservants;investigatingallegationsofcorruptionandfraudinelectoralregistrationandtheelectionofmembersofgovernment institutions inMacao;andprotectinghumanrights,freedomandlegitimateinterestsofindividuals,aswell as ensuring fairness, lawfulness andefficiencyof thepublic

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administration(CCAC2001:12).Unlike thepreviousACAs, theCCAC is concernednotonlywith

investigatingandpreventingcorruptionamongcivil servants. It alsoperformsthefunctionofanOmbudsmantoprotecttherights,freedomandinterestsofindividualsinMacao.

Functions of the Ombudsman

InthePhilippines, theOfficeof theOmbudsmanwasoriginallyformedinJuly1979whenPresidentFerdinandMarcosissuedPresidentialDecreeNo1630. In fightingcorruption, theOmbudsman’srolewas to fileandprosecute civil andadministrative cases involvinggraft andcorruptpracticesandotheroffencescommittedbycivilservants.However, theOmbudsmanwasineffectiveduringtheremainingsevenyearsofMarcos’ rule,ascorruption“reacheditsall timehigh”and“permeatedalmostallaspectsofbureaucratic lifeandinstitutions”,resultingin“thesystematicplunderofthecountry”(Varela1995:174).

WhenPresidentCorazonAquinoassumedoffice inFebruary1986,“therewashighexpectation that the endof the cultureofgraft andcorruptionwasnear” (Varela 1995: 174).Among theanti-corruptionmeasures introduced, theTanodbayan was reorganised in 1988duringAquino’s termofoffice.The “rejuvenated”Ombudsman is theconstitutionallymandated leadACA in thePhilippinesandperformsthe following functions: investigationof anomaliesand inefficiency;prosecutionofgraftcasesintheSandiganbayan(SpecialAnti-GraftCourt);disciplinarycontroloverallelectedandappointedofficialsexcept formembersoftheCongressandJudiciaryandimpeachableofficials;requiringpublicofficialsandemployeestogiveassistancetothepublic;andgraftpreventionbyanalysinganti-corruptionmeasuresandincreasingpublicawarenessandcooperation(OfficeoftheOmbudsmanofficialwebsite).

Functions of KICAC/ACRC

InSouthKorea,PresidentKimDaeJung’scomprehensiveanti-corruptionstrategymetwithstiffresistanceintheNationalAssembly.Consequently,ittookmorethantwoyearsbeforetheAnti-CorruptionActwaspassedon24July2001.Sixmonthslater,theKICACwasformedon25January2002asthedejureACAinSouthKorea(Quah2003:169).InitsAnnual Report 2005, theKICAC(2006:4,7) identifiedits functionsas: formulatingandcoordinatinganti-corruptionpoliciesbyorganisingregularly the Inter-AgencyMeetingonCorruption;evaluatingthelevelsofintegrityandanti-corruptionpracticesofpublicsectororganisations;monitoringcorruptionandprotectingandrewardingwhistle-blowers;promotingcooperationtofightcorruptionbyencouragingcivilsocietyinvolvementandpublic-privatepartnershipagainstcorruption,andengagingintheglobalfight

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againstcorruption; improvingthe legalandinstitutional frameworkstoremovelawsandpracticeswhichencouragecorruption;andinculcatingethicalvaluesinsocietybypromotingpublicawarenessofcorruptionrisksandbyenforcingthecodeofconductforpublicsectoremployees.

UnliketheothersixACAs,theKICACcannotinvestigatecorruptioncasesbyitself; ithastorelyontheBoardofAuditandInvestigationandotheragenciestodoso.On29February2008,theKICACwasmergedwiththeOmbudsmanandtheAdministrativeAppealsCommissiontoformtheAnti-CorruptionandCivilRightsCommission(ACRC),whichperformsthesefunctions:handlingandaddressingpubliccomplaintsandimprovingrelatedunreasonablesystems;buildingacleansocietybypreventinganddeterringcorruptioninthepublicsector;andprotectingpeople’srightsfromillegalandunfairadministrativepracticesthroughtheadministrativeappealssystem(ACRCwebsite).

Comparative Analysis

AcomparisonofthefunctionsofthesevenACAsshows,first, thatonlySingapore’sCPIBandHongKong’sICACareconcernedwithcombatingcorruptioninboththepublicandprivatesectors.Incontrast,theotherfiveACAsdevotetheiranti-corruptioneffortsonlytothepublicsector.

Second, theCPIBandICACare the twoACAswhich focuson theinvestigationof corruptionoffences, thepreventionof corruptionbyreducing theopportunities for corruption, and the educationof thepopulationonthenegativeeffectsofcorruption.However,as theCPIBhasarelatively limitednumberofstaff (eg,only89 in2007), itdevotesmoreattentiontoinvestigationthantheotherfunctionsofpreventionandeducation(RepublicofSingapore2008:374).Incontrast,theICAC,whichhad1,200staff in2007,emphasisesallof thefunctionsof investigation,preventionandeducation(ICAC2008:30).

Third, theother fiveACAsperformother functions inaddition tocombatingcorruption.Thailand’sNCCC,forexample, isalsoconcernedwiththeinspectionandverificationoftheassetsandliabilitiesofpoliticiansandseniorbureaucrats,alongwithitsanti-corruptionfunctions.Similarly,theCBIinIndiaisresponsiblenotonlyforcombatingcorruption,butalsoforeconomiccrimesandspecialcrimesliketerrorismandorganisedcrime.

Macao’sCCACand thePhilippines’OmbudsmannotonlycombatcorruptionbutalsoperformthefunctionsofanOmbudsman.However,thePhilippines’Ombudsmanperformsmore functions as it is alsoresponsiblefortheinvestigation,preventionandprosecutionofcorruptioncases,disciplinarycontrolofcivilservants,andtheprovisionofpublicassistance.SouthKorea’sKICACwasconcernedonlywiththepreventiveandeducativeaspectsofcombatingcorruptionduringits firstsixyearsas itdidnothaveinvestigativepowers.After theKICAC’smergerwiththeOmbudsmanand theAdministrativeAppealsCommissionon29

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February2008toformtheACRC,theACRCisnowresponsibleforanti-corruption(withoutinvestigation),ombudsmanfunctions,andconsideringadministrativeappeals.Thus,theKICACandACRChavebeenuniqueasACAs,astheyhavenotbeenresponsibleforinvestigatingcorruptioncaseseventhoughtheirfunctionistocombatcorruption.

Benchmarking the Seven ACAs’ Performance

Asthefirststep inbenchmarkingtheperformanceofAsianACAs, it isnecessarytoidentifythemosteffectiveACAs.Rose(2005:35,37)describesthisfirststepastheagreementonastandardforcomparingprogrammeoutcomes.Thesecondstep is tocompareprogrammeswith thechosenstandardsoastocreatealeaguetableindicatingtheperformanceofalloftheACAsaccordingtotheselectedindicators.

National Indicators

Threeindicatorsareusedhere:TransparencyInternational’s2008CPIscore;theWorldBank’s2008controlofcorruption indicator;andthePoliticalandEconomicRiskConsultancy’s (PERC)2008surveyoncorruption.Theseindicatorsreflecttheeffectivenessofthecountries’anti-corruptionstrategieswhichareimplementedbytheirrespectiveACAs.

Table3ranksthesevenAsiancountriesaccordingtotheirscoresonthe2005CPIandPERCandtheirpercentilerankontheWorldBank’scontrolofcorruptionindicator.AsshowninTable4,therankingofthesevenAsiancountriesdoesnotchangeverymuchiftheyarerankedaccordingtothe2008CPI,PERCscores,andthecontrolofcorruptionpercentilerank.TheonlychangesarethehigherrankingofSouthKoreaandIndiaoverMacaoandThailand,respectively,in2008.

Aspoliticalwillisthemostimportantfactorforensuringtheeffectiveimplementationofacomprehensiveanti-corruptionstrategyinacountry(Quah2003:181),howcan itbeascertained?Politicalwill refers to thecommitmentofpolitical leaders tominimizecorruption. Itexistswhenthesethreeconditionsaremet:comprehensiveanti-corruptionlegislationexists; the independentACAisprovidedwithsufficientpersonnelandresources;andtheanti-corruption lawsare impartiallyenforcedbyanindependentACA(Quah2007:37-38).

Agency Indicators: Per Capita Expenditure and Staff-Population Ratio

ToassesswhetherthesevenACAsareprovidedwithadequatepersonnelandbudgetbytheirgovernmentstoperformtheirfunctions,dataontheirpersonnelnumbersandbudgets foraselectedyear (2005)areused tocalculatethesetwoindicators:

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Table 3CPI, CC and PERC Indicators for Seven Asian Countries, 2005

Economy CPI score* Control of corruption* PERC score* Rank

Singapore 9.4 98.1 0.65 1

HongKong 8.3 92.7 3.50 2

Macao 6.6** 68.9 4.78** 3

SouthKorea 5.0 70.4 6.50 4

Thailand 3.8 54.4 7.20 5

India 2.9 46.1 8.63 6

Philippines 2.5 34.0 8.80 7

*CPIscorerangesfrom0(mostcorrupt)to10(leastcorrupt);PERCscorerangesfrom0(leastcorrupt)to10(mostcorrupt);andcontrolofcorruptionusesapercentilerank.**2006figuresareusedasMacaowasnotincludedinthe2005CPIandPERCsurvey.Sources:WorldBank(2009),TransparencyInternational(2005),andPERC(2008).

Table 4CPI, CC and PERC Indicators for Seven Asian Countries, 2008

Economy CPI score Control of corruption

PERC score Rank

Singapore 9.2 99.5 1.13 1

HongKong 8.1 94.2 1.80 2

SouthKorea 5.6 69.6 5.65 3

Macao 5.4 58.0 3.30 4

India 3.4 44.4 7.25 5

Thailand 3.5 43.0 8.00 6

Philippines 2.3 26.1 9.00 7

Sources:TransparencyInternational(2008),WorldBank(2009),andPERC(2008).

Percapitaexpenditure–thatis,theACA’sbudgetfor2005inUS$(toensurecomparability),dividedbythetotalpopulationinthecountryforthesameyear.Staff-populationratio–that is, theratioof thepopulationinthecountryin2005tothenumberofACApersonnelin2005.

Table5shows thatwhileHongKong’s ICACis thebest fundedofthesevenACAswithabudgetofUS$85million, it isrankedsecondas

1.

2.

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Table 5Per Capita Expenditure of the Seven ACAs in 2005

ACA Budget Population Per capita expenditure

Rank

CCAC US$10.6m 488,100 US$21.72 1

ICAC US$85m 7,000,000 US$12.14 2

CPIB US$7.7m 4,300,000 US$1.79 3

KICAC US$17.8m 47,800,000 US$0.37 4

NCCC US$22.8m 64,200,000 US$0.36 5

CBI US$30.3m 1,081,200,000 US$0.28 6

Ombudsman US$12m 81,400,000 US$0.15 7

Sources:BudgetdataareobtainedfromCBI(2006),CCAC(2006),ICAC(2006),KICAC(2006),OfficeoftheOmbudsman(2006),ONCCC(2006b),andRepublicofSingapore(2007).The2005populationfiguresaretakenfromEconomist(2007).

itspercapitaexpenditureofUS$12.14 isbelowthatofMacao’sCCAC,whichhasapercapitaexpenditureofUS$21.72.Singapore’sCPIBhasthesecondsmallestbudgetofUS$7.7million,but itspercapitaexpenditureofUS$1.79isrankedthirdasSingapore’spopulationof4.3millionisthesecondsmallestamongthesevencountries. Incontrast, thepercapitaexpendituresoftheotherfourACAsarelessfavourablebecauseoftheirlargerpopulations,withIndiahavingtheworld’ssecondlargestpopulation(1.0812billion).ThisexplainswhytheCBIisrankedsixthintermsofpercapitaexpenditureeventhoughitsbudgetofUS$30.3million ishigherthanthebudgetsoftheNCCC,KICAC,andtheOmbudsman.TheKICAC’

spercapitaexpenditureofUS$0.37isfourth,asSouthKoreahasasmallerpopulation thanThailandand thePhilippines.TheNCCC is rankedfifthwithapercapitaexpenditureofUS$0.36eventhoughitsbudget islargerthantheKICAC’sbudget,asThailandhasmorepeoplethanSouthKorea.TheOmbudsman’s lowestpercapitaexpenditureofUS$0.15 isnotsurprising inviewof itsbudgetofUS$12millionandthecountry’s populationof81.4million.

WhilethepercapitaexpendituresoftheACAsindicatetheirleveloffunding,theirstaff-populationratiosindicatewhethertheyareadequatelystaffedornot.Table6showsthateventhoughtheCBIhasthemoststaffwith4,711personnel, it is rankedsixthwithastaff-populationratioof1:229,505.On theotherhand, theCPIBhas the smallest staffwith82personnel,butitsstaff-populationratioof1:53,086isrankedthird,behindtheCCAC,whichhasthebeststaff-populationof1:4,358,andtheICAC,whichisrankedsecondwithastaff-populationratioof1:5,863.TheNCCC’

sstaff-populationratioof1:69,481isrankedfourth,andtheOmbudsman

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Table 6Staff-Population Ratios of the Seven ACAs in 2005

ACA Personnel Population Staff-population ratio

Rank

CCAC 112 488,100 1:4,358 1

ICAC 1,194 7,000,000 1:5,863 2

CPIB 82 4,300,000 1:53,086 3

NCCC 924 64,200,000 1:69,481 4

Ombudsman 957 81,400,000 1:85,057 5

CBI 4,711 1,081,200,000 1:229,505 6

KICAC 205 47,800,000 1:233,171 7

Sources:asinTable5.

isrankedfifthwithastaff-populationratioof1:85,057.TheKICAC’sleastfavourablestaff-populationratioof1:233,171 indicates that it isunder-staffedwith205personnelgiventhecountry’spopulationof47.8million.

Agency Indicators: Independence and Credibility

InhisanalysisofthestrategyofrelyingonanACA,Johnston(2002:255)hasidentifiedfourprerequisitesforitssuccess:independence,permanence,coherence,andcredibility.However,forthisdiscussion,onlythecriteriaof independenceandcredibilityareconsidered.The firstprerequisiteof independence is important topreventanACAfrombeingusedasapoliticalweaponagainsttheopponentsofthegovernment,as“corruptioninvestigationsdobecomeweapons inpartisanconflictsand tacticsofreprisal.”Indeed,“wherecorruptioninvestigationsarepoliticized,powerfulofficialscan‘protecttheirown’andconcealevidence”(Johnston2002:256).An independentACAcan followtheevidenceofcorruptionwhereverit leadsandresistpressurestoconduct investigationsandprosecutionsofpolitical targets.Furthermore, itpublicisesall itsactivitiesfreelyandconductstheminatransparentmannertoassurecitizensthat“theevidencetheygivewillbetakenseriously,andthattheycanfilereportswithoutfearofreprisals”(Johnston2002:257).IndependenceensuresthatanACAwillhaveadequatefundingandaccesstoinformation.

Second,howdoesanACAenhanceitscredibility?Johnston(2002:261)contendsthat:

… if thepublic believes that all complaintswill be carefullyconsidered,andpursuedas faras theevidencetakes them; thatinvestigatoryandmonitoringfunctionsaresustainedandbroadlyemployed;thatpreventionactivitiesareavailabletoall;thatchoices

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andprioritiesareguidedbyavisionof theoverallgood,ratherthanbyexpediencyorpartisangain;andthattheagencyitself isincorruptible(nosmallchallengeinitsownright),acredibleimageofindependencecanbebuiltupovertime.

Tosustain itscredibility,anACAhas toconductpubliceducationcampaignsregularly.Credibilityisperhapsthemost importantcriterionasanACA’sreportsandeffortswill“becomesuspectorseenasfutile”ifitlosesitscredibility(Johnston2002:261).

BasedonJohnston’scriteriaofindependenceandcredibility,howcananACA’sindependenceandcredibilitybeevaluated?AnACA’sdegreeofindependencecanbeassessedaccordingtotheseindicators:

Location:WhereistheACAlocatedinthegovernment?

Appointment of director:Whoappointshim/herandtowhommusthe/shereport?

Independence from police: AstheACAsinformerBritishcoloniesoriginatedfromthepolice,istheACAstillpartofthepoliceorisitanindependentagency?

Investigation of political leaders and senior civil servants:HastheACAinvestigatedpolitical leadersandseniorcivilservants if theyareaccusedofcorruption?

Taking action against “big fish”:HastheACAtakenactionagainstcorruptprominent individuals?Howmany “bigfish”havebeenprosecutedandconvicted?

Weapon against opposition: Has theACA been used by thegovernmentasaweaponagainstitspoliticalopponents?

HowdoesanACAensure itscredibilityamong thecitizens in thecountry?TherearefourmainindicatorsofanACA’scredibility:

Consideration of all complaints:Does thepublicperceive thatallcomplaints,nomatterhowsmall,willbeconsideredbytheACA?WhatistheproportionofcomplaintsinvestigatedbytheACA?

Public perceptions of the ACA’s professionalism: Does thepublicperceivetheACAtobeimpartialinitsinvestigationsandnotabuseitspowers?Does thepublicbelieve that theACAwillkeepthecorruptionreportsconfidential?

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

1.

2.

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Enforcement of the anti-corruption laws:DoestheACAenforcetheanti-corruption laws impartially?Does theACAfocusonpettycorruptionandignoregrandcorruption?Aretherichandpowerfulprotected from investigation andprosecution for corruptionoffences?

Public image of the ACA:Howis theACAviewedbythepublic?Isitseenasanincorruptibleagencyorasanagencyriddledwithcorruption?HowarecomplaintsagainstACAofficersdealtwith?

To illustrate theuseof the first indicatorofanACA’s credibility,available data on the actual proportion of corruption complaintsinvestigatedbytheICAC,CPIBandCCACareprovidedinTables7,8and9,respectively.Table7showsthattheproportionof“pursuablereports” in theICAC’sOperationsDepartmentincreasedfrom78.3percentin2001toapeakof91.5percentin2004.TheICACreceived23,927corruptionreportsduring2001-2006,and19,844reports(82.9percent)werepursuable.

UnliketheICAC,theCPIBhasreceivedfewerreportsofcorruption,asTable8shows that4,563reportswerereceivedby theCPIBduring1998-2002.Theproportionof reports investigatedby theCPIBvariedfrom47.6percent in2002to68.9percent in1999.Onaverage,however,nearly60percentofthereportsreceivedbytheCPIBfrom1998-2002wereinvestigated.

Like theCPIB, theCCAChasalsoreceived fewerreports than theICAC.Table9showsthattheCCACreceived5,942casesduring2000-2007.However,only949cases(19percent)werecommencedorinvestigatedbytheCCACduringthatperiod.Theproportionofcommencedcasesvariedfrom9.7percentin2004to25percentin2007.

Toassess thepublicperceptionsofanACA’sprofessionalismandpublic image,surveysmustbeconductedofacountry’spopulation toobtain informationon theseaspects.Therelevant findingsof surveysconductedinHongKongandSingaporearehighlightedinTables10and11,respectively.Table10demonstrates the tremendouspublicsupportfor the ICACandtheirpositiveassessmentof itsprofessionalism.TheICAC’sannual surveys from2003-2006 showed thatnearlyallof therespondentssaid that the ICACdeservedtobesupported.Ninety-fivepercentofthemindicatedthattheirconfidencewouldincreaseorremainthe same in thenextyear.Theirhigh levelof trust in the ICACwasmanifestedinthefactthatanaverageof72.6percentoftherespondentswould reveal their identitywhen reporting corruption to the ICAC.Nearly 68percentof thembelieved that the ICAC’s anti-corruptionworkwaseffective.Finally, about three-quartersof the respondentsin all of the four surveysviewed the ICACas an impartial agency.

Table 11 shows, first, that 13 percent of the respondents ratedcorruptioncontrol inSingaporeasexcellent;42percentasverygood;39

3.

4.

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Table 7Proportion of Pursuable Reports by ICAC, 2001-2006

Year Total corruption reports

Pursuable reports

Proportion of pursuable reports

2001 4,476 3,504 78.3%

2002 4,371 3,255 74.5%

2003 4,310 3,930 91.2%

2004 3,746 3,426 91.5%

2005 3,685 3,022 82.0%

2006 3,339 2,707 81.1%

Total 23,927 19,844 82.9%

Sources:ICAC(2004,2007).

Table 8Proportion of Reports Investigated by CPIB, 1998-2002

Year Reports received Reports investigated

Proportion of reports investigated

1998 852 575 67.5%

1999 1,128 777 68.9%

2000 991 515 52.0%

2001 812 497 61.2%

2002 780 371 47.6%

Total 4,563 2,735 59.9%

Source:CPIB(2003:5.36).

percentasgood;andonly7percentas fair.Second,71percentof themagreedorstronglyagreedthattheCPIBhaddonewellinsolvingcorruptionoffences;61percentofthemtrustedtheCPIBtokeepSingaporecorruptionfree;and56percentofthemagreedorstronglyagreedthattheCPIBwasworld-classincurbingcorruption.Third,whentherespondentswereaskedwhethertheCPIBwasimpartialorfairinitsinvestigations,Table11showsthat69.9percentsaidthatitwasimpartialorfair,5.6percentsaidthatitwaspartialorunfair,and24.5percentdidnotknoworhaveanopinion.Similarly,whentherespondentswereaskedwhethertheCPIBhadabuseditsinvestigationpowers,Table11showsthat65percentofthemsaidthat

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Table 9Commenced Cases by CCAC, 2000-2007

Year Commenced cases Not-commenced cases

Proportion of commenced cases

2000 135 783 14.7%

2001 134 1,062 11.2%

2002 131 917 12.5%

2003 90 333 21.3%

2004 76 708 9.7%

2005 142 438 24.5%

2006 116 377 23.5%

2007 125 375 25.0%

Total 949 4,993 19.0%

Source:CCAC(2001-2008).

Table 10Public Perceptions of Hong Kong’s ICAC, 2003-2006

Survey Item 2003 2004 2005 2006 Average

%indicatingthattheICACdeservestobesupported 99.3% 99.1% 98.9% 98.9% 99.1%

% indicating that their confidence inICACwould increaseor remain samenextyear

94% 93.9% 96.0% 97.1% 95.3%

%believingthatICACwouldkeepcorruptionreportsconfidential 88.9% 89.3% 88.6% 92.6% 89.9%

%indicatingthattheywouldrevealtheiridentitywhen reporting corruption toICAC

75.9% 71.8% 70.7% 72.0% 72.6%

%believingthatICAC’santi-corruptionworkiseffective 67.3% 67.5% 67.9% 68.5% 67.8%

%believingthattheICACisanimpartiallawenforcementbody 73.4% 70.9% 72.6% 80.3% 74.3%

Source:CompiledfromICAC(2004-2007).

ithadnot,7.2percentsaidthat ithaddoneso,and27.8percenthadnoopinionordidnotknow.Finally,66percentoftherespondentsbelievedthattheCPIBwouldkeepthecorruptionreportsitreceivedconfidential,andonly10percentsaidthatitwouldnotdoso.

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Table 11Public Perceptions of CPIB’s Performance in 2002

Survey item Survey findings

HowwouldyouratecorruptioncontrolinSingapore?

1. Excellent=13%;verygood=42%;good=39%;fair=7%;poor=0

CPIBhasdonewellinsolvingcorruptionoffences

2. Stronglyagree=20%;agree=51%;notsure=28%;disagree=2%;stronglydisagree=0

CPIBcanbe trusted tokeepSingaporecorruption-free

3. Stronglyagree=24%;agree=37%;notsure=32%;disagree=6%;stronglydisagree=1%

CPIBisworld-classinfightingcorruption4. Stronglyagree=17%;agree=39%;notsure=36%;disagree=7%;stronglydisagree=1%

DoyouthinkCPIBisimpartial/fairinitsinvestigations?

5. Yes=69.9%;no=5.6%;don’tknow/noopinion=24.5%

Do you think CPIB has abused i tsinvestigationpowers?

6. No=65%;yes=7.2%;don’tknow/noopinion=27.8%

DoyouthinkCPIBwillkeepcorruptionreportsitreceivesconfidential?

7. Yes=66%;no=10%don’tknow/noopinion=24%

Source:CPIB(2003:5.40&14.97)

Performance Indicators for ACAs

Meagher(2005:80-81)suggeststhreetypesofperformanceindicatorsforACAs:output indicatorsbasedon theirworkload;outcome indicatorstomeasure their effectiveness in attaininggoals; andefficiencyandproductivityindicatorssuchascost-effectiveness, input-outputratio,andunitcosts.However,only theperformance indicatorsof theCPIBandICACareavailableandshowninTables12,13and14asillustrations.Table12identifiesanddefinestheCPIB’sperformanceindicatorsanddatafrom1997to2002.

Table13showsthatthenumberofcases investigatedbytheICAC’s OperationsDepartmentincreasedfrom1,522in1987to4,989in2002.TheOperationsDepartment’sstaffalsogrewfrom744to966duringthesameperiod.While theOperationsDepartment’sproductivityratio increasedfrom2.05in1987to5.16in2002, itdeclinedfrom4.71in1994to4.39in1999,andincreasedagainto5.09in2000.

Finally, Table 14 shows that 2,751personswereprosecuted forcorruptionand1,068civilservantsweredisciplinedduring2001-2006.TheICAC’saverageconvictionrateduringthisperiodwas83percent.

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Table 12CPIB’s Performance Indicators and Data, 1997-2002

Performance indicator Definition Performance data

Cycletime1. Time taken to complete aninvestigation

Exceededtargetbyanaverageof31%from1999-2002

Completionrate2. Percentageofcasescompletedin a year

Exceededtargetofcompleting90%casesfrom1999-2002

Prosecutionrate3. Percentageofcaseresultinginprosecution

Increased from47% to 60%from2000-2002

Convictionrate4. Percentageofcasesconvictedincourt

Increased from97% to 99%from2000-2002

Attendancetovisitors

5. Target is toattendto80%ofitsvisitorswithinfiveminutes

Exceededtargetby1%to6%from1997-2000

Numberofpersonschargedanddisciplined

6. Numberofpersonschargedandnumberofpublicofficersdisciplined

680 personswere chargedand293publicofficersweredisciplinedfrom2000-2002

Source:CPIB(2003:3.24,3.25,5.36,14.96).

Table 13ICAC Operations Department’s Productivity Ratio, 1987-2002

YearNumber of staff

(a)Number of cases investigated (b)

Productivity ratio (b/a)

1987 744 1,522 2.05

1988 739 1,699 2.30

1989 736 1,895 2.57

1990 791 2,065 2.61

1991 794 2,430 3.06

1992 758 2,502 3.30

1993 773 3,086 3.99

1994 814 3,836 4.71

1995 827 3,710 4.49

1996 885 3,257 3.68

1997 929 3,307 3.56

1998 925 3,774 4.08

1999 943 4,139 4.39

2000 932 4,748 5.09

2001 943 4,954 5.25

2002 966 4,989 5.16

Source:ICAC(2003:104).

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Table 14Number of Persons Prosecuted for Corruption, ICAC’s Conviction Rate, and

Number of Civil Servants Disciplined, 2001-2006

Year Number of persons prosecuted

Conviction rate Civil servants disciplined

2001 535 79% 188

2002 604 83% 165

2003 421 85% 234

2004 494 84% 161

2005 356 81% 170

2006 341 88% 150

Total 2,751 83% 1,068

Sources:CompiledfromICAC(2004-2007).

Benchmarking for Excellence: An Agenda for Action

TheprevioussectionhassuggestedthattheperformanceofAsianACAsshouldbebenchmarkedaccordingto22indicators,whicharelistedinTable15.These22 indicatorsarenotexhaustiveasnotallof theperformanceindicatorsemployedbyotherAsianACAsareincluded.

Benchmarkingprovides theAsianACAswithanobjectivemethodforevaluatingtheirperformancebycomparingtheirperformancewiththeperformanceofmoreeffectiveACAs; identifyingtheirstrengthsandweaknesses;andlearningfromtheexperiencesofmoreeffectiveACAsbyeliminatingtheirweaknessesandreinforcingtheirstrengths.ItgivestheseACAsandtheirgovernmentsthenecessarydataformakingimprovementsif theyaredissatisfiedwith theeffectivenessof theiranti-corruptionstrategies.

AnotheradvantageofbenchmarkingtheACAs’performance is thatgovernmentswhichareconsideringthecreationofanACAwillfindthebenchmarkingdataon theexistingAsianACAsuseful in identifyingtheir strengths to emulate and theirweaknesses to avoid. In theiroverviewreportonPacificIslandcountries,LarmourandBarcham(2004:33-34) found that the12countriesconsidereddidnothaveanyACA.Indiscussingtheutilityof introducinganACAinthesecountries, theyrecommendedcautionas theexistingauditor-generalofficesandotherwatchdogagenciesareunder-staffedand ineffective.Furthermore,as“seniorappointmentsinthesecountriesareoftenmadetorewardpoliticalsupport,thepositionofanti-corruptioncommissionermayendupbeingjustsucharesource” (Larmour&Barcham2004:22).Inviewoftheirlowstatecapacity,moreresourcesmustbeallocatedby theirgovernments

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Table 15Indicators for Benchmarking the Performance of Asian ACAs

National Indicators(3)

1.TransparencyInternational’sCPIscoreforaselectedyear.2.WorldBank’scontrolofcorruptionpercentilerankforthesameyear.3.PERC’scorruptionscoreforthesameyear.

Agency Indicators(19)

4.ACA’spercapitaexpenditure5.ACA’sstaff-populationratio6.ACA’sindependence

a.Locationb.Appointmentofdirectorc.Independencefrompoliced.Investigationofgrandcorruptione.Frying“bigfish”

f.Weaponagainstopposition7.ACA’scredibility

a.Considerationofallcomplaintsb.PublicperceptionsofACA’sprofessionalismc.Enforcementofanti-corruptionlawsd.PublicimageofACA

8.ACA’sperformanceindicatorsa.Cycletimeb.Completionratec.Productivityratiod.Prosecutionratee.Convictionratef.Attendancetovisitorsg.Numberofpersonschargedanddisciplined

if theywish toestablishACAs;otherwise suchACAswouldhave tocompetewithotherexistingagenciesforthelimitedresourcesavailable.

BenchmarkingtheperformanceofAsianACAsenablesPacificIslandstatesandothercountriestolearnfromtheexperiencesofboththeeffectiveandthe ineffectiveAsianACAstomaketherightdecision indecidingwhetherornottoestablishACAs.IftheydecidetointroduceACAs,theirgovernmentsmustdemonstrate theirpoliticalwillbyproviding theseagencieswiththenecessarylegislation,personnelandfinancialresources,aswellastheautonomyforthemtoperformtheirfunctionsimpartiallyandwithoutpoliticalinterference.

Inviewof theseadvantagesofbenchmarking, therecommendationhere is thatAsianACAs should initiate the benchmarkingof theirperformancebyadoptingadefiniteagendaforaction,includingcollectingdataonthe22performanceindicators;comparingtheirperformancewiththeperformanceofotherACAs;andmakingimprovementstorectifythose

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weaknessesexposedbycomparisonwiththemoreeffectiveACAs.Benchmarkingenables theAsianACAs to strive forexcellenceby

providingthemwithatoolformeasuringtheirperformanceagainstthebestACAs to improve theirownperformanceby initiatingreforms torectifythoseweaknessesexposedbythecomparisonwithbestpracticeselsewhere.BenchmarkinganACA’sperformancealsoenables interestedstakeholderstoassessthegovernment’spoliticalwilltocurbcorruptioninthecountry.

Thevastdisparity inpolicy contexts and thevaryingdegreesofpoliticalwillinfightingcorruptioninAsiancountriesrequiretheirpolicy-makerstoheedJohnston’s(1999:225)soundadvicethatACAsare“unlikelytoberightforeverycountry.”However, ifagovernmenthasestablishedanACAtospearheaditsanti-corruptionstrategy,itcanenhancetheACA’s prospectsforsuccessbyprovidingitwithadequatestaffandbudget,bynotinterferinginitsdailyoperations,and,mostimportantly,byresistingthetemptationtousetheACAasapoliticalweaponagainstitsopponents.Inshort,anACAisadouble-edgedswordandcanbeusedbyagovernmentforgoodorforevil. Inthehandsofacleangovernment, theACAisanassetandapowerfulweaponagainstcorruptpoliticians,bureaucratsandbusinessmen.Conversely,acorruptgovernmentcanmakeamockeryofitsanti-corruptionstrategybyusingtheACAtovictimizeitspoliticalfoes.

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Jon S T Quah is an anti-corruption consultant in Singapore: http://www.jonstquah.com . This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the Third Anti-Corruption Expertise Workshop on “Excellence in Management of Anti-Corruption Agencies” organized by the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau in Singapore, 14-16 October 2008.