a citizen's guide to the world bank inspection panel, second edition

A CITIZEN�S GUIDE TO THE

WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL

Dana L. Clark

2ND EDITION

October 1999

CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

About the Author

Dana L. Clark is a Senior Attorney at CIEL and an Adjunct Professor of Law at the AmericanUniversity’s Washington College of Law, where she teaches several courses on internationalenvironmental law. Ms. Clark is the Director of CIEL’s International Financial Institutions programand is coordinating CIEL’s work on the interface between human rights and the environment.

Acknowledgments

This publication was made possible with the support from the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, theJohn D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and the Wallace Global Fund. The authorgratefully acknowledges the insights and assistance of David Hunter, Kay Treakle, Lisa Jordan,Richard Bissell, Michael Hsu, Michelle Billig, Emilie Cornu Thenard and Brian Shillinglaw.

Appendix I is reprinted with permission from the World Bank Inspection Panel.

Dedication

This Citizen’s Guide is dedicated to the people around the world who have had the courage andvision to test the Inspection Panel as a mechanism of accountability. In particular, CIEL would liketo honor the memory of Fulgencio Manuel da Silva, farmer, poet and activist. Fulgencio was aleader in the dam-affected peoples movement in Brazil and helped organize the families affected bythe Itaparica dam. Fulgencio played a major role in the filing of a claim on the ItaparicaResettlement project. After receiving several death threats, he was killed on October 16, 1997.

Citation: Clark, Dana L. A Citizen’s Guide to the World Bank Inspection Panel (2nd Ed.) Washington, D.C. (Center forInternational Environmental Law: 1999).

Non-Governmental Organizations may reproduce all or part of this Citizen’s Guide. Please give appropriate credit to theCenter for International Environmental Law as the source. NGOs have CIEL’s permission to translate this guide into otherlanguages as long as it is clearly noted that the translation is “unofficial” and has been done by a group other than the Centerfor International Environmental Law. CIEL would appreciate receiving copies of any such translations. CIEL will betranslating the second edition of the Citizen’s Guide into several languages; please contact CIEL for additional information.

Cover and text printed by Weadon Printing and Communications, Alexandria, VA. Cover: 100% post-consumerrecycled paper, soy-based ink. Text: 100% recycled acid-free paper (20% post-consumer).

Published by the Center for International Environmental LawCopyright © 1999 Center for International Environmental LawFirst Edition, November 1997.Second Edition, October 1999.

Illustrations by Ani Rucki.

TABLE OF CONTENTSPart One: General Overview ...............................................................................1

What is the World Bank? ............................................................................2Box 1-1: World Bank at a Glance ................................................2

What is the World Bank Inspection Panel? Why was it Created? .............3Table 1-1: Inspection Panel Members ............................................5Table 1-2: Inspection Panel Claims Summary ...............................6

Part Two: The Panel Process ...............................................................................9Who Can File a Claim to the Inspection Panel? .........................................10

Box 2-1: Panel Guidance on Filing a Claim ................................11What Information Should be Included in a Claim? ....................................11

Table 2-1: Quick Reference Claim Elements ................................12What Happens After a Claim is Filed? .......................................................13How Long Does the Panel Process Take? ..................................................15Short Summaries of Past Claims ................................................................15What Can Claimants Expect from the Panel Process? ...............................17

Part Three: Practical Considerations................................................................19Documenting Concerns and Policy Violations ..........................................20Communicating with the World Bank .......................................................20Access to Information ................................................................................21Accountability Mechanisms at Other MDBs .............................................23NGO Contacts ............................................................................................24

Appendices

I. Resolution Establishing the Inspection Panel and Inspection Panel Operating ProceduresIBRD Resolution No. 93-10/IDA 93-06 (Resolution establishing the Panel)Inspection Panel Operating ProceduresConclusions of the Second Board Review of the Inspection PanelInspection Panel Guidance on How to Prepare a Request for InspectionModel Form: Request for Inspection

II. Selected World Bank Policies and Procedures That Have Been Helpful in Past ClaimsOD 4.30 Involuntary Resettlement (under revision)OD 4.01 Environmental Assessment*OP/BP 4.01 Environmental Assessment*OD 4.00 Environmental Policy for Dam and Reservoir ProjectsOD 4.20 Indigenous Peoples (under revision)OP 4.04 Natural HabitatsOP 10.04 Economic Evaluation of Investment OptionsOD 13.05 Project SupervisionOPN 11.03 Management of Cultural PropertyBP 17.55 Inspection Panel

*Operational Directive 4.01 was revised to Operational Policy/Best Practices 4.01. The new OP/BP applies to projectsfor which the Project Information Document (PID) was first filed after March 1, 1999. Earlier projects must complywith OD 4.01.

Center for International Environmental Law

A CITIZEN�S GUIDE TO THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL

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PART ONE

GENERAL OVERVIEW

SUMMARY

The World Bank (the “Bank”) is a multilateral development bank that providesloans and credits to developing countries to stimulate social and economicdevelopment. Although its mandate is poverty alleviation, it often providesfinancial support (either by itself or in partnership with other fundinginstitutions) to projects that have significant social and environmental impacts.

The Inspection Panel (the “Panel”) is a quasi-independent body created by theBank as a mechanism for holding the Bank accountable for violations of itspolicies and procedures. The three-member Panel investigates claims broughtby affected citizens, provided that the claim meets certain standards andassuming the Board of Executive Directors agrees to an investigation.

The Bank has established safeguard policies and procedures that set guidelinesfor project design, appraisal, and implementation. Several of these policies— such as Involuntary Resettlement, Environmental Assessment, NaturalHabitats, and Indigenous Peoples — are designed to mitigate the social andenvironmental impacts of Bank-financed projects. The policies and proceduresof the Bank define the jurisdiction of the Inspection Panel. Thus, the Panelfocuses on the Bank’s role in a project and whether or not the Bank is incompliance with its policies and procedures.

In cases where the Bank has violated its policies or procedures and this violationhas caused or is likely to cause harm, two or more adversely affected personswho share some common interests may file a Request for Inspection. Afterreceiving such a Request, the Inspection Panel follows a procedure forevaluating the Request and Management’s response, and determining whetherto conduct an investigation. The Panel submits its recommendation to theBoard of Executive Directors, which is expected to support the Panel’sdetermination of whether an investigation should proceed.



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WHAT IS THE WORLD BANK?

The World Bank is an internationalfinancial institution created at the end of WorldWar II whose mission is to provide loans andcredits to developing countries for projects thatalleviate poverty and promote social and economicdevelopment. The Bank’s public-sector lendingis done through the International Bank forReconstruction and Development (IBRD) and theInternational Development Association (IDA).IBRD loans are made with favorable interest ratesand rather long repayment schedules. IDA creditsare extended to the poorest of the poor countries(defined largely in terms of per capita income) atno interest, with very relaxed loan repaymentschedules. The IBRD and IDA also provide loansand guarantees in support of private sector projects.However, the majority of Bank financing forprivate sector operations is done through theInternational Finance Corporation (IFC) and theMultilateral International Guarantee Agency(MIGA).

Thus, the World Bank Group consists ofIBRD, IDA, IFC and MIGA. In general IBRD andIDA make loans for public sector projects, and IFCand MIGA promote private sector investment.IBRD and IDA share the same staff, and must meetthe World Bank’s policies and procedures. TheIFC and MIGA have recently adopted their ownpolicies and procedures. At the time thispublication went to press, only IBRD and IDA weresubject to the jurisdiction of the Inspection Panel.For the past several years, there have beennegotiations and commitments to extend theInspection Panel to IFC and MIGA.

In the meantime, a Compliance Adviser/Ombudsman (CAO) function for IFC and MIGAwas recently created and began operation in July1999. The CAO is an important step toward greateraccountability in the private sector side of theWorld Bank Group operations. It was designed inpart to address the concerns of the localcommunities who are adversely affected by IFC

and MIGA-supported projects and to advise seniormanagement. The CAO will report directly to thePresident of the Bank. For more information aboutusing and contacting the CAO, please refer to PartThree.

The World Bank is owned and governedby national governments, which become membersby subscribing to capital stock. To join IBRD,countries must first be members of theInternational Monetary Fund (IMF). The amountof shares each member is allocated reflects itsquota in the IMF. There are 181 membergovernments of IBRD and 160 members of IDA.These countries are represented by a Board ofExecutive Directors, which has 24 members.Voting power is determined by shares, so the moreeconomically powerful countries control a greaterpercentage of the vote. For instance, the UnitedStates as the largest shareholder controlsapproximately 17% of the vote. The Board mustapprove all projects financed by the Bank that areproposed by the Bank Management. The Presidentof the Bank is appointed by the Board, and alsoserves as Chairman of the Board.

The World Bank gives project-orientedloans and guarantees to developing countrygovernments but it also exerts enormous influencethrough macroeconomic policy prescriptions,research and technical advice. The Bank alsomakes loans for economic restructuring, and assuch has enormous influence on how developmentis carried out. In recent years, the World Bank

BOX 1-1: THE WORLD BANK AT A GLANCE

Major Shareholders: United States, Japan, Germany,France, United Kingdom

Major Borrowers: China, Mexico, Russia, Indonesia, Brazil, India

Average Annual Lending Volume (FY ‘99):$ 22.2 billion IBRD; $ 6.8 billion IDA

Source: World Bank Annual Report, 1999



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has worked closely with the IMF in designing thefinancial sector reform and economic bailouts foreconomic crises in Indonesia, Korea, Thailand,Russia, Argentina and Brazil. Structural and sectoradjustment lending increased to approximately60% of the Bank’s loan portfolio during 1999,according to the Bank’s annual report.

Most project-related loans and creditspromote infrastructure projects (such as roads,bridges and dams), or agriculture projects (such ascrop intensification, fish farming, and irrigation).Bank-financed projects can involve significantsocial and environmental costs, such asdisplacement of local communities, disruption ofindigenous peoples, and the destruction ordegradation of the environment. The Bank has haddifficulty in effectively mitigating these social andenvironmental impacts, despite the fact that it hasdeveloped many important policies and proceduresto try to address these impacts. These problemsare often exacerbated by inadequate citizeninvolvement in project design and implementation,and by a general failure to follow Bank proceduresand policies.

WHAT IS THE WORLD BANK

INSPECTION PANEL? WHY

WAS IT CREATED?

The World Bank Inspection Panel wascreated in 1993 as part of an effort to bring greaterpublic accountability to World Bank lending. Aseries of events led to an international campaignto improve accountability at the Bank. As a resultof a broad grassroots and international campaignagainst the Sardar Sarovar dam on the Narmadariver in India, the Bank commissioned anindependent review of its role in the project. Thisindependent review, which became known as theMorse Commission, published its findings in 1992.The Morse Commission report documented clearviolations of Bank policies and the devastatinghuman and environmental consequences of those

policy violations.

The Morse Commission’s findings that theBank largely disregarded its social andenvironmental policies and tolerated its borrowers’violation of the policies were soon confirmed moregenerally by an internal review of Bank projects.The Narmada policy violations were not anaberration, but a systemic part of the Bank’sculture. The devastating internal report, authoredby Bank Vice President Willi Wapenhans,criticized the Bank’s pervasive “culture ofapproval,” in which the incentive structureencouraged staff to move large amounts of moneyquickly without adequate attention to the social andenvironmental implications of projects.

In practice, the social and environmentalpolicies that had been developed during the late1980s and early 1990s were in many cases routinelyignored by Bank staff. Prior to the creation of theInspection Panel, project-affected people had noreal avenue of redress and no way of holding theBank accountable for these policy violations. Thislack of accountability was starkly highlighted inthe findings of the Morse Commission’s report.

Spurred on by the international NGOreform campaign and the emerging globalconsensus for sustainable development, membercountry governments called on the Bank to developa transparent system of accountability to ensurethat public funds were spent more consistently withthe Bank’s mandate of sustainable developmentand poverty alleviation. In 1993, the Board ofDirectors passed an improved policy oninformation disclosure and created the InspectionPanel.

The Inspection Panel provides aninnovative and independent forum for those peoplemost directly affected by a World Bank project toraise their concerns about problems in Bankprojects. Two or more local people can bring aclaim to the Inspection Panel asking for anindependent analysis of the Bank’s role in a project.The claim must allege that acts or omissions on



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the part of the Bank have caused or couldpotentially cause them harm and that they believethe Bank has violated its policies and procedures.The Panel is to be used as an avenue of last resortwhen the staff or management of the Bank havebeen unresponsive to the concerns of the affectedpeople. More information about the content andprocess of filing a claim can be found in Part Two.

The Panel is composed of three membersnominated by the President of the Bank andapproved by the Board of Executive Directors (SeeTable 1-1). The members of the Panel serve forfive-year terms. The Chairperson, selected by thePanel members, works full-time and the two othermembers are called upon as needed. The Panel isfinanced by the Bank. To increase theindependence of Panel staff from the Bank, Panelmembers cannot have worked for the World Bankfor at least two years prior to serving on the Panel.They also cannot work again for the Bank afterserving on the Panel. In addition, the Panel has itsown secretariat. This institutional separation allowsthe Panel to ensure the confidentiality of importantinformation, such as the identity of anonymousclaimants. Because it has a permanent office andstaff, the Panel is able to respond to requests forinformation and advice from interested parties.

Two documents –– Bank Resolution 93-10and the Inspection Panel Operating Procedures —set forth the basic procedures for the Panel. Theydefine the composition of the Panel, the criteriafor eligibility, the necessary components of a claim,and provide guidance for how the process shouldwork. The Resolution was approved by the Boardof Executive Directors; the Procedures werewritten by the original Panel. The Resolution andOperating Procedures are included in Appendix Ialong with the 1999 Clarifications that resultedfrom the Board’s Second Review of the InspectionPanel. Appendix I also contains guidance fromthe Inspection Panel on how to prepare a requestfor investigation, together with a model form.

Nineteen cases have been brought to theInspection Panel since it opened in 1994 (See Table

1.2). These claims are briefly discussed on pages15-18. For a more in depth discussion of the firstten claims, please refer to Lori Udall, The WorldBank Inspection Panel: A Three-Year Review(Bank Information Center: 1997). See also AlvaroUmana, The World Bank Inspection Panel: TheFirst Four Years (1994-1998) (The World Bank:1998), Kay Treakle, Accountability at the WorldBank, What does it Take? Lessons from theYacyreta Hydroelectric Project Argentina/Paraguay (Bank Information Center: 1998) andDana Clark & David Hunter, The World BankInspection Panel: Amplifying Citizen Voices forSustainable Development (Center for InternationalEnvironmental Law: 1998).



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TABLE 1-1: INSPECTION PANEL MEMBERS

Jim MacNeill, a Canadian National, is a policy advisor on the environment, energy, management,and sustainable development to international organizations, governments, and industry. He isChairman of the International Institute for Sustainable Development and a member of the boards ofthe Woods Hole Research Center, the Wuppertal Institute on Climate and Energy Policy, theEnvironmental Education and Training Institute of North America, and Ontario Hydro. He wassecretary general of the World Commission on the Environment and Development (the BrundtlandCommission) and a major author of the Commission�s report, Our Common Future. He served forseven years as Director of Environment for the Organization for Economic Cooperation andDevelopment (OECD). Earlier, he was a deputy minister in the government of Canada. Mr. MacNeillholds a graduate diploma in Economics and Political Science from the University of Stockholm andBachelor�s Degrees in Science and Mechanical Engineering from Saskatchewan. Mr. MacNeill is thecurrent Chairman of the Panel; his term on the Panel will expire on August 1, 2002.

Edward S. Ayensu, a Ghanaian national, is president of the Pan-African Union for Science andTechnology and an international development advisor. He is executive chairman of Edward AyensuAssociates Ltd., Advanced Gracewell Communications Co. Ltd. and the founding chairman of theAfrican Biosciences Network. He is chairman of the Ghana National Biodiversity Committee. Healso serves on the International Advisory Board on Global Communications for UNESCO and is amember of the Board of Directors and international vice-chairman of the International Institute forSustainable Development. He has served as the senior advisor to the President of the AfricanDevelopment Bank, as a vice-chairman and advisor at the Global Environment Facility, and at theSmithsonian Institution. He has a doctorate in biological sciences from the University of London.Mr. Ayensu became a member of the Panel in August 1998 and his tenure will expire August 1, 2003.

Maartje van Putten, a Dutch national, served for 10 years as a member of the European Parliament,where she was a member of the Committee on Development and Cooperation. She also served in theEvert Vermeer Foundation and Institute for Development Cooperation and has extensive experienceas a free-lance journalist. She has issued reports relating to the impact of the GATT in developingcountries, fair trade issues, and European Union policies on indigenous peoples and endangeredspecies. She is president of the European Network on Street Children Worldwide, president ofIZNET (think tank on South-North relations) and a member of the board of the European Centrefor Development Policy Management. She has had extensive exposure to developing countries andhas actively worked with non-governmental organizations. Ms. van Putten joined the Panel in October,1999 and her term will expire in August, 2004.



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Panel RecommendsInvestigation

Board Decision onInvestigation

Outcome

Yes Panel issues report;project canceled by BankPresident.

Approved

No. Dismissed. Not applicable (n/a)

No. Found in compliancefor one part of the claim,found ineligible foranother part.

n/a

Yes Denied Partial concessions toaffected people; limitedPanel role in monitoringimplementation.

No. Request not eligiblebecause Panel has nojurisdiction over IFCprojects.

President appointsindependent investigator;report censored by IFC.

No. Panel found thatManagement respondedto Claimants’ concerns.

Partial approval. Panelis permitted a limited“review and assessment’but not a fullinvestigation.

Panel report foundsignificant policyviolations but Board hasnot made any decisions.Still pending.

No. Bank agreed withclaimants, and withdrewthe project.

Yes Denied. Action Planproposed and approvedby the Board.

Panel process bypassed.

Yes Partial approval. Panellimited to desk study inWashington, DC.

Management ActionPlan approved by theBoard; local monitoringteam created.

n/a

Name of Project &Date Filed

1. Arun III HydroelectricProject (Nepal) -10/94

2. Compensation forExpropriation of ForeignAssets (Ethiopia) - 4/95

3. Emergency PowerProject (Tanzania) 5/95

4. PLANAFLORO-Rondonia NaturalResources ManagementProject (Brazil) - 6/95

5. Pangue/RalcoComplex ofHydroelectric Dams,BioBio River (Chile) -11/95

6. Jamuna Bridge Project(Bangladesh) - 8/96

7. YacyretaHydroelectric Project(Argentina/Paraguay) -9/96

8. Jute SectorAdjustment Credit(Bangladesh) - 11/96

9. Itaparica Resettlementand Irrigation Project(Brazil) - 3/97

10. NTPC PowerGeneration Project(India) - 5/97

TABLE 1-2: INSPECTION PANEL CLAIMS SUMMARY

n/a Revision of project torespond to claim.

Yes

n/a Bank halted funding.



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11. Eco-developmentProject (India) - 4/98

12. Proposed Phase 1Bof Lesotho HighlandsWater Project (Lesotho -South Africa) - 5/98

13. Lagos Drainage andSanitation Project(Nigeria) - 6/98

14. Land Reform andPoverty Alleviation PilotProject (Brazil) - 1/99

15. Lesotho HighlandsWater Project DiamondMines (Lesotho-SouthAfrica) - 5/99

16. Western PovertyReduction Project(China) - 6/99

17. Special StructuralAdjustment Loan(Argentina) - 7/99

18. Land Reform andPoverty Alleviation Pilotproject - 2nd filing(Brazil)- 8/99

19. Lake VictoriaEnvironmentalManagement Project(Kenya)- 10/99

No. Because Managementtook steps to compensateaffected people.

No. Harm not suffi-ciently documented.

No. Found ineligible.

No

Yes

Pending

Investigation is nowunderway.

Pending

Pending

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

Approved

TABLE 1-2: INSPECTION PANEL CLAIMS SUMMARY (CONT’D)

Panel RecommendsInvestigation

Board Decision onInvestigation

OutcomeName of Project andDate Filed

Yes Management reportafter six months to briefthe Board on steps tobring the project intocompliance. Pending

Denied



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A CITIZEN ’S GUIDE TO THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL

9

PART TWO

THE PANEL PROCESS

SUMMARY

Two or more adversely affected people who share some common interests orconcerns and meet basic eligibility requirements can file a claim to the InspectionPanel. Claims can also, in certain circumstances, be filed by a member of theBoard of Executive Directors or by a non-local representative. Also, the fullBoard can instruct the Panel to conduct an investigation

Once a claim is filed, the Panel determines whether it meets the eligibilitycriteria, explained in more detail in this section. If the claim is eligible, thePanel evaluates the claim, management’s response, and other available evidenceand then makes a recommendation as to whether or not the claim merits a fullinvestigation. The Board of Executive Directors must approve the Panelrecommendation for an investigation before the Panel can proceed. Accordingto a recent agreement, the Board should approve the Panel’s recommendationunless it questions specific technical eligibility criteria.

If an investigation takes place, the Panel presents its findings to the Board in areport, and the Board asks Management to provide recommendations for howto respond. The Board then announces an Action Plan for resolving any policyviolations.

In practice, the above process has been complicated and subject to politicalmanipulation by Bank Management and the Board. The results of filing aclaim have varied. At times, Bank Management has responded by proposingAction Plans or other remedial action, which if properly implemented couldaddress the problems in the project. At other times, however, Management hasrefused to act to remedy the problems or protect claimants from reprisals byproject authorities. In every case, though, the filing of the claim has raised theconcerns of those most directly affected by the project to the highest levelswithin the Bank.



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INTRODUCTION

The Inspection Panel responds to claims —also called “Requests” — brought by people livingin a country affected by a Bank-financed project.The Panel evaluates the claim, Bank Management’sresponse, and any other available evidence andmakes a recommendation to the Board of ExecutiveDirectors as to whether the claim should beinvestigated. The Panel cannot proceed with aninvestigation without Board authorization. Afterinvestigating, the Panel prepares findings and areport summarizing the results of the investigation.The Panel’s report is submitted to the Board, andBank Management is then required to makerecommendations in response to the Panel’sfindings. Ultimately, the Board announces theremedies that will be designed in response to theclaim.

WHO CAN FILE A CLAIM TO THE

INSPECTION PANEL?

The Resolution and the OperatingProcedures of the Inspection Panel provide forseveral different ways of bringing a claim.

• First, an “affected party” (defined as two ormore individuals who are directly affected bythe alleged violations of Bank policies and whoallege that they have been or could be harmedby those violations) can bring a claim on itsown behalf.

• Second, a local representative, such as a non-governmental organization, can submit a claimon behalf of directly affected persons withproper proof of authorization.

• Third, in exceptional circumstances where localrepresentation is not available (which couldinclude countries where local NGOs are notallowed to operate or where there is a risk ofretaliation), a non-local representative (again,with proper proof of authorization) could filethe claim on behalf of local affected parties.

However, the Board must ultimately agree tothe non-local representation.

• Fourth, an Executive Director may, “in specialcases of serious alleged violations of suchpolicies and procedures, ask the Panel for aninvestigation.”

• Finally, the “Executive Directors, acting as aBoard, may at any time instruct the Panel toconduct an investigation.”

To meet the Panel’s eligibilityrequirements, claimants must allege thefollowing basic elements:

(a) they are two or more people with commoninterests or concerns living in a country or anarea affected by a Bank-financed project;

(b) the Bank has violated its policies and procedures,and they have or are likely to suffer materialadverse effects as a result of those policyviolations;

(c) they have attempted to raise their concerns withBank Management and are not satisfied withthe response; and

(d) the project is under consideration or has beenapproved by the Bank, and the loan has not yetbeen substantially disbursed. (In general, aclaim may be filed once the Bank has filed aProject Information Document at the InfoShop.Substantial completion of the project has beendefined as having 95% or more of the fundsdisbursed, after which point claims are barred.)

In addition to claims relating to projects,the Panel has registered claims relating to structuraland sectoral adjustment loans. Examples includethe Jute Sector Adjustment Credit and theArgentina Special Structural Adjustment Loan.

If the claim is filed by a representativerather than directly by the affected people, thatrepresentative must demonstrate that it has explicitauthorization to act as the agent of the adverselyaffected people. The affected people must signeither the claim itself or a written authorizationdesignating their representative. Claimants andtheir representatives can request the Panel to keep



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their names confidential. In the Yacyretá claim,local residents nominated a non-governmentalorganization, Sobrevivencia, to be theirrepresentative and requested that their individualnames be kept confidential. Similarly, in theSingrauli claim, local citizens authorized anindividual, Madhu Kohli, to be their representative.In the China Western Poverty Reduction Project,the claim was filed by a US-based NGO acting onbehalf of affected people in Tibet. In Yacyretá,Singrauli, and the China/Tibet project, the desirefor anonymity was based on a fear of reprisals fromthe project authorities or the governments involved.

The Panel is specifically prohibited from hearingcomplaints about:

(a) actions which are the responsibility of otherparties (such as the government, implementingagency, corporation, etc.) and which do notinvolve any action or omission on the part ofthe Bank;

(b) claims by suppliers (actual or potential) ofproducts or services relating to procurement;

(c) requests filed after the Closing Date of the loanfinancing the project or after the loan financingthe project has been 95% disbursed;

(d) claims into matters that have already comebefore the Panel if no evidence of changedcircumstances has been presented; and

(e) claims involving projects financed by theInternational Finance Corporation (IFC) or theMultilateral Investment Guarantee Association(MIGA).

New process for dealing with complaints relatingto the IFC and MIGA:

Although the Inspection Panel currently cannotconsider claims involving the IFC and MIGA,complaints may be addressed to the newCompliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO) for theIFC and MIGA. This position was created to be aflexible and solution-oriented problem-solvingmechanism. The CAO will report to the Presidentof the World Bank Group. The first CAO, MegTaylor, began operations in August 1999. Contactinformation for the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman is provided in Part Three. Meanwhile,proposals to extend the mandate of the InspectionPanel to IFC and MIGA are still under review. SeeDavid Hunter, “Extending the World BankInspection Panel to the IFC and MIGA,” in LoriUdall, The World Bank Inspection Panel: Three-Year Review (Bank Information Center: 1997).

WHAT INFORMATION SHOULD

BE INCLUDED IN A CLAIM?

In addition to the information describedabove for claimants to demonstrate their eligibility,the claim should also include:• the name and/or a description of the project;• a description of the harmful effects, immediate

or threatened, caused by the Bank’s actions oromissions;

BOX 2-1: PANEL GUIDANCE ON FILING A CLAIM

The Inspection Panel published Guidance on How to Prepare aRequest for Inspection in Annex 2 to their July 1997 AnnualReport. The Inspection Panel suggests that claimants ad-dress the following questions:

1. Can you elaborate on the nature and importance of thedamage caused by the project to you or those you rep-resent?

2. Do you know that the Bank is responsible for the aspectsof the project that has or may affect you adversely?How did you determine this?

3. Are you familiar with Bank policies and procedures thatapply to this type of project? How do you believe theBank may have violated them?

4. Have you contacted or attempted to contact Bank staffabout the project? Please provide information aboutall contacts, and the responses, if any, you received fromthe Bank. You must have done this before you can filea request.

5. Have you tried to resolve your problem through anyother means?

6. If you know that the Panel has dealt with this matterbefore, do you have new facts or evidence to submit?



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explain the harm that has been or could be sufferedas a result of the Bank’s violations of its policies.

Claimants need not have a fullunderstanding of or access to Bank policies in orderto file a claim. In fact, getting access to Bankpolicies is often difficult for local affected people,because the Bank does not provide copies of Bankpolicies in the local language. If the claimants donot have an understanding of specific policyviolations, they should focus on the factual situationand the elements of harm, and the Panel canevaluate the relevant policies. The Bangladesh Jutesector claim, for example, did not reference anyparticular policy violations. The Panel wasnonetheless able to analyze the relevant policiesbased on the facts presented in the claim. Copiesof some useful Bank policies are included inAppendix II. Part Three also gives information forhow to obtain additional Bank policies.

• an explanation of how the claimants believeBank policies, procedures or contractualdocuments (including the loan agreement) wereseriously violated;

• a summary of the steps taken by affected partiesto raise concerns with Bank staff and anexplanation of why the Bank’s response wasinadequate;

• the name, signature, address and telephonenumber of the claimants (unless the claimantsare requesting confidentiality, in which case thisinformation should be delivered only to thePanel and should be kept separate from theclaim);

• maps or photographs are not required, but theycan help the Panel to understand the situation.

Claims can be as simple as a letter addressedto the Panel, or they can be comprehensive. In anyevent, it is particularly important to emphasize and

Components of a Claim Examples

1. Name of project Yacyretá Hydroelectric Project, Rio Parana

2. Harmful effects Substandard housingClaimants� lost livelihoodLack of sewage treatment could lead to increased diseasesEnvironmental damage

3. Violations Claimants allege that the Bank did not comply with its policiesrequiring participation, environmental assessment and mitigationof social and environmental impacts

4. Bank policies or procedures 4.00 Annex B - Env�t Policy for Dam and Reservoir Projects violated 4.01 Environmental Assessment

4.30 Involuntary Resettlement13.05 Project Supervision(Note: If claimants do not have access to Bank policies, they cansimply allege harms and their belief that Bank policies wereviolated.)

5. Documentation of attempts - Summaries of meetings with dates to raise concerns - Copies of letters with dates

- Summaries of requests for information with dates- Memoranda summarizing telephone conversations (send a copyto correspondent)

6. Claimants signature Claimants can request anonymity

TABLE 2-1: QUICK REFERENCE CLAIM ELEMENTS



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It is also useful to attach copies of allcorrespondence between the affected people andthe Bank in order to demonstrate that steps havebeen taken to try to raise the concerns with Bankstaff without a satisfactory response.

When communicating with the Bank abouta project, it is advisable to keep written copies ofall correspondence or written summaries of allmeetings or telephone conversations. This will helpto document your attempts to get a satisfactoryresolution from the Bank. See also page 20,“Communicating with the World Bank.”

It is important that the claim describe all ofthe policy violations and issues that the claimantswould like the Panel to address. More narrow claimswill result in more narrow, targeted responses byManagement and a narrow investigation by thePanel. In some cases, narrow claims can lead to aprompt resolution of the problems; however, thescope of the Panel’s investigation will necessarilybe limited.

If the request for inspection relates to amatter that has been previously submitted to thePanel, it should include a statement explaining whatnew evidence or changed circumstances justify thePanel revisiting the issue.

Claims should be submitted to the WorldBank Inspection Panel:

The Inspection Panel1818 H St., NWWashington D.C. 20433USA

Alternatively, the claim can be delivered to theresident representative of the country where theproject is located. If using the residentrepresentative, claimants are advised to deliver theclaim in a sealed envelope addressed to theInspection Panel in Washington, D.C. The residentrepresentative is required to issue a receipt to theclaimants and forward the claim (without openingit) to the Panel via the Bank pouch.

WHAT HAPPENS AFTER A

CLAIM IS FILED?

If a claim appears to meet the eligibilityrequirements described above, the Panel willregister the claim in its Registry. It will then senda copy to the President of the Bank, who representsManagement. Bank Management (i.e., the staffinvolved in the design, appraisal, planning andimplementation of the project) has 21 business daysto respond to the claim. Management’s responseis filed with the Inspection Panel. Managementresponds to the claim either by disputing thealleged policy violations or by acknowledging theproblems raised in the claim and explaining thesteps the Bank is taking to come into compliancewith the policies. Management has in the majorityof cases taken a defensive approach to the claims,denying responsibility for any problems with theproject. Management’s response is not made publicuntil after the Board of Executive Directorsconsiders the Panel’s recommendation regardingan investigation.

After receiving Management’s response,the Panel has 21 business days to assess theeligibility of the of the request. It evaluates theclaim and management’s response. It can alsoreview Bank files, interview Bank staff, and visitthe project area during this preliminary period.

After it completes the review of eligibility,the Panel recommends to the Board of ExecutiveDirectors whether or not the claim should beinvestigated. This recommendation must beapproved by the Board before the Panel canproceed. Three days after Board acts on the Panelrecommendation, the claim, Management’sresponse, the Panel recommendation and theBoard’s decision become public.

This stage of the process, requiring Boardapproval, has historically been problematic for avariety of reasons. First, there is no time limit withinwhich the Board must act on the Panel’srecommendation. The Board has repeatedly



14

an investigation, the Chairperson of the Paneldesignates one or more Panel members to conductthe investigation and prepare a report on thefindings.

After the investigation is complete, thePanel submits its report to the Executive Directorsand the President. Within six weeks, Managementmust submit to the Executive Directors itsrecommendations in response to the Panel’sfindings. The Board then meets to consider thePanel report and Management’s recommendations.Based on the Panel report and Management’srecommendations, the Executive Directors decidewhat action to take in response to the claim. TheRequesters are provided a copy of the Panel Report,Management’s Recommendations and the Board’sdecision within three days of the Board’sconsideration of the Panel’s report.

In conducting an investigation, the Panelcan meet with the claimants, affected people, Bankstaff, government officials, project authorities, andrepresentatives of local and international non-governmental organizations. The Panel may alsohold public hearings, visit the project area, requestsubmissions on specific issues, hire consultants,research Bank files, and utilize any other reasonablemethods the inspectors consider appropriate. Inconducting its investigation, the Panel is focusedon the Bank’s performance, not on any actions ofthe Borrower. The Panel has unrestricted accessto the claimants and the project area as necessaryto make its determination of eligibility. Travel tothe project area for purposes of investigationrequires permission of the country where the projectis located. The 1999 Clarifications emphasize anunderstanding that such permission will be granted.

delayed consideration of and decision on thePanel’s recommendation. Another problem is thetendency of the process to become highlypoliticized at this stage. In most cases, the countrywhere the project is located has objected to aninvestigation. The borrowing countries generallyresist investigations by the Panel.

Management has been able to manipulatethis political resistance to promote the adoption ofmanagement or borrowing country-generatedAction Plans as an alternative to an investigation.Management’s objectives in promoting ActionPlans are ostensibly to be forward-looking andproactive in addressing the problems in the project;however, they also hope to avoid scrutiny of policyviolations and the Bank’s role in the problems. Thisundermines the accountability function of the Panelprocess. The Action Plans that have been generatedin the past have been developed in a non-participatory way and have had the tendency toexclude the claimants from any further role in theprocess. By accepting Management Action Plansinstead of an investigation, the Board has in manycases relegated the Panel merely to a role as anadvisor to the Board.

In the Second Review of the InspectionPanel, in April 1999, the Board attempted to solvesome of these political issues. The Board committedto authorize the Panel’s recommendation forinvestigation without questioning the merits of theclaim and without discussion except with respectto certain eligibility criteria. The Board emphasizedthat Management is strictly forbidden frominterfering with the Panel process by proposingAction Plans until after the Panel has finished itsinvestigation and issued its report. See Conclusionsof the Board’s Second Review of the InspectionPanel, Appendix I. Note that the China WesternPoverty Reduction Project was the first claim totest the Board’s commitments to the newagreement. It was encouraging that despite writtenobjections by China, the full Board authorized thePanel to investigate the project.

If the Executive Directors agree to approve



15

HOW LONG DOES THE PANEL

PROCESS TAKE?

The time involved with the Panel processvaries depending on the complexity of the claimand the response of the Board of ExecutiveDirectors. The Panel process has several stepswith explicit time limits:

(1) Bank Management has 21 business days torespond to the claim after it is registered bythe Panel.

(2) The Panel has an additional 21 business daysafter receipt of Management’s response toconduct its preliminary eligibility assessmentand determine whether it believes the claimshould be fully investigated.

(3) After the Panel has conducted a fullinvestigation (authorized by the Board) andsubmitted a report of its findings to the Board,Bank Management has six weeks to submit tothe Board a its recommendations for how toact based on the Panel’s findings.

Three steps in the Panel process do nothave explicit time limits:

(1) when the Board decides whether to approvethe Panel’s recommendation for a fullinvestigation;

(2) when the Panel conducts a full investigation;and,

(3) when the Board responds to the Panel reportand decides on a final action plan.

In practice, the timing of the process hasvaried considerably. For example, the Arun claimwas filed in October, 1994; the Board approvedthe Panel recommendation for an investigation inFebruary, 1995; and the Panel submitted its reportto the Board in June, 1995. Shortly thereafter,Bank President Wolfensohn advised the ExecutiveDirectors that the Bank would not support theproject. The Yacyretá claim was filed in lateSeptember, 1996; the Board authorized the Panelto do a review and assessment in February 1997;

and the Panel submitted its final report to the Boardin September, 1997, a full year after the claim wasfiled. The Board held an informal meeting toconsider the Panel report on June 23, 1998 butreached no decision about how to solve the problemsidentified by the claimants and the Panel.

SHORT SUMMARIES OF PAST

CLAIMS

Although the procedures described in theResolution and Operating Procedures are fairlystraightforward, no claim has made it smoothlythrough the entire Panel review process. Of theclaims that the Panel has fully considered, six wererecommended for a full investigation. Of the sixclaims that the Panel has recommended for aninvestigation, only two have received full Boardapproval. Thus, in Arun , the very first claim filedto the Panel, the Panel received authorization fromthe Board, completed an investigation andsubmitted its report to the Board. However, beforethe Board reached the stage of designing a remedy,President Wolfensohn canceled the Bank’s supportfor the project (an action consistent with theclaimants’ objectives).

In the China Western Poverty ReductionProject, the Panel recommended an investigation.The claim had been filed by the InternationalCampaign for Tibet, serving as a non-localrepresentative of people living in the project area.In requesting the Panel to conduct an investigation,the Board avoided commenting on ICT’s eligibilitybut essentially supported a full investigation intothe policy violations alleged in ICT’s claim. Thatinvestigation was still underway as this Citizen’sGuide went to press.

The Panel also recommended aninvestigation into the Singrauli claim. The Boarddid authorize the Panel to investigate (in the faceof extremely compelling violations of the Bank’s



16

policies and a very tense situation on the groundinvolving allegations of human rights abuses), butit limited the terms of reference for theinvestigation. For example, the Panel wasprohibited from traveling to India to visit the projectsite and it did not have access to the residentmission. The Panel was also not officially asked toevaluate the effectiveness of Management’s last-minute Action Plans. The Panel was restricted toa “headquarters” review and reported back to theBoard. As part of the Management-generatedaction plan, an Independent Monitoring Panelcomprised of Indian nationals was established todeal with the situation, and the Xavier Institute forDevelopment Alternative Studies wascommissioned to conduct an independentassessment of the resettlement plan.

The Yacyretá claim has been the only otherclaim to come close to the intended procedure, andyet the Board consideration of the Panel’srecommendation provoked a major dispute overthe terms defining the Panel’s mandate toinvestigate. Thus, because certain members of theBoard objected to the term “investigation,” theBoard asked the Panel to “review” theenvironmental and social problems and to “assess”the adequacy of Management’s two Action Plans,that were developed after the claim was filed. Onewas supposed to bring the project into compliancewith what should have been done before thereservoir was filled. The other was to take steps tobring the project into compliance at the current levelof the reservoir. The Panel’s assessment was thatthese action plans were insufficient to solve theproblems or bring the project into compliance. TheBoard asked Management for further reports. Theclaimants are still waiting for the Board to announceremedial measures.

In the Brazil Rondonia (PLANAFLORO)claim, the Panel recommended an investigation.The Board was not satisfied with the evidence ofharm, and asked the Panel to do further researchand report back to the Board. The Panel respondedwith detailed evidence of harm to the requestersand again recommended a full investigation. The

Board ultimately rejected an investigation infavor of a Management-generated Action Plan.The Board asked Management to provide a statusreport in 6-9 months and asked the Panel to assistthe Board in evaluating the effectiveness with theAction Plan. One year later, the Panel was invitedby the Board to review the status of the project.

The Panel also recommended aninvestigation into the Itaparica claim. TheExecutive Director representing Brazil objected tothe Panel recommendation and continuouslychallenged the eligibility of the claimants. Theprocess became highly politicized and the Boarddenied the Panel’s recommendation for aninvestigation, accepting instead Brazil’s assurancesthat it had developed and would implement anAction Plan for completion of the irrigation andresettlement works. The government of Brazil alsocommitted to providing $290 million for this work.Thus, the Board approved an Action Plan that ithad never seen or evaluated rather than approvingthe Panel’s recommendation for an investigation.The claimants have complained that they never sawa copy of the government’s Action Plan.Subsequently, the Brazilian government admittedthat its contribution fell far short of its promised$290 million. The Panel was asked to assist theBoard in evaluating implementation of the ActionPlan in 12 months, although this Board evaluationnever took place.

In the Lagos Drainage Project in Nigeriaand the first Brazil Land Reform claim, theInspection Panel decided, after a preliminary visitto the field, that actions undertaken by Managementbetween the filing of the claim and the Inspectorsvisit to the project site were adequate and that nofurther investigation was needed. In the Brazil case,the filing of the claim triggered the projectauthorities to lower the interest rates that wouldhave otherwise barred the poor landless farmersfrom acquiring the proposed land as the projectintended. The claimants are still opposed to theproject concept and are questioning whether thepromised changes took place. They have filed asecond claim based on new and additionalinformation, as the Panel Procedures allow them



17

to do. The Panel has not yet made arecommendation on the second Brazil LandReform claim.

For a thorough discussion of each of theclaims brought to the Panel during the first threeyears, please refer to Lori Udall, The World BankInspection Panel: A Three-Year Review (BankInformation Center, 1997). See also The InspectionPanel: Annual Report (World Bank, 1998).

WHAT CAN CLAIMANTS

EXPECT FROM THE PANEL

PROCESS?

Ultimately, the objective of using theInspection Panel is to force the Bank to solveproblems, to bring the project into compliance withits policies and procedures, and to have aninvestigation into the harm that may be associatedwith the policy violations. The Panel processshould improve project quality, provide importantlessons about why projects fail, and provide ameasure of accountability. The process also canbring greater attention to problems in the projectand generate a comprehensive response, from thelevel of the field office all the way to the office ofthe President. The Panel process is also valuablein that it provides a forum for those directly affectedby projects to voice their concerns, and it forcesthe institution to confront the human andenvironmental impacts of its lending decisions.

However, the Inspection Panel cannotprovide compensation, nor can it issue an injunctionagainst further work on a project or rule that theproject should be canceled. The Panel’s findingsare advisory to the Board, which ultimately mustmake a determination of how to respond to thePanel’s report. Claimants can generally expect anAction Plan that should lead to improvements overthe long-term. The Panel’s findings can also helpinform the Bank and the public about the Bank’s

performance in policy compliance.

The filing of a claim generally results inheightened Bank compliance with policies, even ifno investigation is ever carried out by the Panel. Italso puts pressure on the Bank to supervise theproject more closely (which it is required to doanyway by OD 13.05), which can result in moreeffective implementation of commitments in theloan agreement. For example, soon after thePLANAFLORO claim was filed, hundreds ofthousands of acres of land were accorded legalprotection as required by the loan agreement. Thefiling of the claim also resulted in a completerestructuring of the project and a more active rolefor civil society in its implementation.

In the Singrauli case, managementresponded to the claim by filing an Action Plan.While the Action Plan was designed to subvert thePanel process, certain components of the Planproved to be novel innovations. For instance, anIndependent Monitoring Panel (IMP) comprisedof three respected Indian nationals was formed toprovide a grievance forum for affected people. TheIMP made comprehensive recommendations to theWorld Bank and the National Thermal PowerCorporation (the implementing agency) for actionsneeded to bring the project into compliance withWorld Bank policies and Indian law. Unfortunately,the IMP has faced resistance by the NTPC, andlocal activists feel that it lacked the necessarysupport from the World Bank.

The indirect effects of the Panel processcan be very valuable for local citizens affected byBank projects, as several past cases havedemonstrated. First, the Panel process provides aforum where they can raise concerns that have inmany cases been ignored for years. Regardless ofthe ultimate outcome of the Panel process, thisraises awareness of the problems at the highest levelsin the Bank and in the borrowing country. It canalso be empowering for the claimants.

In the Yacyreta case, the claimants foundthat the visits of teams from the World Bank



18

Inspection Panel and the IDB InvestigationMechanism increased the people’s access to themultilateral development banks and helped torestore the credibility of those institutions in theeyes of the people. “This was the first time someonesent by the Banks actually met with the people andlistened to their concerns,” said Elias Diaz Peña ofSobrevivencia. In addition, the oversight providedby the panels made the project authorities moreresponsive to the complaints of affected people,and long-neglected studies and mitigation projectsare finally starting to move forward.

Another indirect effect is increased mediaattention and support from international NGOsinterested in Bank activities. International attentionhas so far played a critical role in pressuring theBoard to take action. In addition, the time andeffort involved in launching an Inspection Panelclaim has increased solidarity among the claimants,empowered them to have a dialogue withgovernment officials and project authorities,increased awareness within the country, andstrengthened the networks of support at the local,national and international levels.

Even cases that have not been investigatedhave stimulated significant action. For example,after a claim was filed alleging that island dwellersin the Jamuna river had been left out of resettlementplanning and compensation, Bank managementquickly responded by developing a new plan toextend the benefits to the claimants and otherssimilarly affected. Because this response largelymet the concerns of the claimants, the Panel didnot recommend an investigation.

Another example of a claim stimulatingpositive action despite the lack of Inspection Panelreview is the BioBio claim. The Inspection Paneldeclined jurisdiction over the BioBio Claim sinceit was based on an IFC-financed project. However,as a result of the claim being filed, PresidentWolfensohn authorized the first-ever independentreview of an IFC-financed project, and publiclycommitted to the extension of an accountabilitymechanism to IFC and MIGA. There is now a

Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO) positionwhich is designed to promote greaterresponsiveness to problematic IFC and MIGAprojects.

One result that must be considered verycarefully by anyone interested in filing a claim isthe potential for reprisals in the country. This riskshould be carefully evaluated, and claimants shouldnot expect that the Panel can provide protectiononce a claim is filed. However, claimants canrequest that their identities be kept confidential bythe Panel, which offers some protection fromindividual reprisals. International attention canhelp, but it is often not enough to deter retaliation.

The situation in Singrauli is indicative ofthe inability of the Panel and the refusal by theBank to intervene and prevent reprisals by theproject authorities. After the claim was filed, theproject authorities moved into the area with policeforce and heavy machinery and began forciblyevicting people from their homes and acceleratingthe pace of construction. Despite internationalpressure, the Bank refused to publicly intervene,and the Panel has no mandate to call for a halt tothe construction activity or the evictions. MadhuKohli, the representatives of the Singrauli claimants,has noted that, “instead of improvement, theborrower became more hardened in its attitudetoward those who testified or who wanted to reachout to the Panel.”

In the China Western Poverty ReductionProject, local people feared for their lives if theywere to speak out against the project. The filing ofa claim to the Inspection Panel by the InternationalCampaign for Tibet (ICT), a US-based NGO,demonstrated the importance of allowing non-localrepresentation in exceptional circumstances. In arepresentational capacity, ICT was able to raiseserious flaws in the project and to request aninvestigation into the Bank’s role in a highlycontroversial project.


Center for International Environmental Law 19

PART THREE

PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

SUMMARY

Documenting contacts with the World Bank is an important element of anyPanel claim. This section deals with how to get access to information andadvice about Bank projects and policies. It also provides contact informationfor NGOs that are familiar with the Inspection Panel, including many thathave filed claims to the Panel.


Center for International Environmental Law20

DOCUMENTING CONCERNS

AND POLICY VIOLATIONS

One important part of organizing a Panelclaim is to create a record of attempts to contactBank staff or Management and their responses.Whenever possible, create a written record ofmeetings and telephone conversations, in additionto keeping a copy of all correspondence that is sentto or received from the Bank. This informationwill demonstrate that the affected people have takensteps to try to resolve their concerns and have notreceived a satisfactory response. Raising concernswith Bank management is a prerequisite to a Panelclaim.

Although the Bank loans money togovernments, the project authorities are oftengovernment agencies or entities that receive oradminister the Bank loans. For example, in theSingrauli region of India, the project authoritiesthat receive Bank financing and implement theprojects are the National Thermal PowerCorporation and Coal India, Limited. Often, theseproject authorities are the entities with which localcommunities have direct contact. Keep in mindthat the project authorities are receiving financingfrom the World Bank, and try to maintain anddocument a dialogue with the Bank in addition tothe project authorities about problems or concerns.

COMMUNICATING WITH THE

WORLD BANK*Communicating with the World Bank and

borrowing governments is not always easy. WorldBank staff, officials of borrower governments, andthe consultants they may hire are often not fullyaware of the policies they are supposed to befollowing or the real impacts of the project on theground.

Using all the opportunities for publicparticipation mandated in the project cycle – on

environmental, indigenous, resettlement and otherissues – affected communities and NGOs shouldcontinually seek information, ask questions andraise issues of concern. They can do so bycontacting any or all the following in both theborrowing countries and at World Bankheadquarters in Washington, D.C.:

• The borrower government ministry or officeresponsible for the project;

• The Bank’s resident representative in theborrowing country;

• The borrowing country’s Executive Director atthe World Bank, who is based in Washington,D.C. This Executive Director represents thegovernment of the member country;

• The World Bank president and staff inWashington, D.C., such as:

- the project Task Manager;- the Country Director of the appropriate

Country Department;- the Director of the Regional Environment

Division for that geographic region of theworld;

- the Director of the EnvironmentDepartment;

- the Director of the Operations PolicyDepartment;

- the NGO Unit in the Operations PolicyDepartment; and

- other country officers.

The first contact for most individuals andgroups will be the Task Manager (TM). When thename of the TM is not known, the person to contactis the Country Director for that country area. TheCountry Director can identify the TM and ifnecessary will refer the inquiry. The BankPresident, the Operations Policy Department andthe Executive Directors should be contacted whenCountry Directors fail to offer satisfactoryresponses. Letters to each higher level of Bankofficer should include dated copies of earliercommunications with the Bank.

* Adapted in part from: Cindy Buhl, A Citizen’s Guide toMultilateral Development Banks and Indigenous Peoples(Bank Information Center: November 1994)



ACCESS TO INFORMATION

1. Access to World Bank Policies andProject Documents.

One of the main hurdles faced by localcommunities that are concerned about World Bank-financed projects is that they do not have readyaccess to the policies and procedures of the Bank.These policies and procedures provide certainrights for local affected people. Without access tothe policies it is difficult to advocate for those rightsor to use the Panel to defend those rights fromviolations. Compounding this problem is the factthat the Bank generally does not translate policiesinto local languages.

Appendix II reproduces several of theWorld Bank policies that have been significant inpast claims to the Inspection Panel. These includeInvoluntary Resettlement, EnvironmentalAssessment, Environmental Policy for Dam andReservoir Projects, Indigenous Peoples, NaturalHabitats, Economic Evaluation of InvestmentOperations, Project Supervision, Management ofCultural Property, and Inspection Panel.

There are several other policies that mightprove helpful in particular projects, such as OD4.15 Poverty Reduction, OD 8.60 AdjustmentLending, OD 2.00 Country Economic and SectorWork, OD 10.70 Project Monitoring andEvaluation, and OP/BP 13.40 Suspension ofDisbursements. For additional policies, contact theresident mission in the country where the projectis located or:

The World Bank InfoShop701 18th Street, NWWashington, D.C. 20433 - USATelephone: +1.202.458.5454Fax: +1.202.522.1500Email: [email protected]: wbln0018.www.worldbank.org/institutional/Manuals/opmanual.nsf

When contacting the InfoShop (formerlythe Public Information Center), you must bespecific in requesting information. You can askthe InfoShop to give you copies of OperationalDirectives, Operational Policies, and BankProcedures. The InfoShop can also processrequests for public documents relating to the projectdated after 1993, when the Bank passed itsinformation disclosure policy. Staff AppraisalReports (SARs), Project Information Documents(PIDs), and Environmental Assessments (EAs)relating to the project of concern are all usefulsources of information.

2. Access to IFC/MIGA policies.

IFC policies can be obtained either overthe web at http://www.ifc.org/enviro/index.html,at http://www.ifc.org/ngo, or by contacting theIFC NGO Relations Office:

NGO Relations and Outreach OfficerIFC Corporate Relations2121 Pensylvania Ave, NW - USAWashington, DC 20433Telephone: 202.473.1404Fax: 202.974.4384Email: [email protected]

MIGA policies are available over the web athttp://www.miga.org/disclose or by contactingthe Manager of Policy and Evaluation:

Gerald T. WestManager, Policy & Evaluation1800 G Street NW, 12th FloorWashington, D.C. 20433 - USATelephone: 202.473.2060Fax: 202.522.2630Email: [email protected]

3. Contacting the World Bank forInformation.*

Unless otherwise noted, all correspondencewith World Bank headquarters in Washington,D.C., should be addressed as follows:



The World Bank1818 H Street NWWashington, D.C. 20433 - USA

All Bank staff and the Executive Directors may bereached at this headquarters address.

For telephone calls to Washington-basedBank offices, the main switchboard number is:(USA country code +1) 202.477.1234. Calls arereceived by operators between 8:00 am and 6:30pm Eastern Standard Time, Monday throughFriday.

Information on World Bank staff and fieldoffices changes frequently. A good resource is the“World Bank Group Directory,” the Bank’sinternal telephone, fax and address directory, whichis revised and reissued quarterly. The directorymay be ordered from: Office of the Publisher,Room T-8064, 1818 H Street NW, Washington,D.C. 20433, USA. For phone orders, the WorldBank’s publications customer service number is202.473.1155, and the fax number is 202.676.0581.

The resident mission or field officeResident Representative is the official contact forthe World Bank in each member country. TheResident Representative is often a source ofinformation both on the World Bank in general andon specific Bank-supported projects. Someresident missions have appointed an officerresponsible for NGO relations. Names andaddresses of Resident Representatives may berequested from the NGO Unit of the World Bankheadquarters. The contact information for the NGOUnit is:

William Reuben, ManagerNGO Unit1818 H Street NWWashington, D.C. 20433 - USATelephone: +1.202.458.5012Fax: +1. 202.522.1669

4. Additional Information about theInspection Panel.

The Inspection Panel is available to respondto requests for information, advice, and meetingswith potential claimants. The Panel has alsoprepared Annual Reports describing itsexperiences, short descriptions of the Panel processand descriptions of claims brought to date. TheInspection Panel’s operating procedures areavailable in English, Spanish, Portuguese, andFrench.

The Inspection Panel1818 H Street, NWWashington, DC 20433 - USATelephone: +1.202.458.5200Fax: +1.202.522.0916Email: [email protected]: www.worldbank.org/inspection

5. Additional Information about BankProjects.

Often, the Bank has refused to make certaininformation publicly available. This isparticularly true if the project predates the 1993Disclosure Policy. If you are having trouble gettingaccess to information, you can also contact a non-governmental organization that specializes inassisting grassroots organizations in learning moreabout Bank-financed projects. The BankInformation Center (BIC) is a Washington-basedinternational NGO that provides hard-to-obtaininformation on the multilateral development banks.BIC monitors the environmental and social impactsof MDB projects and policies, and provides itspartners with timely information on public andprivate MDB lending activities. BIC is not a partof the World Bank; it is an independent NGO thatcan help project-affected people. BIC’s contactinformation is as follows:

Bank Information Center733 15th Street, NW, Suite 1126Washington, DC 20005 - USA



Telephone: +1. 202.737.7752Fax: +1. 202.737.1155Email: [email protected]: www.bicusa.org

The Bank Information Center has published auseful guide: Kay Treakle, Toolkits for Activists:A User’s Guide to the Multilateral DevelopmentBanks (Bank Information Center: 1999).

6. Information about the ComplianceAdvisor/Ombudsman for IFC andMIGA.

The Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman(CAO) for IFC and MIGA can be reached at thefollowing address:

Meg Taylor2121 Pennsylvania Avenue, NWWashington, DC 20433 USATelephone: +1. 202.458.9452Fax: +1. 202.522.7400Email: [email protected]: www.ifc.org

ACCOUNTABILITY

MECHANISMS AT OTHER

MULTILATERAL

DEVELOPMENT BANKS

1. Introduction

The Inter-American Development Bank(IDB) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB)have also created accountability mechanisms.Although the inspection processes at the IDB andADB are modeled after the Inspection Panel, theyare significantly less independent than the WorldBank Inspection Panel. Both mechanisms rely ona “Roster of Experts” rather than a permanentPanel. This means that there are no permanentPanel members or staff. If a claim is received, andthe banks determine that it should be investigated,

they convene a panel from the roster. Neithermechanism has a procedure for guaranteeing theanonymity of claimants, although the individualclaimants to the IDB mechanism in the Yacyretáclaim insisted on confidentiality.

2. The Inter-American Development Bank

The IDB’s Independent InvestigationMechanism came into effect in August, 1994.Under the IDB process, a claim is filed with theOffice of the President, who then forwards theclaim to Management for a response. Afterreceiving Management’s response, the Presidentmakes a recommendation to the Board of ExecutiveDirectors as to whether a Panel should beconvened. If the Board decides to convene a panel,they draw members from the Roster of Experts.

The IDB process has been tested once:Sobrevivencia filed a claim relating to the YacyretáHydroelectric Project, which involved both theWorld Bank and the Inter-American DevelopmentBank. In that case, the Board of the IDB authorizedan investigation. The IDB Panel report on Yacyretáwas submitted to the IDB Board but did not resultin any definitive action to solve the problems. Asa result of the experience of the Yacyretá claimand pressure for reform from NGOs, IDBManagement is considering reforming the IDBinvestigation mechanism to improve itseffectiveness.

For more information about the IDBmechanism, contact:

The Inter-American Development Bank1300 New York Ave., NWWashington, D.C. 20577 - USATelephone: 202.623.1000Fax: 202.623.3096

The IDB Investigation Mechanismprocedures can also be found in English on the webat http://www.iadb.org/cont/poli/investig.htm. Itcan be found in Spanish at http://www.iadb.org/cont/poli/investigs.htm.



For information about experience with theIDB Investigation Mechanism process, one couldalso contact Sobrevivencia, which is the only NGOto use the mechanism to date. Sobrevivencia’scontact information can be found in the next sectionon NGO contacts.

3. The Asian Development Bank

The Asian Development Bank’sinvestigation process became effective in October1996. The ADB mechanism has several featuresthat make it significantly less independent than thatof the World Bank, including the fact that decisionson whether claims should be investigated are madeby a standing committee (the InspectionCommittee) of the Bank’s Board of Directors. Ifan inspection is authorized, it would be conductedby a panel of experts drawn from a roster. Thepanel of experts would report to the InspectionCommittee, which would forward the Panel’sreport and its own recommendations to the Boardof Directors.

Note that before a claim can be filed underthe ADB process, the claimants must have tried toraise their concerns with Bank management. Thisrequirement is similar to that of the World Bankand the IDB, except that the ADB has created amore formal process requirement. In order tosatisfy this aspect of the process, claimants mustspecifically write to the president of the ADB,raising points of concern. Only if the President orManagement fails to satisfactorily respond within45 days can the claimants file a request forinspection. For further information about the ADBinspection process contact:

Office of the SecretaryAsian Development Bank6 ADB Avenue, Mandaluyong City0401 Metro Manila, PhilippinesTelephone: (63-2) 632.4444Fax: (63-2) 636.2481Email: [email protected]: http://www.asiandevbank.org

NGO CONTACTS

If you would like additional informationor advice about the Inspection Panel process or pastexperience with claims, you can contact thefollowing organizations:

Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL)Dana Clark, David Hunter, and Emilie Thenard1367 Connecticut Ave., NWSuite 300Washington, D.C. 20036 - USATel: +1 202.785.8700Fax: +1 202.785.8701Email: [email protected]: www.ciel.org

Bank Information Center (BIC)Lisa Jordan and Kay Treakle733 15th Street, NWSuite 1126Washington, D.C. 20005 - USATel: +1 202.737.7752Fax: +1 202.737.1155Email: [email protected]: www.bicusa.org

Sobrevivencia, Friends of the Earth ParaguayElias Diaz Peña25 de Mayo 1618Casilla de Correos 1380Asuncion, ParaguayTel/Fax: +595 21.480.182Email: [email protected](Yacyretá claim)

Grupo de Accion por el BioBio (GABB)Juan Pablo Orrego and Cristian OpasoErnesto Pinto Lagarrigue 112Recoleta, Santiago - ChileTel: +56 2.737.1420Fax: +56 2.777.6414Email: [email protected](BioBio claim)

Rede BrasilAurélio Vianna Jr. or Flavia BarrosSCS Qd. 08, Bloco 50Salas 433-441, Vemancio 2.000CEP: 70.333-970Brasilia/DF - BrazilTel: +55 61.226.8093Fax: +55 61.226.8042Email: [email protected]; [email protected](Itaparica and Land Reform claim)



Polo SindicalRua Dantas Barreto, 139Caixa Postal 02CEP: 56.460-000Petrolandia, PE - BrazilTel/Fax: +55 81.851.1160(Itaparica claim)

Madhu Kohli, c/o Delhi ForumF-10/12 Malvina NagarNew Delhi 110017 - IndiaTel: +91 11.6426783Fax: +91 11.6237724Email: [email protected](Singrauli claim)

Jamuna Char Integrated Development ProjectMajibul Huq DuluHouse #37, Road #04Dhanmondi, Dhaka - BangladeshTel: +880 2.865729, 502391Fax: +880 2.886368(Jamuna claim)

International Institute for Human Rights, Environmentand Development (INHURED)Gopal SiwakotiP.O. Box 2125Putalisadak, Kathmandu - NepalTel: +977 1.419.610Fax: +977 1.412.538(Arun claim)

Friends of the Earth - AmazoniaRoberto SmeraldiCEP 04102-002 Sao Paulo - BrasilTel: +55 11.887.8228Fax: +55 11.884.2795Email: [email protected](Rondonia claim)

Friends of the Earth - USAndrea Durbin1025 Vermont Ave., NW - Suite 300Washington, D.C. 20005-3516 - USATel: +1 202.783.7400, ext.209Fax: +1 202.783.0444Email: [email protected]: www.foe.org/international

Reform the World Bank CampaignFrancesco MartoneVia Ferraironi 88/G00172 Roma - ItaliaTel: + 39.06.24.40.42.12Fax: + 39.06.24.24.177e-mail: [email protected]

International Rivers Network (IRN) - BrazilGlenn SwitkesIRN a/c LuccasRua Manoel Carneiro, 53437.464 Itanhandu’, MG - BrasilTel/Fax: +55.35.361.1057Email: [email protected]

International Rivers Network (IRN)Juliette Majot1847 Berkeley WayBerkeley, CA 94703 - USATel: +1 510.848.1155Fax: +1 510.848.1008Email: [email protected]

URGEWALDHeffa SchueckingVon Galen-str.2D-48336 Sassenberg - GermanyTel: +49 2583.1031Fax: +49 2583.4220Email: [email protected]

Centro Mexicano de Derecho Ambiental (CEMDA)Gustavo Alanis OrtegaAtlixco #138Colonia CondesaMexico, D.F., 06140 - MexicoTel: +525 2.86.33.23Fax: +525 2.11.25.93Email: [email protected]

TrasparenciaManuel Fernandez de VillegasSC Pirus #108, JalatlacoOaxaca de JuarezOaxaca, C.P. 68080 - MexicoTel: +525 951.39039Fax: +525 951.39021

Oxfam UKPatricia Feeney274 Banbury RoadOxford, OX2 7DZ - United KingdomTel: +44 1.865.312.292Fax: +44 1.865.312.417Email: [email protected]