ABRIEFHISTORY

OFTHOUGHT

APHILOSOPHICALGUIDETOLIVING

LucFerryTranslatedbyTheoCuffe

Dedication

ForGabrielle,LouiseandClara

Contents

CoverTitlePageDedication

IntroductionChapter1:WhatisPhilosophy?Chapter2:‘TheGreekMiracle’Chapter3:TheVictoryofChristianityoverGreekPhilosophyChapter4:Humanism,ortheBirthofModernPhilosophyChapter5:Postmodernity:TheCaseofNietzscheChapter6:AfterDeconstruction:ContemporaryPhilosophy

InConclusionFurtherReadingIndex

AbouttheAuthorAlsobyLucFerry,availableinEnglishCreditsCopyrightBackAdsAboutthePublisher

Introduction

While chatting over supper on holiday, some friends askedme to improvise aphilosophycourseforadultsandchildrenalike.Idecidedtoacceptthechallengeand came to relish it. The exercise forced me to stick to essentials – nocomplicatedwords,nolearnedquotationsandnoreferencestoobscuretheories.As I worked throughmy account of the history of ideas, without access to alibrary, it occurred tome that there is nothing comparable in print. There aremanyhistories of philosophy, of course; some are excellent, but even thebestonesarealittledryforsomeonewhohasleftuniversitybehind,andcertainlyforthoseyettoenterauniversity.Andtherestofusarenotparticularlyconcerned.This book is the direct result of those evenings amongst friends, so I have

tried topreserve theoriginal impromptustyle. Itsobjective isbothmodestandambitious: modest, because it is addressed to a nonacademic audience;ambitious,becauseIhavenotpermittedmyselfanyconcessiontosimplificationwhereitwouldinvolvedistortionofthephilosophicalideasatitsheart.Ifeeltoomuch respect for the masterpieces of philosophy to caricature them. Clarityshould be the primary responsibility of a work addressed to beginners, but itmustbeachievedwithoutcompromisingthetruthof itssubject;otherwiseit isworthless.Withthatinmind,Ihavetriedtoofferariteofpassage,whichaimstobeas

straightforward as possible, without bypassing the richness and profundity ofphilosophicalideas.Myaimisnotmerelytogiveataste,asuperficialgloss,orasurvey influenced by popular trends; on the contrary Iwant to lay bare theseideasintheirintegrity,inordertosatisfytwoneeds:thatofanadultwhowantstoknowwhatphilosophyisabout,butdoesnotnecessarilyintendtoproceedanyfurther;andthatofayoungpersonwhohopeseventuallytofurthertheirstudy,but does not as yet have the necessary bearings to be able to read thesechallengingauthorsforherselforhimself.Ihaveattempted togiveanaccountofeverything that Iconsider tobe truly

indispensableinthehistoryofthought–allthatIwouldliketopassontofamilyandthosewhomIregardasfriends.But why undertake this endeavour? First, because even the most sublime

spectaclebegins topall ifone lacksacompanionwithwhom to share it. I amincreasingly aware that philosophy no longer counts as what is ordinarilythoughtofas‘generalknowledge’.Aneducatedpersonissupposedtoknowhisorhernationalhistory,afewstandardliteraryandartisticreferences,evenafewodds and ends of biology or physics, yet theymost likely have no inkling ofEpictetus, Spinoza orKant. I am convinced that everyone should study just alittlephilosophy,ifonlyfortwosimplereasons.Firstofall,without itwecanmakenosenseof theworld inwhichwelive.

Philosophyisthebesttrainingforliving,bettereventhanhistoryandthehumansciences.Why?Quitesimplybecausevirtuallyallofour thoughts,convictionsand values exist and havemeaning –whether or notwe are conscious of it –within models of the world that have been developed over the course ofintellectual history. We must understand these models in order to grasp theirreach,theirlogicandtheirconsequences.Many individuals spend a considerable part of their lives anticipating

misfortuneandpreparingforcatastrophe–lossofwork,accident,illness,deathoflovedones,andsoon.Others,onthecontrary,appeartoliveinastateofutterindifference, regarding such fears asmorbid and having no place in everydaylife. Do they realise, both of these character-types, that their attitudes havealreadybeenponderedwithmatchlessprofunditybythephilosophersofancientGreece?The choice of an egalitarian rather than an aristocratic ethos, of a romantic

aesthetic rather than a classical one, of an attitude of attachment or non-attachment to things and to beings in the face of death; the adoption ofauthoritarianor liberalpoliticalattitudes; thepreferenceforanimalsandnatureovermankind,forthecallofthewildoverthecitiesofman–allofthesechoicesandmanymorewereconsideredlongbeforetheybecameopinionsavailable,asinamarketplace,tothecitizen.Thesedivisions,conflictsandissuescontinuetodetermineourthoughtsandourwords,whetherweareawareofthemornot.Tostudy them in theirpure form, tograsp theirdeepestorigins, is toarmoneselfwith not only the means of becoming more intelligent, but also moreindependent.Whywouldonedepriveoneselfofsuchtools?Second, beyond coming to an understanding of oneself and others through

acquaintancewiththekeytextsofphilosophy,wecometorealisethatthesetexts

are able, quite simply, to help us live in a better and freer way. As severalcontemporary thinkers note: one does not philosophise to amuse oneself, noreven to better understand theworld and one’s own place in it, but sometimesliterallyto‘saveone’sskin’.Thereisinphilosophythewherewithaltoconquerthefearswhichcanparalyseusinlife,anditisanerrortobelievethatmodernpsychology,forexample,cansubstituteforthis.Learningtolive;learningtofearnolongerthevariousfacesofdeath;or,more

simply,learningtoconquerthebanalityofeverydaylife–boredom,thesenseoftimeslippingby: thesewerealready theprimarymotivationsof theschoolsofancientGreece.Theirmessagedeserves tobeheard,because,contrary towhathappens in history and in the human sciences, the philosophers of time pastspeaktousinthepresenttense.Andthisisworthcontemplating.Whenascientifictheoryisrevealedtobefalse,whenitisrefutedbyanother

manifestlytruertheory,itbecomesobsoleteandisofnofurtherinterestexcepttoahandfulofscientistsandhistorians.However,thegreatphilosophicalquestionsabouthowtoliveliferemainrelevanttothisday.Inthissense,wecancomparethehistoryofphilosophytothatofart,ratherthanofthesciences:inthesamewaythatpaintingsbyBraqueorKandinskyarenot‘lessbeautiful’thanthosebyVermeerorManet, so too the reflectionsofKantorNietzscheon the senseornon-senseoflifearenotinferior–orsuperior–tothoseofEpictetus,Epicurusor theBuddha.Theyall furnishpropositionsabout life,attitudes in thefaceofexistence,thatcontinuetoaddressusacrossthecenturies.WhereasthescientifictheoriesofPtolemyorDescartesmayberegardedas‘quaint’andhavenofurtherinterestotherthanthehistorical,wecanstilldrawuponthecollectivewisdomoftheancientsaswecanadmireaGreek templeoraChinese scroll–withbothfeetplantedfirmlyinthetwenty-firstcentury.Following the lead of the earliest manual of philosophy ever written, The

DiscoursesofEpictetusfromc.100AD,thislittlebookwilladdressitsreadersdirectly.Ihopethereadermaytakemytoneasasignofcomplicityratherthanfamiliarity.

Chapter1WhatisPhilosophy?

Iamgoingtotellyouthestoryaswellasthehistoryofphilosophy.Notallofit,ofcourse,butitsfivegreatmoments.Ineachcase,Iwillgiveyouanexampleofoneor two transformingvisionsof theworldor, aswe say sometimes,oneortwogreat‘systemsofthought’.Ipromisethat,ifyoutakethetroubletofollowme,youwillcometounderstandthisthingcalledphilosophyandyouwillhavethemeanstoinvestigateitfurther–forexample,byreadingindetailsomeofthegreatthinkersofwhomIshallbespeaking.The question ‘What is philosophy?’ is unfortunately one of the most

controversial(althoughinasensethatisagoodthing,becauseweareforcedtoexerciseourability to reason)andonewhich themajorityofphilosophersstilldebatetoday,withoutfindingcommonground.WhenIwasinmyfinalyearatschool,myteacherassuredmethatitreferred

‘quitesimply’tothe‘formationofacriticalandindependentspirit’,toa‘methodof rigorous thought’, to an ‘art of reflection’, rooted in an attitude of‘astonishment’ and ‘enquiry’…These are the definitionswhich you still findtodayinmostintroductoryworks.However,inspiteoftherespectIhaveformyteacher, Imust tell you from the start that, inmy view, such definitions havenothingtodowiththequestion.It is certainly preferable to approach philosophy in a reflective spirit; that

much is true.And thatoneshoulddosowithrigourandeven inacriticalandinterrogatorymood – that is also true.But all of these definitions are entirelynon-specific.I’msurethatyoucanthinkofaninfinitenumberofotherhumanactivitiesaboutwhichweshouldalsoaskquestionsandstrivetoargueourwayasbestwecan,withouttheirbeingintheslightestsensephilosophical.Biologistsandartists,doctorsandnovelists,mathematiciansandtheologians,

journalistsandevenpoliticiansallreflectandaskthemselvesquestions–noneofwhichmakesthem,formymoney,philosophers.Oneof theprincipalerrorsof

the contemporaryworld is to reducephilosophy to a straightforwardmatterof‘critical reflection’. Reflection and argument are worthy activities; they areindispensable to the formation of good citizens and allow us to participate inciviclifewithanindependentspirit.Butthesearemerelythemeanstoanend–andphilosophyisnomoreaninstrumentofpoliticsthanitisapropformorality.I suggest that we accept a different approach to the question ‘What is

philosophy?’ and start from a very simple proposition, one that contains thecentralquestionofallphilosophy:thatthehumanbeing,asdistinctfromGod,ismortalor,tospeaklikethephilosophers,isa‘finitebeing’,limitedinspaceandtime.As distinct from animals,moreover, a human being is the only creaturewho is awareof his limits.Heknows that hewill die, and that his near ones,those he loves, will also die. Consequently he cannot prevent himself fromthinking about this state of affairs, which is disturbing and absurd, almostunimaginable.And,naturallyenough,he is inclined to turnfirstofall to thosereligionswhichpromise‘salvation’.

TheQuestionofSalvation

Thinkaboutthisword–‘salvation’.Iwillshowhowreligionshaveattemptedtotake charge of the questions it raises.Because the simplestway of starting todefinephilosophyisalwaysbyputtingitinrelationtoreligion.Open any dictionary and you will see that ‘salvation’ is defined first and

foremost as ‘the condition of being saved, of escaping a great danger ormisfortune’.Butfromwhat‘greatdanger’,fromwhat‘misfortune’doreligionsclaim to deliver us? You already know the answer: from the peril of death.Whichiswhyallreligionsstrive,indifferentways,topromiseuseternallife;toreassureusthatonedaywewillbereunitedwithourlovedones–parentsandfriends,brothersandsisters,husbandsandwives,childrenandgrandchildren–fromwhomlifeonearthmusteventuallyseparateus.In the Gospel According to St John, Jesus experiences the death of a dear

friend,Lazarus.Likeeveryotherhumanbeingsincethedawnoftime,heweeps.Heexperiences,likeyouorI,thegriefofseparation.ButunlikeyouorI,simplemortals,itisinJesus’spowertoraisehisfriendfromthedead.Andhedoesthisin order to prove that, as he puts it, ‘love is stronger than death’. Thisfundamental message constitutes the essence of the Christian doctrine ofredemption:death,forthosewholoveandhavefaithinthewordofChrist,isbutanappearance,ariteofpassage.Throughloveandthroughfaith,weshallgain

immortality.Whichisfortunateforus,forwhatdowetrulydesire,aboveallelse?Tobe

understood,tobeloved,nottobealone,nottobeseparatedfromourlovedones–inshort,nottodieandnottohavethemdieonus.Butdailylifewillsoonerorlaterdisappointeveryoneofthesedesires,and,soitis,thatbytrustinginaGodsomeofusseeksalvation,andreligionassuresusthatthosewhodosowillberewarded.Andwhynot,forthosewhobelieveandhavefaith?But for those who are not convinced, and who doubt the truth of these

promises of immortality, the problem of death remains unresolved. Which iswherephilosophycomes in.Death isnot as simpleanevent as it isordinarilycreditedwithbeing. It cannotmerelybewrittenoffas ‘theendof life’, as thestraightforward termination of our existence. To reassure themselves, certainwise men of antiquity (Epicurus for one) maintained that we must not thinkaboutdeath,becausethereareonlytwoalternatives:eitherIamalive,inwhichcase death is by definition elsewhere; or death is here and, likewise bydefinition,Iamnotheretoworryaboutit!Why,undertheseconditions,wouldyoubotheryourselfwithsuchapointlessproblem?This lineofreasoning, inmyview,isa little toobrutal tobehonest.Onthe

contrary,deathhasmanydifferentfaces.Anditisthiswhichtormentsman:foronly man is aware that his days are numbered, that the inevitable is not anillusion and that hemust consider what to dowith his brief existence. EdgarAllanPoe,inoneofhismostfamouspoems,‘TheRaven’,conveysthisideaoflife’sirreversibilityinasinisterravenperchedonawindowledge,capableonlyofrepeating‘Nevermore’overandoveragain.Poeissuggestingthatdeathmeanseverythingthatisunrepeatable.Death is,

inthemidstoflife,thatwhichwillnotreturn;thatwhichbelongsirreversiblytotime past,whichwe have no hope of ever recovering. It canmean childhoodholidayswithfriends,thedivorceofparents,orthehousesorschoolswehavetoleave, or a thousand other examples: even if it does not always mean thedisappearance of a loved one, everything that comes under the heading of‘Nevermore’belongsindeath’sledger.Inthissense,youcanseehowfardeathisfromamerebiologicalending.We

encounter an infinite number of its variations, in the midst of life, and thesemanyfacesofdeathtroubleus,evenifwearenotalwaysawareofthem.Tolivewell,therefore,tolivefreely,capableofjoy,generosityandlove,wemustfirstandforemostconquerourfear–or,moreaccurately,ourfearsoftheirreversible.Buthere,precisely,iswherereligionandphilosophypullapart.

PhilosophyversusReligion

Facedwith thesupreme threat toexistence–death–howdoes religionwork?Essentially,throughfaith.Byinsistingthatitisfaith,andfaithalone,whichcandirect thegraceofGod towardsus. Ifyoubelieve inHim,Godwill saveyou.The religions demand humility, above and beyond all other virtues, sincehumility is in their eyes theopposite–as thegreatestChristian thinkers, fromSaintAugustinetoPascal,neverstoptellingus–ofthearroganceandthevanityof philosophy. Why is this accusation levelled against free thinking? In anutshell, because philosophyalso claims to save us – if not fromdeath itself,thenfromtheanxietyitcauses,andtodosobytheexerciseofourownresourcesandour innate facultyof reason.Which, froma religiousperspective, sumsupphilosophical pride: the effrontery evident already in the earliest philosophers,fromGreekantiquity,severalcenturiesbeforeChrist.Unable to bring himself to believe in a God who offers salvation, the

philosopher isaboveallonewhobelieves thatbyunderstanding theworld,byunderstanding ourselves and others as far our intelligence permits, we shallsucceedinovercomingfear,throughclear-sightednessratherthanblindfaith.Inotherwords,ifreligionscanbedefinedas‘doctrinesofsalvation’,thegreat

philosophiescanalsobedefinedasdoctrinesofsalvation(butwithoutthehelpofaGod).Epicurus,forexample,definedphilosophyas‘medicineforthesoul’,whoseultimateaimistomakeusunderstandthat‘deathisnottobefeared’.Heproposes fourprinciples to remedyall those ills related to the fact thatwearemortal: ‘The gods are not to be feared; death cannot be felt; the good can bewon; what we dread can be conquered.’ This wisdom was interpreted by hismosteminentdisciple,Lucretius,inhispoemDererumnatura(‘OntheNatureofThings’):

ThefearofAcheron[theriveroftheUnderworld]mustfirstandforemostbedismantled;thisfearmuddiesthelifeofmantoitsdeepestdepths,stainseverythingwiththeblacknessofdeath,leavesnopleasurepureandclear.

And Epictetus, one of the greatest representatives of another of the ancientGreek philosophical schools – Stoicism – went so far as to reduce allphilosophicalquestionstoasingleissue:thefearofdeath.ListenforamomenttohimaddressinghisdiscipleinthecourseofhisdialoguesorDiscourses:

Keepwell in mind, then, that this epitome of all human evils, of mean-spiritednessandcowardice,isnotdeathassuch,butratherthefearofdeath.Discipline yourself, therefore, against this. Towhich purpose let all yourreasonings,yourreadings,allyourexercises tend,andyouwillknowthatonlyinthiswayarehumanbeingssetfree.(Discourses,III,26,38–9)

ThesamethemeisencounteredinMontaigne’sfamousadage–‘tophilosophiseistolearnhowtodie’;andinSpinoza’sreflectionaboutthewisemanwho‘dieslessthanthefool’;andinKant’squestion,‘Whatarewepermittedtohopefor?’Thesereferencesmaymeanlittletoyou,becauseyouareonlystartingout,butweshallcomebacktoeachoftheminturn.Beartheminmind.Allthatmatters,now,isthatweunderstandwhy,intheeyesofeveryphilosopher,fearofdeathpreventsusfromliving–andnotonlybecauseitgeneratesanxiety.Mostofthetime,ofcourse,wedonotmeditateonhumanmortality.Butatadeeperleveltheirreversibility of things is a kind of death at the heart of life and threatensconstantly to steer us into timepast – the home of nostalgia, guilt, regret andremorse,thosegreatspoilersofhappiness.Perhapsweshouldtrynottothinkofthesethings,andtrytoconfineourselves

tohappymemories,ratherthanreflectingonbadtimes.Butparadoxicallythosehappy memories can become transformed, over time, into ‘lost paradises’,drawingusimperceptiblytowardsthepastandpreventingusfromenjoyingthepresent.Greekphilosophers lookedupon thepastand thefutureas theprimaryevils

weighinguponhumanlife,andasthesourceofalltheanxietieswhichblightthepresent. The present moment is the only dimension of existence worthinhabiting,becauseit istheonlyoneavailabletous.Thepastisnolongerandthefuturehasyet tocome, theylikedtoremindus;yetwelivevirtuallyallofour lives somewhere between memories and aspirations, nostalgia andexpectation.We imaginewewould bemuch happierwith new shoes, a fastercomputer, a bigger house, more exotic holidays, different friends … But byregrettingthepastorguessingthefuture,weendupmissingtheonlylifeworthliving: the one which proceeds from the here and now and deserves to besavoured.Facedwiththesemirageswhichdistractusfromlife,whatarethepromisesof

religion?Thatwedon’t need tobe afraid, becauseourhopeswill be fulfilled.Thatitispossibletoliveinthepresentasitis–andexpectabetterfuture!Thatthere exists an infinitely benign Being who loves us above all else and will

thereforesaveusfromthesolitudeofourselvesandfromthelossofourlovedones,who,aftertheydieinthisworld,willawaitusinthenext.Whatmustwedotobe‘saved’?FacedwithaSupremeBeing,weareinvited

toadoptanattitudeframedentirelyintwowords:trust(Latinfides,whichalsomeans ‘faith’) and humility. In contrast, philosophy, by following a differentpath,vergesonthediabolical.Christiantheologydevelopedapowerfulconceptof ‘the temptations of the devil’. Contrary to the popular imagery whichfrequentlyservedthepurposesofaChurchinneedofauthority,thedevilisnotonewho leadsus away from the straight andnarrow,morally speaking,by anappeal to theweaknesses of the flesh.The devil is rather onewho, spirituallyspeaking, does everything in his power to separate us (diabolos in Greekmeaning‘thewhowhodivides’)fromtheverticallinkunitingtruebelieverswithGod,andwhichalonesavesthemfromsolitudeanddeath.Thediabolos isnotcontentwithsettingmenagainsteachother,provokingthemtohatredandwar,butmuchmoreominously,hecutsmanofffromGodandthusdelivershimbackintotheanguishthatfaithhadsucceededinhealing.For a dogmatic theologian, philosophy is the devil’s ownwork, because by

incitingmantoturnasidefromhisfaith,toexercisehisreasonandgivereintohisenquiringspirit,philosophydrawshimimperceptiblyintotherealmofdoubt,whichisthefirststepbeyonddivinesupervision.In theaccountofGenesis,withwhichtheBibleopens, theserpentplays the

roleofDevilbyencouragingAdamandEve–thefirsthumanbeings–todoubtGod’swordabout theforbiddenfruit.Theserpentwants themtoaskquestionsandtrytheapple,sothattheywilldisobeyGod.ByseparatingthemfromHim,theDevilcantheninflictuponthem–meremortals–allthetormentsofearthlyexistence. The ‘Fall’ of Adam and Eve and their banishment from the firstParadiseisthedirectconsequenceofdoubtingdivineedicts; thus,menbecamemortal.All philosophies, however divergent theymay sometimes be in the answers

theybring,promiseusanescapefromprimitivefears.Theypossessincommonwithreligionstheconvictionthatanguishpreventsusfromleadinggoodlives:itstops us not only frombeing happy, but also frombeing free.This is an everpresentthemeamongsttheearliestGreekphilosophers:wecanneitherthinknoractfreelywhenweareparalysedbytheanxietyprovoked–evenunconsciously– by fear of the irreversible. The question becomes one of how to persuadehumansto‘save’themselves.Salvation must proceed not from an Other – from some Being supposedly

transcendent (meaning ‘exterior to and superior to’ ourselves) – but well andtruly from within. Philosophy wants us to get ourselves out of trouble byutilising our own resources, by means of reason alone, with boldness andassurance.AndthisofcourseiswhatMontaignemeantwhen,characterisingthewisdomoftheancientGreeks,heassuredusthat‘tophilosophiseistolearnhowtodie’.Iseveryphilosophylinkedthereforetoatheism?CantherenotbeaChristian

oraJewishoraMuslimphilosophy?Andifso,inwhatsense?Inotherwords,whatarewetomakeofthosephilosophers,likeDescartesorKant,whobelievedinGod?Andyoumayaskwhyshouldwerefusethepromiseofreligion?Whynotsubmitwithhumilitytotherequirementsofsalvation‘inGod’?For two crucial reasons, which lie at the heart of all philosophy. First and

foremost, because the promise of religions – that we are immortal and willencounter our lovedones after our ownbiological demise– is toogood to betrue.SimilarlyhardtobelieveistheimageofaGodwhoactsasafathertohischildren. How can one reconcile this with the appalling massacres andmisfortunes which overwhelm humanity: what father would abandon hischildren to thehorrorofAuschwitz,orRwanda,orCambodia?Abelieverwilldoubtless respond that that is the price of freedom, that God created men asequals andevilmustbe laid at theirdoor.Butwhat about the innocent?Whatabout the countless children martyred in the course of these crimes againsthumanity?Aphilosopherbeginstodoubtthatthereligiousanswersareadequate.(Undoubtedlythisargumentengagesonlywiththepopularimageofreligion,butthis is nonetheless the most widespread and influential version available.)Almost invariably the philosopher comes to think that belief in God, whichusually arises as an indirect consequence, in the guise of consolation, perhapsmakes us lose in claritywhatwe gain in serenity.He respects all believers, itgoes without saying. He does not claim that they are necessarily wrong, thattheirfaithisabsurd,orthatthenon-existenceofGodisacertainty.(HowwouldonesetaboutprovingthatGoddoesnotexist?)Simply,thatinhiscasethereisafailureoffaith;thereforehemustlookelsewhere.Wellbeing is not the only ideal in life. Freedom is another. And if religion

calmsanguishbymakingdeathintoanillusion,itrisksdoingsoatthepriceoffreedomof thought.For itdemands,moreor less, thatweabandonreasonandthe enquiring spirit in return for faith and serenity. It asks that we conductourselves,beforeGod,likelittlechildren,notascuriousadults.Ultimately, to philosophise, rather than take on trust, is to prefer lucidity to

comfort,freedomratherthanfaith.Italsomeans,ofcourse,‘savingone’sskin’,but not at any price.Youmight ask, if philosophy is essentially a quest for agoodlifebeyondtheconfinesofreligion–asearchforsalvationwithoutGod–why is it so frequently presented in books as the art of right-thinking, as theexerciseofthecriticalfacultyandfreedomofconscience?Why,inciviclife,ontelevisionandinthepress,isphilosophysooftenreducedtomoralengagement,castingthevoteforjusticeandagainstinjustice?Thephilosopherisportrayedassomeonewhounderstandsthingsastheyare,whoquestionstheevilsoftheday.Whatarewetomakeoftheintellectualandmorallife,andhowdowereconciletheseimperativeswiththedefinitionofphilosophyIhavejustoutlined?

TheThreeDimensionsofPhilosophy

If the quest for a salvation without God is at the heart of every greatphilosophicalsystem,andthatisitsessentialandultimateobjective,itcannotbeaccomplishedwithoutdeepreflectionuponreality,orthingsastheyare–whatisordinarilycalled‘theory’–andconsiderationofwhatmustbeorwhatoughttobe–whichisreferredtoas‘morals’or‘ethics’.(Note: ‘Morals’ and ‘ethics’: what difference is there between these terms?

The simplest answer is: nonewhatsoever. The term ‘morals’ derives from theLatinwordfor‘manners,customs’,and‘ethics’derivesfromtheGreektermfor‘manners,customs’.Theyarethereforeperfectlysynonymous.Havingsaidthis,somephilosophershaveassigneddifferentmeaningstothetwoterms.InKant,for example, ‘morals’ designates the ensemble of first principles, and ‘ethics’refers to theirapplication.Otherphilosophersrefer to‘morals’as thetheoryofduties towardsothers,andto‘ethics’as thedoctrineofsalvationandwisdom.Indeed, there is no reason why different meanings should not be assigned tothese terms,but,unlessI indicateotherwise, Ishalluse themsynonymously inthefollowingpages.)Ifphilosophy, like religion,has itsdeepest roots inhuman ‘finiteness’– the

fact that forusmortals time is limited,and thatweare theonlybeings in thisworldtobefullyawareofthisfact–itgoeswithoutsayingthatthequestionofwhattodowithourtimecannotbeavoided.Asdistinctfromtrees,oystersandrabbits,we think constantly about our relationship to time: about howwe aregoingtospendthenexthourorthisevening,orthecomingyear.Andsoonerorlaterweareconfronted–sometimesduetoasuddeneventthatbreaksourdailyroutine–withthequestionofwhatwearedoing,whatweshouldbedoing,and

whatwemustbedoingwithourlives–ourtime–asawhole.This combination of the fact of mortality with our awareness of mortality

contains all the questions of philosophy. The philosopher is principally notsomeonewhobelievesthatwearehereas‘tourists’,toamuseourselves.Evenifhedoescometobelievethatamusementaloneisworthexperiencing, itwillatleastbetheresultofaprocessofthought,areflectionratherthanareflex.Thisthoughtprocesshasthreedistinctstages:a theoreticalstage,amoralorethicalstage,andacrowningconclusionastosalvationorwisdom.Thefirsttaskofphilosophyisthatoftheory,anattempttogainasenseofthe

worldinwhichwelive.Isithostileorfriendly,dangerousordocile,orderedorchaotic,mysteriousor intelligible,beautifulorugly?Anyphilosophy thereforetakesas its startingpoint thenatural scienceswhich reveal thestructureof theuniverse–physics,mathematics,biology,andsoon–andthedisciplineswhichenlightenusaboutthehistoryoftheplanetaswellasourownorigins.‘Letnooneignorantofgeometryenterhere,’saidPlatotohisstudents,referringtohisschool,theAcademy;andthereafternophilosophyhaseverseriouslyproposedto ignore scientific knowledge.But philosophy goes further and examines themeansbywhichweacquiresuchknowledge.Philosophyattemptstodefinethenature of knowledge and to understand itsmethods (for example, how doweestablishthecausesofanaturalphenomenon?)anditslimits(forexample,canoneprove,yesorno,theexistenceofGod?).These two questions – the nature of the world, and the instruments for

understanding it at our disposal as humans – constitute the essentials of thetheoreticalaspectofphilosophy.Besidesourknowledgeoftheworldandofitshistory,wemustalsointerest

ourselves in other people – those with whom we are going to share thisexistence.Fornotonlyarewenotalone,butwecouldnotbebornandsurvivewithout thehelpofothers, startingwithourparents.Howdoweco-existwithothers,what rules of the game must we learn, and how should we conductourselves– tobehelpful,dignifiedand‘fair’ inourdealingswithothers?Thisquestion is addressed by the second part of philosophy; the partwhich is nottheoreticalbutpractical,andwhichbroadlyconcernsethics.Butwhyshouldwelearnabouttheworldanditshistory,whybothertryingto

live in harmonywith others?What is the point of all this effort?And does ithavetomakesense?Thesequestions,andsomeothersofasimilarnature,bringus to the third dimension of philosophy, which touches upon the ultimatequestionofsalvationorwisdom.Ifphilosophyisthe‘love’(philo)of‘wisdom’

(sophia),itisatthispointthatitmustmakewayforwisdom,whichsurpassesallphilosophicalunderstanding.Tobeasage,bydefinition, isneither toaspire towisdom or seek the condition of being a sage, but simply to live wisely,contentedlyandasfreelyaspossible,havingfinallyovercomethefearssparkedinusbyourownfiniteness.

I am aware this is becoming rather abstract, so I would like to offer someexamplesofthethreeaspectsIhavetouchedupon–theory,ethicsandthequestforsalvationorwisdom–inaction.Thebestcourseisthereforetoplungeintotheheartofthematter,tobeginat

the beginning; namely the philosophical schools which flourished in Greekantiquity. Let’s consider the case of the first of the great philosophicalmovements,whichpassesthroughPlatoandAristotletofinditsmostperfected–oratleastitsmost‘popular’–forminStoicism.Thisisourwayintooursubject,afterwhichwecanexploretheothermajorepochsinphilosophy.Wemustalsotrytounderstandwhyandhowmenpassfromonemodelofrealitytoanother.Isitbecause theacceptedversionno longer satisfies,no longerconvinces?Afterall,severalversionsofrealityareinherentlyplausible.Youmustunderstand thatphilosophy isanartnotofquestionsbut ratherof

answers.And as you are going to judge these things foryourself – this beinganothercrucialpromiseofphilosophy,becauseitisnotreligion,becauseitisnotanswerabletothetruthofanOther–youwillquicklyseehowprofoundtheseanswershavebeen,howgripping,andhowinspired.

Chapter2‘TheGreekMiracle’

MosthistoriansagreethatphilosophyfirstsawthelightofdayinGreece,sometime around the sixth century BC. So sudden and so astonishing was itsmanifestation, it has become known as ‘the Greek miracle’. But what wasavailable, philosophically speaking, before the sixth century and in othercivilisations?Whythissuddenbreakthrough?Ibelievethattwostraightforwardanswerscanbeoffered.Thefirstisthat,as

far as we know, in all civilisations prior to and other than Greek antiquity,religionwasasubstituteforphilosophy.Analmostinfinitevarietyofcultsbearswitnesstothismonopolyofmeaning.Itwasintheprotectionofthegods,notinthe free play of reason, that men traditionally sought their salvation. It alsoseemslikelythatthepartiallydemocraticnatureofthepoliticalorganisationofthecity-stateplayedsomerolein‘rational’investigationbecomingemancipatedfrom religious belief. Among the Greek elite, un-precedented freedom andautonomy of thought were favoured, and in their assemblies, the citizensacquiredthehabitofuninterruptedpublicdebate,deliberationandargument.Thus, inAthens, as early as the fourth centuryBC, a number of competing

philosophicalschoolscametoexist.Usuallytheywerereferredtobythenameoftheplacewheretheyfirstestablishedthemselves:ZenoofCitium(c.334–262BC), the founding father of the Stoic school, held forth beneath colonnadescoveredwith frescoes (the word ‘stoicism’ derives from theGreekword stoameaning‘porch’).ThelessonsdispensedbyZenobeneathhisfamous‘paintedporch’wereopen

andfreetoall-comers.Theyweresopopularthat,afterhisdeath,theteachingswerecontinuedandextendedbyhisdisciples.HisfirstsuccessorwasCleanthesofAssos(c.331–230BC)followedbyChrysippusofSoli(c.280–208BC).Zeno,Cleanthes and Chrysippus are the three great names of what is called ‘EarlyGreek Stoicism’. Aside from a short poem, theHymn to Zeus by Cleanthes,

almostnothingsurvivesofthenumerousworkswrittenbythefirstStoics.Ourknowledge of their philosophy comes by indirectmeans, through laterwriters(notablyCicero). Stoicism experienced a second flourishing, inGreece, in thesecondcenturyBC, and a third,much later, inRome.Themajorworksof thisthird Roman phase no longer come down by word of mouth from Athenianphilosopherssucceedingeachotherat theheadoftheschool;rathertheycomefromamemberoftheimperialRomancourt,Seneca(c.8BC–AD65),whowasalsoatutorandadvisortoNero;fromMusoniusRufus(AD25–80)whotaughtStoicismatRomeandwaspersecutedbythesameNero;fromEpictetus(c.AD50–130), a freed slave whose oral teachings were faithfully transmitted toposteritybyhisdisciples–notablybyArrian,authoroftwoworkswhichwereto travel down the ages, the Discourses and the Enchiridion or Manual ofEpictetus(thetitlewassaidtoderivefromthefactthatthemaximsofEpictetusshouldbe at everymoment ‘tohand’ for thosewanting to learnhow to live–‘manual’ coming from theLatinmanualis, ‘of or belonging to thehand’); andlastly, this body of Stoic teaching was disseminated by the Emperor MarcusAureliushimself(AD121–180).I would now like to show you how a particular philosophy – in this case

Stoicism – can address the challenge of human salvation quite differently toreligions;howitcantrytoexplaintheneedforustoconquerthefearsbornofourmortality, by employing the tools of reason alone. I shall pursue the threemainlinesofenquiry–theory,ethicsandwisdom–outlinedearlier.Ishallalsomake plenty of room for quotations from the writers in question; whilequotationscanslowonedownalittle,theyareessentialtoenableyoutoexerciseyourcriticalspirit.Youneedtogetusedtoverifyingforyourselfwhetherwhatyou are told is trueor not, and for that, youneed to read theoriginal texts asearlyonaspossible.

Theory,ortheContemplationofaCosmicOrder

To find one’s place in the world, to learn how to live and act, wemust firstobtainknowledgeoftheworldinwhichwefindourselves.Thisisthefirsttaskofaphilosophical‘theory’.InGreek,thisactivitycallsitselftheoria,andtheoriginsoftheworddeserve

ourattention:totheionortatheiaoraomeans‘Isee(orao)thedivine(theion)’or ‘divine things’ (theia). And for the Stoics, theoria is indeed a striving tocontemplatethatwhichis‘divine’intherealitysurroundingus.Inotherwords,

theprimarytaskofphilosophyistoperceivewhatis intrinsicabout theworld:whatismostreal,mostimportantandmostmeaningful.Now,inthetraditionofStoicism,theinnermostessenceoftheworldisharmony,order–bothtrueandbeautiful–whichtheGreeksreferredtobythetermkosmos.If wewant to form a simple idea of what wasmeant by kosmos, we must

imaginethewholeoftheuniverseasifitwerebothorderedandanimate.FortheStoics,thestructureoftheworld–thecosmicorder–isnotmerelymagnificent,it isalsocomparabletoalivingbeing.Thematerialworld, theentireuniverse,fundamentallyresemblesagiganticanimal,ofwhicheachelement–eachorgan– is conceived and adapted to the harmonious functioning of thewhole. Eachpart, each member of this immense body, is perfectly in place and functionsimpeccably(althoughdisastersdooccur, theydonotlastforlong,andorderissoonrestored)inthemost literalsense:withoutfault,andinharmonywiththeotherparts.Anditisthisthattheoriahelpsustounravelandunderstand.InEnglish, the termcosmoshas resulted in,amongotherwords, ‘cosmetic’.

Originally, thisscienceof thebodybeautiful related to justnessofproportions,then to the art of make-up, which sets off that which is ‘well-made’ and, ifnecessary,concealsthatwhichislessso.Itisthisorder,orcosmos,thisordainedstructureoftheuniverseinitsentiretythat theGreeksnamed‘divine’(theion),andnot–aswiththeJewsandChristians–aBeingapartfromorexternaltotheuniverse,existingpriortoandresponsiblefortheactofitscreation.It is this divinity, therefore (nothing to do with a personal Godhead),

inextricablycaughtupwiththenaturalorderofthings,thattheStoicsinviteustocontemplate (theorein), for example, by the studyof sciences such as physics,astronomyorbiology,whichshowtheuniverseinitsentiretytobe‘well-made’:fromtheregularmovementoftheplanetsdowntothetiniestorganisms.Wecanthereforesaythatthestructureoftheuniverseisnotmerely‘divine’andperfectof itself,butalso ‘rational’,consonantwithwhat theGreeks termed theLogos(from which we derive ‘logic’ and ‘logical’), which exactly describes thisadmirable order of things. Which is why our human reason is capable ofunderstanding and fathoming reality, through the exercise of theoria, as abiologistcomestocomprehendthefunctionoftheorgansofalivingcreaturehedissects.For the Stoics, opening one’s eyes to the world was akin to the biologist

examining the body of a mouse or a rabbit to find that everything therein isperfectly‘well-made’:theeyeadmirablyadaptedfor‘seeingwell’,theheartandthe arteries for pumping blood through the entire body to keep life going; the

stomach fordigesting food, the lungs foroxygenating themuscles, and soon.Allofwhich,intheeyesoftheStoic,isboth‘logical’and‘divine’.Whydivine?NotbecauseapersonalGodisresponsibleforthesemarvels,butbecausethesemarvelsareready-made.Norarewehumansinanysensetheinventorsof thisreality.Onthecontrary,wemerelydiscoverit.It is here that Cicero, one of our principal sources for understanding the

thought of the early Stoics, intervenes, in hisOn theNature of theGods. Hescornsthosethinkers,notablyEpicurus,whothinktheworldisnotacosmos,anorder,butonthecontraryachaos.TowhichCiceroretorts:

Let Epicurus mock as much as he likes … It remains no less true thatnothing is more perfect than this world, which is an animate being,endowedwithawareness,intelligenceandreason.

This little excerpt givesus a senseof just how remote thiswayof thinking isfromourown.Ifanyoneclaimedtodaythattheworldisalive,animate–thatitpossesses a soul and is endowedwith reason–hewouldbe considered crazy.ButifweunderstandtheAncientscorrectly,whattheyaretryingtosayisbynomeansabsurd:theywereconvincedthata‘logical’orderwasatworkbehindtheapparentchaosof thingsand thathumanreasonwasable todiscern thedivinecharacteroftheuniverse.Itwas this same idea, that theworld possesses a soul of sorts, like a living

being, which would later be termed ‘animism’ (Latin anima, meaning soul ).This ‘cosmology’(or conception of the cosmos) was also described as‘hylozoism’,literallymeaningthatmatter(hyle)isanalogoustowhatisanimal(zoon): that it is alive, in other words. The same doctrine would also bedescribed by the term ‘pantheism’ (the doctrine that nature and the physicaluniverseareconstituentsoftheessenceofGod;fromGreekpan,‘all’,andtheos,meaning ‘God’): that all isGod, since it is the totality of the universe that isdivine, rather than there being aGod beyond theworld, creating it by remotecontrol,sotospeak.IfIdwellonthisvocabularyitisnotoutofafondnessforphilosophicaljargon(whichoftenimpressesmorethanitenlightens),butratherto enableyou to approach thesegreat philosophical texts for yourself,withoutgrindingtoahaltwheneveryouencounterthesesupposedly‘technical’terms.FromthepointofviewofStoictheoria,then–andignoringthosetemporary

manifestations known as catastrophes – the cosmos is essentiallyharmonious.And,asweshallsee,thiswouldhaveimportantconsequencesforthe‘practical’

sphere(moral,legalandpolitical).Forifnatureasawholeisharmonious,thenitcanserveasamodelforhumanconduct,andtheorderofthingsmustbejustandgood,asMarcusAureliusinsistsinhisMeditations:

‘Allthatcomestopasscomestopasswithjustice.’Youwillfindthistobesoifyouwatchcarefully.Idonotmeanonlyinaccordancewiththeorderednatureofevents,butinaccordancewithjusticeandasitwerebysomeonewhoassignstoeachthingitsvalue.(IV.10)

What Marcus Aurelius suggests amounts to the idea that nature – when itfunctionsnormallyandasidefromtheoccasionalaccidentsandcatastrophesthatoccur–rendersjusticefinallytoeachofus.Itsuppliestoeachofusouressentialneeds as individuals: a body which enables us to move about the world, anintelligencewhichpermitsustoadapttotheworld,andnaturalresourceswhichenable us to survive in theworld. So that, in this great cosmic sharing out ofgoods,eachreceiveshisdue.ThistheoryofjusticeushersinwhatservedasafirstprincipleofallRoman

law: ‘to render toeachwhat ishisdue’and toassigneach tohisproperplace(whichassumes,ofcourse,thatforeachpersonandthingthereissuchathing)–what the Greeks thought of as a ‘natural place’ in the cosmos, and that thiscosmoswasitselfjustandgood.Youcanseehow,inthisperspective,oneoftheultimateaimsofahumanlife

is to find its rightful placewithin the cosmicorder.For themajorityofGreekthinkers–withtheexceptionoftheEpicureanswhomweshalldiscusslater–itwas through the pursuit of this quest, or, better, its accomplishment, that weattainhappinessandthegoodlife.Fromasimilarperspective,thetheoriaitselfimplicitlypossessesanaestheticdimension, since theharmonyof theuniversewhichitrevealstousbecomesforhumansamodelofbeauty.Ofcourse,justastherearenatural catastropheswhichseem to invalidate the ideaofagoodandjust cosmos – althoughwe are told that these are nevermore than temporaryaberrations–sotoothereexistwithinnaturethingsthatareatfirstsightugly,orevenhideous.Intheircase,wemust learnhowtogobeyondfirst impressions,the Stoics maintain, rather than remain content with appearances. MarcusAureliusmakesthepointforcefullyinhisMeditations:

The lion’s wrinkled brow, the foam flowing from the boar’s mouth, andmany other phenomena that are far from beautiful ifwe look at them in

isolation, do neverthe less because they follow from Nature’s processeslend those a further ornament and fascination. And so, if a man has afeelingfor,andadeeperinsightintotheprocessesoftheUniverse,thereishardlyanyofthesebutwillsomehowappeartopresentitselfpleasantlytohim…Even anoldmanor oldwomanwill be seen to possess a certainperfection,abloom,intheeyesofthesage,whowilllookuponthecharmsofhisownboyslaveswithsobereyes.(III,2)

This is the same idea already expressed by one of the greatest GreekphilosophersandmodelfortheStoics,Aristotle,whenhedenouncedthosewhojudgetheworldtobeevil,uglyordisjointed:becausetheyarelookingonlyatadetail,withoutanadequateintelligenceofthewhole.Ifordinarypeoplethink,ineffect, that the world is imperfect, it is because, according to Aristotle, theycommit the error ‘of extending to the universe as awhole observationswhichbearonlyuponphysicalphenomena,and thenonlyuponasmallproportionofthese.Infact,thephysicalworldthatsurroundsusistheonlyonedominatedbygeneration and corruption, but this world does not, one might say, constituteevenasmallpartofthewhole:sothatitwouldbefairertoabsolvethephysicalworldinfavourofthecelestialworld,thantocondemnthelatteronaccountofthe former.’Naturally, ifwerestrictourselves toexaminingour littlecornerofthe cosmos, we shall not perceive the beauty of the whole, whereas thephilosopherwhocontemplates,forexample,theadmirablyregularmovementofthe planets will be able to raise himself to a higher plane through anunderstanding of the perfection of the whole, of which we are but aninfinitesimalfragment.Thus, the divine nature of the world is both immanent and transcendent.

Again, Ihaveused thesephilosophical termsbecause theywillbeuseful touslater.Somethingthat is immanentcanbefoundnowhereelseotherthaninthisworld.We say it is transcendent when the contrary applies. In this sense, theChristian God is transcendent in relation to the world, whereas the divineaccordingtotheStoics,whichisnottobelocatedinsome‘beyond’–beingnoneotherthantheharmoniousstructure,cosmicorcosmetic,oftheworldasitis–iswholly immanent. Which does not prevent Stoic divinity from being definedequallyas‘transcendent’:notinrelationtotheworld,ofcourse,butinrelationtoman,giventhatitisradicallysuperiorandexteriortohim.Menmaydiscoverit–withamazement–butinnosensedotheyinventitorproduceit.Chrysippus,thestudentofZenowhosucceededCleanthesasthethirdheadof

the Stoic school notes: ‘Celestial things and thosewhose order is unchangingcannotbemadebymen.’ThesewordsarereportedbyCicero,whoaddsinhiscommentaryonthethoughtoftheearlyStoics:

Wherefore the universemust bewise, andnaturewhichholds all things in itsembrace must excel in the perfection of reason [Logos]; and therefore theuniversemustbeaGod,andalltheforceoftheuniversemustbeheldtogetherbynature,whichisdivine.(OntheNatureoftheGods,II,11,29–30)

We can therefore say of the divine, according to the Stoics, that it represents‘transcendencewithin immanence’;wecangrasp thesense inwhich theoria isthe contemplation of ‘divine things’ which, for all that they do not existelsewhere than in thedimensionof thereal,arenonethelessentirely foreign tohumanactivity.Iwould like you to note again a difficult idea, towhichwe shall return in

moredetail:thetheoriaoftheStoicsrevealsthatwhichismostperfectandmost‘real’ –most ‘divine’, in theGreek sense – in the universe. In effect,what ismost real,mostessential, in theiraccountof thecosmos, is itsordonnance, itsharmony – and not, for example, the fact that at certain moments it has itsdefects, such as monsters or natural disasters. In this respect, theoria, whichshows us all of this and gives us the means to understand it, is at once an‘ontology’ (a doctrine which defines the innermost structure or ‘essence’ ofbeing),andalsoa theoryofknowledge (thestudyof the intellectualmeansbywhichwearriveatthisunderstandingoftheworld).Whatisworthtryingtounderstand,here,isthatphilosophicaltheoriacannot

be reduced to a specific science such as biology, astronomy, physics orchemistry.For,although ithasconstant recourse to thesesciences, it isneitherexperimental,norlimitedtoaparticularbranchorobjectofstudy.Forexample,itisnotinterestedsolelyinwhatisalive(likebiology),orintheheavenlybodies(likeastronomy),norisitsolelyinterestedininanimatematter(likephysics);ontheotherhand it tries to seize the essenceor inner structureof theworld as atotality.Thisisambitious,nodoubt,butphilosophyisnotascienceamongothersciences,andevenifitdoestakeaccountofscientificfindings,itsfundamentalintentisnotofascientificorder.Whatitsearchesforisameaninginthisworldandameansofrelatingourexistencetowhatsurroundsus,ratherthanasolelyobjective(scientific)understanding.However,letusleavethisaspectofthingstoonesideforthetimebeing.We

shall return to it later when we need to define more closely the differencebetweenphilosophyandtheexactsciences.Ihopethatyouwillsensealreadythat this theoria – so different to our modern sciences and their supposedly‘neutral’principles,inthattheydescribewhatisandnotwhatoughttobe–musthavepracticalimplicationsintermsofmorality,legalityandpolitics.Howcouldthis description of the cosmos not have had implications for men who wereaskingthemselvesquestionsastothebestwayofleadingtheirlives?

Ethics:aSystemofJusticeBasedonCosmicOrder

Whatkindofethicscorrespondstothetheoriathatwehavesketchedsofar?Theanswerisclear:onewhichencouragesustoadjustandorientateourselvestothecosmos, which for the Stoics was the watchword of all just actions, the verybasisofallmoralsandallpolitics.Forjusticewas,aboveall,adjustment–asacabinetmakershapesapieceofwoodwithinalargerstructure,suchasatable–so our best efforts should be spent in striving to adjust ourselves to theharmonious and just natural order of things revealed to us by theoria.Knowledge is not entirely disinterested, as you see, because it opens directlyonto ethics. Which is why the philosophical schools of antiquity, contrary towhathappenstodayinschoolsanduniversities,placedlessemphasisonspeechthanonactions,lessonconceptsthanontheexerciseofwisdom.I will relate a brief anecdote so that you might fully understand the

implications.BeforeZenofoundedtheStoicschool,therewasanotherschoolinAthens,fromwhichtheStoicsdrewagreatdealoftheirinspiration:thatoftheCynics.Todaytheword‘cynic’impliessomethingnegative.Tosaythatsomeoneis‘cynical’istosaythathebelievesinnothing,actswithoutprinciples,doesn’tcareaboutvalues,hasnorespectforothers,andsoon.Inantiquity,inthethirdcenturybeforeChrist, itwasaverydifferentbusiness,andtheCynicswere, infact,themostexactingofmoralists.Thewordhasaninterestingorigin,derivingdirectlyfromtheGreekwordfor

‘dog’.Whatconnectioncantherebebetweendogsandaschoolofphilosophicalwisdom? Here is the connection: the Cynics had a fundamental code ofbehaviour and strived to live according to nature, rather than according toartificial social conventions which they never stopped mocking. One of theirfavouriteactivitieswasneedlingthegoodcitizensofAthens, in thestreetsandmarket squares, deriding their attitudes and beliefs – playing shock-the-bourgeois, as we might say today. Because of this behaviour they were

frequently compared to those nasty little dogs who nip your ankles or startbarkingaroundyourfeetasiftodeliberatelyannoyyou.It isalsosaidthattheCynics–oneofthemosteminentofwhom,Cratesof

Thebes, was Zeno’s teacher – forced their students to perform practicalexercises,encouragingthemtodiscounttheopinionsofothersinordertofocusontheessentialbusinessoflivinginharmonywiththecosmicorder.Theyweretold,forexample,todragadeadfishattachedtoapieceofstringacrossthetownsquare.You can imaginehow the unhappyman forced to carry out this prankimmediatelyfoundhimselfthetargetofmockeryandabuse.Butittaughthimalessonortwo!First,nottocarefortheopinionsofothers,orbedeflectedfrompursuing what Cynic believers described as ‘conversion’: not conversion to agod,buttothecosmicrealityfromwhichhumanfollyshouldneverdeflectus.And, another more outrageous example: Crates occasionally made love in

public with his wife Hipparchia. At the time, such behaviour was profoundlyshocking,asitwouldbetoday.Buthewasactinginaccordancewithwhatmightbe termed ‘cosmic ethics’: the idea thatmorality and the art of living shouldborrow their principles from the harmonic law which regulates the entirecosmos.ThisratherextremeexamplesuggestshowtheoriawasfortheStoicsadisciplinetoacquire,giventhatitspracticalconsequencescouldbequiterisky!CiceroexplainsthiscastofmindlucidlywhensummarisingStoicthoughtin

anotherofhisworks,OnMoralEnds:

Thestarting-pointforanyonewhoistoliveinaccordancewithnatureistheuniverseasawholeanditsgovernance.Moreover,onecannotmakecorrectjudgementsaboutgoodandevilunlessoneunderstands thewholesystemofnature,andevenofthelifeofthegods,notknowwhetherornothumannature is in harmony with that of the universe. Similarly, those ancientprecepts of thewise that bid us to ‘respect the rightmoment’, to ‘followGod’, to ‘knowthyself ’,and‘donothing toexcess’cannotbegrasped intheir full force (which is immense)without a knowledgeof physics.Thisscience alone can reveal to us the power of nature to foster justice, andpreservefriendshipandotherbondsofaffection.(III,73)

Inwhich respect, according toCicero, nature is ‘the best of all governments’.Youmayconsiderhowverydifferentthisantiquevisionofmoralityandpoliticsistowhatwebelievetodayinourdemocracies,inwhichitisthewillofmenandnotthenaturalorderthatmustprevail.Thuswehaveadoptedtheprincipleofthe

majority to elect our representatives or make our laws. Conversely, we oftendoubtwhethernatureisevenintrinsically‘good’:whensheisnotconfirmingourworst suspicions with a hurricane or a tsunami, nature has become for us aneutralsubstance,morallyindifferent,neithergoodnorbad.FortheAncients,notonlywasnaturebeforeallelsegood,butinnosensewas

amajorityofhumanscalledupontodecidebetweengoodandevil,betweenjustand unjust, because the criteria which enabled those distinctions all stemmedfromthenaturalorder,whichwasbothexternaltoandsuperiortomen.Broadlyspeaking,thegoodwaswhatwasinaccordwiththecosmicorder,whetheronewilleditornot,andwhatwasbadwaswhatrancontrarytothisorder,whetherone liked it or not. The essential thing was to act, situation-by-situation,moment-by-moment,inaccordancewiththeharmoniousorderofthings,soastofindourproperplace,whicheachofuswasassignedwithintheUniversal.Ifyouwanttocomparethisconceptionofmoralitytosomethingfamiliarand

current inoursociety, thinkofecology.Forecologists–andinthissensetheirideas are akin to aspects of ancient Greek thought, without their necessarilyrealising it – nature forms a harmonious totalitywhich it is in our interest torespect and even to imitate. In this sense the ecologists’ conception of the‘biosphere’, or of ‘ecosystems’, is close in spirit to that of the cosmos. In thewordsoftheGermanphilosopherHansJonas,agreattheoristofcontemporaryecology,‘theendsofmanareathomeinnature’.Inotherwords,theobjectivestowhichweoughttosubscribeontheethicalplanearealreadyinscribed,astheStoics believed, in the natural order itself, so that our duty – the moralimperative–isnotcutofffrombeing,fromnatureassuch.AsChrysippussaid,morethantwothousandyearsbeforeHansJonas,‘there

isnootherormoreappropriatemeansofarrivingatadefinitionofgoodorevilthings,virtueorhappiness, than to takeourbearingsfromcommonnatureandthe governance of the universe’, a propositionwhichCicero in turn related intheseterms:‘Asforman,hewasborntocontemplate[theorein]andimitatethedivineworld…Theworldhasvirtue, and is alsowise, and is consequently aDeity.’(OntheNatureoftheGodsII,14).Isthis,then,thelastwordofphilosophy?Doesitreachitslimits,intherealm

of theory,byoffering ‘avisionof theworld’, fromwhichmoralprinciplesarethen deduced and in agreement with which humans should act? Not in theslightest!Forwearestillonlyonthethresholdofthequestforsalvation,ofthatattempt to raise ourselves to the level of true wisdom by abolishing all fearsoriginatinginhumanmortality,intime’spassage,indeathitself.Itisonlynow,

therefore,on thebasisofa theoryandapraxis (the translationofan idea intoaction;thepracticalsideofanartorscience,asdistinctfromitstheoreticalside)thatwehavejustoutlined,thatStoicphilosophyapproachesitstruedestination.

FromLoveofWisdomtothePracticeofWisdom

Whybotherwith a theoria, or even an ethics?What is the point, after all, intaking all this trouble to contemplate the order of the universe, to grasp theinnermost essence of being?Why try so doggedly to adjust ourselves to theworld?Nooneisobligedtobeaphilosopher…Andyetitisherethatwetouchonthedeepestquestionofall,theultimateendofallphilosophy:thequestionofsalvation.Aswithallphilosophies,thereisfortheStoicsarealm‘beyond’morality.To

use philosophers’ jargon, this is what is termed ‘soteriology’, from theGreeksoterios whichmeans, quite simply, ‘salvation’. As I have already suggested,thispresentsitselfinrelationtothefactofdeath,whichleadsus,soonerorlater,towonderabouttheirreversiblenatureoftimeand,consequently,aboutthebestusewecanmakeofit.Evenifallhumansdonotbecomephilosophers,allofusareonedayoranotheraffectedbyphilosophicalquestions.AsIhavesuggested,philosophy,unlikethegreatreligions,promisestohelpusto‘save’ourselves,toconquerour fears, not through anOther, aGod, but throughourown strengthandtheuseofourreason.AsthephilosopherHannahArendtnotedinBetweenPastandFuture(1961),

theAncients,evenbeforethebirthofphilosophy,traditionallyfoundtwowaysof taking up the challenge of the inescapable fact of human mortality; twostrategies,ifyoulike,ofattemptingtooutflankdeath,oratleast,ofoutflankingthefearofdeath.Thefirst,quitenaturally,residesinthesimplefactofprocreation:byhaving

children, humans assure their ‘continuity’: becoming in a sense a part of theeternalcycleofnature,ofauniverseofthingsthatcanneverdie.Theproofliesin the fact thatour children resembleusphysic ally aswell asmentally.Theycarryforwards,throughtime,somethingofus.Thedrawback,ofcourse,isthatthis way of accessing eternity really only benefits the species: if the latterappearstobepotentiallyimmortalasaresult,theindividualontheotherhandisborn,maturesanddies.So,byaimingatself-perpetuationthroughthemeansofreproduction,notonlydoestheindividualhumanfallshort,hefailstoriseabovethe condition of the rest of brute creation. To put it plainly: however many

childrenIhave,itwillnotpreventmefromdying,nor,worsestill,fromseeingthemdiebeforeme.Admittedly, Iwilldomybit toensure the survivalof thespecies,butinnosensewillIsavetheindividual,theperson.Thereisthereforenotruesalvationbymeansofprocreation.The second strategy was rather more elaborate: it consisted of performing

heroicandgloriousdeedstobecomethesubjectofanepicnarrative,thewrittentracehavingasitsprincipalvirtuetheconquestoftransitorytime.Onemightsaythatworksofhistory–and inancientGreece therealreadyflourishedsomeofthe greatest historians, such as Thucydides andHerodotus – by recording theexceptionaldeedsaccomplishedbycertainmen, saved them from theoblivionwhichthreatenseverythingthatdoesnotbelongtotherealmofnature.Natural phenomena are cyclical. They repeat themselves indefinitely: night

follows day; winter follows autumn; a clear day follows a storm. And thisrepetition guarantees that they cannot be forgotten: the natural world, in apeculiarbutcomprehensibleway,effortlesslyachievesakindof ‘immortality’,whereas ‘all things that owe their existence tomen, such asworks, deeds andwords, are perishable, infected as it were, by the mortality of their authors’(Arendt). It isprecisely thisempireof theperishable,whichgloriousdeeds,atleastintheory,allowedtheherotocombat.Thus,accordingtoHannahArendt,theultimatepurposeofworksofhistoryinantiquitywastoreport‘heroic’deeds,suchasthebehaviourofAchillesduringtheTrojanwar,inanattempttorescuethem from the world of oblivion and align them to events within the naturalorder:

Ifmortalssucceededinendowingtheirworks,deedsandwordswithsomepermanenceandinarrestingtheirperishability,thenthesethingswould,toadegreeat least,enterandbeathomeintheworldofeverlastingness,andmortalsthemselveswouldfindtheirplaceinthecosmos,whereeverythingisimmortalexceptmen.(‘TheConceptofHistory,AncientandModern’,inBetweenPastandFuture,1961)

This is true. In certain respects – thanks towriting,which ismore stable andpermanent than speech – the Greek heroes are not wholly dead, since wecontinue today to readaccountsof their exploits.Glorycan thus seem tobeaformofpersonalimmortality,whichisnodoubtwhyitwas,andcontinuestobe,covetedbysomany.Althoughonemustaddthat,formanyothers,itwillneverbemorethanaminorconsolation,ifnotaformofvanity.

With the comingofphilosophy, a thirdwayof confronting the challengeofhumanmortalitydeclareditself.Ihavealreadyremarkedhowfearofdeathwas,accordingtoEpictetus–andallthegreatcosmologists–theultimatemotiveforseeking philosophical wisdom. According to the Stoics, the sage is one who,thankstoajustexerciseofthoughtandaction,isabletoattainahumanversion–ifnotofimmortality–thenatleastofeternity.Admittedly,heisgoingtodie,butdeathwillnotbeforhimtheabsoluteendofeverything.Ratheritwillbeatransformation,a‘riteofpassage’,ifyoulike,fromonestatetoanother,withinauniversalorderwhoseperfectionpossessescompletestability,andby thesametokenpossessesdivinity.Wearegoingtodie:thisisafact.Theripenedcornwillbeharvested;thisisa

fact.Mustwethen,asksEpictetus,conceal thetruthandrefrainsuperstitiouslyfrom airing such thoughts because they are ‘ill omens’?No, because ‘ears ofwheatmay vanish, but the world remains’. The way in which this thought isexpressedisworthourcontemplation:

Youmightjustaswellsaythatthefallofleavesisillomened,orforafreshfig tochange intoadriedone, andabunchofgrapes into raisins.Forallthesechangesarefromaprecedingstateintoanewanddifferentstate;andthusnotdestruction,butanorderedmanagementandgovernanceofthings.Travelling abroad is likewise, a small change; and so is death, a greaterchange,fromwhatpresently is–andhereIshouldnotsay:achangeintowhat is not, but rather: intowhat presently is not. – Inwhich case, then,shall Icease tobe?–Yes,youwillcease tobewhatyouare,butbecomesomethingelseofwhichtheuniversethenhasneed.(Epictetus,Discourses,III,24,91–4)

Or,accordingtoMarcusAurelius:‘Youcameintothisworldasapart:youwillvanish into thewholewhichgaveyoubirth,or ratheryouwillbegatheredupintoitsgenerativeprinciplebytheprocessofchange.’(Meditations,IV,14)

Whatdosuchtextsmean?Theymeansimplythis:thathavingreachedacertainlevelofwisdom,theoreticalandpractical,thehumanindividualunderstandsthatdeathdoesnotreallyexist,thatitisbutapassagefromonestatetothenext;notanannihilationbutadifferentstateofbeing.Asmembersofadivineandstablecosmos,wetoocanparticipateinthisstabilityandthisdivinity.Assoonasweunderstand this, we will become aware simultaneously how unjustified is our

fear of death, not merely subjectively but also – in a pantheistic sense –objectively.Becausetheuniverseiseternal,wewillremainforeverafragment–wetoowillneverceasetoexist!Toarriveatapropersenseofthistransformationis,forEpictetus,theobject

ofallphilosophicalactivity.Itwillalloweachofustoattainagoodandhappyexistence,byteachingus(accordingtothebeautifulStoicformula),‘toliveanddie likeaGod’– that is, to liveanddieasonewho,perceivinghisprivilegedconnection with all other beings inside the cosmic harmony, attains a sereneconsciousness of the fact that,mortal in one sense, he is no less immortal inanother.Thisiswhy,asinthecaseofCicero,theStoictraditiontendedto‘deify’certainillustriousmensuchasHerculesorAesculapius:thesemen,becausetheirsouls‘survivedandenjoyedimmortality,wererightlyregardedasgods,fortheywereofthenoblestnatureandalsoimmortal’.These were the words of Cicero inOn the Nature of the Gods. We might

almostsaythat,accordingtothisancientconceptofsalvation,therearedegreesofdeath:asifonediedmoreorless,dependingonwhetheronedisplayedmoreorlesswisdomor‘illumination’.Fromthisperspective, thegoodlifewasonewhich, despite the disappointed acknowledgement of one’s finiteness,maintainedthemostdirectpossible linkwitheternity; inotherwords,with thedivineordinancetowhichthesageaccedesthroughtheoriaorcontemplation.ButletusfirstlistentoPlato,inthislengthypassagefromtheTimaeus,which

evokesthesublimepowerofman’ssovereignfaculty,hisintellect(nous):

Godgavethissovereignfacultytobethedivinityineachofus,beingthatpartwhich,aswesay,dwellsatthetopofthebody,andinasmuchasweareaplantnotofanearthlybutofaheavenlygrowth,raisesusfromtheearthtoourkindredwhoareinheaven.Forthedivinitysuspendedtheheadandrootofusfromthatplacewherethegenerationofthesoulfirstbegan,andthusmadethewholebodyupright.Nowwhenamangiveshimselfovertothecravingsofdesireandambition,andiseagerlystrivingtosatisfythem,all his thoughts necessarily become mortal, and, as far as it is possiblealtogethertobecomesuch,hemustbecomeentirelymortal,becausehehascherished his mortal part. But he who has been earnest in the love ofknowledge andof truewisdom, andhas exercisedhis intellectmore thananyotherpartofhim,musthavethoughtsimmortalanddivine,ifheattaintruth,andinsofarashumannatureiscapableofsharinginimmortality,hemustaltogetherbeimmortal.(90b–c)

Andmustalsoachieveahigherconditionofhappiness,addsPlato.Toattainasuccessfullife–onewhichisatoncegoodandhappy–wemustremainfaithfulto the divine part of our nature, namely our intellect. For it is through theintellect that we attach ourselves, as by ‘heavenly roots’, to the divine andsuperior order of celestial harmony: ‘Therefore must we attempt to flee thisworldasquicklyaspossibleforthenext;andsuchflightistobecomelikeGod,to the extent that we can. And becoming like God is becoming just andwholesome,bymeansofintellect.’(Theaetetus,176a–b).Andwe find a comparable statement in one of themost noted passages of

Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, where he too defines the good life, ‘thecontemplativelife’,theonlylifewhichcanleadustoperfecthappiness,asalifebywhichweescape,atleastinpart,theconditionofmeremortality.Somewillperhapsclaimthat

suchalifeistoorarefiedforman’scondition;foritisnotinsofarasheismanthathecanliveso,butinsofarassomethingdivineispresentinhim…Ifreasonisdivine,then,incomparisonwithman,thelifeaccordingtoreason is divine in comparison with human life. So we must not followthose who advise us, being human, to think only of human things, and,beingmortal,ofmortalthings;butmust,sofaraswecan,makeourselvesimmortal,andstraineverynervetoliveinaccordancewithwhatisbestinus.’(X,7)

Ofcourse, thisobjective isbynomeanseasy,and ifphilosophy is tobemorethanmere aspiration towisdom– a genuine conquering of our fears – then itmustbeembodiedinpracticalexercises.EventhoughIamnotmyselfaStoicbyinclinationandamnotconvincedby

this way of philosophical thinking, I must acknowledge the grandeur of itsprojectandtheformidablesetofanswerswhichittriestobring.Iwouldliketolook at these now, by evoking a few of the exercises in wisdom to whichStoicismopenstheway.Forphilosophy,astheworditselfindicates,isnotquitewisdom but only the love (philo) of wisdom (sophia). And, according to theStoics, it is through practical exercise that one passes from one to the other.Theseexercisesareintendedtoeradicatetheanxietyassociatedwithmortality–andinthisrespecttheystillretain,inmyview,aninestimablevalue.

AFewExercisesinWisdom

These almost exclusively concern our relation to time, for it is in the folds oftimethattheseanxietiesestablishthemselves,generatingremorseandnostalgiafor the past, and false hopes for the future. The exercises are all the moreinterestingandsignificantinthatweencounterthemtimeandagainthroughoutthe history of philosophy, in the thought of philosophers who are in otherrespects quite distant from the Stoics – in Epicurus and Lucretius, but also,curiously,inSpinozaandNietzsche,andevenintraditionsremotefromWesternphilosophy,suchasTibetanBuddhism.Iwillrestrictmyselftofourexamples.

TheBurdenofthePastandtheMiragesoftheFuture

Letusbeginwiththeessentials:intheeyesoftheStoics,thetwogreatillswhichprevent us from achieving fulfilment are nostalgia and hope, specificallyattachmenttothepastandanxietyaboutthefuture.Theseblockouraccesstothepresentmoment,andpreventusfromlivinglifetothefull.IthasbeensaidthatStoicismhereanticipatedoneof themostprofound insightsofpsychoanalysis:thathewhoremainstheprisonerofhispastwillalwaysbeincapableof‘actingandenjoying’,asFreudsaid;thatthenostalgiaforlostparadises,forthejoysandsorrowsofchildhood,laysuponourlivesaweightasheavyasitisunknowntous.MarcusAureliusexpressesthisconviction,perhapsbetterthananyoneelse,at

thebeginningofBookXIIofhisMeditations:

It is in your power to secure at once all the objectswhich you dream ofreachingbyaroundaboutroute, ifyouwillbefair toyourself: ifyouwillleave all thepast behind, commit the future toProvidence, anddirect thepresent alone, towards piety and justice. To piety, so that you may becontentwithwhathasbeenassignedtoyou–forNaturedesigneditforyouandyou for it; to justice, thatyoumay freelyandwithoutcircumlocutionspeakthetruthanddothosethingsthatareinaccordwithlawandinaccordwiththeworthofeach.(XII.1)

Tobesaved,toattainthewisdomthatsurpassesallphilosophy,wemustschoolourselvestolivewithoutvainfearsorpointlessnostalgias.Onceandforallwe

must stop living in thedimensionsof timepast and time future,whichdonotexistinreality,andadhereasmuchaspossibletothepresent:

Donotletyourpictureofthewholeofyourlifeconfuseyou,donotdwelluponall themanifold troubleswhichhavecometopassandwillcometopass;butaskyourselfinregardtoeverypassingmoment:whatisthereherethatcannotbeborneandcannotbeendured?Thenremindyourselfthatitisnot the future or the past that weighs heavy upon you, but always thepresent,andthatthisgraduallygrowsless.(Meditations,VIII,36)

MarcusAureliusisquiteinsistentonthispoint:‘Rememberthateachofuslivesonlyinthepresentmoment,intheinstant.Alltherestisthepast,oranuncertainfuture.Theextentoflifeisthereforebrief.’Thisiswhatwemustconfront.OrasSenecaexpressesit,intheLetterstoLucilius:‘Youmustdispensewiththesetwothings:fearofthefuture,andtherecollectionofancientills.Thelatternolongerconcernsme, the formerhasyet to concernme.’Towhichonemight add, forgoodmeasure, that it isnotonly ‘ancient ills’ that spoil thepresent lifeof theunwise,butperverselyandperhapstoagreaterdegree,therecollectionofhappydaysirrevocablylostandwhichwillreturn‘nevermore’.Ifshouldnowbeclearwhy,paradoxically(andcontrarytopopularopinion),

Stoicism would teach its disciples to part ways with those ideologies thatpromotethevirtueofhope.

‘HopeaLittleLess,LoveaLittleMore’

As one contemporary philosopher, André Comte-Sponville, has emphasised,StoicismhereisveryclosetooneofthemostsubtletenetsofOrientalwisdom,andofTibetanBuddhism inparticular: contrary to the commonplace idea thatone‘cannotlivewithouthope’,hopeisthegreatestofmisfortunes.Foritisbynatureanabsence,alack,asourceoftensioninourlives.Forweliveintermsofplans, chasing after objectives located in a more or less distant future, andbelievingthatourhappinessdependsupontheiraccomplishment.Whatweforgetisthatthereisnootherrealitythantheoneinwhichweare

livinghereandnow,and that thisstrangeheadlongflight fromthepresentcanonly end in failure. The objective accomplished, we almost invariablyexperienceapuzzlingsenseofindifference,ifnotdisappointment.Likechildren

who become bored with their toys the day after Christmas, the possession ofthingssoardentlycovetedmakesusneitherbetternorhappierthanbefore.Thedifficultiesof lifeand the tragedyof thehumanconditionarenotmodifiedbyownershipor successand, in the famousphraseofSeneca, ‘whilewewait forlife,lifepasses’.Perhapsyoulikeimaginingwhatyouwoulddoifyouweretowinthelottery:

youwould buy this and that; youwould give some of it to this friend or thatcousin;youwoulddefinitelygivesomeofittocharity;andthenyouwouldtakeoff on a trip around the world. And then what? In the end, it is always thegravestonethatissilhouettedagainstthehorizon,andyoucometorealisesoonenough that the accumulation of all imaginable worldly goods solves nothing(although let us not be hypocrites: as the saying goes, money certainly doesmakepovertybearable).Which is also why, according to a celebrated Buddhist proverb, you must

learntoliveasifthispresentmomentwerethemostvitalofyourwholelife,andasifthosepeopleinwhosecompanyyoufindyourselfwerethemostimportantinyourlife.Fornothingelseexists,intruth:thepastisnolongerandthefutureisnotyet.Thesetemporaldimensionsarerealonlytotheimagination,whichwe‘shoulder’–likethe‘beastsofburden’mockedbyNietzsche–merelytojustifyourincapacitytoembracewhatNietzschecalled(inentirelyStoicmode)amorfati:theloveofrealityforitself.Happinesslost,blissdeferred,and,bythesametoken,thepresentreceding,consignedtonothingnesswhereasitistheonlytruedimensionofexistence.It iswith thisperspective that theDiscourses ofEpictetus aimed todevelop

oneofthemorecelebratedthemesofStoicism:namely,thatthegoodlifeisalifestrippedofbothhopesandfears.Inotherwords,alifereconciledtowhatisthecase,alifewhichacceptstheworldasit is.Asyoucansee, thisreconciliationcannot sit alongside the conviction that the world is divine, harmonious andinherentlygood.HereishowEpictetusputsthemattertohispupil:youmustchasefromyour

‘complaining’spirit

allgrief,fear,desire,envy,malice,avarice,effeminacyandintemperance.ButthesecanbeexpelledonlybylookingtoGod,andattachingyourselftohim alone, and con secrating yourself to his commands. If you wish foranythingelse,youwillonlybe followingwhat is stronger thanyou,withsighsandgroans,alwaysseekinghappinessoutsideyourself,andneverable

tofindit:foryouseekitwhereitisnot,andneglecttoseekitwhereitis.(Discourses,II,16,45–7)

This passagemust of course be read in a ‘cosmic’ or pantheistic sense, ratherthaninamonotheisticsense(monotheism:thebeliefinonlyoneGod).Letusbeveryclearaboutthis:theGodofwhomEpictetusspeaksisnotthe

personalGodofChristianity,butmerelyanembodyingof thecosmos,anothernamefor theprincipleofuniversal reasonwhich theGreeksnamedtheLogos:thetruefaceofdestiny,thatwehavenochoicebuttoaccept,andshouldyearnforwith our entire soul.Whereas, in fact, victims aswe are of commonplaceillusions, we keep thinking that we must oppose it so as to bend it to ourpurposes.Asthemasteradviseshispupil,oncemore:

Wemustbringourownwillintoharmonywithwhatevercomestopass,sothatnoneofthethingswhichhappenmayoccuragainstourwill,northosewhichdonothappenbewishedforbyus.Thosewhohavesettled thisasthe philosopher’s task have it in their power never to be disappointed intheirdesires,or fallprey towhat theywish toavoid,but to leadpersonallivesfreefromsorrow,fearandperturbation.(Discourses,II,14,7–8)

Of course, such advice seems absurd to ordinary mortals: amounting to anespeciallyinsipidversionoffatalism.Thissortofwisdommightpassforfolly,becauseitisbaseduponavisionoftheworldwhichrequiresaconceptualeffortout of the ordinary to be grasped. But this is precisely what distinguishesphilosophy from ordinary discussion, and, to me, why it possesses anirreplaceablecharm.IamfarfrombeinganadvocateofStoicresignation,andlateron,whenwe

touchuponcontemporarymaterialism,Iwillexplainmorefullywhythisisso.However, I admire the fact that –when things are goingwell! –Stoicismcanseemtoofferaformofwisdom.Therearemomentswhenweseemtobeherenottotransformtheworld,butsimplytobepartofit,toexperiencethebeautyand joy that itoffers tous.Forexample,youare in thesea, scubadiving,andyouputonyourmasktolookatthefish.Youarenottheretochangethings,toimprovethem,ortocorrectthem;youaretheretoadmireandacceptthings.Itissomewhat in this spirit that Stoicism encourages us to reconcile ourselves towhatis,tothepresentasitoccurs,withouthopesandregrets.Stoicisminvitesustoenjoythesemomentsofgrace,and,tomakethemasnumerousaspossible,it

suggeststhatwechangeourselvesratherthantheorderofthings.TomoveonfromthisconcepttoanotheressentialStoiccounsel:becausethe

onlydimensionofrealityisthepresent,andbecause,ofitsnature,thepresentisinconstant flux, it iswiseforus tocultivate indifferenceornon-attachment towhatistransient.Otherwisewestoreuptheworstsufferingsforourselves.

Non-attachment

Stoicism,inaspiritremarkablyclosetothatofBuddhism,appealsforanattitudeof‘non-attachment’towardsthethingsofthisworld.TheTibetanmasterswouldnodoubthaveapprovedofthistextfromEpictetus:

Theprincipalandhighestformoftraining,andonethatstandsattheveryentrancetohappiness,is,thatwhenyoubecomeattachedtosomething,letit not be as to something which cannot be taken away, but rather, as tosomethinglikeanearthenwarepotorcrystalgoblet,sothatifitbreaks,youmayrememberwhatkindofthingitwasandnotbedistressed.Sointhis,too,whenyoukissyourchild,oryourbrother,oryour friend,nevergivewayentirelytoyouraffections,norfreereintoyourimagination;butcurbit, restrain it, like those who stand behind generals when they ride intriumphandremindthemthattheyarebutmen.Remindyourselflikewisethat what you love is mortal, that what you love is not your own. It isgrantedtoyouforthepresent,andnotirrevocably,notforever,butlikeafig or a bunch of grapes in the appointed season…What harm is therewhile you are kissing your child to murmur softly, ‘Tomorrow you willdie’?(Discourses,III,2484–8)

LetusbeclearaboutwhatEpictetus is saying: it isnot inanysenseacaseofbeing indifferent, as we might know it, and even less of lacking in theobligationswhich compassion imposes upon us in respect of others and,mostimportantly, of those close to us. He is saying that we must distrust allattachments that make us forget what the Buddhists call ‘impermanence’: thefactthatnothingisstableinthisworld,thateverythingpassesandchanges,andthatnot tounderstandthis is tocreateforoneselfahopelessnessaboutwhat ispastandahopeofwhatisyettocome.Wemustlearntocontentourselveswiththe present, to love the present to the point of desiring nothing else and of

regrettingnothingwhatsoever.Reason,whichisourguideandwhichinvitesustoliveinaccordancewiththeharmonyofthecosmos,mustthereforebepurifiedofthatwhichweighsitdownandfalsifiesit,wheneveritstraysintotheunrealdimensionsoftimepastandtimefuture.But once the truth of this is grasped we are still far from putting it into

practice. Which is why Marcus Aurelius invites his disciples to embody itpractically:

So,ifyouseparate,asIsay,fromthisgoverningself[i.e.themind]whatisattached to it by passions, andwhat of time is left to run or has alreadyflown, and make yourself like the sphere of Empedocles, ‘rounded,rejoicinginthesolitudewhichisaboutit’,andpractiseonlytolivethelifeyouareliving, that is thepresent, thenitwillbeinyourpowerat least tolive out the time that is left until you die, untroubled and dispensingkindness,andreconciledwithyourowngooddaemon.(Meditations,XII,3)

As we shall see, this is precisely what Nietzsche refers to in his suggestivephrase, ‘the innocence of becoming’. To attain this level ofwisdom,wemusthavethecouragetoliveourlivesundertheguidanceofthe‘futureperfect’tense.

‘WhenCatastropheStrikes,IWillBeReady’

Whatmightthismean?Epictetusisspeakingabouthischild,andwhatisatstakeisonceagaindeathandthevictoriesthatphilosophycanenableustogainover(fearof)death.Itisinthissensethatthemostpracticalofexercisesconnecttothemostexaltedspirituality.Toliveinthepresentanddetachoneselffromtheregretsandanguishthatdefinethepastandthefutureisindeedtosavoureachmoment of existence as itmerits; in the full awareness that, for usmortals, itmaybeourlast.

Your time is circumscribed, andunlessyouuse it to attaincalmofmind,timewillbegoneandyouwillbegoneandtheopportunitytouseitwillnotbeyoursagain…Performeachaction in lifeas though itwereyour last.(Epictetus,Meditations,II,4,5)

What is at issue spiritually in this exercise, where the subject shakes off all

attachmentstopastandfuture, is thereforeclear.It isaquestionofconqueringthe fearsassociatedwithourmortality, thanks to theuseofan intuition that isnotintellectualbutintimateandalmostphysical.There are moments of grace in our lives, instants when we have the rare

experience of being completely reconciled to the world. Just now I gave theexampleofswimmingunderwater.Perhapsthisdoesn’tmeananythingtoyouorseems an odd choice, but I am sure you can imagine for yourselfmany otherexamples:awalkinaforest,asunset,beinginlove,thecalmandyetheightenedstateofsomethingaccomplishedwell–anyoftheseexperiences.Ineachcase,weexperienceafeelingofserenity,ofbeingatonewiththeworldinwhichwefindourselves,whereharmonyoccursof itsownaccord,withoutbeingforced,so that time seems to stop, making room for the enduring present, a presentwhichcannotbeunderminedbyanythinginthepastorfuture.To see to it that life as a whole resembles such moments: that is the

fundamental project of Stoic wisdom. It is at this point that we touch onsomething resemblingsalvation, in thesense thatnothing furthercan troubleaserenity which comes from the extinguishing of fears concerning otherdimensions of time.When he achieves this degree of enlightenment, the sagedoes indeed live ‘like a god’, in the eternity of an instant that nothing candiminish.Fromwhichyoucanunderstandhow,forStoicismasforBuddhism,thetense

in which the struggle against anxiety is to be waged is indeed the ‘futureperfect’. In effect: ‘When destiny strikes, I shall have been prepared for it.’When catastrophe – be it illness, poverty or death, all the ills linked to theirreversiblenatureoftime–willhavetakenplace,IshallbeabletoconfrontitthankstotheabilityIhaveacquiredtoliveinthepresent.Inotherwordsonecanlovetheworldasitis,nomatterwhattranspires:

If someso-called ‘undesirable’event shouldbefallyou, itwill in the firstplacebeanimmediaterelieftoyouthatitwasnotunexpected…Youwillsaytoyourself,‘IknewallalongthatIammortal.IknewthatinthislifeImighthavetogoaway,thatImightbecastintoexile.IknewthatImightbe thrown into prison.’ Then if you reflect within yourself and ask fromwhat quarter the accident has come, you will at once remember that itcomes from the region of things outside our will, which are not ours.(Epictetus,Discourses,III,105–6)

This wisdom still speaks to us today, through the centuries and overarchingmanycultures.However,wenolongerinhabittheworldofGreekantiquity,andthe great cosmologies have for the most part vanished, together with the‘wisdomof the ages’.This raises an important question:why and howdowepassfromonevisionoftheworldtoanother?Or,inotherwords,whyaretheredifferentphilosophieswhichseemtofollowonfromoneanotherinthehistoryof ideas, rather than a single systemof thoughtwhich survives thepassageoftimeandsufficesusonceandforall?Let’s examine this question in detail through looking at the most recent

example:thatofthedoctrinesofsalvationassociatedwiththegreatcosmologies.WhywasStoicwisdomnotenoughtostifletheemergenceofcompetingsystemsof thought, and, specifically, to prevent the spread of Christianity? After all,Christianity was to deal Stoicism a lethal blow, relegating it to a marginalpositionforcenturies.Bytakingaspecificexampleofhowonevisionoftheworldyieldstoanother,

we may learn lessons of a more general kind about the development ofphilosophy.As farasStoicismgoes,we recognise that,howevergrandiose thepositionsitadvocated,amajorweaknessaffecteditsresponsetothequestionofsalvation– onewhichwas to leave room for a competingversion to establishitself,andwhichconsequentlyallowedthemachineofhistorytosetoffagain.As you have probably noticed, the Stoic doctrine of salvation is resolutely

anonymous and impersonal. It promises us eternity, certainly, but of a non-personalkind,asanobliviousfragmentofthecosmos:death,fortheStoic,isamere rite of passage, which involves a transition from a state of individualconsciousness–youandI,aslivingandthinkingbeings–toastateofonenesswiththecosmos,inthecourseofwhichweloseeverythingthatconstitutesourself-awareness and individuality. It is by nomeans certain, therefore, that thisdoctrine can fully answer the questions raised by our anxiety about humanfiniteness.Stoicismtriesvaliantlytorelieveusofthefearslinkedtodeath,butatthecostofobliteratingourindividualidentity.Whatwewouldlikeaboveallistobereunitedwithourlovedones,and,ifpossible,withtheirvoices,theirfaces– not in the form of undifferentiated cosmic fragments, such as pebbles orvegetables.Inthisarena,Christianitymightbesaidtohaveuseditsbigguns.Itpromises us no less than everything that we would wish for: personalimmortality and the salvation of our loved ones. Exploiting what it saw as aweaknessinGreekwisdom,Christianitycreatedanewdoctrineofsalvationso‘effective’itopenedachasminthephilosophiesofAntiquityanddominatedthe

Occidentalworldfornearlyfifteenhundredyears.

Chapter3TheVictoryofChristianityOverGreek

Philosophy

When Iwas a student – in 1968,when religious questionswere not themostfashionable–webasicallyignoredthemedievalframeofmind.Inotherwords,we lumped together and cheerfully channel-hopped ourway through the greatmonotheist religions. It was possible to pass our exams and even become aphilosophy professor by knowing next to nothing about Judaism, Islam orChristianity. Of course, we had to attend lectures on ancient thought –Greekthought,aboveall–afterwhichwecouldcutstraighttoDescartes.Withoutanytransition, we leapt fifteen centuries, broadly speaking from the end of thesecondcentury(thelateStoics)tothebeginningoftheseventeenthcentury.Asaresult, for years I knewmore or less nothing about the intellectual history ofChristianity,beyondtheculturalcommonplaces.This strikesmeas absurd, and Iwouldnotwishyou to repeat thismistake.

Evenifoneisnotabeliever,andallthemoresoifoneishostiletoreligion–asweshallseeinthecaseofNietzsche–wehavenorighttoignorance.Ifonlytooppose it,wemust at least be familiarwith religion in its various forms, andunderstandwhatwe are opposing.At the least, it explainsmany facets of theworld inwhichwe live,which is thedirectproductof a religiousworld-view.Thereisnotamuseumofart,evenofcontemporaryart,whichdoesnotrequireaminimumoftheologicalunderstanding,ifoneistofullyunderstanditscontents;andthereisnosingleconflictintheworldtodaythatisnotmoreorlesslinkedtothe history of religious communities: Catholics and Protestants in NorthernIreland;Muslims,OrthodoxandCatholics in theBalkans;Animists,ChristiansandIslamistsinAfrica,andsoon.Yet,accordingtothedefinitionofphilosophygivenatthestartofthisbook,

youwouldnotnormallyexpectittoincludeachapteronChristianity.Thenotion

ofa‘Christianphilosophy’mightseemoutofplaceandcontradictorytowhatIhave been proposing at length. Religion is the prime example of a non-philosophicalquest forsalvation–given itsassumptionofGodandaneedforfaith–ratherthanbymeansofhumanreason.So,whydiscussithere?Forfoursimplereasons,whichIwillnowsetoutbriefly.First, as I suggested at the endof the last chapter, the doctrine ofChristian

salvation, although fundamentally non-philosophical, even anti-philosophical,founditself indirectcompetitionwithGreekphilosophy.Itwastoprofit,sotospeak, from the flaws which weakened the Stoic response to the question ofsalvation.TheChristiansolutionevenappropriatedthevocabularyofphilosophyforitsownends,assigningnewreligiousmeanings,andputforwardanentirelyfreshresponsetothequestionofourrelationtodeathandtotime.Itsapproachsupplantedmoreor lessentirely theanswerssuppliedby thephilosophyof theprecedingcenturies.Thismeritsourattention.Thesecondreason is thateven if thedoctrineofChristiansalvation isnota

philosophy, there remainsnonetheless aplace for theexerciseof reasonat theheartofChristianity:ontheonehand,toreflectonthegreatevangelicaltexts–tointerpretthemessageofChrist;ontheotherhand,togainanunderstandingofthe natural orderwhich, in so far as it isGod’swork,must surely bear somemarkofitscreator.Weshallreturntothisquestion,butitwillsufficefornowtounderstandthat,paradoxically,therewastobeaplaceafterall–subordinateandmodest,certainly,butnonethelessreal–forphilosophicalactivityattheheartofChristianity: a role for human reason to clarify and reinforce a doctrine ofsalvation,even if the latterwould remain fundamentally religiousand foundedonfaith.The third reason proceeds directly from the second: that there is no more

illuminatingwayofunderstandingphilosophythantocompareitwithwhatitisnot;toplaceitinrelationtothattowhichitismostfirmlyopposedandyetmostclosely linked,namely religion.Ultimately setting their sightson theglitteringprizeofsalvation,bothreligionandphilosophyarecloselylinked,throughtheirattempt to conquer anxiety over human mortality. They are at the same timeopposed, because the means used by each are not merely different butirreconcilable.TheGospels, theGospelofJohninparticular, reveala leveloffamiliarity with Greek philosophy, notably Stoicism. There can be no doubt,therefore,astotheconfrontationandcompetitionbetweenopposingdoctrinesofsalvation–ChristianandGreek.Anexaminationof thereasonwhytheformerprevailedoverthelatterisessentialforanunderstandingnotonlyofthenature

ofphilosophy,butalsoforanunderstandingofhow,afterthelongepochduringwhichChristianideasweredominant,philosophywasabletore-emergeandsetofffornewhorizons–thoseofmodernthought.Finally,thereareinChristianthought,aboveall intherealmofethics, ideas

which are of great significance even today, and even for non-believers; ideaswhich,oncedetachedfromtheirpurelyreligiousorigins,acquiredanautonomythatcametobeassimilatedintomodernphilosophy.Forexample,theideathatthemoralworthofapersondoesnotlieinhisinheritedgiftsornaturaltalents,butinthefreeusehemakesofthem,isanotionwhichChristianitygavetotheworld,andwhichmanymodernethicalsystemswouldadoptfortheirpurposes.It would be obtuse to try and pass from the Greek experience to modernphilosophywithoutanymentionofChristianthought.I would like to explain why Christian thought gained the upper hand over

Greek thought and dominated Europe until the Renaissance. This is no smallachievement:theremustsurelybereasonsforthishegemony.Infact,asweshallsee,Christianscameupwithanswerstohumanquestionsaboutmortalitywhichhavenoequivalent inGreek thought–answers so ‘successful’, ifyou like, so‘attractive’ and so indispensable that they convinced a large proportion ofhumanity.To compare this doctrine of salvation and those philosophies of salvation

which dispensed with God, I am going to follow once more the formula oftheory,ethicsandwisdom.Tokeeptoessentials,Iwillfirstsummarisethekeycharacteristicswhichmarked theradical ruptureofChristianitywith theGreekworld–fivecharacteristicswhichwillallowyoutounderstandhow,basedonanew theoria,Christianitywasable tooutlineanewmoralityandadoctrineofsalvationbasedonlove.Thusdidreligioncapturetheheartsofmen.

HowReligionReplacedReasonwithFaith

Firstly, andmost fundamentally: theLogos,which aswe as have seen for theStoics merged with the impersonal, harmonious and divine structure of thecosmosasawhole,cametobeidentifiedforChristianswithasingleanduniquepersonality, that of Christ. To the horror of the Greeks, the new believersmaintainedthattheLogos–inotherwordsthedivineprinciple–wasinnosenseidentical with the harmonious order of the world, but was incarnated in oneoutstandingindividual,namelyChrist.Perhapsthisdistinctionleavesyoustonecold.Afterall,whatdoesitmatter–

forus, today– that theLogos (for theStoicsa ‘logical’orderingof theworld)came to mean Christ as far as Christians were concerned? I might reply thattoday there exist more than a thousand million Christians – and that for thisreason alone, to understand what drives them, their motives, the content andmeaningof their faith, isnot absurd for anyonewithamodicumof interest intheir fellowmen.But thisanswerwouldbe inadequate.Forwhat isatstake inthisseeminglyabstractdebateastowherethedivineprincipleresides–whetherinthestructureoftheuniverseorinthepersonalityofoneexceptionalman–isnolessthanthetransitionfromananonymousandblinddoctrineofsalvationtoonethatpromisesnotonlythatweshallbesavedbyoneperson,Christ,butthatweshallbesavedasindividualsinourownright:forwhatweare,andasweare.This‘personalising’ofsalvationallowsusfirstlytocomprehend–bymeans

ofaconcreteexample–howmankindcanpassfromonevisionoftheworldtoanother:howanewresponsetorealitycomestoprevailoveranolderresponsebecauseit‘adds’something:agreaterpowerofconviction,butalsoconsiderableadvantagesoverwhathadprecededit.Butthereismore:byrestingitscaseuponadefinitionofthehumanpersonandanunprecedentedideaoflove,Christianitywas to have an incalculable effect upon the history of ideas. To give oneexample, it is quite clear that, in this Christian re-evaluation of the humanperson,of the individualas such, thephilosophyofhuman rights towhichwesubscribetodaywouldneverhaveestablisheditself.Itisessentialthereforethatwe have a more or less accurate idea of the chain of reasoning which ledChristianity to break so radically with the Stoic past. And to have such anunderstanding, we must first grasp that in the vernacular translations of theGospelswhichnarratethelifeofJesus,thetermLogos–borroweddirectlyfromthe Stoics – is translated by ‘word’. For Greek thought in general, and forStoicism in particular, the idea that theLogos could designate anything otherthan the rational (therefore true, therefore beautiful) order of the universewasunthinkable.Intheireyes,toclaimthatameremortalcouldconstitutetheLogos,or‘thewordincarnate’,astheGospelsexpressit,wasinsanity.Itwastoassigntheattributeofdivinitytoamerehumanbeing,whereasthedivine,asyouwillrecall,isinterchangeablewiththeuniversalcosmicorder,andcaninnosensebeidentifiedwithasinglepunyindividual,whateverhiscredentials.TheRomans–notablyunderMarcusAurelius,RomanEmperorat theclose

ofthesecondcenturyandthelastgreatStoicthinker–didnotholdbackfrommassacringChristiansonaccountoftheirintolerable‘deviance’.Forthiswasatimewhenideaswerenotplaythings.

Whatexactlywasatissueinthisapparentlyinnocentchangeinthemeaningofasingleword?Theanswer:nothinglessthanarevolutioninthedefinitionofdivinity.Andasweknow,revolutionsdonottakeplacewithoutsuffering.Let us return for amoment to the text inwhich John, author of the Fourth

Gospel, effects this diversion ofmeaning away from the Stoic sense. Here iswhathesays–withmycommentsitalicisedinsidebrackets:

InthebeginningwastheWord[Logos],and theWordwaswithGod,andtheWordwasGod…Allthingsweremadebyhim;andwithouthimwasnot any thingmade thatwasmade. [Up to this point, all iswell, and theStoicscouldstillbeinagreementwithJohn,especiallywiththenotionthattheLogosandthedivineareoneandthesamereality.]AndtheWordwasmadeflesh[thingsstarttotakeaturnfortheworse!]anddweltamongus[quiteunacceptable–thedivinehasbecomeman,as incarnated inJesus,noneofwhichmakessensetoaStoic].Andwebeheldhisglory,thegloryas of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth. [sheermadness,fortheGreeksages:thefollowersofChristarenowpresentedaswitnesses of the transformation of the Logos/Word (or Godhead) – intoMankind(orChrist)asifthelatterweresonoftheformer.](1John1)

Whatisthemeaningofthis?Toputitsimplynow–althoughatthetimeitwasamatter of life or death – the divine had shifted ground: it was no longer animpersonal structure,but anextraordinary individual, in the formof Jesus, the‘Man-God’. This was an unfathom able shift, which was to direct Europeanhumanityalongaquitedifferentpath than thatsetoutby theGreeks. Inafewlinesoftext,theveryopeninglinesofhisGospel,Johninvitesustobelievethatthe incarnateWord, the divine as such, no longer designates the rational andharmonious structure of the cosmos, the universal order as such, but refersinsteadtoasimpleindividual.We shall see how Marcus Aurelius would order the death of Saint Justin

Martyr,a formerStoicwhobecamethefirstFatherof theChurchand thefirstphilosopher to convert to Christianity, but let us continue for a moment toexplore the new aspects of this entirely original theoria. You will recall thattheoria always comprises two aspects: on the one hand an unveiling of theessentialstructureoftheuniverse(thedivine);ontheotherhandtheinstrumentsof knowledge which it employs to arrive at this understanding (the vision orcontemplation). Now it is not simply the divine, the theion, which is utterly

changedherebybecominganindividualbeing;butalsotheorao,thefashionofseeing, or act of contemplating, understanding and approaching reality that istransformed. From now on, it is no longer reason that will be the theoreticalfacultyparexcellence,butfaith.Inwhichrespect,religionwillsoondeclareitsopposition to the rationality at the heart of philosophy, and, by these means,deposephilosophyitself.And so, faith begins to supplant reason. For Christians, truth is no longer

accessed through the exercise of a human reasonwhich cangrasp the rationaland ‘logical’ order of the cosmic totality by virtue of its being an eminentcomponentofthatsameorder.Fromnowon,whatwillpermitmantoapproachthedivine, toknow itand tocontemplate it,belongs toaquitedifferentorder.Whatwillcounthere,aboveall,isnolongerintelligencebuttrustinthewordofa man, the Man-God, Christ, who claims to be the son of God, the Logosincarnate.WearegoingtobelieveHim,becauseHeisworthyofthisactoffaith– and themiraclesHe accomplisheswill play their part in the creditwhich isaccordedtoHim.You will recall that trust originally meant ‘faith’. To contemplate God, the

appropriatetheoreticalinstrumentisfaith,notreason,andthismeansplacingallourconfidenceinthewordsofChristannouncingthe‘goodnews’:accordingtowhichweshallbesavedbyfaithandnotby‘works’;inotherwords,ouralltoohuman actions, however admirable these might be. It is no longer a case ofthinkingforoneself,butratherofplacingtrustinanother.Andinthat,nodoubt,lies the most profound and significant difference between philosophy andreligion.Fromwhichproceedstheimportanceofbearingwitness,as theFirstEpistle

ofSaintJohnmakesclear:

Thatwhichwasfromthebeginning,whichwehaveheard,whichwehaveseen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands havehandled,oftheWord[Logos]oflife–forthelifewasmanifested,andwehaveseen it,andbearwitness,andshewuntoyou thateternal life,whichwaswiththeFather,andwasmanifesteduntous–thatwhichwehaveseenandhearddeclareweuntoyou,thatyoualsomayhavefellowshipwithus.(1John1)

Ofcourse,itisofChristthatJohnisspeaking,andyouwillseethathiswordsrestuponaquitedifferentlogictothatofreflectionandreason:itisnotacaseof

arguingfororagainst theexistenceofaGod–suchatopicforargumentgoesbeyondhumanreason–butacaseofbearingwitnessandbelieving,ofdeclaringthat we have seen ‘the Word made flesh’, Christ; that we have ‘handled’,touched,heard,spokenwithHim,andthatthiswitnessistobetrusted.YouarefreetobelieveornottobelievethatthedivineLogos,thelifeeternalwhichwaswiththeFather,hasbeenincarnatedinaMan-GodwhocamedowntoEarth.Butitisnolongeracaseofworkingthisoutbyintelligenceandreason.Ifanything,thereverseisthecase:‘Happythepoorinspirit’,asChristsaysintheGospels,for they will believe and consequently see God.Whereas the ‘confident’, the‘haughty’–asAugustinedescribedthephilosophers–willwalkpastthetruthinallthefineryoftheirprideandarrogance.Third: what is required to put into practice the new theoria is not the

comprehensionofphilosophers,butthehumilityofsimplefolk.Itisnolongeraquestion of thinking for oneself but of believing in and through another. Thethemeofhumility is omnipresent in the critiquesof the twogreatestChristianphilosophers: St Augustine, who lived in the Roman Empire in the fourthcenturyafterChrist,andPascal,wholivedinseventeenth-centuryFrance.Eachbased their attack on philosophy (which they never missed an opportunity tocriticize,tothepointthatitseemsforthemtohavebeenthegreatenemy)onthefactthatitwasanexerciseofpride.ThereisnoshortageofpassagesfromStAugustinedenouncingtheprideand

vanityofphilosopherswhorefusedtoacceptthatChristcouldbetheincarnationoftheWord,ofthedivineprincipleandwhocouldnottoleratethemodestyofaGodheadreduced to thestatusofahumblemortal,vulnerable tosufferinganddeath.AshesaysinTheCityofGod,takingaimatphilosophers:‘ThehaughtydisdainedtoacceptthisGodastheirmaster,because“theWordwasmadefleshanddweltamongstus”.’Thiswasintolerabletophilosophers.Why?Becauseitrequired that they hang up their intelligence and their reason in the churchvestibuletomakeroomforfaithandbelief.There is, then, a double humility in religion, which opposes it to Greek

philosophy from the outset, and which corresponds to the two aspects of thetheoria, thatofthedivinit(theion)andthatofcontemplativeseeing(orao).Onthe one hand there is the humility, ‘objective’ if you like, of a divine Logoswhichfindsitself‘reduced’inthepersonofJesustothestatusofalowlymortal(toolowly,fortheGreeks).Ontheotherhand,thereisthesubjectivehumilityofourbeingenjoinedbybelieversto‘letgo’ofourownthinkingfaculty,toforsakereasonfortrust,soastomakeplaceforfaith.Nothingismoresignificantinthis

respectthanthetermsemployedbyAugustineinTheCityofGod:

Swollen with pride by the high opinion they had of their science, they[philosophers]didnothearChristwhenhe said: ‘LearnofMe,because Iammeek,andhumbleofheart,andyoushallfindpeace.’

ThefoundingtextofChristianity,here,occursintheNewTestament,intheFirstEpistletotheCorinthians,writtenbyStPaul.Itisadifficulttext,butitwastohave such a profound influence on the subsequent history of Christianity, itdemandstobereadwithsomecare.ItshowshowtheideaoftheincarnationoftheWord– the idea, therefore, that the divineLogoswasmademan, and thatChrist,inthissense,isthesonofGod–isunacceptable,asmuchfortheJewsasfor theGreeks: unacceptable to the Jews,because adiminishedGod,who letshimself be put to death on a cross without defending himself seemscontemptible,andcontrarytotheirimageofanall-powerfulandangryJahweh;unacceptable to the Greeks, too, because an incarnation as mundane as thisdiminishesthegrandeuroftheLogosasconceivedbythe‘wisdomoftheages’ofStoicphilosophy.Hereisthetext:

HathnotGodmadefoolishthewisdomofthisworld?ForafterthatinthewisdomofGodtheworldbywisdomknewnotGod,itpleasedGodbythefoolishnessofpreaching tosave themthatbelieve.For theJewsrequireasign, and theGreeks seek after wisdom. But we preach Christ crucified,untotheJewsastumbling-block,anduntotheGreeksfoolishness;butuntothemwhicharecalled,bothJewsandGreeks,ChristthepowerofGod,andthewisdomofGod.BecausethefoolishnessofGodiswiserthanmen;andtheweaknessofGodisstrongerthanmen.(1Corinthians1:20–25)

HerePaul traces the image, incredibleat this time,ofaGodwho isno longerbombastic: neither angry, nor terrifying, nor all-powerful, like theGod of theJews; rather he is meek and forgiving to the point of allowing himself to becrucified–which to theJewsof the timeonlywent to show thathedefinitelyhadnodivineattributes!NorwasthisGodcosmicandsublime,likethedivinityof the Greeks, who identified God with the perfect structure of the entireuniverse. And yet it was through the humility of this new God, and Hisdemanding humility of those who would follow Him, that he became therepresentative of the weak, the lowly, the excluded. Hundreds of millions of

peoplerecognisedthemselves,andstilldosotoday,inthestrangepowerofthisveryweakness.According to believers, it was this, specifically, that the philosophers could

notstomach.Iwouldliketodwellonthisforamoment,sothatyoucanassessthis theme of religious humility opposed to philosophical arrogance. TheoppositioniseverywheretobefoundinTheCityofGodwhereAugustinetakesapokeatthemostimportantphilosophersofhistime(distantdisciplesofPlato,to be precise) who refuse to accept that the divine could become human.According to Augustine, their intelligence should have led them to the sameconclusionastheChristians:

Buthumilitywasthenecessaryconditionforsubmissiontothistruth;anditisnoeasy task topersuade theproudnecksofyouphilosophers toacceptthisyoke.Forwhatisthereincredible–especiallyforyouwhoholdcertainopinionswhichshouldencourageyoutobelief–whatisthereincredibleintheassertionthatGodhasassumedahumansoulandbody?…Whyisit,then, that when the Christian faith is urged upon you, you straightawayforget,orpretendtohavenoknowledgeof,yourcustomaryargumentsanddoctrines?What reason is there for your refusal to becomeChristians onaccount of opinions which are your own, though you yourselves attackthem?ItcanonlybethatChristcameinhumility,andthatyouareproud.(TheCityofGod,X,29)

This articulates thedouble-humilityofwhich I spokeamomentago: thatof aGodwho agrees to ‘abase himself ’ to the point of becoming aman amongstmen;andthatofthebelieverwhorenounceshisreasoningtoplaceallhistrustinthewordofJesus,andtherebymakeroomforfaith.As isnowclear, the twoaspectsofChristian theoria – thedefinitionof the

divineandthedefinitionoftheintellectualattitudewhichallowscontactwithit–arepolesapartfromthoseofGreekphilosophy.Thisleadsusintothefourthcharacteristic.Fourth:inaperspectivewhichaccordsprimacytohumilityandtofaithover

reason – to ‘thinking through an other’ rather than ‘thinking for oneself ’ –philosophydoesnotvanishentirelybutbecomes the ‘handmaiden’ to religion.Thisviewappearsfirstintheeleventhcentury,inthewritingsofPeterDamian,aChristian apologist close to the papacy. It had an immense impact because itindicated that, henceforth, in Christian doctrine, reason would be entirely

subjectedtothefaithwhichguidesit.So,isthereaChristianphilosophy?Theresponsemustbe‘yes’and‘no’.No,

in the sense that the highest truths in Christianity, as in all of the majormonotheisticreligions,aretermed‘revealedtruths’:thatis,truthstransmittedbythewordofChrist,thesonofGodhimself.Thesetruthsbecomeanactivebeliefsystem. We might then be tempted to say that there is no further role forphilosophy within Christianity, because the essentials are decided by faith.However, one might also assert that in spite of everything there remains aChristianphilosophical activity, although relegated to secondplace.SaintPaulemphasises repeatedly in hisEpistles that there remains a dual role for reasonand consequently for purely philosophical activity. On the one hand, Christexpresseshimselfintermsofsymbolsandparables(thelatterinparticularneedinterpreting, if we are to draw out their deeper sense). Even if the words ofChrist have the distinction, a little like the great orally transmitted myths,legends and fairytales, of speaking to everyone, they do require the effort ofreflectionandintelligencetodeciphertheirmorehiddenmeanings.ButthisisnotsimplyamatterofinterpretingtheScriptures.Naturetoo–‘the

createdorder’–needstoberead;arationalapproachtowhichmustbecapableofshowinghowit ‘demonstrates’ theexistenceofGod through thebeautyandgoodness of His works. From St Thomas Aquinas onwards, in the thirteenthcentury, this aspect of Christian philosophy was to become more and moreimportant.Anditwouldleadtowhattheologiansrefertoas‘theproofsfortheexistence of God’; in particular, the proof which shows that the world isperfectlyconstructed–theGreeksdidnotgeteverythingwrong,afterall!YoucanseenowwhyonemightsaythattherebothisandisnotaChristian

philosophy. There must clearly be a place for rational activity – to interpretScripture and comprehend the natural order sufficiently to draw the correctconclusionsastotheChristiandivinity.Butthedoctrineofsalvationisnolongertheprerogativeofphilosophy,and,eveniftheydonotinprinciplecontradictoneanother, the truths revealed by faith take precedence over those deduced byreason.This leadsus to the fifthand last characteristic:no longer themasterof the

doctrineofsalvation,philosophymustbecome‘scholastic’;adrydisciplineandnotabodyofwisdomoralivingprinciple.Thispointiscrucial,foritexplainswhy, even today, at a time whenmany people think they have definitely leftbehindtheChristianera,themajorityofphilosopherscontinuetorejecttheideathat philosophy can be a doctrine of salvation, or even an apprenticeship to

wisdom. At school as at university, philosophy has become essentially thehistory of ideas, a purely ‘discursive’ apprenticeship, contrary to what it hadbeeninancientGreece.WithChristianitythisrupturewasintroduced,wherebytheGreekphilosopher

ceasedtoinvitehisdiscipletopractisethoseexercisesinwisdomwhichwerethebasis of teaching in the academies. This is quite understandable, since thedoctrineofsalvation,foundedonfaithandonrevelation,nolongerbelongedtothe domain of reason. Philosophy for the most part evolved into a learnedcommentary upon realities which transcended philosophy and were removedfrom its sphere of practice: one philosophises about the meaning of theScriptures,oraboutnatureasaworkofGod,butnotabouttheultimateendsandpurposes of human life. Even today, it seems that philosophy starts from andspeaks about realities exterior to itself: the philosophy of science, of law, oflanguage,ofpolitics,ofart,ofmoralsandsoon,butalmostneverphilo-sophia:the loveofwisdom.Withafewrareexceptions,contemporaryphilosophystillassumes the secondary status to which it was relegated by the victory ofChristianityoverGreekthought.Personally,Ifindthisregrettable–Ishalltrytoexplainwhyinthechapterdevotedtocontemporaryphilosophy.But for the present, let us trace howChristianity would also evolve a new

ethicswhichwasinseveralrespectsatoddswiththeGreeks’consensus.

TheBirthoftheModernIdeaofHumanity

Onemight have expected that the strangleholdof religionover thoughtwouldhave as a consequence a reduction of the ethical plane. However, one couldargue that thereversehappened.Christianitywas tobring toethical thoughtatleast threenovel ideas,noneofwhichwasGreek–ornotessentiallyGreek–and all of which directly linked to the theoretical revolution we have justobserved in action. These new ideas were arresting in their modernity. It isprobablyimpossibleforus,nomatterhowmucheffortwemake,toimaginejusthowdisruptivetheymusthaveseemedtocontemporaries.TheGreekworldwasfundamentallyanaristocraticworld,auniverseorganisedasahierarchyinwhichthosemostendowedbynatureshouldinprinciplebe‘atthetop’,whilethelessendowed saw themselves occupying inferior ranks. Andwe should not forgetthattheGreekcity-statewasfoundedonslavery.Indirectcontradiction,Christianitywastointroducethenotionthathumanity

wasfundamentallyidentical,thatmenwereequalindignity–anunprecedented

idea at the time, and one to which our world owes its entire democraticinheritance.Butthisnotionofequalitydidnotcomefromnowhere.Here, I shall restrictmyself todescribing the three characteristicswhichare

criticalforanunderstandingofearlyChristianethics.First:freedomofchoice,‘freewill’,becamethefoundationofmorals,andthenotionoftheequaldignityof all human beings made its first appearance. The natural (Greek) order isfundamentally hierarchical: for each category of beings, nature displays a fullrange,fromthemostsublimeexcellencetothedeepestmediocrity.Itisevidentthat if nature is our guide, we are endowed unequally: we are more or lessstrong, swift, tall, beautiful, intelligent etc. All natural gifts are unequallydistributed.InthemoralvocabularyoftheancientGreeks,thenotionof‘virtue’was always directly linked to those of talent or natural endowment.Which iswhy,togiveatypicalexampleofGreekthought,Aristotlecantranquillyspeakof a ‘virtuous eye’ in oneof hisworks devoted to ethics, bywhichhe simplymeant an ‘excellent’ eye, a perfectly functioning eye, neither long-sighted norshort-sighted.Toexplainfurther: theGreekworld isanaristocraticworld,onewhichrests

entirely upon the conviction that there exists a natural hierarchy, of organs ofsight,ofplants,orofanimals,butalsoofmen:somemenareborntocommand,others toobey,which iswhyGreekpolitical lifeaccommodates itselfeasily tothenotionofslavery.ForChristians,thisbeliefinanaturalhierarchyhasnolegitimacy.Tospeakof

a ‘virtuous’eyeno longermakesanysense,because thegifts receivedatbirthare unequally distributed among men; some men are much stronger or moreintelligent thanothers, just as thereexist innature sharper eyesand less sharpeyes.Theseinequalitieshavenobearingonmorals.Hereallthatcountsishowwe use the qualities with which we have been endowed, not the qualitiesthemselves. What counts as moral or immoral is the act of choice, whatphilosophers began to call ‘freewill’. Thismay seem self-evident, but it wasliterallyunheard-ofatthetime,anditturnedanentireworld-orderupsidedown.To summarise: we exit an aristocratic universe and we enter a ‘meritocratic’universe, a world which first and foremost values not natural or inheritedqualities, but themeritwhich each of us displays inmaking use of them.Weleavebehindanaturalorderof inequalityandenteraconstructedorder (in thesense that it is devised by us) of equality; human dignity is the same foreveryone, whatever their actual inequalities, because it is connected to ourfreedomtochoosehowtoact,notuponourinnateendowments.

TheChristianargumentisatonceverysimpleandverypowerful.Itsaysthefollowing:thereisindisputableproofthatthetalentsbestowedbynaturearenotintrinsically virtuous, that they are in no sense inherently moral, because,withoutexception,theycanbeemployedasmuchforillasforgood.Strength,beauty, intelligence – all natural gifts received at birth – are self-evidentlyqualities,butnotonamoralplane.Youcanuseyour strength,yourbeautyoryourintelligencetocommitthemostwickedcrime,andyoudemonstratebythisalonethatthereisnothinginherentlyvirtuousaboutnaturalgifts.Therefore,youcanchoosewhatusetomakeofthem,whethergoodorbad,butitistheusethatis moral or immoral, not the gifts themselves. ‘Free will’ becomes thedetermining factor of the morality of an action. With this idea, Christianityrevolutionisedthehistoryofthought.Forthefirsttimeinhumanhistory,libertyratherthannaturehadbecomethefoundationofmorality.Atthesametime,theideaoftheequaldignityofallhumanbeingsmakesits

first appearance: and Christianity was to become the precursor of moderndemocracy.Although at times hostile to the Church, the French Revolution –and, to some extent, the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man – owes toChristianity an essential part of its egalitarian message. We see today howcivilisations that have not experienced Christianity have great difficulties infostering democratic regimes, because the notion of equality is not so deep-rooted.Thesecondupheaval isdirectly linked to thefirst: that, in themoralsphere,

thespiritismoreimportantthantheletter,the‘innerforum’ofconsciencemoredecisivethanthe‘outwardforum’ofsecularlaw,whichcanneverbemorethananexternalimposition.Here,apassagefromtheGospelsmayserveasamodel:itconcernsthefamousepisodewhereChristcomestothedefenceofawomanaccusedofadultery,whomthecrowdispreparingtostonetodeath.Atthistimeadultery,thedeceptionofahusbandorawife,wasuniversallyregardedasasin,andthelawstatedthatanadulteressshouldbestonedtodeath.Butwhataboutthespirit, the ‘innerconscience’?Christ stepsout fromtheGod-fearingcrowdandappealsdirectlytotheirconscience,saying

Inyourheartofhearts(innerforum),areyousurethatalliswell?Andwereyoutoexamineyourselves,areyoucertainthatwhatyouwouldfindwouldbe better than this woman whom you are preparing to kill and who,perhaps,hassinnedonlythroughlove?Hethat iswithoutsinamongyou,lethimfirstcastastoneather…

And all these men, instead of following the letter of the law, look intothemselves,intotheirhearts,andreflectontheirowndefects.Andtheybegintodoubtthattheyshouldactasmercilessjudges.ItisdifficultatfirsttograsptheimmensenoveltyofChristianity,notmerely

inrelationtoGreekthought,butevenmoresoperhapsinrelationtotheJewishworld.BecauseChristianityplacedsomuchweightonconscience,onthespiritovertheletter,itimposedalmostnojurisdictionovereverydaylife.RitualssuchaseatingnofishonFridaysaremostlymodern,datingbacknofurtherthanthenineteenth century and having no originswhatsoever in theGospels.You canreadandre-readtheGospels,andfindnexttonothingaboutwhatyoushouldorshouldnoteat,howandtowhomyoushouldgetmarried;therearehardlyanyrituals required for proving to yourself and others that you are a good andcommitted believer.While the lives ofOrthodox Jews andMuslims are filledwithdutiestobecarriedoutincivilsociety,Christianitylefteverythinguptotheindividualastowhethersomethingisgoodornot.This attitude smoothed the passage to democracy, and the arrival of secular

rather than religious societies: asmoralitywas essentially amatter of internalconscience,ithadlessreasontocomeintoconflictwithexternalconventions.Itmatteredlittlewhetheroneprayedonceorahundredtimesdaily,orthatonewasforbiddentoeatthisorthat:alllaws,moreorless,becameacceptableiftheydidnotinfringethespiritoftheChristianmessage.Andnowtothethirdfundamentalinnovation:themodernnotionofhumanity

makesitsentrance.Not,ofcourse,thatthisnotionwasunknowntotheGreeks,or to other civilisations: there existed an awareness of a ‘human species’, asdistinct from other animal species – the Stoics in particular were especiallyattached to the idea that allmen formed a single community. Theywere true‘cosmopolitans’.But with Christianity, the idea of a common humanity acquired a new

strength.Basedon theequaldignityofallhumanbeings, itwas to takeonanethicalaspect.Assoonasfreewillbecomesthefoundationofmoralactionandvirtueislocatednotinnatural,‘unequal’gifts,butintheusetowhichtheyareput,thenitgoeswithoutsayingthatallmenareofequalmerit.Humanitywouldneveragainbeabletodivideitself(philosophically)accordingtoanaturalandaristocratic hierarchy of beings: between superior and inferior, gifted and lessgifted,masters and slaves.From thenon, according toChristians,wewere all‘brothers’, on the same level as creatures ofGod and endowedwith the samecapacity to choose whether to act well or badly. Rich or poor, intelligent or

simple; itno longerholdsany importance.And this ideaofequality leads toaprimarily ethical conception of humanity. TheGreek concept of ‘barbarian’ –synonymouswith‘stranger’(‘anyonenotGreek’)–willslowlydisappeartobereplacedbytheconvictionthathumanityisONE.Toconclude,wecouldsaythatChristianityisthefirstuniversalistethos;universalismmeaning thedoctrineorbeliefinuniversalsalvation.In awholly unprecedentedmanner, Christianity responded forcefully to the

fundamentalquestionofhowtoconquerthefearsarousedinmanbythesenseofhis own mortality. Whereas the Stoics represent death as a transition from apersonal to an impersonal state of existence (from a condition of individualconsciousnesstothatofacosmicfragmentwithoutconsciousness),theChristianversion of salvation promises us nothing less than individual immortality.Theideaofwhichisnoteasytoresist.This promise is not superficial: on the contrary it is part of a coherent

intellectualframework–aconceptofloveandtheresurrectionofthebody–andoneofextraordinaryprofundity.

SalvationthroughLove

TheheartoftheChristiandoctrineofsalvationisdirectlylinkedtothetransitionfrom a cosmic to a personal conception of theLogos, of divinity as such. Itsthree most characteristic traits stem from this transformation, and it becomesclear how the Christian arguments came to prevail over the Stoic doctrine ofsalvation.First: if theLogos, ordivineprinciple, is incarnated in thepersonofChrist,

the ideaofprovidencechanges itsmeaning. Insteadofablindandanonymousdestiny,aswiththeStoics,itbecomesapersonalandbenevolentact,comparabletothatofafatherforhischildren.Thesalvationtowhichwecannowaspire–basedno longerona cosmicorderbuton thecommandmentsof thispersonaldivinity – is personal. Individual immortality is promised to us. This turningpointwasdescribedin160ADinaworkbythefirstFatheroftheChurch,SaintJustin. What is so unusual about this Dialogue is that it is written in asurprisinglyfamiliarstyle,foritstime:JustinwaswellversedinGreekthoughtand studied theChristian doctrine of salvation in relation to the great texts ofPlato,Aristotle and theStoics.HealsodescribeshowhehasbeenvariouslyaStoic,anAristotelian,aPythagorean,andaferventPlatonist–beforeeventuallybecomingaChristian!His testimony is thereforeextremelyvaluable tousand

worthspendingsometimeon.JustinbelongedtoagroupofearlyChristiansknownasthe‘Apologists’and

wastheirprimemoverduringthesecondcentury.AtthistimethepersecutionofChristians was still a feature of daily life in the Roman Empire. The firstChristian theologians began to compile ‘apologias’ or ‘reasoned defences’ oftheir religion, which were addressed to the Roman emperors, in the hope ofdefendingtheircommunityagainsthostilerumoursabouttheirformofworship.Christianswere regularly accused of themost bizarre behaviour, for example,thattheyworshippedaGodwiththeheadofadonkey,indulgedincannibalisticsacrificeandritualmurders,orwereinvolvedinsuchdebauchedactsasincest.Noneofwhichwastrue.The apologias compiled by Justin were intended to testify to the reality of

Christian practices and to countermalicious gossip. The first apologia, datingfrom 150 AD, was sent to the Emperor Antoninus; the second to MarcusAurelius,oneofthegreatestrepresentativesofStoicthoughtandalso,curiously,a statesman.Roman lawdecreed thatChristians could not be harrassedunlesstheyweredenouncedbyanindividual‘ofcredibility’.Itfelltoaphilosopherofthe Cynic school named Crescens to take on this sinister role: a staunchadversaryofJustin,andonewhowasjealousofhispublicrepute.CrescenshadJustinandsixofhispupilscondemned,andtheyweredecapitatedinAD165–underthereignofMarcusAurelius.ThetranscriptofJustin’strialhassurvived,theonlyprimarydocument relating to themartyrdomofaChristian thinker inRomeduringthisperiod.ItisespeciallyinterestingtoreadwhatJustinprofesses,asheisconfrontedby

Stoics intent on executing him. The bone of contention, unsurprisingly,concernedthedoctrineofsalvation.AccordingtoJustin,theChristianversionofsalvationwinsoutoverthatoftheStoics:

They[theGreekthinkers]attemptmoreovertopersuadeusthatGodtakescareoftheuniversewithitsgeneraandspecies,butnotofyouandI,andeachofusindividually,sinceotherwisewewouldsurelynotneedtopraytoHimnightandday!(DialoguewithTrypho,1)

The implacable and blind Fate of the Ancients gives way to the benevolentwisdomofanindividualwholovesusasindividuals,andinawaythatnooneelselovesus.Itislovethatbecomesthekeytosalvation.But,thisisnotloveintheusualsense;itiswhatChristianthinkerswillcall‘loveinGod’.

This leadsus to the secondcharacteristic: love is stronger thandeath.Whatlink can there be between the sentiment of love and the question ofwhat cansave us from mortality and death? It is simplest to start from the Christianproposition that there are, fundamentally, three faces of love, which betweenthemformacoherent‘system’.First,thereisthelovethatwemightcall‘love-as-attachment’: in the sense thatwe arebound to another, to the point of notbeing able to imagine life without this other.We can experience this love asmuchwithinafamilyaswithalover.Onthispoint,ChristianswereunitedwithStoics andBuddhists inviewing this love as themostdangerous and the leastenlightened of all.Not only because it risks diverting us from our true dutiestowards God, but also because it cannot survive death and it cannot tolerateruptureandchange.Asidefromthefactthatitisusuallypossessiveandjealous,love-as-attachmentstoresupforustheworstofallsufferings–thelossoflovedones.At theoppositeextreme iswhatwemightcall ‘compassion’: a love thatdrives us to care for strangers when they are in need.We still encounter thistoday, in the form of Christian charity, or, for example, the work of ahumanitarianagency.And,finally,thereis‘love-in-God’.Hereandonlyhereistheultimatesourceofsalvation,which,forChristians,willprovestrongerthandeath.Let us examine these definitions of love a little more closely. They are

fascinating, because they have all endured for centuries and remain as activetodayasatthetimewhentheyfirstcameintobeing.You will remember that Stoicism regards the fear of death as the greatest

obstacle to the happy life (likewise in Buddhism). And this anxiety is notwithout its connection to love. In simple terms there is an apparentlyinsurmountable contradiction between love, which leads to attachment, anddeath,whichleadstoseparation.Ifthelawofthisworldisoneoffinitenessandmutability, and if, as the Buddhists maintain, everything is ‘impermanent’ –changingandperishable–thenwesinbylackofwisdomifweattachourselvestothingsorpersonsthataremortal.Notthatwemustresort toindifference,ofcourse, which neither Stoic sage nor Buddhist monk would for a momentcountenance:compassionandbenevolencetoothers,indeedtoallotherformsoflife,mustremainthehighestethicalimperativeofourbehaviour.Butpassionisnotacceptableinthehomeofthewiseman,andfamilialties,whentheybecometoobinding,mustbeloosened.Whichiswhy,liketheGreeksage,theBuddhistmonklives,asmuchaspossible, inaconditionofsolitude. (Theword‘monk’derives from the Greekmonos, meaning ‘alone’.) It is truly in solitude that

wisdomcanbloom,uncompromisedbythedifficultiesassociatedwithallformsofattachment.Itisimpossible,ineffect,tohaveawifeorhusband,childrenorfriends without becoming in some degree attached to them. We must freeourselves of these ties ifwewish to overcome the fear of death.AsBuddhistwisdomremindsus:

The ideal condition in which to die is one where you have abandonedeverything,inwardlyandoutwardly,sothatthereshouldbe,atthiscrucialmoment,theleastpossiblelonging,desireorattachmenttowhichthesoulcancling.Thisiswhy,beforedying,weshouldfreeourselvesfromallourgoods, friends and family. (SogyalRinpoche,TheTibetanBookofLivingandDying)

Or,astheNewTestamentexpressesit:

Forhethatsowethtohisfleshshallofthefleshreapcorruption;buthethatsowethto theSpiritshallof theSpirit reaplifeeverlasting.(Epistle to theGalatians,VI,8)

From the same perspective, Saint Augustine condemns those who attachthemselvestomortalcreaturesthroughbondsoflove:

Youseekahappylifeintheregionofdeath.Howcantherebeahappylifewherethereisnotevenlife?(ConfessionsIV,12)

Similarly, Pascal, in his Pensées (1658–62), brilliantly elaborates the reasonswhyit isunworthynotonlytoattachoneself toothers,but toallowanother toattachhimselforherselftoone.Istronglyrecommendreadingthewholeofthisprofoundlyimportanttext:

Itisunjustthatmenshouldattachthemselvestome,eventhoughtheydoitwithpleasureandvoluntarily.IshoulddeceivethoseinwhomIevincethisdesire; for I am an end for no person, and have not the where-withal tosatisfythem.AmInotabouttodie?Andthustheobjectoftheirattachmentwill die. Therefore, as I would be culpable in causing a falsehood to bebelieved, though I should employ gentle persuasion, though it should bebelievedwithpleasure,andthoughitshouldgivemepleasure;evensoIam

culpable in making myself loved. And if I attract persons to attachthemselvestome,Ishouldwarnthosewhoarereadytoconsenttosuchaliethattheyshouldnotbelieveit,whateveradvantageImightderivefromit; and likewise that they ought not to attach themselves tome; for theyshouldbespendingtheirlifeandtheireffortsinpleasingGod,orinseekingHim.(Pensées,471)

Inthesamevein,Augustinedescribeshow,whenhewasayoungmanandstillapagan,helethisheartbebrokenbyattachinghimselftoafriendwhosuddenlydied.Hebelievedthathisgriefwascausedentirelybythislackofwisdom:

Thereasonwhythisgriefhadpenetratedmesoeasilyandsodeeply,wasthatIhadpouredmysouloutontoquicksandbylovingapersonsuretodie,asifhewouldneverdie.(Confessions,IV,8)

Hedescribesahumanloveasseekingintheotheronlythose‘marksofaffection’whichincreaseourstanding,reassureusandsatisfyourownego:

Hence themourningwhenafrienddies, thedarknessofgrief.Andas thesweetnessisturnedtobitternesstheheartisfloodedwithtears.Thelostlifeofthosewhodiebecomesthedeathofthosestillliving.(Confessions,IV,9)

Wemust therefore learnhow to resistexclusiveattachments, since ‘everythingperishesinthisworld,everythingissubjecttofailureanddeath’.Assoonasitinvolvesmortalcreatures,wemustensurethat

our soul does not become stuck and glued to these transient things bylovingthemthroughthephysicalsenses.Foras theseperishablecreaturespassalongthepathofthingsthatracetowardsnon-existence,theyrendthesoul with pestilential desires, and torment it without cease; for the soullovestobeinthemandtakeitsreposeamongtheobjectsofitslove.Butinthese things there is nopoint of rest, for they are impermanent, they fleeawayandcannotbefollowedwiththebodilysenses.Noonecanfullygraspthemevenwhiletheyarepresent.(Confessions,IV,10)

This isbeautifullyexpressed,anditseemstomethat theStoicsageaswellasthe Buddhist would agree wholeheartedly with these words from a Christian

convert.On the other hand, who says man is mortal? The entire originality of the

Christian message resides in ‘the good news’ of literal immortality –resurrection, in otherwords, and notmerely of souls but of individual humanbodies.IfhumansareimmortalaslongastheyobeythecommandmentsofGodand ifwe suppose that this immortality is notmerely compatiblewith earthlylovebutpossiblyoneofitsconsequences,thenwhydepriveourselves?Whynotbecomeattachedtoournearestanddearest, ifChristpromisesthatweshallbereunitedafterourbiologicaldeath?Thus,between‘love-as-attachment’andloveassimpleuniversalcompassion

towardsothers,aplaceopensupfora third formof love: the love‘in’Godofcreatureswho are themselves eternal.And it is here thatAugustinewishes toleadus:

Happy,myGod,isthepersonwholovesyou,andhisfriendinyou,andhisenemyforyoursake.Thoughleftalone,helosesnonewhoaredeartohim;forallaredearintheonewhocannotbelost.WhoisthatbutGod,ourGod…Noonecanloseyou,myGod,unlessheabandonsyou.(Confessions,IV,9)

Towhichwemightadd,thatnoonecanlosetheindividualsheloves,unlessheceases to love them inGod; in otherwords, ceases to lovewhat is eternal inthem, bound toGod and protected byHim. This promise is, to say the least,tempting.AnditwastofinditsmostcompleteforminthatultimatestatementoftheChristiandoctrineofsalvation:thatofresurrection,uniqueamongstallofthemajorreligions.Tothethirdtrait:personalimmortalityatlast–theresurrectionofthefleshas

the culmination of the Christian doctrine of salvation. For the Buddhist, theindividual is but an illusion, something destined for dissolution andimpermanence; for the Stoic the individual self is destined to merge into thetotalityofthecosmos;Christianityonthecontrarypromisesimmortalityoftheindividualperson:hissoul,hisbody,hisface,hisbelovedvoice–aslongasheis saved by the grace of God. Now here is a seductive promise, since it isthrough love,andnotonly loveofGod,notonlyofone’sneighbour,butmostparticularlyloveofone’snearestanddearestthatsalvationistobegained.ThusdoeslovebecomethesolutionforChristians.This is why Augustine, having conducted a radical critique of ‘love-as-

attachment’ in general, does not banish it when its object is divine – is Godhimself,andGod’screatures:

Ifsoulspleaseyou, theyarebeinglovedinGod;for theytooaremutableandacquire stabilitybybeingestablished inhim.Otherwise theygo theirwayandperish…Standwithhimandyouwillstandfast.(Confessions,IV,12)

Nothing is mores striking than the serenity with which Augustine evokes thebereavements he has suffered, not prior to his conversion, but after hisconversion–startingwiththedeathofhismother,towhomhewasveryclose:

Thenwhenshebreathedherlast,theboyAdeodatuscriedoutinsorrowandwaspressedbyallofustobesilent.Inthiswaytoosomethingofthechildinme,whichhad slipped towardsweeping,was checked and silencedbythe voice of reason. For we did not think it right to accompany herobsequies with tearful dirges and lamentations, since in most cases it iscustomarytousesuchmourningtoimplysorrowforthemiserablestateofthosewho die, or even to assume their complete extinction.Whereasmymother’sdyingmeantneitherthatherstatewasmiserablenorthatshewassufferingextinction,ofwhichwewereconfidentbecauseoftheevidenceofhervirtuouslife.(Confessions,IX,12)

Inthesameway,Augustinedoesnothesitatetoevoke‘thehappydeathsoftwofriends’, whom he also had the happiness of seeing converted and whoconsequently would benefit in turn from ‘the resurrection of the just’(Confessions, IX,3).Asalways,Augustine finds theaptword, for it is indeedthe resurrection which ultimately founds this third kind of love – the love ofGod. Neither attachment to worldly things – which is doomed to endure theworstsufferings,onwhichStoicsandBuddhistsagree–noravaguecompassiontowards the much vaunted ‘neighbour’, meaning the world and his wife; butratheralovewhichisattached,physicalandpersonal,towardsotherindividuals,those nearest as well as neighbouring, provided that this love is founded ‘inGod’, that is, in the context of a faith which makes real the possibility ofresurrection.From which emerges the direct link between love and the doctrine of

salvation.For it is through love inGod thatChrist aloneproves tobe theone

who,making‘deathitselfdie’and‘makingthismortalfleshputonimmortality’,promisesthatthelifeofourloveswillnotcometoanendwithearthlydeath.Weshouldnotforgetthattheideaofpersonalimmortalitywasalreadypresent

inanumberofphilosophiesandreligionspriortoChristianity,nonetheless,theChristian version of resurrection is unique in closely associating threefundamental themes for its doctrine of the happy life: that of the personalimmortality of the soul, the resurrection of the body and of salvation throughlove.Without resurrection– significantlydesignatedas ‘thegoodnews’ in theActs of the Apostles – the whole message of Christ collapses, as the NewTestamentmakesunambiguouslyclear:

NowifitbepreachedthatChristrosefromthedead,howsaysomeamongyouthatthereisnoresurrectionofthedead?Butiftherebenoresurrectionofthedead,thenisChristnotrisen:AndifChristbenotrisen,thenisourpreaching vain, and your faith is also vain. Yea, and we are found falsewitnessesofGod;becausewehavetestifiedofGodthatheraisedupChrist:whomhe raisednotup, if sobe that thedeadrisenot. (1Corinthians15:12‒15)

Theresurrectionis,sotospeak,thealphaandomegaoftheChristiandoctrineofsalvation: itstandsnotonlyat theendofourearthly life,butequallysoat thebeginning, in the liturgy of the baptism, considered as a first death andsymbolisedas suchby immersion inwater, andas a first entrance to true life,oneofacommunityweddedasindividualstoeternity.This cannot be emphasised toomuch: that it is not merely the soul that is

resuscitated, but the ‘soul-body’ in its entirety; and therefore the individual.WhenJesusreappearstohisdisciplesafterhisdeath,hesuggests–toremovealldoubts–thattheytouchhim,and,asproofofhis‘materiality’,heasksforalittlefood,whichheeatsbeforethem:

SothatiftheSpiritofHimthatraisedupJesusfromthedeaddwellinyou,He that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken your mortalbodiesbyhisSpiritthatdwellethinyou.(Romans,8:11)

Whileit isdifficult,evenimpossible, toimaginetheresurrectionoftheflesh–Withwhichbodyshallwebereborn,andatwhatage?Whatismeantbya‘spiritualbody’,a‘glorious’body,andsoon?,andforall that thisdoctrineisoneof

theunfathomablemysteriesofaRevelationwhichgoesfarbeyondourpowersof reason, even asChristians– thedifficulty changesnothing.The teaching isentirelyunambiguous.Although atheistswouldhaveus believeotherwise, theChristian religion is

notentirelygivenovertowagingwaragainstthebody,theflesh,thesenses.Ifthatwereso,howwouldChristianityhaveacceptedthatthedivineprinciplebeincarnatedinthepersonofChrist,thattheLogostakeonthephysicalaspectofasimplemortal?EventheofficialcatechismoftheChurch,perhapsnotthemostboldlyoriginaloftexts,insists:

Thefleshisthehingeofsalvation.WebelieveinGodwhoiscreatoroftheflesh;webelieveintheWordmadefleshinordertoredeemtheflesh;webelieveintheresurrectionoftheflesh, thefulfillmentofboththecreationand the redemptionof the flesh…Webelieve in the true resurrectionofthisfleshthatwenowpossess.Wesowacorruptiblebodyinthetomb,buthe raises up an incorruptible body, a spiritual body. (Catechism of theCatholicChurch,1015–17)

Onecanbeanon-believer,butonecannotmaintainthatChristianityisareligiondedicatedtocontemptfortheflesh.Becausethisissimplynotthecase.Takingresurrectionastheend-pointofthedoctrineofsalvation,wecanbegin

tounderstandwhatenabledChristianitytorulemoreorlessunchallengedoverphilosophyfornearlyfifteenhundredyears.TheChristianresponsetomortality,forbelieversatleast,iswithoutquestion

themost ‘effective’ of all responses: it would seem to be the only version ofsalvationthatenablesusnotonlytotranscendthefearofdeath,butalsotobeatdeath itself. And by doing so in terms of individual identity, rather thananonymity or abstraction, it seems to be the only version that offers a trulydefinitivevictoryofpersonalimmortalityoverourconditionasmortals.The personalising of the Logos changes all factors in the equation. If the

promisesmadetomebyChristaregenuine;andifdivineprovidencetakesmeinhandasanindividual,howeverhumble,thenmyimmortalitywillalso,inturn,bepersonal.Inwhichcase,deathitselfisfinallyovercome,andnotmerelythefearsitarousesinme.Immortalityisnolongertheanonymousandcosmiceventproposed by Stoicism, but the individual and conscious resurrection of soulstogether with their ‘glorious’ bodies. In this sense, it is ‘love in God’ whichconfers its ultimate meaning upon this revolution effected by Christianity in

relationtoGreekthought.Itisthisnewdefinitionoflove,foundattheheartofthenewdoctrineofsalvation,whichfinallyturnsouttobe‘strongerthandeath’.Howandwhydid thisdoctrinebegin to recedewith theRenaissance?How

and why did philosophy succeed in gaining the upper hand once more overreligion, fromtheseventeenthcenturyonwards?Whatwasphilosophyable toproposeinitsplace?It is tothebirthofmodernphilosophywemustnowturnourattention.

Chapter4Humanism,orTheBirthofModernPhilosophy

Let us retrace our steps for amoment.We have seen how ancient philosophyfoundedadoctrineofsalvationintermsofaconsiderationofthecosmos.IntheeyesofapupiloftheStoicschools,itwentwithoutsayingthat,tobesaved–inotherwords,toovercomethefearofdeath–wemustinthefirstplaceendeavourtounderstandthecosmicorder;secondly,doourutmosttoimitateit;andthirdly,mergeourselvesinit,byfindingourrightfulplacetherein,andthussucceedinattainingakindofeternity.We have also analysed theways inwhichChristian doctrine prevailed over

Greek thought, and how, to attain salvation, a Christian was required toacknowledge the Word, through the humility of faith, observe thecommandments,andfinallytopractiseloveinGodinordertoenterthekingdomofeternallife.Themodernworldaroseoutofthecollapseofancientcosmologyandanew

questioning of religious authority, and eventually a scientific revolution unprecedented in the history of humanity, which occurred in Europe over thecourseofonehundredand fiftyyears.Tomyknowledge,noothercivilisationhasundergonesucharadicalupheavalinthefabricofitsculture.This upheaval began with the publication of Copernicus’s work On the

Revolutions of theHeavenlyBodies in 1543, continuedwith that ofNewton’sPrincipiaMathematicain1687,andtookinDescartes’PrinciplesofPhilosophy(1644)andGalileo’sDialogueConcerningtheTwoChiefWorldSystems(1632).Thesefourdatesandthesefourauthorsweretomarkthehistoryofthoughtasnootherthinkersbeforethem.Anewerawasestablished,which,inmanyrespects,westillinhabittoday.Itwasnotonlymanwho‘losthisplace’intheworld,asisoftensaid,butthecosmositself–theenclosedandharmoniousframeofhumanexistencesinceantiquity–quitesimplyevaporated;leavingtheintellectsofthetimeinastateofconfusionitisvirtuallyimpossibleforustoimaginetoday.

Modern physics annihilated the foundations of the ancient world-picture –through its assertion, for example, that the world is not round, enclosed,hierarchicalanddivinelyordered,butratherisaninfinitechaosdevoidofsense;afieldofforcesandobjectsjostlingforplacewithoutharmony–andweakenedconsiderablythefoundationsofChristianreligion.SciencecalledintoquestionissuesthattheChurchhadunwiselyadopted–the

age of the Earth, its relation to the Sun, the date of birth ofmankind and ofanimalspeciesetc–andinvitedmentoadoptanattitudeofdoubtandacriticalspirit incompatible with respect for religious authority. Belief, at this timefetteredinshacklesrigidlyimposedbytheChurch,startedtowaver,sothatthemostenlightenedindividualsfoundthemselvesdramaticallyatoddswithancientdoctrinesofsalvationwhichwerebecominglessandlesscredible.Nowadayswe speakof a lossofbearings, togetherwith the suggestion that

amongst the young in particular, things are falling apart – manners andknowledge, thesenseofhistory, interest inpolitics,minimalacquaintancewithliterature, religion and art –but Iwould suggest that this harkingback to ‘thegoodolddays’isasnothingcomparedtothedisorientationmeninthesixteenthandseventeenthcenturiesmusthavefelt.Thisiswhywespeakof‘Humanism’inrelationtothisperiod:manfoundhimselfforthefirsttimealone,deprivedofthesupportofbothcosmosandGod.To try to imagine the abyss which opened at this time, we need to put

ourselves in the shoes of someone who is beginning to realise that the mostrecentscientificdiscoverieshavejustinvalidatedtheideaofthecosmosasjustandgood; that inconsequence it isgoing tobe impossible forhim to take thecosmosashisethicalmodel;and,forgoodmeasure,thatthebeliefinGodwhichmight have served as his life-raft is taking in water! Our seventeenth-centuryfriendisgoingtohavetorethink,fromscratch,thequestionof theoria, thatofethicalconductandthatofsalvation.First, on the theoretical level: if the world is no longer finite, ordered and

harmonious, and is instead infinite and chaotic, according to the newphysics,how can hemake sense of thisworld and his place in it?One of the greatestmodern historians of science, Alexander Koyré, describes the scientificrevolutionofthesixteenthandseventeenthcenturiessowell,thatIwillsimplyquotehisaccounthere:

the destruction of the idea of aCosmos; that is, the disappearance, fromphilosophically and scientifically valid concepts, of the conception of the

world as a finite, closed, and hierarchically ordered whole … and itsreplacement by an indefinite and even infinite universe which is boundtogether by the identity of its fundamental components and laws, and inwhichall thesecomponentsareplacedon thesamelevelofbeing…TheimmediateeffectoftheCopernicanrevolutionwastospreadscepticismandbewilderment,towhichthefamousversesofJohnDonne(writtenin1611)givesuchstrikingexpression:…newPhilosophycallsallindoubt,TheElementoffireisquiteputout;TheSunislost,andth’Earth,andnoman’switCanwelldirecthimwheretolookeforit.’Tisallinpieces,allcoherencegone;Alljustsupply,andallRelation.(AlexanderKoyré,FromtheClosedWorldtotheInfiniteUniverse,11,47)

‘Allcoherencegone’:noharmoniouscosmosandnonaturalmoralorder.HowcanwecomprehendtheanguishwhichmusthavepossessedRenaissancemen?Second,intermsofethics,thistheoreticalrevolutionhasaneffectasobvious

as it is devastating: if the universe no longer has any of the attributes of acosmos,itcannotserveasamodelforimitationwithinthemoralsphere.AndifChristianityitselfisunsureofitsfoundations,ifobediencetoGodisnolongeragiven,wherethenarewetolookfortheprinciplesofanewrelationshipbetweenmen,andanewfoundationforthecommonlife?Wearegoingtohavetorebuildthemoralitywhichhasservedasamodelforcenturies.Nothingless.Third, thedoctrineof salvation: you can see for yourself that, for the same

reasons,neither theancientmodelnor theChristianmodel remaincredible foranyoneofacriticalandinformeddisposition.Thechallengestakenupbymodernphilosophyonthesethreefrontswereof

an unprecedented scale and complexity – and urgency, too: as the verses byDonne suggest, never had humanity been so convulsed and at the same timerenderedsoresourceless,intellectually,morallyandspiritually.But,asweshallsee, the greatness of modern philosophy is to have been equal to thesechallenges.

ANewTheoryofKnowledge

As you may imagine, numerous factors played a role in the passage from aclosedworld to infinite space.Of key importancewas technological progress,notablythedevelopmentofnewastronomicalinstrumentssuchasthetelescope,whichenabledobservationsthatcouldnotbereconciledwiththeframeworkofexisting and ancientmodels of cosmology.One examplewhichmade a strongimpressiononcontemporarieswas thediscoveryof thenovae–newstars–orconversely,thedisappearanceofexistingstars,neitherofwhichconformedwiththedogmaof‘celestialimmutability’sodeartotheancients.Theirnotionoftheultimate perfection of the cosmos resided in the fact that it was eternal andimmutable, thatnothingwithinitcouldchange.For theGreeks, thisorthodoxyrepresentedsomethingabsolutelyessential–humansalvationdependedonit–yet contemporary astronomers were revealing that this belief was false: quitesimply,itwascontradictedbythefacts.There were of course many other causes for the decline of the old

cosmologies, notably economic and social, but the new scientific discoverieswere the most critical. Before we can even begin to consider the upheavalswhichthiseclipseofthecosmoswastocausewithinthemoralsphere,wemustunderstand that it was above all the theoria which had wholly changed itsmeaninganddirection.Thebookthatwastounderpinthewholeofmodernphilosophyandonethat

remainsamonumentinthehistoryofthought,wasEmmanuelKant’sCritiqueofPureReason (1781). I amnot going to attempt to summarise it here in a fewsentences,but,althoughitischallengingwork,Iwouldliketotrytogiveyouanidea of how it came to reformulate in totally novel terms the question of thetheoria.If theworld isno longeracosmosbutachaos, a fieldof forcesengaged in

constantconflictwitheachother,itbecomesclearthatknowledgecannolongertaketheformofcontemplation(theoria).Onemightsaythat,afterthecollapseofabeautifulcosmicorderanditsreplacementbyanaturedevoidofsenseandatwarwith itself, there isnothingdivine about the universe.Order, harmony,beauty and goodness are no longer the first principles. Consequently, to re-establishadegreeofcoherence,sothattheworldinwhichmenlivecontinuestohaveameaning,itwasgoingtorequiremanhimself,oratleastmenoflearning,tointroducesomeorderintoauniversewhichseemednolongertoofferanyofitsown.Thenewtaskofcontemporarysciencewasnolongertoframeitselfasthepassivecontemplationofabeautyinscribedbeforehandinnature; itwastodoajobofwork,namelytheactiveconstructionoflawswhichwouldendowa

disenchanteduniversewithmeaning.Sciencewasnolongerapassivespectacle;itwasanactivityofthemind.Iwould like to give at least one example of this transition from passive to

active knowledge, from assumption to construction, from ancient theoria tomodern science. Let us consider the principle of causality – the principleaccordingtowhicheveryeffecthasacauseor,ifyouprefer,everyphenomenonmusthavearationalexplanation.Insteadofbeingcontentwithdiscoveringtheorder of theworld through contemplation, the ‘modern’ philosopher or savant(scholar;learnedperson)wouldattempttointroduce,bymeansofaprincipleofcausality, some coherence and sense into the chaos of natural phenomena.Hewould try actively to make logical connections between certain phenomena,whichhewastoconsideraseffects,andotherswhichhesucceededindetectingascauses.Inotherwords,thoughtwasnolongera‘seeing’,anorao,astheword‘theoria’ suggests, but an ‘acting’, a work which consists in relating naturalphenomena to each other, so that they form a chain of connections: and thusexplain each other. This is what will come to be termed ‘scientific method’,virtually unknown as such to the ancients, and which would become thefundamentalbuildingblockofmodernscience.An example of this ‘acting’ isClaudeBernard, the great nineteenth-century

French doctor and biologist, who published his celebrated Introduction to theStudyofExperimentalMedicine in 1865.He illustrates perfectly the theory ofknowledgeelaboratedbyKantwhichreplacedtheancienttheoria.Claude Bernard provides a detailed account of his discovery of ‘the

glycogenetic functionof the liver’– thecapacityof the liver toproducesugar.Bernardhadobserved,whilecarryingouttests,thattherewassugarinthebloodof the rabbits he dissected.Hewondered about the origin of this sugar: did itcomefromingestedfoodorwasitproducedbythebody,and,ifso,whichorganwas responsible?He separated his rabbits into three groups: somewere givenfood containing sugar; others were given food with no sugar; and the leastfortunatewereplacedon a starvationdiet.After several days, he analysed theblood of the rabbits, only to discover that, in every case, therewas the sameamountofsugarintheirblood.Thisindicatedthatglucosedidnotderivefromfood,butwasproducedbythebody.The work of contemplation, the theoria, has changed completely since the

Greeks: it is no longer a question of contemplation; science is no longer aspectacle but a job ofwork, an activitywhich consists ofmaking connectionsbetween phenomena, inassociating an effect (sugar) with a cause (the liver).

AndthisispreciselywhatKant,beforeClaudeBernard,hadalreadyformulatedandanalysedintheCritiqueofPureReason;namelytheideathatsciencemustdefine itself henceforth as a work of the associative faculty, or, to use hisvocabulary, as a work of ‘synthesis’ – a word which in Greekmeans ‘to puttogether’, to ‘combine’; just as an explanation in terms of cause and effectconnectstwophenomena:inthisinstance,sugarandtheliver.WhenIwasyoungandIopenedtheCritiqueofPureReasonforthefirsttime,

I was deeply dis appointed. I had been told that he was perhaps the greatestphilosopherofall time.NotonlydidIunderstandnothing, literallynothing,ofwhatIread,norcouldIunderstandwhy,fromtheopeningpagesofthismythicalwork,Kantwas sopreoccupiedbyaquestionwhich seemed tome trivial anduninteresting: ‘How are synthetic a priori (not supported by fact; based onhypothesisortheoryratherthanexperiment)judgmentspossible?’Thisdoesnotat first seeman especially fertile subject for reflection– nor even, perhaps, atsecondsight.Forseveralyears,IunderstoodalmostnothingofKant.Iwasabletointerpret

thewordsandsentences,ofcourse,andwasabletogiveaplausibleaccountofeach concept, but thewhole continued tomake no sense. It was onlywhen IrealisedtheradicallynovelproblemwhichKanttriedtoaddress,inthewakeofthe collapse of inherited cosmologies, that I grasped the stakes raised by hisopening question, which had previously struck me as purely ‘technical’. Inasking himself about our capacity to create ‘syntheses’, or ‘syntheticjudgements’,Kant formulated theproblemconfrontingmodernscience, thatofscientific method: how does one devise laws which lay the ground forassociations,thatis,forcoherentandrevealingconnectionsbetweenphenomenawhose ordinance or organising principle is no longer a given but must beintroducedbyusasanintervention,fromoutside.

ARevolutionintheMoralLife

The theoretical revolution that Kant inaugurated was to have considerableconsequences in the moral sphere. The new vision of the world forged bymodern sciencehadalmostnothing incommonwith thatof theAncients.TheuniverseasdescribedbyNewton,particularly,isnolongerinanysenseaplaceofpeaceandharmony;ratheritisaworldofblindforcesandcollision,inwhichwe no longer knowwhere to place ourselves, for the simple reason that it isinfinite,withoutboundariesinspaceortime.Asaresult,itcannolongerserve

in any sense as a guide formorality.All of the questions of philosophymustthereforebecompletelyreformulated.Wemightsaythatmodernthoughtputsmankindintheplaceofcosmosand

divinity. It was on the rock of humanity that philosophers must build a newedificeoftheory,ofmorality,andevennewdoctrinesofsalvation.Itwasuptomantointroduce,bymeansofhisintellectuallabour,senseandcoherenceintoaworldwhichseemednolongertopossessmeaning.In terms of morality, you have only to consider the Declaration of Human

Rights of 1789, the most visible and familiar external sign of a revolutionwithout precedent in the history of ideas. It placed man at the centre of theworld, whereas for the Greeks the world had been the centre of attention.Moreover, it not only made humans the sole beings on Earth worthy of fullrespect,butitproposedtheequalityofallhumans,whetherrichorpoor,manorwoman,white or black. In this case,modernphilosophy is in the first place ahumanism.This transformation posed a significant question: if the ancient principles,

cosmologicalandreligious,hadhadtheirday,andmenunderstoodwhythiswasthecase,whatnewtheoria,newethicsandnewdoctrineofsalvationcouldtaketheplaceofthosewhichhadproducedacosmosandadivinity?To answer this,modern philosophy placed at the centre of its cogitations a

questionwhichmayseemverystrange:whatisthedifferencebetweenmenandanimals? The philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries werefascinated by the definition ofwhat is an animal, believing that if they couldestablishthedifferencesbetweenmanandbeast,theycouldbetterdiscernman’s‘specificdifference’,thatwhichdefinesandispropertohim.Inthewordsofthegreatnineteenth-centuryhistorian,JulesMichelet,animals

are‘ourhumblerbrothers’.Theyarethebeingsclosesttous;wecanreadilyseehow,fromthemomentthattheideaofreligionbeginstofalterandbereplacedbytheideaofmanascentreoftheworldandsubjectofphilosophicalreflection,thequestionofwhatis‘propertoman’becomesintellectuallycrucial.Modernphilosophersnowsharedthenotionnotonlythatmanhadrights,but

thathewasthesolebeingtohaverights–astheDeclarationof1789affirms.Ifthey now placed man above all other beings and assigned vastly increasedimportance to him, not merely over other animals, but also over a defunctcosmos and an increasingly doubtful divinity, then there must logically besomethingaboutmanthatdistinguisheshimfromtherestofcreation.By startingwith thedebate about animals and, at the same time, thedebate

aboutman and the nature of humanity, we enter directly the key concepts ofmodernphilosophy,andespeciallythoseofJean-JacquesRousseau,who,intheeighteenthcentury,wouldmakethemostdecisivecontribution.

TheDifferencebetweenAnimalsandHumansAccordingtoRousseau

IfIwereallowedtotakeonlyonetextofmodernphilosophytoadesertisland,thenIwouldundoubtedlychooseapassagefromRousseau’sDiscourseon theOrigin of Inequality, published in 1755. We will come to the passage in amoment,but inorder tounderstandit fully,youmustfirstbeaware thatat thetimeofitswritingthereexistedtwoclassiccriteriafordistinguishingmenfrombeasts: intelligenceandsensibility(meaningaffect,sociability,whichincludedlanguage).InAristotle, for example,man is defined as ‘the rational animal’, bywhich

was meant a living being who possessed – as his ‘specific’ difference – anadditionalcharacteristic: thecapacityforreason.ForDescartes, thecriterionofreasonor intelligencewas joinedby a further property: that of affectivity (theemotion that lies behind action). He believed that animals are comparable tomachines, or automata – machines that imitate the movement of a livingcreature,suchasaclock–anditwasanerrortothinkofthemasexperiencingemotions. This would explain why they do not speak, even though they areequippedwithorganswhichwouldmakespeechpossible.Theyhavenothingtoexpress.Rousseauproposedaradicallynewsolution.Hisnewdefinitionofthehuman

person was to prove inspirational, in that it enabled the founding of a newmorality thatwasno longer ‘cosmic’or religiousbuthumanist–and ‘atheist’.For Rousseau, animals clearly possessed intelligence, sensibility, even thefaculty of communication. Therefore it is not reason, or affectivity, or evenlanguagethatdifferentiatesthehumanbeing.Onthecontrary,everyonewhohasa dog knows perfectly well that the dog is more sociable and even moreintelligentthan,insomecases,certainhumanbeings.Intermsofsociabilityandintelligence, we barely differ from animals. Contemporary ethology – thescientific study of the function and evolution of animal behaviour – broadlyconfirmsthisdiagnosis.Weknowtodaywithcertaintythatthereexistsahighlydevelopedanimalintelligenceandaffectivity,whichinthecaseofthegreatapesincludestheacquisitionoffairlysophisticatedlanguage-learningskills.The true criteria for differentiating man and animal were to be sought

elsewhere.Rousseaucame to locate thedifference in termsofman’s libertyofaction,whathecalled‘perfectibility’–broadlyspeaking,thecapacitytoimproveoneself over the course of a lifetime; whereas the animal is guided from theoutsetby‘instinct’–is, inamannerofspeaking,perfect‘fromthestart’,frombirth. It is clear that an animal is led by an unerring instinct, common to allmembers of his species, from which it can never really deviate. It is in thisrespectthattheindividualanimalisdeprivedbothoflibertyandofthecapacityto improve itself. It is ‘programmed’bynatureand,unlikeman,cannotevolvefurther.Man,onthecontrary,hasthecapacitytoforgeapersonalhistory,whoseprogressisbydefinitionopen-endedandunlimited.Rousseau expresses these ideas in a lucid passage, which should be read

carefullybeforeproceedingfurther:

I see in every animal merely an ingenious machine to which nature hasgivensensestokeepitgoingbyitselfandtoprotectitself,uptoacertainpoint,fromeverythinglikelytodistressorannihilateit.Iseepreciselythesame things in the humanmachine, with the difference that nature alonebringseverythingtotheactivitiesofabeastwhereasmancontributestohisown,inhiscapacityasafreeagent.Thebeastchoosesorrejectsbyinstinct,meaningthatitcannotdeviatefromtheruleprescribedforit,evenwhenitmightbenefitfromdoingso,whereasmanoftendeviatesfromsuchlawstohisowndetriment.Thisiswhyapigeonwoulddieofhungernexttoadishfilledwithchoicemeatsandacatnext toaheapof fruitorgrain, thougheitherof themcouldgetnourishment from the foods itdisdains ifonly ithadthoughtoftryingthem.Thisiswhydissolutemengivethemselvesovertotheexcessesthatbringonfeversanddeath,becausethemindpervertsthesensesandthewillcontinuestospeakwhennaturefallssilent…Althoughthedifficultiessurroundingallthesequestionsleaveroomfordisagreementabout this difference betweenman and beast, there is one further highlyspecific,distinctiveandindisputablefeatureofman,namelyhisfacultyforself-improvement – a faculty that, with the help of circumstances,successivelydevelopsalltheothersandthatinmaninheresasmuchinthespeciesasintheindividual;whereasananimalattheendofafewmonthshasalreadybecomewhatitwillremainfortherestofitslife,anditsspecieswillbeat theendofa thousandyearswhat itwas in thefirstyearof thatmillennium.Whyisonlymanpronetoturnsenile?Isitnotthecasethathethusreturnstohisprimitivestateandthat,whilethebeastthathasacquired

nothingandhencehasnothingtoloseisalwaysleftwithitsinstincts,man,losingthroughageorsomeaccidentallthathis‘perfectibility’hasenabledhim to acquire, ends by sinking lower than the beast? the origin of(DiscourseontheOriginofInequality)

WhatexactlyisRousseausaying?Letusbeginwiththeexampleofthecatandthe pigeon.He is saying that animals operatewithin a framework of invisiblecodes,akindof‘software’fromwhichtheyareunabletoescape.Itisasifthepigeonistheprisonerofhisprogrammingbecauseitcanonlyeatgrain,andthecatlikewisebecauseitisacarnivore.Thereislittlepossibility,ifany,forthemtodepartfromthesescripts.Nodoubtapigeoncouldingestaverysmallquantityofmeat, and thecat couldnibbleat a fewbladesofgrass,but, all inall, theirnaturalprogrammeleavesthemalmostnoroomformanoeuvre.The human condition is very different, because he is capable of change. In

fact,hecandeviate fromall the rulesprescribed for animals.For example,hecan commitexcess: drink and smoke, to the point of killing himself,which isimpossible in nature.Or, asRousseau says in a formulawhich announces thewholeofmodernpolitics,inman‘thewillcontinuestospeakwhennaturefallssilent’. In thecaseofanimals,naturespeakscontinuallyandforcibly,somuchso,thattheanimalcandonothingbutobeythisvoice.Inman,itisacertainlackofdetermination that speaks loudest:althoughnaturedoes,ofcoursespeak,aswe are constantly reminded by biologists: we too have bodies, geneticprogramming, the rule of DNA, of the genome transmitted by our parents.Nevertheless, man can disregard these natural rules and even create a culturewhich opposes them virtually point by point – as we see in the culture ofdemocracywhichtriedtothwartthelogicofnaturalselectionsoastosecurethesafetyoftheweakest.Oneexampleof the transcendenceofhumanwillovernaturalprogramming

anditscapacityfordeviationorexcessisfarmorestriking:thephenomenonofevil. It powerfully confirms Rousseau’s argument about the anti-natural andthereforenon-animalcharacterofhumanwill.Itisasifonlymankindiscapableofbehavinginwhatmightbetermedadiabolicalmanner.But are animals not as capable of aggression and cruelty as man? At first

sight,thismightappeartrue,andonecouldgiveseveralexampleswhichanimalloversusuallyprefernot todiscuss.When Iwasachild, living in thecountry,thereweredozensofcats,whichIwouldregularlyseedestroyingtheirpreywithwhatseemedgreatcruelty:eatingmicealive,toyingforhourswithabirdwhose

wingstheyhadbroken…Butradical evil,which inRousseau’sperspective isunknown to theanimal

order anda specificallyhuman invention, is tobe foundelsewhere: it consistsnot simply of ‘doing ill’, but of adopting evil as its project, which is a quitedifferentproposition.Thecatmistreatsthemouse,butthisisnotthepurposeofitsnaturalinstincttohuntmice.Ontheotherhand,everythingsuggeststhatthehuman being is capable of consciously organising himself so as to inflict thegreatestpossibleeviluponhisneigh-bour–whattraditionaltheologydesignatesmalice:theevilspiritwithinus.Thismalice,unfortunately,seemstobeuniquetoman.Thereisanabsencein

theanimalworld, inthenaturalorder,ofanythingresemblingthephenomenonoftorture.TodayonecanvisitinGhent,inBelgium,amind-bogglingmuseum:amuseumoftorture.Here,exhibitedinglasscases,aretheappallingproductsofthe human imagination: chisels, knives, pliers, head-clamps, instruments forpullingnailsandcrushingfingers,andathousandotherdevices.Admittedly,animalsfrequentlyeateachotheralive,whichstrikesusascruel,

butevilassuchisnottheirintention,andtheirapparentcrueltystemsfromtheirindifference to the suffering of others. Even when they appear to kill ‘forpleasure’, they are only exercising their instinct.Anyonewho has owned catswill have seen them ‘torturing’ their prey, but it is because in doing so theyexerciseandperfecttheirhuntingskills.Whatseemslikecrueltyislinkedtotherelationsbetweenpredatorandprey.But the human is not subject to a rule of indifference. He commits evil

knowingly and, onoccasion, enjoys it.Contrary to the animal, thehuman canmake a conscious choice to do evil. Everything would seem to indicate thattorturegoesbeyondthelogicofanysituation.Somewouldarguethatsadismisapleasurelikeanyother,andthatitmustbeencodedsomewhereinhumannature.Butthisexplanationexplainsnothing.Itisintentionallydeceptive:asifsadismcanbe justifiedbyevoking thepleasure taken in the sufferingof another.Thereal question is the following: why is there so much gratuitous pleasure intransgression,evenwhenitservesnoend?Man tortures man for no reason, other than torture itself. Why did a Serb

militia(asnotedinonereportonwarcrimescommittedintheBalkans)forceaCroat grandfather to eat the liver of his still living grandson? Why, for thatmatter,dosomecookshappilydismemberlivefrogsandeels,whenitwouldbesimplerandmorelogicaltokillthemfirst?Thefactisthathumanstakeitoutonanimalswhenthehumanmaterialisinshortsupply,butneveronautomatathat

donotsuffer:haveyoueverseenamantakepleasureintorturingawatchorapendulumclock?Idonotbelievethereisaconvincing‘natural’explanationforcommittingevil;itseemstobelongtoanotherorderthanthatofnature.Itservesnopurpose,andisinmostcasescounter-productive.Itisthisanti-naturalvocation,thisconstantpossibilityofexcessthatweseein

the human eye: because it reflects not only nature, it can seem to express theworst; but equally, and for the same reason, the best: absolute evil or anastonishingcapacityforselflessness.ItisthisprincipleofexcessthatRousseaureferstoasliberty.

ThreeConsequencesoftheNewDistinctionbetweenManandBeast

The consequences of this redefinition ofman are enormous, and three aspectsweretohaveconsiderableconsequencesfortheethicalandpoliticalspheres.First:humans,contrarytobeasts,becomeinvestedwithwhatmightbecalled

adoublehistoricity:thereisthehistoryoftheindividual,whichisreferredtoaseducation; and there is the history of the human species, or human societies,theircultureandpolitics.Whenweconsideranimals,thecaseisquitedifferent.FromAntiquity onwards we have descriptions of ‘animal societies’, a perfectexamplebeingabeecolony.Fromthesewecandeducethattheirbehaviourhasbeen the same, exactly the same, for thousands of years: their habitat has notchangedandneitherhastheirmethodofgatheringpollen,nourishingthequeenand dividing responsibilities.Human societies change incessantly: ifwe couldtravelbackintimetwohundredyearswewouldnotrecogniseParisorLondonorNewYork.Butwewouldhavenodifficultyinrecognisingananthilloracatchasingamouse.Youmightwonder about animals learning tohuntwith theirparents. Is that

notaformofeducation?Yes,butitisashort-term‘apprenticeship’thatstopsassoonastheobjectivehasbeenattained;ahumaneducationisunlimited,endingonlywithdeath.Someanimals don’t even serve an apprenticeship; theybehave asminiature

adults from themoment of their birth. In the case of youngmarine turtles, assoonastheyemergefromtheeggtheyknowinstinctivelyhowtofindtheirwayunaided to the ocean. They are immediately able to walk, swim and eat –everythingtheyneedtosurvive.Whereasmychildrenhaveremainedhappilyathomeuntiltheirtwenties!So, Rousseau touched on an important issue when he spoke of liberty and

perfectibility.Howcanweexplainthisdifferencebetweentheyoungturtleandthe human infant if we do not accept some form of liberty. The baby turtlepossesses neither a personal history (an education) nor a political and culturalhistory,andisfromitsbirthandforalwaysdrivenbytheregimeofnature,byinstinct.Thehumanindividualcanevolveindefinitely,educatehimself‘forlife’,andembarkonapersonalhistoryofwhichnobodycansayhoworwhenitwillend.Second:Jean-PaulSartresaidthatifmanisfree,thereisthereforeno‘human

nature’, no human ‘essence’, no definition of humanity which precedes anddetermines his individual existence. In a little book, Existentialism is aHumanism,whichIwouldadviseeveryonetoread,Sartredevelopsthisideabyasserting that, in the case of man, ‘existence precedes essence’. This is pureRousseau,almostword forword.Animalshavean ‘essence’,common to theirentire species, which precedes their existence as individuals: there is a catessence,anessenceofpigeon–andthisinstinctor‘essence’iscommontotheentire species, so much so that the individual identity and existence of eachindividualiswhollydeterminedbyit:nocat,nopigeon,canswerveawayfromthisessencewhichsuppressesallindividualaction.But, with humans, the opposite is true: no essence predetermines it, no

programmecaneversucceedinentirelyhemmingitin;nosystemcanimprisonit so absolutely that it cannot emancipate itself. I amborn into a society: as aman or woman, native or immigrant, rich or poor, aristocrat or labourer, buttheseinitialcategoriesdonotdefinemefortherestofmylife.Icanbeawomanand decide not to have children; I can be born poor and underprivileged, butbecome rich; I can be born French, but adopt another language and changenationality,andsoon.Fromthisnotionthatthereisnohumannature,thatman’sexistenceprecedes

hisessence–according toSartre–wearriveatanunanswerabledebateaboutracism and sexism.What is racism?What is sexism? It is the idea that thereexists an essence exclusive to each race, or to each sex, and that individualmembers are wholly contained by it. The racist says that ‘the African ischildlike’, ‘the Jew is intelligent’, ‘theArab is lazy’; and from this use of thedefinitearticle–‘the’–weknowthatwearedealingwitharacist,someonewhobelievesthatallindividualsofthesamegroupsharethesametraits,or‘essence’.Likewiseforthesexist,whobelievesthatitispartofthe‘natural’essenceofawoman to be more emotional than intelligent, more kind-hearted thancourageous,whosedutyitistohavechildrenandstayinthekitchen.

Rousseaudestroyedthistypeofreasoningattheroot.Thehumanindividualisfree: endlessly improvable, and in no sense programmed by characteristicssupposedly linked to race or gender. Of course, the individual is born into aparticular‘situation’,butthatisnotequivalenttoasoftwareprogrammewithnomargin for manoeuvre. It is this margin, this gap, which is the distinctivepropertyofmankind,andwhichracism–‘inhuman’asitis–woulddestroyatallcost.Third:becauseheisfree,becauseheisnotimprisonedbyanynaturalcodeor

historicaldeterminant,thehumanisamoralbeingwhocanchoosefreelytoactinagoodwayoranevilway.Whowoulddreamofaccusingasharkwhohasjust eaten a surfer of acting badly?When a lorry causes an accident, it is thedriver whom we judge, not the vehicle. Neither the fish nor the vehicle areresponsiblefortheeffects,howeverharmful,theyhaveuponahumanbeing.FromRousseau’sperspectiveonemustdistanceoneselffromtherealinorder

to judgewell or poorly, just as onemust distance oneself from appearances –natural or historical – to acquire what is termed the ‘critical spirit’, withoutwhichnovaluejudgementispossible.KantoncesaidofRousseauthathewas‘the Newton of the moral universe’, in that man is unendingly torn betweenegotism and altruism, just as the Newtonian universe is pulled betweencentripetalandcentrifugalforces.Hemeantprimarilythatwithhisinventionofhumanfreedom,Rousseauwas tomodernethicswhatNewtonhadbeen to thenewphysics:apioneer,a foundingfatherwithoutwhomwewouldneverhavebeen able to free ourselves from ancient ideas regarding the cosmos and thedivineprinciple.Byidentifyingtheprincipleofadifferentiationbetweenanimalandhuman,Rousseaufinallymadepossibleanewmoralvisionoftheworld.

TheHeritageofRousseau:Manasa‘DenaturedAnimal’

In the 1953 novelYou ShallKnowThem, byVercors (the pseudonymof JeanBruller, who worked in the French Resistance), there is an interestinginterpretationofthesenotionsofRousseau.Hereisabriefsummaryoftheplot:inthe1950s,a teamofBritishscientistssetsoutforNewGuinea, insearchofthecelebrated‘missinglink’–theprimatethatlinksmanandanimal.Theyhopetodiscoversomeunknowngreatapefossilbutbysheerchancetheycomeuponanentirecolonyofevolutionary‘intermediates’,whichtheycall‘Tropis’.Theseare quadrupeds –monkeys– but they live, like the troglodytes, in caves, and,most importantly, theybury theirdead.Thisperplexesourexplorersbecause it

does not resemble any known animal custom, and theTropis seem to speak arudimentarylanguage.Wheredotheysitontheimaginaryladderbetweenthehumanandtheanimal?

Theanswertothisquestionbecomesurgentwhenanunscrupulousbusinessmanplans to domesticate the Tropis in order to make slaves of them. If they areanimalshecangetawaywithit,butiftheywereclassifiedashumanitwouldbeunacceptable,aswellasillegal.Howcanthequestionberesolved?Theheroof thenovelmakes thenecessarysacrifice:hegetsa femaleTropi

pregnant, theact itselfproving that this species is closer to thehumanspecies(biologists agree that,with rare exceptions,onlymembersof the same speciescanreproduce).Isthechildtobeclassifiedashumanoranimal?Adecisionmustbe taken, for the fatherhasdecided tokillhischild, inanattempt to force thelaw to make a decision. A legal case gets underway, which grips the entirenation,andverysoon involves theworld’spress.Themosteminentspecialistsare summoned to appear: anthropologists, biologists, palaeontologists,philosophers, theologians … All of them disagree with each other, but theirrespectiveargumentsaresopersuasive thatnonesucceeds inwinningover theothers.At last, the judge’s wife comes upwith the decisive criterion: if they bury

their dead, she argues, the Tropismust be human.And the reason is that thisritual indicates ametaphysical awareness of reality.As she expresses it to herhusband:‘Inordertoaskaquestion,onemustbetwo:theonewhoasks,andtheone who is asked. Because he is part of nature, the animal cannot questionnature.Itseemstomethatthisisthedistinctionwearelookingfor.Theanimalis one with nature; whereas man and nature make two.’ This is a perfecttranslation ofRousseau’s insight: the animal is a natural creature, andmergedcompletelywithnature;manonthecontraryisbeyondnature.This needs further refinement. Why, in these circumstances should the

criterion of distance fromnature bemore important than any other?After all,animalsdonotwearwatchesor carryumbrellas,donotdrive carsor listen toMP3s, do not smoke cigarettes or drink wine. There can be no doubting theanswer:distancefromnatureistheonlycriterionthatcountsdecisivelyonbothanethical and cultural plane: this distancemakes it possible for us to engagewith the history of culture, rather than remaining the hostages of nature. Thisdistance enables us to interrogate reality, to judge and transform theworld, toinvent ‘ideals’, to distinguish between good and evil.Without it, no moralitywouldbepossible.Ifnaturewereourcode,noethicaldecisioncouldeverhave

occurred–theTropiswouldnotevenconsiderburyingtheirdead.Whilehumanbeingsconcern themselveswith the fateof animals, trying to save thewhales,for example, have you ever known awhale show any interest in the fate of ahumanbeing,exceptinfairytales?Withthisnew‘anthropology’,thisnewdefinitionofwhatispeculiartoman,

Rousseaupreparedthewayformodernphilosophy.Andfromherethedominantsecular morality of the past two hundred years came into being: namely, theethical system of the greatest German philosopher of the eighteenth century,ImmanuelKant, the repercussions ofwhichwere to have considerable impactwithintheFrenchrepublicantradition.

KantianEthicsandtheFoundationsoftheRepublicanIdeal

ItwasKantwhoillustratedthetwomoststrikingconsequences,formorality,ofthisnewdefinitionofmanasafreeagent:first,theideathatmoralvirtueresidesinactions thataredisinterestedandnotforprivateorselfishgain;andsecond,thatthesearedirectedtowardsthecommonand‘universal’good.Thesearethetwoprincipalpillars–disinterestednessanduniversality–oftheethicsKantwasto set forth in his famousCritique of Practical Reason (1788). Theywere tobecomesogenerallyaccepted–especiallybytheFrenchrepublicans–thattheycametodefinewhatmightbetermedthemodernmorality.The trulymoral – truly ‘human’ – action (and it is significant that the two

termsbegin tooverlap)becomes first and foremost thedisinterestedaction: inother words, man’s capacity to act independently of his natural urges, whichleads him inexorably in the direction of egotism. The decision to resistegotistical temptations is described by Kant as ‘Good Will’: although I aminclined(sinceIamalsoananimal)tosatisfymypersonalinterests,Iamequallyabletoignorethemandtoactdisinterestedlyandaltruistically.What isperhapsmoststrikingabout thisnewmoralperspective–bothanti-

naturalist and anti-aristocratic (since, contrary to the distribution of naturaltalents,thetalentforfreedomissupposedlyinnateinallofus),isthattheethicalvalueof disinterestedness seems self-evident, so thatwedonot evenpause toreflectuponit.IfIdiscover,forexample,thatsomebodywhoappearskindlyandgenerous towardsme is doing so in the hope of obtaining some advantage orotherwhichtheyconcealfromme(thehopeofinheritingmyfortune,perhaps),thepresumedmoralvalueattributedtotheiractionsimmediatelydisappears.Inthesamesense,Iattributenoespecialmoralvaluetothetaxi-driverwhoagrees

totakemesomewhere,becauseIknowthathedoesitformoney.Ontheotherhand, I would be very grateful to the cabbie who picks me up, without anymotiveofself-interest,whenIamhitchingtoworkonadayoftransportstrikes.TheseexamplesallpointtowardsthesameconclusionforthenewHumanist:

thatvirtueanddisinterestedactionareinseparable.Wemustbecapableofactingfreely,withoutbeingprogrammedbyanynaturalorhistoricalcodes,toattaintothesphereofdisinterestednessandunscriptedgenerositytowardsothers.Thesecondfundamentalethicalconclusiontobederivedfromthethoughtof

Rousseauandhisdisciplesislinkeddirectlytothefirst,andconcernstheidealof the common good, on the universality of moral actions transcendingindividual private interests. The good is no longer linked solely to my ownpersonal interest, or that of my family or tribe. It does not exclude these, ofcourse,butitmustalsoaccommodatetheinterestsofothers,evenofhumanityasawhole.Here,too,thelinkwithfreedomisexplicit:natureisbydefinitionspecificand

particular;Iamamanorawoman;Ihaveaparticularbodywithitsowntastes,desires and inclinationswhich are not necessarily altruistic.Were I always tofollow my animal nature, it is likely that the common good and the generalinterestwouldhavetowaitalongtimebeforeIpaidthemanyattention.ButifIamfree,Icanresistmyanimalnature,eveninsmalldoses,becauseIdistancemyselffrommyself,inaway–Icandrawclosertoothers,enterintosolidaritywith them, and take account of their requirements. Which is, surely, theminimumconditionforamutuallyconsiderateandharmonioussharedlife.Freedom,thevirtueofdisinterestedaction(‘goodwill’),andconcernforthe

general welfare: these are the three key concepts which define the modernmorality of duty, and which Kant was to express in the form of absolutecommandments,knownascategoricalimperatives.Giventhat it isnolongeraquestionofimitatingnature,oftakingnatureasourguide,butactuallyresistingnature (and our innate egotism), it becomes clear that the achievement of thegood,ofthegeneralinterest,doesnothappenofitsownaccord,butthatonthecontraryitencountersresistance.Ifwewerenaturally inclined towards thegood, therewouldbenoneed for

absolutecommandments.Mostofthetimewehavenodifficultyinrecognisingwhatweoughttodoinordertoactwell,yetweconstantlymakeexceptions,forthe simple reason that we place ourselves before others. This is why thecategoricalimperativeinvitesusto‘makeaneffort’,toconstantlytrytoimproveourselves.

Withinthisnewmoralityisthenotionofmerit:weallhavedifficultyindoingour duty, in following the commands of morality, even as we recognise theirvalidity.Thereisthereforemeritinactingwell,inpreferringthegeneralinterestto our private interest, the common good to egoism. The reason for this issimple: while we are unequal in terms of our innate talents – strength,intelligence,beautyandsoon–intermsofmeritweareallequal.For,inKant’sperspective, it ismerely a question ofmotive, of ‘goodwill’. And this is thepropertyofallofus,strongorweak,beautifulorugly.

AristocraticandMeritocraticModels

To understand the novelty of thismodern ethos, we need to see what is newabout the meritocratic model of virtue, as opposed to older and aristocraticversions.In1755inLisbonanearthquakewipedoutseveralthousandpeopleina matter of hours. It had a devastating effect across Europe, and manyphilosophers questioned themeaning of natural catastrophes: should it be thisversionofnature,hostileandmalevolent, thatweshouldtakeforourguide,asinstructedbytheAncients?Notonlydoesnaturenolongerseemremotelygood,most of the time men find themselves having to oppose the natural order toarriveat anynotionofgood.And this is asmuch thecasewithinourselvesasaroundus.If I listen tomy inner nature, it is an uninterrupted and insistent babble of

egotismthatspeaks,urgingmetofollowmyprivateintereststothedetrimentofothers.HowcouldIforamomentimagineconnectingwiththecommongoodifI contentmyselfwith listeningexclusively to thedemandsofmyownnature?Withone’sinnernatureotherscanalwayswait.Thecrucialquestionconfrontingethicsinmodernlifeishowdoweremakea

coherentworldbetweenhumanswithoutinvolvingnature–whichisnolongeracosmos–oradivinity,whichhasnomeaningotherthanforitsfollowers?Theanswer,whichdefinesmodernhumanismethicallyasmuchaspolitically

orjuridically,isasfollows:suchaworldmustbefoundedsolelyuponthewillofmen, provided that they agree to restrain themselves, to limit themselves byacknowledgingthattheirindividualfreedommustsometimesstopwherethatofothers begins. It was only from this voluntary restriction of our desire forexpansionandconquestthatapeacefulandreciprocalrelationcouldbecreatedbetweenmen– ‘anewcosmos’, onemight say,but this time ideal rather thannatural, and socially constructed rather thanpreexisting.Kantwoulddesignate

this‘secondnature’,thisfictionofcoherencedevisedbythefreewillofhumansin the name of collective values, ‘the kingdom of ends’. In this ‘brave newworld’, the world of the will rather than of nature, humans would be treatedfinallyas ‘ends’ rather than ‘means’: asbeingspossessedofdignitywhowerenot rawmaterial in the serviceof supposedlyhigherobjectives. In the ancientworld, the human individual was no more than an atom among atoms, afragment of a far superior reality. Now, the individual was the centre of theuniverse,andthecreaturebeyondallelseentitledtoabsoluterespect.To fully understand how revolutionary Kantian morality was, it is worth

comparing it to classical ethics, specifically the notion of ‘virtue’. Ancientcommentatorscharacteristicallydefinedvirtueorexcellenceasanextensionofnature;asarealisation,moreorlessperfect,foreachbeing,ofwhatconstitutesitsnatureandtherebyindicatesits‘function’oritspurpose.Inthisgivennatureofeverybeingcouldbereaditsfinaldestiny.WhichiswhyAristotlebeginstheNicomacheanEthics by reflecting onwhat is the final purpose ofman amongother creatures: ‘For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or any artist, and, ingeneral, for all things that have a function or activity, the good and the“achieved”isthoughttoresideintheirfunction,soitwouldseemtobeforman,if he has a function.’ This being so, it would be absurd to suppose ‘that acarpenteroratannerhavecertainfunctionsandactivities,butthatmanhasnone,andisbornwithoutafunction.’(1097b25)Herewe are in the presenceof a nature that fixes the purposes ofman and

givesadirectiontoethics.ThephilosopherHansJonasnotedthat,intheancientideaofthecosmos,endsare‘domiciledinnature’,hard-wiredinnature.Whichdoesnotmeanthatintheaccomplishingofhisspecifictask,theindividualdoesnotencounterdifficulties,thathedoesnotneedtoexercisewillandthefacultiesof judgement. But it remains the case, for moral as for all other activities –learning to play a musical instrument, for example – that practice maymakebetter,butaboveallelsetalentmakesperfect.While the aristocratic order did not completely exclude a notion of the

individualwill,onlynaturalgifts could indicate theway forwardsand removetheobstacleswithwhichitwasstrewn.Thiswaswhy‘virtue’(or‘excellence’,the termsheremean the same)wasdefinedas a ‘justmeasure’, amiddlewaybetweenextremes.Intermsoffullyrealisingournaturaldestiny,itwasclearthatthiscouldonlybefoundinanintermediateposition:forexample,couragewastobefoundequidistantfromcowardiceandrecklessness,justasgoodeyesightlaybetweennear-sightednessandlong-sightedness.Thejustmeasurehadnothingto

dowithtakinga‘centrist’ormoderateposition;itwasasearchforperfection.Inthissense itcouldbesaid thatan individual realises toperfection itsnatureoressencewhenitisequallyremotefrompoleswhich,becausetheyareatthelimitoftheirdefinition,vergeuponmonstrosity.Themonstrousis thatwhich,byits‘extremism’,endsbydistortingitspropernature,anunseeingeye,forexample,orathree-leggedhorse.EarlyoninmyphilosophystudiesIhadgreatdifficultyinunderstandinghow

Aristotlecouldspeakseriouslyofahorseashavinga‘virtuous’eye.Thetextinquestion,fromtheNicomacheanEthics,perplexedme:

Wemayremark,then,thateveryvirtueorexcellencebothbringsintogoodconditionthethingofwhichitistheexcellence,andmakestheworkofthatthingtobedonewell;e.g.theexcellenceoftheeyemakesboththeeyeandits works good; for it is by the excellence of the eye that we see well.Similarlytheexcellenceofthehorsemakesahorsebothgoodinitselfandgood at running and at carrying its rider and awaiting the attack of theenemy.’(1106a15)

I could not see what the notion of ‘virtue’ con tributed to this case. In anaristocratic perspective, however, such a proposition held no mystery: the‘virtuous’individualisnotonewhoattainsacertainexcellencethankstoopenlyacknowledgedeffort,butonewhofunctionswell,evenexcellently,accordingtothe nature and purposes which are innately his. And this principle applies tothings and animals as much as to humans whose happiness is linked to thisaccomplishingofself.Attheheartofsuchanethicalvision,thequestionoflimitsthusreceivesits

‘objective’solution:itisintheorderofthings,intherealityofthecosmos,thatwe must seek instruction; just as a physiologist seeking to understand thefunctionoforgansandlimbssimultaneouslyrecognisesthelimitswithinwhicheachexercisesitsfunction.Justaswewouldnotexchangealiverforakidney,without injury, each of us in society must find his proper place and confinehimselftoit;otherwisethelawwillintervenetorestoreorderandharmony,andrender–inthefamousformulaofRomanlaw–‘toeachhisown’.The difficulty, for us nowadays, is that such a ‘cosmic’ reading became

impossible;forlackofacosmostointerpretandforlackofanaturetodecipher.Onecould thereforedescribe thecardinaldistinctionbetweenthecosmologicalethics of the Ancients and the meritocratic, individualist ethics of republican

Moderns, beginning with the anthropology of Rousseau, as follows: for theAncients,virtue,understoodasexcellenceofitskind,isnotopposedtonature;itisnoneotherthanthesuccessfulfulfilmentofanindividual’snaturalaptitudes.For the philosophies of human freedom,most notably forKant, virtue takes adifferentform,asthestruggleforreleasefromwhatisnaturalwithinourselves.Ournature inclinesusnaturally to egotism, and if Iwish togive a place to

others, if Iwish to attunemy freedom tobeing in accordwith the freedomofothers,Imustmakeaneffort–orrestrainmyself–anditisonthesetermsalonethataneworderofpeacefulcoexistencebetweenindividualsbecomespossible.Hereisthefutureofvirtue,nolongerinthefulfilmentofawell-endowednaturalself. It is throughtheexerciseofanewvirtuealone thatanewcosmos,aneworderofthings,becomespossible;onefoundedonmanandnotonapreexistingcosmosoradivinity.On the political plane, this new order of things was to display three

characteristicfeatures,directlyopposedtothearistocraticworldoftheAncients:categoricalequalityofstatus, individualismand theassignationofvalue to theideaofwork.Ifwe identifyvirtuewithnatural endowments, all individuals arenot equal.

Fromthisperspective,itislogicaltocreateanaristocraticorder,inotherwordsanunequalworld; not just anatural hierarchyofbeings, but one inwhich thebestareontopandtherestbelow.But, ifwelocatevirtue infreedom–ratherthaninnature–allindividualsareequal,anddemocracybecomesinevitable.Individualism is a consequence of this reasoning. For the Ancients, the

cosmos is infinitely more significant than its constituent parts. This can bedescribed as ‘holism’, deriving from theGreekholos (‘all’, ‘everything’). FortheModerns,thereisnolongeranythingsacredabouttheAll,sincethereisnolongeranydivinelyordainedandharmoniouscosmoswithinwhichwemustfindourplace.Onlytheindividualcounts:wenolongerhavetherighttosacrificetheindividualinordertomaintaintheuniversal(theAll),forthelatterisnolongeranythingotherthananaggregateofindividuals,withinwhicheachhumanbeingremains‘anendinhimself’.So, the term individualism is far from meaning egotism, as is commonly

thought; on the contrary, it is the birth of a moral sphere within whichindividuals–persons–arevaluedbytheircapacitytobreakfreeofthelogicoftheirnaturalegoism,inordertoconstructaman-madeethicaluniverse.Finally,inthesameperspective,workbecomesthedefiningactivityofman:a

human being who does not work is not merely poor – without income – but

impoverished, in that he cannot realisehispotential andhispurposeonEarth.Hisaimistocreatehimselfbyremakingtheworld,totransformitintoabetterplacebythesheerforceofhis‘goodwill’.Inthearistocraticworld-view,workwasconsideredtobeadefect,aservileactivity–literally,reservedforslaves.Inthe modern world-view, it becomes an arena for self-realisation, a means notmerelyofeducatingoneselfbutalsooffulfilmentandimprovement.Wehave seenhowmodern scienceexploded thevery ideaof acosmos and

obedience to divine injunctions, and how ancient systems ofmorality ran intodifficulties.Thenewdefinitionofmanproposedbymodernhumanism–notablybyRousseau–preparedthewayforthebirthofanewmorality,beginningwiththatofKantandFrenchrepublicanism.I began my account of modern philosophy with Rousseau and Kant –

eighteenth-century philosophers – whereas the true rupture with antiquityoccurredintheseventeenthcentury,specificallywithDescartes.Descartesisthetruefounderofmodernphilosophy,anditisimportantthatwehavesomeideaofthereasonswhyherepresentsbothapointofruptureandapointofdeparture.

TheOriginofModernPhilosophy

Cogito ergo sum – ‘I think therefore I am’ – is one of the most universallycelebrated and significant of philosophical utterances, and rightly so, since itdrawsalineinthehistoryofWesternthought,andinauguratesanewepoch;thatof modern humanism, at the centre of which is what we shall refer to as‘subjectivity’.Whatexactlydowemeanbysubjectivity?Atthestartofthischapter,wesawhowtheversesofJohnDonne(‘’Tisallin

pieces, all coherence gone’) epitomised the state of mind of an age ofuncertainty,inwhicheverythinghadtobereconstructed:atheoryofknowledge,anewethicsand,perhapsmostofall,adoctrineofsalvation.Forthis,anewfirstprinciplewas required,whichwasneithercosmos nordivinity.Thiswas tobenoneotherthanman,or,asthephilosopherswouldsay,the‘subject’.ItwasDescarteswho‘invented’thisnewfirstprinciple,priortoitsapplication

byRousseauandKant.ItwasDescarteswhotransformedthedoubtlinkedtothedisappearance of ancient certainties into a formid able tool for reconstructingfromscratchtheentireedificeofphilosophicalthought.Inhistwofundamentalworks,TheDiscourseonMethod (1637)andtheMeditations(1641),Descartesconceives,undervariousguises,aformofphilosophicalfiction(or‘method’,ashe terms it).He forceshimself tocall intoquestioneachandeveryoneofhis

ideas,withoutexception,eventhemostsettledandself-evidenttruths;suchas,forexample,theexistenceofobjectsoutwithmyself,thatIamseatedonachairetc. In order to be certain about doubting all certaintieswithout exception, heeven imagines the hypothesis of an ‘evil genie’ who amuses himself bydeceivingDescartesaboutabsolutelyeverything.Descartes adopts an attitude of total scepticism, taking nothing on trust…

except that, at the end of the day, there does remain a certitudewhich resistseverythingandvigorouslystandsitsground,aconvictionthatholdsgoodundereventhemostextremedoubt.Andthisisthecertitudethat,accordingtowhichifIamthinkingthesethings,eveninastateofuncertainty,Imyselfmustthereforebesomethingthatexists!ItmaywellbethecasethatIamcontinuallymakingerrors, that allmy ideas are false, that I am permanently deceived by an evilgenie–but inorderformetobedeceived,or todeceivemyself, Imustat theveryleastbesomethingthatexists!Aconvictionremainsthatisresistanttoalldoubt,howevergeneral,anditisthecertaintyofmyownexistence.Fromwhichcomes the formulawithwhichDescartes concludeshis investigations: ‘I thinkthereforeIam’.The experience of radical doubt whichDescartes depicts – andwhichmay

strike you initially as outlandish – offers three new ideas, which make theirappearance for the first time in the history of thought.These three ideasweredestined for a remarkableposterity and theyareof fundamental importance tomodernphilosophy.First: each timeDescartes stages a newdramaof doubt, it is notmerely an

intellectual game; it aims to arrive at a newdefinition of truth.By examiningcloseup,andwithscrupulouscare,theonlycertaintywhichcategoricallyresistsevery challenge– thecogito, in effect – hewill arrive eventually at a reliabletruth-criterion.We can even say that this method of reasoning will lead to adefinition of truth as thatwhich resists doubt, as that ofwhich the individualsubject canhaveabsolute certainty.Thusa stateof subjective consciousness–certainty–becomesnothing less than thenewcriterionof truth.And thiswillgive you an idea of how central the category of subjectivity becomes for theprojectofModernity. It ishenceforthexclusively in termsof the ‘subject’ thatthesurestmeasureoftruthistobefound(whereastheAncientsdefinedtruthinobjectiveterms;forexample,whenIsayitisnight,thispropositionistrueifandonlyifitcorrespondstoobjectivereality,tothefactsthemselves,whetherIamcertainofmyselfornot).Ofcourse,thesubjectivecriterionofcertaintywasnotunknown to theAncients– it isdiscussed in thedialoguesofPlato–butwith

Descartesitwastotakeonaprimordialauthorityandoverrideallothercriteria.Second:evenmoredecisively,inpoliticalandhistoricalterms,wastheideaof

the‘tabula rasa’– theabsolute rejectionofallpreconceptionsandall inheritedbeliefs deriving from tradition.Byputting indoubt all received ideas,withoutdistinction,Descartesat a stroke invented themodernnotionofrevolution. Asthenineteenth-centurypoliticalthinkerandhistorianAlexisdeTocquevillewastoremark,themenwhostartedtheFrenchRevolutionof1789,andwhowerefertoas the‘Jacobins’,were infact‘Cartesians’whohadleftschoolandtakentothestreets.Onecouldsaythattherevolutionariesrepeatedinthehistoricalandpolitical

spherewhatDescarteshadinitiatedinthesphereofabstractthought.Thelatterdeclared that all past beliefs, all ideas inherited from family or state, orindoctrinated from infancy onwards by ‘authorities’ (masters, priests)must becastindoubt,andexaminedincompletefreedombytheindividualsubject.Healoneiscapableofdecidingbetweentrueandfalse.Inthesameway,theFrenchrevolutionaries declared that we must cast aside all the paraphernalia of theAncien Regime; as one of them, Rabaut Saint-Etienne, declared, in a wholly‘Cartesian’maximwhichcametostandoutasamilestone,theRevolutioncouldbeencapsulatedinasinglesentence:‘Ourhistoryisnotourdestiny.’Just because we have lived since time immemorial in a regime that is an

aristocracyandamonarchy,withestablishedprivilegesandinequalities,wearenot for ever obliged to continue doing so.Nothing compels us to continue toobserve traditions for ever.On the contrary,when theyarenotgood,wemustrejectthemandchangethem.Wemustknowhowto‘makeablankslateofourpast’ in order to create from scratch – just asDescartes, having cast all priorbeliefs indoubt, undertook the total reconstructionofphilosophyupona solidbasis:namelyanimmovablecertitude,thatofasubjectwhotakesresponsibilityforhimself,andwhotrustshenceforthtohimselfalone.Inbothcases–withDescartesaswiththerevolutionariesof1789–thehuman

subject becomes the foundation of all thought, and the agent of all change:through the decisive experiment of the cogito, the democratic and egalitarianabolition of the privileges of the Ancien Regime and the (entirelyunprecedented)declarationoftheequalityofallmen.Note that there is a direct link between the two ideas above; between the

definitionoftruthascertitudeofthesubjectandthefoundingofarevolutionaryideology. If wemustmake a tabula rasa of the past and subject to the mostrigorousprocessofdoubt all thoseopinions,beliefs andpreconceptionswhich

havenotundergoneminuteexamination,thisisbecauseitispropertobelieve,to‘admit to credence’ (in Descartes’ words) only that of which we can beabsolutelycertaininourownminds.Fromwhichalsoproceedsanewversionofnature, founded on individual conscience rather than tradition, of a uniquecertitudewhichcompelsrecognitionbeforeallotherkinds:thatoftheindividualsubject in his relation to himself. Thus it is no longer belief or faith whichenablesustoreachanultimate(Christian)truth,butawarenessofself.Third, an idea whose unprecedented revolutionary power in the age of

Descartesishardforusnowtoimagine:wherebywemustrejectall‘argumentsfrom authority’. The expression ‘arguments from authority’ means all beliefswithaclaimtoabsolute truth imposedexternallyby institutionsendowedwithpowersthatwehavenorighttodispute:family,schoolmasters,priestsandsoon.For example, if the Church decrees that the Earth is not round and does nottravelaroundtheSun,youmustdolikewise,andifyourefuse,yourunahighriskofendingupburnedatthestakeorbeingcompelledtoconfesspubliclythatyouareinthewrong,likeGalileo,evenifyouareentirelyintheright.ItistheseargumentsfromauthoritythatDescartesabolished,withhisradical

doubt.With his invention of the ‘critical spirit’, freedomof thought, he is therightfulfounderofmodernphilosophy.Theideathatonemustacceptanopinionbecause it is maintained by external authority, of whatever kind, became sorepugnant to theModern spirit as virtually to defineModernity. It is true,wesometimes extend our trust to a person or an institution, but the gesture hasceased to have any of its traditional meaning: if I agree to follow another’sjudgement, it is because I have formulated good reasons for doing so, notbecausethisotherimposesitsauthorityexternallywithoutmyassent.I hope that you can now grasp a little more clearly how one can say that

modernphilosophyisaphilosophyof‘thesubject’–ahumanism–withmanatthecentreofeverything.And, finally, a fewwordsabout thenewdoctrinesofsalvation: in the absence of a cosmos or aGod, according to strict humanismprinciples,theideaofsalvationwouldseemvirtuallyunthinkable.Itisdifficulttoseewhereanynotionofsalvationmightrest,inordertocircumventthefearofdeath.Sodifficult,infact,that,formanypeople,thequestionofsalvationwastovanish completely. Or it became confused with the question of ethics. Thisconfusion is so frequent, even today, that I shall attempt to dispel it beforeembarkingonthemodernresponsestotheancientquestionofsalvation.

FromEthicalQuestionstotheQuestionofSalvation

Toreducetotheiressentialsthesenewideas,wecoulddefinesecularmoralityasanensembleofvalues,expressedbyobligationsandimperatives,whichaskusto pay a minimum of respect to others without which a shared and peacefulcoexistencebecomes impossible.Whatour societies–whichmakean idealoftherightsofman–askustorespectinothersistheirdignityasourequals,theirrighttofreedom,notablyfreedomofopinion,andtheirrighttowellbeing.Thisis described in the famous maxim, ‘My freedom stops where that of anotherbegins’.No one can doubt that moral laws should be indispensable and rigorously

applied,for in theirabsenceawarofeveryoneagainsteveryoneelsebegins toloomonthehorizon.Suchlawsappearthereforetobethenecessaryconditionofthat peaceful coexistencewhich favours the emergence of a democratic order.Theyarenotsufficient inthemselves,however,andIaimtoconvinceyouthatethicalprinciples,howeverprecioustheymaybe,havenopurchasewhatsoeveron the great existential questions that were formerly taken care of by thedoctrinesofsalvation.Iwouldlikeyoutoimaginethatyouownamagicwandwhichallowsyouto

arrangematters so that everyone in the world today begins to observe to theletter the idealof respect forothersembodied inhumanistprinciples.Supposethat, everywhere in the world, the rights ofmanwere scrupulously observed,witheveryonepayingrespecttothedignityofeveryoneelseandtheequalrightofeachindividualtopartakeofthosefamousfundamentalrightsoffreedomandhappiness. We can hardly begin to comprehend the unprecedented revolutionthatsuchanattitudewouldintroduceintoourlivesandcustoms.Therewouldbenowarsormassacres,nogenocideorcrimesagainsthumanity.Therewouldbean end to racism and xenophobia, to rape and theft, to domination and socialexclusion, and the institutionsof controlorpunishment–police, army,courts,prisons –would effectively disappear. So,morality counts for something, andthisexercisesuggeststhedegreetowhichitisessentialtoourcommonlife;and,atthesametime,howfarweactuallyarefromitsrealisation.Yet, suchamiraclewouldnotpreventus fromgettingold, from lookingon

helplesslyaswrinklesandgreyhairsappear,fromfallingill,fromexperiencingpainfulseparations,fromknowingthatwearegoingtodieandwatchingthosewelovedie.Intheend,nothingwillsaveusfromgettingboredandfindingthateverydaylifelackszest.Evenwerewesaints,immaculateapostlesoftherights

of man and the republican ethos, nothing would guarantee us a fulfilledemotionallife.Literatureteemswithexamplesofhowthelogicofmoralityandthatofloveobeycontradictoryprinciples.Goodmoralshaveneversavedanyonefrombeingdeceivedorabandoned.UnlessIammuchmistaken,noneofthelovestoriesrecountedintheclassicnovelsproceedfromhumanitarianmotives.Iftheimplementation of the rights of man makes possible a peaceful coexistence,theserightsdonotofthemselvesgivemeaningorpurposeordirectiontohumanexistence.Thisiswhy,inmodernlifeasintheancientworld,itwasnecessarytodevise

something–beyondmorality–totaketheplaceofadoctrineofsalvation.Thedifficulty is that, in the absence of a cosmos or a God, it becomes especiallydifficulttothinkthisthrough.Howdoweconfrontthefragilityandfinitenessofhumanexistence,themortalityofallthingsinthisworld,intheabsenceofanyprincipleexternal toandhigher thanhumanity?This is theproblemwhich themoderndoctrinesofsalvationhavetriedtosolve–forbetterorworse–and,ithastobeadmitted,usuallyfortheworse.

TheEmergenceofModernSpirituality

Toreachthispoint,theModernsturnedintwomaindirections.Thefirst–IwillnothidethefactthatIhavealwaysfounditfaintlyridiculous,butithasacquiredsuchpredominanceover two centuries thatwe cannot ignore it – arewhatwemightcall the‘religionsofearthlysalvation’,notablyscientism,patriotismandcommunism. Unable to continue believing in God, the Moderns inventedsubstitute-religions,godlessspiritualitiesor,tobeblunt,ideologieswhich,whileusually professing a radical atheism, cling to notions of giving meaning tohuman existence, or at least justifyingwhywe should die for them. From thescientismofJulesVernetothecommunismofMarx,passingviathenineteenthcentury’sbrandofpatriotism,thesegrandhuman–alltoohuman–utopiashaveallatleastsharedthemerit(albeitadoomedmerit)ofattemptingtheimpossible:resuscitatinggreatnotionswithoutsteppingoutsidetheframeofhumanity–astheGreeksdidwiththeircosmosortheChristianswiththeirGod.Herearethreeways of saving one’s life, or justifying one’s death, which come to the samething,bysacrificingitforanoblercause:whetherthatmeanstherevolution,thehomelandorthetruthsofscience.Withthesethree‘idols’,asNietzschewouldtermthem,theessentialsoffaith

wererescued:toconsecrateandifnecessarysacrificeone’slifetoanidealwas

topreservetheconvictionofbeing‘saved’.Togiveagrotesqueexample,IwillquotealowpointfromthehistoryoftheFrenchpress.ItconcernsanarticleinFrance nouvelle, the weekly organ of the communist party, published on themorningafterthedeathofStalin.StalinwasthentheheadoftheSovietUnion,thepopeofworldcommunism,sotospeak,andconsideredbythefaithfulasahero,despitehiscrimes.On14March1953 theFrenchCommunistPartycomposed thenewspaper’s

frontpage in terms thatseemtoday incredible,butwhichcaptureperfectly theabidingly religious idea of death at the heart of a doctrinewhich neverthelesssawitselfasradicallymaterialistandatheist.Hereisthetext:

TheheartofStalin,illustriouscomrade-in-armsandrenownedsuccessorofLenin, the chief, the friend, thebrother ofworkers everywhere and in allcountries,hasceasedbeating.ButStalinismliveson,andisimmortal.Thesublimenameoftheinspiredmasterofworldcommunismwillshinewithblazingclarityacross thecenturiesand shall for everbepronouncedwithlove by a grateful humanity. To Stalin we shall remain faithful forevermore. Communists everywhere will endeavour to deserve, by theiruntiringdevotiontothesacredcauseoftheworkingclass…thehonorarytitle of Stalinists. Eternal glory to the great Stalin, whose masterly andimperishable scientific works shall help us to rally the majority ofhumanity.(Francenouvelle,14March1953)

Asyoucansee,thecommunistidealwassopowerful,so‘sacred’inthewordsoftheotherwiseentirelyatheisteditorialofFrancenouvelle,thatitdefeateddeathitself, and justified laying down one’s life without fear or remorse. It is noexaggeration to say that here was a new version of the doctrine of salvation.Even today, as a last vestige of this religionwithout Gods, there are nationalanthems which extend this hope to their citizens, provided that they sacrificetheirdestinyasindividualstothehighercause,since‘todieforthehomelandistoenterintoeternity’.Ofcourse,wecanalsofindon therightof thepoliticalspectrumequivalent

formsofpatriotismwhichgobythenameof‘nationalism’–thenotionthatitisworthwhiletolaydownone’slifeforthenationofwhichoneisamember.In a style that is fairly close to communism and nationalism, scientism

furnisheditsfollowerswithreasonsforlivinganddying.IfyouhaveeverreadJules Verne, you will recall the degree to which ‘scientists, explorers and

builders’(astheyusedtobecalledwhenIwasatprimaryschool)areconvincedthatbydiscoveringanunknownlandoranewscientificlaw,orbyinventingamachineforexploringtheskyorthesea,theyareinscribingtheirnamesintheeternityofhistoricalprogressandtherebyjustifyingtheirentireexistence.Goodforthem.I remarkeda fewpagesearlier that Ihavealwaysfound thesenewreligions

absurd–sometimesgrosslyso.Communismandnationalismcausedthedeathsofmanypeople, it is true, but it is also their naivety that disconcertsme.Theevidencesuggeststhatsalvationoftheindividuallifeisnotthesamethingasthesalvation of humanity as a whole. Even if we devote ourselves to a ‘higher’cause, in theconviction that the ideal is infinitelysuperior to the individual, itremainstruethatintheenditistheindividualwhosuffersanddies.Facedwiththeentirelypersonalnatureofdeath,communismornationalismorscientism(orany otherisms we might substitute for them) strike me as desperately emptyabstractions.Asthegreat‘postmodern’thinker,Nietzschewastoask:isnotthepassionfor

‘grand designs’ that are supposedly superior to the mere individual, superioreventolifeitself,merelythefinalruseofthosereligionsthatwehopedwehadleftbehind?Andyet,howeverderisorytheselast-ditchattemptsatadoctrineofsalvationmay seem, they representednonetheless a revolution of considerablescale. For what was hatched by these false religions and their platitudes wasnothinglessthanthesecularisationorhumanisingoftheworld.Intheabsenceofcosmicor religious firstprinciples,humanitycame tobeendowedwith sacredproperties.Afterall,noonecandenythathumanityinitsglobalaspectis,inasense,superiortothesumoftheindividualswhocomposeit,justasthegeneralinterest must in principle prevail over that of individuals. This is clearly thereasonwhy these new godless doctrines of salvation succeeded in convincingandconvertingsomany.Butmodernphilosophyalsosucceeded,andfarmoreprofoundly, inarriving

atadifferentwayofformulatingthequestionofsalvation.It was Kant, in the wake of Rousseau, who first launched the notion of

‘enlargedthought’tomakesenseofhumanlife.EnlargedthoughtwasforKanttheoppositeofanarrow-mindedspirit;itwasawayofthinkingwhichmanagedtodisregardthesubjectiveprivateconditionsoftheindividuallifesoastoarriveat an understanding of others. To give a simple example, when you learn aforeign language you come to establish somedistance both fromyourself andfromyourparticularpointoforigin– thatofbeingEnglish, for example.You

enterintoalargerandmoreuniversalsphere,thatofanotherculture,and,ifnotadifferent humanity, at least a different community from that to which youbelongedformerly,andwhichyouarenowlearningnottorenouncebuttoleavebehind. By uprooting ourselves from our original situation, we partake of agreater humanity. By learning another language, we can communicate with agreaternumberofhumanbeings,andwealsodiscover,throughlanguage,otherideasandotherkindsofhumour,otherformsofexchangewithindividualsandwith theworld.Youwidenyourhorizonandpushback thenaturalconfinesofthespiritthatistetheredtoitsimmediatecommunity–thisbeingthedefinitionoftheconfinedspirit,thenarrowmind.Beyond the particular example of languages, the whole realm of human

experience is open to you. If to know is to love, then it is also true that byenlarging your horizons and improving yourself, you enter a dimension ofhumanexistencewhich‘justifies’lifeandgivesitameaningandadirection.What is thepurposeof‘growingup’,wearesometimes tempted toask,and

whatideacouldsaveus?Let’ssaythatitatleastgivesasensetothebusinessoffacingdeath,andweshallreturntothis‘enlarged’thoughtlater,tofleshitoutasitdeserves,and togiveyouabetter ideaofhow it tookover from theancientdoctrines of personal salvation. But for the moment we must pass throughanotherstage:thatof‘deconstruction’–thecritiqueofpreexistingconstructionsof theworld, their illusionsandnaiveties.Andat thispointNietzscheenters–themasterofsuspicion,themostabrasivethinker–amanwhomarkedaturningpoint,philosophicallyspeaking,forallthatcameafterwards.Itistimeforustounderstandwhythiswasthecase.

Chapter5Postmodernity:TheCaseofNietzsche

Incontemporaryphilosophy,wecall ‘postmodern’ those ideaswhich, fromthemid-nineteenth century, were to set about dismantling the humanist creed ofmodernity, inparticular thephilosophyof theEnlightenment. In the samewaythatthelatterbrokewiththegrandcosmologiesofAntiquityandbroughtaboutanewcritiqueofreligion,sotoopostmodernitywastosetaboutdemolishingthetwostrongestconvictionsoftheModernsfromtheseventeenthtothenineteenthcenturies: the belief that the human individual is at the centre of theworld –whichcametoformthebasisofallmoralandpoliticalvalues;andthebeliefthatreasonisanirresistibleforceforemancipationandthat,thankstotheprogressof‘Enlightenment’,wearegoingtobecomeeverfreerandhappier.Postmodernphilosophycontestedbothof these ideas. Itwas toofferboth a

critiqueofhumanismandacritiqueofrationalism.And,withoutanydoubt,itiswithNietzschethatpostmodernityarrivedatitszenith.Whilethereremainmanyreservations concerning Nietzsche, the radical aspect and the violence of hisassaultupontheidolsofmodernityareequalledonlybythegeniuswithwhichhewasabletomarshallhisforces.But–asthegreatcontemporaryphilosopherHeideggerasked–whythisneed

topulldownor‘deconstruct’whatmodernhumanismhadtakensomuchtroubletoerect?Whyturnyetagainfromonevisionoftheworldtoanother?OnwhatgroundsdidthegainsoftheEnlightenmentcometoseeminsufficientorillusory;what reasons could seem important enough to provokemodern philosophy towantto‘goevenfurther’?Theanswer isquite simple, ifwestick toessentials.Modernphilosophy,as

wehaveseen,haddeposedthecosmosandturneditsbackonreligiousauthority,replacingthemwithreasonandindividualfreedom;thedemocraticandhumanistideal of moral value founded upon man’s humanity to man – based on whatmademandifferent as a species fromall other animals.However, aswehave

also seen, this was achieved on the basis of radical doubt introduced byDescartes. In otherwords, bymaking the critical spirit ‘sacred’, a freedomofthought which went so far as to make a tabula rasa of the entire past, itsintellectuallegacyandtraditions.Sciencewasitselfsothoroughlyimbuedwiththis spirit that nothing could stop it in its quest for truth. Like the sorcerer’sapprenticewhounleashes forceswhich soonescapehis control,Descartes andtheEnlightenmentphilosophersunleashedacriticalspiritwhich,onceinmotioncould not be stopped, somewhat like an acid that continues to eat into thematerialswithwhichitcomesincontact,evenafterwaterhasbeenthrownoverit.As we have seen, modern science, the fruit of the critical spirit and of

scientific method, laid waste to the preceding cosmologies and greatlyweakened,initiallyatleast,thefoundationsofreligiousauthority.Thisisafact.Evenso,aswesawattheendoftheprecedingchapter,humanismwasfarfromdismantling the underlying religious assumptions: the opposition between thehereandthehereafter,ofparadiseasopposedtoearthlyreality,or,ifyouprefer,of the ideal set against the real. This is why, inNietzsche’s eyes, even if therepublicanswhoinherited themantleofEnlightenmentpronouncedthemselvesatheists,ormaterialists,theycontinuedineffecttobebelievers!Not,ofcourse,inthesensethattheystillprayedtoGod,butinthesensethattheyreveredtheirnewillusions,sincetheycontinuedtobelievethatcertainvaluesweresuperiortolifeitselfandthatwemusttransformrealitytomakeitconformtohigherideas:therightsofman,science,reason,democracy,socialism,equalopportunityandsoon.Nowthisvisionremainsfundamentallytheological,evenifitdoesnotrealise

the fact and thinks of itself as revolutionary or anti-religious. Briefly, topostmodern eyes, and for Nietzsche above all, Enlightenment humanismremained a prisoner of the underlying religious structures. Which is whymodernitywasgoing tohave toendure thesamecritique that ithadunleasheduponthesupportersofcosmologiesandreligiousbeliefsystems.In thepreface toEcceHomo, one of his rareworkswhich takes an overtly

confessionalform,Nietzschedescribeshisphilosophicalattitudeintermswhichdescribe perfectly his rupture with modern humanism. The latter was stillproclaimingitsbeliefinprogress,itsconvictionthatthediffusionofscienceandtechnology would bring happier days and that history and politics must beshapedbyanideal.Thiswaspreciselythetypeofbelief,thisgodlessreligion,or– asNietzsche expresses it in his very idiosyncratic vocabulary – the type of

‘idol’whichheproposedtodeconstruct,by‘philosophisingwithahammer’.Letuslistentohimforamoment:

Improvemankind?ThatisthelastthingthatIofallpeoplewillpromisetodo.Don’texpectnewidolsfromme;lettheoldidolslearnwhatitcoststohavefeetofclay.Tooverthrowidols–mywordfor‘ideals’–thatratherismybusiness.Realityhaslostitsvalue,itsmeaning,itsveracity,andanidealworld has been fabricated to take its place … The lie of the ideal hashithertobeenthecurseonreality,throughwhichmankinditselfhasbecomemendacious and false down to its deepest instincts – to the point ofworshiping the opposite values to those which alone could guarantee itprosperity,afuture,theexaltedrighttoafuture.(EcceHomo)

It is no longer a case therefore of piecing together or reconstituting a humanworld, Kant’s ‘realm of ends’, where men are at last equal in dignity. Topostmodern eyes, democracy, whatever content it is assigned, is merely onemorereligious illusionamongothers;oneof theworst, infact,since itusuallydissimulates itself under the appearance of a break with the religious world,pretendingtoafree‘laicity’(thestateofbeingofthepeople,notmembersoftheclergy).Nietzscheneverceasestoreturntothis,withthegreatestlucidity,asinthispassagefromBeyondGoodandEvil:

We who hold to a different belief – we who consider the democraticphenomenontobenotmerelyadecadentformofpoliticalorganisation,butadecadent (that is to say,diminished) formof thehumanbeing,one thatreduceshimtomediocrityanddebaseshisvalue–wherearewetopinourhopes?

Not on democracy, clearly! It is undeniable: Nietzsche is wholly againstdemocracy,and,unfortunately,itisnotentirelybychancethathewastakenupbytheNazisasoneoftheirinspirations.ButifwewanttounderstandNietzsche,beforecondemninghim,wemustgofurther:ifheabhorredidealsassuch,ifhewanted to smash the idols of modernity with his philosophical hammer, it isbecausetheyallderivefromanegationoflife,fromwhathetermed‘nihilism’.Before advancing further, we need to understand this central tenet in

Nietzsche’s deconstruction of modern moral and political utopias. It wasNietzsche’sconvictionthatallideals,whetherexplicitlyreligiousornot,whether

coming from the right or the left, conservative or progressive, spiritualist ormaterialist, possessed the same configuration and the same purpose:fundamentally,theyarealltheproductofatheologicalworld-view,becausetheyall persisted in assuming a hereafter that is better than the here and now, inoffering values supposedly superior and external to life itself; or, inphilosophicalterms,valuesthatare‘transcendental’.InNietzsche’seyes,suchafabricationwasalwaysanimated,covertlyofcourse,by‘wickedintentions’;itstruepurposebeingnottohelphumanity,butonlytojudgeandfinallycondemnlifeitself;todenyactualtruthinthenameoffalserealities,insteadofacceptingtherealasitis.ThisnegationoftherealinthenameoftheidealwaswhatNietzschemeant

by ‘nihilism’. Thanks to this fiction of supposed ideals and utopias,we placeourselvesbeyondreality,beyondlife,whereastheheartofNietzsche’sthoughtisthatthereisnotranscendence,thatalljudgementonlifeisasymptom,aproductoflife,andcanneversituateitselfoutsideoflife.Ifyoucangraspthis,nothingcanholdyoubackfromreadinghim:thatthereisnothingoutsidethisreality,nobeyond,noabove,neitherinheavenorinhell;andallthefineidealsofpolitics,ethicsandreligionaremerely‘idols’,metaphysicalprojections,fablesthatturntheirbackonlifepriortoturningagainstlife.Youcanseewhypostmodernphilosophywasdestined inevitably tocriticise

the Moderns as being excessively in thrall to religious utopia. The Modernsinventedthecriticalspirit,thepracticeofdoubt,theluciditiesofreason…onlyfor all theweapons essential to their armoury to be turned against them. Theprincipalpostmodernthinkers,Nietzscheofcourse,butalsotovaryingdegreesMarx and Freud, have been justly described as ‘masters of suspicion’: theirpurpose is todeconstruct the illusionswithwhichclassical humanismdeludeditself.Thesephilosophersadoptedasafirstprinciplethesixthsensethat,behindthecurtainoftraditionalbeliefsand‘goodold-fashionedvalues’whichpretendtobeauty,truthandtranscendence,lurksalwaysconcealedinterests,unconsciouschoices, and deeper (for the most part inadmissible) truths. As withpsychoanalysis, postmodern philosophy learnt above all else to distrust self-evidence, received ideas; to look behind, above and sideways if necessary tobringtolightthehiddenagendaswhichunderpinallvalues.ThisiswhyNietzschedislikesgrandsolutions,and‘consensus’,andwhyhe

prefers shortcuts, sidelines, contention. Like the founding figures ofcontemporaryart,suchasPicassoorSchoenberg,Nietzscheisanavant-gardist,someonewhointendsabovealltoinnovateandmakeacleansweepofthepast.

Whatwastodefinethepostmodernmood,aboveallelse,wasitsirreverence,itsimpatiencewithfinesentimentsandbourgeoisvalues:everyonewhoprostratedthemselves before scientific truth, reason, Kantian morality, democracy,socialism,republicanism.Theavant-gardists,withNietzscheinthelead,tookitupon themselves to smash everything, so as to expose to full viewwhat wasconcealed behind. They were, you might say, hooligans (albeit sophisticatedones)! As far as theywere concerned, humanism had lost all its creative anddestructiveenergies:thisattitudeexplainstheradicalism,thebrutalityandeventhe more frightening aspects of postmodern philosophy. Yes, we mustacknowledgewithoutcontentionthatitisnoaccidentthatNietzschebecamethecultphilosopheroftheNazis,inthewaythatMarxbecamesoforStalinistsandMaoists. However, Nietzsche’s thought, intolerable at times, is also inspired.Onemightnotsharehisideas–onemightevendetestsomeofthem–butonecannot think in the same way after reading his work. This is a sure sign ofgenius.Toindicatetheprincipalfeaturesofhisphilosophy,Ishallcontinuetofollow

thethreegrandaxesofenquirytowhichwehavebecomeaccustomed:theoria,praxis,anddoctrineofsalvation.SomeadmirersofNietzschebelievethatitispointlesstotryandfindanything

asorganisedasa theoria in thewritingsofonewhowasbeyondallothers thedestroyerofrationalismandatirelesscriticofwhathecalled‘theoreticalman’–driven by ‘the passion for knowledge’. It seems sacrilegious – it would havemadeNietzsche laugh– to search for a ‘morality’, given thatNietzsche neverstoppeddescribinghimselfasan‘immoralist’,ortoseekwisdomintheworksofonewhodied insane.Andwhat sort of doctrine of salvationmightwe expectfromathinkerwhohadtheaudacitytocomparehimselftotheAntichristandtoderideallformsof‘spirituality’?InreplytowhichIwouldsay,donotlistentoeverything you are told, and always judge for yourself. Read the works ofNietzsche – starting with Twilight of the Idols, particularly the brief chapterentitled‘TheProblemofSocrates’.Thenmakeupyourownmind.Itisasplainasday,fromthefirstreading,thatyouwillnotfindinNietzschea

theoria,apraxis,oradoctrineofsalvationinthesensethatwehaveencounteredindiscussing theStoics, theChristiansor evenDescartes,RousseauandKant.Nietzscheistrulywhatmightbetermeda‘genealogist’–itisthenamehegavehimself–whospenthislifedismantlingtheillusionsoftraditionalphilosophy.Does thismean, then, that youwill not find in hiswork a body of thought

which takes the place of the ancient certainties it comes to bury, and which

substitutesforthe‘idols’oftraditionalmetaphysics?Asweshallsee,Nietzschedoes not deconstruct Greek cosmology, Christianity or Enlightenmentphilosophy merely for the pleasure of destruction; he is clearing the way forradical new thoughts which truly constitute a new theoria, praxis and evenphilosophyofsalvation.Itisnothinglessthananewwayofthinking.Inwhichcaseitremainsaphilosophy.

A‘GayScience’:FreefromCosmos,Godandthe‘Idols’ofReason

Letusremindourselvesofthetwokeyaspectsofphilosophicaltheoria.Thereisthetheionandtheoraio;thedivinethatweareseekingtolocatewithinthereal,and the act of seeing that contemplates it: there is that which one tries tounderstand and that with which one tries to accede to understanding (theinstrumentsoneemploystoget there).Theoryalwayscombinesadefinitionoftheessenceofbeing,ofwhatismostimportantintheworldaroundus(whatwecallontology–ontosderivingfromtheGreekwordforbeing)andadefinitionofvision,themeansofapprehensionwhichwillenableustograspit(whatwerefertoasatheoryofknowledge).WeshalltracethesetwocomponentsoftheoriainthethoughtofNietzsche,in

order to see the distortions towhich he subjects them, and how he overhaulstheminanunprecedentedfashion.Asyoushallsee,histheoriaisinfactan‘a-theoria’–inthesensethatonesaysofamanwhodoesnotbelieveinGodthathe isatheist: literally,withoutGod (theGreek prefix ‘a-’meaning ‘without’).Because for Nietzsche, the innermost essence of being partakes neither ofcosmos nor divinity; knowledge itself is no longer a category of vision,analogous to the Greek orao. It is not an act of contemplation, or a passivespectacle, as itwas for theAncients.Nor is it, as itwas for theModerns, anattempttoelaborateagainstalloddsthesumofrelationsbetweenphenomena,soas todiscoveraneworderandanewmeaning.ToNietzsche,knowledgeisanactof ‘deconstruction’,hence thename ‘genealogy’, asmentionedearlier.Theword is eloquent: as with the activity that consists of tracing the differentbranchesofafamilytree,truephilosophyaccordingtoNietzschebringstolightthehiddenoriginsofvaluesandideaswhichpretendtobeuntouchable,sacredandhandeddownfromonhigh,soastobringthemdowntoEarthanddisclosetheir nature (and all too often earthly – one of Nietzsche’s favourite words –origins).

ATheoryofKnowledge:GenealogyReplacesTheoria

Nietzsche’s most profound insight, and one that will underpin his entirephilosophyisthattheredoesnotexist,categorically,anyperspectiveexternaltoor higher than life itself, any point of view privileged enough (for whateverreason) to abstract itself from the tissueof forceswhichare thegroundof thereal, and are therefore the innermost essence of being. Consequently, nojudgement on existence in general has any sense, other than illusory, orsymptomaticoftheconditionofthevitalforcesoftheindividualconcerned.This ishowNietzschesetsouthisargument inadecisivepassage fromThe

TwilightoftheIdols:

Judgements, value-judgements on life, whether for or against, canultimately never be true: they have value only as symptoms, they can beconsideredonlyassymptoms–inthemselvessuchjudgementsarefoolish.Wemust really stretch out our fingers and make the effort to grasp thisastonishingrefinement:thatthevalueoflifecannotbeassessed.Notbyalivingpersonbecauseheisaninterestedparty,isindeedeventheobjectofdispute,andnotthejudge;norbyadeadperson,foradifferentreason.Foraphilosophertofindthevalueoflifeproblematicisthereforeanobjectionagainsthim,aquestionmarkagainsthiswisdom,apieceofunwisdom.(II,2)

For the deconstructionist, for the genealogist, there can be no ‘objective’ or‘disinterested’ value judgements – independent of the vital interests of thespeaker – which devastates the classical conceptions of law and ethics – andthere can be neither autonomous and dis interested judgements, nor objectiveand universally valid ‘facts’. All our judgements, all our utterances, all thesentences we employ, all our ideas, are expressions of our vital energies,emanationsofour inner life and inno senseabstract entities, autonomousandindependentoftheforceswithin.Thewholeprojectofgenealogyistoprovethisnewtruth.According to one of Nietzsche’s most celebrated statements, ‘There are no

facts,only interpretations’. In the sameway thatwecanneverbeautonomousandfreeindividuals,transcendingtherealattheheartofwhichwemustliveourlives, but are solely the product of historical forces, entirely immersed in therealitythatisours–bythesametoken,andcontrarytowhatisclaimedbythe

positivistsorscientists, thereareno‘facts in themselves’.Thescientistalwayssays: ‘These are the facts!’ – whether to remove an objection or merely toexpress what he feels, faced with the constraints of ‘objective truth’. But the‘facts’ to which he claims to submit, as if to an abstract and incontrovertiblereality, are merely – on a deeper level – the product (itself changeable) ofhistory,andoftheforcesthatcompriselifeataparticularmoment.Truephilosophyleadsustowardsanabyss:thedeconstructiveactivityofthe

genealogist ends in the realisation that underlying the business of judgementthere is no foundation but a void: behind the ‘other-worlds’ of traditionalphilosophy there recede yet more other-worlds, for ever imperceptible. Aloneand cut off from the ‘herd’ of society, the true philosopher must undertakehenceforththeagonisingtaskoffacingintotheabyss:

Indeedthehermit…willdoubtwhetheraphilosopher isevencapableofhaving ‘final and true’ opinions,whether at the back of his every cave adeepercaveislying,isboundtolie–awider,stranger,richerworldbehindevery surface, an abyss beneath his every depth, and beneath his everyabyssaninmostdepth.‘Everyphilosophyisafaçade-philosophy’–suchisthe hermit’s judgement…Every philosophy also conceals a philosophy;everyopinion is also a hiding-place; everyword is also amask. (BeyondGoodandEvil,289)

Ifknowledgecanneverreachabsolutetruth,ifitisforeverpushedback,fromone horizon to the next, without ever touching down on solid ground, this isbecause the real itself is a chaos which no longer resembles the harmoniousorder of the Ancients or the more or less ‘rationalisable’ universe of theModerns. Through this new idea we penetrate to the heart of Nietzsche’sthought.

TheWorldasaChaosWithoutCosmosorDivinity

IfwewanttofullyunderstandNietzsche,wehavetostartfromtheideathatheimaginestheworldinamanneralmostdirectlyopposedtotheStoics.Nietzscheconsideredtheworld–organicandinorganic,withinusasmuchasoutsideofus– tobeavast fieldofenergies, awebof forcesanddriveswhose infiniteandchaoticmultiplicitycannotbereducedtounity.Inotherwords,thecosmosofthe

Greekswas in his eyes the supreme untruth – a pretty piece ofmake-believe,withnopurposeotherthantoconsoleandreassureus:

Anddoyouknowwhat‘theworld’istome?ShallIshowittoyouinmymirror?Thisworld:amonsterofenergywithoutbeginningorend,arigidquantum of forces, unyielding as bronze, becoming neither greater norsmaller, that does not expend itself but only transforms itself…a sea offorcesflowingandrushingtogether,inperpetualflux.(TheWilltoPower,1067)

OfcoursethecosmosoftheGreekshadalreadybeenexplodedbytheModerns,byKant andNewton, sohowcanNietzsche take things further indismantlingtheideaofuniversalharmony?ThemostsuccinctansweristhatwhileKantorNewtonstrovetofindacoherence,anorderintheworld,byattemptingtoinjectitwithrationality,with logic–rememberClaudeBernardandhisrabbits–forNietzschesuchanenterprisewasanutterwasteof timeandeffort.Itremainedtrappedinsidefantasiesofreason,meaningandlogic,becausenounificationofthechaosofnatural forces ispossible.Like theRenaissance thinkerswhosawthecosmoscollapsingbeneaththeblowsofthenewphysics,wearenowinthegripofterror,and‘consolation’isnolongerpossible:

Theworld has once again become infinite to us…Once again the greatshudderisuponus–butwhowouldwanttostartdeifyingalloveragaininthe old manner this monster of an unknown world? … Alas, too manyungodly possibilities of interpretation are included in this Unknown; toomuch devilry, stupidity, foolishness of interpretation. (The Gay Science,374)

ThescientificrationalismoftheModernsisamereillusion,andisnomorethanaway of keeping faithwith the illusions of theAncients – an all too human‘projection’(NietzschewasalreadyusingtermsthatweresoontobeadoptedbyFreud); inotherwordsawayof substitutingourdesires for realities,awayofprocuring for ourselves the semblance of power over inanimate nature,multiformandchaotic,whichinrealityescapesourgrasponallsides.ImentionedPicassoandSchoenbergearlier,asfoundersofcontemporaryart

who are fundamentally attuned toNietzsche. If you look at these paintings orlisten to thismusic, youwill see that it too delivers us up to a world that is

destructured, chaotic, fragmented, alogical, deprived of the ‘beautiful unity’whichperspectiveandtherulesofharmonyconferreduponworksofart inthepast.ThiswillgiveyouanaccurateimageofwhatNietzschewasattemptingtothink towards, fiftyyearsearlier–and it isworthnoting thatphilosophy,evenmoresothanthearts,isagainaheadofitstime.In these circumstances therewas little chance for philosophy to stay in the

business of contemplating a divinely ordained universe, of any variety. Itbecomesimpossibleforphilosophytotaketheformofatheoria,inthestrictestsense, as a ‘vision’ of the ‘divine’. However, Nietzsche does remain aphilosopher.Hestrivestounderstandthisrealitythatsurroundsus,tograsptheunderlying nature of a world within which, even if it is a chaos, we mustabsolutelylearntosituateourselves.Butratherthantryingatallcoststodiscoveralogictothischaos,thistissue

of contradictory forces that is the universe – which he designates as ‘Life’ –Nietzschewastodistinguishbetweentwoquitedistincttypesofforce–or,ashewas to say, two ‘drives’or ‘instincts’; on theonehand, ‘reactive’, and,on theother, ‘active’. It isupon thisdistinction thathis thinking is founded.Reactiveforces,onan intellectual level, aremodelledupon the same ‘will to truth’ thatanimatesclassicalphilosophyandscience;inpoliticstheyattempttorealisethedemocraticideal.Activeforces,onthecontrary,areessentiallycalledintoplaybyart,andtheirnaturalsphereisthatofaristocracy.

TheNegationoftheVisibleWorld

Reactiveforces:thoseforceswhichcanonlydeploythemselvesintheworldandachievetheirfulleffectbyrepressing,annihilatingordistortingotherforces.Insimplerterms,theysucceedonlybyopposing;theybelongtotherealmof‘no’rather than ‘yes’,of ‘against’ rather than ‘for’.Themodelhere is theclassicalsearch for truth, since this always triumphsmoreor lessnegatively, by settingitself to refute errors, illusions, false opinions. This applies as much inphilosophyasinthepositivistsciences.The exampleNietzsche uses, andwhich he has inmindwhen he speaks of

reactiveforces, is thatof thegreatdialoguesofPlato.Youneedonlybeawareherethatthesedialoguesalmostalwaystakethefollowingform:thereaders–orrather, listeners, for they frequently take place before a public, like theatricalperformances–witnessanexchangebetweenacentralfigure,usuallySocrates,andhis interlocutors,whoare sometimeswell-disposed and somewhatpliable,

sometimeshostileandinaquarrelsomeframeofmind;notablysowhenSocratestakesonthosewhowerecalledthe‘Sophists’–themastersofpublicspeaking,of ‘rhetoric’.TheSophistsmadenoattempt,unlikeSocrates, toseek the truth,but only to instill the best means of seducing and persuading by the art oforatory.Having settled on a philosophical theme for discussion, of the ‘What is

courage?’or‘Whatisbeauty?’variety,Socrateswouldproposethattheysurveytogetherthe‘commonplaces’, thecurrentopiniononthetopicinquestion,asapointofdeparture,withaviewtoelevatingthediscussion,pointbypoint,andifpossible arriving at the truth of the matter. Once this opening survey wasconcluded,discussioncouldtakeplace;whatisknownasthe‘dialectic’,theartofdialogue,inthecourseofwhichSocratesproceedstoaskhisinterlocutorsastreamofquestions,usuallytoshowthattheyarecontradictingthemselves,thattheir initial ideas or convictions do not holdwater, and that theymust reflectmoreiftheyaretogetanyfurther.YoumustalsoknowonemorethingaboutPlato’sdialoguesbeforewereturn

to the ‘reactive forces’ of Nietzsche: the exchanges between Socrates and hisinterlocutors are always in reality unequal. For Socrates always takes up aposition at an angle to whomever he interr ogates. He makes a show of notknowing.Helikestoplaytheinnocent–let’ssaythereisanInspectorColumboside to his personality. But in truth he knows exactly where the interview isheading. This is not a level playing field: Socrates is pretending to be equal,whereashehastheadvantage,thatofthemasteroverhispupil.ItwasthisthattheGermanRomanticschristened‘Socraticirony’–becauseSocratesisplayingagame;heisnotmerelyatanangleto thosewhosurroundhim,butabovealltowardshisownbeliefs,sinceheisperfectlyaware–contrarytoappearances–thatheisplayingarole.Andit is thisattitudethatNietzscheconsideredtobeessentiallynegativeor

reactive:notonlydoes the truthwhichSocrates isseekingreveal itselfonly intermsofarefutationofothers,butSocrateshimselfaffirmsnothing:hetakesnorisk,revealsnothing,proposesnothingpositive.Hemerelycontentshimselfwithplacinghisinterlocutorindifficulty,leadinghimtocontradicthimself,asawayofinducinghimtogivebirthtothetruth.In one of his dialogues, Socrates describes himself as a torpedo fish – he

paralyseshisprey.Foritisinrefutingothersthatthedialogueadvances,inorderto arrive at a better idea of things.Youwill now see the linkwhich exists inNietzsche’smindbetweentheSocraticpassionforthetrue, thewill tofindthe

truth–whetherphilosophicalorscientific–andtheideaof‘reactive’forces.ForNietzsche, the search for the truth reveals itself to be doubly reactive: trueknowledgeisnottobehadsolelythroughacombatagainsterror,badfaithanduntruth, butmoregenerally, through a combat against the illusions inherent inthesensibleworld.Philosophyandscienceareonlyabletofunctionineffectbyopposing‘theintelligibleworld’tothe‘physicalworld’insuchamannerthatthesecond is always devalued in relation to the first. This is a crucial point forNietzsche,anditisimportantthatweunderstanditfully.Nietzscheaccusesallthegrandscientific,metaphysicalandreligioussystems

–Christianity in particular – of having systematically ‘despised’ the body andthesensesintheinterestsofreasonandrationality.Itmightseemstrangetoyouthat he puts religion and science in the same basket. But there is noinconsistency here. Despite all that separates and even opposes metaphysics,religionandscience,theyshareincommonaclaimtoaccedetoidealtruths,tointellectualrealities,entities thatarenotavailable to thesenses,and tonotionswhichdonotpartakeof thecorporealworld. It is therefore ‘against’corporealreality–hereagaintheideaof‘reaction’–thatthesesystemsstrive,because(aseveryoneknows)weareceaselesslydeludedbythem.To takeoneexample, ifweconfineourselves strictly to theevidenceof the

senses–tosight,touchandsoon–water,forexample,appearstousinavarietyofguises,oftencontradictory(boilingwater,coldrain,softsnow,hardiceetc.),whereasitisalways‘intruth’oneandthesamesubstance.Whichiswhywearetoldwemustattempttoriseabovethesensibleworld,andeventothinkagainstthe senses– reactively,as farasNietzsche isconcerned– ifwewish toattain‘theintelligible’,toapprehend‘theideaofwater’.Fromthepointofviewofthe‘willtotruth’,asNietzscheputsit,thescientist

orphilosopherwhowishestoattaintrueknowledgemustconsequentlyrejectallthoseimpulseswhichrelytooexclusivelyontheevidenceofthesenses,ofthebody.Ineffect,then,philosophyandsciencewouldhaveusmistrusteverythingthat is essential to the creationof art.AndNietzsche’s suspicion,of course, isthatbehindthis‘reaction’lurksanagendawhoseconcernisquiteotherthanthesearch for truthalone;namely,ahiddenprejudice in favourof ‘thebeyond’asagainst‘thehereandnow’.Ifwechallengenotmerelythe‘search’fortruth,butalsothefellow-travelling

idealsofdemocratichumanism,thenthecritiqueofmodernphilosophyandthe‘bourgeoisvalues’onwhichitisbased,asfarasNietzscheisconcerned,isnowcomplete. For the truths which science endeavours to attain are ‘intrinsically’

democratic:theyarethosewhichclaimthatonevalueappliestoall,atalltimesandinallplaces.Aformulasuchas2+2=4knowsnobarriersofsocialclass,of space or time, no frontiers of geography or history; it lays claim touniversality.Thus the truthsof scienceareat theheartofhumanism;or, ashewouldprefertosay,theyare‘plebeian’andprofoundly‘anti-aristocratic’.Heretoo,moreover,iswhatscientists(usuallyrepublican,asfarasNietzsche

isconcerned)prizeaboutscience:itaddressestheweakasmuchasthepowerful,the poor and the rich, commoners and kings. Nietzsche amuses himself byreminding us of the plebeian origins of Socrates, inventor of philosophy andscience, and the first to promote reactive forces idealising ‘the truth’. I shallquote a passage from the chapter on Socrates (inTwilight of the Idols)whichlinks the will to truth with the legendary ugliness of the hero of Plato’sdialogues, who signalled the end of an aristocratic order imbued with‘distinction’and‘authority’:

Socratesbelongedbyorigintothelowestrungofthepeople:Socrateswasrabble.Weknow,wecanevenstillsee,howuglyhewas…WasSocratesactuallyevenaGreek?Uglinessisoftenenoughtheexpressionofastunteddevelopment, hampered by cross-breeding…With Socrates, Greek tasteswitched over to dialectics: what is actually going on here?Above all itmeans that a noble taste has been defeated. With dialectics, the rabblecomesoutontop.BeforeSocrates,dialecticalmannersweredisapprovedofinpolitesociety…Whateverneedsfirsttohaveitselfprovedtobebelievedisof littlevalue.Wherever it is still goodmanners tohave authority, andpeopledonot‘reason’butcommand,thedialecticianisakindofbuffoon:heislaughedat,heisnottakenseriously.Socrateswasthebuffoonwhogothimselftakenseriously.

It is difficult, today, to ignorewhat is disagreeable about this passage.All theingredients of fascist ideology seem to come together: the cult of beauty, a‘distinction’fromwhichthe‘mob’arebynatureexcluded; theclassificationoftheindividualaccordingtosocialorigins;theequivalencebetweenthepopulaceandugliness;thevaluingofthenation-state(ancientGreece,inthiscase);andanunsavourysuspicionaboutcross-breedingrelatingtosocialdecadence.Nothingismissing. But let us not judge by first impressions. This account fails to dojustice to what is nonetheless profound in Nietzsche’s interpretation of thecharacter of Socrates. Rather than reject it outright, we might examine the

meaningofhispropositionsandteaseoutadeepersignificance.Beforedoingso,weneedto increaseourunderstandingofanotheraspectof

Nietzsche’sthought,namelythose‘active’forceswhichbalancethereactive,andwhichtogethercompletehisversionoftheworld,hisattemptuponreality.

An‘Aristocratic’VisionoftheWorld

Contrarytoallthatisreactive,theactiveforcestakeeffectintheworldanddotheirworkwithoutneedingtodisfigureorrepressotherenergies.Itisinart,andnotinphilosophyandscience, that theseforcesfindtheirnaturalhome.Closerexamination will allow us to understand Nietzsche’s fearsome verdict uponSocratesandseehowhis‘ontology’fitstogether,bywhichImeanhiscompleteaccountoftheworldasanensembleofreactiveandactiveforces.Contrary to the ‘theoreticalman’– thephilosopheror scientistofwhomwe

have been speaking – the artist is the figure who, above all others, imposesvalues without discussion, opens up perspectives and invents worlds withoutneeding to demonstrate the legitimacy of his propositions, still less to provethem by a refutation of those works which preceded his own. Like thearistocracy,theartistcommandswithoutarguingwithanyoneoranything–andnotethatitisinthissensethatNietzschedeclares:‘Whateverneedsfirsttohaveitselfprovedtobebelievedisoflittlevalue.’ClearlyyoucanlikeChopin,Bach,rockmusicortechno,theDutchpainters

orcontemporaryart,without itoccurring toanyone to require thatyouchooseoneofthesetotheexclusionoftheothers.Intherealmofseekingtruth,ontheotherhand,atsomepointorotheryoumustmakeachoice:CopernicusisrightandPtolemywaswrong;Newtonianphysics isdemonstrably truer than thatofDescartes.Inthiswaytruthestablishesitselfonlybyprogressivelyremovingtheerrorswhich ineffectconstitute thehistoryofscience(withwhosecorpses thestage is littered).Thehistoryofart,on thecontrary, isaspacewheredifferentand even radically opposingworks can coexist.Not that tensions andquarrelsareabsent;aestheticconflictshaveoftenbeenofthemostviolentandpassionatenature.Nonetheless, they are not settled in terms of ‘who is right andwho iswrong’ – they remain unresolved, and they always leave open – at least inretrospect – the possibility of an equal result for their respective protagonists.Nobody would dream of saying, for example, that Chopin is right and Bachwrong,orRavelmistakenincomparisontoMozart.Allofwhichconnectswiththe fact that, since the dawnof philosophy inGreece, twokinds of discourse,

twoconceptionsofwordsandtheirusehaveclashedwitheachother.On the one side sits the Socratic and reactivemodel,which seeks the truth

throughdebateanddialogue,andinordertogetthere,takesitsstandagainstthevarious faces of ignorance, stupidity or bad faith. On the other side sits themodel of the Sophists, which makes no attempt to seek the truth, but seeksmerely to seduce, to persuade, to effect an audience with almost physicalintensity,andwinoverbythepowerofwordsalone.Thefirstprocedureisthatofphilosophyandscience:wherelanguageissolelyaninstrumentintheserviceof a higher reality, the intelligible and democratic Truth which will one dayimposeitsreignuponeachandeveryone.Thesecondis thatofart,ofpoetry:words are no longer simply means, but ends in themselves, which possessintrinsic value from the moment they produce an aesthetic effect upon thosecapableofexperiencingit.One of the tactics employed bySocrates, in his oratorical sparringwith the

Sophists,illustratesperfectlythisopposition.WheneveragreatSophist,Gorgiasor Protagoras, for example, had just finished a dazzling speech before anaudience still under the spell of enchantment, Socrates would feignincomprehension,or,evenbetter,deliberatelyarrivetoolate,afterthespectaclewasover.Thisprovidedhimwithanexcellentpretexttoaskthespeakertogiveasummaryofhisspeech–toreformulate,brieflyifpossible,thesalientpoints.Asyoucanimagine,fortheSophist,thisisvirtuallyimpossible–whichiswhySocrates’requestis,forNietzsche,theproductofpuremalice!Aseasytoreducea conversation between lovers to its ‘kernel of sense’, or ask Baudelaire orRimbaud to summarise one of their poems! ‘The Albatross’? About a birdstrugglingtoachievelift-off.‘TheDrunkenBoat’?Concernsasea-goingvesselin difficulties. Socrates has no difficulty in keeping the score: as soon as hisadversarycommitstheblunderoftakingupthechallengeheislost,becauseasfarasartisconcerned,allthesignssuggeststhatitisnotthetruth-contentthatmattersbuttheemotionallogic,andthelatter,ofcourse,hasnodefenceagainstthereductivismofasummary.WebegintoseefinallywhatNietzschemeans,inthepassagedescribing‘the

ugliness’ofSocrates,whenhelinkshimwithdemocraticideology,orwhenhedenounces,a littlefurtheron, ‘therabble’sresentment’which takespleasure inwielding triumphantly against its interlocutors ‘the knife-thrusts of thesyllogism’.Rather than fascist noise,what speakshere isNietzsche’s aversiontowards thewill to truth (at least in its rationalist and reactive forms– forwemustnotforgetthatNietzscheishimselfalsoasearcheraftertruth).

Similarly,whenhespeaksof‘stunteddevelopment’andassociatestheideaofcross-breeding with degeneracy, let us ignore the apparent stench of racism.However ambivalent or distasteful it may appear, he is setting his sights onsomethingprofound,referringtoaphenomenonwhichweshallneedtoclarify:namely,thefactthatforceswhichcollide,whichconstantlythwarteachother–whatNietzsche refers tohereas ‘cross-breeding’–dilute life andmake it lessintense,lessinteresting.In Nietzsche’s eyes – perhaps to Nietzsche’s ears, rather, since the whole

vocabularyofsight,ofvision,oftheoriaissocontaminated–theworldisnotacosmos: neither a natural order, as it was for the Ancients, nor an orderconstructedbythewillofman,asitwasfortheModerns.Theworldisachaos,an irreducible plurality of forces, instincts and driveswhich ceaselessly clash.Thisbeingso,theproblempresentsitselfasfollows:bytheirconstantjostling,theseforces(withinus,asmuchasintheworldoutside)areinconstantdangerof thwarting each other, and at worst of creating a blockage, a diminution orweakening. In this state of conflict, therefore, life languishes, becomes lessvibrant, less unbounded, less spirited, less strong. In this respect Nietzscheheralds the coming of psychoanalysis, in which our unconscious psychicconflictsand internalbattlespreventus from livinga full life,makeus ill andpreventusfrom‘playingandworking’,touseoneofFreud’sterms.ManyrecentcommentatorsonNietzschehavecommittedthesamegraveerror

inrespectofhis thinking: theyhavehastilyconcludedthat, torenderlifemorefreeandmorespirited,Nietzscheproposedtorejectthereactiveforcesinorderto give free play to the active forces alone – to liberate the physical andcorporeal,byrejecting‘thecoldanddryreignofreason’.Atfirstsightthismightseemlogicalenough,butletusrememberthatsucha‘solution’istypicalofwhatNietzsche called ‘stupidity’: because, clearly, to reject all reactive forces ismerely to founder upon another kind of reaction, since itwould in turnmeansettingoneselfagainstrealityinoneofitsforms.Nietzscheisnotinvitingustofollow him into some version of anarchy, or emancipation of the senses, or‘sexual liberation’, but is leading us on the contrary towards a more intense,moredialecticalexperienceandmasteryofthemultipleforcesthatgovernlife.ItisthisthatNietzschereferstointhephrase‘thegrandstyle’.Anditiswiththisnotionthatwereachtheethicalcoreofthisself-styledimmoralist.

BeyondGoodandEvil

There isofcoursesomethingparadoxicalaboutsearchingforamorality in thethoughtofNietzsche–justastherewasaboutsearchingforatheoria.Youwillrecalltheviolencewithwhichherejectsallattemptstoimprovetheworld.Heisfor ever characterised as the ‘immoralist’ par excellence, who railed againstcharity, compassion and altruism in all their guises, whether Christian orotherwise.As I have said before, Nietzsche detested the notion of the ideal, and was

amongthosewhocontestedthefirsttentativestepsofmodernhumanitarianism,inwhichhesawmerelyawatered-down,feebleversionofChristianity:

Toproclaimauniversalloveofhumanityis,inpractice,toacknowledgethepreferment of all that is suffering, ill-constituted, degenerate … For thewellbeingof the species, it is necessary for the ill-constituted, the feeble,thedegeneratetoperish.(TheWilltoPower)

Sometimes, his anti-charitable passion, or his relish for catastrophe, border ondelirium.Atonepoint,accordingtofriends,hecouldnotcontainhisjoywhenaminorearthquakedestroyedsomehousesinNice–wherehenonethelesslikedtospend time – and his dismay that the disasterwas not as serious as originallythought. Happily, he learnt shortly afterwards that a major cataclysm hadravaged the island of Java. (Writing to his friend Paul Lanzky: ‘Two hundredthousandwiped out at a stroke – howmagnificent!Whatwe need is the totaldestructionofNiceandallwholivethere’).Is it not therefore an aberration to speak of a Nietzschean ‘morality’? And

whatmightitconsistof?Ifhumanlifeismerelyawebofblindforcestearingeach other apart, if our value judgements are merely arbitrary, more or lesscompromisedaccording to thecase,butnecessarilydevoidofanysignificanceother than as symptoms of our vital spirits,whywouldwe expect any ethicalconsiderationwhatsoeverfromNietzsche?Onehypothesis,itistrue,whichhasappealedtocertain‘leftist’Nietzscheans

(anunlikelycategory,perhaps,andone thatwouldhavedrivenNietzscheevencloser to theedge)runsasfollows: if thereactiveforcesmaybe thoughtofas‘repressive’,andtheactiveforcesasprogressiveandemancipatory,mustwenotsimply overcome the former in the interest of the latter? Should we not gofurther and proscribe all norms, insist that it is ‘forbidden to forbid’ (to use a1968studentmotto),thatbourgeoismoralityistheinventionofclerics–andsoforth,soastoliberatethosedriveswhichareoperativeinart,inthebody,inour

emotions?Soitmightseem.Certainly,Nietzschewasreadinthisluridlightduringthe

student revolutions of 1968: as a rebel, an anarchist, an apostle of sexualliberation and the emancipation of the body. But it suffices merely to readNietzsche to see that this hypothesis is not merely simplistic and absurd, butdirectlyantitheticaltohisbeliefs.ThatNietzschewasanythingbutananarchist,andthatheinsisteduponthisfactloudlyandclearly,canbeseenforexampleinthispassage:

Whentheanarchist,asthemouthpieceofsocialinterestsindecline,waxesindignant and demands ‘rights’, ‘justice’, ‘equality’, then he is merelyfeelingthepressureofhislackofculture,whichisincapableofequippinghimtounderstandwhyheisinfactsuffering,andinwhichrespecthislifeisimpoverished… There is a powerful causal drive within him: someonemustbetoblameforfeelingbad…Andwaxingindignantmakeshimfeelbetter,too:allpoordevilstakepleasureincursing,itgivesthemalittlerushofpower.(TwilightoftheIdols,IX,34)

OnemightdisagreewithNietzsche’sanalysishere,butwecannotmakehimbearthe responsibility for the libertarian passion and idealist indignation of aphenomenonsuchastheParisriotsofMay1968,whichhewouldundoubtedlyhave considered a prime example of ‘the herd instinct’. Whatever oursympathies,wecannotdenyhisaversiontoallformsofrevolutionaryideology,whethersocialist,communistoranarchist.That the simple-minded idea of ‘sexual liberation’ would have frozen him

withhorror isequallyevident:whata trueartist, awriterworthyof thename,mustseekabovealliseconomy.AccordingtoonestrandofNietzsche’sthought,‘Chastityistheartist’seconomy’,whichhemustpractiseconstantly,since‘theforce that is expended in artistic creation is the same as that expended in thesexual act: there is only one kind of force’ (The Will to Power). Besides,Nietzsche does not have words strong enough to proscribe the flood ofemotionalism that characterisesmodern life in thewake of Romanticism, andwhichheregardsascatastrophic.WemustthereforereadNietzsche,beforepronouncingonhisviewsormaking

himthemouthpieceofourown.Ifwewishtounderstandhim,wemustaddthisrider, which will be clear to any true reader of his work: that any ‘ethical’attitude which consists in rejecting some part of our vital energies –

corresponding to the reactive forces – in favour of another, wholly ‘active’though thismaybe, is inevitably andbydefinitioncounter-productive.This isnot merely a corrective to his definition of reactive forces as mutilating andcastrating,butisalsoanexplicitandconstantlyreiteratedthesis,asseeninthispassagefromHuman,AllTooHuman:

Letussupposeamanwholovedtheplasticartsormusicasmuchashewasmoved by the spirit of science [is seduced therefore by both visages offorce, active and reactive], andwho deemed it impossible to resolve thiscontradiction by destroying the one and completely unleashing the otherpower;then,theonlythingremainingtohimwouldbetomakesuchagreatedifice out of himself that both powers can inhabit it, even if at oppositeends;betweenwhichare shelteredconciliatorypowers,providedwith thedominantstrengthtosettle,ifneedbe,anyquarrelsthatbreakout.(Human,AllTooHuman,I,276)

Itisthisreconcilingthatis,forNietzsche,thenewideal,theultimatelycredibleideal.Because,unlikeallothersbefore,itisnotatafalseremovefromlife;itis,onthecontrary,explicitlylashedtothecargooflife.Anditisthis,precisely,thatNietzschereferstoas‘grandeur’–akeytermforhim–thesignofthe‘edifice’of culture, at the heart of which opposing forces, because they are finallyharmonised and hierarchised, attain the greatest intensity as well as the mostperfectelegance.Itisonlythroughthisharmonisingofopposingforces,eventhereactive ones, that our human powers can flourish and life cease to bediminished, mutilated. Thus, wherever a great civilisation developed, whetheronethinksofanindividualoranera,‘itwasitstasktoforceopposingforcesintoharmony through an overwhelming aggregation of the remaining, lessirreconcilablepowers,andyetwithoutsuppressingorshacklingthem’(Human,AlltooHuman1,276).To the question ‘What isNietzscheanmorality?’, then, the following is one

answer: the good life is the most intensely lived because it is the mostharmonious,themostelegantlife(inthesensethatonespeaksofamathematicalsolutionwhichdoesnot takeunnecessarydetours,orexpendneedlessenergy).Which is to say,a life inwhich thevital forces, insteadofactingagainsteachother, tearing each other apart and thereby cancelling each other out, insteadlearntocooperatewitheachother,underthemandateoftheactiveforcesratherthanofthereactiveforces.Andthis,accordingtoNietzsche,is‘thegrandstyle’.

On this point Nietzsche’s thought is utterly clear, and his definition of‘grandeur’,throughoutthematurewritings,isofanunwaveringconsistency.Asis explained very well in a fragment from his posthumous work, TheWill toPower,‘thegreatnessofanartistisnotmeasuredbythe“finesentiments”thathe excites’, but resides in ‘the grand style’, which is to say his capacity ‘tomasterthechaoswithinhimself,tocompelhischaostobecomeform:tobecomelogical,simple,unambiguous,mathematical, tomakeoneself the law– that isthegrandambition.’Itneedstobesaidagain,thatthosewhoaresurprisedbythesetextscommit

the error, as inane as it is commonplace, of seeing inNietzsche apurveyorofanarchism,of‘leftist’sloganswhichanticipatethelibertarianmovementsofourowntime.Nothingismorefalse,sincethevirtuesof‘mathematical’precision,ofclearand rigorous reasoning,have their importantpart toplay in the tangleoflife-forces. Let us recall once again the reasoning: if we acknowledge that‘reactive’ forces are those which can only operate by denying other kinds offorce,wemustalsoagreethat thecritiqueofPlatonism,andmoregenerallyofmoral rationalism under all its forms, however justified this might be inNietzsche’s eyes, cannot lead to a pure and simple elimination of rationality.Suchaneradicationwoulditselfbe‘reactive’.Wemust,ifwearetoarriveatthatgrandeurwhichisthesignofasuccessfulfusionoflife’sforces,harnesstheminsuch a way that they cease to block each other. And, in such a hierarchy,rationalitymustalsofinditsplace.Nothingcanbeexcluded,andintheconflictbetweenreasonandthepassions,

the latter cannot be privileged to the detriment of the former,without sinkinginto ‘stupidity’, asNietzsche repeatedly insists: ‘All passions have a period inwhichtheyaremerelyfateful,inwhichtheydrawtheirvictimsdownbyweightof stupidity–anda later,verymuch laterone, inwhich theymarry the spirit,‘spiritualise’themselves.(TwilightoftheIdols,V,1)AssurprisingasitmayseemtolibertarianreadersofNietzsche,itisprecisely

this‘spiritualising’thatheconvertsintoanethicalcategory,andwhichallowsustoaccedetoa‘grandstyle’byenablingustoharnessthereactiveforcesinsteadof‘stupidly’rejectingthem–togetherwithallthatistobegainedbyintegratingthis ‘enemywithin’, instead of exiling it and as a resultweakening ourselves.Nietzscheexpressesthisinamoststraightforwardmanner:

The spiritualisation of sensuality is a great triumph over Christianity. Afurther triumph is our spiritualisation of enmity. This consists in our

profoundunderstandingofthevalueofhavingenemies:inshort,ourdoinganddeciding theoppositeofwhatpeoplepreviously thought anddecided…Throughouttheagesthechurchhaswantedtodestroyitsenemies:we,the immoralists and anti-Christians, see it as to our advantage that thechurch exists … Even in the field of politics, enmity has becomespiritualised.Almosteverypartyseesthatself-preservationisbestservedifthe opposite number does not lose its powers. The same is true ofRealpolitik.A new creation, such as the newReich, needs enemiesmorethanitdoesfriends:onlybybeingopposeddoesitfeelnecessary;onlybybeingopposeddoesitbecomenecessary.Ourbehaviourtowardsour‘innerenemy’isnodifferent:here,too,wehavespiritualisedenmity;here,too,wehavegraspeditsvalue.(TwilightoftheIdols,V,3)

In this context,Nietzsche (the self-styledAntichrist andunremitting enemyofChristian values) does not hesitate in asserting, loud and clear, that ‘thecontinuationoftheChristianidealisentirelytobedesired’becauseitoffersus,throughconfrontation,asuremeansofbecominggreater:

I have declaredwar on the anaemicChristian ideal (alongwith all thosethingscloselyassociatedwithit),notwiththeintentionofdestroyingit,butsimplytoputanendtoitstyranny,andtoclearthegroundfornewideals,morerobustideals…ThecontinuationoftheChristianidealisoneofthemostdesirablethingsthereis–ifonlyforthesakeofthoseidealsthatwishto show their worth alongside it, or even above it – for they needadversaries,andstrongadversaries,iftheyaretobecomestrong.Whichiswhy we immoralists need the power of morality: our instinct for self-preservationwantsourenemiestostaystrong–itmerelywantstoachievemasteryoverthem.(TheWilltoPower)

If we have understood the distinction between reactive and active forces, theabovepassagesfromNietzsche–soobscureandcontradictorytonovicereaders– become intelligible. And of course it is ‘grandeur’ which constitutes thebeginning and end of ‘Nietzschean ethics’, andwhich should guide us in oursearch for the good life, and for a reason which becomes gradually clearer:because it alone enables us to integrate all forces within ourselves, therebyauthorisingus to leada life that ismore intense,more richlydiverse, but alsomore ‘powerful’ – in Nietzsche’s sense of ‘the will to power’ – because it is

moreharmonious.Harmonyhere is not theharmonyof theAncients, that condition of peaceful contentment, but harmony as the most vigorously testedstrength,derivingfromtheavoidanceofthoseconflictswhichexhaustusandtheself-hurtwhichdepletesus.

TheWilltoPower

Thenotionofa‘willtopower’issocentralthatNietzscheplacesitattheheartof his definition of the real, the crowning point of what we have called his‘ontology’.Or,asherepeatedlydescribesit,thewilltopoweris‘theinnermostessenceofBeing’.Herewemustavoidamajorandfrequentmisunderstanding:thewilltopower

hasnothing todowitha lust forpower in theworld, adesire tooccupysomeimportantpositionorother.Itreferstosomethingquitedifferent.Itisthewilltointensityofexperience,thewilltoavoidatallcosttheinternalwrenchingsthatIhavedescribed,whichbydefinitiondiminishus,sothatourpowerscanceleachotherandthelifeinsideusstagnatesandweakens.Thewilltopowerisnotthewill to conquer, to have money and influence, but a profound desire for amaximum intensity of life, for a life that is no longer impoverished and tornapartbyself-division,butonthecontrarylivedtothefull.Bywayofexample, letusconsider thefeelingofguilt,when,as thephrase

goes:we‘holdsomethingagainstourselves’.Nothingisworsethanthisinternalconflict;thisconditionfromwhichweareunabletofindanexit,whichparalysesustothepointofremovingall joy.Andwemustthinktooofthethousandsofminor‘unconsciousfeelings’ofguilt,whichpassunnoticed,butwhichproducetheir own equally devastating effects upon our ‘powers’. Rather as, in certainsports,wecanbesaidto‘pullourpunches’ratherthan‘letfly’–indeferencetosomeburiedremorse,anunconsciousfearinscribedinthebody.Thewilltopowerisnotthewilltohavepower,but,asNietzschealsophrases

it, ‘the will to will’ – the will that seeks to exercise itself, and which is notenfeebled by internal strife, guilt and unresolved conflicts, but which realisesitself in ‘grand style’, in a version of life inwhichwehave done finallywithfear, remorse and regret – all internal conflicts which ‘weigh us down’ andpreventus livingwith a lightnessof being.Let us examine indetailwhat thismightmean.

AConcreteExampleofthe‘GrandStyle’

Wehaveonlytothinkofwhatmustbedonewhenpracticingadifficultsportorarttoarriveataperfectexecution.Thinkofthearcofthebowalongthestringsofaviolin,thefingersonthechordsofaguitar,oraserveintennis.Whenyouobserve the trajectoryof a shotplayedby a champion, it is of adisconcertingsimplicityandfacility.Withoutapparenteffortandagracefulfluidity,theplayerdispatchestheballwithastoundingvelocity:theforcesinplayinperformingthisgesture are perfectly integrated. They are in perfect harmony, are fullycoordinated, without division, without loss of energy, without consequent‘reaction’ in Nietzsche’s sense of the term. The consequence of which is anadmirablereconciliationofgraceandpowerascanbeseenalreadyintheveryyoung,providedtheyareendowedwithalittletalent.Onthecontrary,theplayerwhohasstartedtoolatewilldisplayanincurably

chaotic movement, uncoordinated, or, as we say ‘hampered’. He pulls hispunchesratherthanfollowingthrough…Andheneverstopscriticisinghimself,mutteringself-accusationseachtimehemissesashot.Conflictedateveryturn,he plays against himself rather than his adversary. Not only has his rhythmdeparted,buthispowerhasdisappeared:forthesimplereasonthattheforcesinplay,insteadofcooperating,thwartandblockeachother.ThisiswhatNietzscheproposestogobeyond,inthemorallife.Whichisnot

to say that he is proposing a new ‘ideal’, a new idol –whichwould be self-contradictory, for the model he sketches is, unlike all previously constructedideals, wedded to life itself as it unfolds. It does not in any sense aspire to‘transcendence’, located above or beyond the present, in some superior orexteriorrelationtoit.Ratheritisaboutimaginingtooneselfwhatalifemightbethat tookas itsmodel ‘thefreegesture’, thegestureofachampionoranartistwhich unites the greatest diversity to achieve the greatest compression orharmony of forces,without laborious effort,without loss of energy.This is ineffectthe‘moralvision’ofNietzsche,inwhosenamehedenouncesall‘reactive’versionsofmoralitywhich, sinceSocrates,haveextolleda resistance to life,alesseningoflife.Opposedto‘thegrandstyle’,therefore,arerangedallthosehabitswhichwork

against mastery of self – a mastery made possible only by harmonising andhierarchising the chaos of forces within us. In this respect, the unleashing ofpassionswhichcertain‘liberationist’creedshavetriedtopromoterepresentstheworstofworlds, since it always involvesan internal and reciprocal conflictof

forcesandaconsequentascendancyofallthatisreactive.Such a mutilation of self exactly defines what Nietzsche refers to as

‘ugliness’; the latter manifesting itself whenever passions that are unleashedjostle and weaken each other. ‘When there is contradiction, and insufficientcoordinationofinternaldesires,thereisadiminutionoftheorganisingpower,ofthe will…’ (The Will to Power); under which conditions, the will to powerlanguishesandjoygiveswaytoguiltandresentment.The example I gave of ‘the grand style’, as the reconciling of active and

reactive forces which alone permits access to the ‘power’ within us – thebackhand return of a tennis player – is not Nietzsche’s example. But he hasmanyotherimageswhichillustratetheidea,andyoushouldbefamiliarwithatleast one of these, which he regarded as the most important. It concerns theoppositionbetweenclassicismandromanticism.Tosimplifymatters,wecouldsaythatclassicismreferstoancientGreekart,

but equally to French art of the seventeenth century, whether the drama ofMolièreorCorneille,ortheartoflandscapegardening,withitstreesshapedintogeometricalpatterns.Whenyouvisitthewingofagalleryormuseumdedicatedto antique sculpture, you will notice that the Greek statuary – perfectembodimentsofclassicalart–hastwodominantandtypicalcharacteristics:thefiguresareconsummatelyproportioned,asharmoniousasonecouldwish,andthe faces are absolutely calm and serene. Classicism is a stylewhich accordspride of place to harmony and reason. It deeply distrusts the unleashing ofemotionswhich,onthecontrary,constitutessolargeapartofromanticism.ItremainsaconstantwithNietzschethatthe‘logicalsimplicity’ofclassicism

is the best approximation to the hierarchical synthesis achieved by the grandstyle.The classical style is essentially a representationof calm, simplification,abbreviationandconcentration.Hemakesnomysteryofthis:

‘Becomingmorebeautiful’isaconsequenceofenhancedstrength;itistheexpressionofavictoriouswill,ofincreasedcoordination,ofaharmonisingofallstrongdesires.Ofaninfalliblyperpendicularstressandbalance.Thesimplificationsof logic andgeometry are a necessary consequenceof theenhancementofstrength.(TheWilltoPower)

We should acknowledge, again, how Nietzsche catches off-guard those whowould see him as an enemy of reason, an apostle for the emancipation of thesensesfromtheprimacyoflogic.Heproclaimstheopposite,loudandclear:‘We

aretheadversariesofsentimentandemotion!’Theartistworthyofthenameisone who cultivates a ‘hatred of sentiment, of sensibility, of finer feelings, ahatred for what is inconstant, changeable, vague, superstitious…’ For, ‘to beclassical one must possess all the strong, seemingly contradictory gifts anddesires–butinsuchawaythattheyadvancetogetherunderoneyoke’(TheWilltoPower);what is required therefore is ‘coldness, lucidity,hardnessand logic,aboveallelse.’(TheWilltoPower)Thiscouldnotbeclearer: classicism is theperfect incarnationof ‘thegrand

style’inmorality.Whichiswhy,asagainstVictorHugo,whomhetakestobeasentimentalromanticist,NietzscherestorestheclaimsofCorneille,inhiseyesaCartesianrationalist,likeoneofthose

poets of an aristocratic civilisation…whomade it a point of honour tosubmittheirsenses,howevervigorous,toaconcept,and imposeupon thebrutal claimsof colours, sounds and forms the lawof a clear and refinedintellectuality; inwhich respect they seem tome to have followed in thestepsoftheancientGreeks.(TheWilltoPower)

Thetriumphofclassicism,GreekorFrench,consistsinvictoriouslycombatingwhatNietzscheagainreferstoas‘theplebeiansensuality’withwhich‘modern’–romantic–painters andcomposers so eagerly fill theirworks.Contrary to theclassicalspirit, theromanticheroisusuallydepictedassomeonedevouredandtherefore diminishedbyhis internal passions.He is unhappy in love; he sighsandweeps;hetearshishair;heleavesthetormentsofpassiononlytofallbackintothoseofcreation.Whichiswhy,ingeneral,theromanticheroisillandpale,and invariably dies young, sapped fromwithin by those forceswhich possesshimandunderminehimwith their failure toharmonise: this iswhatNietzscheabhors,anditiswhyhecomestodetestWagnerandSchopenhauer,andwhyhealways prefers Mozart to Brahms – in other words, prefers classical and‘mathematical’to‘romanticandsentimental’music.Here in fact is an essential aspect of all philosophy, that the practical

dimensionmust join the theoretical, thatethics isnotseparablefromontology;forinthismoralityofgrandeuritisintensitywhichcountsformost,thewilltopower which prevails over all other considerations.Which goes to show thattherearevalues,thereisanethicsoftheimmoralist.Likethediscipleofmartialarts,theexponentof‘thegrandstyle’movesina

sphere of grace, at a furthest remove from any apparent effort. He does not

perspire, and if he moves mountains, he does so with serenity. Just as trueknowledge–‘thegayscience’–mockstheoryandmocksthewilltotruth,inthename of a different verity, so Nietzsche mocks morality in the name of adifferentmorality.Thesameistrueofthedoctrineofsalvation.

ANewIdeaofSalvation

IsitvaintoseekadoctrineofsalvationinNietzsche?Itistruethatdoctrinesofsalvation,ofwhateverkind,areinhiseyesthefinalexpressionofnihilism–bywhichhemeansthenegationoflife’shereandnowinthenameofsome‘idealbeyond’ or hereafter. Mocking the promoters of such doctrines, Nietzschesuggests that,of course,noneof themwillopenlyadmit tobeinganihilist, topreferringextinctiontolife:

Of course, one doesn’t say never say ‘extinction’, one says ‘the otherworld’, or ‘God’, or ‘the true life’, orNirvana, salvation, blessedness…Thisinnocentrhetoric,fromtherealmofreligio-ethicalbalderdash,appearsagooddeal less innocent, however,whenone reflects upon the tendencythatisconcealedbeneaththesesublimewords:thetendencytodestroylife.(TheAntichrist,7)

TofindsalvationinGod,orinwhateverfigureoftranscendenceonemightwishtoputinhisplace,meansto‘declarewaronlife,onnature,onthewilltolive!Godbecomes the formula for every slanderupon the“hereandnow”, and forevery lie about the “hereafter”.’ (The Antichrist, 18) You can see from thesedeclarationshowdirectlyNietzsche’scritiqueofnihilismconfrontsthedoctrineofsalvation,confrontstheprojectofseekinga‘beyond’ofwhatevervariety,an‘ideal’whichwould‘justify’life,giveitasense,andtherebyinsomesortsavelifefromthemisfortuneofbeingmortal.Butdoesthismeanthateveryimpulsetowardswisdomorblessednessmust,inNietzsche’seyes,bediscarded?Nothingcouldbefurtherfromthetruth,sinceNietzsche,likeeverytruephilosopher,isaseekerafterwisdom.ReadtheopeningchapterofEcceHomo,‘WhyIAmSoWise’.Thiswisdom

is progressively entrusted to readers in Nietzsche’s late works, and becomesenshrinedinhisfamous–ifinitiallyobscure–doctrineof‘eternalrecurrence’.Thishasgivenrisetosomanyinterpretationsandmisunderstandings,itisworth

ourwhilereviewingitsessentialoutlines.

Recurrence:ADoctrineofSalvationwithoutGodsorIdols

It needs to be said that Nietzsche barely had time to formulate his notion ofeternalrecurrencebeforeillnesspreventedhimfromdevelopingitasfullyashewouldhavewished.Nevertheless,hewaswhollyconvinced that itwas in thisfinal doctrine that his most original thought was to be found, his truecontributiontothehistoryofideas.Itscentralquestionisonethatconcernsusall–oratleastallofuswhoareno

longer‘believers’. If there isnolongeranelsewhere–ahereafter,acosmos,adivinity–andifthefoundingideasofEnlightenmenthumanismarethemselvescompromised, how are we to distinguish between good and evil, and (moreprofoundly), between what is worth living for and what is second-rate? Toimplementthisdistinction,dowenotneedtoliftoureyestowardssomeheavenor other in order to find a transcendent answer here below?And if the sky ishopelesslyempty,whereshallweturn?It was to provide a response to this question that Nietzsche formulated the

doctrine of eternal recurrence; to afford us quite simply a criterion, of aterrestrial and this-worldly kind, finally, for decidingwhat isworth living for,andwhatisnot.Forthosewhoarebelievers,thiswillnaturallygounheeded.Butfor the rest of us,who no longer believe in anotherworld, or forwhom this-worldly engagement of whatever kind – political activism, for example – nolongersuffices,Nietzsche’sanswerisworthhearing.Astowhetheritcorrespondstoadoctrineofsalvation,ornot,ofthistherecan

be no doubt. We have only to consider for a moment the manner in whichNietzschepresentshistheory,inrelationtotraditionalreligion.Itoffers,hesays,‘more thanall the religions,whichhave taughtus todespise life as transitory,andtolooklonginglytowardsanotherlife’,sothatitwillbecome‘thereligion[parexcellence]ofthefreestandmostserenespirits’.Nietzschegoessofarastoproposeplacing‘thedoctrineofeternalrecurrenceintheplaceof‘metaphysics’and ‘religion’ – just as he replaced theoria with genealogy, and replaced theidealsofmoralitywith‘thegrandstyle’.Wemustaskourselveshowheappliesthemtohisownphilosophy.Whatdoes thedoctrineofeternalrecurrenceteachus?Inwhatsensedoes it

provideanewanswertothequestionsofwisdomandofsalvation?Isuggestabriefanswertothesequestions.Ifthereisnolongertranscendence,orideals,or

possibleescapeintoanelsewhere,however‘humanised’–afterthedeathofGod–intheformofmoralorpoliticalutopias(‘humanity’,‘fatherland’,‘revolution’,‘republic’,‘socialism’etc.), thenitmustbeatthecoreofthislifeonearththatwe learn to distinguish between what is worth living for and what must beallowedtoperish.Itishereandnowthatwemustlearntoseparateformsoflifethat are failed – mediocre, reactive, weakened – from forms of life that areintense,grandiose,courageousandrichindiversity.The first lesson to retain, therefore: that salvation according to Nietzsche

cannotbeotherthanresolutelyearthly,sewnintothetissueofforcesthatarethefabric of life. Nor can salvation have anything to do with inventing a newideality,anewidolthroughwhichtojudgeandcondemnexistence–yetagain–in thenameof someprinciple supposedlysuperior toandexterior to it.Allofthis is clearly suggested in a crucial text, the Prologue to Thus SpakeZarathustra, one of the last things which Nietzsche wrote. In his distinctivestyle,heinvitesthereadertothenotionofblasphemyupsidedown:

I entreat you, my brothers, remain true to the earth, and do not believethose who speak to you of extraterrestrial hopes. They are poisoners,whethertheyknowitornot…Theyaredestroyersoflife,atrophyingandself-poisoning, of whom the earth is weary: so let them be gone!… ToblasphemeagainstGodwasformerlythegreatestblasphemy.ButGoddied,and his blasphemers died likewise. Themost dreadful offence now is toblaspheme the earth, and to prefer interpreting the entrails of theunknowablemorethanthemeaningsoftheearth.

InafewlinesNietzschesetsdown,asnooneelsehaddone,whatwouldbecomeinthetwentiethcenturytheagendaofeverymaterialist-inspiredphilosophy;theagenda of all thinking resolutely opposed to ‘idealism’, understood as aphilosophywhichwouldimposeidealssuperiortotherealitythatislivedlife,or,in Nietzschean terms, our human will to power. Blasphemy here changes itsmeaningovernight:intheseventeenthandevenaslateastheeighteenthcentury,whoevermadeapublicprofessionofatheismcouldbethrowninprison,andinsomecasesputtodeath.Today,saysNietzsche,theconverseshouldbetherule:to blaspheme is no longer to claim that God is dead, but on the contrary, tosuccumbyetagain to themetaphysicaland religious inanitieswhich insist thatthereisa‘beyond’consistingofhigherideals–howeverirreligiousthesemightbe,suchassocialismorcommunism– inwhosenamewemust‘transformthe

world’.Nietzsche explains all of this with great clarity in a fragment dating from

1881,where,inpassing,heamuseshimselfbyparodyingKant:

If,inallthatyouwishtodo,youbeginbyaskingyourself:amIcertainthatIwouldwishtodothisaninfinitenumberoftimes?Thisshouldbeforyouthemostsolidcentreofgravity…Mydoctrinesays,thetaskistoliveyourlifeinsuchawaythatyoumustwishtoliveitagain–foryouwillanyway!If strivinggivesyou thehighest feeling, then strive! If rest givesyou thehighestfeeling,thenrest!Iffittingin,followingandobeyinggiveyouthehighestfeeling,thenobey!Onlymakesureyoucometoknowwhatgivesyouthehighestfeeling,andthensparenomeans.Eternityisatstake!Thisdoctrine ismild in its treatment of thosewho do not believe in it. It hasneither hell nor threats. But anyonewho does not believemerely lives afugitive life in the consciousness of it. (Extract from Nietzsche’s 1881notebook)

(Compare alsoTheGayScience, IV, 31, aswell as the celebrated passages inZarathustra where Nietzsche extolls his doctrine, according to which ‘all joy[Lust]wantseternity’.)Here,atlast,thesignificanceofeternalrecurrencebecomesclear.Itisneither

a description of the way of the world nor ‘a return to the Ancients’, as hasfoolishlybeensuggested,notisityetaprediction.Atbottom,itisnothingmorethanacriterionfordecidingwhichmomentsinalifeareworthlivingandwhicharenot.Thankstoit,weareenabledtoexamineourlivessoastoavoidpretenceand half-measure, all those small acts of weakness, as Nietzsche says again,thoseconcessionsto‘justthisonce’,wherewegiveintotheeasyexceptiontoanyrule,withoutreallywishingto.Nietzscheinvitesustoliveinsuchamannerthatregretsandremorsehaveno

placeandmakenosense.Suchisthelifelivedaccordingtotruth.Who,afterall,wouldwishthatalltheinstantsofmediocrity,thepettystruggles,thefutileguilt,the hidden weaknesses, the lies, the cowardice, the little arrangements withoneself– that all of this should recur for all eternity?And,byextension,howmany instants of our lives would happen in the first place were we to apply,honestlyandrigorously,thetestoftheirrecurrence?Afewmomentsofjoy,nodoubt;afewmomentsoflove,oflucidity,ofserenity…Youmightthinkthatthisisallveryinteresting,andpossiblyusefulandtrue,

but appears to have no connection to religious belief, even of a radically newkind, nor to the question of salvation. How exactly can it prevent me fromsuffering themortal fearwhichwe examined at the outset of this book?Howdoes it connect to human mortality and its anguish, which the doctrines ofsalvationattemptedtoaddress?Perhapsthenotionofeternitywillsetusontherighttrack.Foryouwillnotethat,evenintheabsenceofGod,thereiseternityjustthesame;andtoattainit,wemust,Nietzscheinsists–strangely,becausetheassertionseemsalmostChristian–havefaithandcultivatelove:

Oh,hownottoburnwithlongingforEternityandforthewedding-ringofrings – the ring of Recurrence? Never yet have I found the woman bywhomIshouldliketohavechildren,unlessitbethiswomanwhomIlove:forIlovethee,OEternity!ForIlovethee,OEternity!(‘TheSevenSeals’,ThusSpakeZarathustra)

Thepoetryofsuchpassagesdoesnotalwaysincreasetheirclarity,Iadmit.IfwewishtounderstandthemandtounderstandthesenseinwhichNietzscherevivesthedoctrinesofsalvation,weneed torealisehowclosehis ideasare tooneofthemoreprofoundintuitionsofancientphilosophy:accordingtowhichthegoodlifeisthatwhichsucceedsinexistingforthemoment,withoutreferencetopastorfuture,withoutcondemnationorselection,inastateofabsolutelightness,andinthefinishedconvictionthatthereisnodifferencethereforebetweentheinstantandeternity.

Amorfati(LoveofWhatthePresentBrings)

Wehaveseenhowcentral this themewastotheAncients,as totheBuddhists.Nietzschereturnstoitinthismagnificentpassage:

Myformulaforgreatnessinahumanbeingisamorfati:towantnothingtobeotherthanasitis,neitherinthefuture,norinthepast,norinalleternity.Notmerely to endurewhathappensofnecessity, still less tohide it fromoneself–allidealismisuntruthfulnessinthefaceofnecessity–buttoloveit…(EcceHomo,‘WhyIAmSoWise’)

Nottowishanythingtobeotherthanitis!Themaximcouldhavebeenwritten

byEpictetusorMarcusAurelius–whosecosmologyNietzscheneverceasedtoholduptoridicule.Andyet,Nietzscheclingstoitstubbornly,forexampleinthisfragmentfromTheWilltoPower:

An experimental philosophy such as I live anticipates even the mostextremenihilism…Butitwantsrathertocrossovertotheopposite–toadionysianaffirmationoftheworldasitis,withoutsubtraction,exceptionorselection. Itwants the eternal cycle: the same things, the same logic andillogic of entanglements. The highest state to which a philosopher canattain: to stand in a dionsyian relationship to existence –my formula forthisisamorfati.Whichperceivesnotmerelythenecessityofthoseaspectsof existence hitherto denied, but their desirability. (The Will to Power,1041)

Tohopealittleless,regretalittleless,lovealittlemore.Nevertoloiterinthoseunrealcorridorsoftime–thepastandthefuture–buttryonthecontrarytoliveinandembracethepresentasmuchaspossible(witha‘dionysiacaffirmation’,areferencetoDionysus,theGreekgodofwine,festivityandjoy–whoaboveallotherdeitieslovedlife).Whynot?But youmay raise a fewobjections.We can admit, just, that the

presentmoment andeternity resemble eachother if neither is ‘relativised’ andfore-shortenedbyreferencetopastorfuture.Wecanalsoaccept,togetherwiththeStoicsandBuddhists, thathewhosucceedsinlivingentirelyinthepresentcanfindinsuchanattitudethemeanstoescapetheanguishofdying.Sofar,sogood. But there remains a troubling contradiction between the two messageswhich Nietzsche is preaching: on the one hand, in the doctrine of eternalrecurrence,herequiresustochoosewhatweare liveandarewilling torelive,given that thiswillbe repeatedunavoidably;on theotherhand,heurgesus tolove the real,whatever the case,without picking and choosing, and above allwithoutwishinganythingtobeotherthanitis.Thedoctrineofrecurrenceinvitesustoselecttoliveonlythoseinstantsthatwewouldbewillingtolivewithoverandover again, in infinite recession–whereas the notionofamor fati, whichsays yes to destiny,makes no exceptions, but comprehends and accepts all ofexperience within the one perspective: namely, love of the real. How do wereconcile these two positions? By admitting, as far as is possible, that thisembrace of destiny kicks in only after the application of the highly selectiverequirementsofeternalrecurrence:werewetoliveundertheauspiceofeternity,

were we finally to discover ourselves in and through ‘the grand style’,everything thathappens touswouldbegood.Theslingsandarrowsof fortunewould no longer have any significance, no more than the happy outcomes.Becausewewouldfinallybelivingrealityasawhole,asifeachmomentwereeternity – for a reason that Buddhists and Stoics alike had also grasped: ifeverything that occurs is necessary, if the real in effect means the presentmoment,pastandfuturelosetheircapacitytoburdenuswithguilt,topersuadeusthatwemightactdifferently,andthereforemustactdifferently.Thisexplainsour attitudes of remorse, of nostalgia, of regret – but equally of doubt andhesitation in respect of the future –which lead to somuch inner torment andself-conflict, and therefore to the victory of reaction, since these attitudesinevitablyleadourvitalforcesintomutualconfrontation.

TheInnocenceofBecoming

If thedoctrineof eternal recurrenceechoes thatofamor fati, the latter in turnculminates in the idealofanexistenceentirely freeofguilt.Aswehaveseen,guiltistheessenceofwhatisreactive,thedirectoutcomeofinnertormentandself-division.Onlythewisemanwhopractisesthegrandstyleandlivesbytherule of eternal recurrence can attain to true serenity.And this is preciselywhatNietzsche means by the expression ‘the innocence of becoming’: ‘to situateoneselfbeyondeverykindofpraiseandblame,tomakeoneselfindependentofeverythingconnectedwithyesterdayandtoday–soastopursuemyownaiminmyownmanner’.Foritisbythismeansalonethatwecanexperiencesalvation.Butsavedfromwhat?Asalways:savedfromfear.Bywhatmeans?Asalways:throughserenity.Forthisreason:

We who desire to restore innocence to becoming, would like to be themissionaries of a cleaner idea: that no one has given man his qualities,neitherGod,norsociety,norhisparentsandancestors,norhehimself–thatnooneistoblameforhim.Thereisnobeingwhocanbeheldresponsiblefor the fact that someone exists, that someone is thus and thus, thatsomeonewasbornintocertaincircumstances,intoacertainmilieu.–Anditis a tremendous restorative that such a being is lacking … There is noplace,nopurpose,nomeaning,ontowhichwecanshift responsibility forourbeing,notourmannerofbeing…And, tosayitonceagain, this isatremendousrestorative;thisconstitutestheinnocenceofallexistence.(The

WilltoPower,765)

Unlike the Stoics, clearly, Nietzsche does not believe that the world isharmoniousandrational; thetranscendenceofthecosmosnolongerholds.ButliketheStoics,heinvitesustoliveinsidethemoment,toberesponsibleforourownsalvationbyacceptingeverythingthatisthecase,toobliterateinourselvesthe distinction between happy and unhappy events, to emancipate ourselvesabove all from these inner conflicts fatally nurtured by amisunderstanding oftime:remorseboundupwithaindeterminatevisionofthepast(‘Ishouldhaveacted differently’), hesitation in the face of the future (‘Should I not actdifferently?’). For it is in freeing ourselves from this insidious double bind ofreactive forces (all inner conflict is in essence reactive), in freeing ourselvesfrom the burdens of past and future, that we shall attain to serenity and toeternity, here and now, because there is nothing else, no more reference to‘possibility’,whichwouldrelativisepresentexistenceandwouldsowinusthepoisonousweedsofdoubt,remorseorhope.

Nietzsche:CriticismsandInterpretations

I have tried to placeNietzsche’s thought in the best light, without seeking tocriticise. Ibelieve thatwemustunderstandbeforemakingobjections, and thatthisprocesstakestime,sometimesalotoftime;butalsoandaboveall,Ibelievethatwemustlearntothinkwiththehelpofothers,andthroughthemtoattempttothinkforourselves.However,thereisonespecificobject–concerningNietzsche–Imustraise,so

thatyoumayunderstandwhy,despitemyconsiderable interest in theworkofNietzsche,IamunabletobeaNietzschean.Thisobjectionconcernsthedoctrineofamorfatiwhichisfoundinseveralphilosophicaltraditions,notablyBuddhistand Stoic, and also resurfaces in contemporary materialist philosophy (in thenextchapter).Thenotionofamorfatisitsontheseprinciples:toregretthingsalittleless,tohopeforthefuturealittlelessandtolovethepresentalittlemore,if not completely! I can understand perfectly that there can be serenity, relief,solace–everythingNietzschedescribessocompellingly–in‘theinnocenceofbecoming’.Butthisinjunctionreallyonlyappliestothemorepainfulaspectsofexistence:toenjoinustolovewhatisalreadylovableaboutrealitywouldmakelittlesense,sincewedosoanyway.Whatthewisemanmustmanagetorealise

in himself is the love of whatever happens; otherwise he merely resembleseveryoneelseinlikingwhatislikeableandnotlikingwhatisnotlikeable!Andhere is the problem: if we must say yes to everything, without ‘picking andchoosing’,butmustshoulderwhatevercomesourway,howdoweavoidwhatonecontemporaryphilosopheranddiscipleofNietzsche,ClémentRosset,hassoaptly referred to as ‘the hangman’s argument’. This can be summarised asfollows: there exist on Earth, since time immemorial, hangmen and torturers.They are indubitably part of the real; consequently, the doctrine ofamor fati,which urges us to love whatever is the case, likewise must urge us to lovetorturers.Another contemporary philosopher, Theodor Adorno, asked whether, after

AuschwitzandthegenocideperpetratedagainstEuropeanJews,mankindcouldstill be urged to love the real as it is,without reserve or exception. Is such athingpossible,even?Epictetus,forhispart,admittedthathehadneverinhislifemetasingleStoicsage,ifbythisismeantsomeonewholovedtheworldasitis,under all aspects, however atrocious, and who under all circumstances couldrefrain from either regret or hope. Must we see in this failure a temporarywobble, a difficultywith thedemandsofwisdom–or is it not a sign that thetheoryfalters,thatamorfatiisnotmerelyimpossiblebutonoccasionobscene?Ifwemustaccepteverythingthatoccurs,asitis,inallitstragicsenseorlackofsense,howcanweavoidtheaccusationofcomplicity,evenofcollaborationwithevil?There ismore. If lovingeverything that is thecase turnsoutnot tobe truly

feasible,neitherforStoicsnorforBuddhistsnorforNietzschehimself,does itnot immediately risk taking on the abhorrent form of a new ideal, and,consequently, a new figure of nihilism? Here, in my own opinion, is thestrongest argument against the long tradition running from the most ancientpractices of Oriental and Occidental wisdom to the most up-to-datephilosophicalmaterialism.Whatisthegoodofpretendingtohavefinishedwith‘idealism’,withallidealsand‘idols’,ifthisproudphilosophicalprogrammeofamorfatiremainsitselfanideal?Whatisthegoodofholdingupforderisionalltheories of transcendence, old andnew, and invoking thewisdomof things astheyare,ifthisloveoftherealisitselfinthralltotranscendenceandremainsanobjective that becomes radically inaccessible whenever the going gets evenmildlydifficult?Wherever such questions lead, they cannot undermine the historical

importance of Nietzsche’s responses to the three challenges confronting all

philosophy:genealogyasanewtheoria,the‘grandstyle’asanewmorality,andthe innocence of becoming as a doctrine of salvation without God or ideals.These form a coherentwhole. In its claim to dismantle the very notion of theideal,Nietzsche’sthoughtopenedthewayforthegreatmaterialistphilosophiesofthetwentiethcentury.Iwould like tosuggest threeways inwhich theworkofNietzschehasbeen

interpreted.First,wecantracethedevelopmentofaradicalanti-humanism,anunprecedenteddismantlingoftheidealserectedbytheEnlightenment.Infact,itisgenerallyacceptedthatprogress,democracy,therightsofman,republicanandsocialist ideals–allof these idolsandmoreweredenouncedbyNietzsche, sothatwhenHitlermetMussolini itwasnotentirelybychance thathepresentedhimwithahandsomeboundeditionofNietzsche’scompleteworks.NorisitanaccidentthatNietzschehasalsoservedinacontextthatisdifferentbutrelated–initshatredofdemocracyandhumanism–namelyasamodelfor theculturalleftism thatemerged in the1960s.Wecanalso seeNietzscheasaparadoxicalcontinuation of Enlightenment philosophy, a progenitor of Voltaire and theFrenchmoralistsoftheeighteenthcentury.Thereisnothingabsurdaboutsuchathought. In many respects Nietzsche continued the work inaugurated by theircritiqueofreligion,oftradition,oftheAncienRegime,andindeedinhistirelessexposure of the interests and hypocrisies concealed behind the arras of theirgreatideals.Finally,wecanreadNietzscheasaccompanyingthebirthofanewworld,in

whichnotionsoftherealandtheidealwerereplacedbytheoverridinglogicofthewilltopower.ThiswastobeHeidegger’sconclusion,asweshallseeinthenext chapter, who saw Nietzsche as the ‘thinker of technology’, the firstphilosopher to destroy – entirely andwithout leaving the smallest trace – thenotion of ‘purposes’: the idea that there was a meaning to be sought for inhumanexistence,objectives topursue,ends toachieve.With‘thegrandstyle’,theonlyremainingcriterionbywhichtodefine‘thegoodlife’,isindeedoneofintensity,offorcemeetingforce,tothedetrimentofallhigherideals.But–oncethepleasureofdestructionisover–wouldthisnotcondemntheworldtopurecynicism,totheblindlawsofthemarketandunbridledcompetition?

Chapter6AfterDeconstruction:ContemporaryPhilosophy

Butfirstofall,aquestionforphilosophy:onceagain,whygofurther?WhynotstaywithNietzscheandhiscorrosivelucidities?Whynotrestsatisfied,asmanyhavedone,withdevelopinghisproject,withfillingthestillemptycompartmentsofhisthought,andelaboratinguponthethesesthathehashandeddowntous?And if we do not like some of them, if we find that his thought flirtsuncomfortablywithcynicismandwithfascistideologieswhynotrewindalittle,totheRightsofMan,totheideaoftheRepublic,totheEnlightenment?Thesequestionscannotbedodgedevenbythesimplesthistoryofphilosophy.

Fortoconsiderthetransitionfromoneepochtoanother,fromonevisionoftheworldtoanother,isfromnowonpartofphilosophyitself.Iwillstatethematterassimplyaspossible:thedeconstructionoftheidolsofmetaphysicsrevealedtoomanythingsforusnottotakeaccountofthem.It isnotpossible,evenwereitdesirable, togobackwards.Versionsof ‘a return’ toapriordispensationnevermakemuch sense: if the earlier positionswere so feasible and so convincing,theywouldnothavebeenabandoned,wouldnothave laid themselvesopen totherigoursofcriticism,wouldneverhaveceasedbeinginseason.Thedesiretoregainlostparadisesalwaysproceedsfromalackofhistoricalsense.Wecanofcoursetrytobringbackschooluniforms,blackboardsandchalk;wemayprefertogobacktotheEnlightenment,orre-embracetheRepublicanideal,butthiscanneverbemorethanaposture,aperformancethatignorestime’spassage,asifthelatter were null and void –which of course is not the case. The problems ofadvanced democracies are not those of the eighteenth century; ourcommunitarianism has changed, human aspirations have changed, as have ourrelations with authority and our habits of consumption; new rights and newpoliticalactors(ethnicminorities,women,children)haveemerged,andthereisnopointinpretendingotherwise.The same applies to the history of philosophy. Whether we like it or not,

Nietzscheasksquestionswhichwecannotpretendhavenotbeenasked.Wedonotthinkinthesamewayafterhimaswedidbefore,asifhehadnotoccurred,as if his famous ‘idols’were still standingbolt upright.This is simplynot thecase.Anupheavalhasoccurred–notonlywithNietzsche,butwiththewholeofwhatcanbecalledpostmodernity: theavant-gardistshavepassed through,andwecannolongerthink,write,paintorplaymusicquiteaswedidbefore.Poetsno longerextolmoonlightorsunsets.Acertaindisenchantmentwith theworldoccurred, but was accompanied by new forms of lucidity, and new freedoms.WhotodaywouldseriouslywishtoreturntothetimeofDickens’OliverTwist,whenwomenlackedthevote,whereworkerswentwithoutholidays,wheretinychildren laboured,where the countries ofAfrica andAsiawere colonised oneafteranother.Nobodywouldwishforareturntothis,whichiswhythenostalgiaforlostparadisesisadisplayofdesireratherthananactofwill.Wheredoesthisleaveus?Andif,Nietzscheisso‘unignorable’,whynotrest

thereandcontentourselves,ashavesomanyofhisdisciples(MichelFoucaultorGillesDeleuze,amongothers)withcontinuing theworkof themaster?This isonepossibility,andwefindourselvestodaycaughtbetweenalternativeswhichmightbesummarisedalongtheselines:whethertocontinuealongapathopenedupbythefoundersofdeconstruction,ortotakeoncemoretothehighroad.

AFirstPossibilityforContemporaryPhilosophy

It is of course possible to carry onup the path set out byNietzsche, or,moregenerally, that ofdeconstruction. I say ‘more generally’, becauseNietzsche isthegreatestbutbynomeanstheonly‘genealogist’,theonly‘deconstructor’,theonlynemesisofidols.TherearealsoMarxandFreud,andsincethebeginningofthe twentieth century, these three have had an extended progeny. And thesephilosophersof suspicionhavebeen joinedby themassed ranksof thehumansciences, which have broadly pursued the deconstructive work of the greatmaterialists.An entire wing of sociology, for example, has undertaken to show how

individualswho thinkof themselves as autonomous agents are in fact entirelydeterminedintheirchoices,whetherethnic,political,cultural,aestheticorevensartorial–andby‘classhabitus’,whichistosay,determinedbythefamilyandsocialmilieuintowhichtheyareborn.Thehardsciencesthemselvesjoinedin–startingwithbiology,whichcanbeused todemonstrate, inNietzscheanmode,thatourfamous‘idols’aremerelyaproductoftheentirelyphysicalfunctioning

ofourbrains,ifnotamereby-productofthenecessityofprogressiveadaptationtoitsenvironmentbythehumanspeciesover thecourseof itshistory.Totakeoneexample,ourprejudicesinfavourofdemocracyandtherightsofmanaretobeexplained,inthefinalanalysis,notbyadisinterestedintellectualchoice,butby the fact that there is more at stake, for our survival as a species, incooperationandharmonythaninconflictandwar.Wecancontinue to thinkand theorise in thephilosophical style inaugurated

byNietzsche,and thisessentiallyhasbeen thepath followedbycontemporaryphilosophy.Notthatthisstylespeakswithonevoice,byanymeans.Itisinfactrichindiversity,andonewouldbehardpressedtoreduceit to thebusinessofpuredeconstruction.Weshouldmention,forexample,theAnglophonetraditionof‘analyticalphilosophy’,whichisconcernedaboveallwiththefunctioningofthe sciences, andwhich is regardedby someas all-important, even if it is notmuchspokenaboutontheContinent.Inanothersphereofactivity,philosopherssuch as JürgensHabermas,Karl-OttoAppel,Karl Popper or JohnRawls haveattempted,eachaftertheirfashion,topursuetheworkofKant,bothmodifyingandextending it toembracecontemporaryquestions suchas social justiceandtheethicalprincipleswhich should regulatediscussionbetween freeandequalcitizens;orthenatureofscienceanditsproperrelationtothedemocraticidea.In France, and also to a great extent in the United States, it has been

deconstruction which has, at least until recent years, prevailed over othercurrentsofthought.AsIsaid,the‘philosophersofsuspicion’,Marx,Nietzscheand Freud, have had numerous disciples. The names of Althusser, Lacan,Foucault, Deleuze, Derrida and others less known, belong within thisconfiguration,howevervarioustheirmethods.Eachhasattemptedtounmasktheidolsinwhichwebelieve,theconcealedandunconsciouslogicwhichimprisonsuswithoutourknowledge.FollowingMarx thefocushasbeenuponeconomicand social relations; following Freud it has been upon language and buriedsubconsciousinstincts,andfollowingNietzscheuponournihilisttendenciesandsubmissiontoreactiveforcesinalltheirforms.Where is it going – this interminable trial of the ‘idols’ of humanism,

conducted in thenameof lucidityand thecritical spirit?Whatpurposedoes itserve?Andwhere is deconstruction itself coming from?Beneath its bold andavant-gardistshell,undertheclaimtobeelaboratinga‘counter-culture’inordertothwarttheongoing‘idols’ofthebourgeoisie,thereistheparadoxicalriskofmakingabsolutelysacred the realas it is.Whichwouldbeentirely logical:bydisqualifying these famous ‘idols’, by refusing to accept that there canbe any

other horizonof thought than that of ‘philosophisingwith a hammer’,we canonlyend,asNietzschedoes,withhisamorfati,byprostratingourselvesbeforetherealasitis.How, in these circumstances, do we avoid the fate of those former

revolutionaryactivistconverts tothelawsofthemarket-place,whoturnedinto‘cynics’ in the most debased sense of the term: disillusioned, shorn of allambition other than that of an efficient accommodation to the terms andconditions of reality? And must we resign ourselves, in the name of anincreasingly problematic notion of lucidity, to paying our last respects to theghosts of Reason, Liberty, Progress and Humanity? Does nothing remain inthesewords,whichwereoncesochargedwiththelightofhope,thatcanescapetherigoursofdeconstructionandsurvivedemolition?

HowtoMoveBeyondDeconstruction

Ifdeconstructiontipsintocynicismandthecritiqueof‘idols’enshrinesthingsastheyare,howdowemovebeyonddeconstruction?Forme,thesequestionsopenupanotherpathforcontemporaryphilosophy.NotthatofaturningbacktowardsEnlightenment,reason,therepublic,humanism–whichwouldmakenosense–rather,anattempttorethinkthem,not‘asbefore’butafterdeconstruction,andinitslight.Not tomake such an attempt is to risk submitting to things as they are. In

whichcasedeconstruction,whichsetouttoliberatemindsandbreakthechainsoftradition,hasinvoluntarilyturnedintoitsopposite–anewformofadaptation,disillusioned rather than clear-sighted, to the hard reality of a globaliseduniverse.Wecannothedgeourbets forever;on theonehandadvocatingwithNietzscheamorfatiandgoodriddancetoall‘higherideals’,butatthesametimeshedding crocodile tears for the disappearance of utopian aspirations and theharshnessofarampantcapitalism.To become fully aware of this predicament, I need to enlist the thought of

MartinHeidegger,who remains inmy view themost important contemporaryphilosopher.He toowasoneof the founding fathersofdeconstruction,buthisthought is not a version of materialism and is not hostile to the idea of thetranscendental.Heistomymindthefirsttohavegiventhecontemporaryworld– what he refers to as ‘the world of technology’ – a reason why we cannotremaincontentwithbeingNietzscheans,ifwedonotwishtobecomecomplicitwitharealitywhichtodaytakestheformofcapitalistglobalisation.Despiteits

extraordinarily positive aspects – formidable economic growth and widerdistributionofwealththaneverbefore–italsohasdevastatingeffectsuponthelifeofthemind,onthepoliticalsphereand,fundamentally,onourexistence.Bywayofanintroductiontocontemporaryphilosophy,Iwouldliketobegin

by exploring this fundamental aspect of Heidegger’s thinking. First of all,because it is an inspired and brilliant body of thought, and one which shedsincomparablelightuponthepresent.Second,becauseitequipsustounderstandnotonlytheeconomic,culturalandpoliticallandscapewhichsurroundsus,butalso tograspwhy the tirelesspursuitofNietzscheandeconstructioncanat thispointleadonlytothehallowingoftherealities–howevertrivialandun-sacredtheymaybe–ofaliberaluniversegivenovertoaccommodation.Many people say as much today, ecologists in particular, or those who

describethemselvesas‘alter-globalists’.ButtheoriginalityofHeideggerandhiscritique of ‘theworld of technology’ is that it does not content itselfwith thehabitualcriticismofcapitalismandliberalism.Usually,thelatterarereproachedindiscriminately for increasing inequality, destroying regional cultures andidentities,reducingbiologicaldiversityandthespecies-count,wideningthegapbetweenrichandpoor,andsoon.Allofwhichisnotonlyhighlyquestionablebutmissestheessential.(Itdoesnotfollow,forexample,thatpovertyincreasesintheworldifinequalitywidens,northatrichcountriesareunconcernedaboutthe environment. On the contrary, developed societies are infinitely moreconcerned thanpoorcountries– forwhomthenecessitiesofdevelopment takeprecedence over those of conservation – just as they are also the first to seepublicopinionbecometrulypreoccupiedwiththepreservationoflocalidentitiesandcultures.)All of the above can be debated at length, but what is certain and what

Heideggerenablesustounderstand,isthatliberalglobalisationisintheprocessof betraying one of the most fundamental promises of democracy – howcollectivelytomakeourownhistory,toparticipateinitandhaveoursayaboutourdestiny,andtotryandchangeitforthebetter–becausetheworldwhichweare entering not only ‘escapes’ us on all sides, but turns out to be devoid ofsense:strippedofmeaningandofdirection.Eachyear,yourmobilephone,yourMP3playerandcomputergameschange,

along with everything else around you: their functionsmultiply, they becomesmaller,theirscreensgetbiggerorbecomecoloured,andsoon.Andyouknowthataproductwhichdoesnotkeepinstepisgoingtofail.Unlessitfollowssuit.Itisnotaquestionoftaste,ofonechoiceamongothers,butanecessitywithout

choice,inwhichsurvivalisatstake.In thissense,wecouldsay that in today’sworldofglobalisedcapitalwhich

places all human activities in a state of perpetual and unending competition,historyismovingbeyondthewillofmen.Competitionisbecomingnotonlyaformofdestiny,but,whatismore,thereisnothingtosuggestthatitismovinginthe direction of what is better.Who can seriously believe that we shall havemorefreedomandbehappierbecause inafewmonths theweightofourMP3players will have halved, or their memory doubled? In accordance withNietzsche’swishes,theidolsarealldead:noideal,ineffect,animatesordisturbsthe course of things, only the absolute imperative of change for the sake ofchange.To use an ordinary but suggestive image: as a bicycle must keep going in

ordernottotoppleover,oragyroscopemustkeepspinningtoremainonitsaxis,we must ceaselessly ‘progress’; but this mechanical progress induced by astruggleforsurvivalcannolongerbeintegratedwithinagranddesign.Heretoo,thetranscendentalbiasofthegreathumanistidealsNietzschemockedhaswellandtrulydisappeared–sothatinasenseitisindeedNietzsche’sprogrammethathas been accomplished to perfection by globalised capitalism – as Heideggersuggestedwasthecase.Thedifficulty isnotsomuchthatglobalisationsupposedly impoverishes the

poorinordertoengorgetherich,asecologistsandalter-globalistssuggest,butthatitdispossessesusallofanypurchaseonhistory,anddivestshistoryitselfofall purpose. Dispossession and directionlessness are the terms which bestcharacterise it– inwhichrespectagainit fulfilsperfectly, inHeidegger’seyes,thephilosophyofNietzsche:abodyofthoughtwhichassumed,asnootherhaseverdone,thecompleteeradicationofallidealsatthesametimeasthelogicofhistoricaldirection.

TheAdventofa‘WorldofTechnology’andtheRetreatofMeaning

In a brief essay entitled Overcoming Metaphysics, Heidegger described thedominationoftechnologywhichcharacterisesthecontemporaryuniverseastheresult of a processwhich took root in seventeenth-century science and spreadslowlyintoallareasofdemocraticlife.Iwouldliketooffertheprincipleaspectsofthisargumentinsimplelanguage,

for thosewho have not yet read anyHeidegger. I shouldwarn you, however:whatIamgoingtosaywillnotbefoundinthisforminHeidegger.Ihaveadded

variousexampleswhicharenothis,andIpresenthistechnicalargumentinmyown non-technical fashion. Nevertheless, the central idea is certainly his, andwhatmattershereisnottheprovenanceofanyparticularconcept,buttheideatobedrawnfromHeideggeriananalysis:accordingtowhich,theprojectofmasteryof nature and history which accompanied the birth of the modern world andwhichgivesall itsmeaning to thedemocratic idea, canbe seen to turn finallyintoitsexactopposite.Democracypromisedusthepossibilityoftakingpartinthe collective construction of a free and fair world. Yet today we are losingalmost all control over the course of theworld inwhichwe live – a supremebetrayal of the promises of humanism, implicit in democracy, and one whichraisesmanyquestions.ThefirstmomentoftheprocessHeideggerdescribescoincideswiththebirth

of modern science, which broke with ancient philosophy at every point andwhich saw the emergence of a project of domination over Earth, of its totalmasteryby thehumanspecies.According to the famous formulaofDescartes,scientific knowledgewould permitman tomakehimself ‘as if themaster andowner of nature’: ‘as if ’, because he was not yet entirely alike to God, hiscreator,butalmost.Thisaspirationtoscientificdominationtakesadualform.Itwastoexpressitselffirstonastraightforwardly‘intellectual’ortheoretical

level:thatofknowledgeabouttheworld.Modernphysicswasentirelyfoundedonthepremisethatnothing,intheworld,occurswithoutreason.Inotherwords,everything must be rationally explicable, sooner or later; every event has itscause, a reason forbeing, and the roleof science is todiscover these reasons.Scientific progress became merged with the progressive eradication of themysterythat,intheMiddleAges,wasbelievedtobepartandparcelofnature.A second impulse to domination emerges behind that of the need for

knowledge; this timeanentirelypracticaldominance,proceedingnot from theintellectbutfromthewillofmen.Ifnatureisnolongermysteriousorsacredbuton thecontrarycanbe reduced toan inventoryofmerelyphysicalphenomenaentirely devoid ofmeaning or value, then there is nothing to prevent us fromharnessingnatureinwhicheverwayseemsappropriateforourends.Totakeanexample,ifthetreegrowingintheforestisnolonger(asitwasinthefairytalesof our childhood) amagical being, likely to transform itself into awitch or agoblinduring thenight, butmerely apieceofwooddevoidof a soul, nothingprevents us from turning it into furniture or chucking it on the fire to warmourselves.Natureasawhole loses its spell, andbecomesavastwarehouseonwhichhumanscandrawatwill,withoutrestrictionotherthanthatimposedbya

conceivableneedtokeepsomethingbackforthefuture.Forallthat,withthebirthofmodernsciencewehavestillnotquitearrivedat

whatHeideggerwouldcall‘theworldoftechnology’,whichistosayauniversein which the preoccupation with ends – with the ultimate purpose of humanhistory–hastotallydisappeared,intheinterestsofanoverridingandexclusivepreoccupationwithmeans.Inseventeenth-andeighteenth-centuryrationalism–in the thoughtofDescartes, or theEncyclopedists, orKant, for example– theproject of a scientificmastery of the universe still possesses an emancipatorypurpose, by which I mean that, in its principles, it remains subject to thefulfilment of certain ends and objectives considered to be beneficial forhumanity. We are not as yet exclusively interested in the means which willenable us to dominate theworld, but in theobjectiveswhich suchdominationmightenableustorealise.Inthisrespect,clearly,humaninterestindominationhasnotyetbecomepurelytechnological.Ifthismeansdominatingtheuniverseboththeoreticallyandpractically,throughscientificknowledgeandtheexerciseofwill,itisnotmerelyforthepleasureofdominationorafascinationwithourown powers. The project is not about mastery for mastery’s sake, but aboutunderstanding theworld and, if necessary, being able to exploit it in order toreach certain higher objectives, which ultimately can be grouped under twoheadings: libertyandhappiness. In this sense, itbecomesclear thatat itsbirthmodernsciencehadnotyetbeenreducedtopuretechnology.

FromSciencetoTechnology:theDisappearanceofEndsandtheTriumphofMeans

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, science still rested on twoconvictionswhichunderpinnedanEnlightenmentoptimisminhumanprogress.The first conviction is that science will allow us to liberate our spirit, toemancipatehumanityfromtheshacklesofsuperstitionandmedievaloppositiontonewknowledge.Reasonwillemergetriumphantfromitscombatwithreligionand,moregenerally,fromthecombatagainstallformsofargumentbasedonthemonopolyof authority.And in this sense, aswehave seen in connectionwithDescartes, modern rationalism prepared the way intellectually for the FrenchRevolution.Thesecondconvictionisthatmasteryofnaturewillliberateusfromthe ills and natural servitude to which we are heir, and turn them to ouradvantage.You will recall the emotions provoked by the famous Lisbon

earthquakeof1755which,inamatterofhours,killedthousandsofpeople,andset in train a debate between philosophers as to the ‘wickedness’ of a naturalorder which bore no relation to received ideas about a harmonious and well-intentionedcosmos.Virtuallyeveryoneatthetimeconcludedthatsciencewouldsave us from the tyranny of nature. Thanks to science, it would be possiblefinallytoforeseeandthereforepreventthecatastrophessoregularlyvisiteduponus by nature. Here the seeds of the modern idea of happiness dispensed byscience,ofwellbeingmadepossiblebymasteryovertheworld,maketheirfirstappearance.And it is on account of these two convictions or purposes – freedom and

happiness,whichtogetherdefinetheideaofprogress–thatthedevelopmentofthe sciences appears as the vector of another idea, that of civilisation and itsmarch.Nomatterthatsuchavisionstrikesusasnaïveorotherwise.Whatcountsis that the will to mastery over nature is still linked to higher objectives andmotives, and in this sense cannot be reduced to a purely instrumental ortechnologicalrationalism.Forthisvisionoftheworldtobecomethoroughlytechnologicalrequiredonly

onemorestep;thattheprojectoftheEnlightenmentbeintegratedand‘docked’with theworldofcompetition, so that theengineofhistory– theevolutionaryprinciple–ceasedtobelinkedtoanyvisionorideal,tobecomeinsteadthemereoutcomeofcompetition.

ThePassagefromSciencetoTechnology:TheDeathoftheGreatIdeas

In this new perspective, that of generalised competition – which we refer totodayas‘globalisation’–theideaofprogresschangesitsmeaningcompletely:instead of being inspired by transcendental ideals, the progress of society (or,moreneutrally,itsforwardmovement)isgraduallyreducedtomeaningnomorethantheautomaticoutcomeofthefreecompetitionbetweenitsconstituentparts.At the core of businesses, but also of scientific laboratories and research

centres, the unceasing imperative to measure oneself against others (what istoday known by the awful term ‘benchmarking’), to increase productivity, todevelopexpertiseandabovealltoapplythefruitstoindustryandtheeconomy–consumption, inotherwords–hasbecomeanabsolutelyvital imperative.ThemoderneconomyfunctionslikeDarwiniannaturalselection:withinthelogicof

globalisedcompetition, abusinesswhichdoesnot ‘progress’ eachday isquitesimplydoomedtoextinction.Butthisadvancehasnootherendthanitself–tostayintheracewiththeothercompetitors.Hencethefearsomeandincessantdevelopmentoftechnology,tetheredtoand

largely financed by economic growth, and the fact that the increase of humanpowerovernaturehasbecomecompletelyautomatic,uncontrollableandblind,becauseiteverywhereexceedstheconsciouswilloftheindividual.Andthisis,quitesimply,theinevitableresultofcompetition.Inwhichsense,contrarytothephilosophy of the Enlightenment, which aimed at emancipation and humanhappiness,technologyiswellandtrulyaprocesswithoutpurpose,devoidofanyobjectives:ultimately,nobodyknowsanylongerthedirectioninwhichtheworldismoving,becauseitisautomaticallygovernedbycompetitionandinnosensedirectedbytheconsciouswillofmencollectivelyunitedbehindaproject,attheheartofasocietywhich,asrecentlyasthelastcentury,couldstillthinkofitselfasrespublica:‘thecommonweal’.Inthetechnologicalworld,whichfromnowonmeanstheworldassuch,since

technologyisaplanetaryphenomenonwithoutlimits,itisnolongeraquestionofdominatingnatureorsocietyinorder tobemorefreeormorehappy,butofmasteryformastery’ssake,ofdominationforthesakeofdomination.Why?Forno end, precisely, or rather: because it is quite simply impossible to dootherwise,giventhenatureofsocietiesentirelygovernedbycompetition,bytheabsoluteimperativeto‘advanceorperish’.NowweunderstandwhyHeideggercalls theuniverse inwhichwe live‘the

worldof technology’,or the technicalworld,and letus think foramomentofthesignificanceassumedbytheword‘technique’ incurrentusage.Itgenerallydesignatestheensembleofmeansrequiredinordertoachieveagivenend.Itisin this sense, for example, that we say of a painter or pianist that he or shepossessesa‘goodtechnique’,toindicatethattheymastertheirartsufficientlytobeabletopaintorplaywhatevertheywish.Itisimportanttonotethat,beforeallelse, technique concerns means and not ends, that is, it can be placed in theserviceofdifferentends,butdoesnotofitselfchoosethem:essentiallythesametechniquewillserveapianistplayingclassicalorjazz,traditionalormodern,butthequestionofchoosingwhichworkstoplaydoesnotinanysensederivefromtechnicalcompetence.Thelatteroperatesinaworldof‘ifthis…thenthat’.‘Toachievethis,youmustdothat’,itsays–butneverdoesittelluswhattochooseasanobjective,orwhy.A ‘gooddoctor’, in the senseof agood technicianofmedicine,canbothkillorcurehispatient–thefirstperhapsmoreeasilythanthe

second.But the decision to kill or to cure is indifferent as far as the logic oftechniqueisconcerned.Itisequallylegitimatetosaythattheuniverseofglobalisedcompetitionis,in

abroadersense,‘technical’.Fortheretoo,scientificadvancementwellandtrulyceasestohaveendsinviewthatareexteriortoorhigherthanitself,butbecomesakindofendinitself–asiftheproliferationofmeans,ofpowerandmasteryofmankind over nature have become their own finality. It is precisely this‘technicalisationoftheworld’whichoccursinthehistoryofthought,accordingto Heidegger, with the Nietzschean doctrine of ‘the will to power’, whichdeconstructedandevendestroyedall‘idols’,allhigherideals.Inreality–andnolongermerely in thehistoryof ideas– thismutationoccurs in theadventof aworld where ‘progress’ has become a process automated and divested ofpurpose, a sort of self-regulating mechanism from which human beings aretotallydispossessed.Anditisjustthisdisappearanceofendsintheinterestsofanoverridinglogicofmeansthatconstitutesthevictoryoftechnology.Hereisthefinaldifference,thegulfseparatingusfromtheEnlightenmentand

dividing the contemporary world from that of the Moderns: no one can bereasonably convinced any longer that this teeming anddisruptive evolutionaryimpulse, this incessant movement unconnected by a common project, leadsinfallibly towards what is better. Ecologists are sceptical, as are critics ofglobalisation,but equally republicansandeven liberalsbecomenostalgic for atimethat isstill recentyetseemsirrevocablyof thepast.Fromwhichcomesasenseofdoubt.Forthefirsttimeinthehistoryoflife,alivingspeciesholdsthemeans to destroy the entire planet, and this species doesnot knowwhere it isgoing. Itspowersof transformationand, ifneedbe,ofdestruction,arebynowunbounded, but like a giant with the faculties of an infant, they are totallydissociatedfromanycapacityforreflection–whileatthesametimephilosophyitself withdraws from engagement with such questions, likewise seized by apassionforthetechnical.Noonetodaycanseriouslyclaimtobelieveinaguaranteeofsurvivalforour

species,andmanyare troubled,butnooneknowshow to take the reins: fromKyotoprotocolstoecologicalsummits,ourheadsofstateparticipateimpotently,brandishing a rhetoric crammed with pious hopes but with no real power tocontroleven those scenariosmostclearly identifiedaspotentiallycatastrophic.Theworstdoesnotalwayscometopass,andnothingpreventsusofcoursefromremainingoptimistic, but this ismore an act of faith than having anybasis inreason. Hence the Enlightenment ideal gives way to a diffuse and multiform

anxiety,alwaysatthereadytofocusuponthisorthatparticularthreat,insuchawaythatfearisslowlybecomingthecharacteristicdemocraticemotion.What lessons are to be drawn from such an analysis? First, that the

genealogicalandtechnicalattitudesare,asHeideggerthought,twosidesofthesamecoin:thefirstistheclose-fittingphilosophicaldoubleofthesecond,whichismerelyitssocial,economicorpoliticalequivalent.Thereisaparadoxhere,ofcourse.Onthesurface,nothingcouldseemfurtherremovedfromthetechnicalworld–withitsdemocraticmandate,insipidandcollectivist,attheoppositepoletoanynotionofa‘grandstyle’–thanthearistocraticandpoeticformulationsofNietzsche.However,bysmashingallouridolswithhishammer,anddeliveringus – in the guise of clear-sightedness – bound and gagged to the world ofwhatever is the case, Nietzsche’s thought serves however unintentionally theincessantflux,thehitherandthitherofmoderncapitalism.FromthispointofviewHeideggeriscorrect,andNietzscheiswellandtruly

‘the thinker of technology’ – the philosopher who, like no other, sings thedisenchantmentoftheworld,theeclipseofmeaning,thedisappearanceofhigherideals in the interest of the single-minded logic of the will to power. ThatNietzschewasheldupassomethingofaradicalutopianduringthe1960sisoneof thegreatblunders in thehistoryofmisinterpretation.Nietzsche isanavant-gardist,ofcourse,butcertainlynotathinkerofutopias.Quitetheopposite,heistheirmostardentandeffectivedenigrator.The risk is therefore great that the indefinitely prolonged and inexhaustible

pursuitofdeconstructionwillonlybelayingsiegetoadoorthatisalreadyfairlywideopen.Theproblemisnolonger,regrettably,thatofbreakingyetagainthepoor ‘clayfeet’of thoseunfortunate ideals thatnoonecanmanageany longereventoidentify,sofragileanduncertainhavetheybecome.Theurgentneediscertainlynolongertochallengeconcealed‘powers’bynowsoinvisibleastobenon-existent,somechanisedandanonymoushas thecourseofhistorybecome;butonthecontrary,toenablenewideasandevennewidealstoarisevigorously,so as to regain a minimum of control over the shape of things. For the realproblemisnotthathistoryisinthecoverthandsoffiguresof‘authority’,butonthe contrary that it now eludes all of us, authorities included. It is no longerpowerthatinhibitsus,buttheabsenceofpower–sothatthedesiretokeepondeconstructing idols, to keep on discovering yet again the hiding places of‘Power’ with a capital ‘P’, is not so much to work for the emancipation ofmankindasinvoluntarilytoconspirewithablindanddementedglobalisation.Thepriority,inourcurrentsituation,is,aswehavesaid,totakethereins:to

attempt ifpossible to ‘keepourmastery incheck’.Forhispart,Heideggerdidnotbelievethatthiscouldbedone,orratherdidnotbelievethatdemocracywasequipped for sucha challenge–which isnodoubtoneof the reasonswhyheembraced instead theworst authoritarian regimemankindhas ever known.Hebelieved, ineffect, thatdemocraciesare fatallywedded to thestructuresof thetechnical world. Economically so, because they are intimately bound to theliberal creed of competition. And this system, as we have seen, of necessitytriggers an unlimited and automatic proliferation of productive forces.Politically, likewise, because elections also take the form of organisedcompetition which imperceptibly tends towards a logic whose fundamentalelements–thatofthepopularvoteandthesupremacyoftheratingspoll–aretheveryessenceofthetechnicalworld,thesocietyofglobalisedcompetition.HeideggerthereforechoseNazism,convincedwithoutanydoubtthatonlyan

authoritarianregimecouldproveequaltothechallengetohumanityposedbythetechnicalworld.Subsequently,inhislaterwritings,hedistancedhimselffromallvoluntarism,allattemptstotransformtheworld.Althoughunderstandable,eitherof these positions is unpardonable, even absurd –which proves that tragicallymistakenconclusionsmaybedrawnfromananalysisofgenius.AlargepartofHeidegger’s work is for this reason desperately disappointing, and sometimesunbearable, although the essence of his conception of the technical world isextraordinarilyilluminating.

TwoPossibleAvenuesforContemporaryPhilosophy

Inthetechnicalworld,philosophycantaketwoverydifferentdirections.First,we canmake of philosophy a new ‘scholasticism’, in the proper sense of theterm: a discipline confined to school and university. The fact is that after anintensehistoricalphaseof‘deconstruction’,inauguratedbyNietzsche’shammerand pursued under diverse guises, philosophy, itself in thrall to technique,divideditselfintospecialisedcategories:philosophyofscience,oflogic,oflaw,ofmorals,ofpolitics,of language,ofenvironment,ofreligion,ofbioethics,ofthe history of ideas (Occidental and Oriental), Continental or Anglophonephilosophy,philosophybyhistoricalperiods,bycountry…Intruth,thereisnoend to the ‘specialisms’ which students are required to choose in order to beconsidered‘serious’and‘technicallycompetent’.In research organisations, young people who do not work on a rigorously

specialisedsubject–‘thebrainsof leeches’,asNietzschealreadyjoked–have

nochanceofbeingconsideredtrueresearchers.Notonlyisphilosophyrequiredtoapeatallcostthemodelofthe‘hard’sciences,butthesehardscienceshavethemselvesbecome‘techno-sciences’,inotherwordsoftenmorepreoccupiedbythe economic or commercial spin-offs of their activity than by fundamentalquestions.When university philosophy wants to take the broader view – when for

example a philosopher is asked to pronounce as an ‘expert’ upon this or thatquestionconcerningsociety–itmaintainsthatitstrueroleistodiffuseacriticaland‘enlightened’spiritonquestionswhich ithasnot raisedof itsownaccord,butwhich are of general interest.According towhich the highest purpose forphilosophy would ultimately be a moral purpose: to clarify public debate,promoterationalargumentinthehopethatbysodoingwewillkeepmovinginthe right direction. And to arrive at this point, philosophy believes, out ofintellectualprobity, that itmustspecialise inveryparticularareas–subjects inwhichthephilosopher(aprofessorofphilosophy),endsbyacquiringaparticularcompetence.Today,manyuniversitiesthroughouttheworldinterestthemselvesinbioethics

or ecology,with the aimof studying the impact of positivist scienceupon theevolutionofhumansocieties,soastofurnishanswersastowhatitisadvisabletodoornot to, to authoriseorprohibit, on topics such as cloning, geneticallymodifiedorganisms,eugenicsormedicallyassistedprocreation.Clearlythereisnothing unworthy about such a role for philosophy.Quite the contrary, it canhave its uses, and I would not dream of denying these. It is nonethelessdreadfully reductive,whenone thinksof the idealswhichwerecommon toallthegreatphilosophersfromPlatotoNietzsche;noneofwhomhadrenouncedtothisextenttheirresponsibilityforponderingwhatismeantbythegoodlife–orpersuadedthemselvesthatcriticalreflectionandmoralpronouncementweretheultimatehorizonsofphilosophy.Facedwiththisdevelopment–notinmyviewtobeconfusedwithprogress–

the great philosophical questions can seem like the sentimental films ofyesteryear,at leastasfaras thesenewspecialists inseriousnessareconcerned.Nomorediscussionofmeaning,orofwhatconstitutesdoingandlivingwell,orthe nature of wisdom, or (even less) of salvation! Everything that for severalmillennia had constituted the essence of philosophywould seem to have beenwritten off, to leave room only for erudition, for ‘reflection’ and ‘the criticalspirit’.Not that theseattributesarenotqualities,but in theend,asHegelsaid,‘erudition begins with ideas and endswith ordures’. Everything and anything

can become an object of erudition, bottle tops as much as concepts, so thattechnicalspecialisationproducesformsofexpertisethatarecloselyalliedtothemostaridabsenceofmeaning.As for ‘critical reflection’, I have already had occasion to explain, in the

openingpagesofthisbook,whatIthinkofthisindispensablefaculty:thatit isan essential requirement in our egalitarian world, but that in no respectwhatsoeverisittheprerogativeofphilosophy.Everyhumanbeingworthyofthename reflects upon his work, his love life, the newspapers, politics and theplacesinwhichhefindshimself,withouttherebybecomingaphilosopher.Thisiswhysomeofustodayprefertosetupshopatadiscreetdistancefrom

the great avenues of academic thought, and likewise from the diagonalcrossways of deconstruction. And we would wish, not to restore the oldquestions– as Ihave suggested,dreamsof ‘return’nevermake sense–but torevisit them, so as to rethink them afresh. It is in this perspective thatauthentically philosophical discussion remains alive.After deconstruction, andtoonesideofemptyerudition,philosophysetsoffoncemoretowardsdifferenthorizons–morepromisingones, inmyview. Iamconvinced thatphilosophycanandmust–morethaneverbefore,giventhetechnicaluniverseinwhichweare immersed – keep alive the philosophical questions, not only concerningtheoria and ethics, but also the question of salvation, even if this meansrenewingthelatterfromtoptobottom.We can no longer be content today with a philosophical practice that is

reducedtothestatusofaspecialiseduniversitydiscipline,norsticktothelogicofdeconstructionalone,asifitscorrosiveclaritywereanendinitself.Eruditionstripped ofmeaning is not enough, and themuch vaunted critical spirit, evenwhenitservestheidealsofdemocracy,ismerelyanecessarybutnotasufficientconditionofphilosophy:itenablesustoshakeofftheillusionsandinnocenceofclassical metaphysics, but does not in any sense offer a response to theexistentialquestionswhichthesearchforwisdominherentintheverynotionofphilosophyusedformerlytoplaceatthecoreofitsdoctrinesofsalvation.Wecanofcourseturnourbacksonphilosophy.Wecanproclaimloudlyand

clearly that it isdead, finished,definitivelyoustedby thehumansciences.Butwe cannot remain content with the dynamic of deconstruction alone and bymakinganimpasseoutof thenotionofsalvation(inwhateversenseweintendit).Andifweprefernottoyieldtothecynicismofamorfatiwemusttrytogobeyondphilosophicalmaterialism.Inotherwords,forwhoeverisnotabeliever,forwhoeverrefusestocontentthemselveswithfantasiesofareturntoagolden

age,orconfine themselves tophilosophisingwithahammer, it isnecessary totakeupthechallengeofawisdomoraspiritualitythatispost-Nietzschean.Such a project supposes keeping one’s distance from contemporary

materialism, of course,with its rejection of all transcendental ideals and theirrelegationbygenealogytonothingmorethantheillusoryby-productsofhistoryandnature.Wemust showhowmaterialism, even at itsmostpersuasive, doesnotanswersatisfactorilythequestionsofknowledgeorspirituality.Iwouldliketo explain this in more detail before suggesting how a post-Nietzscheanhumanism can succeed in rethinking theoria, morality and the problematicquestionofsalvation–orwhatmightstandinitsplace.

TheFailureofMaterialism

Evenwhenitchoosesopenlytoaddressethics,orindeedadoctrineofsalvation– which Nietzsche, for example, only ever attempted to do surreptitiously –contemporarymaterialismseemsunabletocommandsufficientcoherencetobepersuasive.Whichdoesnotmeanthatthereisnotruthinthematerialistposition,norcompellingintellectualprinciples,butratherthattheattemptstohavedonewithhumanismendinfailure.Iwouldliketodwellforamomentonthisrenewalofmaterialism–whichhas

similarities with Stoicism, with Buddhism and of course with the thought ofNietzsche – because through its failure, indirectly, as I have suggested, a newhumanismmaybeconceivable.Inthecontextofcontemporarythought,theFrenchphilosopherAndréComte-

Sponville has probably pushed furthest and with most rigour the attempt tofound a new ethics and a new doctrine of salvation, on the basis of a radicaldeconstruction of the claims of humanism to transcendency of ideals. In thissense,evenifComte-Sponville isnoNietzschean–andstrenuouslyrejects thefascisticovertonestowhichhisphilosophyissometimesprey–heshareswithNietzschenonethelesstheconvictionthatthe‘idols’ofauthorityareclay-footed,that theyneed tobedeconstructed, tracedbackgenealogically to theirorigins,and that theonlypossiblewisdom isoneof radical (this-worldly) immanence.Histhought,too,culminatesthereforeinoneofthenumerousversionsofamorfati,inanappealforreconciliationwiththeworldasitis,or,ifyouprefer,inaradical critique of hope. ‘Hope a little less, love a little more’ – such is, atbottom,thekeytosalvationforComte-Sponville.Forhope,contrarytowhatiscommonlythought,farfromhelpingustolivebetter,ineffectmakesusforego

theessenceoflife,whichishereandnow.AsforNietzscheandtheStoics,hopeismanifestlyamisfortuneratherthanavirtue.Inamaximasencompassingasitis terse Comte-Sponville summarises: ‘To hope is to desire withoutconsummation,withoutknowledge,withoutpower.’Itisthereforeablight,andnotanattitudewhichcangiveanyzesttolife.This maxim describes hope, first and foremost, as to desire without

consummation,forbydefinitionwedonotpossesstheobjectsofourhopes.Towish to be richer, younger, healthier and so on, is necessarily not to be inpossession of these things. It is to place ourselves in a relation of absence towhat we would wish to have or be. But hope also means to desire withoutknowledge: if we knew when and how the objects of our hopes were to berealised, we would no doubt content ourselves with waiting for them – andwaitinghasadifferentmeaningtohoping.Finally,hopemeanstodesirewithoutpower since, self-evidently, ifwehad thecapacityor thepower toactoutourwishes,hereandnow,wewouldnotdepriveourselvesbutwouldputthemintoeffectwithoutthepreliminariesofhopingforthem.Thisreasoningisfaultless.Frustrationandimpotencearethesalientproperties

ofhope,fromamaterialistpointofview–inwhichrespectComte-Sponville’scritiquesharesakinshipwith thespiritualityofStoicismandBuddhism.FromGreekwisdom thematerialist doctrine of salvation freely borrows the famousnotionofcarpediem–‘seizetheday’–thatis,theconvictionthattheonlylifeworththepainoflivingislocatedinthehereandnow,inourreconciliationwiththepresent.According towhich the twoevilswhich ruinhumanexistencearenostalgiaforapastwhichnolongerexistsandtheexpectationofafuturewhichhas yet to exist; thus, wemiss life as it is, the only life with any validity: apresentmomentwhichwemustfinallylearntoembraceforwhatitis.AswiththeStoicmessage,butalsoaswithSpinozaandNietzsche,wemustendeavourtolovetheworld,andascendtothelevelofamorfati–thisbeingthefinalwordon the subject from what we might call, paradoxical though it may sound, amaterialist‘spirituality’.Norcanitsinvitationleaveusentirelycold.Iamconvincedthatithasitsown

truth,which corresponds to an experiencewe have all had: thosemoments of‘grace’ in our lives, when, by good fortune, theworld as-it-is ceases to seemthreatening,vileorugly,buton the contrarybenevolent andharmonious.Thismightarisethroughawalkalongariverbank,thenaturalbeautyofalandscape,oreven–withinsociety–whenaconversationoranencounteroverwhelmsus.AlloftheseexamplesIhaveborrowedfromRousseau.Eachofuscanremember

for ourselves such moments of weightless happiness, when we experience asensethattherealisinnoneedoftransformationorimprovement,throughourhardwork,butistheretobesavouredforthesakeofthemoment,withoutpastorfuture–injoyandcontemplationratherthaninthehopeofbetterdays.It is clear that, in this sense,materialism is a philosophy of happiness; and

when all is going well, who would not willingly yield to its charms? Aphilosophyforthegoodtimes,inshort,butcanwestillfollowitsleadwhentheweather turnsnasty?This ispreciselywhereourmaterialistguidemightbeofsome assistance, but suddenly he slips from our grasp – which is what thegreatestphilosophers, fromEpictetus toSpinoza,havebeenforced toconcede:the true sage is not of this world, and beatitude remains, sadly, inaccessible.Facedwith imminent catastrophe– a sick child, the riseof fascism, anurgentpolitical or military decision – I know of no materialist sage who does notinstantly turn into a vulgar humanist, weighing up the alternatives, suddenlyconvinced that the course of events must in some sense depend on his freechoices.Thatwemustprepareformisfortune,evenanticipate it,ashasbeensaid, in

themoodof thefutureperfect tense(‘Whenitcomes,Iwillat leasthavebeenprepared for it’), I wholeheartedly agree. But that we must embrace whathappens under whatever circumstances seems to me quite simply impossible.WhatmeaningcantheimperativeofamorfatihaveconfrontedwiththefactofAuschwitz?Andwhatvaluecanourrevolutionsandouractsofresistancehaveif they are inscribed for all eternity in the real, alongside and undifferentiatedfromeverythingtowhichtheyareopposed?Ihaveyettoencounteramaterialist,ancientormodern,whowasabletoprovideananswertothisquestion.Whichiswhy,allthingsconsidered,Iprefertocommitmyselftothepathofahumanismwhichhasthecouragefullytotakeontheproblemoftranscendence.Forthisiswhat isat stake:our logical incapacity toputaside thenotionof libertyaswehaveencountereditinRousseauandKant–theidea,inotherwords,thatthereiswithinussomethinginexcessofnatureorhistory.Contrary to what is claimed by materialism, we are unable to think of

ourselvesastotallydeterminedbyhistoryandnature;weareunabletoeradicatethesensethatwecandetachourselvessufficientlytobeabletolookuponthemcritically.Onecanbeawomanandyetrefusetobedeterminedbywhatnatureappearstohaveplannedinthematterofwomanhood:child-rearing,familylife;onecanbebornintoasociallydisadvantagedmilieuandyettransformoneself,thanks to educationperhaps, and enterworlds quite different to thosewhich a

socialdeterminismwouldhaveprogrammedforus.To convince yourself of this, reflect for amoment upon a logicwhich you

have undoubtedly experienced,whichwe all experiencewheneverwemake avaluejudgement.Totakeaparticularexample:likemoreorlesseveryone,youcannot help but feel that the Bosnian Serb armed forces which ordered themassacreofBosnianMuslimsatSrebrenicawerewicked.Beforetheslaughter,they amused themselves by terrifying their victims, shooting them in the legs,makingthemrunbeforemowingthemdown,cuttingofftheirears,torturingandthenmurderingthem.Icannotseehowonecanthinkabouttheperpetratorsoftheseactsother thanaswicked.When I say this, it is self-evidentlybecause Ipresumethat, likeotherhumanbeings, thesemencouldhaveacteddifferently;theypossessedfreedomofchoice.IftheSerbgeneralsresponsiblefortheseactsof genocide were bears or wolves, I would not think of bringing a valuejudgement.Iwouldmerelydeplorethemassacreofinnocentmenbywildbeasts,butitwouldnotoccurtometojudgefromamoralpointofview.IfIdoso,itisprecisely because generals are not wild beasts but human beings, to whom Iattributethecapacitytochoosebetweenalternatives.From a materialist perspective, one might of course argue that such value

judgementsareillusory.Onecouldtracetheir‘genealogy’,showtheirdirectionof origin and bias, how they are determined by a particular history, milieu,educationandsoon.Theproblem,however, is thatIhaveyet tomeetanyone,materialist or otherwise,whowas able todispensewithvalue judgements.Onthecontrary, theliteratureofmaterialismispeculiarlymarkedbyitswholesaleprofusion of denunciations of all sorts. Starting with Marx and Nietzsche,materialists have never been able to refrain from passing continuous moraljudgementonallandsundry,whichtheirwholephilosophymightbeexpectedtodiscourage them fromdoing.Why?Quite simplybecause,without realising it,theycontinuetoattributetohumanbeingsafreedomineverydaylifewhichtheydeny to them in philosophical argument – to such a degree that we can onlyconcludethattheillusionresideslessintheideaoflibertythaninthethesesofmaterialismitself,whichquitesimplyprovetobeunsustainable.Beyond themoral sphere, all judgements of value – from a remark about a

filmyouhaveenjoyed tosomemusic thathasaffectedyou– implies thatyoubelieveyourselftobefree,thatyourepresentyourselfasspeakingfreelyratherthanas abeing in thegripofunconscious forceswhich talk acrossyou, so tospeak,withoutyourbeingawareofthefact.Whatmustwetrust,then?Yourownsenseofyourselfasactingfreely,which

is implicitly thecasewheneveryouuttera judgement?Or thematerialist,whotellsyou(freely?)thatyouarenothingofthekind–whilehimselfcontinuingtoscattervaluejudgementswhenevertheoccasionarises,allofwhichpresupposehisownfreedom?It’syourchoice,sotospeak.Formypart, Iwould prefer if possible not to exist in a continuous state of

self-contradiction. To which end, I attribute to myself – even if it remains amysteriousbusiness, like life–a facultyof self-removal frombothnatureandhistory: the faculty which Rousseau and Kant called liberty or perfectibility,evenifthisoccupiesapositionoftranscendenceinrespectofthehistoricalandbiologicalcodeswithinwhichmaterialismwould imprisonus. Iwouldaddforgoodmeasure,andtoexplainthesimplereflexofvalue-judgementwhichIhavebeen describing, that there exists notmerely a transcendence of liberty, so tospeak,withinus,butalsovalueswhichresideoutsideus: that it isnotwewhoinventthevalueswhichguideandanimateus;notwewhoinvent,forexample,thebeautyofnatureorthepoweroflove.Letmemakemyselfclear:Iamnotsayingthatwe‘need’transcendence,asa

somewhatinanemodernhabitofthoughtisgiventoproclaiming(thatwe‘need’meaning, that we ‘need’ God). Such formulas are problematic, because theyinstantlyreboundonthosewhousethem:it isnotourneedforsomethingthatprovesitsexistence.Quitethecontrary:thereisastronglikelihoodthattheneedpushesustoinventthething,andthentodefendit,withalltheargumentsofbadfaithatourdisposal,becausewehavebecomeattachedtoit.TheneedforGodis,inthisrespect,thegreatestargumentagainstHisexistencethatIknowof.I am not saying, therefore, that we ‘need’ the transcendence of being free

agents,orthetranscendenceofvalues.Iamsayingthatwecannotdispensewiththem,whichisquiteadifferentmatter;thatwecannotthinkaboutourselves,orour relation tovalues,withoutpositing thehypothesisof transcendence. It isalogical necessity, a rational constraint, not an aspiration or a desire. What isbeingdebatedhereisnotamatterofourcomfort,butofourrelationtotruth.Or,to put the matter differently: if I am not convinced by materialism, it is notbecause it seems uncomfortable, or lacking in solace. Quite the contrary. AsNietzsche said,moreover, the doctrine of amor fati is a source of solace likenone other, the ground of an infinite serenity. If I feel obliged to go beyondmaterialism, to try and push things further, it is because I find it literally‘unthinkable’ – too full of logical contradictions for me to settle down withintellectually.Tooutlineonceagaintheprincipalgroundofthesecontradictions,Iwillsay

thatthecrossofmaterialismisthatitneverquitesucceedsinbelievingwhatitpreaches,inthinkingitsownthought.Thismaysoundcomplicated,butisinfactsimple: the materialist says, for example, that we are not free, though he isconvinced, of course, that he asserts this freely, that no one is forcing him tostate thisviewof thematter–neitherparents,norsocialmilieu,norbiologicalinheritance.Hesaysthatwearewhollydeterminedbyourhistory,butheneverstopsurgingustofreeourselves,tochangeourdestiny,torevoltwherepossible!Hesaysthatwemustlovetheworldasitis,turningourbacksonpastandfuturesoastoliveinthepresent,butheneverstopstrying,likeyouorme,whenthepresentweighsuponus,tochangeitinthehopeofabetterworld.Inbrief,thematerialistsetsforthphilosophicalthesesthatareprofound,butalwaysforyouandme, never for himself.Always, he reintroduces transcendence – liberty, avisionforsociety,theideal–becauseintruthhecannotnotbelievehimselftobefree,andthereforeanswerabletovalueshigherthannatureandhistory.From which arises the fundamental question for contemporary humanism:

how to formulate transcendence under both aspects – within ourselves (asliberty)andoutsideourselves(asvalues)–withoutfallingimmediatelybackintotheclutchesofamaterialistgenealogyandamaterialistdeconstruction.Or:howto formulate a humanism which is finally relieved of those metaphysicalillusionswhichitwascartingaroundwithitrightfromthestart,atthebirthofmodernphilosophy.

TowardsaNewIdeaofTranscendence

Contrary to materialism, to which it is diametrically opposed, the post-NietzscheanhumanismofwhichIdreaminthesepages–alongtraditionwhichhas its roots in the thought ofKant and flowers in that of one of his greatesttwentieth-century disciples, Husserl – rehabilitates the idea of transcendence.But it also affords it, notably on a theoretical level, a new meaning which Iwould like to try and explain here.For it is through this newemphasis that itmanagestoescapethecriticismsofcontemporarymaterialismandsituateitselfinaphilosophicalspacewhichisnot‘pre-’but‘post-’Nietzschean.Wecandistinguish threekey conceptionsof transcendence.The first is that

whichwasemployedbytheAncientstodescribethecosmos.Fundamentally,ofcourse,Greekthoughtisaphilosophyofimmanenceinthattheperfectorderofthingsisnotanideal,amodelwhichislocatedelsewherethanintheuniverse,butisonthecontrarywhollyincarnatedwithinitsfabric.Asyouwillrecall,the

divineprincipleoftheStoics,asdistinctfromtheGodoftheChristians,isnotaBeing external to the world, but is so to speak its very organising principle.However, as I have already indicated in passing, we can also say that theharmonious order of the cosmos is nonetheless transcendent in relation tohumans,inthespecificsensethattheyhaveneithercreateditnorinventedit.Onthecontrary,theydiscoveritasarealitythatisexternaltoandsuperiortothem.Theword‘transcendent’heremeansinrelationtohumanity,designatingarealitywhichexceedsus,withouthoweverbeinglocatedelsewherethanintheuniverse.Atranscendenceonearthratherthaninheaven.Asecondconceptionoftranscendence,quitedifferentandevenopposedtothe

first,appliestotheGodofthemajormonotheisticreligions.Itreferssimplytothe fact that the supremeBeing is – contrary toGreekdivinity– ‘beyond’ theworld which He made, both external to and superior to creation as a whole.ContrarytotheStoicconceptionofdivinity,whichmergeswiththeharmonyofthenaturalorder, and is consequentlynot locatedoutsideof it, theGodof theJews,ChristiansandMuslimsisentirely‘supernatural’.Hereisatranscendencenotmerelyrelativetohumanity(likethatoftheGreeks),butalsorelativetotheuniverseitself,conceivedentirelyasacreationwhoseexistencedependsuponaBeingexteriortoit.A third form of transcendence, different from the two versions described

above,canalsobeformulated.ItalreadytakesrootinthethoughtofKant,andfollowsitscoursethroughthephenomenologyofHusserl.ItcanbesummarisedinHusserl’s‘transcendencewithinimmanence’.Theformulamaynotbeelegant,but within it is concealed an idea of great profundity. Here is how Husserlhimselfapparentlypreferredtodescribeittohisstudents–for,likemanyofthegreat philosophers, Husserl was first and foremost a remarkable teacher. Hewouldtakeacubeorrhomboid–aboxofmatches,forexample–andholditupbeforehisstudents,makingthemobservethefollowing:thathoweverwetrytoarrange the cube in question, one can never seemore than three sides at onetime, althoughwe know there are in fact six sides.Youmaywell reply, ‘So?Whydoesthismatter,andwhatcanitcontributetophilosophicalpurposes?’Towhichthereisananswer:thatfirstandlastthereisnosuchthingasomniscience,noabsoluteknowledge,sinceeverythingthatisvisible(thevisibleassymbolisedbythethreeexposedfacesofthecube)restsonafoundationofinvisibility(thethree hidden faces of the cube). All presence supposes an absence; allimmanence supposes a hidden transcendence; all visible sides of an objectsupposeasidethatisinvisible.

Clearly this example is nomore thanmetaphorical.What it signifies is thatthistranscendenceisnotanew‘idol’,aninventionofmetaphysicsorbelief,norisitmake-believeaboutaworldbeyond,thepurposeofwhichistobelittlethereal in the name of the ideal. Rather, transcendence is a fact, a deduction, anundeniabledimensionofhumanexistence,inscribedattheheartofourcommonreality.And it is in this respect that transcendence – or,more specifically, thenotionoftranscendencehere-and-now–cannotbemerelytroddenunderfootbytheclassiccritiqueofidolsasformulatedbymaterialistsandotheradherentsofdeconstruction.Inthissense,itisnotmetaphysical,anditispost-Nietzschean.Todefinemorepreciselythisnewideaoftranscendence–beforemovingon

tosomeexamples–a fruitfulapproach is to reflect,Husserl suggested,on thenotionofahorizon.Whenyouopenyoureyestotheworld,objectsalwaysofferthemselves against abackground, and thisbackground, asyouproceed furtherinto the world which surrounds us, continually displaces itself rather as thehorizondoesforasailor,withouteverresolvingitselfintoafinalandimpassablebackground. Thus, from background to background, from horizon to horizon,youcanneversucceedingraspingontoanythingwhichyoucanholdasafinalentity,asupremeBeingorafirstcausewhichmightguaranteetherealinwhichweareimmersed.Anditisinthisrespect,precisely,thatthereistranscendence,somethingwhich always escapesus at thevery coreofwhatwe are given, ofwhatweseeandtouch–atthecoreofimmanenceitself.Likethecube,whoseseveralfacesIcanneverseesimultaneously,thereality

oftheworldisneverpresentedtomeastransparency,asmastery.Inotherwords,ifweconfineourselvestothepointofviewofhumanfiniteness,totheidea–asexpressed by Husserl, again – that ‘all consciousness is a consciousness ofsomething’, that all consciousness is therefore limited by a world external toitselfandconsequently,inthissense,finite;thenwemustcorrespondinglyadmitthathumanknowledgecanneverattaintoomniscience,cannevercoincidewiththepointofviewwhichChristiansaccordtoGod.Itisthereforebyitsrefusalofclosure,byitsrejectionofallformsof‘absolute

knowledge’, that this third type of transcendence does indeed seem to be a‘transcendencewithin immanence’,willingonly toconfer rigorousmeaning tohuman experience as formulated by a humanism freed from the illusions ofmetaphysics.Itistruly‘withinme’,inmythoughtorinmysensibility,thatthetranscendenceof valuesmanifests itself.Although they are situatedwithinme(‘immanent’), everything unfolds nonetheless as if values impose themselves(‘transcendent’)uponmysubjectivityfromwithout–asthoughtheycomefrom

elsewhere.Considerforamomentthefourgreatsettingsinwhichthefundamentalvalues

of human existence are played out: truth, beauty, justice and love.All four ofwhich,whateverthematerialistssay,remainfundamentallytranscendentfortheparticular individual, for you andme, as for everyone else. Let us simplify alittlemore:Icannotinventmathematicaltruths,northebeautyofaworkofart,northeimperativesofthemorallife;andwhenI‘fall’inlove,asthephrasesoaccurately describes it, I cannot choose deliberately to do this. Thetranscendence of values is in this sense patently real. But it is also housed inconcrete experience, not in ametaphysical fiction, nor in the form of an idolsuch as ‘God’ or ‘Paradise’ or ‘Republic’, or ‘Socialism’.We can construct a‘phenomenology’ofthisexperience,asimpledescriptionwhichstartsfromthesense of an inescapable necessity, from the awareness of not being capable ofthinkingorfeelingdifferentlyonaparticularsubject:Icandonothingaboutit,2+2=4,andthisisnotamatteroftasteorsubjectivechoice.Thenecessitiesofwhich I speak impose themselves onme as if they come fromelsewhere, andyet,itisinsidemyselfthatthistranscendenceispresent,andpalpablyso.Inthesameway,thebeautyofalandscapeorapieceofmusicimposesitself,

‘bowlsmeover’, transportsme, irrespectiveofchoice.Andinthesameway,IamnotatallpersuadedbytheargumentthatImerelychooseethicalvalues,thatI decide for example to be anti-racist: the truth is rather that I cannot thinkotherwise, that the ideaofacommonhumanityasserts itselfwith its attendantbaggageofnotionsofjusticeandinjustice.There exists, well and truly, a transcendence of values, and this is the

proposition embraced by a humanism without metaphysics (as opposed to amaterialism which claims to explain everything by reducing everything, andwithouteversucceeding).Notembracedoutofimpotence,butinfullawareness,because the experience of it is sovereign, and nomaterialism can arrive at anadequateexplanationofit.But if there is transcendence, why must it be ‘within immanence’? Quite

simply,becausefromthispointofview,valuesarenolongerimposeduponusinthenameofauthoritynordeducedfromthisorthatmetaphysicalortheologicalfiction.ItistruethatIdiscover–ratherthaninvent–thetruthofamathematicalproposition,themagnificenceoftheoceanorthelegitimacyoftherightsofman,butnonethelessitisunquestionablywithinmethatthesethingsarediscovered,andnowhereelse.Thereisnolongeraheavenofmetaphysicalideas,noGod–oratleastIamnotobligedtothinksoinordertoaccepttheideathatIaminthe

presenceofvaluesthatareatoncebeyondme,yetnowheretobefoundexceptwithinme,manifestonlyinsidemyconsciousnessandconscience.Let us take another example.When I ‘fall’ in love, there is no doubt that,

unlessmynameisNarcissus,Iamwhollyinthralltoabeingexteriortomyself,anotherwhoeludesorisdistinctfromme,andwhomIcometodependupon.Inthiscase,too,thereistranscendence.ButitisalsoclearthatitisinmyselfthatIsensethistranscendentrealityoftheother.Itislocated,sotospeak,inthatpartofmypersonthatismostintimateandprivate,inthesphereoffeelingsor,aswesay,in‘theheart’.Onecouldnotfindamorebeautifulmetaphorforimmanencethanthisimageoftheheart.Forthelatterisatoncetheplaceoftranscendence–of love for another as something irreducible to myself – but also of theimmanence of love as the emotionmost inward tomyself. So, transcendencewithinimmanence.Materialism would reduce my experience of transcendence to the material

realitieswhichsupposedlyunderlieit;whereasahumanismwhichhasshedthenaïvebaggagestillcarriedbymodernphilosophy(asdescribedearlier),canofferinstead a practical description without preconceptions: a ‘phenomenology’ oftranscendence,assomethingsettledatthecoreofmysenseofself.Thisisthereforewhyhumanisttheoriaprovesitselftobeaboveallatheoryof

knowledge centred upon self-knowledge or, to use the language of contemporaryphilosophy,upon‘auto-reflection’.Contrarytomaterialism,whichasI have suggested never succeeds in thinking its own thought, contemporaryhumanismsetsitselftoreflectuponthemeaningofitsownassertions,tobecomefullyawareof them, tocriticiseandevaluate itsownpropositions.Thecriticalspiritwhich already characterisedmodern philosophy fromDescartes onwardsmust take a further step: instead of describing others, it will finally andsystematicallysetaboutdescribingitself.

Theoriaas‘Auto-reflection’

Here, once again, we can distinguish three ages of knowledge. The firstcorresponds toGreek theoria.Contemplationofadivinelyordainedworld, theendeavour tocomprehend thestructureof thecosmos– thiswashardly,aswehave seen, a knowledge indifferent to the question of values. Or, to use theterminology of the great twentieth-centuryGerman sociologist,MaxWeber, itwasnot‘axiologicallyneutral’–meaning‘objective’,disinterestedordevoidofbias. As we have seen in the case of Stoicism, knowledge and values are

inextricably linked, in the sense that thediscoveryof thecosmicnatureof theuniverseimpliescertainmoralpurposesforhumanexistence.The second age appears with the modern scientific revolution, which sees

emerge, in opposition to the Greek world, the idea of a knowledge that isradically indifferent to thequestionofvalues. In the eyesof theModerns, notonly does nature not give us any ethical pointers whatsoever, but no longerprovidesamodelforustoimitate;furthermore,truesciencemustberigorouslyneutralinrespectofvalues,onpainofbeingaccusedofpartisanshipandlackofobjectivity.Inotherwords:sciencemustdescribewhatis,notwhatoughttobe,notwhatweshouldorshouldnotbedoingmorally.Aswesayinphilosophicaljargon, science does not possess any normative (as opposed to descriptive)purpose. The biologist, for example, can demonstrate to you that smoking isharmfultoyourhealth,andonthispointisentirelycorrect.Ontheotherhand,whetherfromamoralpointofviewtheactofsmokingisorisnotafault,and,consequently,whetherstoppingsmokingisanethicalobligation,hehasnothingto say. It is for us to decide, on the basis of values which are not, as such,scientific.Inthiscontext,generallydesignatedbytheterm‘positivist’andwhichcame to predominate during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, sciencequestioneditselfratherlessthanitfocuseduponunderstandingtheworldasitis.We can go further: the scientific method could not remain content with

evaluatingphenomena.Theremustcomeadaywhen,ifonlybyobeyingitsownprinciples,itincludesitselfinthestory.Thecriticalspiritmustarrivesoonerorlater at self-criticism, which is what modern philosophy is only beginning tocome to termswith, but whichNietzsche and thematerialists para doxic allyrefused to do. The genealogist and the deconstructionist worked wonders atfiring bullets into metaphysics and religion, at breaking up our idols with ahammer,butontheirownaccountitwasacaseofnothingdoing.Theiraversionto self-reflection constitutes theirmanner of seeing theworld. Their clarity ofanalysis in respect of others is admirable, but it is equalled only by theirblindnesstotheirownpositions.Athirdageofknowledgearrivesthereforetochallengebutalsotocomplete

its precursor; namely an age of self-criticism or auto-reflection, which bestdefinescontemporarypost-Nietzscheanhumanism.Thisonlybegantooccurjustafter the Second World War, when questions began to be asked about thepotentialmisdeeds of a science in some sense responsible for the atrocities ofHiroshimaandNagasaki.Thisself-criticismwas tocontinuemoregenerally inall areas where the consequences of science might have moral or political

implications–andlatterlyinthefieldofecologyorbioethics.Onecouldsaythatinthesecondhalfofthetwentiethcenturyscienceceased

tobeessentiallydogmaticandauthoritarian,andbegantoapplytoitselfitsownprinciples,methodandcritical spirit–whichasa resultbecamefarmoreself-criticalor‘auto-reflective’.Physicistsquestionedthemselvesaboutthepotentialdangersoftheatom,orthepossibleravagesofthegreenhouseeffect;biologistsaskedthemselvesifgeneticallymodifiedorganismspresentariskforhumanity,orifthetechnologyofcloningismorallylegitimate,andmanyotherquestionsof a similar nature, which displayed a complete reversal of the nineteenth-century perspective. Science, no longer imperious and certain, learnt tochallengeitself,slowlybutsurely.Fromwhereproceedstheformidableexpansionof thesciencesof thepast–

historyandhistoriography,historicalgeography,archivism–overthecourseofthetwentiethcentury.Historyitselfbecomesthequeenof‘humansciences’,andhere too it is useful to reflect for a moment upon the significance of theextraordinary expansion of these practices. Borrowing from the model ofpsychoanalysis, history promises us that by progressively reclaiming andmastering our past, by practising this collective and heightened form of auto-reflection, we shall come to a better understanding of our present and orientourselvesmoreeffectivelytowardsourfuture.The historical sciences in the broadest sense, therefore, including a large

swathe of the social sciences, take root progressively, and more or lessconsciously,intheconvictionthathistoryweighsuponourlivesanddestiniesinproportion to our ignorance of the past. To know one’s history, is, as inpsychoanalysis, to work towards one’s own emancipation, and a democraticidealof libertyof thought cannotdispensewith the studyofhistory, if it is toapproachthepresentwithoutprejudices.Fromwhich alsoproceeds the current andwidespread error that philosophy

devotesitselfentirelytoself-appraisal.Thereissometruthinthiserror:ineffect,modern theoria haswell and truly entered the age of auto-reflection.What isfalse,however,isthedeductionthatphilosophyasawholeshouldremainfixedat this point – as if henceforth theoria was the one and only dimension ofphilosophy,as if theproblemof salvation,notably,mustbeabandoned. I shallshow in a moment that this is not so, that it remains more than ever alive,providedthatweaccepttheneedtoformulateitintermswhicharenotthoseofthe past. But first let us see how, in the perspective of a humanism withoutmetaphysicalclaims,modernmoralityisalsoenrichedwithnewdimensions.

TheDeificationoftheHuman

Nietzscheperfectlyunderstood,evenifhewastodrawhostileconclusionsandtake an ‘immoralist’ direction, that the problem of morality arises from themoment that a human being posits sacrificial values, values ‘superior to life’.Thereisamoralityinplaythereforeassoonasprinciplespresentthemselvestous, rightly orwrongly as so elevated, so ‘sacred’, as to seemworth riskingorevensacrificingourlivesforthem.I am sure, for example, that if you witnessed the lynching of somebody

becauseof the colourofhis skin,oronaccountofhis religion,youwoulddowhatwasinyourpowertohelphim,eveniftodosowasdangerous.Andifyouwere to lack the courage, which is something everyone can understand, youwouldneverthelessadmittoyourselfthat,morally,thisiswhatoughttohappen.And if the person being attacked was someone you love, then you wouldprobably take enormous risks to save him or her. I give this small example –perhapsnotaverylikelyscenarioforustoday,butalltoolikelyincountriesatwar a mere plane journey away – in order to make the following reflection:counter to the inevitable logicofa thoroughgoingmaterialism,wecontinue tobelieve(whetherornotweprofesstobematerialists)thatcertainvaluescould,inagivensituation,leadustoriskourlives.Intheearly1980s,whenSoviet totalitarianismwasstillverymuchinplace,

Germanpacifistsadoptedadetestableslogan,Lieberrotalstod(‘Betterredthandead’) – in other words, better to submit to oppression than risk death byresisting it.Evidently the slogandidnotconvinceeveryone, and thereare stillmany people – not necessarily ‘believers’, either – who believe that thepreservation of one’s own life, infinitely precious though it may be, is notnecessarily and in all circumstances the only value that counts. I am evenconvincedthat,ifneedbe,myfellowcitizenswouldstilltakeuparmstodefendtheir neighbours or resist a totalitarianmenace – or at the least, that such anattitude, even if they did not themselves have the courage to carry it through,wouldnotstrikethemaseithercontemptibleorridiculous.Sacrifice,whichreturnsus to thenotionofavalueregardedassacred (both

fromLatin,‘sacer’),paradoxicallyretains,evenforthecommittedmaterialist,anaspectwhichcanalmostbedescribedasreligious.It implies, ineffect, thatweadmit, however covertly, the existence of transcendent values, superior to ourmaterialandbiologicalexistence.Itissimplythecase–anditisherethatIwouldwishfinallytoidentifywhat

might be new about a humanist ethics in a contemporary context, as distinctfrom themoralityof theModerns– that the formermotives for sacrificehavelong departed. In our Occidental democracies, at least, very few individualsindeedwouldstillbewillingtosacrificetheirlivesforthegloryofGod,orforthe homeland, or for the revolutionary proletariat. On the other hand, theirfreedom,and–stillmorelikely–thelivesofthosetheylove,mightwellstrikethemincertainextremecircumstances,asworthfightingfor.Inotherwords,theradicalimmanencesodeartomaterialism(requiringarenunciationofthesacred,alongwiththeverynotionofsacrifice)hasnotinanywayreplacedtheversionsof transcendence formerly on offer – whether God, homeland or revolution.Instead, new forms of transcendence have intervened, ‘horizontal’ rather thanvertical: rooted inourhumanity, inotherbeingswhoare in thesameframeasourselves,ratherthanvestedinabstractentitieslocatedaboveourheads.In this respect, it seems tome that theevolutionof thecontemporaryworld

has involved the intersection of two broad tendencies. There has been ahumanisingofthedivine.Togiveanexample:onecouldarguethattheuniversaldeclarationof therightsofmanisnomore than(andagainNietzschesawthisclearly)a‘secularised’Christianity, inotherwordsarestatementofthecontentoftheChristianreligionwithoutbeliefinGodbeingarequisite.Andthereisnodoubtthatwearelivingthroughareversalofdivinisation,oramakingsacredofthehuman,inthesenseIhavejustdefined:itisonlyonbehalfofanotherhumanbeing that we are prepared, in the case of necessity, to undertake risks, andcertainly not to defend the abstract entities of the past. Because no one anylongerbelievesthat,inthewordsoftheCubannationalanthem,‘todieforthehomeland is to live for eternity’. Of course, we can remain patriotic, but thenationassuchhaschangedmeaning:itreferslesstoaterritorythantoitshumaninhabitants,anditislessarepositoryofnationalismthanofhumanism.Ifyouwishforanexample, ifnotaproof,readtheshortbutveryimportant

bookbyHenriDunantentitledAMemoryofSolferino.DunantwasthefounderoftheInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross,andthusthefounderofmodernhumanitarianism,towhichhededicatedhislife.Inthislittlebookhedescribeshowhisextraordinaryvocationcameabout.Onabusinessassignmentin1859,reluctantly forced to cross the battlefield of Solferino (in its immediateaftermath), he witnessed a world of absolute horror. Thousands of dead and,worsestill,countlesswoundedwhowereslowlydyinginconditionsofappallingsuffering,withouthelporassistanceofanykind.Dunantspentforty-eighthours,uptohiselbowsinblood,assistingthedying.

Hedrewanexemplarylessonfromhisexperience,whichisattheoriginofaveritable moral revolution, that of modern humanitarianism and its protocols:accordingtowhichasoldier,onceheisfallen,woundedanddisarmed,ceasestobelong to a particular nation or camp, but reverts to being a man, a simplehumanbeingwho,assuch,earnstherighttobeprotected,assisted,caredfor–irrespective of his participation in the conflict. Dunant here echoed thefundamental inspiration of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights ofMan: everyhuman being merits respect without regard for community or for ethnic,linguistic,culturalorreligiousallegiances.ButDunantgoesfurtherthanthis,inthat he asks us equally to disregard national allegiances, to the extent that thehumanitarian mission, in this respect heir to Christianity, asks us to treat ourenemy, in so far ashe is reduced toa stateofharmlesshumanity, in the samewayaswewouldtreatafriend.Asyousee,wearealongwayfromNietzsche,whoseaversiontothenotion

even of compassion led him to detest all forms of charitable action, undersuspicionofperpetuatingChristianity,tothepointofhisliterallyjumpingforjoywhenhelearnt thatanearthquakehadstruckNiceoracyclonehaddevastatedFiji.Nietzschestrayed,ofthistherecanbelittledoubt,buthisdiagnosisisnotentirely wrong: by wearing a human face, the sacred does not diminish: thetranscendentliveson,evenlodgedintheimmanent,intheheartofman.Insteadofdeploringthesituation,withNietzsche,itispreciselythisshiftwhichmustbethought afresh, ifwe are to stop living in denial togetherwith thematerialist:who recognises in his private experience the existence of values which bindabsolutely, yet commits himself on a theoretical level to defending moralrelativism.It is on this basis that we can now raise our sights to a consideration of

salvation,oratleasttoaconsiderationofwhattakesitsplace.

RethinkingSalvation

Iwould like to endby proposing three topics for reflection, on themanner inwhichahumanismwithoutmetaphysicsmighttodaygivenewlifetotheancientproblemofwisdom.First,therequirementofan‘enlargedthought’;second,thewisdomoflove;third,theexperienceofmourning.TheKantiannotionofan‘enlargedthought’,whichImentionedattheendof

thechapteronmodernphilosophy,takesonanewsignificanceafterNietszche.Itno longer merely designates, as for Kant, the need for a critical spirit, a

disposition to see theother sideof aquestion (‘puttingoneself in theplaceofothers,soastounderstandtheirpointofview’),butwellandtrulyanewwayofresponding to thequestionof life’smeaning. Iwould like tosayawordaboutthis, before indicating some of its points of connection with the question ofhumansalvation.Incontrastwitha‘restricted’vision,thehorizonofanenlargedthoughtcould

bedefined, initially, asone thatmanages todisplace itself, ‘toput itself in theplaceof another’ – thebetter to understand, but also to try, in amovementofreturn upon itself, to look upon its own judgements as if they were those ofanother. It is this aspect that requires the auto-reflection of which we spokeearlier:tobecomeproperlyconscious,onemustsituateoneselfinsomesenseata distance. Whereas the restricted self remains bogged down in its place oforigin, to thepointofbelieving that this is theonlypossiblecommunity,oratleasttheonlyproperandlegitimatecommunity,theenlargedspiritmanages,byoccupyinginsofaraspossiblethepointofviewoftheother,tocontemplatetheworldintheguiseofabenevolentanddisinterestedspectator.Agreeingtounseathis initial and inheritedway of seeing and to remove himself from the closedcircleofegocentrism,heisabletopenetratecustomsandvaluesremotefromhisown; then, returning tohimself,hecanbeawareofhimself inadistancedandlessdogmaticfashion,andcantherebyenrichhisownviewofthings.In this respect, and it indicates how deep are the intellectual roots of

humanism,thenotionof‘anenlargedthought’iscontinuouswiththatofhuman‘perfectibility’,whichRousseau isolatedas thespecificallyhuman,asopposedto animal, property. Both notions suppose the idea of an extended liberty ofaction,consideredasthefacultyofself-withdrawalfromaparticularconditioninorder toaccede toan increaseduniversality,whether individualor collective–thatofeducationon theonehand,orcultureandpoliticson theother– in thecourseofwhichiseffectedwhatonemightcallthehumanisingofthehuman.Itis precisely this humanising process which gives all its meaning to life andwhich,inthequasi-theologicalmeaningoftheterm,‘justifies’alife.InmybookWhatisaGoodLife?Iquotedatlengthfromaspeechgivenby

thegreatAnglo-IndianwriterV.S.Naipaul,ontheoccasionofhisacceptanceoftheNobelPrizeforLiteraturein2001.Thepassageinquestionseemstometodescribetoperfectionthisexperienceofan‘enlargedthought’andthebenefitsitbrings,notonlyinthewritingofabookbutalsomoreprofoundlyintheconductofalife.Inthespeech,entitled‘TwoWorlds’,NaipaulrecallshischildhoodinTrinidad and evokes the limitations inherent to the life of these small

communities, enclosed upon themselves and folded back upon theirparticularisms:

We Indians, immigrants from India… lived for the most part ritualisedlives,andwerenotyetcapableofself-assessment,whichiswherelearningbegins … In Trinidad, where as new arrivals we were a disadvantagedcommunity,thatexcludingideawasakindofprotection;itenabledus–forthe timebeing,andonly for the timebeing– to live inourownwayandaccordingtoourownrules,toliveinourownfadingIndia.Itmadeforanextraordinaryself-centredness.Welookedinwards;welivedoutourdays;theworldoutsideexistedinakindofdarkness;weinquiredaboutnothing.(ExtractfromV.S.Naipaul’sNobelPrizeacceptancespeech)

Naipaul goes on to explain how, once he became a writer, these ‘zones ofshadow’whichsurroundedthegrowingchild–thatis,everythingthatwasmoreorlessthereandpresentontheisland,butwhichself-absorptionpreventedhimfromseeing:thenativepopulation,theNewWorld,India,theMuslimuniverse,Africa, England – became subjects of preoccupation which enabled him toestablishadistance,andonedaywriteabookabout theislandofhisbirth.Asyou can see, his entire itinerary as a man and a writer – the two are strictlyinseparablehere–hasconsistedofenlarginghishorizonbymakingaprofoundeffortof‘decentering,’uprootinghimselfwithaviewtobeingabletopenetratethe‘zonesofshadow’inquestion.

Thenheaddsthis,whichisperhapstheessential:Thedistancebetweenthewriterandhismaterialgrewwiththetwolaterbooks;thevisionwaswider.Andthenintuitionledmetoalargebookaboutourfamilylife.Duringthisbookmywritingambitiongrew.ButwhenitwasoverIfeltIhaddoneallthatIcoulddowithmyislandmaterial.NomatterhowmuchImeditatedonit,nofurtherfictionwouldcome.Accident,then,rescuedme.Ibecameatraveller. I travelled in the Caribbean region and understood much moreabout the colonial set-up of which I had been part. I went to India, myancestral land, forayear; itwasa journey thatbrokemylife in two.Thebooks that I wrote about these two journeys took me to new realms ofemotion,gavemeaworld-viewIhadneverhad,extendedmetechnically.(ExtractfromV.S.Naipaul’sNobelPrizeacceptancespeech)

No renunciation, here, nor any disowning of the particularities of his origin.Merely a distancing, an extending (it is striking that Naipaul himself uses avocabularyofenlargement)whichenableshimtograsptheseparticularitiesfromanother perspective, less immersed, less egocentric – by means of which hiswriting,farfromstandingstill, likethelocalcraftindustry,managedtoelevateitselftothelevelof‘worldliterature’.BywhichImeanitisnotreservedforthe‘indigenous’ population of Trinidad, nor even a former colonial readership,because the itinerary it describes is not exclusively particu lar: it possesses auniversal human meaning, which, beyond the particularity of Naipaul’scircumstances,isabletoaffectallreaders.The literary and even existential ideal traced by Naipaul in these pages

requires that we uproot ourselves from our egocentrism.We need others andotherness in order to understand ourselves; we need their liberty, even theirhappiness if possible, to accomplish our own lives. In this sense, theconsiderationofmoralitypointstowardsadeeperquestionofmeaning.In the Bible, to know means to love: traditionally, to speak of knowing

somebody‘biblically’meanstohavecarnalknowledge.Thequestionofmeaningisasecularversionofthisbiblicalequation:ifknowingandlovingareoneandthe same, then what must give sense above all to our lives – at once anorientation and a meaning – is indeed the ideal of an enlarged horizon. Thisalone,byitsinvitationauvoyage,itsexhortingustocomeoutofourselvesthebettertofindourselves–whichisHegel’sdialecticaldefinitionof‘experience’–enablesusbettertoknowandloveothers.Thisisperhapstheoneandonlyanswertothequestion:‘Whatisthepointof

growingup?’Toenlargeourvision, to learn to relish thesingularityofothers,andonoccasion–whenthis loveof theotherattains itsgreatest intensity– toexperiencetheabolitionoftime.Inwhichwesucceed,ifonlymomentarily(astheGreeksexhortedus)tofreeourselvesfromthetyrannyofpastandfuture,toinhabitapresentwhichisfinallysereneandcleansedofguilt.Itisatthispoint–wherethefearofdeathhasnoreality–thatthequestionofmeaningintersectswiththatofsalvation.But first Iwould like topress further thequestionofwhether there exists a

‘wisdomoflove’,avisionwhichallowsustounderstandfullythereasonswhyitalone,inahumanistperspectiveatleast,givesmeaningtoourlives.I would like to begin with a very simplified analysis of what constitutes a

workofart.Inwhateverrealm,theworkofartisalwaysinitiallydefinedbytheparticularity of its cultural context of origin. It is always historically and

geographicallymarkedbytheepochandthe‘spirit’ofthepeopleamongwhomitoriginates.Thismightbedescribedasits‘folkloric’aspect(fromGermanVolk,meaning‘people’), itsdebt toacommonvocabularyorvernacular, ifyou like.Wecantellimmediately,withoutbeinginanywayspecialists,thatacanvasbyVermeer belongs neither to the Asiatic world nor to the Arab world; that itobviously cannot be situated in terms of contemporary art, but rather belongswithNorthernEuropeanartoftheseventeenthcentury.Similarly,afewbarsareoften enough to tell us that a piece ofmusic is Eastern orWestern, that it isclassicalormodern,thatitisreligiousmusicordancemusic,andsoon.Besides,eventhegreatestworksofclassicalmusicborrowelementsfrompopulardances,whose national characteristics are never far from the surface. A polonaise byChopin, a Hungarian rhapsody by Brahms, the Romanian Dances of Bartokmaketheseconnectionsexplicit.Andevenifitisnotovert,theparticularitiesoforigin always leave their trace, and no matter how great a work of art, howuniversalitsappeal,itneverentirelybreakswithitslinkstoaplaceandadate.However, it is equally the case that a great work is distinguished from a

folkloricartefactinnotbeingtetheredtoaparticular‘people’.Itraisesitselftothe ‘universal’; it addresses itselfpotentially to thewholeofhumanity.This iswhat Goethe referred to, in terms of literary exchanges and relations, asWeltliteratur(worldliterature)–withwhichthenotionof‘globalisation’haslessthan nothing in common: the access of thework of art toworld status is notobtainedbyfloutingitsparticularitiesoforigin,butbyassumingthesefromtheoutset,asitsnourishment,soastotransfiguretheminthespaceofartandmakeofthemsomethingotherthansimplefolklore.Asaresult,theparticularitiesoforiginareintegratedintoalargercontext,to

formanexperience largeenough tobepotentiallycommon toallofhumanity.Whichiswhytheworkofartpossessesthedistinctionofspeakingtoeveryone,whateverthetimeorplaceinwhichwelive.Letustakeastepfurther.InanattempttounderstandNaipaul,Imakeuseof

twokeyconcepts:particularanduniversal.Theparticular,tobespecific,residesintheexperiencedescribedbythewriter,hispointofdeparture:thesmallislandand,moreprecisely, at theheartof the island, the Indiancommunity towhichNaipaulbelonged.Andthewritingdoesabsolutelyconcernaparticularreality,with its own language, its religious traditions, its cuisine, its rituals etc. Andthen, at the other end of the spectrum, if you like, there is the universal. Bywhichismeantnotmerelythevastworldofothers,butalsothepurposeoftheitinerary to which Naipaul commits himself when he takes on the ‘zones of

shadow’,or thoseelementsofothernesswhichonfirstacquaintanceheneitherknowsorunderstands.WhatIwouldlikeyoutounderstand,sinceitiscrucialtograspthesensesin

whichloveimpartsmeaning,isthatbetweenthesetworealities–theparticularwithitsfocus,andtheuniversalwhichpotentiallyincludesallofhumanity,thereis room for amiddle term: the singular, or the individual.And it is this latterreality,andthisonly,whichistheobjectofourlovesandthebearerofmeaning.Let us try to make sense of an idea which, quite simply, is the beam

supportingtheentirephilosophicaledificeofasecularhumanism.Tohelpustoseethismoreclearly,Iwillbeginwithadefinitionofsingularity,inheritedfromGerman romanticism. If, as has been the case since classical antiquity, wedesignatebytheterm‘singularity’or‘individuality’adistinctivequalitywhichisnotmerelythatoftheparticularcase,butgraduatestowardsabroaderhorizon,to attain greater universality, it is immediately apparent that the work of artoffersthemostperfectmodel.Andit isbecausetheyare, inthisprecisesense,theauthorsofsingularworks,atoncerootedintheircultureandepochoforigin,butatthesametimecapableofaddressingthemselvestoallmeninallages,thatwestillreadPlatoorHomer,MolièreorShakespeare,andthatwestilllistentoBach or Chopin. The same is true of all great masterpieces and even greathistoricalmonuments:wecanbeEnglishandProtestantandyetbeprofoundlymovedbythetempleofAngkorWat,bytheGreatMosqueofCairo,byacanvasof Vermeer or a scroll of Chinese calligraphy. Because they have raisedthemselvestothesupremelevelof‘singularity’:meaningthattheyhavedaredtosatisfy themselves neitherwith the particularitieswhich formed them (as theyform every individual) nor with an abstract, disembodied universality (like achemicalormathematicalformula,forexample).Theworkofartworthyofthenameisneitheralocalartefactnorisitauniversaldenudedoftouchandtaste,asis the product of pure scientific research. And it is to this singularity, thisindividuality that is neither entirely particular nor entirely universal, that werespondsopowerfully.Fromwhichyoumayalsoseehowthenotionofsingularitylinksdirectlyto

our ideal of an enlarged thought: by uprootingmyself to become another, byenlargingthefieldofmyexperiences,Ibecomesingular–becauseIgobeyondtheparticularitiesofmyoriginstoaccede,not topureunmediateduniversality,but to a broader and richer awareness of the possibilities which are those ofhumanityasawhole.Onesimpleexample:whenIsettle inanothercountry tolearnaforeignlanguage,Ienlargemyhorizoncontinually,whetherIamaware

of it or not. I affordmyself themeans of entering into communicationwith alargernumberofpeople;andanentirecultureisattachedtothelanguageIamdiscovering, so that I enrich myself incomparably by this new and externaladditiontomyoriginalparticularity.Inotherwords,singularityisnotmerelytheprimarycharacteristicofaworkofart–this‘thing’thatisexternaltome–butisalsoasubjectiveandpersonalattributeofthehumanindividualassuch.Anditisthisattribute, to theexclusionofallothers,which is theprimaryobjectofourloveforeachother.Weneverlovetheparticularassuch,northeuniversalinitsabstractionandvacancy.Whowouldfallinlovewithahedgehogoranalgebraicformula?Ifweholdonalittlelongertothisnotionofsingularity,towhichtheidealof

anenlargedhorizonhasledus,wemustaddthedimensionoflove:becauseitislove that gives its ultimate justification andmeaning to thewhole business of‘enlargement’ which can and should guide human experience. Considered assuch, it is thefulfilmentofahumanistsoteriology(thebranchoftheologythatdeals with salvation), the only plausible response to the question of life’smeaning–inrespectofwhich,onceagain,ahumanismwithoutmetaphysicscaneasilylooklikeasecularisedChristianity.WemaybeassistedinunderstandingthisquestionbyafragmentinPascal’s

Pensées, where he quizzes himself, in effect, about the exact nature of theobjectsofouraffection,andoftheselfthatexperiencesaffection:

Whatthenisthis‘I’?Supposeamanplaceshimselfbyawindowtoseethosewhopassby.IfI

passby,canIsaythatheplacedhimselftheretoseeme?No;forhedoesnot think of me in particular. But does the man who loves someone onaccountofherbeautyreallylovethatperson?No;forthesmallpox,whichwillkillherbeautywhilesparingherperson,willcausehimtolovehernomore.Andifsomeonelovesmeformyjudgement,orformymemory,hedoes

not loveme, for I can lose these qualitieswithout losingmyself.Where,then,isthis‘I’,ifitbeneitherinthebodynorinthesoul?Andhowlovethebodyor thesoul,exceptfor thosequalitieswhichdonotconstitutean‘I’, since theyareperishable?For it is impossibleandwouldbeunjust tolovethesoulofapersonintheabstractandforwhateverqualitiesmightbetherein.Wenever,then,loveaperson,butonlyqualities.

Letusthereforenolongerjeeratthosewhoarehonouredonaccountofrank and office; forwe only ever love a person on account of borrowedqualities.(Pensées,323)

The conclusion usually drawn from this text runs as follows: the ‘I’, whichPascalconstantlyreferstoas‘hateful’,becauseitisalwaysmoreorlessvowedtoegotism,isnotatenableobjectoflove.Quitesimplybecausewealltendtoattachourselvestoparticularities,tothe‘external’qualitiesofthoseweclaimtolove: to their beauty, strength, humour, intelligence etc. This is what initiallyseducesus.Butgiventhatsuchattributesareboundtofail,lovesoonerorlatergiveswaytowearinessandboredom.Andthis,forPascal,isourmostcommonexperience:

He no longer loves the personwhom he loved ten years ago. I canwellbelieveit.Sheisnolongerthesame,norishe.Hewasyoung,andshetoo;nowsheisquitedifferent.Hewouldperhapsloveherstill,weresheasshewasbefore.(Pensées,123)

Yes,sadly.Farfromhavinglovedintheotherpersonwhatweunderstoodtobetheirmost intimate essence – what I have been calling their singularity – wemerely became attached to their particular and consequently entirely abstractqualities,whichcouldaseasilybefoundinanynumberofotherpeople.Beauty,strength,intelligenceetc.arenotthepreserveofthisorthatperson,noraretheylinked in any inward and essential sense to the ‘substance’ of this person asopposed to that person; these qualities are so to speak interchangeable. IfPascal’sboredhusbandpersistsinhisfolly,hewillprobablydivorceherinorderto find a younger andmorebeautifulwoman, just like theonehemarried tenyearsearlier.Well before the German romantics of the early nineteenth century, Pascal

discovered that the irreducibly particular and the interchangeably abstract anduniversal, far from being opposites, ‘merge into each other’, and are but twosidesof thesamecoin.Reflectforamomentonthefollowingall-too-commonexperience:youtelephoneafriendandyousimplysay,‘Hello,it’sme’,butthistells them nothing about who is speaking. This ‘I’ is abstract and lacking insingularitybecauseeveryone in theworldcalls themselves ‘I’.Onlyby takingother information intoaccount–yourvoice, forexample–willyourfriendbeable to identify you. But not by simple reference to an ‘I’ that remains

paradoxicallygeneralisedandunlovablyabstract.In the sameway, I think Ihavepenetrated to thequickofanotherbeing, to

what ismost essential and irreplaceable about the beloved by loving them fortheirabstractandmostundifferentiatedqualities,buttherealityisquitedifferent:allIhaveidentifiedareattributesasanonymousasabadgeofofficeoccupationor the letters that come after a name. In otherwords, the particular is not thesameasthesingular.And we need to grasp that singularity alone, which transcends equally the

particularandtheuniversal,canbetheproperobjectoflove.If we content ourselveswith itemising particularities, we end up by failing

evertoloveanybody,inwhichcasePascaliscorrect:letusstopjeeringatthosewhovalueonlytheborrowingsofrankandoffice.Afterall,whetherwegoafterbeautyormedalscomesdowntothesamething:thefirstis(almost)asexternaltothepersonasthesecond.Whatmakesanindividuallovable,whatcreatestheconvictionthatwecouldcontinuelovingthemeveniftheirlooksareravagedbyillness, isnot reducible toanexternalattribute,aquality,however important itmay be. What we love in the beloved (and are loved for in return, at leastpotentially),isneitherpureparticularitynorabstractuniversalattributes,butthesingularitywhich distinguishes and renders he or she unlike any other.Of theonewe love,wemaysay,affectionately,withMontaigne, ‘becausehewashe,becauseIwasI’,butnot,‘becausehewashandsome,strong,intelligent…’Andthissingularity,youmaybesureofit,wasnothandedoutatbirth.Itis

formed of a thousand details, and habits, ofwhichmoreoverwe are not evenconscious. It is formed over the course of existence, and through experience;which is why, precisely, it is irreplaceable. Hedgehogs are all alike. As arekittens.Adorable,certainly.But it isonlyslowly,when itbegins tosmile, thatthe child becomes humanly lovable. From the moment he enters into aspecificallyhumanhistory,thatofhisrelationtoothers.In this sense, we can reinvest the Greek ideal of the ‘eternal instant’: this

presentmomentwhichisfreedfromtheanxietiesofmortality–byvirtueofitssingularity,andbecauseweregarditas irreplaceable,preferringtoweighitonits own terms rather than discard it in the name of nostalgia for what camebeforeorhopesforwhatmightfollow.It is here, once more, that the question of meaning connects with that of

salvation.Ifwithdrawalfromtheparticularandexposuretowhatisuniversalarewhatcreatesingularityofexperience–ifthisdoubleprocessgivessingularitytoour lives and allows us recognise what is singular in others – it offers us

simultaneouslythemeansofenlargingourthoughtandofaccedingtomomentsofgrace,wherethefearofdeath(linkedas it is todimensionsof timethatareoutsidethepresent)isitselfremoved.You might object that, compared to the doctrine of Christianity – whose

promise of the resurrection of the bodymeans that we shall be reunitedwiththosewe love after death – a humanismwithoutmetaphysics is small beer. Igrantyouthatamongsttheavailabledoctrinesofsalvation,nothingcancompetewith Christianity – provided, that is, that you are a believer. If one is not abeliever–andonecannotforceoneselftobelieve,norpretendtobelieve–thenwe must learn to think differently about the ultimate question posed by alldoctrinesofsalvation,namelythatofthedeathofalovedone.Thereare, itseemstome, threewaysofconsideringthe lossofa lovedone

andthreewaysofpreparingyourselfforit.WecanbetemptedbythecounselsofBuddhism,whichcanbereducedtoafundamentalprinciple:donotbecomeattached.Notfromindifference–Buddhism,likeStoicism,speaksupforhumancompassion and the obligations of friendship, with the precaution that if weallowourselvestobetrappedbythenetofattachmentsinwhichloveinvariablyentangles us, we are without doubt preparing the worst of sufferings forourselves:because life isastateof fluxand impermanence,andhumanbeingsareperishable.Wedonotdepriveourselvesonlyofhappiness and serenity, inadvanceofthefact,butalsooffreedom.Thewordsweuseforthesethingsarethemselves suggestive: to beattached is to be linked orbound, as opposed tofree;andifwewishtoemancipateourselvesfromthebondsforgedbylove,wemustpractiseasearlyaspossiblethatformofwisdomknownasnon-attachment.Anotherresponse,diametricallyopposedtotheabove,characterisesthegreat

monotheisms – Christianity above all, since only Christianity professes theresurrectionof thebodyaswellas thesoul.Thisconsistsofpromising thataslongaswepractiseloveinGod–inotherwords,alovethatbearsuponwhatisimmortal in our loved ones rather than uponwhat ismortal –we shall experiencetheblissoffindingthemagain.Inotherwords,attachmentisnotprohibitedas long as it is correctly oriented. This promise is symbolised in theGospelsthrough the episode of the death of Lazarus, a friend of Christ. Christ weepswhen he learns that his friend is dead – which Buddha would never allowhimselftodo.Heweepsbecause,havingtakenhumanform,heisexperiencingthisseparationasgrief,assuffering.Buthealsoknows,ofcourse, thathewillsoonbeunitedoncemorewithLazarus:thatloveisstrongerthandeath.Here are two forms of wisdom, then, two doctrines of salvation, which

although opposed in almost every respect, deal nonetheless with the sameproblem: that of the death of loved ones. To put it bluntly, neither of theseattitudes persuadesme.Not only am I unable to preventmyself from formingattachments, I havenowish todo so.Nor am I in the least ignorant as to thesufferingstocome–indeedIamalreadyfamiliarwithsomeoftheirbitterness.However, as the Dalai-Lama acknowledges, the only way of truly livingaccording to the rules of non-attachment is to follow themonastic life, to besolitary(monastikos)inordertobefree,toavoidallbonds.Ibelievethattobethecase.ThereforeImustrenouncethewisdomofBuddhism,asIrenouncethatof Stoicism –with respect and esteem, but alsowith a sense of unbridgeabledifference.IfindtheChristianpropositioninfinitelymoretempting–exceptforthefact

thatIdonotbelieveinit.ButwereittobetrueIwouldbecertainlybeataker.Iremembermy friend, the atheist and historian François Furet, being asked ontelevisionwhat hewouldwishGod to say to himwere they ever tomeet.Towhich he gave an immediate answer: ‘Come quickly, your loved ones arewaiting for you!’ I would have given the same answer, and with the sameundertowofdisbelief.What remains, then, other than to await the inevitablewithoutpaying it too

much attention? Nothing, perhaps. Except, despite everything, to develop onone’s ownaccount,without any illusions, something resembling a ‘wisdomoflove’ – as well as a love of wisdom. We each of us know that we must bereconciled with our parents before they die, whatever the tensions of thatrelationship. Because later, whatever Christianity may say, is too late. If weacknowledge that thedialoguewithour lovedonesmusthave a stop, thenwemustdrawtheconsequencesinthislife.Italsostrikesmethatparentsshouldnotlietotheirchildrenaboutimportant

things. I know several people who have discovered, after the death of theirfather,thathewasnottheirbiologicalparent–eitherthattheirmotherhadtakenalover,orthattherewasaconcealedadoption.Ineverycase,thiskindofuntruthcausesconsiderablepain.Notmerelybecausethebelateddiscoveryofthetruthwillalwaysbeunhappy;butaboveallbecause,afterthedeathofthefatherwhowasnotafatherintheusualsense,itisimpossibleforthechildturnedadulttohavethatconversation:tograspthemeaningofasilence,orofaremark,orofanattitudewhichhasleftitstraceonhim,towhichhewouldliketohavegivenameaning–butwhichheisnowforeverpreventedfromdoing.Tomethisformofwisdom–awisdomoflove–iselaboratedbyeachofus

largelyinsilence.ButIthinkthat,toonesideofChristianityorBuddhism,wecan learn how to live and love as adults, even if thismeans thinkingof deatheveryday.Notoutofmorbidity,buttodiscoverwhatneedsdoing,hereandnow,withthosewhomweloveandwhomweshalllose,unlesstheyloseusfirst.Iamconvinced, even if I myself am still far from possessing it, that this type ofwisdomexists,andthatitisthecrowningachievementofahumanismreleasedfinallyfromtheillusionsofmetaphysicsandreligion.

InConclusion…

Asyouwillhaveguessed,IlovephilosophyandaboveallIrevereKant’snotionofanenlargedhorizonofthought–uponwhichIhaveplacedalotofemphasisin these pages – as perhaps the central truth of modern philosophy andcontemporaryhumanism.Ithinkitpermitsustocreateatheoriawhichgivesthenecessary space to self-reflection, an ethics which is open to the globalisedworldwithwhichwearegoingtohavetodealfromnowon,andalsooffersusapost-Nietzscheandoctrineofsalvation.Beyondthesethreegreataxesofenquiry,the dream of an enlarged thought also allows us to perceive differently –bypassingscepticismanddogmatism– theenigmaticprospectof therebeingapluralityofphilosophicaltruths.Ingeneral,theideathatthereareseveralphilosophicalsystemsandthatthese

do not agree with each other tends to provoke two responses: scepticism ordogmatism.Scepticismarguesmoreorlessasfollows:sincethedawnoftime,differentphilosophieshavedonebattlewitheachotherwithouteverarrivingatagreement about what constitutes the truth. And this plurality, because it isinsurmountable,provesthatphilosophyisnotanexactscience;thatitislostinmistandunabletocreateaclearingfortruth,whichbydefinitionmustbesingleandunique.Ifthereexistseveralversionsofreality,andthesefailtocometoanagreement,wemust then admit that none can claim seriously to hold the trueanswer to the questions we ask ourselves about knowledge, morality andsalvation.Consequently,allphilosophyisidle.Dogmatism takes the opposite stance: certainly, there are several possible

waysof lookingat reality;andmine– theoneIhaveendedupoptingfor– ismanifestlysuperiortoandtruerthantheothers,whicharenothingbutamazeofendlesserrors.HowmanytimesmustwelistentoSpinoziststellingusthatKantwasoffthewall,orKantiansdenouncingthestructuralweaknessesofSpinoza?Tiredoftheseolddebates,underminedbyrelativism,guilt-strickentoobythe

memoryof itsown imperialisms, thedemocratic impulse todaysideswillingly

withpositionsofcompromise,which,inthenameofacommendableconcernto‘respectdifferences’,endupresigningthemselvestoslacknotionsof‘tolerance’,‘dialogue’,‘respectforothers’,towhichitisnoteasytoassignameaning.The notion of an enlarged horizon suggests a different way forward.

Sidestepping thechoicebetweenapluralismofbelief that isall façade,on theonehand,andawholesalerenunciationofconvictionsontheother,itinvitesustoextricate–casebycase–whattruththeremightbeinavisionoftheworldthatisnotours,therebyaffordingusthemeansbywhichtounderstandit,andtotakefromitwhatweneedforourownpurposes.I once wrote a book with a friend, André ComteSponville, the materialist

philosopherwhomIrespectaboveallothers.Everythingstoodbetweenus:weare of the same age – room therefore for potential rivalry; politically he wascoming from a communist background, and I from the republican right.Philosophically,hedrewhis inspirationentirelyfromSpinozaandthesagesoftheEast,whereasminederivesfromKantandfromChristianity.Butinsteadofhatingeachother,weendedalmostbytradingplaces.BywhichImeanthat,farfrompresumingthattheotherwasactinginbadfaith,weseparatelyattemptedtounderstandasfullyaspossiblewhatmightbepersuasiveandconvincingaboutavisionoftheworldthatisnotours.Thanks to which, I have come to understand the grandeur of Stoicism, of

Buddhism,ofSpinozism–allthosephilosophieswhichinviteus‘tohopealittlelessandlovealittlemore’.Ihaveunderstood,too,howthecombinedweightofpastandfuturedeadensourrelishinthepresent;Ihavecometoagreaterlikingfor Nietzsche, even, and his doctrine of the innocence of becoming. As ithappensIdidnotturnintoamaterialist,butIcannolongerignorematerialismifI am to comprehend and describe certain aspects of human experience. Insummary,IthinkthatIenlargedthehorizonthathadbeenminehitherto.Every great philosophical system epitomises in the form of thought a

fundamental human experience, just as every great work of art or literaturetranslateshumanpossibilityintothemostconcreteandsensuousform.RespectfortheOtherdoesnotafterallexcludepersonalchoice.Onthecontrary,itisitsprimarycondition.

FurtherReading

Itwouldbeeasytoprovideabibliography,asweusedtodoinuniversities.Thefirsthourofthephilosophycoursewasspentintakingdownadictatedlistofahundredandfiftytitles, togetherwiththesecondaryliterature–allofwhichtobereadwithoutfailbytheendoftheyear.Theonlyproblemisthatthisdidnotreally serve any purpose; even less so today when you can find all thebibliographies you couldwish for onlinewithin a few seconds. So I prefer tooffer a short but ‘reasoned’ list for further reading, merely to call to yourattentionthefewnecessarybookswithwhichyoushouldmakeastart–withouttrying to anticipatewhatwill follow.And, to be quite honest, there is enoughheretobegettingonwith.

Pierre Hadot,What is Ancient Philosophy? (Harvard University Press, 2002)Jean-JacquesRousseau,Discourseon theOriginof Inequality (translatedbyPatrick Coleman, Oxford University Press, 1999) Immanuel Kant,GroundworkoftheMetaphysicsofMorals(translatedbyH.J.Paton,HarperPerennialModernThought, 2009)FriedrichNietzsche,Twilight of the Idols(translatedbyDuncanLarge,OxfordUniversityPress,1998)Jean-PaulSartre,ExistentialismisaHumanism(translatedbyCarolMacomber,YaleUniversityPress, 2007) André Comte-Sponville, Le Bonheur, désespérément (EditionsLibrio,2003)

Martin Heidegger, ‘What is Metaphysics?’ and ‘After Metaphysics’, in BasicWritings(ed.DavidFarrellKrell,HarperPerennialModernThought,2008)

Index

Thepaginationofthiselectroniceditiondoesnotmatchtheeditionfromwhichit was created. To locate a specific passage, please use your e-book reader’ssearchtools.

absolutecommandments,119–20activeforces,157,163–68,169,172,175,179Adorno,Theodor,194affectivity,104,105Althusser,Louis,203altruism,118,168amorfati,44,189–91,193–95,203,204,223,224,226,227,231analyticalphilosophy,202anarchy,169–70,173animals:consequencesofnewdistinctionbetweenhumansand,110–14denatured,humansas,114–17differencebetweenhumansand,103–10educationin,111–12essenceof,112societiesof,111

animism,22Antichrist,The(Nietzsche),182,183Antoninus,79Apologists,79Appel,Karl-Otto,202Arendt,Hannah,33–34,35aristocracy,aristocraticmodel,72,73,77,118meritocraticmodelvs.,120–27

Nietzscheand,157,163–64Aristotle,16,25,73,78,104NicomacheanEthics,39–40,122,123–24

Arrian,18–19art,artists,156–57,161,163–64,165,177,178,180,252–56beautyand,236,237classicalvs.romantic,179–81culturalcontextof,252–53economyand,170greatnessof,172–73

astronomy,97–98,132,164atheism,10,105,136,137,145attachment,47–49,80–87,261,262Augustine,Saint,6,64,65,82TheCityofGod,65,66,67–68Confessions,83–87

Auschwitz,194,227authority,argumentsfrom,132–33,211auto-reflection,239–43,248,265

baptism,88barbarians,77beauty,14,24–25,98,99,120,236–38,258–60bees,111Bernard,Claude,99–100,156BetweenPastandFuture(Arendt),33–34,35BeyondGoodandEvil(Nietzsche),146–47,154Bible,69–70,251–52Corinthians,66–67,88FirstEpistleofSaintJohn,64Galatians,82Genesis,9–10Gospels,3,57,60,61–62,64,75,76,262Romans,89

bioethics,220–21,241–42biology,202,241blasphemy,185–86

BosnianMuslims,228–29Bruller,Jean,114Buddhism,41,43,44,47,48,50–51,80–82,84–87,190,191,193–95,224,225,261,262,264,267

capitalism,204–7CatechismoftheCatholicChurch,89–90categoricalimperatives,119–20cats,106,107,108,109,112causality,99,100–101chaos,14,94,95,98,99Nietzscheand,154–57,167

Christ,3–4,57,69,75,87–90,262crucifixionof,67asLogos,59–66,78,89

Christianity,10,45,55–91,136,233,236,245,257,264,267apologiasand,79bodyand,89–90,160devilin,9–10ethicsand,58,71–77humanismand,94–97humanitarianismand,247lovein,4,60,77–91andmodernideaofhumanity,58,60,71–78Nietzscheand,150,160,168,174–75reasonin,57reasonreplacedbyfaithin,59–71resurrectionin,84–85,87–90,261salvationin,3–4,53,56–60,70,77–91,93,94,261–63scienceand,94,132Stoicismand,52–53,56,57,59–71,93theoryin,58–71truthsin,69,70,132

Chrysippus,18,26,32Cicero,18,38OnMoralEnds,30–31OntheNatureoftheGods,21–22,26,32,38

CityofGod,The(Augustine),65,66,67–68classicism,romanticismvs.,179–81Cleanthes,18,26commandments,absolute,119–20commongood,117,119communism,136–39,170,186,244compassion,81,85,87,168,247,261competition,207,212–14,215,218Comte-Sponville,André,43,224–25,266–67Confessions(Augustine),83–87conscience,75–76,132consciousness,236contemporaryphilosophy,199–204deconstructionand,201–4,217–18,219ethicsand,222,223Heideggerand,143–44,196–97,205–9,210,214–19humanismin,239movingbeyonddeconstructionin,204–8Nietzscheand,199–205,207,208,219possibleavenuesfor,219–23andretreatofmeaning,205–11salvationand,222–23,247–64technologyand,205–11theoryand,222,223transcendenceand,232–39

Copernicus,Nicolaus,93–94,96,164Corinthians,66–67,88Corneille,Pierre,181cosmos,cosmicorder,121,126,136,144,145,233,239Christianityand,61,62contemplationof,19–28Epictetusand,45,48humanismand,94–103,114,124–27,128,133,135justicebasedon,28–32naturalcatastrophesand,23,24,120–21,168–69,211–12,247Nietzscheand,150,151,155–57,166–67,184,192scienceand,97–101,127

Stoicsand,19–28,45,48,52,59,93Crates,29,30Crescens,79criticalreflection,1–2,221–22CritiqueofPracticalReason(Kant),117CritiqueofPureReason(Kant),98,100–101,102culture,111,112,116,249cynicism,199,203–4,223Cynics,29–30,79

Dalai-Lama,262death,2–8,10,11,13,33–40,49–53,57,58,77,90,140,260,264heroicdeedsand,33–36oflovedones,3,80–81,248,261–64procreationand,33–34

DeclarationoftheRightsofMan,74,102,103,199,245,246deconstruction,140,199,222,223,224,241contemporaryphilosophyand,201–8,217–18,219movingbeyond,204–8seealsopostmodernismDeleuze,Gilles,201,203

democracy,17,31,72,74–75,76,108,126,144–47,149,157,161,166,196,202,206,208–9,217,218,222

Dererumnatura(“OntheNatureofThings”)(Lucretius),6–7Derrida,Jacques,203Descartes,René,10,55,94,104–5,127–32,144,164,209–11TheDiscourseonMethod,128Meditations,128

devil,9–10DialogueConcerningtheTwoChiefWorldSystems(Galileo),94Dionysus,190DiscourseonMethod,The(Descartes),128DiscourseontheOriginofInequality(Rousseau),104–10,111Discourses(Epictetus),18,36–37,45–48,51disinterestedness,117–18,119,153divinity,151,233Christianityand,61–63,65,67–68,70,78humanisingof,245,247

humanismand,98,102,103,114,121,125,126,128Nietzscheand,151,155–57,184Platoon,38–39Stoicismand,20–21

dogmatism,265–66Donne,John,96,97,127–28doubt,128,129,132,144,148,216aboutfuture,191,193

Dunant,Henri,246–47

earthquakes,120–21,168–69,211–12,247EcceHomo(Nietzsche),145–46,183,189ecology,31–32,215–16,220–21education,111–12,127,249egotism,114,118,119,121,125,126,257enlargedthought,139–40,248–52,256,260,265,266Enlightenment,143–45,150,184,196,199,200,204,211–13,215,216Epictetus,7,18–19,36,37,189,194–95,227Discourses,18,36–37,45–48,51Meditations,49

Epicureans,24Epicurus,4,6,21–22,41equality,72–75,77,102,125–26erudition,221,222eternalinstant,260seealsopresentmomenteternalrecurrence,183–89,190–91,192

ethicsandmorals,12–15,223,236,237,265inaristocraticvs.meritocraticmodels,120–27bioethics,220–21Christianityand,58,71–77andconsequencesofnewdistinctionbetweenhumansandanimals,110–14contemporaryphilosophyand,222,223anddifferencebetweenanimalsandhumans,103–10humanismand,95,96,102–35Kantian,117–20,121–22,127,149andmanasdenaturedanimal,114–17Nietzscheand,150,168–76,178,181–82,185,195–96,243

ontologyand,181relativismin,247salvationand,133–35scienceand,220–21,240,241–42secular,definitionof,133Stoicismand,23,28–33useofterms,12–13

ethology,105evil,108–10,114,116,184ExistentialismisaHumanism(Sartre),112–13

facts,153–54faith,4–6,9,12,56,57,93,132reasonreplacedby,59–71

fascism,162–63,199,224,227fears,10,42,45,50ofdeath,seedeathFoucault,Michel,201,203

freedomandfreewill,144,153,228–32,261Christianityand,72–74equalityand,77fearand,10Greeksand,10,17humanismand,105–8,111–14,117–19,121–22,125,126,133–34Kantand,117–18,121–22,125religionand,11–12Rousseauand,105–8,111–12,113–14,119

FrenchCommunistParty,136–37Frenchrepublicanism,127FrenchRevolution,74,130–31,211Freud,Sigmund,41,148,156,167,201,203FromtheClosedWorldtotheInfinite(Koyré),95–96Furet,François,263future,8,40–44,189,190,231,252doubtsabout,191,193hopesfor,7,8,41,43–47,190,194–95,224–26,232,260,267

Galatians,82

GalileoGalilei,94,132GayScience,The(Nietzsche),156,187genealogy,150,152–55,185,195–96,201,223,224,229,232,241Genesis,9–10Germany,244Nazi,seeNazisglobalisation,205–7,212–13,215–16,218,265

God,2,10,11,14,45,135,230,233–34,236,238humanismand,95–96pantheismand,22salvationand,4–6,8,10,33transcendenceof,26

gods,17,38Goethe,JohannWolfgangvon,253goodwill,118,119–20,126Gospels,3,57,60,61–62,64,75,76,262grace,50,226,260Greekphilosophy,15–16,17,24,55,102Christianityand,52–53,93seealsoStoicismgrief,248,261–64

guilt,regretandremorse,8,40–41,47,49,176–77,179,187–88,190–95,252

Habermas,Jürgens,202harmony,171–72,175–76Hegel,GeorgWilhelmFriedrich,221Heidegger,Martin,143–44,196–97,205–9,210,214–19OvercomingMetaphysics,208

hierarchicalorder,72–73,77,94inaristocraticworld,72,73,77,118,120–27

Hiroshima,241Hitler,Adolf,196hope,7,8,41,43–47,190,194–95,224–26,232,260,267horizon,235Hugo,Victor,181human(s):Christianityandmodernideaof,58,60,71–78consequencesofnewdistinctionbetweenanimalsand,110–14deificationof,243–47

asdenaturedanimals,114–17differencebetweenanimalsand,103–10equalityof,72–75,77,102,125–26rightsof,60,74,102,103,133–35,196,199,202,238,245,246

Human,AllTooHuman(Nietzsche),171,172humanism andmodern philosophy, 93–141, 144–45, 184, 196, 203, 204, 209,224,227contemporary,239ethicsand,95,96,102–35originof,127–33postmodernismand,143–45,148,149post-Nietzschean,232–33,241salvationand,95,96–97,102,103,128,133–39theoryin,95,97–101,103withoutmetaphysics,236–39,243,247–48,257,261,264

humanitarianism,246–47humannature,112–13humility,5–6,9,10,64–69,93Husserl,Edmund,232,234–36

ideals, 136–39, 145–48, 168, 171, 175, 178, 185–86, 189, 195–96, 204, 207,217–18,224

idols,136,145–48,178,185,195,196,200–204,207,215,217,234–35,237immanence,25–26,224,233,245transcendencewithin,234–38

impermanence,48,81individualism,125,126individuality,255innocenceofbecoming,49,191–96,267instinct,105–6,108,112intelligence,104,105,120,258,260IntroductiontotheStudyofExperimentalMedicine(Bernard),99–100Islam,10,55,56,76,233

Jacobins,130Jesus,seeChristJohn,Saint,3,61–62,64Jonas,Hans,32,123

Jews,10,20,55,66–67,75–76,233genocideagainst,194,227

judgements,153–54,169,228–31justiceandlaw,23–24,75–76,236–38cosmicorderand,28–32

Justin,Saint,62,78–80

Kant, Immanuel, 7, 10, 13, 100, 114, 125, 127, 128, 139, 146, 202, 210, 227,230,232,234,248,265–67CritiqueofPracticalReason,117CritiqueofPureReason,98,100–101,102ethicsand,117–20,121–22,127,149Nietzscheand,155–56,186–87

knowledge,97–101,128,150,151,209,211,223absolute,234,236Nietzscheand,152–55,182self-,239–43,248,265threeagesof,239–42

Koyré,Alexander,95–96

Lacan,Jacques,203Lanzky,Paul,169law,seejusticeandlawLazarus,3,262LetterstoLucilius(Seneca),42–43liberalism,206libertarians,173,174liver,100Logos,26,45,59–66,78,89love,3,4,60,77–91,93,135,190,224,236–38,248,251–62,267deathand,3,80–81,248,261–64wisdomof,252,263,264

Lucretius,6–7,41

MarcusAurelius,19,61,62,79,189Meditations,23,24–25,37,41–42,48–49

Marx,Karl,136,148,149,201,203,229materialism,195–96,205,223,236–39,241,244,245,247,267failureof,223–32

Meditations(Descartes),128Meditations(Epictetus),49Meditations(MarcusAurelius),23,24–25,37,41–42,48–49MemoryofSolferino,A(Dunant),246–47meritocraticmodel,73–74aristocraticmodelvs.,120–27

Michelet,Jules,103misfortune,227monotheism,45Montaigne,Michelde,7,10,260morals,seeethicsandmoralsmourning,248,261–64music,156–57,164,181,237,253,255Muslims,10,55,56,76,233Bosnian,228–29

MusoniusRufus,18Mussolini,Benito,196

Nagasaki,241Naipaul,V.S.,249–51,254nationalism,138–39,246–47naturalcatastrophes,23,24,120–21,168–69,211–12,247nature,240masteryof,209–14

Nazis,147,149,196,218,219Auschwitz,194,227

Newton,Isaac,94,102,114,155–56,164NicomacheanEthics(Aristotle),39–40,122,123–24Nietzsche,Friedrich,41,55,139,140–41,143–97,220,221,224,225,229,241,245,247,248,267activeforcesand,157,163–68,169,172,175,179amorfatiand,44,189–91,193–95,203,204,226,231asanarchist,169–70,173TheAntichrist,182,183aristocracyand,157,163–64BeyondGoodandEvil,146–47,154chaosand,154–57,167Christianityand,150,160,168,174–75

contemporaryphilosophyand,199–205,207,208,219cosmosand,150,151,155–57,166–67,184,192divinityand,151,155–57,184EcceHomo,145–46,183,189eternalrecurrenceand,183–89,190–91,192TheGayScience,156,187asgenealogist,150,152–55,185,195–96,201“grandstyle”and,168,172–75,177–82,185,191,192,195–97,217harmonyand,171–72,175–76Human,AllTooHuman,171,172idolsand,136,145–48,178,185,195,196,200–204,207,215,217andinnocenceofbecoming,49,191–96,267interpretationsof,196–97knowledgeand,152–55moralityand,150,168–76,178,181–82,185,195–96,243Nazisand,147,149,196nihilismand,147–48,182–83,195,203praxisand,149,150–51reactiveforcesand,157–63,165,167,169,171–75,179,185,191–93,203religionand,160,184–85salvationand,149,150–51,182–89,223–24Socratesand,158–60,162–63,165–66,178theoryand,149–55,157,166,168,185,195–96ThusSpakeZarathustra,185–88TwilightoftheIdols,150,152–53,162,170,173–74TheWilltoPower,155,168,170–71,172–73,175,179–81,189–90,192willtopowerand,176–77,181–82,186,215,217

nihilism,147–48,182–83,195,203nostalgia,8,40–43,191,226,260

omniscience,234OnMoralEnds(Cicero),30–31OntheNatureoftheGods(Cicero),21–22,26,32,38“OntheNatureofThings”(Dererumnatura)(Lucretius),6–7OntheRevolutionsoftheHeavenlyBodies(Copernicus),93–94ontology,151,181OvercomingMetaphysics(Heidegger),208

pantheism,22,45parents,263–64particularity,251,254,258–60Pascal,Blaise,6,65,259Pensées,83,257–58

past,8,40–44,189,190,231,252guilt, regretandremorseover,8,40–41,47,49,176–77,179,187–88,190–95,252

nostalgiafor,8,40–43,191,226,260patriotism,136,137–38,246–47Paul,Saint,66–67,69Pensées(Pascal),83,257–58perfectibility,105–6,111,230,249PeterDamian,Saint,69philosophy,1–16analytical,202beginningof,17contemporary,seecontemporaryphilosophycriticalreflectionin,1–2,221–22definitionsof,1–2,6Greek,seeGreekphilosophymodern,seehumanismandmodernphilosophypluralityoftruthsin,265–67

postmodern,seepostmodernismreligionand,3,5–12,16,57,63,91replacementofonebyanother,51–52,60,199asscholasticdiscipline,70–71,219–22self-appraisalin,242–43specialisedcategoriesof,219–21threedimensionsof,12–15;seealsoethicsandmorals;salvation(wisdom),inphilosophy;theoryphysics,94,95,114,156,164,209,241

Picasso,Pablo,149,156–57pigeons,106,107,112Plato,14,16,67,78,130,158,221Timaeus,38–39

Poe,EdgarAllan,4–5politics,125,145–46,218,227,249andconsequencesofnewdistinctionbetweenhumansandanimals,110–14democracy,17,31,72,74–75,76,108,126,144–47,149,157,161,166,196,202,206,208–9,217,218,222

patriotism,136,137–38,246–47Popper,Karl,202postmodernism,143–45,148,149,200irreverenceof,149Nietzscheand,seeNietzsche,Friedrichpoverty,206,207

power,218praxis,32–33Nietzscheand,149,150–51Stoicismand,33–40

presentmoment,8,42–44,47,48,51,189,225–26,231–32,252,260amorfatiand,44,189–91,193–95,203,204,223,224,226,227,231

prideandarrogance,6,64–68PrincipiaMathematica(Newton),94PrinciplesofPhilosophy(Descartes),94progress,212–13,215psychoanalysis,148,167,242

RabautSaint-Etienne,Jean-Paul,131rabbits,100,156racism,113“Raven,The”(Poe),4–5Rawls,John,202reactiveforces,157–63,165,167,169,171–75,179,185,191–93,203reasonandrationalism,6,9,12,17,26,48,56,104,105,143–45,148,149,156,160,167,173,180,204,209,211,212inChristianity,57replacedbyfaith,59–71

recurrence,183–89,190–91,192regret,remorse,andguilt,8,40–41,47,49,176–77,179,187–88,190–95,252relativism,moral,247religion(s),17,55–56,93,144–45,211,233–34Christianity,seeChristianityfaithin,4–6,9,12,56,57,59–71,93,132humilitydemandedby,5–6,9,10,64–69,93Islam,10,55,56,76,233Judaism,10,20,55,66–67,75–76,233Nietzscheand,160,184–85philosophyand,3,5–12,16,57,63,91

promisesof,8,10,11salvationthrough,seesalvation,religiousscienceand,94,132,160substitute,136–39truthsin,69

remorse,regret,andguilt,8,40–41,47,49,176–77,179,187–88,190–95,252resurrection,84–85,87–90,261revolution,130–31,170,227rights,60,74,102,103,133–35,196,199,202,238,245,246Rinpoche,Sogyal,82Romans(Biblicalbook),89romanticism,classicismvs.,179–81Rosset,Clément,194Rousseau,Jean-Jacques,112–17,119,125,127,128,139,226,227,230,249DiscourseontheOriginofInequality,104–10,111

sacrifice,243–47salvation(wisdom),inphilosophy,6,10,12,14,15,57,58,70,71,93,221,224,243,265contemporaryphilosophyand,222–23,247–64humanismand,95,96–97,102,103,128,133–39materialismand,225moralityand,133–35Nietzscheand,149,150–51,182–89,223–24rethinking,247–64Stoicismand,32–53,59–60,78,80,86,93substitutereligionsand,136–39

salvation,religious,3,5–6,8–12,17,33,53,56Christian,3–4,53,56–60,70,77–91,93,94,261–63resurrectionin,84–85,87–90,261universal,77

Sartre,Jean-Paul,112scepticism,128,265–66Schoenberg,Arnold,149,156–57science(s),14,21,27–28,94,97–101,102,127,144–45,149,153–54,156,157,160–62,164,165,209–11,220,240–42astronomy,97–98,132,164biology,202,241

anddeathofgreatideas,212–19ethicsand,220–21,240,241–42andmasteryofnature,209–14movementtotechnologyfrom,210–19physics,94,95,114,156,164,209,241religionand,94,132,160self-criticismin,241–42sociology,201–2

scientificmethod,99,101,144,240scientism,136,138–39self-knowledge,239–43,248,265Seneca,18,44LetterstoLucilius,42–43

sexism,113singularity,255–56,258–60slaves,72,73,77,127socialism,170,186sociology,201–2Socrates,158–60,162–63,165–66,178Solferino,246solitude,82Sophists,158,165–66soteriology,33SovietUnion,244Spinoza,Baruch,7,41,226,227,266,267spirituality,223materialist,226

Srebrenicamassacre,228–29Stalin,Joseph,137stars,97Stoicism,7,16,17–53,55,76,77,79,80,84,87,90,192,224,225,233,239–40,261,262,267Christianityand,52–53,56,57,59–61,93ethicsand,23,28–33Logosin,26,45,59–66,78presentmomentand,42–44,47,48,51,190–95,226salvationin,32–53,59–60,78,80,86,93

theoryin,19–28subjectivity,127–30synthesis,100–101

tabularasa,130,131,144technique,214–15technology,205–19anddeathofgreatideas,212–19anddisappearanceofendsandtriumphofmeans,210–12movementfromscienceto,210–19andretreatofmeaning,205–11

theoria,239originsofword,19–20twoaspectsof,151

theory,12,14,15,19–20,27–28asauto-reflection,239–43,248inChristianity,58–71incontemporaryphilosophy,222,223inhumanism,95,97–101,103Nietzscheand,149–55,157,166,168,185,195–96practicaldimensionand,181inStoicism,19–28

ThomasAquinas,Saint,70ThusSpakeZarathustra(Nietzsche),185–88TibetanBookofLivingandDying,The(Rinpoche),82Timaeus(Plato),38–39time,13,33,40–41,252,260seealsofuture;past;presentmomentTocqueville,Alexisde,130

torture,109–10,194,228transcendence,25–26,205,224,245horizontal,245inimmanence,234–38materialismand,223,230–32newideaof,232–39Nietzscheand,147,148,178,185,192,195threeconceptionsof,233–36

trust,9,63,66,128,132–33

seealsofaithtruth(s),129,131,132,144,154,158,231,236andargumentsfromauthority,132–33inChristianity,69,70,132mathematical,236,237,238Nietzscheand,160–62,164–66,182inphilosophy,pluralityof,265–67

turtles,111–12TwilightoftheIdols(Nietzsche),150,152–53,162,170,173–74“TwoWorlds”(Naipaul),249–51,254

universalism,77universality,117,119,161,249,251,254–56,259–60utopias,136,147–48,185,204,217

valuejudgements,153–54,169,228–31values:sacrificial,243–47seealsoethicsandmoralsVerne,Jules,136,138

virtue,73,74,122–26disinterestedactionand,118

Voltaire,196

Weber,Max,239WhatisaGoodLife?(Ferry),249willtopower,176–77,181–82,186,215,217WilltoPower,The(Nietzsche),155,168,170–71,172–73,175,179–81,189–90,192

wisdom,seesalvation,inphilosophywork,valueof,125,126–27WorldWarII:atomicbombsin,241Auschwitzin,194,227

YouShallKnowThem(Vercors),114–17

Zeno,17–18,26,28

AbouttheAuthor

ProfessorLuc Ferry teaches philosophy at the Sorbonne (University of ParisVII,DenisDiderot).Hehaswonnumerousawards,includingthePrixMédicis,Prix Jean-Jacques-Rousseau, and Prix Aujourd’hui, in addition to being anofficer of the French Legion ofHonor and a knight of theOrder ofArts andLetters. From 2002 to 2004 Ferry served as French Minister of NationalEducation.HelivesinParis.

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AsEditor

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