“Freewill is an illusion so convincing thatpeople simply refuse tobelievethatwedon’thaveit.InFreeWill,SamHarriscombinesneuroscienceandpsychologytolaythisillusiontorestatlast.LikeallofHarris’sbooks,thisonewillnotonlyunsettleyoubutmakeyouthinkdeeply.Readit:youhavenochoice.”

—JERRYA.COYNE,ProfessorofEcologyandEvolution,UniversityofChicago,andauthorofWhyEvolutionIsTrue

ABELIEFINFREEWILLtouchesnearlyeverythingthathumanbeingsvalue. It is difficult to think about law, politics, religion, public policy,intimaterelationships,morality—aswellasfeelingsofremorseorpersonalachievement—withoutfirstimaginingthateverypersonisthetruesourceofhisorherthoughtsandactions.Andyetthefactstellusthatfreewillisanillusion.In this enlightening book, SamHarris argues that this truth about the

humanmind does not underminemorality or diminish the importance ofsocialandpoliticalfreedom,butitcanandshouldchangethewaywethinkaboutsomeofthemostimportantquestionsinlife.

“In this elegant and provocative book, Sam Harris demonstrates—withgreat intellectual ferocity and panache—that free will is an inherentlyflawedandincoherentconcept,eveninsubjectiveterms.Ifhe isright, thebookwillradicallychangethewayweviewourselvesashumanbeings.”

—V.S.RAMACHANDRAN,DirectoroftheCenterforBrainandCognition,UCSD,andauthorofTheTell-TaleBrain

“Brilliant and witty—and never less than incisive—Free Will shows thatSamHarriscansaymorein13,000wordsthanmostpeopledoin100,000.”

—OLIVERSACKS

“Many say that believing that there is no free will is impossible—or, ifpossible,will causenihilismanddespair. In this feistyandpersonal essay,Harrisoffershimselfasanexampleofaheartmadelessself-absorbed,andmoremorallysensitiveandcreative,becausethisparticularwickedwitchisdead.”

—OWENFLANAGAN,ProfessorofPhilosophy,DukeUniversity,andauthorofTheReallyHardProblem

“Ifyoubelieveinfreewill,orknowsomeonewhodoes,hereistheperfectantidote. In this smart, engaging,andextremely readable littlebook,SamHarrisarguesthatfreewilldoesn’texist,thatwe’rebetteroffknowingthatitdoesn’texist,andthat—oncewethinkaboutitintherightway—wecanappreciatefromourownexperiencethatitdoesn’texist.Thisisadelightfuldiscussionbyoneofthesharpestscholarsaround.”

—PAULBLOOM,ProfessorofPsychology,YaleUniversity,andauthorofHowPleasureWorks

©PHOTOGRAPHBYJENNIFERROPER

SAMHARRIS is the author of the bestselling booksThe End of Faith,Letter to aChristianNation,TheMoralLandscape,andLying. TheEnd ofFaith won the 2005 PEN Award for Nonfiction. His writing has beenpublished in over fifteen languages. Dr. Harris and his work have beendiscussedinTheNewYorkTimes,ScientificAmerican,Nature,RollingStone,Newsweek,Time,andmanyotherpublications.HiswritinghasappearedinTheNewYorkTimes,LosAngelesTimes,The Times (London),TheBostonGlobe, The Atlantic, Newsweek, Annals of Neurology, and elsewhere. Dr.Harris is cofounder and CEO of Project Reason, a nonprofit foundationdevotedtospreadingscientificknowledgeandsecularvaluesinsociety.Hereceived a degree in philosophy from Stanford University and a PhD inneurosciencefromUCLA.Pleasevisithiswebsiteatwww.samharris.org.

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Contents

TheUnconsciousOriginsoftheWill

ChangingtheSubjectCauseandEffect

Choices,Efforts,IntentionsMighttheTruthBeBadforUs?

MoralResponsibilityPolitics

ConclusionAcknowledgments

NotesIndex

AbouttheAuthor

FREEWILL

Thequestionoffreewilltouchesnearlyeverythingwecareabout.Morality,law,politics, religion, public policy, intimate relationships, feelings of guilt andpersonal accomplishment—most of what is distinctly human about our livesseemstodependuponourviewingoneanotherasautonomouspersons,capableoffreechoice.Ifthescientificcommunityweretodeclarefreewillanillusion,itwouldprecipitateaculturewarfarmorebelligerent than theone thathasbeenwaged on the subject of evolution. Without free will, sinners and criminalswouldbenothingmorethanpoorlycalibratedclockwork,andanyconceptionofjusticethatemphasizedpunishingthem(ratherthandeterring,rehabilitating,ormerelycontainingthem)wouldappearutterlyincongruous.Andthoseofuswhowork hard and follow the ruleswould not “deserve” our success in any deepsense. It is not an accident thatmost people find these conclusions abhorrent.Thestakesarehigh.In the early morning of July 23, 2007, Steven Hayes and Joshua

Komisarjevsky, two career criminals, arrived at the home of Dr.William andJenniferPetit inCheshire,aquiet townincentralConnecticut.TheyfoundDr.Petit asleep on a sofa in the sunroom. According to his taped confession,Komisarjevskystoodoverthesleepingmanforsomeminutes,hesitating,beforestrikinghimintheheadwithabaseballbat.Heclaimedthathisvictim’sscreamsthen triggered something within him, and he bludgeoned Petit with all hisstrengthuntilhefellsilent.ThetwothenboundPetit’shandsandfeetandwentupstairstosearchtherest

ofthehouse.TheydiscoveredJenniferPetitandherdaughters—Hayley,17,andMichaela, 11—still asleep. Theywoke all three and immediately tied them totheirbeds.At7:00a.m.,Hayeswenttoagasstationandboughtfourgallonsofgasoline.

At9:30,hedroveJenniferPetit toherbank towithdraw$15,000 incash.TheconversationbetweenJenniferandthebanktellersuggeststhatshewasunawareofherhusband’sinjuriesandbelievedthathercaptorswouldreleaseherfamilyunharmed.WhileHayesandthegirls’motherwereaway,Komisarjevskyamusedhimself

bytakingnakedphotosofMichaelawithhiscellphoneandmasturbatingonher.When Hayes returned with Jennifer, the two men divided up the money andbriefly consideredwhat they should do. They decided thatHayes should take

Jenniferintothelivingroomandrapeher—whichhedid.Hethenstrangledher,totheapparentsurpriseofhispartner.At this point, the twomennoticed thatWilliamPetit had slippedhis bonds

andescaped.Theybegantopanic.Theyquicklydousedthehousewithgasolineandsetitonfire.Whenaskedbythepolicewhyhehadn’tuntiedthetwogirlsfrom their beds before lighting the blaze, Komisarjevsky said, “It just didn’tcrossmymind.”Thegirlsdiedofsmokeinhalation.WilliamPetitwastheonlysurvivoroftheattack.Uponhearingaboutcrimesofthiskind,mostofusnaturallyfeelthatmenlike

HayesandKomisarjevskyshouldbeheldmorallyresponsiblefor theiractions.HadwebeenclosetothePetitfamily,manyofuswouldfeelentirelyjustifiedinkilling thesemonsters with our own hands. Dowe care that Hayes has sinceshownsignsof remorseandhasattemptedsuicide?Not really.Whatabout thefact that Komisarjevsky was repeatedly raped as a child? According to hisjournals,foraslongashecanremember,hehasknownthathewas“different”fromotherpeople,psychologicallydamaged,andcapableofgreatcoldness.HealsoclaimstohavebeenstunnedbyhisownbehaviorinthePetithome:Hewasa career burglar, not a murderer, and he had not consciously intended to killanyone.Suchdetailsmightbegintogiveuspause.As we will see, whether criminals like Hayes and Komisarjevsky can be

trustedtohonestlyreporttheirfeelingsandintentionsisnotthepoint:Whatevertheirconsciousmotives, thesemencannotknowwhytheyareastheyare.Norcan we account for why we are not like them. As sickening as I find theirbehavior, Ihave toadmit that if Iwere to tradeplaceswithoneof thesemen,atomforatom,Iwouldbehim:Thereisnoextrapartofmethatcoulddecidetoseetheworlddifferentlyortoresisttheimpulsetovictimizeotherpeople.Evenifyoubelievethateveryhumanbeingharborsanimmortalsoul,theproblemofresponsibilityremains:IcannottakecreditforthefactthatIdonothavethesoulofapsychopath.IfIhadtrulybeeninKomisarjevsky’sshoesonJuly23,2007—thatis,ifIhadhisgenesandlifeexperienceandanidenticalbrain(orsoul)inanidentical state—I would have acted exactly as he did. There is simply nointellectually respectable position from which to deny this. The role of luck,therefore,appearsdecisive.Of course, ifwe learned that both thesemenhadbeen suffering frombrain

tumors that explained their violent behavior, our moral intuitions would shiftdramatically. But a neurological disorder appears to be just a special case ofphysical events giving rise to thoughts and actions. Understanding theneurophysiology of the brain, therefore, would seem to be as exculpatory asfinding a tumor in it. How canwemake sense of our lives, and hold people

accountable for their choices, given the unconscious origins of our consciousminds?

Freewillisanillusion.Ourwillsaresimplynotofourownmaking.Thoughtsand intentions emerge from background causes ofwhichwe are unaware andoverwhichweexertnoconsciouscontrol.Wedonothavethefreedomwethinkwehave.Freewillisactuallymorethananillusion(orless),inthatitcannotbemade

conceptually coherent.Either ourwills aredeterminedbyprior causes andwearenot responsible for them,or theyare theproductofchanceandwearenotresponsibleforthem.Ifaman’schoicetoshootthepresidentisdeterminedbyacertainpatternofneuralactivity,whichisinturntheproductofpriorcauses—perhaps an unfortunate coincidence of bad genes, an unhappy childhood, lostsleep,andcosmic-raybombardment—whatcanitpossiblymeantosaythathiswill is“free”?Noonehaseverdescribedaway inwhichmentalandphysicalprocesses couldarise thatwouldattest to theexistenceof such freedom.Mostillusionsaremadeofsternerstuffthanthis.Thepopularconceptionoffreewillseemstorestontwoassumptions:(1)that

eachofuscouldhavebehaveddifferentlythanwedidinthepast,and(2)thatwearetheconscioussourceofmostofourthoughtsandactionsinthepresent.Asweareabouttosee,however,bothoftheseassumptionsarefalse.Butthedeepertruthisthatfreewilldoesn’tevencorrespondtoanysubjective

factaboutus—andintrospectionsoonprovesashostiletotheideaasthelawsofphysics are. Seeming acts of volition merely arise spontaneously (whethercaused, uncaused, or probabilistically inclined, it makes no difference) andcannotbetracedtoapointoforigininourconsciousminds.Amomentortwoofserious self-scrutiny, andyoumightobserve that younomoredecide thenextthoughtyouthinkthanthenextthoughtIwrite.

TheUnconsciousOriginsoftheWill

We are conscious of only a tiny fraction of the information that our brainsprocess in each moment.1 Although we continually notice changes in ourexperience—in thought, mood, perception, behavior, etc.—we are utterlyunawareoftheneurophysiologicaleventsthatproducethem.Infact,wecanbevery poor witnesses to experience itself. By merely glancing at your face orlisteningtoyourtoneofvoice,othersareoftenmoreawareofyourstateofmindandmotivationsthanyouare.Igenerally starteachdaywithacupofcoffeeor tea—sometimes two.This

morning,itwascoffee(two).Whynottea?Iaminnopositiontoknow.IwantedcoffeemorethanIwantedteatoday,andIwasfreetohavewhatIwanted.DidIconsciouslychoosecoffeeovertea?No.Thechoicewasmadeformebyeventsinmybrain that I, as theconsciouswitnessofmy thoughtsandactions,couldnotinspectorinfluence.CouldIhave“changedmymind”andswitchedtoteabefore the coffee drinker inme could get his bearings?Yes, but this impulsewouldalsohavebeentheproductofunconsciouscauses.Whydidn’titarisethismorning?Whymight itarise in thefuture?Icannotknow.Theintentiontodoonethingandnotanotherdoesnotoriginateinconsciousness—rather,itappearsinconsciousness,asdoesanythoughtorimpulsethatmightopposeit.ThephysiologistBenjaminLibetfamouslyusedEEGtoshowthatactivityin

thebrain’smotorcortexcanbedetectedsome300millisecondsbeforeapersonfeels that he has decided to move.2 Another lab extended this work usingfunctional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI): Subjects were asked to pressoneoftwobuttonswhilewatchinga“clock”composedofarandomsequenceofletters appearing on a screen. They reported which letter was visible at themomenttheydecidedtopressonebuttonortheother.Theexperimentersfoundtwobrainregionsthatcontainedinformationaboutwhichbuttonsubjectswouldpress a full7 to10 seconds before thedecisionwas consciouslymade.3Morerecently,directrecordingsfromthecortexshowedthattheactivityofmerely256neuronswassufficienttopredictwith80percentaccuracyaperson’sdecisiontomove700millisecondsbeforehebecameawareofit.4These findings are difficult to reconcile with the sense that we are the

conscious authors of our actions. One fact now seems indisputable: Somemomentsbeforeyouareawareofwhatyouwilldonext—atimeinwhichyou

subjectivelyappeartohavecompletefreedomtobehavehoweveryouplease—yourbrainhasalreadydeterminedwhatyouwilldo.Youthenbecomeconsciousofthis“decision”andbelievethatyouareintheprocessofmakingit.Thedistinctionbetween“higher”and“lower”systemsin thebrainoffersno

relief: I, as theconsciouswitnessofmyexperience,nomore initiateevents inmyprefrontalcortexthanIcausemyheart tobeat.Therewillalwaysbesomedelaybetweenthefirstneurophysiologicaleventsthatkindlemynextconsciousthought and the thought itself. And even if there weren’t—even if all mentalstateswere trulycoincidentwith theirunderlyingbrainstates—IcannotdecidewhatIwillnextthinkorintenduntilathoughtorintentionarises.Whatwillmynextmentalstatebe?Idonotknow—it justhappens.Where is thefreedominthat?

Imagine a perfect neuroimaging device that would allow us to detect andinterpret the subtlest changes in brain function. You might spend an hourthinkingandactingfreelyinthelab,onlytodiscoverthatthescientistsscanningyourbrainhadbeenabletoproduceacompleterecordofwhatyouwouldthinkand do some moments in advance of each event. For instance, exactly 10minutesand10secondsintotheexperiment,youdecidedtopickupamagazinefrom a nearby table and begin reading, but the scanner log shows thismentalstate arising at 10minutes and 6 seconds—and the experimenters even knewwhichmagazineyouwouldchoose.Youreadforawhileandthengotboredandstopped; theexperimentersknewyouwould stopa secondbeforeyoudidandcouldtellwhichsentencewouldbethelastyouread.Andsoitwouldgowitheverythingelse:Youtriedtorecall thenameofthe

leadexperimenter,butyouforgotit;aminutelateryouremembereditas“Brent”when itwasactually“Brett.”Next,youdecided togoshoppingfornewshoesafteryouleftthelab—butonsecondthought,yourealizedthatyoursonwouldbegettingoutofschoolearlythatday,soyouwouldn’thaveenoughtimetogoshopping after all. Imaginewhat itwould be like to see the time log of thesementalevents,alongsidevideoofyourassociatedbehavior,demonstrating thattheexperimentersknewwhatyouwouldthinkanddojustbeforeyoudid.Youwould,ofcourse,continuetofeelfreeineverypresentmoment,butthefactthatsomeoneelsecould reportwhatyouwereabout to thinkanddowouldexposethisfeelingforwhatitis:anillusion.Ifthelawsofnaturedonotstrikemostofus as incompatible with freewill, that is becausewe have not imagined howhuman behavior would appear if all cause-and-effect relationships wereunderstood.

ItisimportanttorecognizethatthecaseIambuildingagainstfreewilldoesnotdependuponphilosophicalmaterialism(theassumptionthatrealityis,atbottom,purelyphysical).Thereisnoquestionthat(most,ifnotall)mentaleventsaretheproductofphysicalevents.Thebrainisaphysicalsystem,entirelybeholdentothe laws of nature—and there is every reason to believe that changes in itsfunctionalstateandmaterialstructureentirelydictateourthoughtsandactions.But even if the human mind were made of soul-stuff, nothing about myargumentwouldchange.Theunconsciousoperationsofasoulwouldgrantyounomorefreedomthantheunconsciousphysiologyofyourbraindoes.Ifyoudon’tknowwhatyoursoulisgoingtodonext,youarenotincontrol.

Thisisobviouslytrueinallcaseswhereapersonwisheshecouldfeelorbehavedifferently thanhedoes:Thinkof themillionsof committedChristianswhosesoulshappentobegay,pronetoobesity,orboredbyprayer.However,freewillisnomoreevidentwhenapersondoesexactlywhat,inretrospect,hewisheshehaddone.Thesoulthatallowsyoutostayonyourdietisjustasmysteriousastheonethattemptsyoutoeatcherrypieforbreakfast.There is a distinction between voluntary and involuntary actions, of course,

butitdoesnothingtosupportthecommonideaoffreewill(nordoesitdependuponit).Avoluntaryactionisaccompaniedbythefeltintentiontocarryitout,whereasaninvoluntaryactionisn’t.Needlesstosay,thisdifferenceisreflectedatthelevelofthebrain.Andwhatapersonconsciouslyintendstodosaysalotabout him. It makes sense to treat a man who enjoys murdering childrendifferently from one who accidentally hit and killed a child with his car—becausetheconsciousintentionsoftheformergiveusalotofinformationabouthowheislikelytobehaveinthefuture.Butwhereintentionsthemselvescomefrom, andwhat determines their character in every instance, remains perfectlymysterious in subjective terms.Our senseof freewill results froma failure toappreciate this:Wedonotknowwhatweintend todountil the intention itselfarises.Tounderstandthisistorealizethatwearenottheauthorsofourthoughtsandactionsinthewaythatpeoplegenerallysuppose.Of course, this insight does notmake social and political freedom any less

important.Thefreedomtodowhatone intends,andnot todootherwise, isnolessvaluablethaniteverwas.Havingaguntoyourheadisstillaproblemworthrectifying,wherever intentions come from.But the idea thatwe, as consciousbeings, are deeply responsible for the character of our mental lives andsubsequentbehaviorissimplyimpossibletomapontoreality.Considerwhatitwouldtaketoactuallyhavefreewill.Youwouldneedtobe

awareofallthefactorsthatdetermineyourthoughtsandactions,andyouwouldneedtohavecompletecontroloverthosefactors.Butthereisaparadoxherethat

vitiates theverynotionof freedom—forwhatwould influence the influences?Moreinfluences?Noneoftheseadventitiousmentalstatesaretherealyou.Youarenotcontrollingthestorm,andyouarenotlostinit.Youarethestorm.

ChangingtheSubject

Itissafetosaythatnoonewasevermovedtoentertaintheexistenceoffreewillbecauseitholdsgreatpromiseasanabstractidea.Theenduranceofthisnotionis attributable to the fact that most of us feel that we freely author our ownthoughtsandactions(howeverdifficultitmaybetomakesenseofthisinlogicalorscientificterms).Thustheideaoffreewillemergesfromafeltexperience.Itis, however, very easy to lose sight of this psychological truth oncewe begintalkingphilosophy.In the philosophical literature, one finds three main approaches to the

problem:determinism,libertarianism,andcompatibilism.Bothdeterminismandlibertarianism hold that if our behavior is fully determined by backgroundcauses, free will is an illusion. (For this reason they are both referred to as“incompatibilist” views.) Determinists believe that we live in such a world,whilelibertarians(norelationtothepoliticalphilosophythatgoesbythisname)imagine that human agency must magically rise above the plane of physicalcausation.Libertarianssometimesinvokeametaphysicalentity,suchasasoul,as the vehicle for our freely acting wills. Compatibilists, however, claim thatdeterministsand libertariansarebothconfusedand that freewill iscompatiblewiththetruthofdeterminism.Today,theonlyphilosophicallyrespectablewaytoendorsefreewillistobea

compatibilist—because we know that determinism, in every sense relevant tohumanbehavior,istrue.Unconsciousneuraleventsdetermineourthoughtsandactions—and are themselves determined by prior causes of which we aresubjectivelyunaware.However,the“freewill”thatcompatibilistsdefendisnotthefreewillthatmostpeoplefeeltheyhave.Compatibilistsgenerallyclaimthatapersonisfreeaslongasheisfreefrom

anyouterorinnercompulsionsthatwouldpreventhimfromactingonhisactualdesiresand intentions. Ifyouwanta secondscoopof icecreamandnoone isforcingyoutoeat it, theneatingasecondscoopisfullydemonstrativeofyourfreedomofwill.Thetruth,however,isthatpeopleclaimgreaterautonomythanthis.Ourmoral intuitions and sense of personal agency are anchored to a feltsense that we are the conscious source of our thoughts and actions. Whendecidingwhom tomarryorwhichbook to read,wedonot feel compelledbyprioreventsoverwhichwehavenocontrol.Thefreedomthatwepresumeforourselvesandreadilyattributetoothersisfelttosliptheinfluenceofimpersonal

backgroundcauses.Andthemomentweseethatsuchcausesarefullyeffective—as any detailed account of the neurophysiology of human thought andbehaviorwouldreveal—wecannolongerlocateaplausiblehookuponwhichtohangourconventionalnotionsofpersonalresponsibility.5Whatdoes itmean tosay that rapistsandmurdererscommit theircrimesof

theirownfreewill?Ifthisstatementmeansanything,itmustbethattheycouldhave behaved differently—not on the basis of random influences over whichtheyhavenocontrol,butbecause they,asconsciousagents,werefree to thinkandactinotherways.Tosaythattheywerefreenottorapeandmurderistosaythattheycouldhaveresistedtheimpulsetodoso(orcouldhaveavoidedfeelingsuch an impulse altogether)—with the universe, including their brains, inprecisely the same state itwas in at themoment they committed their crimes.Assumingthatviolentcriminalshavesuchfreedom,wereflexivelyblamethemfortheiractions.Butwithoutit,theplaceforourblamesuddenlyvanishes,andeventhemostterrifyingsociopathsbegintoseemlikevictimsthemselves.Themoment we catch sight of the stream of causes that precede their consciousdecisions, reachingback intochildhoodandbeyond, theirculpabilitybegins todisappear.Compatibilists have produced a vast literature in an effort to finesse this

problem.6 More than in any other area of academic philosophy, the resultresembles theology. (I suspect this is not an accident. The effort has beenprimarily one of not allowing the laws of nature to strip us of a cherishedillusion.) According to compatibilists, if a manwants to commitmurder, anddoes so because of this desire, his actions attest to his freedom ofwill. Frombothamoralandascientificperspective,thisseemsdeliberatelyobtuse.Peoplehavemany competing desires—and some desires appear pathological (that is,undesirable)eventothoseintheirgrip.Mostpeopleareruledbymanymutuallyincompatiblegoalsandaspirations:Youwant to finishyourwork,butyouarealsoinclinedtostopworkingsothatyoucanplaywithyourkids.Youaspiretoquit smoking, but you also crave another cigarette.You are struggling to savemoney,butyouarealsotemptedtobuyanewcomputer.Whereisthefreedomwhenoneoftheseopposingdesiresinexplicablytriumphsoveritsrival?The problem for compatibilism runs deeper, however—for where is the

freedom inwantingwhat onewantswithout any internal conflictwhatsoever?Whereisthefreedominbeingperfectlysatisfiedwithyourthoughts,intentions,andsubsequentactionswhen theyare theproductofpriorevents thatyouhadabsolutelynohandincreating?Forinstance,Ijustdrankaglassofwaterandfeelabsolutelyatpeacewiththe

decision todoso. Iwas thirsty,anddrinkingwater is fullycongruentwithmyvisionofwhoIwanttobewheninneedofadrink.HadIreachedforabeerthisearly in the day, Imight have felt guilty; but drinking a glass ofwater at anyhourisblameless,andIamquitesatisfiedwithmyself.Whereisthefreedominthis?ItmaybetruethatifIhadwantedtodootherwise,Iwouldhave,butIamnevertheless compelled to dowhat I effectivelywant.And I cannot determinemy wants, or decide which will be effective, in advance. My mental life issimplygiventomebythecosmos.Whydidn’tIdecidetodrinkaglassofjuice?Thethoughtneveroccurredtome.AmIfreetodothatwhichdoesnotoccurtometodo?Ofcoursenot.AndthereisnowayIcaninfluencemydesires—forwhattoolsofinfluence

would I use? Other desires? To say that I would have done otherwise had IwantedtoissimplytosaythatIwouldhavelivedinadifferentuniversehadIbeen in a different universe. Compatibilism amounts to nothingmore than anassertionofthefollowingcreed:Apuppetisfreeaslongasheloveshisstrings.

Compatibilists likemy friendDanielDennett7 insist that even if our thoughtsandactionsaretheproductofunconsciouscauses,theyarestillourthoughtsandactions.Anything that our brains do or decide,whether consciously or not, issomething thatwe have done or decided. The fact that we cannot always besubjectively aware of the causes of our actions does not negate free will—becauseourunconsciousneurophysiologyisjustasmuch“us”asourconsciousthoughts are. Consider the following, from Tom Clark of the Center forNaturalism:

Harris is of course right that we don’t have conscious access to theneurophysiological processes that underlie our choices. But, as Dennettoftenpointsout,theseprocessesareasmuchourown,justasmuchpartofwhoweare aspersons, just asmuchus, asour conscious awareness.Weshouldn’t alienate ourselves from our own neurophysiology and supposethat the conscious self,whatHarris thinks of as constituting the real self(andasmanyothersdo,too,perhaps),isbeingpushedaroundatthemercyofourneurons.Rather,asidentifiableindividualsweconsist(amongotherthings)ofneuralprocesses,someofwhichsupportconsciousness,someofwhichdon’t.Soitisn’tanillusion,asHarrissays,thatweareauthorsofourthoughts and actions;we are notmerewitnesses towhat causation cooksup.We as physically instantiated persons really do deliberate and chooseandact,evenifconsciousness isn’tultimatelyincharge.Sothefeelingofauthorshipandcontrolisveridical.

Moreover, the neural processes that (some-how—the hard problem ofconsciousness) support consciousnessare essential to choosing, since theevidence strongly suggests they are associated with flexible action andinformationintegrationinservicetobehaviorcontrol.Butit’sdoubtfulthatconsciousness (phenomenal experience) per se adds anything to thoseneuralprocessesincontrollingaction.It’s true that humanpersons don’t have contra-causal freewill.We are

not self-caused little gods. But we are just as real as the genetic andenvironmental processeswhich createdus and the situations inwhichwemakechoices.Thedeliberativemachinerysupportingeffectiveactionisjustas real andcausally effective as anyotherprocess innature.Sowedon’thave to talkas ifwe are real agents in order to concoct amotivationallyusefulillusionofagency,whichiswhatHarrisseemstorecommendwedoneartheendofhisremarksonfreewill.Agenthoodsurvivesdeterminism,noproblem.8

This perfectly articulates the difference between Dennett’s view and my own(Dennettagrees9).AsIhavesaid,IthinkcompatibilistslikeDennettchangethesubject:They trade apsychological fact—the subjective experienceofbeing aconsciousagent—foraconceptualunderstandingofourselvesaspersons.Thisisabaitandswitch.Thepsychologicaltruthisthatpeoplefeelidenticaltoacertainchannelofinformationintheirconsciousminds.Dennettissimplyassertingthatwearemorethanthis—wearecoterminouswitheverythingthatgoesoninsideour bodies, whetherwe are conscious of it or not. This is like sayingwe aremade of stardust—which we are. But we don’t feel like stardust. And theknowledgethatwearestardustisnotdrivingourmoralintuitionsoroursystemofcriminaljustice.10At this moment, you are making countless unconscious “decisions” with

organs other than your brain—but these are not events for which you feelresponsible.Are you producing red blood cells and digestive enzymes at thismoment?Yourbody is doing these things, of course, but if it “decided” todootherwise,youwouldbethevictimofthesechanges,ratherthantheircause.Tosaythatyouareresponsibleforeverythingthatgoesoninsideyourskinbecauseit’s all “you” is to make a claim that bears absolutely no relationship to thefeelingsofagencyandmoralresponsibilitythathavemadetheideaoffreewillanenduringproblemforphilosophy.Therearemorebacteria inyourbodythantherearehumancells. Infact,90

percentofthecellsinyourbodyaremicrobeslikeE.coli(and99percentofthe

functional genes in your body belong to them). Many of these organismsperformnecessaryfunctions—theyare“you”insomewidersense.Doyoufeelidenticaltothem?Iftheymisbehave,areyoumorallyresponsible?People feel (or presume) an authorship of their thoughts and actions that is

illusory.Ifweweretodetecttheirconsciouschoicesonabrainscannersecondsbeforetheywereawareofthem,theywouldberightlyastonished—becausethiswoulddirectlychallengetheirstatusasconsciousagentsincontroloftheirinnerlives.Weknowthatwecouldperformsuchanexperiment,atleastinprinciple,andifwetunedthemachinecorrectly,subjectswouldfeelthatwewerereadingtheirminds(orcontrollingthem).11Weknow, in fact, thatwesometimes feel responsible foreventsoverwhich

wehavenocausalinfluence.Giventherightexperimentalmanipulations,peoplecanbeledtobelievethattheyconsciouslyintendedanactionwhentheyneitherchoseitnorhadcontrolovertheirmovements.Inoneexperiment,subjectswereasked to selectpicturesona screenusingacomputer’scursor.They tended tobelieve that they had intentionally guided the cursor to a specific image evenwhenitwasunder thefullcontrolofanotherperson,as longas theyheardthenameoftheimagejustbeforethecursorstopped.12Peoplewhoaresusceptibletohypnosiscanbegivenelaboratesuggestionstoperformoddtasks,andwhenaskedwhytheyhavedonethesethings,manywillconfabulate—givingreasonsfor their behavior that have nothing to do with its actual cause. There is noquestionthatourattributionofagencycanbegravelyinerror.Iamarguingthatitalwaysis.Imaginethatapersonclaimstohavenoneedtoeatfoodofanykind—rather,

hecanliveonlight.Fromtimetotime,anIndianyogiwillmakesuchaboast,much to themerrimentof skeptics.Needless to say, there isno reason to takesuchclaimsseriously,nomatterhowthintheyogi.However,acompatibilistlikeDennettcouldcometothecharlatan’sdefense:Themandoesliveonlight—wealldo—becausewhenyoutracetheoriginofanyfood,youarriveatsomethingthatdependsonphotosynthesis.Byeatingbeef,weconsumethegrassthecowate,andthegrassatesunlight.Sotheyogiisnoliarafterall.Butthat’snottheability the yogi was advertising, and his actual claim remains dishonest (ordelusional).Thisisthetroublewithcompatibilism.Itsolvestheproblemof“freewill”byignoringit.Howcanwebe“free”asconsciousagentsifeverythingthatweconsciously

intendiscausedbyeventsinourbrainthatwedonotintendandofwhichweareentirelyunaware?Wecan’t.Tosaythat“mybrain”decidedtothinkoractinaparticular way, whether consciously or not, and that this is the basis for my

freedom, is to ignore the very source of our belief in freewill: the feeling ofconscious agency. People feel that they are the authors of their thoughts andactions,andthisistheonlyreasonwhythereseemstobeaproblemoffreewillworthtalkingabout.

CauseandEffect

Inphysicalterms,weknowthateveryhumanactioncanbereducedtoaseriesofimpersonal events: Genes are transcribed, neurotransmitters bind to theirreceptors,musclefiberscontract,andJohnDoepullsthetriggeronhisgun.Butforourcommonsensenotionsofhumanagencyandmorality tohold, it seemsthat our actions cannot be merely lawful products of our biology, ourconditioning, or anything else that might lead others to predict them.Consequently, some scientists and philosophers hope that chance or quantumuncertaintycanmakeroomforfreewill.For instance, the biologist Martin Heisenberg has observed that certain

processesinthebrain,suchastheopeningandclosingofionchannelsandtherelease of synaptic vesicles, occur at random, and cannot therefore bedetermined by environmental stimuli. Thus, much of our behavior can beconsidered truly “self-generated”—and therein, he imagines, lies a basis forhumanfreedom.Buthowdoeventsofthiskindjustifythefeelingoffreewill?“Self-generated” in this sense means only that certain events originate in thebrain.If my decision to have a second cup of coffee this morning was due to a

random release of neurotransmitters, how could the indeterminacy of theinitiatingeventcountasthefreeexerciseofmywill?Chanceoccurrencesarebydefinition ones for which I can claim no responsibility. And if certain of mybehaviors are truly the result of chance, they shouldbe surprisingeven tome.Howwouldneurologicalambushesofthiskindmakemefree?Imaginewhatyour lifewouldbe like ifall your actions, intentions, beliefs,

and desires were randomly “self-generated” in this way. You would scarcelyseem tohaveamindatall.Youwould liveasoneblownaboutbyan internalwind.Actions,intentions,beliefs,anddesirescanexistonlyinasystemthatissignificantly constrained by patterns of behavior and the laws of stimulus-response.Thepossibilityofreasoningwithotherhumanbeings—or,indeed,offinding their behaviors and utterances comprehensible at all—depends on theassumption that their thoughts and actions will obediently ride the rails of ashared reality. This is true as well when attempting to understand one’s ownbehavior. In the limit, Heisenberg’s “self-generated” mental events wouldprecludetheexistenceofanymindatall.The indeterminacy specific toquantummechanicsoffersno foothold: Ifmy

brain is a quantum computer, the brain of a fly is likely to be a quantumcomputer, too. Do flies enjoy free will? Quantum effects are unlikely to bebiologically salient in any case.They play a role in evolution because cosmicrays and other high-energy particles cause point mutations in DNA (and thebehaviorofsuchparticlespassingthroughthenucleusofacell isgovernedbythe laws of quantummechanics). Evolution, therefore, seems unpredictable inprinciple.13Butfewneuroscientistsviewthebrainasaquantumcomputer.Andevenifitwere,quantumindeterminacydoesnothingtomaketheconceptoffreewill scientifically intelligible. In the face of any real independence from priorevents, every thought and action would seem to merit the statement “I don’tknowwhatcameoverme.”Ifdeterminismistrue,thefutureisset—andthisincludesallourfuturestates

ofmindandoursubsequentbehavior.Andtotheextentthatthelawofcauseandeffect is subject to indeterminism—quantum or otherwise—we can take nocredit for what happens. There is no combination of these truths that seemscompatiblewiththepopularnotionoffreewill.

Choices,Efforts,Intentions

When we consider human behavior, the difference between premeditated,voluntaryactionandmereaccidentseemsimmenselyconsequential.Aswewillsee,thisdistinctioncanbepreserved—andwithit,ourmostimportantmoralandlegalconcerns—whilebanishingtheideaoffreewillonceandforall.Certainstatesofconsciousnessseemtoariseautomatically,beyondthesphere

of our intentions. Others seem self-generated, deliberative, and subject to ourwill. When I hear the sound of a leaf blower outside my window, it merelyimpingesuponmyconsciousness: Ihaven’tbrought it intobeing,andIcannotstop it at will. I can try to put the sound out of my mind by focusing onsomething else—my writing, for instance—and this act of directing attentionfeelsdifferentfrommerelyhearingasound.Iamdoingit.Withincertainlimits,IseemtochoosewhatIpayattentionto.Thesoundoftheleafblowerintrudes,but I can seize the spotlight of my attention in the next moment and aim itelsewhere.Thisdifferencebetweennonvolitionalandvolitionalstatesofmindisreflectedat the levelof thebrain—for theyaregovernedbydifferent systems.Andthedifferencebetweenthemmust,inpart,producethefeltsensethatthereisaconsciousselfendowedwithfreedomofwill.Aswe have begun to see, however, this feeling of freedom arises fromour

moment-to-moment ignorance of the prior causes of our thoughts and actions.Thephrase“freewill”describeswhatitfeelsliketoidentifywithcertainmentalstates as they arise in consciousness. Thoughts like “What should I get mydaughterforherbirthday?Iknow—I’lltakehertoapetstoreandhaveherpickoutsometropicalfish”conveytheapparentrealityofchoices,freelymade.Butfromadeeperperspective(speakingbothobjectivelyandsubjectively),thoughtssimplyariseunauthoredandyetauthorouractions.Thisisnottosaythatconsciousawarenessanddeliberativethinkingserveno

purpose.Indeed,muchofourbehaviordependsonthem.Imightunconsciouslyshift in my seat, but I cannot unconsciously decide that the pain in my backwarrantsatriptoaphysicaltherapist.Todothelatter,Imustbecomeawareofthepainandbeconsciouslymotivatedtodosomethingaboutit.Perhapsitwouldbepossibletobuildaninsentientrobotcapableofthesestates—butinourcase,certain behaviors seem to require the presence of conscious thought. Andweknow that the brain systems that allow us to reflect upon our experience aredifferent from those involved when we automatically react to stimuli. So

consciousness,inthissense,isnotinconsequential.14Andyettheentireprocessof becoming aware of the pain in my back, thinking about it, and seeking aremedyforitresultsfromprocessesofwhichIamcompletelyunaware.DidI,theconsciousperson,createmypain?No.Itsimplyappeared.DidIcreate thethoughtsaboutitthatledmetoconsiderphysicaltherapy?No.They,too,simplyappeared. This process of conscious deliberation, while different fromunconsciousreflex,offersnofoundationforfreedomofwill.AsDanDennettandmanyothershavepointedout,peoplegenerallyconfuse

determinism with fatalism. This gives rise to questions like “If everything isdetermined, why should I do anything? Why not just sit back and see whathappens?”This ispureconfusion.Tositbackandseewhathappens is itselfachoice thatwillproduce itsownconsequences. It isalsoextremelydifficult todo:Justtrystayinginbedalldaywaitingforsomethingtohappen;youwillfindyourselfassailedbytheimpulsetogetupanddosomething,whichwillrequireincreasinglyheroiceffortstoresist.Andthefactthatourchoicesdependonpriorcausesdoesnotmeanthatthey

don’tmatter. If I had not decided towrite this book, itwouldn’t havewrittenitself.Mychoicetowriteitwasunquestionablytheprimarycauseofitscomingintobeing.Decisions,intentions,efforts,goals,willpower,etc.,arecausalstatesofthebrain,leadingtospecificbehaviors,andbehaviorsleadtooutcomesintheworld.Humanchoice,therefore,isasimportantasfanciersoffreewillbelieve.Butthenextchoiceyoumakewillcomeoutofthedarknessofpriorcausesthatyou,theconsciouswitnessofyourexperience,didnotbringintobeing.Therefore,whileitistruetosaythatapersonwouldhavedoneotherwiseifhe

hadchosentodootherwise,thisdoesnotdeliverthekindoffreewillthatmostpeopleseemtocherish—becauseaperson’s“choices”merelyappearinhismindas though sprung from the void. From the perspective of your consciousawareness, you are no more responsible for the next thing you think (andthereforedo)thanyouareforthefactthatyouwerebornintothisworld.

Let’ssayyourlifehasgoneofftrack.Youusedtobeverymotivated,inspiredbyyouropportunities,andphysicallyfit,butnowyouarelazy,easilydiscouraged,and overweight.Howdid you get thisway?Youmight be able to tell a storyabouthowyour lifeunraveled,butyoucannot trulyaccountforwhyyoulet ithappen.Andnowyouwanttoescapethisdownwardtrendandchangeyourselfthroughanactofwill.Youbeginreadingself-helpbooks.Youchangeyourdietandjoinagym.You

decidetogobacktoschool.Butaftersixmonthsofeffort,youarenoclosertoliving the life you want than you were before. The books failed to make an

impactonyou;yourdietandfitnessregimeprovedimpossibletomaintain;andyougotboredwithschoolandquit.Whydidyouencountersomanyobstaclesinyourself? You have no idea. You tried to change your habits, but your habitsappeartobestrongerthanyouare.Mostofusknowwhatitisliketofailinthisway—andtheseexperiencesarenotevenslightlysuggestiveoffreedomofwill.But you woke up this morning feeling even greater resolve. Enough is

enough!Now you have awill of steel. Before stepping out of bed you had abrilliant idea for a website—and the discovery that the domain name wasavailable for only 10 dollars has filled youwith confidence. You are now anentrepreneur!Yousharetheideawithseveralsmartpeople,andtheythinkitisguaranteedtomakeyourich.Thewindisatyourback,yoursailsarefull,andyouaretackingfuriously.As

it turnsout, a friendofyours isalsoaclose friendofTimFerriss, the famouslifestyle coach and fitness guru. Ferriss offers to consultwith you about yourapproach to diet and exercise. You find this meeting extremely helpful—andafterwardyoudiscoverareservoirofdisciplineinyourselfthatyoudidn’tknowwasthere.Overthenextfourmonthsyouswap20poundsoffatfor20poundsofmuscle.Youweighthesame,butyouarefullytransformed.Yourfriendscan’tbelievewhatyouhaveaccomplished.Evenyourenemiesbegin toaskyou foradvice.Youfeelentirelydifferentaboutyourlife,andtherolethatdiscipline,choice,

andefforthaveplayedinyourresurrectioncannotbedenied.Buthowcanyouaccountforyourabilitytomaketheseeffortstodayandnotayearago?Wheredidthisideaforawebsitecomefrom?Itjustappearedinyourmind.Didyou,astheconsciousagentyoufeelyourselftobe,createit?(Ifso,whynotjustcreatethe next one right now?) How can you explain the effect that Tim Ferriss’sadvicehadonyou?Howcanyouexplainyourabilitytorespondtoit?If you pay attention to your inner life, you will see that the emergence of

choices,efforts,andintentionsisafundamentallymysteriousprocess.Yes,youcan decide to go on a diet—and we know a lot about the variables that willenable you to stick to it—but you cannot knowwhy youwere finally able toadheretothisdisciplinewhenallyourpreviousattemptsfailed.Youmighthaveastorytotellaboutwhythingsweredifferentthistimearound,butitwouldbenothingmorethanaposthocdescriptionofeventsthatyoudidnotcontrol.Yes,youcandowhatyouwant—butyoucannotaccountforthefactthatyourwantsareeffectiveinonecaseandnotinanother(andyoucertainlycan’tchooseyourwantsinadvance).Youwantedtoloseweightforyears.Thenyoureallywantedto.What’s thedifference?Whatever it is, it’snotadifference thatyoubroughtintobeing.

Youarenotincontrolofyourmind—becauseyou,asaconsciousagent,areonlypartofyourmind,livingatthemercyofotherparts.15Youcandowhatyoudecidetodo—butyoucannotdecidewhatyouwilldecidetodo.Ofcourse,youcancreateaframeworkinwhichcertaindecisionsaremorelikelythanothers—youcan, for instance, purgeyourhouseof all sweets,making it veryunlikelythat youwill eat dessert later in the evening—but you cannot knowwhy youwereabletosubmittosuchaframeworktodaywhenyouweren’tyesterday.So it’s not that willpower isn’t important or that it is destined to be

underminedbybiology.Willpower is itself abiologicalphenomenon.Youcanchange your life, and yourself, through effort and discipline—but you havewhatevercapacityforeffortanddisciplineyouhave in thismoment,andnotascintillamore(orless).Youareeitherluckyinthisdepartmentoryouaren’t—andyoucannotmakeyourownluck.

Manypeoplebelievethathumanfreedomconsistsinourabilitytodowhat,uponreflection,webelieveweshoulddo—whichoftenmeansovercomingourshort-term desires and following our long-term goals or better judgment. This iscertainlyanabilitythatpeoplepossess,toagreaterorlesserdegree,andwhichotheranimalsappeartolack,butit isneverthelessacapacityofourmindsthathasunconsciousroots.Youhavenotbuiltyourmind.Andinmomentsinwhichyouseemtobuildit

—when you make an effort to change yourself, to acquire knowledge, or toperfectaskill—theonlytoolsatyourdisposalarethosethatyouhaveinheritedfrommomentspast.Choices, efforts, intentions, and reasoning influence our behavior—but they

are themselvespartofachainofcauses thatprecedeconsciousawarenessandoverwhichweexertnoultimatecontrol.Mychoicesmatter—andtherearepathstowardmakingwiserones—but I cannot choosewhat I choose.And if it everappearsthatIdo—forinstance,aftergoingbackandforthbetweentwooptions—Idonotchoose tochoosewhatIchoose.Thereisaregressherethatalwaysendsindarkness.Imusttakeafirststep,oralastone,forreasonsthatareboundtoremaininscrutable.16Many people believe that this problem of regress is a false one. Certain

compatibilists insist that freedomofwill issynonymouswith the idea thatonecouldhavethoughtoracteddifferently.However,tosaythatIcouldhavedoneotherwise is merely to think the thought “I could have done otherwise” afterdoingwhateverIinfactdid.Thisisanemptyaffirmation.17Itconfuseshopeforthe future with an honest account of the past.What I will do next, andwhy,remains,atbottom,amystery—onethatisfullydeterminedbythepriorstateof

theuniverseand the lawsofnature (including thecontributionsofchance).Todeclaremy“freedom”is tantamount tosaying,“Idon’tknowwhyIdid it,butit’sthesortofthingItendtodo,andIdon’tminddoingit.”

Oneofthemostrefreshingideastocomeoutofexistentialism(perhapstheonlyone)isthatwearefreetointerpretandreinterpretthemeaningofourlives.Youcan consider your firstmarriage,which ended indivorce, to be a “failure,” oryou can view it as a circumstance that caused you to grow inways thatwerecrucialtoyourfuturehappiness.Doesthisfreedomofinterpretationrequirefreewill? No. It simply suggests that different ways of thinking have differentconsequences.Somethoughtsaredepressinganddisempowering;othersinspireus.Wecanpursueanylineofthoughtwewant—butourchoiceistheproductofprioreventsthatwedidnotbringintobeing.Take amoment to think about the context inwhich your next decisionwill

occur:Youdidnotpickyourparentsor the timeandplaceofyourbirth.Youdidn’tchooseyourgenderormostofyourlifeexperiences.Youhadnocontrolwhatsoeveroveryourgenomeorthedevelopmentofyourbrain.Andnowyourbrain ismakingchoiceson thebasisofpreferencesandbeliefs thathavebeenhammered into it over a lifetime—by your genes, your physical developmentsince themomentyouwereconceived,and the interactionsyouhavehadwithotherpeople,events,andideas.Whereisthefreedominthis?Yes,youarefreetodowhatyouwantevennow.Butwheredidyourdesirescomefrom?

Writing for The New York Times, the philosopher Eddy Nahmias criticizedargumentsofthesortIhavepresentedhere:

Many philosophers, including me, understand free will as a set ofcapacities for imagining future coursesof action,deliberatingaboutone’sreasons for choosing them, planning one’s actions in light of thisdeliberationandcontrollingactionsinthefaceofcompetingdesires.Weactofourownfreewilltotheextentthatwehavetheopportunitytoexercisethesecapacities,withoutunreasonableexternalorinternalpressure.Weareresponsible for our actions roughly to the extent that we possess thesecapacitiesandwehaveopportunitiestoexercisethem.18

There is no question that human beings can imagine and plan for the future,weigh competing desires, etc.—and that losing these capacities would greatlydiminishus.Externaland internalpressuresofvariouskindscanbepresentorabsentwhileapersonimagines,plans,andacts—andsuchpressuresdetermine

oursenseofwhetherheismorallyresponsibleforhisbehavior.However,thesephenomenahavenothingtodowithfreewill.For instance, inmy teens and early twenties Iwas a devoted student of the

martial arts. I practiced incessantly and taught classes in college. Recently, Ibegantrainingagain,afterahiatusofmorethan20years.Boththecessationandthe renewal ofmy interest inmartial arts seem to be pure expressions of thefreedom that Nahmias attributes to me. I have been under no “unreasonableexternalorinternalpressure.”IhavedoneexactlywhatIwantedtodo.Iwantedtostop training,andIstopped. Iwanted tostartagain,andnowI trainseveraltimes aweek.All this hasbeen associatedwith conscious thought and acts ofapparentself-control.However,when I look for thepsychological causeofmybehavior, I find it

utterlymysterious.Why did I stop training 20 years ago?Well, certain thingsjustbecamemoreimportanttome.Butwhydidtheybecomemoreimportanttome—andwhy precisely then and to that degree?Andwhy didmy interest inmartial arts suddenly reemergeafterdecadesofhibernation? I canconsciouslyweigh the effects of certain influences—for instance, I recently read RoryMiller’sexcellentbookMeditationsonViolence.ButwhydidIreadthisbook?Ihaveno idea.Andwhydid I find it compelling?Andwhywas it sufficient toprovoke action on my part (if, indeed, it was the proximate cause of mybehavior)?Andwhy somuchaction? I’mnowpracticing twomartial arts andalsotrainingwithMillerandotherself-defenseexperts.Whatinhellisgoingonhere? Of course, I could tell a story about why I’m doing what I’m doing—whichwouldamounttomytellingyouwhyIthinksuchtrainingisagoodidea,whyIenjoyit,etc.—buttheactualexplanationformybehaviorishiddenfromme.AnditisperfectlyobviousthatI,astheconsciouswitnessofmyexperience,amnotthedeepcauseofit.After reading the previous paragraph, some of youwill think, “ThatMiller

booksoundsinteresting!”andyouwillbuyit.Somewillthinknosuchthing.Ofthosewhobuythebook,somewillfinditextremelyuseful.Othersmightputitdownwithoutseeingthepoint.Otherswillplaceitontheshelfandforgettoreadit.Whereisthefreedominanyofthis?You,astheconsciousagentwhoreadsthesewords,areinnopositiontodeterminewhichofthesebinsyoumightfallinto.Andifyoudecidetoswitchbins—“Iwasn’tgoingtobuythebook,butnowIwill,justtospiteyou!”—youcannotaccountforthatdecisioneither.Youwilldowhateveritisyoudo,anditismeaninglesstoassertthatyoucouldhavedoneotherwise.

MighttheTruthBeBadforUs?

Manypeopleworrythatfreewillisanecessaryillusion—andthatwithoutitwewill fail to live creative and fulfilling lives. This concern isn’t entirelyunjustified.Onestudyfound thathavingsubjects readanargumentagainst theexistenceoffreewillmadethemmorelikelytocheatonasubsequentexam.19Anotherfoundsuchsubjectstobelesshelpfulandmoreaggressive.20Itissurelyconceivablethatknowing(oremphasizing)certaintruthsaboutthehumanmindcould have unfortunate psychological and/or cultural consequences. However,I’m not especially worried about degrading the morality of my readers bypublishingthisbook.Speakingfrompersonalexperience, I think that losing thesenseof freewill

has only improved my ethics—by increasing my feelings of compassion andforgiveness, and diminishingmy sense of entitlement to the fruits ofmy owngood luck. Is such a state of mind always desirable? Probably not. If I wereteaching a self-defense class for women, I would consider it quitecounterproductive to emphasize that all human behavior, including awoman’sresponse tophysical attack, isdeterminedbyaprior stateof theuniverse, andthatallrapistsare,atbottom,unlucky—beingthemselvesvictimsofpriorcausesthat they did not create. There are scientific, ethical, and practical truthsappropriatetoeveryoccasion—andaninjunctionlike“Justgougethebastard’seyes”surelyhasitsplace.Thereisnocontradictionhere.Ourinterestsinlifearenot always served by viewing people and things as collections of atoms—butthisdoesn’tnegatethetruthorutilityofphysics.Losing a belief in free will has not made me fatalistic—in fact, it has

increased my feelings of freedom. My hopes, fears, and neuroses seem lesspersonal and indelible. There is no telling how much I might change in thefuture.Justasonewouldn’tdrawalastingconclusionaboutoneselfonthebasisofabriefexperienceofindigestion,oneneedn’tdosoonthebasisofhowonehasthoughtorbehavedforvaststretchesoftimeinthepast.Acreativechangeof inputs to the system—learning new skills, forming new relationships,adoptingnewhabitsofattention—mayradicallytransformone’slife.Becomingsensitive to thebackgroundcausesofone’s thoughtsand feelings

can—paradoxically—allowforgreatercreativecontroloverone’slife.Itisonething tobickerwithyourwifebecauseyouare inabadmood; it isanother torealizethatyourmoodandbehaviorhavebeencausedbylowbloodsugar.This

understanding reveals you to be a biochemical puppet, of course, but it alsoallowsyou tograbholdofoneofyour strings:Abiteof foodmaybeall thatyour personality requires. Getting behind our conscious thoughts and feelingscanallowustosteeramoreintelligentcoursethroughourlives(whileknowing,ofcourse,thatweareultimatelybeingsteered).

MoralResponsibility

Thebeliefinfreewillhasgivenusboththereligiousconceptionof“sin”andourcommitmenttoretributivejustice.TheU.S.SupremeCourthascalledfreewilla“universal and persistent” foundation for our system of law, distinct from “adeterministic view of human conduct that is inconsistent with the underlyingpreceptsofourcriminaljusticesystem”(UnitedStatesv.Grayson,1978).Anyintellectualdevelopmentsthatthreatenedfreewillwouldseemtoputtheethicsofpunishingpeoplefortheirbadbehaviorinquestion.The great worry, of course, is that an honest discussion of the underlying

causesofhumanbehaviorappearstoleavenoroomformoralresponsibility.Ifwe view people as neuronal weather patterns, how can we coherently speakabout right andwrong or good and evil? These notions seem to depend uponpeople being able to freely choose how to think and act. And if we remaincommitted to seeing people aspeople, wemust find some notion of personalresponsibilitythatfitsthefacts.Happily, we can. What does it mean to take responsibility for an action?

YesterdayIwenttothemarket;Iwasfullyclothed,didnotstealanything,anddidnotbuyanchovies.TosaythatIwasresponsibleformybehaviorissimplytosay that what I did was sufficiently in keeping with my thoughts, intentions,beliefs,anddesirestobeconsideredanextensionofthem.IfIhadfoundmyselfstandinginthemarketnaked,intentuponstealingasmanytinsofanchoviesasIcouldcarry,mybehaviorwouldbe totallyoutofcharacter; Iwould feel that Iwasnotinmyrightmind,orthatIwasotherwisenotresponsibleformyactions.Judgmentsofresponsibilitydependupontheoverallcomplexionofone’smind,notonthemetaphysicsofmentalcauseandeffect.Considerthefollowingexamplesofhumanviolence:

1. A four-year-old boy was playing with his father’s gun and killed a youngwoman.Thegunhadbeenkeptloadedandunsecuredinadresserdrawer.

2. A 12-year-old boy who had been the victim of continual physical andemotionalabusetookhisfather’sgunandintentionallyshotandkilledayoungwomanbecauseshewasteasinghim.

3. A 25-year-oldmanwho had been the victim of continual abuse as a childintentionally shot and killed his girlfriend because she left him for anotherman.

4. A 25-year-old man who had been raised by wonderful parents and neverabusedintentionallyshotandkilledayoungwomanhehadnevermet“justforthefunofit.”

5. A 25-year-old man who had been raised by wonderful parents and neverabusedintentionallyshotandkilledayoungwomanhehadnevermet“justforthefunofit.”AnMRIoftheman’sbrainrevealedatumorthesizeofagolfball in his medial prefrontal cortex (a region responsible for the control ofemotionandbehavioralimpulses).

Ineachcaseayoungwomandied,andineachcaseherdeathwastheresultofevents arising in the brain of another human being. But the degree of moraloutragewe feeldependson thebackgroundconditionsdescribed in eachcase.Wesuspectthatafour-year-oldchildcannottrulykillsomeoneonpurposeandthat the intentionsofa12-year-olddonot runasdeepas thoseofanadult. Incases1and2,weknowthatthebrainofthekillerhasnotfullymaturedandthatnotalltheresponsibilitiesofpersonhoodhaveyetbeenconferred.Thehistoryofabuse and theprecipitating circumstance in case3 seem tomitigate theman’sguilt: This was a crime of passion committed by a person who had himselfsuffered at the hands of others. In 4 there has been no abuse, and themotivebrands the perpetrator a psychopath. Case 5 involves the same psychopathicbehavior andmotive, but a brain tumor somehow changes themoral calculusentirely:Givenitslocation,itseemstodivestthekillerofallresponsibilityforhiscrime.Anditworksthismiracleeveniftheman’ssubjectiveexperiencewasidenticaltothatofthepsychopathincase4—forthemomentweunderstandthathisfeelingshadaphysicalcause,abraintumor,wecannothelpseeinghimasavictimofhisownbiology.How can we make sense of these gradations of moral responsibility when

brainsandtheirbackgroundinfluencesareineverycase,andtoexactlythesamedegree,therealcauseofawoman’sdeath?We need not have any illusions that a causal agent lives within the human

mindtorecognizethatcertainpeoplearedangerous.Whatwecondemnmostinanotherpersonistheconsciousintentiontodoharm.Degreesofguiltcanstillbejudged by reference to the facts of a case: the personality of the accused, hisprioroffenses,hispatternsofassociationwithothers,hisuseofintoxicants,his

confessedmotiveswith regard to thevictim,etc. If aperson’sactions seem tohavebeenentirelyoutofcharacter,thismightinfluenceourviewoftheriskhenowposestoothers.Iftheaccusedappearsunrepentantandeagertokillagain,weneedentertainnonotionsoffreewilltoconsiderhimadangertosociety.Why is the conscious decision to do another person harm particularly

blameworthy?Becausewhatwedo subsequent to consciousplanning tends tomostfullyreflecttheglobalpropertiesofourminds—ourbeliefs,desires,goals,prejudices,etc.If,afterweeksofdeliberation,libraryresearch,anddebatewithyourfriends,youstilldecidetokilltheking—well,thenkillingthekingreflectsthesortofpersonyoureallyare.Thepointisnotthatyouaretheultimateandindependent cause of your actions; the point is that, forwhatever reason, youhavethemindofaregicide.Certain criminalsmust be incarcerated to prevent them from harming other

people.Themoraljustificationforthisisentirelystraightforward:Everyoneelsewillbebetteroffthisway.Dispensingwiththeillusionoffreewillallowsustofocus on the things that matter—assessing risk, protecting innocent people,deterringcrime,etc.However,certainmoralintuitionsbegintorelaxthemomentwetakeawiderpictureofcausalityintoaccount.Oncewerecognizethateventhemost terrifyingpredatorsare, inavery real sense,unlucky tobewho theyare, the logic of hating (as opposed to fearing) them begins to unravel. Onceagain,evenifyoubelievethateveryhumanbeingharborsanimmortalsoul,thepicturedoesnot change:Anyonebornwith the soulof apsychopathhasbeenprofoundlyunlucky.Why does the brain tumor in case 5 change our view of the situation so

dramatically? One reason is that its influence has been visited upon a personwho(wemustassume)wouldnototherwisebehaveinthisway.Boththetumorand its effects seem adventitious, and thismakes the perpetrator appear to bepurely a victim of biology. Of course, if we couldn’t cure his condition, wewouldstillneedtolockhimuptopreventhimfromcommittingfurthercrimes,butwewouldnothatehimorcondemnhimasevil.HereisonefrontonwhichIbelieveourmoral intuitionsmust change:Themoreweunderstand thehumanmindincausalterms,theharderitbecomestodrawadistinctionbetweencaseslike4and5.Themenandwomenondeathrowhavesomecombinationofbadgenes,bad

parents, bad environments, and bad ideas (and the innocent, of course, havesupremelybad luck).Whichof thesequantities, exactly,were they responsiblefor?Nohumanbeingisresponsibleforhisgenesorhisupbringing,yetwehaveeveryreasontobelievethatthesefactorsdeterminehischaracter.Oursystemofjustice should reflect an understanding that any of us could have been dealt a

verydifferenthand in life. In fact, it seems immoralnot to recognize justhowmuchluckisinvolvedinmoralityitself.Toseehowfullyourmoralintuitionsmustshift,considerwhatwouldhappen

ifwediscoveredacureforhumanevil.Imaginethateveryrelevantchangeinthehumanbraincouldnowbemadecheaply,painlessly,andsafely.Infact,thecurecouldbeputdirectly into the food supply, likevitaminD.Evilwouldbecomenothingmorethananutritionaldeficiency.If we imagine that a cure for evil exists, we can see that our retributive

impulse ismorally flawed.Consider, for instance, the prospect ofwithholdingthecureforevilfromamurdereraspartofhispunishment.Wouldthismakeanysenseatall?Whatcoulditpossiblymeantosaythatapersondeservestohavethistreatmentwithheld?Whatifthetreatmentwasavailablepriortohiscrime?Wouldhestillberesponsibleforhisactions?Itseemsfarmorelikelythatthosewhohadbeenawareofhiscasewouldbeindictedfornegligence.Woulditmakeanysensetodenysurgerytothemanincase5asapunishmentifweknewthatthe brain tumor was the actual cause of his violence? Of course not. Theimplicationsofthisseeminescapable:Theurgeforretributiondependsuponournotseeingtheunderlyingcausesofhumanbehavior.Despite our attachment to the notion of free will, most of us know that

disorders of the brain can trump the best intentions of themind. This shift inunderstanding represents progress toward a deeper,more consistent, andmorecompassionateviewofourcommonhumanity—andweshouldnotethatthisisprogress away from religiousmetaphysics. Few concepts have offered greaterscope for human cruelty than the idea of an immortal soul that standsindependentofallmaterialinfluences,rangingfromgenestoeconomicsystems.Withinareligiousframework,abelief infreewillsupports thenotionofsin—which seems to justify not only harsh punishment in this life but eternalpunishment in the next. And yet, ironically, one of the fears attending ourprogress in science is that a more complete understanding of ourselves willdehumanizeus.Viewinghumanbeingsasnaturalphenomenaneednotdamageoursystemof

criminal justice. If we could incarcerate earthquakes and hurricanes for theircrimes,wewouldbuildprisonsforthemaswell.Wefightemergingepidemics—and even the occasional wild animal—without attributing free will to them.Clearly,we can respond intelligently to the threat posed by dangerous peoplewithoutlyingtoourselvesabouttheultimateoriginsofhumanbehavior.Wewillstill need a criminal justice system that attempts to accurately assessguilt andinnocencealongwiththefuturerisksthattheguiltyposetosociety.Butthelogicof punishing peoplewill come undone—unlesswe find that punishment is an

essentialcomponentofdeterrenceorrehabilitation.Itmustbeadmitted,however,thattheissueofretributionisatrickyone.Ina

fascinatingarticleinTheNewYorker,21JaredDiamondwritesofthehighpricewesometimespaywhenourdesireforvengeancegoesunfulfilled.Hecomparestheexperiencesoftwopeople:hisfriendDaniel,aNewGuineahighlanderwhoavenged the death of a paternal uncle; and his late father-in-law,who had theopportunitytokillthemanwhomurderedhisentirefamilyduringtheHolocaustbutoptedinsteadtoturnhimovertothepolice.(Afterspendingonlyayearinjail,thekillerwasreleased.)Theconsequencesoftakingrevengeinthefirstcaseandfor-goingitinthesecondcouldnothavebeenstarker.Whilethereismuchto be said against the vendetta culture of theNewGuinea highlands,Daniel’srevengebroughthimexquisiterelief.WhereasDiamond’sfather-in-lawspentthelast 60 years of his life “tormented by regret and guilt.” Clearly, vengeanceanswerstoapowerfulpsychologicalneedinmanyofus.Wearedeeplydisposedtoperceivepeopleas theauthorsof theiractions, to

hold them responsible for the wrongs they do us, and to feel that thesetransgressions must be punished. Often, the only punishment that seemsappropriateisfortheperpetratorofacrimetosufferorforfeithislife.Itremainstobeseenhowascientifically informedsystemof justicemightsteward theseimpulses. Clearly, a full account of the causes of human behavior shouldattenuateournaturalresponseto injustice,at least tosomedegree.Idoubt, forinstance,thatDiamond’sfather-in-lawwouldhavesufferedthesameanguishifhis familyhadbeen trampledbyanelephantor laid lowbycholera.Similarly,we can assume that his regret would have been significantly eased if he hadlearned that his family’s killer had lived a flawlessly moral life until a virusbeganravaginghismedialpre-frontalcortex.However, itmay be that a sham form of retributionwould still bemoral—

even necessary—if it led people to behave better than they otherwise would.Whether it is useful to emphasize the punishment of certain criminals—ratherthan their containment or rehabilitation—is a question for social andpsychological science. But it seems clear that a desire for retribution, arisingfromtheideathateachpersonisthefreeauthorofhisthoughtsandactions,restsonacognitiveandemotionalillusion—andperpetuatesamoralone.Onewayofviewingtheconnectionbetweenfreewillandmoralresponsibility

istonotethatwegenerallyattributethesequalitiestopeopleonlywithrespecttoactions that punishment might deter.22 I cannot hold you responsible forbehaviors thatyoucouldnotpossiblycontrol. Ifwemadesneezing illegal, forinstance,somenumberofpeoplewouldbreakthelawnomatterhowgravethe

consequences.Abehaviorlikekidnapping,however,seemstorequireconsciousdeliberation and sustained effort at every turn—hence it should admit ofdeterrence.Ifthethreatofpunishmentcouldcauseyoutostopdoingwhatyouaredoing,yourbehaviorfallssquarelywithinconventionalnotionsoffreewillandmoralresponsibility.It may be true that strict punishment—rather than mere containment or

rehabilitation—is necessary to prevent certain crimes. But punishing peoplepurelyforpragmaticreasonswouldbeverydifferentfromtheapproachthatwecurrently take.Of course, if punishing bacteria and viruseswould prevent theemergenceofpandemicdiseases,wewouldmeteoutjusticetothemaswell.A wide variety of human behaviors can be modified by punishments and

incentives—and attributing responsibility to people in these contexts is quitenatural. It may even be unavoidable as a matter of convention. As thepsychologistDanielWegner points out, the idea of freewill can be a tool forunderstandinghumanbehavior.Tosaythatsomeonefreelychosetosquanderhislife’s savings at the poker table is to say that he had every opportunity to dootherwiseandthatnothingaboutwhathedidwasinadvertent.Heplayedpokernot by accident or while in the grip of delusion but because he wanted to,intendedto,anddecidedto,momentaftermoment.Formostpurposes,itmakessense to ignore the deep causes of desires and intentions—genes, synapticpotentials, etc.—and focus instead on the conventional outlines of the person.Wedothiswhenthinkingaboutourownchoicesandbehaviors—becauseit’stheeasiestwaytoorganizeourthoughtsandactions.WhydidIorderbeerinsteadofwine?Because Ipreferbeer.WhydoIprefer it? Idon’tknow,but Igenerallyhavenoneed toask.Knowing that I likebeermore thanwine is all Ineed toknowtofunctioninarestaurant.Whatever thereason,Ipreferonetaste to theother.Istherefreedominthis?Nonewhatsoever.WouldImagicallyreclaimmyfreedomifIdecidedtospitemypreferenceandorderwineinstead?No,becausetherootsofthisintentionwouldbeasobscureasthepreferenceitself.

Politics

Forbetterorworse,dispellingtheillusionoffreewillhaspoliticalimplications—becauseliberalsandconservativesarenotequallyinthralltoit.Liberalstendtounderstandthatapersoncanbeluckyorunluckyinallmattersrelevanttohissuccess.Conservatives,however,oftenmakeareligiousfetishofindividualism.Many seem to have absolutely no awareness of how fortunate onemust be tosucceedatanythinginlife,nomatterhowhardoneworks.Onemustbeluckytobeabletowork.Onemustbeluckytobeintelligent,physicallyhealthy,andnotbankruptedinmiddleagebytheillnessofaspouse.Consider the biography of any “self-made”man, and youwill find that his

successwasentirelydependentonbackgroundconditionsthathedidnotmakeandofwhichhewasmerelythebeneficiary.Thereisnotapersononearthwhochose his genome, or the country of his birth, or the political and economicconditionsthatprevailedatmomentscrucial tohisprogress.Andyet, living inAmerica,onegetsthedistinctsensethatifcertainconservativeswereaskedwhytheyweren’tbornwithclubfeetororphanedbeforetheageoffive,theywouldnothesitatetotakecreditfortheseaccomplishments.Even if youhave struggled tomake themostofwhatnaturegaveyou, you

must still admit that your ability and inclination to struggle is part of yourinheritance.Howmuchcreditdoesapersondeservefornotbeinglazy?Noneatall.Laziness,likediligence,isaneurologicalcondition.Ofcourse,conservativesare right to think thatwemust encourage people towork to the best of theirabilities and discourage free riders wherever we can. And it is wise to holdpeopleresponsiblefortheiractionswhendoingsoinfluencestheirbehaviorandbringsbenefittosociety.Butthisdoesnotmeanthatwemustbetakeninbytheillusion of free will. We need only acknowledge that efforts matter and thatpeople can change.We do not change ourselves, precisely—becausewe haveonly ourselves with which to do the changing—but we continually influence,andareinfluencedby,theworldaroundusandtheworldwithinus.Itmayseemparadoxical toholdpeople responsible forwhathappens in their cornerof theuniverse,butoncewebreakthespelloffreewill,wecandothispreciselytothedegreethatit isuseful.Wherepeoplecanchange,wecandemandthattheydoso.Wherechangeisimpossible,orunresponsivetodemands,wecanchartsomeothercourse. In improvingourselvesandsociety,weareworkingdirectlywiththeforcesofnature,forthereisnothingbutnatureitselftoworkwith.

Conclusion

It is generally argued that our experience of free will presents a compellingmystery:Ontheonehand,wecan’tmakesenseofitinscientificterms;ontheother,wefeelthatwearetheauthorsofourownthoughtsandactions.However,Ithinkthatthismysteryisitselfasymptomofourconfusion.Itisnotthatfreewill is simply an illusion—our experience is notmerely delivering a distortedviewofreality.Rather,wearemistakenaboutourexperience.Notonlyarewenotasfreeaswethinkweare—wedonotfeelasfreeaswethinkwedo.Oursenseofourownfreedomresultsfromournotpayingcloseattentiontowhatitisliketobeus.Themomentwepayattention,itispossibletoseethatfreewillis nowhere to be found, and our experience is perfectly compatible with thistruth.Thoughts and intentions simply arise in themind.What else could theydo?Thetruthaboutusisstrangerthanmanysuppose:Theillusionoffreewillisitselfanillusion.The problem is not merely that free will makes no sense objectively (i.e.,

whenourthoughtsandactionsareviewedfromathird-personpointofview);itmakes no sense subjectively either. It is quite possible to notice this throughintrospection.Infact,Iwillnowperformanexperimentinfreewillforalltosee:IwillwriteanythingIwantfor therestof thisbook.WhateverIwritewill,ofcourse,besomethingIchoosetowrite.Nooneiscompellingmetodothis.Noone has assigned me a topic or demanded that I use certain words. I can beungrammatical ifIpleased.AndifIwanttoputarabbit inthissentence,Iamfreetodoso.Butpayingattentiontomystreamofconsciousnessrevealsthatthisnotionof

freedomdoesnotreachverydeep.Wheredidthisrabbitcomefrom?Whydidn’tIputanelephantinthatsentence?Idonotknow.Iamfreetochange“rabbit”to“elephant,”ofcourse.But ifIdidthis,howcouldIexplainit?It is impossibleformetoknowthecauseofeitherchoice.Either iscompatiblewithmybeingcompelledbythelawsofnatureorbuffetedbythewindsofchance;butneitherlooks, or feels, like freedom. Rabbit or elephant? Am I free to decide that“elephant”is thebetterwordwhenI justdonot feel that it is thebetterword?AmIfreetochangemymind?Ofcoursenot.Itcanonlychangeme.Whatbringsmydeliberationsonthesematterstoaclose?Thisbookmustend

sometime—and now I want to get something to eat. Am I free to resist thisfeeling?Well,yes,inthesensethatnooneisgoingtoforcemeatgunpointtoeat

—butIamhungry.CanIresistthisfeelingamomentlonger?Yes,ofcourse—andforanindeterminatenumberofmomentsthereafter.ButIdon’tknowwhyImaketheeffortinthisinstanceandnotinothers.Andwhydomyeffortsceasepreciselywhen theydo?Now I feel that it really is time forme to leave. I’mhungry,yes,butitalsoseemsthatI’vemademypoint.Infact,Ican’tthinkofanythingelsetosayonthesubject.Andwhereisthefreedominthat?

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Iwouldliketothankmywifeandeditor,AnnakaHarris,forhercontributionstoFree Will. As is always the case, her insights and recommendations greatlyimprovedthebook.Idon'tknowhowshemanagestoraiseourdaughter,workonherownprojects,andstillhave time toeditmybooks—butshedoes. Iamextremelyluckyandgratefultohaveherinmycorner.JerryCoyne,GalenStrawson,andmymotheralsoreadanearlydraftof the

manuscriptandprovidedveryhelpfulcomments.

NOTES

1.Recentadvancesinexperimentalpsychologyandneuroimaginghaveallowedustostudytheboundarybetweenconsciousandunconsciousmentalprocesseswithincreasingprecision.Wenowknowthatatleasttwosystemsinthebrain—often referred to as “dual processes”—govern human cognition, emotion,and behavior. One is evolutionarily older, unconscious, slow to learn, andquick torespond; theotherevolvedmorerecentlyand isconscious,quick tolearn, and slow to respond. The phenomenon of priming, in whichsubliminally presented stimuli influence a person’s thoughts and emotions,exposes the first of these systems and reveals the reality of complexmentalprocesses at work beneath the level of conscious awareness. People can beprimed in awidevarietyofways, and theseunconscious influences reliablyaltertheirgoalsandsubsequentbehavior(H.Aarts,R.Custers,&H.Marien,2008. Preparing and motivating behavior outside of awareness. Science319[5780]:1639;R.Custers&H.Aarts,2010.Theunconsciouswill:Howthepursuitofgoalsoperatesoutsideofconsciousawareness.Science329[5987]:47–50).

The experimental technique of “backward masking” has been at thecenter ofmuch of thiswork: If one presents subjectswith a brief visualstimulus (around 30 milliseconds), they can consciously perceive it; buttheycannolongerdosoifthissamestimulusisimmediatelyfollowedbyadissimilar pattern (the “mask”). This technique allows for words andimagestobedeliveredtothemindsubliminally.Interestingly,thethresholdfortheconsciousrecognitionofemotionalwordsis lowerthanforneutralwords, which suggests that semantic processing occurs prior toconsciousness(R.Gaillard,A.DelCul,L.Naccache,F.Vinckier,L.Cohen,& S. Dehaene, 2006. Nonconscious semantic processing of emotionalwords modulates conscious access.Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 103[19]:7524–7529).Recentneuroimagingexperimentshaveofferedfurtherevidence:Masked

wordsengageareasassociatedwithsemanticprocessing(M.T.Diaz&G.McCarthy, 2007. Unconscious word processing engages a distributednetwork of brain regions. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 19[11]: 1768–1775; S.Dehaene,L.Naccache,L.Cohen,D.LeBihan,J.F.Mangin,J.B.Poline,et

al., 2001. Cerebral mechanisms of word masking and unconsciousrepetitionpriming.Nat.Neurosci.4[7]:752–758;S.Dehaene,L.Naccache,H.G.LeClec,E.Koechlin,M.Mueller,G.Dehaene-Lambertz,etal.,1998.Imaging unconscious semantic priming. Nature 395[6702]: 597–600);subliminally promised rewards alter activity in the brain’s reward regionsand influence subsequent behavior (M. Pessiglione, L. Schmidt, B.Draganski, R. Kalisch, H. Lau, R. J. Dolan, et al., 2007. How the braintranslates money into force: A neuroimaging study of subliminalmotivation. Science 316[5826]: 904–906); and masked fearful faces andemotional words drive activity in the amygdala, the hub of emotionalprocessinginthelimbicsystem(P.J.Whalen,S.L.Rauch,N.L.Etcoff,S.C.McInerney,M.B.Lee,&M.A.Jenike,1998.Maskedpresentationsofemotional facial expressions modulate amygdala activity without explicitknowledge. J. Neurosci. 18[1]: 411–418; L. Naccache, R. Gaillard, C.Adam, D. Hasboun, S. Clemenceau, M. Baulac, et al., 2005. A directintracranial record of emotions evoked by subliminal words. Proc. Natl.Acad.Sci.USA102[21]:7713–7717).Thesubliminalpresentationofstimuliposessomeconceptualproblems,

however.AsDanielDennettpointsout,itcanbedifficult(orimpossible)todistinguishwhatwasexperiencedandthenforgottenfromwhatwasneverexperiencedinthefirstplace—seehisinsightfuldiscussionofOrwellianvs.Stalinesque processes in cognition (D. C. Dennett, 1991. Consciousnessexplained.Boston:Little,BrownandCo.,pp.116–125).Thisambiguityislargely attributable to the fact that the contents of consciousnessmust beintegratedovertime—around100to200milliseconds(F.Crick&C.Koch,2003.Aframeworkforconsciousness.Nat.Neurosci.6[2]:119–126).Thisperiod of integration allows the sensation of touching an object and theassociated visual perception of doing so, which arrive at the cortex atdifferent times, to be experienced as though they were simultaneous.Consciousness, therefore, is dependent upon what is generally known as“workingmemory.”Manyneuroscientistshavemadethissamepoint(J.M.Fuster, 2003. Cortex and mind: Unifying cognition. Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress;P.Thagard&B.Aubie,2008.Emotionalconsciousness:Aneuralmodelofhowcognitiveappraisalandsomaticperceptioninteracttoproducequalitativeexperience.Conscious.Cogn.17(3):811–834;B.J.Baars & S. Franklin, 2003. How conscious experience and workingmemory interact. Trends Cogn. Sci. 7(4): 166–172). The principle issomewhat more loosely captured by Gerald Edelman’s notion ofconsciousness as “the remembered present” (G. M. Edelman, 1989. The

remembered present: A biological theory of consciousness. New York:BasicBooks).

2. B. Libet, C. A. Gleason, E. W. Wright, & D. K. Pearl, 1983. Time ofconscious intention to act in relation toonsetof cerebral activity (readiness-potential):Theunconsciousinitiationofafreelyvoluntaryact,Brain106(Pt3):623–642;B. Libet, 1985.Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role ofconsciouswillinvoluntaryaction.Behav.BrainSci.8:529–566.Anotherlabhassincefoundthataperson’sjudgmentofwhenheintendedtomovecanbeshifted in time by giving him delayed sensory feedback of his actualmovements. This suggests that such judgments are retrospective estimatesbasedontheapparenttimeofmovementandnotbasedonanactualawarenessoftheneuralactivitythatcausesthemovement(W.P.Banks&E.A.Isham,2009). We infer rather than perceive the moment we decided to act.(PsychologicalScience,20:17–21).

However,Libetandothershavespeculatedthat theconceptoffreewillmight yet be saved: Perhaps the consciousmind is free to “veto,” ratherthaninitiate,complexaction.Thissuggestionhasalwaysseemedabsurdonits face—for surely the neural events that inhibit a planned action ariseunconsciouslyaswell.

3.J.D.Haynes,2011.Decodingandpredicting intentions.Ann.NYAcad.Sci.1224(1):9–21.

4.I.Fried,R.Mukamel,&G.Kreiman,2011.Internallygeneratedpreactivationofsingleneuronsinhumanmedialfrontalcortexpredictsvolition.Neuron,69:548–562;P.Haggard,2011.Decisiontimeforfreewill.Neuron,69:404–406.

5.TheneuroscientistsJoshuaGreeneandJonathanCohenmakeasimilarpoint:

Mostpeople’sviewof themind is implicitlydualistand libertarianandnotmaterialist and compatibilist. . . . That is, it requires the rejection ofdeterminismandan implicitcommitment tosomekindofmagicalmentalcausation . . . contrary to legal and philosophical orthodoxy, determinismreallydoesthreatenfreewillandresponsibilityasweintuitivelyunderstandthem (J. Greene & J. Cohen, 2004. For the law, neuroscience changesnothingandeverything.Philos.Trans.R.Soc.Lond.BBiol.Sci.359[1451]:1775–1785).

6. For a good survey of compatibilist thought, seehttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/.SeealsoG.Watson,ed.,2003.Freewill(secondedition).Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

7.D.C.Dennett,2003.Freedomevolves.NewYork:Penguin.

8.TomClark,personalcommunication.9.DanielDennett,personalcommunication.10.GalenStrawson(personalcommunication)haspointedoutthatevenifone

agreeswithDennetthere,theordinarynotionofmoralresponsibilityisstilldeeplyproblematicforthereasonsalreadygiven.

11.InhisbookConsciousnessExplained,DanielDennettdescribesanunpublishedexperimentinwhichtheneurosurgeonW.GreyWalterdirectlyconnectedthemotorcorticesofhispatientstoaslideprojector.Askedtoadvancetheslidesattheirleisure,thesubjectsweresaidtohavefeltthattheprojectorwasreadingtheirminds.Unfortunately,thereissomeuncertaintyastowhethertheexperimentwaseverperformed.

12.D.Wegner,2002.Theillusionofconsciouswill.Cam-bridge,MA:BradfordBooks/MITPress.

13.L.Silver,2006.Challengingnature:Theclashofscienceandspiritualityatthenewfrontiersoflife.NewYork:Ecco,p.50.

14.Forarecentdiscussionoftheroleofconsciousnessinhumanpsychology,seeR.F.Baumeister,E.J.Masicampo,&K.D.Vohs,2011.Doconsciousthoughtscausebehavior?AnnualReviewofPsychology,62:331–361.

15.Again,asGalenStrawsonpointsout(personalcommunication),evenifwegrantedthatyouarethewholeofyourmind(consciousandunconscious),youstillcannotultimatelybeheldresponsibleforitscharacter.

16.Einstein(followingSchopenhauer)oncemadethesamepoint:

Honestly, I cannot understandwhat peoplemeanwhen they talk aboutthe freedom of the humanwill. I have a feeling, for instance, that Iwillsomething or other; but what relation this has with freedom I cannotunderstandatall.IfeelthatIwilltolightmypipeandIdoit;buthowcanIconnectthisupwiththeideaoffreedom?Whatisbehindtheactofwillingto light the pipe? Another act of willing? Schopenhauer once said: DerMenschkannwaserwill;erkannabernichtwollenwaserwill(Mancandowhathewillbuthecannotwillwhathewills).(M.Planck,1932.Whereissciencegoing?NewYork:W.W.Norton&Company,p.201.)

17.AsJerryCoynepointsout(personalcommunication),thisnotionof

counterfactualfreedomisalsoscientificallyuntestable.Whatevidencecouldpossiblybeputforwardtoshowthatonecouldhaveacteddifferentlyinthepast?

18.http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/is-neuroscience-the-death-of-free-will/.

19.K.D.Vohs&J.W.Schooler,2008.Thevalueofbelievinginfreewill:Encouragingabeliefindeterminismincreasescheating.PsychologicalScience,19(1):49–54.

20.R.F.Baumeister,E.J.Masicampo,&C.N.DeWall,2009.Prosocialbenefitsoffeelingfree:Disbeliefinfreewillincreasesaggressionandreduceshelpfulness.PersonalityandSocialPsychologyBulletin,35:260–268.

21.J.Diamond,2008.Vengeanceisours.TheNewYorker,April21,2001,pp.74–87.

22.StevenPinker,personalcommunication.

INDEX

actions:brainand,69nfreedomtoreinterpretmeaningof,40modificationof,throughpunishmentorincentives,59–60past,freewilland,6,39–40,77nasproductsofimpersonalevents,27seenas“self-generated,”27–29voluntaryvs.involuntary,12–13,31–32,41–42seealsointentionsagency,senseof:experimentalmanipulationof,24–25freewilland,23–26attention,directingof,asconsciousact,31–32

backwardmasking,70nbacteria,inhumanbodies,23–24behavior,seeactionsbrain:causalstatesof,34disordersandtumorsof,50,51,53–54,55–56dualsystemsin,9,32,69n–70nmedialprefrontalcortexof,50,58assubjecttolawsofnature,11–12subliminalpresentationofstimulito,70n–71nseealsoneurophysiologybrainactivity,asprecedingconsciousnessofintent,8–11brainscans,8–11,24,69n–72n

chance,27–28seealsoluckchange,possibilityof,62–63childabuse,3–4,50,51choice:

ascausalbrainstate,24importanceof,34–35asproductofpriorevents,34,43–44seemingspontaneityof,6,37storiesasexplanationsof,35,37,43–44seealsointentionsClark,Tom,20–23cognition,69nCohen,Jonathan,73n–74ncompassion,45compatibilism,15–26freewillasdefinedby,16–17,39–40,74nmoralresponsibilityand,18consciousness:delayedsensoryfeedbackand,73nasdependentonworkingmemory,72nfreewilland,6,26intentionsasappearingbutnotoriginatingin,8unconsciousoriginsof,5,7–14ConsciousnessExplained(Dennett),74nconservatives,freewilland,61–62Coyne,Jerry,76ncriminals,criminalbehavior:causesof,3–5asdangerstosociety,52–53,56deterrenceof,56,58–59empathyfor,45–46freewilland,17–18,53incarcerationof,53,54,58moralresponsibilityand,3,17–18,49–52punishmentof,seeretributionrehabilitationof,56,58Daniel(NewGuineahighlander),57deliberativethinking,roleof,32–33Dennett,Daniel,20–23,25,33,71ndesires:mutuallyincompatible,18–19pathological,18determinism,15,74n

fatalismvs.,33–34moralresponsibilityand,48–49scientificvalidityof,16,29–30DNA,mutationsof,29

Edelman,Gerald,72nEEG(electroencephalogram),8Einstein,Albert,75n–76nemotion,brainand,69nemotionalwords,subliminalpresentationof,70n–71nempathy,45–46entitlement,senseof,45evolution,29existentialism,40experimentalpsychology,69n–72n,74n–75n

fatalism,46determinismvs.,33–34Ferriss,Tim,36,37forgiveness,45fMRI,seefunctionalmagneticresonanceimagingfreedom:asabilitytoactonbeliefs,38–39senseof,asenhancedbylossofbeliefinfreewill,46–47socialandpolitical,13freewill,asconcept:asbasisofjusticesystem,1,23,48,54compatibilistviewof,seecompatibilismconsciousnessand,6,26conservativesand,61–62criminalbehaviorand,17–18deterministviewof,seedeterminismhatingand,53–54hypotheticalrequirementsfor,13–14asillusion,5–6,11,22,53liberalsand,61libertarianismand,15–16,74nluckvs.,4,38,53,54,61–62pastactionsand,6,39–40,77n

rethinkingjusticesystemrelianceon,54,56retributionasdependentonsenseof,1scientificvaliditylackingfor,6,64–65senseofagencyand,23–26subjectivevaliditylackingfor,6,65successand,1freewill,senseof:chanceand,27–28conceptualunderstandingofselfvs.,22–23asfeltexperience,15,22–23,26moralresponsibilityasdependenton,16–17,23,27asmystery,64–65asresultingfromignoranceofunconsciousoriginsofintentions,13,32,60seenasnecessaryillusion,45–47functionalmagneticresonanceimaging(fMRI),8

Greene,Joshua,73n–74n

hating,freewilland,53–54Hayes,Steven,1–4Heisenberg,Martin,27Holocaust,57illusion:freewillas,5–6,11,22necessary,senseoffreewillseenas,45–47incarceration,ofcriminals,53,54,58intentions:asappearingbutnotoriginatinginconsciousness,8brainactivityasprecedingconsciousnessof,8–11ascausalbrainstate,34todoharm,52–53externalandinternalrestraintson,41–42asproductofpriorevents,5–6,19–20,34,60souland,12subjectivemysteryof,13,37–38,39–40unconsciousoriginsof,7–14seealsoactions;choiceionchannels,27

justicesystem:anddistinctionbetweenvoluntaryandinvoluntaryactions,31,56

freewillasbasisof,1,23,48rethinkingofrelianceonfreewill,54,56retributionand,1,48,56

Komisarjevsky,Joshua,1–4

lawsofnature,40brainassubjectto,11–12laziness,62liberals,freewilland,61libertarianism,15–16,74nLibet,Benjamin,8,73nluck:freewillvs.,4,38,53,54,61–62moralresponsibilityand,54seealsochance

materialism,11,74nmeaning,ofactions,freedomtoreinterpret,40medialprefrontalcortex,50,58MeditationsonViolence(Miller),43–44Miller,Rory,43–44moralresponsibility,48–60andbraindisorders,50,51,53–54,55–56compatibilismand,18ofcriminals,3degreesof,49–52asdependentonsenseoffreewill,16–17,23,27determinationof,asdependentonoverallcomplexionofmind,49determinismand,48–49anddistinctionbetweenvoluntaryandinvoluntaryactions,31,41–42andfearofretribution,58–59luckand,54murder,3–4,12–13,17,18,55,57mystery:originsofintentionsas,13,37–38,39–40senseoffreewillas,64–65

Nahmias,Eddy,41–42

neuroimaging,8–11,24,69n–72nneurophysiology,seenaspartoftheself,20–22,75nNewGuinea,57NewYorker,57NewYorkTimes,41–42

pastactions,freewilland,6,39–40,77nPetit,Hayley,2–3Petit,Jennifer,2–3Petit,Michaela,2–3Petit,William,2–3philosophicalmaterialism,11,74nphilosophy,freewilland,seecompatibilism;determinism;libertarianismpolitics,61–63priming,69npsychopaths,51punishment,seeretribution

quantumindeterminacy,27,29–30

rape,3,17,46rehabilitation,ofcriminals,56,58religion,18,56retribution:asdependentonsenseoffreewill,1asdeterrent,58–59humanneedfor,57–58justicesystemand,1,48religionand,56asresultingfromignoranceofunderlyingcausesofbehavior,55

Schopenhauer,Arthur,75n–76nself,seenascomprisingbothconsciousandunconsciousprocesses,20–22,75nsensoryfeedback,consciousnessand,73nsin,48,56soul,56intentionsand,12libertarianismand,16stimuli,subliminalpresentationof,70n–71n

stories,asexplanationofchoices,35,37,43–44Strawson,Galen,74n,75nsuccess,freewilland,1SupremeCourt,U.S.,48synapticvesicles,27

theology,18,56

unconscious,seenaspartoftheself,20–22,75nUnitedStatesv.Grayson,48

violence,degreesofmoralresponsibilityfor,49–52volition,seechoiceWalter,W.Grey,74n–75n

Wegner,Daniel,60will,seefreewill;intentionsworkingmemory,consciousnessasdependenton,72n

ABOUTTHEAUTHOR

SamHarris is theauthorof thebestsellingbooksTheEndofFaith,Letter toaChristianNation,TheMoralLandscape,andLying.TheEndofFaithwon the2005PENAwardforNon-fiction.Hiswritinghasbeenpublishedinmorethan15 languages. Dr. Harris and his work have been discussed inTheNew YorkTimes,ScientificAmerican,Nature,RollingStone,Newsweek,Time, andmanyother publications. His writing has appeared inThe New York Times, theLosAngelesTimes,TheTimes(London),theBostonGlobe,TheAtlantic,Newsweek,theAnnalsofNeurology,andelsewhere.Dr.HarrisisacofounderandtheCEOof Project Reason, a nonprofit foundation devoted to spreading scientificknowledge and secular values in society. He received a degree in philosophyfromStanfordUniversityandaPhD inneuroscience fromUCLA.Pleasevisithiswebsiteatwww.samharris.org.

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