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A 377755
MAJOR CRISESIN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICANFOREIGN POLICY
A Documentary History
Edited by RUSSELL D. BUHITE
Primary Documents in American History and Contemporary Issues
GREENWOOD PRESSWestport, Connecticut • London
Contents
Series Foreword xxxix
Introduction xli
PART I: Soviet-American Relations and the Origins of the Cold
War, 1945-1947 1
CHRONOLOGY 2
AGREEMENTS AND PERSONALITIES AT YALTA 4
Document 1: The Yalta Conference Protocol and Agreements(February 1945) 4
Document 2: Soviet Diplomat Andrei Gromyko Recalls the Stalin-Roosevelt Meeting at Yalta, and the Issue of SovietForces in the Pacific (February 1945) 6
Document 3: Soviet "Spymaster" Compares Soviet GeopoliticalGains from the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact with Stalin'sExpansionist Motives at Yalta (Spring 1945) 7
REPATRIATION AND POLAND " 8
Document 4: Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall'sInstructions to General John Deane to Investigatethe Treatment of American Servicemen BehindRussian Lines (3 March 1945) 8
Document 5: American Ambassador to the Soviet Union CablesState Department that Soviets Using U.S.Servicemen "as a Club" in Negotiations(14 March 1945) 9
Document 6: President Franklin Roosevelt's Letter to Josef Stalinon Evacuation and Treatment of Liberated
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U.S. Servicemen in Eastern Europe (17 March 1945) 11
Document 7: Stalin's Reply to President Roosevelt's Cable[Document 6] on the Evacuation of AmericanPOWs from Liberated Eastern Europe (22 March1945) 11
Document 8: Ambassador Harriman Reports the UnsatisfactoryConditions for Liberated American Servicemen inSoviet Camps (24 March 1945) 12
Document 9: President Harry Truman Meets with Soviet ForeignMinister Molotov in Washington(22-23 April 1945) 14
ATOMIC DIPLOMACY AND POTSDAM 15
Document 10: Winston Churchill to Secretary of War HenryStimson on "Tube Alloys" (18 July 1945) 16
Document 11: Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov Recalls theSoviets' Atomic Program and the Role ofAmerican Scientists Julius and Ethel Rosenberg(1943-1953) 16
Document 12: Secretary of War Stimson's Memo to PresidentTruman on the Effect of the U.S. Atomic Bomb onRelations with Russia(11 September 1945) 17
Document 13: Ambassador Gromyko Recalls How PresidentTruman Notified Stalin that America WasPreparing to Use the Atomic Bomb Against Japan(24 July 1945) 18
Document 14: The Potsdam Conference's Protocol of Proceedings(1 August 1945) 20
Document 15: Soviet General Recounts Stalin's Cancellation ofSoviet Landing on the Japanese Island ofHokkaido (August 1945) 21
Document 16: Soviet Intelligence Officer Reveals that anAmerican Scientist Informed Soviets of America'sInability to Conduct a Nuclear War Against theUSSR (Late 1940s) 21
THE COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS: TRIPOLITANIA,JAPAN, AND IRAN 22
Document 17: Secretary of State James Byrnes Remembers the
Contents xi
Council of Foreign Ministers Meeting in London(September 1945) 22
Document 18: Secretary Byrnes Recalls Ambassador Harriman'sReport of Stalin's Keen Interest in the AlliedOccupation of Japan (November 1945) 23
Document 19: Secretary Byrnes at the Council of ForeignMinisters Meeting in Moscow and His Discussionwith Stalin about Iran (December 1945) 24
Document 20: Stalin's Speech that the Western Powers InitiallyAssessed as "The Declaration of World War III"(9 February 1946) 26
THE LONG TELEGRAM, THE IRON CURTAIN SPEECH, ANDTHE CLIFFORD REPORT 27
Document 21: East-West Tension Ascribed to Kremlin'sIdeological Conception of Inevitability of ConflictBetween Communist-Capitalist Camps (June 1946) 27
Document 22: Charg6 George F. Kennan's "Long Telegram"(22 February 1946) 29
Document 23: Winston Churchill's "Iron Curtain" Speech(5 March 1946) 34
Document 24: The "Monumental Top-Secret" Clifford-ElseyReport Prepared for President Truman(24 September 1946) 36
THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND THE NATIONAL SECURITYACT 40
Document 25: President Truman Reveals Plan to Aid Greece andTurkey as Crucial Element of His Doctrine toContain Communist Expansion (12 March 1947) 41
Document 26: National Security Act of 1947 . . . the NSC, theCIA, the JCS, and the National MilitaryEstablishment (26 July 1947) 44
THE MARSHALL PLAN AND COMINFORM 47
Document 27: American Diplomat George Kennan Explains theFunctions of the State Department's PolicyPlanning Staff and Its Recommendations toSecretary of State George Marshall of Plan for theEconomic Reconstruction of Europe (24 May 1947) 47
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Document 28: Soviet General Stresses that COMINFORM WasStalin's Response to Truman's Doctrine ofContainment (September 1947) 48
PART II: The Berlin Blockade and Airlift, 1948-1949 51
CHRONOLOGY 52
THE ALLIES' GERMANY AND BERLIN DILEMMA 53
Document 29: Lancaster House Protocol on the Zones ofOccupation in Germany and the Administration of"Greater Berlin" (12 September 1944) 53
Document 30: Protocol on Germany at the Yalta Conference(February 1945) . 55
Document 31: U.S. General Lucius Clay and Soviet GeneralGeorgi Zhukov Discuss Lines of CommunicationBetween Germany and Berlin (29 June 1945) 55
Document 32: The Berlin (Potsdam) Conference Protocol(2 August 1945) 56
Document 33: General Clay Recalls the Allied Control Council'sDecision to Approve Air Corridors to and fromBerlin (30 November 1945) 57
Document 34: Secretary of State James Byrnes' Speech atStuttgart Concerning U.S. Relations with PostwarGermany (6 September 1946) 58
Document 35: The London Conference Communique onGermany (7 June 1948) 61
Document 36: Soviet Intelligence Officer Pavel SudoplatovAsserts that Stalin Initiated the Crisis to AssureCommunist Victory in China (1994) 63
OPERATION VITTLES 64
Document 37: General Clay's Cable to Army General OmarBradley (1 April 1948) 64
Document 38: Teleconference Between General Clay, ArmySecretary Royall, and Army Chief of Staff GeneralBradley over Evacuation from Berlin(2 April 1948) 65
Document 39: General Clay Orders Airlift Phase of OperationVittles (June 1948) 67
Document 40: The Importance of Transatlantic TeleconferenceCommunication, and General Clay's Request toUpgrade the Airlift with C-54s (July 1948) 68
Contents xiii
Document 41: General Bradley Remembers the Airlift as theCold War's "Single Greatest Triumph" (1983) 69
Document 42: Secretary of Defense James Forrestal's Diary withComments on the Blockade, B-29s to Britain, andthe Atomic Bomb (June-July 1948) 69
Document 43: Secretary Forrestal to Secretary of State Marshallon U.S. Preparation for Global Conflict (28 July1948) 72
Document 44: U.S. Diplomatic Note to the Soviet Government (6July 1948) 73
Document 45: Note from the Soviet Union to the United States(14 July 1948) 74
Document 46: Secretary Marshall to U.S. Ambassador LewisDouglas on the Allied Approach Toward Stalin(20 July 1948) 76
Document 47: Foreign Ministers' Communique Refers the Crisisto the UN Security Council (26 September 1948) 79
Document 48: Dean Acheson on the State Department's Reactionto Stalin's Interview with Kingsbury Smith(February 1949) 79
Document 49: Ambassador Philip Jessup's "Park AvenueDiplomacy—Ending the Berlin Blockade" (March-May 1949) 81
Document 50: Communique of Agreement on Berlin from theFrench, British, and United States Representativesto the United Nations (4 May 1949) 84
PART III: The Korean War, 1950-1953 87
CHRONOLOGY 89
PRIOR TO 25 JUNE 1950 90
Document 51: The Cairo Declaration by President Roosevelt,Prime Minister Churchill, and Generalissimo Jiang(1 December 1943) 90
Document 52: Dean Rusk Recalls How "Two Tired Colonels"Divided Korea at the 38th Parallel (14 August1945) 91
Document 53: As Commander of U.S. Forces in the Pacific,General Douglas MacArthur Recommends to theWar Department that Both American and
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Russian Forces Be Withdrawn from Korea(16 December 1945) 92
Document 54: U.S. Notification to Soviets of Intent to Refer theKorean Question to the UN (7 September 1947) 94
Document 55: Joint Chiefs of Staff's Assessment of America'sNational Interest in Korea (September 1947) 94
Document 56: Soviet Ambassador to North Korea Reports toStalin of Kim Il-Sung's Increasing Preparations toAttack South Korea (19 January 1950) 95
Document 57: Secretary of State Dean Acheson's "DefensivePerimeter of the Pacific" Speech During a Meetingof the U.S. Press Club (12 January 1950) 97
Document 58: Acheson Recalls His Speech and the Defeat of anAid Package (1950) 98
Document 59: National Security Council Paper #68 (25 April
1950) 99
THE 38TH PARALLEL 101
Document 60: President Truman Responds to the North KoreanAttack (25 June 1950) 101
Document 61: President Truman's Military Response to Attack(27 June 1950) 103
Document 62: President Truman on Military Action in Korea (30June 1950) 103
Document 63: American Diplomat George Kennan RecallsDiscussions at the State Department to Restore38th Parallel as the Status Quo Ante (June-July1950) 104
Document 64: Internal State Department MemorandumOutlining U.S. Policy Concerning the 38th Parallel(1 July 1950) 105
Document 65: John Foster Dulles' 38th Parallel Memorandum (14July 1950) 105
Document 66: Secretary of Defense George Marshall to GeneralMacArthur to Cross the 38th Parallel(29 September 1950) 107
Document 67: General MacArthur's Rationale for Amphibious
Landing at Inchon (23 August 1950) 107
TRUMAN-MACARTHUR CONTROVERSY 108
Document 68: General MacArthur's Proposed Message to the
Contents xv
Chicago Convention of Veterans of Foreign Wars(28 August 1950) 108
Document 69: Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson and PresidentTruman's Responses to MacArthur's VFWMessage (August 1950) 110
Document 70: President Truman Recalls Policy Differences withGeneral MacArthur (August 1950) 110
Document 71: President Truman's Meeting at Wake Island withGeneral MacArthur (October 1950) 111
Document 72: General MacArthur Remembers Wake IslandMeeting with President Truman (October 1950) 112
Document 73: General MacArthur's "My Authority as FieldCommander" Statement (24 March 1951) 113
Document 74: Joint Chiefs of Staff Message to GeneralMacArthur (24 March 1951) 114
Document 75: The Open Letters Between Minority LeaderCongressman Joseph Martin and GeneralMacArthur Discussing U.S. Policy in Asia andEurope (March 1951) 114
Document 76: President Truman's Dismissal of GeneralMacArthur (April 1951) 115
Document 77: President Truman Replaces General MacArthur(10 April 1951) 117
COMBAT AND ESPIONAGE 118
Document 78: Indian Diplomat K. M. Panikkar Warns WesternGovernments from Post in Beijing of ImpendingIntervention in Korea by Communist China(October 1950) 118
Document 79: Commander of Chinese Forces in Korea, MarshalPeng Dehuai, Describes His Strategy of ProtractedWar Against the United States (1950-1951) 119
Document 80: Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff General OmarBradley Recalls Critical Decisions (November1950) 120
Document 81: An American Soldier's Letter from the Front toHis Family Back Home (2 December 1950) 120
Document 82: State Department Memorandum Chronicles DeanRusk's Position that U.S. Make an Effective Standin Korea (4 December 1950) 121
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Document 83: State Department Minutes of President Truman-British Prime Minister Clement Attlee Meeting toDiscuss Allied Interests in Asia (December 1950) 121
Document 84: General Matthew Ridgway Assumes Command ofU.S. 8th Army in Korea (26 December 1950) 123
Document 85: Britain's Kim Philby and Soviet Espionage Duringthe War (Autumn 1950) 123
Document 86: UN General Assembly Resolution DeclaringCommunist China an Aggressor (1 February 1951) 124
Document 87: CIA Estimate on Communist Capabilities andIntentions in Korea (6 August 1951) 125
EISENHOWER-DULLES PLAN 126
Document 88: John Foster Dulles to President-Elect Eisenhoweron POWs, and the Advantages the Soviets Derivefrom the Korean War (26 November 1952) 127
Document 89: President-elect Dwight Eisenhower Visits Koreaand Meets with South Korean President SyngmanRhee (December 1952) 128
Document 90: President Eisenhower's Plan to End the War withAtomic Weapons (January 1953) 129
Document 91: President Eisenhower's Correspondence with
South Korea's President Rhee (April 1953) 130
PRISONERS OF WAR AND REPATRIATION DILEMMA 131
Document 92: Kim Il-Sung Proposal on Repatriation of Prisoners(February 1953) 131
Document 93: Dulles and Eisenhower Discuss Chinese PremierZhou En-lai's Cablegram on Role of Neutral Statesin Repatriation (30 March 1953) 132
Document 94: State Department Memo Notes U.S. Reaction toZhou En-lai's Proposal for Repatriation(30 March 1953) 132
Document 95: National Security Council's James Lay Notes theRelationship of POW Issue to ArmisticeNegotiations (2 April 1953) 133
Document 96: American Diplomat Charles Bohlen Helps DraftState Department Formula Toward Prisoners-of-War Issue (1952-1953) 134
Document 97: Prisoners of War and the U.S. Military Code ofConduct (1980) 135
Contents xvii
ASSESSING THE USE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN KOREA 136
Document 98: Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru FearsU.S. Will Use Atomic Bomb Only Against Asiatics(3 December 1950) 136
Document 99: National Security Council Discusses Use ofAtomic Weapons (11 February 1953) 137
Document 100: Joint Chiefs of Staff and State DepartmentMeeting on the Use of Atomic Weapons(27 March 1953) 138
Document 101: President Eisenhower Weighs the Options ofUsing Atomic Weapons in Korea (31 March1953) 139
Document 102: NSC Policy Statement on the Advantages andDisadvantages of Using Atomic Weapons inKorea (2 April 1953) 140
CONSEQUENCES OF THE KOREAN CONFLICT 142
Document 103: Prominent Diplomat Charles Bohlen Sees theKorean War as Juncture Where the U.S. Becomesa World Power (1973) 142
Document 104: General Bradley's Assessment as to Why theKorean War Ended (March 1953) 143
PART IV: The Berlin Crisis of 1958-1959 and 1961 145
CHRONOLOGY 146
The Berlin Crisis of 1958-1959 148
KHRUSHCHEV MANEUVERS FOR GDR DIPLOMATICRECOGNITION 148
Document 105: U.S. Embassy-Bonn Requests Policy PlanRegarding Western Access to Berlin andAuthority of German Democratic Republic (GDR)(January 1958) 148
Document 106: Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki's Plan forDenuclearization of Central Europe (February1958) 149
Document 107: President Eisenhower's Diary on Not Being "TooStiffnecked" about U.S. Recognition of GermanDemocratic Republic (9 June 1958) 150
Document 108: Chairman Khrushchev's "Ultimatum" Directingthe Western Powers to Deal Directly with the
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GDR on Any Questions Concerning Berlin(10 November 1958) 150
Document 109: President Eisenhower Recalls the Physical andPsychological Symbolism of Berlin to BothWestern Allies and Soviet Bloc (10 November1958) 151
Document 110: Nikita Khrushchev Remembers the Berlin Crisisof 1958-1959 (1974) 152
Document 111: U.S. Ambassador Llewellyn ThompsonSpeculates from Moscow on Motives forKhrushchev's Ultimatum (11 November 1958) 153
Document 112: American Diplomatic-Military Mission in BerlinAnalyzes Khrushchev's Ultimatum (12 November1958) 154
Document 113: State Department Circular to DiplomaticMissions (13 November 1958) 154
Document 114: Acting Secretary of State Christian HerterReports to President Eisenhower ConcerningIncreased Tension over the Status of Berlin(13 November 1958) 155
EISENHOWER-DULLES IN RESPONSE 156
Document 115: President Eisenhower Recalls the Military andDiplomatic Options (20 November 1958) 156
Document 116: President Eisenhower and Secretary DullesCompare Tension over Berlin with QuemoyCrises of 1954 and 1958 with Communist China(18 November 1958) 157
Document 117: West German Chancellor's Letter to SecretaryDulles (20 November 1958) 157
Document 118: U.S. Diplomatic and Pentagon Leaders DiscussBerlin (21 November 1958) 158
Document 119: Secretary Dulles' Controversial Press Conference(26 November 1958) 159
Document 120: U.S. Ambassador David Bruce Reports WestGerman Reaction to Dulles' Remarks(26 November 1958) 161
Document 121: Soviet Diplomatic Note to the United States(27 November 1958) 161
Document 122: President Eisenhower's Perception thatKhrushchev's Berlin Gambit Was an
Contents xix
"Ultimatum" and "Showdown" to Divide theWest (27 November 1958) 163
Document 123: Khrushchev Describes Berlin as "a Bone in HisThroat" (3 December 1958) 164
Document 124: U.S. Embassy in Moscow Reports that PremierKhrushchev Worried over Intellectuals andProfessionals Fleeing from Eastern Bloc(5 December 1958) 165
Document 125: State Department Memo Expresses Concern thatPremier Khrushchev May Lack Any DomesticOption for Flexibility over Berlin (8 December1958) 166
Document 126: Former High Commissioner for Germany JohnMcCloy Advises the State Department on BerlinSituation (10 December 1958) 167
Document 127: Ambassador Bruce's Diary on Use of Threats(10 December 1958) 168
Document 128: President Eisenhower's National SecurityMeeting (11 December 1958) 168
Document 129: Foreign Ministers' Communique ReaffirmsQuadripartite Responsibilities in Berlin (Paris,14 December 1958) 169
Document 130: North Atlantic Council Denies the USSR's Rightto Unilaterally Renounce Responsibility for FreeAccess to Berlin (Paris, 16 December 1958) 170
Document 131: President Eisenhower Recalls Drafting theAmerican Response to Soviets' 27 NovemberNote (11-31 December 1958) 171
Document 132: U.S. Diplomatic Note to USSR on Status of Berlin(31 December 1958) 172
Document 133: Excerpt from President Eisenhower's State "of theUnion Address (9 January 1959) 173
Document 134: President Eisenhower's Conference with HisAdvisers (29 January 1959) 173
Document 135: American Note Accepting Soviet Proposal for aForeign Ministers Meeting on Germany-Berlin(16 February 1959) 175
Document 136: British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's"Voyage of Discovery" to Moscow for Talkswith Khrushchev Concerning Tension over Berlin(25 February 1959) 175
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Document 137: President Eisenhower Meets with CongressionalLeaders (6 March 1959) 176
Document 138: President Eisenhower's Radio-TV Address onBerlin (16 March 1959) 177
Document 139: President Eisenhower's Effort to ProvideKhrushchev with "a Remarkable DiplomaticRetreat" (27 May 1959) 178
Document 140: Following Their "Kitchen Debate" in Moscow,Vice President Richard Nixon and ChairmanKhrushchev Discuss East-West Tension (July1959) 179
Document 141: Four Power (Britain, France, USSR, and U.S.)Communique Agreeing to a NegotiatedSettlement of Situation in Germany and Berlin(5 August 1959) 179
The Berlin Crisis of 1961 181
KENNEDY-KHRUSHCHEV 181
Document 142: Presidential Adviser Charles Bohlen's Memoirson the Vienna Summit Between Soviet ChairmanKhrushchev and President Kennedy (3-4 June1961) 181
Document 143: Secretary of State Dean Rusk Recalls PresidentKennedy's Prediction of "a Very Cold Winter"Following the Vienna Summit (3-4 June 1961) 182
Document 144: Aide-M6moire from Soviets to PresidentKennedy Proposing "Peace Treaty" withGermany and "Free City" of West Berlin (4 June1961) 183
Document 145: Secretary Rusk Recalls Drafting the StateDepartment's Reply to Soviets' Aide-M6moire(Mid-June 1961) 184
Document 146: Presidential Adviser Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.,Notes the Debate Stirred in the KennedyAdministration over the "Hawkish" AchesonMemorandum on Berlin (July 1961) 185
Document 147: Soviet Defector Colonel Oleg PenkovskyProvides Information to the West onKhrushchev's Plans and Soviet NuclearCapabilities (July 1961) 187
Document 148: "The Penkovskiy Papers" and Their Insight onSoviet Military Preparedness and Khrushchev'sRhetorical Bluff on Berlin (July 1961) 188
Contents xxi
THE BERLIN WALL 190
Document 149: Nikita Khrushchev Remembers the Berlin Crisisof 1961 (1974) 190
Document 150: Secretary Rusk's Reaction and Response to theWall (August 1961) 191
Document 151: Secretary Rusk Remarks that Germans "Votedwith Their Feet" to Flee Communism in EastGermany (13 August 1961) 192
Document 152: President Kennedy's Memorandum on theAmerican Response to the Berlin Wall(14 August 1961) 193
Document 153: State Department's Berlin Steering Group Reactsto the Berlin Wall (15 August 1961) 193
Document 154: American Note to USSR Condemning the BerlinWall (17 August 1961) 194
Document 155: Presidential Adviser Reports on Vice PresidentLyndon Johnson's Trip to Berlin andReinforcement of the Berlin Garrison(17-19 August 1961) 195
Document 156: President Kennedy's Memo to Secretary of StateRusk (28 August 1961) 197
Document 157: Secretary Rusk's Negotiations with BritishForeign Minister Douglas-Home and SovietForeign Minister Gromyko (September-October1961) 198
Document 158: Secretary Rusk Remembers His Discussions withForeign Minister Gromyko and AmbassadorAnatoly Dobrynin and Khrushchev's "Squeeze"Metaphor (1962-1963) . 198
Document 159: Circular Telegram from Secretary Rusk to AllU.S. Embassies on Possible Link of CubanMissile Crisis to Tension over Berlin (24 October1962) 199
Document 160: Presidential Adviser Clark Clifford Makes aConnection Between the Superpower Tensionover Berlin and the Cuban Missile Crisis (1961-1962) 200
Document 161: Nikita Khrushchev Recalls "UnpleasantIncidents" at the Berlin Wall (1974) 201
Document 162: President Kennedy's "ich bin ein Berliner" ["IAm a Berliner"] Speech at the Rudolph WildePlatz in Berlin (26 June 1963) 201
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PART V: The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962 205
CHRONOLOGY 206
NUCLEAR BRINKMANSHIP 207
Document 163: National Security Adviser McGeorge BundyComments on Deputy Secretary of DefenseRoswell Gilpatric's Speech Designed to Exposethe Soviets' Pretension to Nuclear Superiority(October 1961) 207
Document 164: Robert Kennedy's "The Cuba Project" with Planfor Operation Mongoose to Overthrow theRegime of Fidel Castro (20 February 1962) 209
Document 165: Nikita Khrushchev's Objective to Defend Cubafrom U.S. Invasion (Spring 1962) 210
Document 166: Soviet Chief of Staff General Anatoly GribkovComments on Operation Anadyr, Summer-Fall1962 (Havana Conference, 1992) 211
Document 167: Draft Cuban-Soviet Agreement on MilitaryCooperation and Mutual Defense in the Event ofAggression (never signed) (August 1962) 214
Document 168: CIA Director John McCone's "HoneymoonCables from Paris" Directing Extensive Searchfor Soviet Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles(MRBMs) in Cuba (7-20 September 1962) 215
Document 169: CIA Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE)85-3-62, "The Military Buildup in Cuba"(19 September 1962) 217
Document 170: Soviet Defector Oleg Penkovsky, Code NameHERO, Provides Western Intelligence with VitalInformation on Soviet Nuclear Capability (June1962) 218
Document 171: Soviet Historian Sergei Khrushchev Asks WhatImpact Western Intelligence Sources Had on U.S.Policymakers' Attitudes about Soviet NuclearCapability in 1962 (Havana Conference, 1992) 219
Document 172: The View that Cuba Had Reason to Prepare forU.S. Invasion and that Policymakers Must "Standin the Other Guy's Shoes," Summer 1962(Moscow Conference, 1989) 221
Document 173: The View that Placing Nuclear Missiles in CubaWas Khrushchev's Gambit to Alter the East-West"Correlation of Forces," Summer 1962 (HavanaConference, 1992) 222
Contents
MISSILES OF OCTOBER 224
Document 174: Imagery Confirmation of Offensive Missiles inCuba (14-15 October 1962) 224
Document 175: CIA's National Photographic InterpretationCenter Memo on "Mission 3101" (16 October1962) 224
Document 176: CIA Operations Officer Richard Helms'Memorandum on Operation Mongoose as theCovert Effort to Overthrow or Remove Castrofrom Power in Cuba (16 October 1962) 225
Document 177: Attorney General Robert Kennedy's Account ofthe NSC's "Executive Committee" (Ex Comm)and Its Initial Decisions (17-20 October 1962) 226
Document 178: Memorandum by Ambassador Charles Bohlen, aSoviet-Specialist State Department Officer andPresidential Adviser, to President Kennedy(18 October 1962) 228
Document 179: The LET [Presidential Adviser Llewellyn E.Thompson?] Memo on Behalf of Air StrikeOption (19 October 1962) 228
Document 180: Conclusions of CIA Estimate "Soviet MissileThreat in Cuba" Which Incorporate SensitivePenkovsky "IRONBARK" Debriefings(18-19 October 1962) 229
Document 181: Special National Intelligence Estimate 11-18-62:Possible Soviet Reactions to U.S. Action(19 October 1962) 230
Document 182: Secretary of State Dean Rusk Recalls theOpposing Opinions of Ex Comm Members, andMeeting with Congressional Leaders(17-22 October 1962) 231
Document 183: National Security Adviser McGeorge BundyDescribes the Dilemma over the Air Strike or theBlockade Response (16-20 October 1962) 233
Document 184: Press Secretary Pierre Salinger's "White Lie" thatPresident Kennedy Has "a Cold" (20 October1962) 233
Document 185: Press Secretary Salinger Recalls Plan to ConvertNational Government to Wartime Posture(21 October 1962) 234
Contents
Document 186: CIA Memo Suggests Vice President LyndonJohnson Favored Surprise Air Strike AgainstSoviet Missile Sites in Cuba (21 October 1962) 234
Document 187: President Kennedy Speaks to the AmericanPeople (22 October 1962) 235
Document 188: President Castro's Speech to the Cuban People(22 October 1962) 237
Document 189: Soviet General Gribkov Comments on Readinessof Soviet Forces in Cuba, 22 October 1962(Havana Conference, 1992) 237
Document 190: Dean Rusk Recalls the American DiplomaticEffort to Resolve the Crisis (23-25 October 1962) 238
Document 191: Robert Kennedy Recalls a Stressful Ex CommMeeting (24 October 1962) 239
Document 192: Secretary of State Rusk's "Eyeball to Eyeball"Remark (25 October 1962) 240
Document 193: UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson's Speech to "theCourtroom of World Opinion" (25 October 1962) 240
Document 194: Dean Rusk Recalls the Confusing Signals fromSoviet Sources and American Perception thatKhrushchev Was Losing Control (26 October1962) 241
Document 195: General Gribkov Emphasizes that a SovietOfficer Ordered, and a Soviet Missile CrewExecuted, the Shootdown of the American U-2on 27 October 1962 (Havana Conference, 1992) 242
Document 196: Fidel Castro Presents the Cuban Perspective forDowning the American U-2 on 27 October 1962(Havana Conference, 1992) 243
Document 197: Two Soviet Generals Describe the RussianPerspective Behind the Downing of the AmericanU-2 by a Soviet Missile Crew on 27 October 1962(Havana Conference, 1992) 244
Document 198: Khrushchev's "Hard" Cable to KennedyProposing Swap of Soviet Missiles in Cuba forU.S. "Analogous Weapons" in Turkey(27 October 1962) 245
Document 199: U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Cables TurkishObjections to American-Soviet Missile Swap(27 October 1962) 246
Document 200: Secretary of State Rusk Recalls Decision to SwapU.S. Missiles in Turkey for Soviet Missiles inCuba (27 October 1962) 247
Contents xxv
Document 201: Robert Kennedy's Meeting with SovietAmbassador Anatoly Dobrynin over Status ofU.S. Missiles in Turkey (27 October 1962) 249
Document 202: Secretary of State Rusk Remembers the "CordierPloy" to Swap Missiles Through UN Auspices(27 October 1962) 250
Document 203: President Kennedy Decides to Respond toKhrushchev's "Soft" Cable (27 October 1962) 251
Document 204: Khrushchev's Cable to Remove Missiles fromCuba (28 October 1962) 252
Document 205: President Kennedy's Reply to ChairmanKhrushchev (28 October 1962) 252
Document 206: Fidel Castro-Nikita Khrushchev Correspondence
(26-31 October 1962) 253
CLOSE CALL 256
Document 207: General Gribkov's Most Humiliating Experience,November 1962 (Havana Conference, 1992) 256
Document 208: President Kennedy's News Conference Liftingthe "Quarantine" of Cuba (20 November 1962) 256
Document 209: Ambassador Charles Bohlen's Assessment of theCrisis (1969) 257
Document 210: Fidel Castro Asks Robert McNamara WhenNuclear Balance Was Achieved Between theUnited States and the Soviet Union (HavanaConference, 1992) 258
Document 211: CIA Report on U.S. Intelligence Agencies'Effectiveness During the Crisis (28 February1963) 259
Document 212: Robert McNamara and Fidel Castro Discuss theRole of the Soviet Lunas in the Defense of Cubaand Their Relevance to the Crisis (HavanaConference, 1992) 260
PART VI: The War in Vietnam, 1954-1975 263
CHRONOLOGY 264
THE GENEVA CONFERENCE AND THE EISENHOWER-KENNEDY COURSE, 1954-1963 266
Document 213: Geneva Conference's Indochina Cease-FireArmistice (20 July 1954) 267
Document 214: Report Detailing Efforts by CIA OperativeColonel Edward Lansdale and the Saigon
XXVI Contents
Military Mission to Shore Up Diem Governmentin South (1954-1955) 268
Document 215: Ngo Dinh Diem Statement ConcerningConsultative Preparations for the 1956 Election ofNational Reunification (16 July 1955) 269
Document 216: National Security Council Directive 5612 on U.S.Policy Toward North Vietnam (5 September1956) 269
Document 217: North Vietnam's Communist Party GeneralSecretary, Le Duan, Provides Guidelines to NorthVietnam's Lao Dong Party for "The Path ofRevolution in the South" (November 1956) 270
Document 218: U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Eldridge DurbrowReports on the Diem Government in Saigon andViet Cong Intentions and Potential in SouthVietnam (7 March 1960) 271
Document 219: National Security Council's Policy Planning forCounterinsurgency in Vietnam (19 June 1962) 272
THE GULF OF TONKIN AND THE AMERICANIZATION OFVIETNAM'S WAR, 1964-1967 273
Document 220: Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum (JCSM)471-64, "Objectives and Courses of Action—Southeast Asia" with Chairman MaxwellTaylor's Addendum (2-5 June 1964) 274
Document 221: U.S. Undersecretary of State George Ball'sDiscussion with French President Charles deGaulle (5 June 1964) 275
Document 222: CIA Estimate on the "Domino Effect" in the FarEast (9 June 1964) 276
Document 223: President Johnson's Tonkin Gulf Message toCongress (5 August 1964) 277
Document 224: Senator Wayne Morse Questions Secretaries Ruskand McNamara and Explains His Opposition tothe Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (6 August 1964) 278
Document 225: Gulf of Tonkin Resolution Empowering thePresident to Use American Forces in SoutheastAsia (7 August 1964) 279
Document 226: "May 2nd Movement" and Student Oppositionto War (August 1964) 280
Document 227: North Vietnam's Foreign Minister Xuan ThuyResponds to U.S. Complaint at the UnitedNations (19 August 1964) 280
Contents xxvii
Document 228: The North Vietnamese Article "Facing theSkyhawks" Reports the Capture of One of theFirst American Prisoners of War in Vietnam(1964) 281
Document 229: Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield's"Sagging Limb" Memo to President Johnson(9 December 1964) 281
Document 230: U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk's Conversationwith Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on U.S.-USSR Relations in Southeast Asia (9 December1964) 283
Document 231: Hanoi's Four Point Negotiating Position (8 April1965) 283
Document 232: Undersecretary of State George Ball ArguesAgainst Escalating U.S. Involvement (18 June1965) 284
Document 233: Undersecretary of State Ball Recalls His"Compromise Solution" (1 July 1965) 285
Document 234: U.S. Commanding General in Vietnam WilliamWestmoreland Recommends a Buildup of U.S.Troops (June-July 1965) 286
Document 235: Undersecretary of State Ball Recalls the NationalSecurity Meeting at Which President JohnsonDecided on Massive Troop Deployment toVietnam (21 July 1965) 287
Document 236: Senator Mansfield Urges President Johnson Notto Get Enmeshed in Vietnam (27 July 1965) 290
Document 237: President Johnson Confers with CongressionalLeaders (27 July 1965) 291
Document 238: President Johnson Recalls His Vantage Point forDecision (July 1965) 291
Document 239: President Johnson's Decision for MassiveAmerican Effort (July 1965) 292
Document 240: Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara Evaluatesthe Bombing Program Against North Vietnamfor President Johnson (30 July 1965) 293
Document 241: Secretary of Defense McNamara EncouragesPresident Johnson to Escalate the War(30 November 1965) 294
Document 242: Assistant Secretary of Defense John T.McNaughton's Memorandum that U.S. ObjectiveIs to Avoid Humiliation (19 January 1966) 294
xxviii Contents
Document 243: Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge's Telegram toSecretary of State Rusk on Failure of Italian-Polish Diplomatic Channel of Talks ("Marigold")with Hanoi (24 July 1966) 295
Document 244: Martin Luther King, Jr.'s "Declaration ofIndependence from the War in Vietnam" and theGrowing Cynicism of American Troops (4 April1967) 296
Document 245: President Johnson's "San Antonio Formula"(September-October 1967) 298
Document 246: Secretary of State Rusk's Remarks onContainment of China (16 October 1967) 299
THE TET OFFENSIVE AND THE CHANGE OF COURSE,JANUARY-DECEMBER 1968 300
Document 247: Senator Robert Kennedy Comments DuringInterview that U.S. Security Is Independent ofAny Victory Against the "Great Threat of AsianCommunism" (26 November 1967) 300
Document 248: President Johnson Remembers the Tet Offensive(January 1968) 301
Document 249: Secretary of State Dean Rusk and the TetOffensive as a Turning Point in America's PolicyToward Vietnam (31 January 1968) 302
Document 250: Senator Eugene McCarthy Advocates a GreaterEmphasis on U.S. Social Problems than onMilitary Action in Vietnam (March 1968) 303
Document 251: Clark Clifford Recalls "the Tuesday Lunch" withPresident Johnson and the Decision to CallTogether "the Wise Men" (19 March 1968) 303
Document 252: Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford Recalls the"Most Distinguished Dinner Party" at the U.S.State Department (25-26 March 1968) 304
Document 253: President Johnson Decides Not to SeekReelection (31 March 1968) 304
Document 254: Inquiry into the Massacre at My Lai, Vietnam(16-19 March 1968) 305
Document 255: An Infantryman's Cynical Perspective of the War(1968) 307
Document 256: Flyer Distributed to Demonstrate Against theWar at the Democratic National Convention inChicago (28 August 1968) 308
Contents xxix
THE NIXON-KISSINGER STRATEGY FOR THEVIETNAMIZATION OF THE WAR, 1969-1972 309
Document 257: President Nixon's Eight-Point Strategy to End theWar (14 May 1969) 309
Document 258: President Nixon's Speech Calling for the"Vietnamization" of the War and His Appeal to"the Great Silent Majority" (3 November 1969) 310
Document 259: President Nixon Decides to Invade Cambodia(26 April 1970) 312
Document 260: The Vietnam Veterans Memorial Wall, Panel10W, Line 3 (11 November 1982) 313
Document 261: The Student Mobilization Committee Platform(22 November 1970) 314
Document 262: John Kerry's Testimony of the "Winter SoldierInvestigation" for the Vietnam Veterans Againstthe War (WAW) Before the Senate ForeignRelations Committee (22 April 1971) 315
Document 263: Tape Recordings by President Nixon's Chief ofStaff, H. R. Haldeman, Reveal Nixon's Reactionto "The Pentagon Papers" (13-15 June 1971) 318
Document 264: Henry Kissinger Remembers President Nixon's"China Initiative" and Exigencies of Realpolitik inNegotiations with Hanoi (January-February1972) 319
Document 265: Henry Kissinger's "Peace Is at Hand" Statement(October 26, 1972) 320
PARIS PEACE AGREEMENT AND FALL OF SAIGON 320
Document 266: President Nixon Urges South VietnamesePresident Thieu to Accept the InescapableConclusion of the War by Jointly Signing theParis Peace Agreement (January 1973) 321
Document 267: Paris Peace Agreement to End Hostilities inVietnam (27 January 1973) 321
Document 268: Secretary of State Kissinger Recalls PresidentNixon's Promise of Economic ReconstructionAid for North Vietnam after Peace Accord(1 February 1973) 323
Document 269: Public Law 93-52, the Fulbright-AikenAmendment Prohibiting U.S. Military Activity inIndochina (1 July 1973) 324
xxx Contents
Document 270: War Powers Resolution of the U.S. Congress(7 November 1973) 325
Document 271: U.S. Defense Attache's Report of Fall of SouthVietnam (May 1975) 326
VIETNAM RETROSPECTIVES, 1976-1995 327
Document 272: General Westmoreland Blames the Press, StudentProtestors, Domestic Politics, and FlawedMilitary Strategy for U.S. Defeat in Vietnam(1976) 328
Document 273: Secretary Kissinger's Lessons for America fromthe Vietnam War (1994) 328
Document 274: Dean Rusk's and Robert McNamara'sRetrospective Memoirs (1990, 1995) 329
Document 275: Following the Persian Gulf War Against Iraq,President George Bush Declares that AmericaHas Kicked the "Vietnam Syndrome" (1-4 March1991) 330
PART VII: The Iranian Revolution and Hostage Crisis, 1978-1981 333
CHRONOLOGY 334
EISENHOWER-NIXON LEGACY, 1953-1976 335
Document 276: National Security Council's Discussion of IranianOil, National Prestige, and Effects on U.S.Security (11 March 1953) 336
Document 277: Operation Ajax as CIA Countercoup for "BoyScout" (3 August 1953) 336
Document 278: Shah Asserts Countercoup Was Popular Mandatefor His Monarchy (13-19 August 1953) 337
Document 279: Message from President Eisenhower to the Shah(24 August 1953) 338
Document 280: U.S. Foreign Service Officer's Dispatch fromTehran (15 June 1964) 338
Document 281: Secretary of State Henry Kissinger Links theStrategy of Selling American Weaponry to Iranas Counterbalance to Soviet-Iraqi Treaty (1972) 339
CARTER ADMINISTRATION AND FALL OF THE SHAH,1977-1978 340
Document 282: National Security Adviser Zbigniew BrzezinskiLinks the Nixon-Kissinger Persian Gulf Strategywith Carter Administration's Objectives (1977-1978) 340
Contents xxxi
Document 283: Secretary of State Cyrus Vance Discusses theCarter Administration's Review of Human Rightsin Iran (1977) 341
Document 284: President Carter and Shah Teargassed on SouthLawn of White House (15 November 1977) 342
Document 285: Shah Recalls President Carter's Remark that IranWas an "Island of Stability" (31 December 1977) 342
Document 286: Empress Farah's Private Secretary Recalls theSpark that Ignited the Revolution and theSymbolism of the Chador (January 1978) 343
Document 287: Shah Blames "the Unholy Alliance of Red andBlack" for Collapse of His Monarchy (January-February 1978) 344
Document 288: Shah's Twin Sister Recalls Her Brother'sRestraint in the Use of Force to Quell the Riotingin Iran (February 1978) 345
Document 289: The Shah Uses SAVAK Against the GrowingStrength of Islamic Fundamentalists in Iran(1978) 345
Document 290: British Ambassador to Iran Anthony ParsonsDescribes the Shah's Loss of Morale (October1978) 346
Document 291: U.S. Ambassador to Iran William SullivanTransmits His "Thinking the Unthinkable" Cableto Washington (November 1978) 347
Document 292: National Security Adviser Brzezinski RecallsOverload on Decision-Making Circuits (Fall 1978) 348
Document 293: Ambassador Sullivan Recommends a VoluntaryExodus of Americans from Iran (December 1978) 349
Document 294: Presidential Adviser George Ball's Reproach ofthe NSC and His Recommendation to PresidentCarter to Retract U.S. Support of Shah(December 1978) 349
Document 295: In an Interview with an Iranian Reporter, theShah Blames British and American OilCompanies for the Iranian Revolution(25 December 1978) 351
CRISIS SWELLS IN ADVERSARIAL IRAN,JANUARY-NOVEMBER 1979 352
Document 296: NSC Adviser Brzezinski Writes Memo withPlan "C" Calling for Iranian Military Coup(18 January 1979) 352
xxxii Contents
Document 297: U.S. Embassy in Tehran and Consulate in TabrizSeized (14 February 1979) 353
Document 298: A U.S. Intelligence Official Links the IranianRevolution with Collapse of SALT II (March1979) 354
Document 299: Rosalynn Carter Recalls Pressure for an EntryVisa for "Mr. Pahlavi" (April-October 1979) 355
Document 300: Adviser Brzezinski Describes Iranian
Revolution's Impact on U.S. Security (1979) 355
EMBASSY SEIZURE AND REACTIONS, NOVEMBER 1979 356
Document 301: The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations(18 April 1961) 357
Document 302: U.S. Embassy-Tehran Informs State DepartmentOps Center that Compound Is under Siege(4 November 1979) 358
Document 303: President Carter's Crisis-Management andDecision-Making Process Within the SpecialCoordinating Committee (SCC) (November 1979) 359
Document 304: National Security Council Aide Gary Sick Recallsthe SCC Discussion on the Rescue or MilitaryRetaliation Options (6 November 1979) 360
Document 305: President Carter Meets with Hostages' Families(9 November 1979) 362
Document 306: A Hostage Assesses the Embassy Seizure byMilitants (November 1979) 362
Document 307: CIA Director Stansfield Turner Meets with RossPerot Concerning Rescue Operation (10-12November 1979) 363
Document 308: President Carter Orders Economic SanctionsAgainst Purchase of Iranian Oil (12 November1979) 365
Document 309: Iranian Captors Release Female and African-American Hostages (19 November 1979) 365
Document 310: CIA Director Turner Remembers President CarterCalling an SCC Meeting at Camp David(23 November 1979) 366
Document 311: CIA Director Turner Lists President Carter's2-2-2 Strategy (28 November 1979) 367
Contents xxxiii
Document 312: President Carter's News Conference withComments on Terrorism and His "Rose GardenStrategy" (28 November 1979) 367
FAILED NEGOTIATIONS AND SOVIETS IN AFGHANISTAN,NOVEMBER 1979-MARCH 1980 368
Document 313: Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's Application forInterim Measures of Protection with theInternational Court of Justice (29 November1979) 369
Document 314: State Department Legal Adviser Roberts Owen'sArguments Before the International Court ofJustice (29 November 1979) 369
Document 315: Stansfield Turner Remembers the Vance-Brzezinski "Two-Horse" Policy Dispute(November 1979) 371
Document 316: Iranian Foreign Minister Bani-Sadr's Memoirs onthe Mullahs' Political Goals with AmericanHostages (November 1979) 373
Document 317: American Hostage Moorhead Kennedy RecallsHis Captors' Motives (December 1979) 375
Document 318: Rosalynn Carter Recalls the 1980 PresidentialCampaign (December 1979) 375
Document 319: National Security Council's Gary Sick Stressesthe Geopolitical Impact of the Soviet Invasion ofAfghanistan (December 1979) 376
Document 320: Address by President Carter EmphasizesDoctrine to Defend Persian Gulf Oil SuppliesFollowing Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan(23 January 1980) 377
Document 321: Secretary Vance Communicates to UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim American Six-PointDiplomatic Position to Resolve Crisis (12 January1980) 378
Document 322: Iranian Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh MeetsSecretly with Presidential Adviser HamiltonJordan in Paris Concerning Plot to Assassinatethe Exiled Shah (17 February 1980) 379
Document 323: The Jordan-Ghotbzadeh Draft AgreementBetween the Carter Administration and theIranian Government of President Bani-Sadr(March 1980) 380
xxxiv Contents
MILITARY RESCUE, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, AND THE 1980ELECTION, MARCH-NOVEMBER 1980 381
Document 324: NSC Aide Recalls When the Military OptionComes to Fore (22 March 1980) 381
Document 325: President Carter Frustrated at Inability toResolve Crisis by the Jordan-GhotbzadehDiplomatic Channel (30 March-11 April 1980) 383
Document 326: Press Secretary Jody Powell Comments onCharges that Carter Administration PlayedDomestic Politics with the Hostage Crisis(1 April 1980) 385
Document 327: President Carter Announces Sanctions AgainstIran (7 April 1980) 386
Document 328: President Carter Decides on Military RescueOption Following the Collapse of the Jordan-Ghotbzadeh Agreement (11-15 April 1980) 387
Document 329: President Carter's Speech Announcing FurtherRestrictions Against Iran (17 April 1980) 388
Document 330: Secretary of State Vance Decides to Resign(21 April 1980) 389
Document 331: President Carter's War Powers Report toCongress on the Abortive Hostage RescueOperation in Iran (26 April 1980) 390
Document 332: Iranian President Bani-Sadr Contends that Jordan-Ghotbzadeh Agreement for Hostage Release WasScrubbed after Khomeini-Reagan Contacts (April-October 1980) 392
Document 333: An American Embassy Hostage RecallsDiscovering that Air Attacks Against TehranWere Part of Iran-Iraq War (22 September 1980) 394
REAL BARGAINING AFTER THE 1980 ELECTION, NOVEMBER1980-JANUARY1981 394
Document 334: Hostage Barry Rosen Remembers FirstAnniversary of His Capture (4 November 1980) 395
Document 335: NSC Adviser Brzezinski Reflects upon the FinalMonths of the Carter Presidency (November 1980-January 1981) 395
Document 336: Islamic Iran's Terms for Release of the Hostages(2 November 1980) 396
Document 337: Declarations and Agreements of Algiers Accords(19-20 January 1981) 397
Contents xxxv
ENDGAME: LESSONS FOR PRESIDENTS AND CITIZENS 400
Document 338: A Hostage's Perspective on the Effect of theCrisis on America (1981) 400
Document 339: New York Times Columnist Reports that PresidentCarter's Priority Was to "Put the Hostages' LivesFirst" (1981) 400
Document 340: American Hostage Charge d'Affaires to IranBruce Laingen Comments on Family LiaisonAction Group and the "Yellow Ribbon"Campaign in the United States (1992) 401
PART VIII: The Persian Gulf War with Iraq, 1990-1991 403
CHRONOLOGY 404
A BORDER DISPUTE AMONG ARABS, 1932-1990 405
Document 341: Iraqi Prime Minister and Kuwaiti Ruler Reaffirmthe Kuwait-Iraq Border Drawn at the 1913 UK-Turkish London Convention (July-August 1932) 405
Document 342: Agreed Minutes of Borders Between Kuwait andIraq (4 October 1963) 406
U.S. RESPONDS TO IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT WITHDESERT SHIELD, AUGUST-DECEMBER 1990 407
Document 343: Text of the Meeting Between Iraqi PresidentSaddam Hussein and U.S. Ambassador April C.Glaspie, as Released by the Government of Iraq(25 July 1990) 407
Document 344: U.S. Ambassador to Kuwait W. NathanielHowell Recalls Iraqi Siege of U.S. Embassy(2 August-13 December 1990) 412
Document 345: U.S. Charge in Baghdad Joseph C. Wilson IVMeets with Saddam Hussein (6 August 1990) 413
Document 346: Vice President Dan Quayle Recalls Decision toBegin Operation Desert Shield to Protect SaudiArabia from Possible Iraqi Invasion (2 August1990) 418
Document 347: President Bush Announces Decision to Send U.S.Troops to Saudi Arabia, the Guiding Principlesto His "This Will Not Stand" Position (8 August1990) 420
Document 348: An American Hostage Recalls How He andOther Civilians Were Captured Attempting toFlee Kuwait (August 1990) 421
xxxvi Contents
Document 349: Alex Molnar's "Open Letter" to President Bushin the New York Times, and the Formation of theMilitary Families Support Network (MFSN)(23 August 1990) 423
Document 350: Iraqi Dissident Kanan Makiya Urges Arab Statesto Take the Lead Against Saddam Hussein(25 August 1990) 423
Document 351: General Colin Powell as the "Reluctant Warrior"(24 September 1990) 424
Document 352: Vice President Quayle Recalls the MilitaryOptions Secretary Cheney and Chairman PowellOffered to "Contain or Defeat" Iraq (August-December 1990) 426
Document 353: An American Captured in Kuwait Used as"Human Shield" in Iraq (September-December1990) 427
Document 354: Vice President Quayle's Seton Hall Address(29 November 1990) 428
Document 355: Saddam Releases American Hostage GeorgeCharchalis to Muhammad Ali (November 1990) 429
Document 356: Synopsis of UN Resolutions Relating to Iraq'sInvasion of Kuwait (August-November 1990) 430
Document 357: Statement by American Council of Churches(21 December 1990) 431
Document 358: Vice President Quayle Recalls President Bush'sEffort to Gain Congressional Support forOperations Desert Shield and Desert Storm(December 1990) 432
OPERATION DESERT STORM AND LIVE COVERAGE OF THEAIR-LAND WAR, JANUARY-MARCH 1991 433
Document 359: President Bush's Letter to President SaddamHussein (5 January 1991) 433
Document 360: Pentagon's Public Affairs Officer Announces"Ground Rules and Guidelines forCorrespondents in the Persian Gulf" (7 January1991) 435
Document 361: American Society of Newspaper Editors ProtestsU.S. Department of Defense's Rules andGuidelines for Journalists (8 January 1991) 437
Document 362: P.L. 102-1, Congressional Resolution AuthorizingMilitary Force Against Iraq (12 January 1991) 438
Contents xxxvii
Document 363: President Bush's Letter to the U.S. Congress(16 January 1991) 439
Document 364: Michael Glennon's "The Gulf War and theConstitution" (1991) 441
Document 365: Barbara Bush Recalls Public Opinion on the War(17 January 1991) 442
Document 366: CBS News Crew and Reporter Robert SimonCaptured by Iraqi Troops Near Saudi-KuwaitBorder (21 January 1991) 442
Document 367: CNN Reporter Peter Arnett Interviews SaddamHussein in Baghdad During the Initial Days ofthe War (28 January 1991) 444
Document 368: Presidential Spokesperson Marlin FitzwaterComments on the U.S. Cruise Missile Attack onan Iraqi Civil Defense Bunker at Amiriya(13 February 1991) 445
Document 369: Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney AnnouncesGround War (24 February 1991) 446
Document 370: CBS News Correspondent Walter Cronkite Asks,"What Is There to Hide?" (25 February 1991) 447
Document 371: Secretary of State Baker and Soviet ForeignMinister Bessmerrnykh's Joint StatementSupporting UN Military Action Against Iraq(29 January 1991) 448
Document 372: Statement by Iraq's Revolutionary CommandCouncil (15 February 1991) 448
Document 373: President Bush Responds to Iraqi Statement(15 February 1991) 449
Document 374: Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's PeaceProposal (22 February 1991) 450
Document 375: President Bush's Ultimatum to Saddam Hussein(22 February 1991) 450
Document 376: General Powell Reflects on Possible Iraqi Use ofChemical Weapons (1995) 451
Document 377: General Norman Schwarzkopf Agrees withPresident Bush's Decision to Cease OffensiveOperations in the "Hundred Hour War"(27 February 1991) 452
Document 378: General Powell's "Force Employment" StrategyAgainst Iraq (January-March 1991) 454
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Document 379: General Schwarzkopf Concludes Cease-fire with
Iraqi Generals at Safwan Airfield (3 March 1991) 455
THE AFTERMATH OF ARMS OVER DIPLOMACY, 1991-1993 458
Document 380: President Bush's Address Before Joint Session ofCongress (6 March 1991) 458
Document 381: Synopsis of UN Resolutions Relating to Iraq'sDefeat by UN Coalition of Forces (March-September 1991) 458
Document 382: Findings of U.S. Army Report on Iraqi WarCrimes (8 January 1992) 460
Index 463