DL-A2S3 982

IEssays

n Strategy

Hostage Rescue PlanningMaritime Theater Nuclear Capability,."Strategic Psychological Operations

OTICýELECTE Wt,MAY 11 1993, .

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ofl Strategy __fAvsan_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Special

Selections from the1984 Joint Chiefs of Staff Essay Competition

1985

National Defense University PressWashington, DC

93-09891

'935 05 181

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CONTENTS

Fo rew o rd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .

1. Planning for Hostage Rescue Missions:A Critical Examination ............................ IRicharn F. Braicr. Ir.

Four Rescue Missions ................................ 4Rescue M issions in General ........... .Planning Im peratives .... .......................... io

2. Maritime Theater Nuclear Warfare: MatchingStrategy and Capability ......................... 30Raymond E. Thomas

Soviet Capability and Strategy ...................... 41US Force Structure and Countering the Soviets ........... 43Upgrading US Capability .......................... 47Revising US Strategy .............................. 4c

3. Psychological Operations: A Strategic View .......... . 3Mch,iu F. Kricscl

US Public Diplomnacy ............................. 57US Psychological Operations in Action -Grenada........04National PSYOP Coordination ..................... o7Appendix: A. The Information Continuumn. ......... 73

B. National Organizations .............. 83C. National PSYOP Implementation Plan . 03

Endnotes .......................................... 05

TABLES and FIGURES

Table

I. Range of Psychological Action ................ 742. Targets of Propaganda ....................... 833. Foreign Students in the Soviet Bloc v's in

the United States ......................... 01

Figu re

1. Interagency Public Diplomacy Organization ..... o02. Proposed Public Diplomacy Organization ....... o83. Levels of Information Control ................. 804. National Coordination Organizations

During the World Wars .................... 845. National Coordination Organizations

During the Cold War Period ................ 87.6. National Coordination Organizations

During the Vietnam War Period .............. 80

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FOREWORD

The essays in this volume won recognition in the 1,84 loint

Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition. Beginning in 1l82, theChairman of the loint Chiefs of Staff has challenged the -tudnt,at our Senior Service Schools each year to develop new ,trategip'-for national security. Original, innovative thinking, rather than

traditional research and reporting, is the goal. The students havemet the challenge well. Each year's best essays have brought fresh

perspectives to old problems, raised new Luestions, otfered solu-tions.

This volumne contains three essavs. Lieutenant ColonelRichard F. Brauer, Jr., US Air Force, considers the reqjUirenient-

for successful planning of hostage rescues, specifically reviewingthe Son Tay raid, the ,Lat/Ltgutcz crisis, the Entebbe rescue, and theIranian hostage rescue attempt. Commander Raymond E.Thomas, US Navy, looks at the US Navy's capability for mari-time theater nuclear warfare, identifying problems and recom-mending improvenunnts. Colonel Melvin E. Kriesel, US Army.finds the United States lacking a national-level mechanism forcoordinating military psychological operations and proposes away to remedy the problem.

The National Defense University conducted the judging otthe essay competition and is pleased to publish these outstandingselections. Addressing topics o(f importance in today's internation-al environment, they contribute to the intelligent debate of nation-al security issues.

Richard D. LawrenceLieutenant General, US ArmyPresident, National D)eense

University' ii

Essayson Strategy

1

PLANNING FORHOSTAGE RESCUE MISSIONS:

A CRITICAL EXAMINATION

by

Richard F. Brauer, Jr.

Lieutenant Colonel Richard F. Brauer. It. IS AirForce, is a navigator. fie holds i lBac helor of A,-rt degreefrom Boston Univer,sitv and a %Master of Arts, degree2from Tro- State Univrsitv. le re:ent, ,vservcd a'Chief, Air Operation, Divi,,ion. Opertions [)irector-ate, 1-3, Fort Bragg. North Carolina. lieutenantColonel Brauer is a 1084 graduate ot the Army t arCollege.

Hostage rescue operations are like icebergs. Occasionally, af-ter a brilliant success or a dismal failure, we momentarily glimpsethe very tip of the berg; because of operational security and sensi-tivity requirements, we seldom see the other nine-tenths of theoperation. However, in today's world of mass media, with rapidproliferation of the spoken and written word, the iceberg analogyapplies only temporarily. It's only a matter of time before we getall the details of an attempted or completed hostage rescue mis-sion. As soon as word of the aborted US rescue attempt in Iran on25 April 1980 hit the news media, dozens of journalists, congres-sional committees, defense analysts, political candidates, andarmchair strategists began to expound on the inadequacy of theplanning effort, the mistakes in execution, and the reasons forfailure. Though some of these individLuals raised valid criticisms ofthe operation, I contend that most can never fully appreciate theenormity of the task at hand until they have actually participated;n the planning for such an operation under the many inevitableconstraints.

The purpose of this essay is to give the reader a better ap-preciation of hostage rescue operations in general and particularlythe planning imperatives behind these operations. To do this, Iwill critically examine four attempted or completed hostage rescueoperations: the Son Tay raid (November 1970), the recovery ofthe Mayaguez (May 1975), the Entebbe raid (July 1076), and theIran rescue mission (April 1980). 1 will not emphasize what tran-spired during the operations themselves, for this is a matter ot his-torical record. Instead, I will concentrate on the thought processesand preparation that went into these missions, searching for simi-larities, differences, and lessons learned that can be applied inplanning future operations.

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liostage Rescut Planning

FOUR RESCUE MISSIONS

The Son Tay Raid

The first of the operations, chronologically, was the raid(code name "Kingpin") on the Son Tav prison compound -r"proxi-mately 23 miles from Hanoi, capital of North Vietnam, on 21 No-vember 1970. The mission of the 56-man heliborne assault forcewas to rescue 61 US prisoner- of war (PWs) believed to have beenheld captive there. Planning for the raid began six months beforethe actual assault. During the planning period the rescue force se-cretly rehearsed the primary assault plans and several backupplans. On the evening of 20 November. the rescue force, including105 aircraft from five air bases in Thailand and three aircraft car-riers in the Gulf of Tonkin (for diversionary airstrikes), launched.All forces were to converge on their respective targets in what wa,to become the most extensive night operation of the SoutheatAsia conflict.:

After a grueling 340-mile, air-refueled flight, the assault forcesuccessfully landed in the Son Tay compound at 2:18 A.M. (localtime) on 21 November. They found the prison camp empty. De-spite a firefight with what appeared to be about 200 Chinese orRussian troops as a result of a helicopter inadvertently landing ina wrong location, total friendly casualties for the operation were

one slight wound and a broken ankle. Estimates of enemy deadvary between 100 and 200. After only 27 minuteson the ground at

Son Tay, the force successfully withdrew to recovery bases inThailand.

Though the tactical plans were meticulouslv executed, the

mission was considered a failure, primarily because of a major in-telligence oversight. Later information revealed that the NorthVietnamese had removed the PWs from the Son Tay camp somefour-and-a-half months earlier because of persistent flooding inthe area. Ironically, the flooding most likely had been caused by"Operation Popeye," a covert US cloud seeding and weathermodification experimental program in the region.' To someAmericans the Son Tay raid became yet another manifestation ofthe US failure in Vietnam. To others, the mission became a sym-bol of hope for eventual recovery (t all Americans listed as 1W1s

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i u'tjgk. Rvs. tic iPdlarfling,

and mIsIIIIIng i n Iot In M I IA).I in\ an. asu. a IIý IaorI pos)It Ive (A ! (o! the mission was, that it for(cud( the North \'iutnanwsu~t t( to (. )n~ dI-date Amucric.an l~~,thius l iberat ing' man v prisonurs to 'i Vcea r,of isolation and near isolation.

The NMailiuaguez Rescue

-[hI( Mayu,?Liýucz Inciden t c ou rred du~ring: OI pe'r it1 12 1.\ia v 10~75. Uinlike the Son Ta v rscueLI Opt'rat i~r 11h hald [14enca reutully plan ned and cexecuted In tilt ultllm )t ~urcvby spc( a,1opcra t ions t orces, thu recovery of thu US nur( han t ,Iliip 85 \ i

u:was conduIctUd by con vunt ional wi lilt arv for us in a1) open,aId ho., r ii-usos nvironmnent.

The .%lawa.gnw: (the f irst t LI11IX contaInerized ship In thu iMerchant fleet) had been en rou~tC fromn Hong Kong to S-attlahirpTha I andm, with a carga, ot com mercial iItemsi inc.lui(ng tood. tlot h-ing. ,~ a supplies, andl mail . O~n the atternoon of 12 Nlav 107-51in the v'icirni tv of ['oulo Wai Island, approximately v c ml ks sou 1t i-west ot the Cambodian port ot Kom pong S m, naVal fORL" ust theCambodian revolutionary government tired Upon and hoardedthe .\aiiaue: , seized thle vessel and it,. 40-mnan creCw, and headedtoward the Cambodian mainland. During the next three-and-a-halt day,. the UInited States mounted a mator joint militaryassault and recovery operation against Cambodian comm U nistlorues on Koh Tang Island. another island, 30 miles, north otIPoulo VWai. where the Mawigiucz lax' anchored and its crew Wallbelieved to be held prisoner. US M'arin-~ Corps. Navy, and AirF-orce personnel and assets were involved in the assault. In addi-ion, retaliatory air strikes were condute~td against Ream ai rt leld

on the Cambodian mainland. On 15 May' the AMoii alo: wvas re-covered intact and the Cambodians returned the shilps rcrw to UScustody. bu~t not wvit hout cost.

Another intelligence failu-re had grossly underestimated thleCambodian military forces and we-apons on Koh Tang, Isand. Uscasua'lties in the assaUlt were high, with 18~ killed and 50 wounded.Fhight helico)pters were lost in act ion on or near FKoh Tong Isand

and ne cashe in hai land en rou~te to the crisis area. wh k haccounted tor an additional 23 dlead. Regardless,, prompt andde. isive act ion by the Ford administration had resuýl~ted Ill the

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I histage v~ t L it, Pla nning

:,,Iu(Ce.,siuI recoverv ot the ship and it, crew and a uon omitant[boo-t i Ainei icJ, ,,eli-image. The incident did, how'ever, ruto•,u,4. rngres,,ional attention on the' 1073 k,'ar Power., RLe'olutiOn,which attects the president-, ability to commit US military tforsc-,Iin Crisis situations

The Entebbe Rescue

The Entebbe operation of 4 luly 107/ was originally code-named "Thunderbolt" and later renamed 'Operation lnmathan•after Lieutenant Colonel Yonni (Jonathan) Netanwahu. com-mander of the Israeli assault force, who was killed in action dur-ing the rescue mission.' The renaming of the operation reflectedan overwhelming feeling of gratitude on the part of the Israeli peo-ple. The Entebbe rescue was similar to both the Son Tax' andMwa'huaguicz olerations. As in the Son Tay mission, operations se-

curitv (OPSEC) and the need for absolute secrecy were drivingforces in the Entebbe operation; as in the Mauatgcz crisis, timewas of the essence.

The crisis began on 27 June 1976 when Air France Flight 139.en route from Tel Aviv to Paris via Athens, was skyjacked by 10Palestinian terrorists (of the Popular Front for the Liberation otPalestine). The terrorists took the plane, via a refueling stop inLibya. to Entebbe airport in Uganda. Facts surrounding the sky-tacking indicate a high degree of complicity on the part of Ugan-dan President Idi Amin. In exchange for the passengers. the

skyjackers demanded the release of terrorists being held in Israel,France, Switzerland, Kenya, and West Germany. The skyiackersthreatened to kill the passengers and blow up the aircraft if thedeadlines for their demands were not met. Some non-Israelihostages were released, but 93 passengers and 12 airline crewmembers remained captive.

Shortly after the aircraft had been hiiacked, Israel secretlyplaced commando forces on alert, drew up preliminary plans for arescue attempt, and began conducting training exercises and re-hearsals. After the terrorists issued a second ultimatum, the rescueforce, consisting of four C- 130 transport aircraft loaded with as-sault teams, took off on 3 July 1Q76 from Tel Aviv and quietlylanded at Entebbe airport shortly after midnight on 4 july. Within

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Stl~~~ostage•. Rvscuv Planning,

minutes, seven of the terrorists had been eliminated and it is be-lieved three were taken prisoner for later interrogation. Only .53minutes after the rescue force landed at Entebbe. the 102 survivinghostages were en route to Israel via a refueling stop in Nairobi.Total ground time for the operation was 00 minutes, Casualtiesincluded three civilian hostages killed, five civilians wounded, oneofficer killed, and four soldiers wounded (one seriouslvy. Israeland the rest of the world deemed the raid an unquestionable suc-cess. It became a model to be emulated, in part, by the planners ofthe Iranian rescue attempt.

The Iranian Rescue Attempt

The Iranian hostage crisis began on 4 November 1079 whenIranian militants seized the US embassy in Teheran. The incidentbegan an extremely difficult period for both the Carter ad-ministration and the American people. During the 444 days untilthe 53 hostages were released, President Carter listened to myriadproposals for freeing them, including the use of nuclear weaponsagainst Iran. At presidential direction, preliminary planning for Irescue operation began only two days after the embassy wastaken .

"Eagle Claw" became the code name of the operation to freethe hostages, with "Rice Bowl" the code name for the planningphase of the mission," The final plan was, of necessity, extremelycomplex and demanding. Time, distances involved, and the loca-tion of the hostages were maior obstacles.

The plan was for three US Air Force troop-carrying MC-130Combat Talons (C-130s configured for special operations) andthree EC-130s configured for ground-refueling to depart from theisland of Masirah, off the coast of Oman, and fly to a site in Iran'sDasht-e Kavir desert, code-named "Desert One," some 200 milessoutheast of Teheran. At Desert One, the force would await thearrival of eight Navy RH-53D Sea Stallion helicopters (flown byMarine pilots) from the carrier Nimitz in the Gulf of Oman, 600miles from the rendezvous site. On arrival, the helicopters wouldrefuel from the EC-130s and a specially trained US Army assaultteam of 90 men would board the helicopters. Soon after they be-gan working, the mission planners determined that an absolute

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Flotage Rescue Planning

minimum of six flyable helicopters would be required to lift theassault force and its equipment from Desert One to the next loca-tion. If this criterion was not met, the mission would have to beaborted at Desert One. (The number of helicopters used in theoperation was to become a key issue of debate long after the res-cue attempt had failed.)

Once the helicopters had refueled and the assault force wasloaded on board, the helicopters would proceed to hide sites--onefor the assault team itself and one for the other helicopters, in thevicinity of Garmsar. The C-130s would return to Masirah. Vir-tually all operations were to take place under cover of darkness.The assault team would eventually be met by Department of De-fense (DOD) agents who had been placed in Teheran several daysbefore. After a series of covert link-ups, the team would be pro-vided a number of Mercedes trucks that had been stored in a ware-house on the outskirts of Teheran. The team would split into threeelements and use the trucks to position themselvcs for an assaulton the embassy compound.

Once the tactical assault plan had been executed and thehostages freed, the helicopters, orbiting north of Teheran, wouldland in the vicinity of the compound (or in nearby Amjadieh soc-cer stadium, if the compound was blocked). The helicopterswould fly the hostages and assault team to Manzariveh airfield.thirty-five miles to the south, which was to be seized and securedearlier by US Army Rangers. When the assault force and hostagesreached Manzariyeh, they would board US Air Force C-141 air-craft and fly to a friendly country.

As the world learned on the morning ot 25 April, the presi-dent ordered the mission aborted at the Desert One site afterequipment failure left the assault force with less than the six heli-copters determined by mission planners to be required for success-tul execution of the rescue operation. Of the six helicopters thatfinally ,irrived at Desert One, after an extremely dilticult flightthrough an unforeseen local weather phenomenon known as a ha-boob (a dust cloud of suspended particles), only live were deter-mined to be flyable--one les,, than the minimum number requiredto proceed. One helicopter was forced down en route to Desert

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Hotage Re%~cue Planning

One by an indication that a rotor blade was about to tail. A sv-ond helicopter lost its navigation and flight instruments and re-turned to the Nimit:. A third helicopter suffered hydraulic tailureat Desert One and was judged to be unsate for further flight. Afterdirect consultation with the on-scene commander via secure satel-lite radio communications, President Carter cancelled themission.

As the entire force prepared to withdraw from Desert One totheir recovery bases, one of the helicopters, which was changingposition to allow a second helicopter to refuel, collided with aC-130 and both aircraft burst into flames. Eight crewmen (three inthe helicopter and five in the C-130) died in the fire. Because ofthe intense heat, exploding ammunition, and impending daylight,the remainder of the force evacuated the Desert One site, leavingbehind the bodies of the eight men in the burning wreckage andthe five remaining operational helicopters.

President Carter announced to the American public at 1:00A.M. (Washington time) that an attempt to rescue the hostages hadbeen made but that the mission had failed. Costs of the failed mis-sion included eight dead and several seriously wounded. In con-gressional testimony, the monetary cost of the attempt wasestimated at around $193 million.' An additional cost that cannotbe measured in absolute terms was the damage to the UnitedStates' reputation for military skill and power. In all fairness tothe brave men who took part in the rescue attempt, just plain badluck had as much to do with the failure as any oversight in plan-ning or execution.

RESCUE MISSIONS IN GENERAL

The Rescue Mission as a Political Act

Rescue missions differ from conventional military operationsin wartime in that the motives behind rescue missions are distinct-ly and expressly political. The national leadership is solely andultimately responsible for ordering the planning and execu-tion of such missions. The rescue mission is, as Clausewitz char-acterized war, an extension of politics by other means.7 Unlike

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f"totage Res'cue ['fanning

conventional military operations, rescue missions are expected tobe accomplished flawlessly, with all hostages recovered alive, nocasualties incurred by the rescuing force, violence directed solelyagainst the captors, and the political situation left no worse than itwas before the rescue attempt.s In other words, hostage rescuemissions are unreasonably expected to be perfect.

The preferred solution to any hostage crisis is negotiation.since this approach does not risk casualties unless the captors be-gin selective or indiscriminate execution of their hostages.Negotiation buys time, allows additional intelligence gathering.and provides a means for covering rescue preparations. Militarypreparation and training for a rescue operation must take placesimultatieously with negotiations in case an emergency assault isrequired.

Closely tied to the notion of the rescue mission as a politicalact is the fact that the mission is also an expression of nationalwill. During the Mayaguez crisis, the Ford administration soughtto avoid another loss of respect and "face" such as resulted fromthe US reluctance to use force in a swift and decisive manner in the1968 Pueblo incident. President Ford felt that the seizure of a USvessel and its crew by a country (Cambodia) which had sorecently caused the United States embarrassment was a veryserious matter. Secretary of State Kissinger was emphatic aboutthe need for a forceful response and felt that the United Statesshould send a strong signal to North Korean President Kim-IlSung and other communist Asian leaders. Kissinger believed thatthe issues at stake went far beyond the isolated seizure of a USmerchant ship on the high seas to questions of internationalperceptions of power and US national will." Kissinger feared thatif the Cambodians used the Mayaguez crew the way the NorthKoreans had manipulated the crew of the Pueblo, the Americanpolitical posture in the rest of Asia could radically deteriorate.The Mayaguez crisis pointed out the need for the United States toact promptly to dispel doubts concerning US national will andcapacity to respond to provocation. President Ford "felt it wouldbe far better to take strong action even though the odds might beagainst us. It was far better than failing and doing nothing.""'

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Htostage Ret,,uc Planning

The aggressors in a hostage crisis, whether they be repre-sentatives of a totalitarian communist government, leftist mili-tants, or a group of terrorists, have selected their victims as asymbol of the government or system which they hope to embar-rass politically or eventually overthrow. Immediately after theskyjacking that led to the Entebbe rescue mission, Israeli Trans-port Minister Gad Yaakobi pointed out to the task force formed todeal with the situation that the terrorists' target was, indeed, thenation of Israel." The decision to go ahead with the Iranian hos-tage rescue attempt was clearly tied to national will. Critics of thatdecision stated that President Carter let public opinion drive him

toward the military solution. As one critic phrased it, "he decidedto ride the tiger." Other observers, including the president's

closest advisers, saw the raid as a means for Carter to politicallydemonstrate his courage to act decisively as the Chief Executive

and to bolster world opinion of American power.'' On II April1980, at a meeting of the National Stcurity Council (NSC). thepresident made his final decision to proceed with the military

option. As his National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, soaptly phrased it, Carter decided to "lance the boil of American

frustration." "

The element of time is often critical in planning rescue

operations. In the case of the Son Tav and Iranian rescuemissions, time was available to adequately plan the mission and

choose the time and place of execution. But during both the Maa-guez and Entebbe operations, time was critical if lives were to be

saved and national prestige restored. Both these latter crises high-lighted the need for in-being, workable crisis-response mecha-

nisms within the governments involved. The US Joint StaffOfficers'Guide defines a crisis as

an incident external to the continental United States thatdevelops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic,political, or military importance to the US government thatcommitment of US military forces is contemplated to achievenational objectives.

Resolution of crises is therefore vital to US national objectives and

national strategy and usually time constrained. In the case of the

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liostage Rescue Planning

Entebbe rescue, a carefully tailored crisis management team wasformed only two hours after the first intelligence reports of theskyjacking. Teams of specialists from various military, political,and diplomatic organizations supported each member of the crisistask force. Only four hours after President Ford was notified ofthe ,'Iaiaguez seizure, the National Security Council held the firstof many meetings to discuss an appropriate response to thesituation. :ý

Rescue Forces

At this point let us briefly discuss the type of forces that areappropriate for conduct of most hostage rescue operations. I con-tend that special operations units are best suited for conductingsuch operations. I base my argument not on any false elitist pride,but on the fact that the individuals within these units have de-veloped-through natural inclination, operational experience, ortraining-a particular mind-set that is essential for survival.Special operations, since their origins in the days of the Office ofStrategic Services (OSS), have been small in size, covert or clan-destine by nature, and imaginative by necessity or design. Duringsuch operations the chances of success are small, the uncertaintiesare great, and the odds on getting killed are even greater. The useof special operations forces might be compared to the "quiet use ofa surgical knife" as opposed to use of a "big stick." "'

The Israeli; historically have assigned special operationsmissions to their commando units. US special operations forcesinclude US Army Special Forces (Green Berets): Navy Sea, Air,Iand (SEAL) Teams; and US Air Force special operations units.Unfortunately, throughout the history of these units and theirpredecessor organizations, each of the Services has displayed aninhcrent distrust of these nonstandard, so-called "elitist" units.Therefore, these units have suffered, as would be expected, fromlow personnel promotion rates and benign neglect in the fiscalsupport arena. Some progress has been made in this latter area asa result of rising national interest in the United States' ability to re-spond to global transnational terrorism.

Training and equipment are important to special operationspersonnel, but imagination and ingenuity are paramount, Colonel

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Hostage Rescue' Planning

Charlie Beckwith, leader of the assault force in the Iranian rescueattempt, described special operations as a "rare and exoticbird.''' The ability to improvise and use standard equipment innonstandard ways becomes critical when funds, are lacking, timeis short, and operation security dictates avoiding routine supplychannels. The Son Tay raiders were particularly adept at u,,ingSears Roebuck catalogues to obtain ideas and rough specificationsýfor a host of mission-peculiar items that would be needed on theraid. "

Israeli Major General (retired) Shlomo Gazit. Director ofMilitary Intelligence from 1974 to 1979, a participant in the plan-ning for the Entebbe raid, portrayed the special operations mind-set when he stated that the planner for a rescue operation requires"the mentality and expertise of a bank robber." "' F )th plannersand operators in this field must be attentive to detl, extremelyaware of the need for precise timing in the conduct of operations.and willing to accept unusual orders and missions withoutquestion. The motto of the US Air Force 1st Special OperationsWing says it vet another way: "Anytime, Anyplace."

Goals and Risks

Before attempting a rescue mission, planners must definesuccess: assess the risk; and determine political, operational, andtechnical feasibility. Definitions of success vary from missioncompletion with no friendly casualties to partial rescue with an"'acceptable" number of losses, whatever that figure may be. Inattempting to define success for the Son Tay raid, planners con-sidered what retaliatory measures the North Vietnamese wouldtake against those prisoners left behind in other PW camps. Theplanners generally accepted that the North Vietnamese would notmake reprisals against PWs who had nothing to do with and wereprobably unaware of the raid.

The Israelis decided they had to attempt the Entebbe rescue atall costs, even though they viewed the odds for success as smallbecause of the great distances involved and the lack of infor-mation about the terrorists. The deciding factor for the Israeligovernment was when the terrorists began a "selection" process

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Hoto age R kIe,,•u N~anning

among the hostage,,, separating lews from non-Jews, whichappeared ominously reminiscent of Dachau and Buchenwald.

For political reasons previously discussed, the US govern-ment defined success in the Mwaagucz crisis as rapid recovery ofthe ship and its 40-man crew. This recovery was achieved at a co;tof 41 Americans killed, 50 wounded, and millions of dollarsworth of military equipment lost. Some would say the truemeasure of success was a restoration in the eyes of the world ot USstature as a highly capable military power.

Mission success can be defined in many ways. As a result otthe "failed" Son Tay raid, all US PWs were relocated to Hanoi.Many who had been isolated for years were now confined withother prisoners, where they could support one another bycommunicating and organizing. The PWs' morale soared and theygenerally felt the raid demonstrated that the United States had notforgotten them. Most importantly, the raid struck a blow againstthe psyche of the North Vietnamese, leaving them with a feeling ofvulnerability. As Colonel "Bull" Simons, assault leader in theraid, stated, "Christ, the thing was worth doing without gettingthem." :

In addition to defining success and assessing political riskswhen contemplating rescue missions, planners must carefullyassess the operational and technical feasibility of the plan. Thelack of one flyable helicopter at Desert One changed the course ofhistory. Whether the plan for the assault on the embassy wouldhave succeeded or resulted in disaster, the world will never know.

Planners for the Iran mission determined a 9o.5 percent prob-ability that six of the eight helicopters would arrive at their hide",ite in a flyable condition. The addition of two more helicopterswould have boosted that probability to 99.2 percent, but alsowould have required another fuel-carrying C- 130, increasing thechances of detection and mechanical failure. The decision wasmade to accept the lower probability of success and use only eighthelicopters.-:- Many critics have argued, alter the fact, that afailure to conduct a serious operational analysis, considering allthe various phases of the rescue plan, predestined the failure of the

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Iran rescue operation. According to Dr. Stefan T. lPossony. Asso-ciate Editor of Defense and Foreign Affairs, using eight helicoptersin the "Eagle Claw" operation produced a 0.3 probability ot over-all success; increasing the number of helicopters to 18 would haveincreased that probability to 0.9.20

Political considerations can heavily influence the technicalaspects of a rescue plan. President Carter believed the number ofhelicopters (eight) deemed necessary by the loint Chiefs of Staff(JCS) was appropriate since he wished to present this mission tothe world as one with humanitarian overtones, not as an act ofwar against Iran. The point is that the planning process mustbalance hard requirements dictated by operational analysis withthose dictated by availability of equipment, additional riskfactors, and political considerations.

As alluded to earlier, special operations rescue missionshistorically have had low probabilities of success. Early in theplanning for the Iran rescue attempt, JCS Chairman GeneralDavid Jones asked Colonel Beckwith about the probability ofsuccess and the risks. Colonel Beckwith replied, "Sir, the prob-ability of success is zero and the risks are high." 23 Carter's Secre-tary of State, Cyrus Vance, was totally convinced that the planwould not work and that any attempt to conduct a rescue wouldresult in considerable harm to both the rescue force and, ulti-mately, the hostages. Vance stressed the need for continued nego-tiation through State Department channels and expressed concernabout an adverse Soviet response to the raid. He resigned his postin protest following the mission's failure.

Vance's resignation was yet another political "price" theCarter administration had to pay. The Iranians were quick toexploit for propaganda purposes the equipment, sensitive docu-ments, and (sadly) the human remains left behind at Desert One.The technical failure of the mission dealt a heavy blow to thepsychological well-being of the United States and sounded thepolitical death knell for the Carter administration. The presidentbore sole political responsibility for the failed mission. The les-son is that when planning for success one must also preparefor failure. Rescue missions are inherently high-risk ventures.

15

IHo,,tage Rescue Planning

Planners must analyze the implicatior of failure at both the tacti-cal and strategic levels and be prepared to accept the consequencesof failure. This is particularly true tor special operations missions.which have high visibility throughout the world and which often,despite their small size, can shape perceptions of the United Statesas a world power.

Historically, special operations missions have failed muchmore than they have succeeded. This is not to say, however, thatthe reasons behind them were not cogent enough to warrant theirattempt. An average of at least three out of four commando, Brit-ish intelligence, and OSS operations in the European theaterduring World War 11 were considered failures. French specialoperations in Indochina and Algeria did not seem to fare anybetter. The Son Tay raid was, by no means, the first such PWrescue attempt in Southeast Asia, but actually the 71st "dry hole"!Between 1966 and 1970, 91 such PW rescue attempts were con-ducted in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Of the 91attempts, 20 succeeded, recovering 318 South Vietnamese soldiersand 60 civilians. Forty-five of those raids were mounted for thepurpose of rescuing American PWs; however, only one was suc-cessful, recovering one US Army Specialist Four (who died 15hours after his liberation, of wounds inflicted by his captorsbefore the rescuers arrived).21

Lessons from Experience

Planners of rescue missions repeatedly use historical prece-dents in their planning. The chief value in studying history is thelessons it teaches for the future. In 1068 the USS Piwc/ho was cap-tured by the North Koreans: 82 American sailors were incar-cerated for 10 months. The United States painfully learned thatthe possibility of rescuing the ship and crew was reduced to zeroonce the ship reached harbor in North Korea. When the,LWc.nez crisis unfolded in May 1975, President Ford lost no

time in committing military forces to prevent the ship from beingtaken to a Cambodian port. The [Pitilco "lesson" was not wastedon the Ford administration. Negotiation is one avenue of release,and it must he pursued simultaneously with tactical mission plan-ning. However, in maritime crises such as those cited above,

lt,

Hostage Rescue Planning

history has taught us that the best time to resolve the crisis mili-tarily is immediately after it occurs.

Planners for the Entebbe operation carefully studied lessonslearned during the Son Tay raid. They were continually plaguedby doubt and "planner's remorse" that the rescue force wouldstrike and find no hostages at the airport, as the Americans hadexperienced at Son Tay some six years earlier. After havingexecuted one of the most successful commando raids in history,Israel was quick to offer to the Carter administration the benefitof lessons learned in the Entebbe rescue. President Carter initiallyopted to pursue negotiation instead, but he soon set the wheels inmotion to plan a US rescue operation.2 °

Captors and Captives

Once the political decision is made to plan a rescue mission,the first step should be to examine the char- teristics and capabili-ties of both the captors and the captives. In both the Son Tav andMayaaeiuz operations, the captors were conventional military per-sonnel (guards and soldiers); in Iran, the captors were militantstudents. However, for this discussion I will refer to the captor asthe "terrorist" and the captive as the "hostage."

Knowing not only the size but also the type of terrorist groupinvolved is important in that the larger, transnational groups havewell-known, historically documented modi operantli. Transna-tional terrorist groups are state sponsored and have politicalobjectives that clearly transcend national boundaries..'- Ascertain-ing group composition is equally important. Are there anywomen or varied nationalities within the group? The ten terroriststhat seized Air France Flight 139 in the Entebbe crisis were led bv aGerman couple of remarkably different personality types.

Other important essential elements of i ,formation (ELIs) forrescue planners are the number and kinds of weapons, cxplosivc,;or boobytraps the terrorists possess; the probability that theterrorists will carry out any threats; and the types of demandsthey are likely to make, Terrorists today are beconing increas-ingly sophisticated. High technology can provide them enhanced

11

Hostage Recue Planning

capabilities in communications and counter-surveillance. Amongthe most important and difficult to ascertain information is thatregarding the terrorists' states of mind and their actual intentions.

(An odd axiom of terrorism is that, hist,)rically, it hostages arenot killed in the first few days after their capture, they probably

never will be, and they eventually become a burden to theircaptors.)

During the Entebbe crisis, non-Israeli passengers releasedbefore the assault were able to provide planners with much of thisessential information. Rescue planners should actively seek insidesources of information whenever possible. Although this type ofintelligence is usually the most difficult to obtain, it is often themost critical to the final assault phase of the operation.

In studying the objective, planners must consider the numberand composition of the hostage group as well as the captors. Thepresence of women, children, clergymen, or important personsmay dictate the type and level of violence the assault force willuse. The ethnic composition of the hostage group must also beconsidered, since the rescuing force, when it reaches the hostages.will probably issue commands such as "Lie down!"' or 'Remainstill!" in only one language. In the Entebbe raid, a soldier in eachsquad used a loudspeaker to shout commands to the hostages tolie down. Those who remained standing stood a chance of beingeither deliberately shot or caught in a crossfire.

Rescuers can expect hostages to behave unpredictably, espe-cially after long months of incarceratin. Over time, positive rela-tionships may develop between the captives and the captors. Thisphenomenon is often referred to as the "Stockholm Syndrome,' sonamed after a Swedish bank robbery incident in 1073 in which thehostages began to identify with the bank robbers and becamesympathetic to their plight. During the Entebbe crisis, the maleGerman terrorist leader, very much unlike his female partner.adopted a pleasant manner. Many of the hostages considered himquiet and even affable; others were not so easily deceived.2 '• Plan-ners must be aware that basic hurnan needs compel the hostage tosee the human qualities in his tormentor. The planners mustadjust their assault plans accordingly.

A good Ri le (I thU ail IV rugadidng ho 'tqx agu hha vior J U Vnw t hras-ýatlt phasu is, to, ucxpct theu nnrxu titl. 'Sonic nia% to'/C.tain t, or, suream:n ofther, wil runII- 1. Th1 CtI) k)t I IfttI ( UIt to leal wI t handilmost dangurowsto hirnsult is thu iostagr whohcuroialiv triu',to ass-ist thuc rcsccr-s by sri/i rig a I, ro -orist owraI p, IIn liur-' pI, vting hiniwl I in perilI

A\ visibit. ,vnibol, ',n~d al an AnIC!u~ri la Ont thu as-linlUniformi, or- a Iokuri famillar word orI phi-rai thuit Isricli ,onfliandos at Entebbe Thou tcd Isract- willI do muo- ,, In.t a itmake the' h otagc uli thu rus(tic I,, takinug placeu a nund himDuring platnning tfor thu L I ran iaIn r-cs( u . Coltionel Be(k w i hr(2quI(2stud pcrn-i isS(ioi t rk)T IPrcsiden t Car'cvto wr ut.he ptirasu.''Thc Prusiden t of the L'ni to! Staf us ha-~ un t L11.

PLANNING IMPERATIVES

I rontend that planning for- an\- hostalgu rCusu 01puratiOlnmut osiu thru asupri-ici plustwofw , r (pj prin

ciplus ~ ~ ~ ~ P~ of war, Thuv au4tCI wi;u, and -i:u

Speed in responding to a crisis sit uatiorn ru rsruc ,ogn itIOnthat a (:risis cxists. During the Mo.iur i ndent a Navy rck onnairssancc aircraft laIunhchd tor on-sct-nU snrvujcllanuc onlytwhours, and twenty niinUtus 11[Vr the National Militairy (ConinandCenter rucuivud the initial report oIt thC ()in I o the 11hip. SlIurdin plannirg anduXC( Lit ion is paramount ýi n~ u indo w~if t ink mu imeteo rologicalI or cliimat oloigical co nsideration- niav rutintaplainnud operation to ',urtain periods. In addition. tcrrrori-ts arucv ulInerahle during the first houtrs of a host agu situnation bco a usthey often have not had tiniu to sutticiently organi/u ~hift schuil-

Af thu nuud to Xuc(Ute the r-aid before thu wonsoon cuaon plant-nursI for the Teheran r'aid vwurc a wa ru that any dul a in C\eu WWIt twoul1.d CXCL udU Lisu( of hel i.opturs u. s i m pend ing hiigh sum n11iufrum -pura t urus In thu Iranian ducur would dU~ilss 10" 4 aurO-

dvnamik lift.

Simpl]iity In a plan isý highly (1 sirahlu but vrrv of funi ditti-( Lilt to chiruTliuru is a nIuas rc oft uluganue in) sim:pl .ilt v. [hr(

t HtWtage Rescue Planning

simpler the plan. the fewer things can go wrong. (In philosophy,Occam's Razor states that in choosing between two similarhypotheses, the simpler is preferred.) During the Nla.vaiw.': affair,no less than five different options were presented by GeneralJones, then Acting JCS Chairman. Planning for the Iran rescueattempt yielded a considerably greater number because of thedifficulties involved. The tendency is usually to provid,: too manyoptions. In addition to seeking simplicity with regard to bothnumbers and complexity of courses of action, forces should bekept as small as the situation will allow. Larger forces meangreater logistic requirements and more chance for compromise ofthe mission. There is an Israeli Defense Force adage that says,"Lean forces fight best," .' It is also axiomatic that during theplanning for any mission of this type, the size of the rescue torcewill grow, as more difficult planning problems are encountered.

The final basic principle, and the single most critical elementthe planner must strive for, is surprise. The Soviets consider sur-prise one of their basic principles of military art. Stevens andMarsh define a surprise as "an event which comes to be known,and perhaps understood, almost exclusively after it has hap-pened." '2 In an assault operation, the element of surprise, used inconcert with violence and speed, is the critical element and thesine qua tio on which the lives of the hostages depend. lo'-ýs ofsurprise should nearly always be cause for a decision to abort themission.

Inherent in planning for surprise is the element of deception,which can be defined as the deliberate misrepresentation ot realityto gain competitive advantage. The Soviets do not assign decep-tion status as a separate principle of their military art because theyconsider it interdependent with surprise. Of the rescue operationsdiscussed in this essay, all but the Mwiav'az rescue had deceptionschemes as part of the basic plan. During the Son Tav raid, fire-fight simulators were airdropped to distract, confuse, anddemoralize the North Vietnamese; diversionary Navy air mission,dropping fl'res were flown over Haiphong harbor to divertattention away from the sector of the prison camp: US Air ForceF 105 Wild Weasel electronic warfare defense suppression air-craft were used to jam enemy radars and as 'bait" to divert sUr-face-to-air missile (SAM) defenses away from the assault force,

20

Foioage Rlescue Planning

A valid criticism of the naval air diversion in the Son Taymission is that for some time before the event, the Navy had vir-tually stopped airstrikes in the vicinity. The caution here is that anoverly elaborate ruse can arouse suspicion and become counter-productive to the primary mission. The most important criterionfor a deception scheme is beliedability. The planners should leadthe enemy to believe what he is predisposed and preconditioned tobelieve.

The Israelis used deception to the maximum at Entebbe. Ttý oof the C-135 (Boeing 707) support aircraft used in the raid werepainted with El Al airline colors and made to appear, both insideand out, to be commercial aircraft. The occupants wore civilianclothes and carried bogus identification documents. One aircraftwas, in fact, a completely equipped airborne command post forthe Israeli Air Force commander; the other was configured tormedical evacuation and was to stand by to meet the assault forcein Nairobi on its way home from Entebbe.

The most publicized deception scheme in the Entebbe raidwas the black Mercedes Benz sedan carrying a burlyv sraeli para-trooper in black make-up, made to look like Idi Arnin. The Mer-cedes preceded the Israeli convoy of Land Rover,, a,; thev rolled oftthe C-130s and rapidly carried the assault force to, the old ter-minal building where the hostages were held. The 1Iraeli, deter-mined correctly that the Mercedes was the official car and asymbol of authority in Uganda and would be allowed to passsecurity points without question. The Ugandan guards tell for theruse and sounded no alarm.

Lastly, the Iranian rescue plan included the use of deception.Before the rescue attempt, the United States increased the fre-quency of C- 130 flights in and out of Egypt as well as the numberof night helicopter sorties from the carrier Nimitz. These actionswere part of a conditioning mechanism in the larger deceptionplan. "

The Need for Intelligence

Timely and accurate intelligence is the element in a rescutIeoperation that ultimately determines the difference between

21

Hostag.' R"tc'u Planning

success and failure, between victory and humiliation, andbetween saving lives and losing them. D1)ctilcd last-minute intelli-gence is the hallmark of successful special operations missions.Every possible source for this type of information must be activelysought and utilized. Just before launch of the Iran rescue mission.a cook from the embassy in Teheran was permitted to ltive thecountry. By mere chance, a CIA agent discovered the cooksrelease and learned from the cook that the 53 hostage,, were all to-gether in one location-a vital and hitherto unknown piece otintelligence, which was relayed to the assault force commanderand caused considerable change in the assault plan.-

Because human beings are predisposed to believe what theywant to believe, last-minute intelligence very often is looked uponwith suspicion, for it will no doubt require changing the plan.Planners and operators ultimatelY reach a point where they wantto go with the final plan as it was rehearsed, for there is comfort infamiliarity. Approximately 24 hours after the deploying Son Tarraiding force had received the execute message (they had notlaunched on the final assault phase yet), the mission commanderreceived word that a Vietnamese stay-behind agent in North Viet-nam, classified by intelligence sources as "usually reliable," hadreported that the prisoners had been removed and the camp wasempty. Lingering doubts about the reliability of the agent andconflicting information from overhead infrared imagery causedthe commander to execute the raid as planned.

Another key lesson learned in the Son Tay operation was thatwhat appears on an aerial photograph is not necessarily the realityof the moment. The rescue plan called for one helicopter to pur-posely crash-land between two small, spindly trees shown onSR-71 photographs. In the time between the last reconnaissancemission and the raid, the trees grew considerably. The helicopterpilot that was to crash-land had to adjust his approach during thefinal moments to avoid what would have been fatal contact withtwo huge trees.

The best and most reliable intelligence will nearly always behuman intelligence (HUMINT), human eyes on the target. Theseizure of the embassy in Teheran in November 1979 left the CIA

22

lito.tjgv Res LWt Planrning

without a single stay-behind agent in the countrv. Not until lateDecember was an agent, identified as "Bob, finally reintroducedto provide critical on-scene intelligence. The next bet thing tothese inside sources, or "invisibles' as the Israelis reter to them,are people with previous experience in the objective area. Beforethe Entebbe assault, the Israelis interviewed Idi Amin , formerpersonal pilot and the former Israeli attache to Uganda, becauseboth were intimately familiar with the layout of the Entebb, air-port.

Weather reconnaissance is a form of intelligence especiallycrucial to a plan involving use of air or maritime assets. Before theSon Tay raid, aerial weather reconnaissance flights were flownalong the border between Laos and North Vietnam because ot theincreasing threat of an approaching typhoon and associated cloudsystems, which could have jeopardized the mission. For theIranian rescue attempt, planners decided against a weather recon-naissance flight to avoid the risk of arousing suspicion and possi-bly compromising the mission. As it turned out, had a weathership been flown (or had the rescue force used secure radio com-munications between the helicopters and the C-130s ahead ofthem, already approaching the clear conditions at Desert One).helicopter number five probably would have continued onthrough the weakening suspended dust phenomenon (babl'ob!without instruments instead of returning to the Nrwit_. I believe

that where aircraft are concerned and the weather is in doubt,weather reconnaissance flights are usually worth the risk, espe-cially in areas where enemy signals intelligence (SIGINTt capabili-ties are known to be weak.

Intelligence failures are often attributed to the tact that worst-case scenarios are ignored or only partially believed. As a rule ofthumb, planners should consider "Murphy" an optimist. Duringthe Ma'yaugnez crisis, estimates of enemy strength in Koh Tangvaried from 18 Cambodian irregulars with their families to a D)e-fense Intelligence Agency estimate of 200 Khmer Rouge soldiersarmed with automatic weapons, mortars, and recoilless rifles. TheDefense Intelligence estimate proved very accurate: however, the175-man strength of the Marine assault force was predicated on anenemy strength estimate of between 20 and 100 lightly armed

23

Hostage Re.cue Planning

troops. ' The decision to use the low estimate resulted in consid-erable loss ot life and equipment.

My final point regarding the processing and evaluation (itintelligence is that the planners must establish one central point ofcollection and collation. This central point should gather all typesof intelligence, including visual imagery from manned and un-manned overhead collection systems, human intelligence, and sig-nals intelligence. This multiplicity of sources will provide plannersa means of cross-checking information to determine both accu-

racy and timeliness.

Security Considerations

Operations security (OPSEC) must be religiously maintainedduring all phases of the mission. Operations security literallymeans the difference between getting to the objective undetectedand compromising the mission. There are as many ways to ensureoperations security as there are ways to comnrromise it. Duringfinal planning and preparation for Operation lonathan (Entebbe),everyone associated with the mission, including high-level Cabi-net ministers, was cautioned to avoid doing anything out ot theordinary that could arouse suspicion. Mission personnel travelledin civilian clothes and used private and commercial rather thanmilitary transportation to move to debarkation point,. •

Perhaps the most difficult aspect of maintaining operationssecurity is determining to what degree the operation and asso-ciated planning will be compartmentalized. Determining whoshould know and what they should know varies depending on theoperation, the political sensitivity of the mission, and the guid-ance from the governing authority. Training ot the assault force,itself, is an OPSEC threat. When variou types, of units arebrought together for the first time, it clearly signals that some-thing unusual is in the making. Cancelled personnel leaves andpasses, interrupted or cancelled unit social and athletic events.and prolonged absences of key personnel in the unit commandstructure all suggest impending military action.

The planners of the Son Tay operation considered operationssecurity paramount. They felt that the more people who knewabout the mission, the greater the risk ot compromise. As a result,

24

Hoslag, 14"t,• tie Planning

access lists were kept small and the mission was highly compart-mentalized. Personnel at Strategic Air Command (SAC) head-

quarters who were responsible for reconnaissance missions overNorth Vietnam did not know what they were trying to photo-graph. SAC personnel later stated that knowle~ige of the exact

requirement (pinpoint target location rather than area coverage)ýVwould have helped them get the desired photo coverage. ý`

With regard to Son Tay, virtually the entire staff directing

the war in Southeast Asia was kept in the dark concerning one ofthe most critical operations ever launched in that theater. The.on•mander of the Pacific Fleet, who was ultimately responsible

tot the Navy air diversion operation, was never told of the reasontbr it. though the commander ot Carrier Task Force 77 was even-tualIv briefed before the raid. Security requirements were so strin-

.ient that even the men of the assault force were not told of theirmi-,ion until airborne and en "-)ute to their final staging location.Three days before the raid, only four key people in the groundtor(e knew the target and details of the mission.•"

The Son Tav planner, and Operators routinely disassembledthe training mockup of the Son Tay camp before daylight and

whe'n the Soviet Cosmos satellite was projected to be overhead.Yet another OPSEC scheme in the Son Tav operation was to em-ploy [I( S counterintelligence teams during all phases of the oper-ation to see if they could break the code and determine missiondetails and objectives. Though the counterintelligence units wereonly partially successful, a young intelligence officer in the Eva-sion and Escape Branch (of Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces, even-

tuallv determined, quite by accident, the mission objective andprecise target. First, he noticed the upgrading in security classi-

fication of requests for photo reconnaissance over a certain areaof North Vietnam. Then a request for a medical evacuation air-craft configured to accommodate the exact number o(f prisoners

thought to be held at Son Tay confirmed his suspicions.

How well operations security is truly maintained can only be

determined after mission execution. Planners for the Teheran

rescue attempt, like the Son Tay group, placed operations securityabove all other considerations. The commander of the loint TaskForce (JTF) assigned to the mission was selected not only because

23

IHostage. Rtt'. tic Nanning

lie was ifl extremely capable officer and already assigned to thePentagon. but also be(cause sele t ion (if any high-visibility combatUnit comnmander would have aroused undueC Lsrsicion and specu-lation.ý Only the Carter adminit rat ions, top-level personnelwere awrare' Ot the mission, tol inCILude the %'I(e President AMon-dLe,1) Secretary of D etensc ( Brown), Sec retarv of State \'ance ,Naitional SeCurity Advisor ( Brieti nski F, Director of the CIA(TUrner, and W~hi te House Chicetkof Staff Oordan.'

FoEllocing the aborted r~i.the [lollOWay Comm11Iss'-ion cri-ticued the I Tf Otort in a fotrmal report coveri ng 23 vepa rate iss"Utsregairding plan ning and eecCLIt ion. OIPSFC issue.1 numiber I , nrt -icisIn' were that

"* Planning may have been too compart mentaililed t herebyinhibiting the flow (if in format ion bet ween players_

"* The' 1a. k of a fullJ dress rehea rsal involving all participants.bec aus (it perceived seCu~rity risk,,, resulted in some ptrational problems, that Occurred oin the minsson not bein)gidentified.

"* The extreme emphasis cn the need for (oniu~nic~ations'ecurity tCOMSEC) ---an ess,.ential elemenit Of opera.tionssecurty ---during missýion execu~tion re-nulted in a lack ofco ordination between misýsion air c-rews, vwhic h could hav-enha nced their capabil ity' to handle unforeseen emner -gencies.

The Holloway report concluded that 'slightly greater selectivityand flexibilityv in the OIPSEC arena, part icularlv within the ITE.could have been beneficial in operational termis wit hout neces(-.,arily sacrificing seCUrity.'

The bottom line regarding operations security I's that It mustbe maintained at all costs; however, the degree to which measures,are taken to enSLire this is strictly a judgment call. A given cost indecreasing Ol'SEC measures is an increased probabilitv ofoperational compromise. The Iranian experience showed thatoperations security mciSt not become an obsession. OlPSEC re-

(lUirements and the need for secrecy muIst be carefully, balancedwith operational reqCuirements (such as joint training) necessa rv to

I htage . us ' ti, anning

accomplish the mission. There is no simple tOrmula or solution forOPSECsuccess.

Security regarding special operations rescue misions isalmost as important after the operation a', during and before it.The United States historically has been wteak in thi, area. Toomuch light on the mission details can imperil the use ot -,ensitivetechniques and equipment in tuture missions. In both the Son Tayand Iranian missions, the planners intended to never reveal thatthe operations were unsuccessful, it that was how they turned out.Ideally, to preserve operations security, mission per,,nrI ,hOUtd

adhere to the principle of silence. But in the open American ,o-ciety, and given the nature of congressional and media inquiry.silence and total secrecy are probably unrealistic goal,.

The Planning Process

The planning process itself for a mission such as a hostagerescue is unique in many ways. Before planning begins,, an agreedupon, limited (for OPSEC purposes) number of people fromrequisite specialties need to be collocated in a central planningcell, where they can exchange views face-to-face. The nature andurgency oft the crisis will dictate both the speed of the selectionprocess, and the tempo of the planning effort. Expertise in one sfield is, Of course, a basic requirement for a planner. In addition, aplanner should have a personality and temperament that enablehim to cope with a rapidly changing and dynamic situation.

Once the planning cell is formed, the planning process mustallow for easy exchange of ideas and information as well as clearchannels of communication and coordination. The group in us",t en-courage brainstorming and tree-wheeling; the planners cannot(onsider any idea too implausible until they fully evaluate it. f ios-tage rescue operations depend wholly upon the element of surpriseto achieve Success. The maximum employment of imaginativeconcepts provides the key to that success. Frequent changes to thebasic operational concept are the rule in this type of planningeffort. Planners must resist the urge to choose one course Ot actionand stilck with it for expediency's sake. They must refine or rad-ically change the basic plan as nvcessary to maximize the chances

27

I ltmstage Re,,,cue Planning

ot mission success. One way to avoid the "groupthink" mentalityis to initially establish independent planning teams and isolate

them from one another. I These teams can then formulate inde-pendent plans, which can be evaluated later as to operational ac-ceptability, feasibility, and suitability.

Planning should proceed from the general to the specific. Thecentral planning unit should concentrate on the general concept ofthe operation while the unit commanders are left unimpeded toformulate detailed tactical execution plans. In the interest of time,operational units should train, prepare, and rehearse simulta-neously with the general planning effort. During crises, imme-diate, "no-plan" assault option,, should be devised in the event

that the captors begin hostage executions.

Earlv involvement ot political authorities-at the highest levelsis necessary for e,,tablishing rules of e'ngagefllent and dicardingpolitically unacceptable ideas at the outset of the planning effort.

Mission planners must also take into account international lawand world opinion. Diplornatic negotiation is the preferredmethod of obtaining ho,,tage release: however, a dual-trackapproach, simultaneously considering a mil tarv option, is alwaysprudent. In many cases, as with the Entebbe operation.negotiation can also deceive the captor, into believing that thediplomatic channel is the only recourse open to the "hostage'government.

An important element of the planning process is what hascome to be known as the "what-if drill . Once the basic plan isformulated, the planners should examine it in the light of allimaginable contingencies, taking into account possible and prob-able technological and human failures. Planners must try to"think the unthinkable.' Although anticipation of every possiblecontingency is an admirable goal, experience has shown this cannever be truly achieved. Alexander Scott asserts, that the Clause-wit/ean "fog of war" is five times as thick for special operationssuch as hostage rescue missions and, therefore, the chances of fail-

ure, five times as great.' The mission planners should use thewhat-if drill, as a thought process, continuallv as they develop thebasic plan. Before formal acceptance of a particular plan. a sep-a rate review group (frequently referred to a, a n'murder board")

Htostage Rescue Planning

should independently review the plan, playing the "devil's advo-cate." The Israelis used an "officer's rap session" for just such apurpose before the raid at Entebbe. '

The what-if drill can determine the need for alternate andbackup plans. The number of these plans, in keeping with theprinciple of simplicity, should be kept to an absolute minimum.The Son Tay planners developed four backup plans in addition tothe primary assault plan. As it turned out, the second-in-command effectively used alternate Plan Green when the leadassault helicopter, carrying the tactical mission commander,landed in the wrong location. In cultivating a rnind-set that en-ables the planner to formulate backup plans, it is often helpful toanticipate the worst in every situation. If something has not beenplanned for, it almost certainly will happen during mission ,xecu-tion.

In airborne rescue operations, especially those involving heli-copters. history has taught us that cross-loading of key personneland equipment among the aircraft to accommodate various back-up plans is a planning imperative. Failure to cross-load helicoptersis an invitation to disaster. During the MaI, iagWz operation, oneof the first helicopters shot down at Koh Tang contained everyavailable radio belonging to the Marine command and controland fire support group. The loss of those radios greatly hinderedsubsequent tactical operations.b During the Iranian attempt, thenumber five helicopter, which aborted en route to Desert One andreturned to the Nitnitz, carried all the spare parts for the remain-ing mission helicopters.

Destruct plans for sensitive, disabled, or purposely aban-loned equipment are another essential sub-task. The assault heli-

copters for the Son Tay rescue were fitted with explosives anddetonators. As a safety precaution, electrical initiators wereplaced apart from the explosives and the electrical leads were leftdisconnected. When the time came to destroy one helicopter, ac-cording to plan, the initiators were connected to the explosivesand a built-in timing device allowed the rescue party to clear thearea. To further reduce the possibility of technical failure, ColonelSimons ordered that dual fuses be installed in the helicopter to bedestroyed. Failure to destroy the five abandoned helicopters at

t

tostage ,.•.tue Planning

Desert One in Iran resulted in the loss of the aircraft themselvesand the loss of classified documents and photographs."' TheIranians used these items for propaganda to embarrass the Carteradministration.

The failure of the Iranian rescue attempt highlights vet an-other important planning consideration. Mandatory abort andgo-no go decisions must be built in at key points in the tacticalplan. After the mishap at Desert One, investigation revealed thatthe force had n wer anticipated nor practiced aborting the missionat that point and loading the C-- 130s for return to bases. The mis-sion planners, though they anticipated many contingencies (suchas the arrival of a busload of Iranians), apparently never consid-ered that an abort order might be necessitated at so late a point inthe operation.

Unfavorable events are not the sole cause of changes to theoriginal plan. Fortuitous circumstances can also dictate the needfor flexibility. During the final Entebbe planning, the plan calledfor ground refueling of the C-130 aircraft at Entebbe during theoperation. At the last minute, a shift in the "political winds"allowed retueling at Nairobi, Kenya, on the return route to Israel.This change in circumstances called for a last-minute, but pro-pitious change of plans.

Proper selection of the assault force can help produce flexi-bility in planning and execution of the mission. Special operation,missions of this type are, by their nature, joint operations. Plan-ners must insist, however, on tailoring the assault force to missionrequirements without regard to Service composition. Hostagerescue operations are an emotional experience for everyoneinvolved. Some people involved in the planning for the Iranianmission felt that ICS members wanted to make sure each of theServices had a "piece of the action." " As a result, Marine heli-copter pilots were used where perhaps Air Force pilots, wouldhave been more suited for the mission.

"The issue (number 12 in the Holloway Report) was certainlynot which Service had the more capable pilots. But the facts werethat during the training period, the Air Force had 114 qualifiedH"- 53 pilots, instructors, and flight examiners, of whom 06 were

30

I-istagt Rt,,sc.ue Planniny

current in long-range flight and aerial reueling. %lost important-ly, 8o of these Air Force pilots had recent special operationsexperience."" Although the Navy had the helicopters (RH 53s)with the appropriate mission capabilities, the Air Force had thepilots with the requisite special operations background to flythem, given only a brief period of transition training. History hasshown that experienced pilots can adjust far more easily andquickly to a different aircraft than an inexperienced pilot can trainfor a new and highly complex mission.

This issue of pilot selection for the Iranian mission merelyillustrates the point that Service parochialism has no place in theplanning and conduct of hostage rescue missions. An equal shareof the glory and credit to each of the four Services should never beconsidered a requirement of the rescue operation. In the finalanalysis, the hostage couldn't care less what uniform or insigniahis rescuer wears. Conflict and competition between Services (andindividual organizations within those Services) inhibits effectiveplanning; it must be recognized for what it is and held in check.

Logistic support requirements for missions of this type will

vary from scenario to scenario- however, the requirements are al-ways demanding, not so much in a quantitative sense but because

of the types of equipment that may be required. OPSEC require-ments dictate that routine supply channels be avoided and

exigencies of the mission require a supply priority code of thehighest order. During planning and training for the Son Tay raid,the unit supply section quickly became saturated with requestsand supply personnel had difficulty in reacting promptly tosudden equipment requirements. A dedicated, fully manned, cen-tralized supply section armed with blanket authority, preferablyin writing, is highly recommended. Another highly useful tech-nique is to have sufficient cash funds on hand to allow immediatepurchase in the local economy of items hard to find through nor-

mal supply channels.

Medical planning is a particularly important aspect of rescuemissions. As a general rule of thumb, casualties and hostagesshould be loaded on the first aircraft to leave, the objective loca-tion. At Entebbe, the Israelis used doctors and medical orderliestrained as combat troops to provide an on-the-scene emergency

31

F

Hostage Rec'ue Planning

medical capability. These personnel arrived On the second ot thefour C-130s to land at Entebbe. The doctors and orderlies wereable to treat the five civilian and four military casualties almostimmediately in that aircraft, which had been configured withoperating tables and full hospital equipment.

The planners for the Entebbe raid also positioned a similarlyconfigured C-135 aircraft at Nairobi. Kenya, for emergency treat-ment of an expected total of 85 casualties. In sum, medical plan-ning must include provision for on-the-spot treatment of woundsresulting from gunshots, explosives, anJ fire, as well as treaimentof shock and trauma. A surgical capability is highly recom-mended, especially where availability of aircraft permits an air-borne hospital for treatment while en route to permanent medicalfacilities.

Command, Control, and Communication

Thorough command, control, and communications planningfor hostage rescue operations is, like the element ofI surprise, abso-lutely critical to mission success. The ability to communicate bothwithin the assault force and to the command authorities is morethan essential. Even during the brief 10-year span of the fourrescue operations discussed in this paper, the impact of quantumtechnological advances in communications can be seen. In the SonTay raid, Colonel Simons and his men cirried 02 radios into theobjective area---almost as many as a standard infantrv battalionpossesses. The mission personnel were assessed as being able tocommunicate nearly 12 times better than the average soldier."During the Mlaague,'z crisis, the National Security Council knewof the Cambodians' firing on the Navv P-3 reconnaissance air-craft witHin 20 minutes of the incident. The Israelis used theirsecond C 135 as an airborne command post near Entebbe to pro-vide a communications link between the ground force commanderand na•ioina lvaders.

I )evelpIent t (I 'satellhte com In Uni(at ions has thrust us intowhat General T.R. Milton (US Air Force, retired) has described asthe era f ''I Iis-(eye-is-on-t he-sparrow" corninMand and control.`Key US polik vmakers have extended their command and (ontrol

Iand (omimunhations in various (rises down to the lowest

tactiz'al level. This situation might at tirnt seem undeirable to atactical co'mmander. BUt in a fast-breaking hostage crisis thepolitical authorities need to be in con,,tant (eCtiure, ( om; muni(.a-tion with the assaLlt force to relav the Iatewt diphlmati otr polit-ical developments and intelligence tindings,, or even to interveneand cancel the mission if necessarv. The ultimate responsibilityfor the success or failure of a hostage rescLue mis,,sion rests with thehighest political authority, not with the military,.

The principles of centralized command and control antidecentralized execution are eq tiallV valid for ho,,tagc res•cueoperations. The political leader ii nts- not attempt to make tact aladecisions for his asault torce commantder. resident Carterdecided to abort the Iranian resCuLe attemnpt onlv aflter thet senioirmilitary officer on the grotind at Desert One re,

I IostjgC RCLcue Planning

Lines of command during thewe operation, must be "tream-lined and relatively simple to in~ure unit%- of com mand. Thecommand lines for the Entebbe operation ran from the politic.al-ministerial crisis action team to the Chief ot Staft, Israel IDef.n-,eForces (Lieutenant General Mordechai Cur), and from G(eneralGur directly to the Task Force commander. with no interveningagencies.' This command and control structure tacilitated a po,.tical-militarv interface, increased information flow, and enhancedsecrecy.

During the Iranian crisis, the chain of command ran fromPresident Carter to the Secretary of Defense (Brown), to the ICSChairman (General Jones), to the Joint Task Force Commander(Major General Vaught). However, the Holloway Report foundthat from the Task Force Commander downward, commandchannels were "fuzzy" and less well defined in some areas, onlyimplied in others. Even among the planners and mission forces,who was in charge of what aspect of training and what mission re-sponsibility was not always readily apparent. Only 12 days betoremission execution, and for no apparent reason (although he hadrecent experience in Iran), a new deputy commander of the JointTask Force was designated. My point is that a sound organiza-tional structure is necessary, with clear and streamlined commandchannels that mission personnel reaJily understand. Plannersmust not allow rigid compartmentalization and OPSEC require-ments to interfere with or have an adverse effect on one of thebasic principles of war-unity of command.

The importance of both comprehensive mission briefings andfull tactical rehearsals cannot be overemphasized. To meetOPSEC requirements, the United States paid the price in prepara-tion for the Iranian rescue attempt. Planners for the operation de-cided that security requirements overrode the need for a full dressrehearsal involving all of the mission forces. Training exerciseswere performed by individual units at widely separatedlocations. Though an admittedly much smaller and less complexoperation, preparation for the Entebbe raid involved a completerehearsal by all the Israeli forces on the night before the actualoperation. Comprehensive, joint mission briefings, including atleast key personnel from all the units, are a planning imperative.

34

I htagtv Rle.,cuý I'PlanningThese briefings should take place as close as possible to the time olthe actual operation so they can include last-minute intelligence,final changes or refinements to plans and procedures, andevaluations of critical mission data such as weather and flight con-ditions. Coordination and communication should be continuousthroughout the planning cycle, but are especially critical for thefinal briefing before mission execution.

Both before and during the operation it,,clf, other than directverbal means can be used to further facilitate communication andcoordination. Planners can devise mission briefing and equipmentchecklists to ensure that no key mission area is left open to ques-tion and no critical item of equipment is left unchecked. Recogni-tion codes and light signals become important in areas whereradio communication must be kept to a minimum or engine noiseor rotor blast may inhibit direct verbal communication.

Personnel recognition is important, especially during nightoperations. During the Entebbe raid. Israeli forces wore whitehats (similar to US Navy caps) with brims down, enabling the per-sonnel to quickly identify one another in the dark and the confu-sion of the assault. 7 Each member of the assault force for the Iranattempt wore an American flag on the right shoulder of his assaultclothing, covered with tape to be removed before entering the em-bassy compound. This identification was primarily for the benefitof the hostages rather than the assault force personnel. Darknessand dust and noise from the C-130 engines and helicopter rotorblades made face-to-face communications on the ground at DesertOne during the out-loading operation all but impossible. Devicessuch as neon, color-coded arm bands might have aided in recogni-tion of key personnel and should be considered for use byplanners of similar operations in the future. Personal recognitiondevices would also help distinguish recovered hostages fromassault force personnel when personnel must be accounted for un-der conditions of duress.

Once the operation is completed, lessons learned need to becaptured and recorded as soon as possible. A record of past exper-ience is critical to the success of future operations. Special opera-tions personnel are as subject to the vagaries of the personnelsystem as the rest of the military community. Normal

35

Hostage Rescue Planning

personnel rotation and retirement will result in an inevitable cor-porate memory loss. Of immediate importance following a suc-cessful operation is the debriefing of both mission personnel andhostages as to the sensitive details of the operation and what mayand may not be discussed. Following the Entebbe raid, the Israelisdebriefed the hostages at an Israeli Air Force base before tlyingthem to Ben Gurion International Airport to face the media."•This type of planning forethought not only allowed Israeli missioncommanders an opportunity to protect sensitive operational tech-niques and procedures, but also permitted an occasion to leakstories for deception purposes.

Based on historical trends, a decrease in the number of inci-dents of hostage-taking and transnational terrorism is highly un-likely. Rather, an increase is likely. The United States presentlyhas 282 embassies and diplomatic posts staffed with almost 14,000Foreign Service personnel in 144 host countries around theworldf, To expect that terrorists will continue to actively targetthis population, as well as senior US military officers and govern-ment officials, is reasonable. Many nations, reeling under theimpact of their own internal terrorist threat, have formed organiccounterterrorist (CT) units to deal with the problem. Many havecalled for the formation of an biterniatioial counterterroristagency to deal with the global aspects of highly organized andstate-sponsored transnational terrorism. To my knowledge, thisorganization has yet to be formed. In the interim, however, na-tional CT units have joined together to exchange ideas and tech-niques for combating the problem.

The facts of the rescue missions discussed in this paper cryout for the formation of a US counterterrorist task force with aneffective crisis management structure, capable of respondingrapidly to terrorist incidents anywhere in the world. This forcewould require a multitude of capabilities, a high degree of re2adi-ness and training for selectively assigned personnel, and thefunding and equipment needed to carry out its mission. Suffice itto say, we have such a force. The days of the ad hoc unit, throwntogether to deal with a particular crisis, are over. Yet the basicproblems facing the military planner still remain.

36

Hostage Res•ue, Planning

I have touched upon numerous planning imperatives in thispaper. But I have only scratched the surface of the problems thatwill have to be overcome. Each scenario will be different and willdictate its own unique set of imperatives. Service parochialismwill continue to haunt the most joint of planning efforts as long asthe Services compete for scarce fiscal resources. The challenge tomilitary planners will be to put aside petty interservice rivalriesand take up the gauntlet thrown at our feet by the specter ot trans-national terrorism.

In my opinion, with the formation of these national CT or-ganizations we have reached a watershed in the fight against themalignant disease that is terrorism. Like cancer, however, terror-ism will be with us for some time to come. The hostage rescueoperation is but one stroke of the surgeon's knife. We must neverfail to try. In the words of Theodore Roosevelt,

Far better it is to dare mighty things, to win glorious tri-umphs, even though checkered by tailure, than to take rankwit!' those poor spirits who neither enjoy much nor ,uttermuch, because they live in the gray twilight that knows notvictory nor defeat .",

37

2

MARITIME THEATERNUCLEAR WARFARE:

MATCHING STRATEGY AND CAPABILITY

by

Raymond E. Thomas

d3

Commander Raymond E. Thomas, US Navy, is anaval aviator. He holds a Bachelor of Arts degree fromthe State University of New York at Oswego. He is theprospective commanding officer of Fighter AttackSquadron One Three Seven, to be commissioned in lulv1985. Commander Thomas is a 1084 graduate of theNational War College.

40

I

Maritime theater nuclear warfare (MTNW) between theUnited States and the Soviet Union is a subject of increasing con-cern in American strategic dialogue. This concern is centered onthe growing recognition that MTNW capability and strategy arecrucially important to the US Navy's ability to defeat the SovietUnion at sea. Ultimately, the success of the United States' overallnational warfighting strategy quite possibly hinges on the USNavy's capability to deter or win a nuclear conflict at sea.

The United States is now at a critical juncture in developingits naval force and formulating its strategy. The US Navy is in adifficult situation: it lacks the torce structure to achieve its statedobjectives. The first step in the renovation process is to recognize

the very real potential for lighting a naval conflict in the nucleararena. Because it lacks a comprehensive, pervasive oftensiveforce, the US Navy cannot choose the level ot hostility. Ananalysis of the US Navy's theater nuclear capability reveals signit-icant deficiencies when compared with Soviet capability and in-tentions.,

SOVIET CAPABILITY AND STRATEGY

Since World War 11, the Soviets have transformed their navyfrom a primarily defensive, coastal force to a modern, potentforce capable of projecting naval power and influence around theglobe. The Soviets' sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) force islarge and at the leading edge of technology, and it is a cornerstoneof Soviet global nuclear strategy. The conventional and theaternuclear warfare forces of the Soviet Navy are increasingly impres-sive in terms of size, capability, and usefulness in smaller scale

41

Maritime Theater Nuclear Capability

conflicts (below the "Armageddon" level). The Soviets have builta multifaceted conventional and theater nuclear force consistingot attack submarines, long-range strike aircraft, and surfacetorces employing well-engineered cruise missiles. This force istailored to counter and neutralize Western naval forces. Today,the Soviet Union possesses over 700 threat platforms capable oflaunching over 2,000 antiship, conventional or nuclear cruise mis-siles. The increase in sophistication and size of the Soviet forcecontinues.

The fundamental Soviet maritime strategy in a major super-power confrontation appears to be sea denial. Because thenuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) fleet is themost valuable component of Soviet naval forces, it will bedeployed where the full range of protective measures can protectit. Therefore, the SSBN fleet will launch SLBMs from within aprotected perimeter near the home waters of the Soviet Union.-Because of this strategy, the majority of Soviet surface units willbe assigned to protect Soviet SSBNs from Western attack sub-marines. As they approach the sea denial area, US and Alliedsurface naval forces will confront primarily cruise missile-firingsubmarines and long-range strike aircraft. At the same time, theSoviets will conduct a more limited but, nonetheless, formidablecampaign to interdict sea lines of communication (SLOC).primarily using attack submarines. Choke points will be con-trolled with mines, high-speed patrol boats, long-range aircraft,and land-based antiship missiles.'

Along with these strategic considerations, several opera-tional characteristics of the Soviet Navy are noteworthy. Soviet,ýurface and sI-'b,_urface unit, are not designed to sustain extendedhigh-tempo operations.' The Soviet Navy does not have a signifi-cant capability for replenishment and rearming at sea. Magazinesin major combatants are relatively small. In a major conflict,weapons stocks would be depleted quickly. Neither logisticsSupport capability nor equipment reliability appear to favor pro-tracted campaigns. Soviet naval strategy theretore stresses thenecessity of winning a short, decisive naval conflict.' Admiral(Corshkov's "battle of the first salvo' is the keynote of the Sovietstrategy.'

42

Maritime Theater Nudear Capability

Perhaps even more signiticantiv, the Soviet, do not viewdeterrence and escalation in the same light a, strategis,t, in theUnited States do. The Soviet military speaks of fighting and win-ning war at all levels, including the expectation that both ,ideswill eventually use nuclear weapons. Soviet commander, expecto be able to use the most elficient means at their disposal to w%*in aconflict with the Western nations. I)eploved Soviet units areassumed to carry a roughly equal mix ot conventional and nuclearweapons,, Sovie.t eOf orts to improve wartighting capability. acros,the lull range ot nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare indicatethat the Soviets are preparing to light and win contlicts at anylevel ot escalation.' In contrast to some US strategic thinking, itappears that the Soviets do not expect wartare to be conductedbelow certain prespecitied thresholds.."

US FORCE STRUCTURE AND COUNTERING

THE SOVIETS

The navies of the Western maritime nations (most -ignifi-cantly, the US Navy) match up well against only the lower levelsof Soviet naval capability and strategy. The US Navy, inparticular, places a large share of its maritime warfare capabilityin its potent "carrier battle groups" (CVBGs), centered primarilyaround 14 large-deck aircraft carriers. This US emphasis app