9780739143193

International Governance, Regimes, and Globalization

International Governance, Regimes, and GlobalizationCase Studies from Beijing and Taipei

Edited by Peter Kien-hong YU, W. Emily CHOW, and Shawn S.F. KAO

R OW M A N & L I T T L E F I E L D P U B L I S H E R S , I N C .Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK

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International governance, regimes, and globalization : case studies from Beijing and Taipei / edited by Peter Kien-hong YU, W. Emily CHOW, and Shawn S.F. KAO. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7391-4319-3 (cloth : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-7391-4321-6 (electronic)1. International organization—Case studies. 2. World government—Case studies. 3. China—Foreign relations—1976- 4. Taiwan—Foreign relations—1945- I. YU, Peter Kien-hong, 1953- II. CHOW, W. Emily, 1967- III. KAO, Shawn S. F., 1952- JZ1318.I5685 2010341.2—dc22 2009054085

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To all those people in the world who put scholarship (xueshu) in the first place

vii

Preface ix

1 International Governance and International Regimes 1Peter Kien-hong YU

2 Norms, Power, the Power of Norms, and Community: Essentials of International Governance 9James C. HSIUNG

3 Does Beijing Understand the Term “International Regimes”?: A Content Study 25Peter Kien-hong YU and W. Emily CHOW

4 Beijing’s Hegemony under International Relations and International Regimes 55Peter Kien-hong YU and Chun-chi CHIANG

5 Adaptation and Strategic Calculation: China’s Participation in International Regimes and Institutions 69Suisheng ZHAO

6 The PRC’s Governance Diplomacy in the Asia–Pacific Region 95Rosita Dellios

7 Governing the Taiwan Strait in a Globalizing World: Using Military and Nonmilitary Adversary Regimes as a Tool 107Shawn S. F. KAO and Peter Kien-hong YU

Contents

8 Globalization, East Asia, and the Future of Global Politics 141Richard W. Mansbach

9 Universality Claims and “Failures” across Cultures: Liberalism vs. Asian Values 181James C. HSIUNG

Index 205

About the Contributors 209

viii Contents

ix

Preface

In March 1999, the lead coeditor of this volume began to acquire knowledge on international regimes at the advice of his New York University (NYU) mentor, James C. HSIUNG, who in December 2005 suggested that in ten or fifteen years the study of international governance will proliferate by becoming the mainstream school of thought (see figure on page xii). Following the recent fall of Wall Street and the financial tsunami, there is reason to believe that the world needs more good, and better, governance—that is, international as well as domestic governance of banking and finance. This moral is bound to find echoes in the international relations literature.

In the first two years of studying regimes, the lead coeditor felt that he had absorbed 70 or 80 percent of what international regimes are all about. In May 2008, at a conference with the second coeditor, he suddenly realized that “international regimes” is merely a very abstract term. One can sense it right away, especially under urgency. Here, perhaps we can add the adjective, palpable. In other words, we need mechanism(s) and measure(s) to shore it up in order to maintain and/or sustain it.

In December 2008, the lead author came up with his own definition of international regimes: a set (or sets) of at least fifteen criteria/core elements/features (including those four as mentioned by Steven D. Krasner) in the contexts of (fragmented) issue-area, (fragmented) issue-areas, and issue-regimes. On this definition, Yale H. Ferguson, who contributed a brief essay on Global Governance for Sage Publications’ International Political Science Association’s Encyclopaedia of International Relations, in August 2009 said: “Best wishes with this!” In April 2009, the lead coeditor became confident that he has understood 99 percent of international regimes. It should be

noted that we cannot use the terms international regimes and international institutions interchangeably, because the former term always has a positive connotation, whereas the latter, depending on the context, may have negative connotation. To be consistent in logic, we cannot discuss nor apply two or more international regimes or issue-regimes at the same time, if they are at odds or clash against each other.

Yes, international/global governance along with international regimes will sooner or later replace Realism/neorealism as the mainstream school of thought in the foreseeable future. On July 8, 2009, State Councilor DAI Bingguo of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), who was attending the outreach session of the Group-Eight Summit on behalf of PRC president HU Jintao, attended the group meeting of leaders of the outreach five developing countries (O-5) in L’Aquila, Italy. DAI exchanged views with leaders present at the meeting on ways to enhance, for example, global economic governance.

For the first time, DAI said that global crisis could only be solved through international cooperation and that a balanced and sustainable development of world economy could only be achieved by strengthening and improving global governance. His remarks were echoed by French president Nicolas Sarkozy, who gave this remark the following day: “To global crisis we must respond with a reform of global governance.” We are excited, because we are on the right track since August 2003, if not earlier, and look forward to more academics in integrating, cultivating, and fertilizing the China studies and the international/global governance studies in the years to come.

The authors of this book are grateful to Joseph C. Parry, acquisitions editor of political science, international relations, and cultural studies at Lexington Books, for agreeing to publish this book, and to an anonymous reviewer, who suggested a new title for us: Globalization, Governance and Regimes: Beijing and Taipei’s Perspectives, as well as Jana M. Wilson and Tawnya Zengierski for editorial assistance throughout the publication.

This book is published in association with the One-dot Center for the Study of International Governance, Regimes, and Globalization (or Yidian Yanjiu Zhongxin in Mandarin Chinese) at Ming Chuan University (MCU), Taoyuan Campus, Taiwan Province, Republic of China (ROC), which was created in April 2007 by the lead coeditor. We are grateful to Win Join Book Company, Ltd., Ta Tong Book Company, Ltd., Knowledge Book Company, Ltd., and Green Po Book, Inc. for partially funding this book project. Chapters written by HSIUNG, Samuel S. ZHAO, Rosita Dellios, and Richard W. Mansbach respectively were presented at the March 2009 international conference, Taipei, Beijing, and the Overseas Chinese/Compatriots in the Context of International/global Governance, Regimes, and Globalization, which was cosponsored by the ROC’s Ministry of

x Preface

Foreign Affairs (MOFA), National Science Council (NSC)(ROC), Overseas Compatriots Affairs Commission (OCAC), Rutgers—the State University of New Jersey (U.S.), University of Denver (U.S.), National Cheng-chi University (NCCU), etc.

Peter K. H. YU, Swinburne University of Technology (Australia, Sarawak Campus)W. Emily CHOW, Ming Chuan University (ROC)Shawn S. F. KAO, Tunghai University (ROC)

Preface xi

1

1International Governance and International RegimesPeter Kien-hong YU

In December 2005, the lead coeditor’s mentor at New York University (NYU), James C. Hsiung, who is well versed in international relations, international law, international organizations, international institutions, and international regimes, predicted that international governance (as opposed to Realism, neorealism, liberalism, neoliberalism, Constructivism, and Marxism) will most likely become a mainstream school of thought in ten or fifteen years. In 2004, Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach’s book, Remapping Global Politics, suggest that the state is losing its capacity, legitimacy, and authority to remain the primary actor in world affairs and is being transformed into a more complex “postinternational universe” or postinternationalism charac-terized by diverse and overlapping polities. They perceive that neorealism will and ought to be replaced and that international regimes will become more important for two reasons—the proliferation of collective goods issues and the erosion of state capacity that makes it impossible for individual states or groups of them to cope with challenges to their well-being and prosperity.1 Accordingly, they revised the “maps” of global politics and explain the shift-ing and accelerating forces transforming them in an important contribution to the issues of globalization and the future of international relations theory. In September 2008, Harvard University (HU)’s Kennedy School of Govern-ment (KSG) launched a new program, which is called international and global governance.2 It should be noted that, in spring 2002, at the advice of Hsiung, I drafted a plan to set up a new Department of International Affairs (DIA) at Wenzao Ursuline College of Languages (WUCL) in Kaohsiung Mu-nicipal City, Taiwan Province, Republic of China (ROC), emphasizing inter-national/global governance and globalization. And, as early as August 2003, informally, and spring 2005, formally, the Graduate School of International

Affairs (GSIA) at Ming Chuan University (MCU) in the ROC began a pro-gram, which is called International/Global Governance in a Globalizing World. Notice that the GSIA used two adjectives, namely, international and global, which are quite different in usage, with the former being more fun-gible, such that it can be used to discuss bilateral and multilateral relations, while the latter cannot. We are confident that, with HU professors, armed with ample funding and prestige, more political scientists in general and theorists in particular, in the world would be attracted to the new school of thought and fertilize it.

Indeed, international/global governance has a very good chance of be-coming a new school of thought, if each academic and expert on interna-tional relations puts scholarship in the first place. To the lead coeditor of this book, scholarship means logic, contribution, preciseness in using words, closeness to reality, etc., in that order of importance.

If we do not write logically, how can we convince ourselves in the first place? For example, one United Kingdom–based academic defined global-ization as deterritorialization. My study of the same term is that it could be defined as territorialization. Later, I read a text, which says that globaliza-tion can be reterritorialization. Obviously, contradictions exist among the three terms. More importantly, if our words and deeds do not match, critics can easily find fault with us in general and politicians in particular, by pointing out our contradictions, unless we can be a second Barack H. Obama, II, who can overshadow his contradictions with his charisma. If we cannot make contributions to the literature, why should we (waste our time and energy to) write something? Needless to say, making substantial contri-butions is not easy. Often, with new findings or discovery, what once was considered a contribution becomes a falsified thing of the past, and is, therefore, useless. Choice of words, terms, etc., is also important. Precision is certainly called for whenever we write or say something, so that confu-sion will not beget confusion. Then comes the tough question: Is your writ-ing or analysis closer to reality, if we can have the truth? Here, choosing a better methodological approach and method becomes important. In other words, should it be dialectical or nondialectical?

If we are talking about, for instance, the ROC or, for that matter, People’s Republic of China (PRC), in December 1949, when China was politically divided, the central government on each side of the Taiwan Strait, indeed, was in control of most resources, tangible and intangible. For that reason, our unit of analysis just has to be the state, meaning a government or a politically organized body. Sometimes, we need only to focus on CHIANG Kai-shek or MAO Zedong, because they were in command of almost every-thing or they were the personification of the state and/or the party.

However, time has changed. The realists or, for that matter, the neo-realists, cannot just focus on, for example, a central government’s external behavior,

2 Peter Kien-hong YU

when they study international relations. It is state-centric, emphasizing power. With the rise of civil society at both national and international levels, international/global governance should be closer to reality, because we have to look at both the state/non-state-sponsored dimensions. For governance, we have to first mention state, to be followed by non-state, and for economy or business, it is the reverse, that is, non-state/state-sponsored. To be sure, there are a zillion words, terms, etc., which belong to the term, non-state, such as economy, business, class, or private think tank or foundation. After having identified the state and non-state, one can proceed to study, for ex-ample, political economy, which is very complicated and complex.

(Neo)liberalism basically focuses on market and contract. When people buy and sell something, they are in a market. If the volume is big, the buyer and seller have to sign a contract for mutual protection. Before goods and services can be delivered, banks, insurance companies, etc., are involved. Politics could follow that, hence the term, (international) political economy. In other words, politics is the superstructure of economics, or “what prevails in economy will ultimately prevail in politics.” In a sense, subscribes to this school of thought are Marxian. However, the study of international/global governance embraces the non-state sponsored dimension. Hence, it is broader than that of the (neo)liberalism school of thought.

Constructivism became popular since the early 1990s. It has pooled many theorists to the school. Two major concepts are often being mentioned: idea and ideal. The sentence which ought to be remembered is: It is all in your mind. Thus, Alexander Wendt said anarchy is what states make of it.3 In this connection, if we were in a Political Science class, whether or not the ROC is a country is of secondary importance. This is because, being a citizen or noncitizen of the ROC, it does not matter, so long as we can discuss or de-bate on it logically. However, if a ROC student or a ROC politician wants to visit a foreign country and he or she cannot get a visa (on time), then the question of whether the ROC is a country becomes a (big) concern. In August 2009, former ROC president, CHEN Shui-bian, as a desperate resort, made a bizarre move, suing Obama and U.S. secretary of defense Robert M. Gates, for failing to place Taiwan under their military occupation, which CHEN claims has continued since October 25, 1945. To be sure, the study of international/global governance also incorporates the study of idea, ideal, etc. For example, the United Nations (UN) model for good governance men-tions the following concepts:4 accountable, transparent, responsive, equita-ble and inclusive, consensus oriented, participatory, follows the rule of law, and effective and efficient. Some concepts are ideas and others, ideals. For instance, “follows the rule of law” is an ideal, because if we put it in context, can a grade or junior school student follow the rule of law, when he or she has a vague idea of what the law is? In short, Constructivism can be a part of international/global governance, broadly defined.

International Governance and International Regimes 3

One of Marxism’s main concepts is class struggle. In the eyes of Karl Marx, class comes before nation, country, or state or it is more important than other things. One class will inevitably replace the other, and this is the his-tory of human development, ending with Communism or Utopia. In September 2008, we witnessed a global economic crisis. Many state practices became socialist. However, the study of international/global governance can also embrace class study, by virtue of the term, non-state.

In sum, international/global governance can forcefully challenge those old schools of thought and even replace them as the mainstream school of thought, given time.

It should be noted that to fully understand international/global gover-nance, one must also understand international regimes. It is one of the most useful tools for those politicians and statesmen who want to govern the world. This book can help students to easily grasp the term, interna-tional regimes, in a short period of time. This is because scholars in the West did not give a fuller picture or a set of definitions of international regimes. Steven D. Krasner mentioned four core elements of an international regime, such as principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures plus that each regime has to do with an issue in a given area of international rela-tions, while Robert O. Keohane defined, for example, international regimes as islands of governance. An island is an example of an area. The four core elements as mentioned by Krasner are related to the term, governance. However, many, if not most, beginners in the East in general and China, Japan, and Korea in particular, cannot tell whether each regime has a posi-tive nature, benefiting all the countries, political and/or economic entities, and individuals like you and me. Throughout our study, the lead coeditor has mentioned at least fifteen (as opposed to Krasner’s four) core elements, by adding, for example, we are all on the same side; one for all and one for one (in the Daoist sense?); pan; transparency; no power struggle; mitigation of anarchy, etc.; community-centered arrangements. In short, the lead co-editor has made contribution to the understanding of international re-gimes, and his definition is: They have to do with a set (or sets) of at least fifteen criteria/core elements/features in the contexts of (fragmented) issue-area, (fragmented) issue-areas, and issue-regimes. In passing, it may well be noted that Mansbach was invited to make a critique of my definition: “I very much like your extension of the definition of international regimes though I would suggest that you try to conflate5 them somewhat as some may overlap others. Perhaps what you might do is illustrate how each is integral to understanding regimes by taking one regime and describing the relevance of each of your elements and how it clarifies the concept.”

The main focus of this book is on regimes, which are mainly related to Beijing and Taipei. The abstract of the second chapter as written by the author is: International governance relies equally on power and norms (i.e.,


international regimes and institutions), perhaps more on norms than coercive power, despite the fact that the latter is the only element that matters to the (neo)realists. If the structure of convergent expectations of decision-makers, created by regimes, can help cope with an international relations governance problem, it will render unnecessary any resort to coercive (or real) power.

The abstract of the third chapter is: In this study, we will conduct a thor-ough content analysis6 of both the Chinese and English versions of the white papers, which were published by the State Council (SC) of the PRC.7 The first one was made known to the public in November 1991, on the human rights in the Chinese mainland, and the sixty-second one was published in Septem-ber 2009, on the Development of Xinjiang and Progress. In the West, we often see the human rights regime. Beginning with the November 1995 white pa-per, China: Arms Control and Disarmament, did we see the word regime applied at the international level for the very first time. That white paper was also the first one dealing with military affairs.

Fourth chapter: Beijing has been regarded by some political observers as a hegemon, which has a negative connotation, under the term international relations. However, under international regimes, what it does can benefit all the countries, international organizations, and individuals like me. Arguably, it is with the latter that PRC president HU Jintao wanted to impress the UN leaders in September 2005 and September 2009, respectively.

Fifth chapter: This chapter attempts to explain mainland China’s turn from reluctance to active participation in international institutions since the end of the Cold War by examining Beijing’s adaptation to the evolving transnational norms associated with globalization; its strategic calculation in shaping the distribution of power in the international system; and the PRC’s evolving position on state sovereignty. It argues that the mainland’s participation in international institutions is first of all a function of Beijing’s growing involve-ment in the increasingly interdependent world and the PRC’s adaptation to the emerging transnational norms, such as cooperative development, human rights, and common security. Beijing’s turn to multilateralism is also part of its soft balancing strategy that relies on participation in international institu-tions and other diplomatic maneuvering to frustrate the U.S. unipolar inten-tion in the post–Cold War world. Although the Chinese Communist govern-ment has gradually moved from staunchly advocating state sovereignty to a more flexible one, state sovereignty remains a central concern in the PRC’s participation in international institutions. Beijing’s behavior in international institutions is thus guided by its consideration on the relevance of issue-areas. These institutions are set up to the PRC’s modernization and the ability to maximize its relative power and autonomy within these organizations.

Sixth chapter: Mainland China’s multilateralist behavior—or governance diplomacy in the pursuit of cooperative regionalism—will contribute to greater stability and less exclusion in regional affairs. Flexibility and infor-


mality are the hallmark of these efforts, as regional cooperation has tended to start with informal dialogue and then progress to practical projects. There is also an emphasis on process rather than results, leading to mutually constitutive relations. Correlative relationships are a feature of East Asian security thinking. Thus this chapter also explores the possible theoretical underpinnings of Beijing’s governance diplomacy and its regional context in terms of East Asian modalities of thought.

Seventh chapter: Periodically, there has been politicomilitary tension in the Taiwan Strait since the late 1940s. However, with the increasing ur-gency, insecurity, convergent expectation, and perception of creating inter-national regimes or Bicoastal Chinese regimes, as the context may be, such tension, (scientific) uncertainty, and mistrust can be mitigated to a considerable extent.

As the world is evolving, international governance, as opposed to rule, control, or command, of the Strait will apply more than ever. Whether the Taiwan Strait experience can be globalized to, for example, the Strait(s) of Malacca, will also be discussed.

Eighth chapter: This chapter identifies the different theoretical perspectives on globalization, addresses the key features of the process, and describes the impact of globalization on East Asia—China, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. It argues that globalization and localization are related phenomena and that East Asia, a major benefactor of the process, has successfully produced a “hy-brid” version of globalization. The chapter also addresses the likely conse-quences for globalization of the 2008–2009 economic and financial crisis and concludes that, although the crisis has created significant challenges to the process, globalization will persist. For East Asia, the 1997–1998 economic crisis was a foretaste of current difficulties, and continued globalization in the region then suggests that it will continue after the present crisis ends.

Ninth chapter: Governance can be related to the Confucian roots of the Asian values, a term also mentioned in Mansbach’s chapter and his 2007 coauthored book, Introduction to Global Politics. The author argued that “the ultimate root of the ‘failures’ of the universality claims of the Western key-stone ideas can be grasped only from a non-unilinear perspective on cul-tural traditions.”

In sum, the major finding of all findings is that there is a long way to go for both sides of the Taiwan Strait’s leaders to fully grasp what regimes are, as can be seen in almost all chapters.

NoTeS

1. Email from Richard W. Mansbach, dated March 18, 2009. 2. Unfortunately, its course listing did not mention the cutting-edge course “in-


ternational regimes.” 3. See Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It,” International Orga-

nization, vol. 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391–425. 4. www.unescap.org//huset/gg/goverance.htm. 5. “To bring together or to combine (as two readings of a text) into a composite

whole.” See www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/conflate, dated March 19, 2009.

6. For approaches of content analysis, see H. D. Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936) and The Structure and Function of Communication in Society (New York: Harper, 1948). See also K. Krippendorf, Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2004).

7. Promoting transparent governance of mainland China, improving public services, and safeguarding citizens’ rights to know, according to the head of the website, www.gov.cn began trials on October 1, 2005 and formal operation on January 1, 2006.


9

2Norms, Power, the Power of Norms, and Community: Essentials of International GovernanceJames C. HSIUNG

A TALe of Two PeRSPeCTIveS

International governance (IG) is more than a phenomenon,1 and a focus in the field of international relations (IR). It is, moreover, a perspective, in stark contrast to that of neorealism,2 which still dominates the IR litera-ture. In pedagogical terms, IG is concerned with the shaping or managing of some form of rule-based, often hierarchically ordered, relations in the international system, through the medium of institutions and following preset norms.

For its part, the neorealist perspective sees in the Westphalian structure3 a system of international politics, driven by conflict and oft-failed efforts at its resolution (witness the “Hundred Years’ War” over Palestine4). From its standpoint, neorealism sees states as the only actors that matter on the world scene. To the IG perspective, on the other hand, the Westphalian structure consists of a mixture of systems as are found in different issue ar-eas, such as trade, finance, development, environment, etc. And, in this view, states share the world stage with non-sovereign actors like interna-tional organizations or institutions (e.g., the likes of Group-7, and the Basel Committee overseeing the monetary regime), transnational corporations (TNCs), and even individuals like the Pope—other individual actors may include terrorists, drug traffickers, and mafia operatives.

It may not be an overexaggeration to suggest that the realists focus almost exclusively on power and its critical importance to the pursuit of national interest by means of self-help. By contrast, the IG perspective views power and norms as being mutually complementary and equally instrumental in furtherance of both the egoistic interests of individual states and the world

community’s broader concerns that transcend state egoism. In the protec-tion of the environment and of our ecosystem, for instance, no single state, no matter how powerful, can achieve the common goals without the col-laboration of other actors. Hence, collective help, often facilitated through international institutions and regimes, is needed to supplement unilateral self-help, in this as in other issue areas.

IG involves the setting of goals and priorities, and may entail the use of power to attain them. But use of power for these purposes may have to fol-low preset norms (or regimes5) and/or through the medium of institutions. Hence, IG depends on both power and norms. Yet, power may take various forms and, as we will see below, norms may also be a source of power in their own right, known as normative power.

vARIouS foRmS of PoweR: A TAxoNomy

In an elucidating volume they edited on power in global governance, Mi-chael Barnett and Raymond Duval (2006) offer a new conceptualization that captures different forms of power and demonstrate how these different forms connect and intersect in global governance. Below is a taxonomy of the four basic forms of power (pp. 2–4) that hold different significance for the two perspectives discussed above:

(a) Compulsory power, or power over others, is the ability to make B do X against its will. This is the kind of power, i.e., real (coercive) power, which commands the attention of the realists.

(b) Structural power concerns the constitution of social capacities and interests of actors in direct relation to one another, as reflected for example in a state’s percentage share (or stakes in) the world econ-omy. This is likewise a source of real power that rivets the realists’ attention.

(c) Institutional power inheres in the capacity of institutions to steer action in a certain direction, producing effects of international re-gimes or institutional arrangements.6

(d) Constitutive power7 shapes the conditions or terms of interaction between actors in their own behavior, in pursuit of their interests and ideals or in the conduct of their mutual relations. In short, it is largely associated with the power of norms.

Institutional power and constitutive power can be summed up as nor-mative power, in comparison with the real (coercive) power inherent in the (a) and (b) categories above. From the IG perspective, power is also associated with the legitimacy of particular governance arrangements:

10 James C. HSIUNG

who gets to participate, whose voice matters, and whose vote or say counts (ibid., p. 8; 185ff).

Two PReRequISITeS of IG

Two prerequisites must be met for IG to be feasible, namely: (i) That states realize they have vital common (shared) interests; and (ii) that there be collective capability to affect the setting of goals and priorities.

The modern consciousness that states share some vital common inter-ests devolved from two bodies of recent human experience. First, World War I drove home in human subconsciousness that peace is indivisible, thus anticipating the Wilsonian scheme of collective security in response. Second, the Great Depression of the 1930s taught the world’s nations that their own economic health and vitality was as much a matter of in-ternational as national concern. Hence, following the end of World War II, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for instance, was created as a lender of last resort, intended to preclude another such global disaster and conceived in the liberal economic theory of peace that underscored the Bretton Woods system as a whole and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization (WTO). The Bretton Woods institutions brought to an end the erstwhile unbridled national legal sovereignty over monetary matters (Simmons 2000: 599). And, the GATT internationalized a system of free trade, until it was globalized un-der WTO.

The liberal economic theory of peace is so-called because it expostulates that if the world’s markets (including financial markets) are kept open and unimpeded, nations will find it easier and less costly to obtain their needed resources from the markets than trying to secure them by resorting to the use of force (war), as in the past.8

Concededly, the IMF did not live up to its raison d’être in preventing the most recent financial tsunami from occurring. In fact, it proved helpless, even irrelevant, while the global financial system ran haywire, following the collapse of Wall Street in late 2008. Nor did the other institutions conceived in the same liberal economic theory of peace prove capable of saving the global economy from the meltdown triggered off by the financial disaster. However, the truth of the matter is that the present round of global eco-nomic catastrophe has, paradoxically, only heightened human awareness that all nations share critical common interests more than ever before in a globalized world, and that collective action is needed if a pareto-optimal bailout9 is to be worked out among nations. This realization demonstrates that collective help (rather than self-help), a typical concern of IG, is neces-sary and desirable.

Norms, Power, the Power of Norms, and Community 11

Despite their shared common interests, states nevertheless may find set-ting of goals and priorities—not to mention operationalizing a game plan for fostering pareto-optimality in the domain of their common interests—is more hazardous than meets the eye. The reasons are: (1) possible clash due to competing egoistic interests outside the specific domain of commonly shared interests, and (2) the fear of uneven gains (“It’s not whether we both gain, but who gains more.”). To the extent that some third party—qua col-lective decision-making mechanism—may be indispensable to the produc-tion of the desired collective goods, individual states may find relying on multilateral institutions preferable to unilateralism. This condition makes IG a workable option among nations.

NoRmS mAkING AND The GeNeRAL wILL of The woRLD CommuNITy

In discussing norms and their power, one rudimentary question is: Where do norms come from? Below, let us entertain a few modalities of norms making in the community of states and nonsovereign actors.

First, settled practice, or practice repeated by a sufficient number of states, is capable of creating customary norms binding on states, provided that (a) in repeating the same practice, states convey a sense of being bound (opinio juris), rather than out of expediency; and (b) that the number of states ac-cepting such practice is significant enough to represent a general will of the world community (opinio juris communis). Unlike customary norms, treaty norms are only binding on states parties to a given treaty. Hence, general international law is ultimately based on customary norms.

Second, when treaty norms are adopted by a significant number of other states not parties to a given treaty, then those norms can be said to have been absorbed into the body of customary norms, or general international law, binding on all nations—because the wide adoption as such reflects an opinio juris communis.

Thirdly, international institutions like the WTO, though themselves cre-ated by agreements reached by states, may create rules that are mandatory for its member states. When the constitutive treaty norms and institutional rules, like other relevant treaty and customary norms, are received into the domestic laws (often through enabling legislations) of states, the resultant enmeshing of supranational and domestic regimes epitomizes an ideal model of IG.

What makes this enmeshment of norms binding on states is no other than the general will of the community as conveyed by the express or im-plicit collective consent of states, through settled practice (custom) or treaty making. To the skeptics, let me stress that most institutions, once created by

12 James C. HSIUNG

the collective will of states, take on a life of their own in that they may cre-ate norms to be followed by member states and their instrumentalities (such as airline and shipping companies). Other than WTO mentioned above, another ready example is the International Civil Aviation Organiza-tion (ICAO). Created by treaty in 1947, the ICAO, based in Montreal, Canada, is charged with the functions of developing the principles and techniques of international civil aviation and fostering and developing in-ternational air transport, so as to ensure the safe and orderly growth of in-ternational civil aviation in the world. The rules and procedures laid down by ICAO, such as in regulating the use of air lanes, liaison between pilots and airport control towers, aviation safety and rescue, etc., are followed by all airline companies (qua instrumentalities of sovereign states) whose ve-hicles traverse the international air space. Even sovereign states themselves follow the rules and standards set by the ICAO—a nonsovereign interna-tional organization—in respect of how their immigration and customs fa-cilities operate in processing international arrivals at their airports.

In addition, ICAO drafts international air-law conventions for states and produces manuals for the guidance of states on many issues, including air-port and air navigation facility tariffs, aircraft emission standards, the eco-nomic regulation of air transport, and the setting of air fares and rates.10

In short, the norms instrumental to IG are not only made by states, but also by international governmental organizations (IGOs) such as ICAO and WTO. To the extent that they are complied with by states and their instru-mentalities, these norms command a peculiar power that is very different from the kind of real (coercive) power of exclusive concern to the realists.

In a section below, we will address more systematically the reasons why nations comply with norms (and regimes), including the ones made by nonsovereign institutions. At this point, I think it is necessary to answer a prior question inherent in the point made above about the general will of the community. The unavoidable question is: How do we know that a world community exists and that its general will prevails over the particular wills of individual states?

INDICATIoNS of The RISe of CommuNITy AS A SuPRANATIoNAL eNTITy

A few indications can serve to highlight the rise and prominence of the world community11 as a supranational identity, realist denials of its exis-tence notwithstanding.

(I) The first indication is the universal acceptance of the concept of jus cogens, or a body of peremptory norms recognized by the world community from which no state can derogate. Although it has long been part of general


international law,12 the concept received distinct attention during the con-clusion of the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties (1969),13 of which it was codified in two articles. Article 53, for one, provides:

A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. For purposes of the present convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recog-nized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subse-quent norm of general international law having the same character [empha-sis added]

Two points are worth noting: First, the “community of states” is explicitly spelled out as the source of authority supporting the sacrosanctity of jus cogens, whose nonderogability derives from its acceptance and recognition of the community. Second, as many as 108 states had become parties to the Convention as of May 2007, including almost all the major powers. The United States signed the Convention in 1970 and, although the Senate has yet to give its advice and consent for ratification, considers it a restatement of customary international law, hence binding on all states. It can thus be deduced that there is universal, or near-universal, acceptance of the exis-tence of a world community of states and, more important, that a jus cogens recognized by it transcends state egoism.

(II) Another indication in support of the premise of a world commu-nity, to whose general will all particular wills of states shall bend, is in the enunciation and rise of the precept of obligations erga omnes, following the Barcelona Traction case (1970). In a dictum in that case, the Interna-tional Court of Justice (ICJ) drew the distinction between the “obligations of a state towards the international community as a whole, and those aris-ing vis-à-vis another state in the field of diplomatic protection”14 (empha-ses added).

(III) Still another indication of the rise of community is the wide prac-tice of actio popularis, as in the European community and within the much larger WTO with a membership of 153 plus 30 observers. The pre-cept actio popularis, of Roman law origin, is like the right of a private citi-zen making a resident’s arrest “in vindication of public interest.” Among states parties to the European human rights convention, a nonvictim state may file a complaint to the European Human Rights Court, against the government of another state for violations of the convention. In like fashion, within the WTO, a member state may bring a complaint to WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body that a fellow member state has violated WTO rules, even when the complainant is not a victim. In both cases, the complaints filed by nonvictims are known as acts “in vindication of com-munity interests.”15

14 James C. HSIUNG

The fact that WTO rules trump domestic laws of member states, just as the community’s will (i.e., systemic values, norms) is often converted into domestic laws and serves as a constraint on domestic whims, provides evi-dence of a workable IG structure.

PoweR of NoRmS: myTh & ReALITy

A test of the power of norms invariably lies in their enforcement or compli-ance record. Realists, and others relying on pure intuition, may have legiti-mate doubts in view of the lack of a central enforcement agency for inter-national norms (i.e., international law, in general). In the lack of reliable statistical studies of the compliance record of nations in history, conven-tional wisdom holds that norms are honored more by their breach than by their enforcement. In one of the most influential theoretical works on norm compliance in the post–Cold War era, however, Abram Chayes and Antonia Chayes (1995) hypothesized a propensity for states to comply, rather than not, with international obligations. It is only infrequently, according to them, that states are found willfully flouting international norms.

One authoritative study of the compliance record of WTO member states with its dispute settlement mechanism (DSB) awards16 may provide empirical support for the Chay and Chay thesis. In proximately 90 percent of the adopted “reports” (read: awards) of the DSB panels, one or more violations of WTO obligations have been found by panels and/or the Ap-pellate Body. In virtually all of the cases the WTO member found to be in violation has indicated its intention to bring itself into compliance, and the record indicates that in most cases it has already done so (Wilson 2007: 397–403).17

Below, we will zero in on two actual cases demonstrating norms- compliance behavior of two states as far apart as a “rogue state” (Libya), in one, and the sole post–Cold War superpower (the U.S.), in the other. We will do so because the power of norms can be ascertained from the effects they produce when they are enforced (or complied with), just as the effect of tree leaves fluttering in the wind can be traced to the power of the winds blowing. But, before we do that, we may pause to ponder the question why most states comply with international norms in most cases.

In fact, most states comply with international norms or the dictates of international institutions for reasons having little to do with fears of sanc-tion. In the absence of a central enforcement agency in our anarchical sys-tem (i.e., without a world government), states’ compliance with norms de-pends on both the power of norms and their own considered self-interests. A combination of both these factors yields the following rationales for com-pliance with international norms by states:18


(a) The utility of norms—that they are useful in bringing about solutions.(b) Reciprocity. An example: Despite his initial objection, President

George W. Bush finally accepted the view that the al-Qaeda and Taliban captives on trial at the U.S. base at Guantanamo Bay were not just “killers,” as they had called them, but prisoners of war en-titled to POW treatment required by the 1949 Geneva conventions (e.g., no torture, no coerced confession, etc.). He relented because Secretary of State Colin Powell, with prompting from the State De-partment Legal Advisor’s Office, convincingly argued that U.S. denial of POW treatment to these alien captured combatants might set a precedent for other states in treating captured American GIs as just “killers,” likewise denied POW treatment.

(c) Habit-driven behavior, which may have begun as rule-driven be-havior.

(d) Compliance may strengthen one’s sense of rectitude and moral authority, which in turn commands respect and influence in IR. Just witness the decline of U.S. moral authority under George Bush, and loss of U.S. influence among its allies and throughout the world.

(e) Peer pressures. European Union (EU) peer pressures may not have had much effect on George Bush on the issue of climate change, but they certainly anticipated a change of policy from his successor, President Barack Obama, who has indicated an intention to seek a replacement for the Kyoto Protocol that Bush scratched.

But a more important additional reason, from the IG perspective, is that violations run the risk of touching off uncontrollable processes leading to the disintegration or collapse of the very institution, or the undoing of the very norms, whose overall worth greatly exceeds any benefits that might be gained from their violations (Young 1984: 74). In rational choice terms, if the cost of violations exceeds that of compliance, a powerful in-centive is provided for states to comply with international norms. Cumu-lative effects of similar calculations will build up a compliance record leading toward patterned regularity, or order, in IR. This in turn will strengthen the shared sense of community among its component parts (states), conducive to IG.

Fears of the undoing (dismantling, or marginalizing) of key norms, such as sovereignty, the cornerstone of the anarchic system—in which a state is left to its own means for the defense of its survival and vital interests—may prompt states to rally together in defense of these cardinal norms. They will do so either unilaterally or more often by collective action. The United States, for example, acts unilaterally in combating drug trafficking in Cen-tral America in defense of its national self-interests. But, in the Desert Storm

16 James C. HSIUNG

operation, 1991, the United States was acting in league with other states, under authorization from the UN Security Council, for the defense of Ku-wait’s sovereignty, the a priori norm of the Westphalian system, and its de-rived norms (i.e., territorial integrity and political independence).

To sum up, coercive real power was used in these cases, in defense of ei-ther a state’s self-interests or the norms of the world community. But, what led to the decision to use coercive real power was, ultimately, traceable to the power of norms, including the norms that defined national interests. Hence, the linkage between power and norms is typical of a model of IG. Herein lies the symbiosis of realism and legalism (F. Kratochwil cited in Byers 2000: 37).

PoweR of NoRmS: how NoRmS CoNDuCe To oRDeR AND JuSTICe

From a realist’s point of view, order is impossible to achieve (because of the uneven gains problem, among other things), and justice is a myth at best. But order and justice are of special concern to students of IG, to whom both are possible by dint of norms (regimes) and institutions. In the absence of norms, states would have two options to follow. They either (a) have to adjust their own conduct to the behavior of other states, very much like drivers “ne-gotiate” their way through a blackout that has knocked out all traffic lights—hence playing a coordination game, or (b) try to push their way as far as their power (plus the tolerance of other states) would allow—hence, a game of the bully. With norms in place, however, it is as though the world had an invisible umpire to insure that the players play by the rules of the game. And institu-tions (such as the UN Security Council, the European Commission, or inter-national tribunals19) can act as an impersonalized authority overseeing the norms compliance record of states—and blows the whistle on the violators of the rules of the game.

In our anarchical system, the extent of enforcement invariably depends largely on how interdependent, and integrated, the international commu-nity is. While self-help is a primitive means of enforcement in a less inte-grated system, greater integration means greater assurance of enforced compliance. One telling example is the outcome of an arbitration case known as Texaco Overseas Petroleum (TOP) v. Arab Republic of Libya (1977). In that case, the arbitral tribunal awarded a huge sum of compensation to be paid to the U.S. firm (TOP Co.) by the Libyan Republic for breach of contract. Despite its stigma as one of the “rogue states” on Washington’s list, Libya under Col. Muammar Qaddafi nevertheless paid the required amount. The reason was that Libya happens to be a party to the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards.20


Under this treaty, each contracting party is committed to enforce arbitral awards made within the territory of any of the other contracting parties. Since Libya had assets in many of the 127 states parties to the Convention, any one of these states, in enforcing the arbitral award, may sequester and attach Libya’s assets found within its jurisdiction, to satisfy the arbitral award won by the U.S. oil company. After initial hesitation, Libya chose to pay the compensation in full, because doing so was more palatable than running the risk of having its vast assets frozen and attached by any one of the 127 contracting states bent on enforcing the arbitral award pursuant to the 1958 Convention.

Both the extensive Libyan assets in foreign countries and the vast number (127) of states that became contracting parties to the 1958 New York Con-vention testify to the close interdependence, and hence integration, of the contemporary world community. The extensive Libyan overseas assets were, in effect, the community’s leverage to ensure enforced compliance with its collective norms.

Another example demonstrating the power of norms involved the United States vis-à-vis a North Korean freighter, in December 2002. The ship was en route to Yemen when it was captured by the Spanish navy, as part of the NATO forces. Both U.S. and Spanish officials said the ship was sailing with-out a flag, its identification markings obscured by paint. A search of the ship turned up, under bags of cement, fifteen complete Scud missiles, with con-ventional, high-explosive warheads, and twenty-three tanks of nitric acid (a potential chemical weapon).

Despite Washington’s initial intent to have the cargo confiscated, Presi-dent Bush, however reluctantly, had to order release of the ship, after Ye-men’s president, Abdullah Saleh, told Vice President Dick Cheney by phone that the United States had no right under regimes of international law to seize weapons he had legally purchased. Realists may assert that the eventual release was due to considerations of Yemen’s strategic position in the Middle East and its cooperation with the United States in the antiterror campaign. But, White House spokesman, Ari Fleischer, flatly told reporters that “we have looked at this matter thoroughly, and there is no provision under inter-national law prohibiting Yemen from accepting delivery of missiles from North Korea” (New York Times, 12 December 2002, A1; emphasis added).

Neither North Korea nor Yemen is a party to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR); hence the sale of Scuds (nuclear-capable mis-siles) by North Korea to Yemen did not violate any international norms. The freighter’s anonymity, obviously intended to avoid discovery, would only make it a stateless vessel, something analogous to a pirate ship. As such, under the regime of maritime law, it was susceptible to temporary seizure, pending full search, as was done by the Spanish navy at U.S. be-hest. Following that, and after consulting all available norms of law, the

18 James C. HSIUNG

Bush administration, for all its sworn determination to rely on unilateral self-help in dealing with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), had no justifiable recourse but to release the North Korean vessel with its cargo destined to Yemen unhampered.21

In brief, what saved the North Korean ship and its WMD cargo was nei-ther the Pyongyang regime nor Yemen’s president, but the power of norms, or, to put it differently, the failure of the United States to find any extant norms that would support its intent to confiscate the cargo on the North Korean ship or else to show that Yemen’s acceptance of the cargo would be illegal. This predicament faced by Washington—the shorthand for which is “no norms, no power”—is another way illustrating the power of norms. With all its reputation for its noncompliance with international law (Beres 1987), the U.S.’s backing down in this instance for the reasons that Ari Fleischer, the White House spokesman, gave above, is all the more elucidat-ing as an evidence of the power of norms. The lesson for the United States from the North Korean case is, to reiterate: no norms, no power.

LINkAGe PoLITICS AND CLASh BeTweeN ReGImeS

One way to discern the power of international norms is to note how they impact on domestic policy debates. Linkage politics is a term referring to this impact. Cortell and Davis (1996) point out that politicians and bureau-crats often invoke international norms to justify their position or actions and, conversely, to question the legitimacy of those of their opponents. Furthermore, international norms may be incorporated into domestic laws, hence implemented by a sovereign state within its territories. A ready ex-ample is the reception of GATT/WTO rules into U.S. trade laws. Another example is the incorporation of the daily allowance minimum set by the Social Security (minimum standards) Convention, sponsored by the Inter-national Labor Organization (ILO), into Sweden’s 1973 Unemployment Insurance Act (p. 453f).

As norms have power, what if norms established in different issue areas should have different provisions that do not agree, thus presenting a prob-lem known as clash of norms/regimes. In that circumstance, states will be prevented from implementing, in full or in part, the norms so locked in a clash. For instance, in a report issued in late 2000, the Geneva-based ILO, found objectionable the practice of corvee labor engaged in by the govern-ment of Myanmar (formerly Burma), forcing villagers to do unpaid con-struction work. It called for sanctions by the organization’s 175 member states. Initially, the EU, the United States, and many other countries indi-cated that they would impose sanctions against Myanmar over the unsa-vory practice. But, a subsequent report by ILO, the following year, failed to


identify a single country that had responded to its call with any concrete action (New York Times, 5 June 2001: W-1).

The reason, it turned out, was that Myanmar is a member of the WTO, and sanctions by fellow member states—like a ban on textile exports—would run the risk of violating WTO rules. Nearly all major powers in a position to enforce sanctions with a sting, such as EU, the United States, and other states, are all fellow WTO members. Besides, a member state practicing corvee labor violates no WTO rules, which pertain to the gover-nance of trade, not labor, issues. Thus, despite ILO’s strong objection to Myanmar’s unpaid labor practice, the country’s trade with both EU and the United States only soared in recent years. And, Japan even announced the largest aid package to Myanmar for all its suppression of pro-democracy demonstrations for over a decade.22

The Myanmar case attests to a clash between two regimes, labor protec-tion vs. free trade. Beneath the surface, the case concretely illustrates the power of one regime canceling out the power of another, contrary to the reading by the uninitiated that norms have no power.

CoNCLuSIoN

The bottom line to the discussions above is that IG relies equally on power and norms (i.e., regimes and institutions), perhaps more on norms than coercive power, despite the fact that the latter is the only element that mat-ters to the realists. If the structure of convergent expectations of decision-makers, created by regimes, can help cope with an IR governance problem, it will render unnecessary any resort to coercive (or real) power.

When two regimes clash, such as in the case surrounding Myanmar, the vast coercive power available to the United States, EU, and other states proved to be to no avail, because they find their hands tied by the norms (i.e., WTO rules) that shielded Myanmar from sanctions called for by norms originating from another source (ILO). In this clash of regimes situation, the mere fact that the most powerful states found their real power irrelevant, indirectly but eloquently, verified the effect of the power of norms, namely the WTO rules, binding on its members.

Questions like this, and others alluded to above, are either of no con-cern to realists or cannot be explained from their frame of reference. These questions can only be properly explored, and comprehended, in light of the IG concerns for norms, power of norms, and the role of the commu-nity, besides real power, all of which provides a well-rounded imagery of the IR reality that we study. Hence, the IG paradigm complements the partial imagery presented by the realists in their international–politics paradigm.

20 James C. HSIUNG

NoTeS

1. By phenomenon, I mean a reality, a situation, or an event; it is shorthand for what is happening in the real world we study.

2. Neorealism, or structural realism, is an updated version of realist theory that sees interest as power, or national interest as the pursuit (and balance) of power, by adding the power distribution pattern (structure) across the Westphalian system of states that we live in. It holds that states are not atomic but positional, and that power distribution determines the behavior of states in their mutual relations. See basically Waltz (1979).

3. The Westphalian structure refers to the modern multi-state system we live in, so-called because its origins date back to the Westphalia Conference of 1648, which ended the Thirty Years War, and the era of imperial or ecclesiastic order.

4. Students of international politics often generalize from the conflict over Pal-estine as an epitome of world politics. Cf. “The Arabs and Israel: The Hundred Years’ War,” Economist, January 10, 2009: 9–10.

5. A regime consists of norms, but includes principles, rules, procedures and, hence, a structure of convergent expectations of decision-makers. A set of norms may also be called regime, for short.

6. “Conditionality” in a World Bank loan agreement is an example of an insti-tutional arrangement, as distinct from a regime.

7. I have modified the original term “productive power” used by Barnett and Duvall (2006) to read “constitutive power,” so as to avoid confusion with the power to produce (manufacture) goods and services.

8. For an exposition of this theory, see Keohane and Nye (1977: 28); Robert Tucker (1977: 74–175); and Robert Gilpin (1976: 227).

9. A pareto-optimal bailout is one that will bring remedies to the global economy in which no state is worse off than others or worse off than before the bailout.

10. These and other details can be obtained from the ICAO Journal, published ten times a year, the information memoranda (booklets), and Annual Reports, is-sued by the organization.

11. Hedley Bull (1977), as does the English School as a whole, preferred to use “international society” for what “world community” connotes here. For a discussion of the implications of “international community,” and abuse of the term in official documents, see Kwakwa (2003).

12. In Europe, it was known as ordre public international (Schwarzenberger 1965: 100–103).

13. 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, reproduced in 8 ILM 679; see discussion in Byers (1999: 195–203).

14. 1970 I.C.J. Reports 3; see discussion in Ragazzi (1997: 210–214).15. See Hsiung (2008: 32–36).16. When a complaint is brought before the DSB, a panel will be constituted if

the disputants cannot reach reconciliation within a specified period, to hear their arguments. The panel will issue a “report,” which if adopted by the DSB (hence an “adopted report”) will be presented to the losing party. The latter has thirty days in which to comply or appeal to the standing Appellate Body.


17. Author Bruce Wilson is Director, Legal Affairs Division, WTO Secretariat, Geneva. Email: [email protected].

18. Cf. generally Henkin (1968), and Byers (1999). 19. International tribunals, used here, denotes the roles that can be played by the

International Court of Justice, the European Court of Justice, the WTO Dispute Settlement Board, and the appropriate arbitral tribunals that have jurisdiction in given cases.

20. 330 U.N.T.S. 38; 21 U.S.T. 2517; T.I.A.S., No. 6997; done at New York, June 10, 1958; entered into force on June 7, 1959.

21. “Bush Administration Reluctantly Clears Cargo of Scud Missiles for Delivery to Yemen,” New York Times, 12 December 2002, 24.

22. “Myanmar Tests Resolve of I.L.O. on Enforcing Standards,” New York Times, June 5, 2001, page W-1.

RefeReNCeS

Barnett, Michael and Raymond Duvall. 2006. Power in Global Governance. Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press.

Beres, Louis Rene. 1987. America Outside the World. Lexington, MS: D.C. Heath & Co.

Bull, Hedley. 1977 [reissued in 1995]. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press.

Byers, Michael. 1999. Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

_______. 2000. The Role of Law in International Politics. Cambridge: Oxford University Press.

Byers, Michael and Georg Nolte. 2003. United States Hegemony and the Foundation of International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chayes, Abram and Antonia Chayes. 1995. The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Cortell, Andrew and James C. Davis, Jr. 1996. “How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 40, no. 4: 451–478.

Gilpin, Robert. 1976. U.S. Power and the Multilateral Corporations. London: Macmillan.Henkin, Louis. 1968. How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy. New York: Praeger.Hsiung, James C. 2008. “Re-thinking International Relations Theory: An Interna-

tional Governance Perspective,” published electronically in The One-Dot Center Occasional Papers Series in International Governance, Regimes, and Globalization, no. 1 (April).

Keohane, Robert and Joseph Nye. 1977. Power and Interdependence. Boston: Little, Brown.

Kwakwa, Edward. 2003. “The International Community, International Law, and the United States: Three in One, Two Against One, or One and the Same?” in Byers and Nolte, 2003.

Ragazzi, Maurizio. 1997 [reprinted in 2002]. The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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Schwarzenberger, Georg. 1965. The Inductive Approach to International Law. Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications.

Simmons, Beth. 2000. “The Legalization of Monetary Affairs,” International Organization, vol. 54, no. 3 (Summer). Special issue on Legalization and World Politics.

Tucker, Robert W. 1977. The Inequality of States. London: Robertson.Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. Reading, MS: Addison-Wesley. Wilson, Bruce. 2007. “Compliance by WTO Members with Adverse WTO Dispute

Settlement Rulings: The Record to Date,” Journal of International Economic Law, vol. 10, no. 2.

Young, Oran. 1984. International Cooperation. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.


25

3Does Beijing Understand the Term “International Regimes”?: A Content StudyPeter Kien-hong YU and W. Emily CHOW

China has more than twenty neighbors that either border on its territory or lie across the nearby seas and oceans.1 In October 2007, it, while still nego-tiating with the Republic of India (ROI) and Kingdom of Bhutan (KOB), has signed land border treaties or agreements with the Union of Myanmar (UOM) and eleven other neighboring countries, thus demarcating 90 per-cent of its 22,000 kilometers (km) land border and resolving national boundary issues left from history with these countries. In October 2008, Beijing and Hanoi, in a joint statement, said they have agreed to consult on finding “a proper area and way of making joint exploration” and “[t]he two countries will coordinate more closely to solve the remaining problems, so as to ensure they complete demarcation and erecting land makers along the whole borderline by year end.”2 Indeed, they had done that in December 2008, and, in February 2009, Beijing and Hanoi marked the final demarca-tion of their land border at the Youyiguan border gate in Pingxiang City in south China’s Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region (GZAR).

In passing, it should be noted that, starting from the year 1991, Beijing has been systematically cleaning up the treaties with foreign countries, so as to clarify the validity of the treaties, resolving the state of uncertainty of the validity of the treaties and to promote the development of closer ties be-tween the mainland and the relevant countries.

To be sure, there were many concepts very foreign to the Chinese, such as anarchy, international law, sovereignty, capitalism, etc., until the Opium War in the mid-nineteenth century. In the last few decades, the term, inter-national regimes (IR), has also troubled the Chinese. The Chinese main-land (neidi) [as opposed to mainland China which incorporated the Xiang-gang (Hongkong) Special Administration Region (SAR) and the Macao

SAR] academics and experts began to conduct in-depth and large quantity studies of IR only in the mid-1990s.

In this chapter, we will conduct a thorough content study3 of both Chi-nese and English versions of the white papers as published by the State Council (SC) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).4 The first one was made known to the public in November 1991, on the human rights on the Chinese mainland, and the sixty-third one was published in September 2009, on China’s Ethnic Policy and Common Prosperity and Development of All Ethnic Groups. Beginning with the November 1995 white paper, China: Arms Control and Disarmament, we see the word, regime, applied at the international level for the very first time. That white paper was also the first one dealing with military affairs.

The main purpose of this research and study is to see whether the term, IR, has been mentioned in these official documents of the SC. If so, in what context was the term used? If not, what are some of the reasons? By con-ducting a content study, we can have a better idea as to whether the PRC fully understands the term, IR, which was first coined by the West. This is important, because the Republic of China (ROC) must know it, in order to properly interact with the PRC, if not the West. However, a preliminary survey suggests that many, if not most, academics and experts as well as government officials in the PRC do not fully understand the IR.

whAT ARe INTeRNATIoNAL ReGImeS?

According to Stephen D. Krasner, who treated regimes as an intervening vari-able, in his 1983 edited book, International Regimes, “[r]egimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms,5 rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of in-ternational relations.” Within this framework, the core element, principles, is defined as “beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude”; norms are “standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations”; rules are “specific pre-scriptions or proscriptions for action”; and decision-making procedures are “prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.”

To be sure, there should be more criteria/core elements/features, if we want to fully understand IR. IR can be defined as a set (or sets) of at least fifteen criteria in the contexts of (fragmented) issue-area, (fragmented) is-sue-areas, or issue-regimes: 1) It must be remembered that the word “re-gime” at the international level is always positive to begin with, beneficial to all the countries, political and/or economic entities, and individuals like you and me, whereas the same word at the national or domestic level is usually negative; 2) principles; 3) norms; 4) rules; 5) decision-making pro-cedures; 6) pan; 7) we are all on the same side; 8) one for all, all for one (in

26 Peter Kien-hong YU and W. Emily CHOW

the Daoist sense?),6 as opposed to collective security’s one for all and all for one;7 9) community-centered arrangement(s); 10) cooperation; 11) coordi-nation; 12) avoidance of mutually damaging outcomes;8 13) no power struggle; 14) transparency; and 15) each regime can mitigate anarchy, ten-sion, (scientific) uncertainty, and mistrust.

IR are attractive to power-oriented realists and neorealists, who agree that, although nations, countries, and states are still the mainstream in in-ternational society, there is a decline or eclipse of them in the Westphalian system, and to those academics and experts who are either proponents of law/market-oriented liberalism or idea/ideal-oriented constructivism.

Regime should be understood both at the national and international levels. Beijing calls itself the central government or, later on, the central people’s government [at least in one of the white papers, the Communist Party of China (CPC) refers to itself as a ruling party]. The mainland fully understands that, at the national level, the word in English has a negative connotation. Thus, for example in the Human Rights in China dated Novem-ber 1991, the term, successive regimes in old China, has been used. In the September 1992 Tibet9—Its Ownership and Human Rights Situation, we see the following sentence: “The regime of the Mongol Khanate changed its ti-tle to Yuan [italics added] in 1271 and unified the whole of China in 1279, establishing a central government. . . .” In the Human Rights in China (No-vember 1991), another term, the Kuomintang (KMT) reactionary rule (or CHIANG Kai-shek’s reactionary rule) or the reactionary rule of the warlords, was also used. In the August 1992 Criminal Reform in China, the puppet Manchuria regime was criticized. In the Tibet—Its Ownership and Human Rights Situation, dated September 1992, we see the term, the Dalai Lama clique. And The Development of Tibetan Culture said, “Tibet later became a local regime practicing a system of feudal serfdom under a theocracy, and ruled by a few upper-class monks and nobles.” In the February 2005 Re-gional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities in China, we see the following sentence: “Almost all the central authorities of the feudal dynasties adopted a policy of ‘rule by custom’ toward the ethnic minorities.” Here, the Chinese charac-ters for central authorities is zhongyangzhengquan. To be sure, zhengquan could also be translated as regime at the national level. And, the Chinese characters for “rule by custom” are yinsuerzhi. Zhi (or tongzhi) refers to the word, rule. And, in the September 2008 white paper on the protection and development of Tibetan culture, we see the term, religious regime (zhidu), which is associated with adjectives like decadent and outdated.

We will list some of the important regimes mentioned in literature of the West. Some of the regimes include: the diplomatic regime;10 the global ocean regime; the deep seabed regime; the outer space regime; the (na-tional) security regime; the (human) security regime; the antiwar regime; the arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation regime; the counter-

Does Beijing Understand the Term “International Regimes”? 27

terrorism regime; the counterpiracy regime; the human rights regime; the international protection regime; the international business policy regime; the foreign aid regime; the barrier-reduction trade and commerce regime; the import/export regime; the free and fair international trade of carbon storage services regime; the import/export regime; the banana regime; the foreign investment regime; the foreign exchange/flexible exchange rate re-gime; the global refugee regime; the antimoney launderers regime; the en-vironmental regime; the intellectual property regime; the international telecommunications regime; the whaling/panda protection regime, etc.

Some Caveats

In November 1991, the first white paper was published. Up to September 2009, sixty-three white papers had been published in English and nine of them are specifically related to human rights, including the April 2005 China’s Progress in Human Rights in 2004.11

We will first point out some caveats. First, given the complexity of differ-ent topics, problems, and issues, it is not possible for one official or expert to write all the papers. What this does imply is that at least one of the of-ficials and experts should understand IR.

Second, it is also not possible for one translator to translate all the pa-pers. This means that some words, terms, etc., could be interpreted (slightly) differently by different translators. In the November 1991 white paper on human rights, we see the following sentence: “There is now a change over the world pattern (geju) from the old to the new, and the world is more turbulent than before.” Yet, in the December 1995 white paper on human rights, the following sentence was written: “At present the world is in a his-torical era when a new century is coming and old world patterns are being replaced by new ones.”

Third, the white papers were first written in Chinese, and, later, they were translated into English from Chinese. It is doubtful that the officials and experts who first drafted each white paper are well versed in international relations. For this reason, the choice of words or terms they use may differ. For example, in Section XI of the September 1992 white paper on Tibet, the following phrase can be seen: “assigning responsibility to those who created pollution to clearing it. . . .” However, in the Chinese version, we see the Chinese characters, zhili, which means govern. The June 2006 white paper on environmental protection, we see Section III’s title: Pollution Control12 in Key Regions (zhongdiandiquwuranzhili). Section IX said that the country has organized and conducted the national key “water pollution control tech-nology and treatment project.” For the term “treatment project,” the Chinese characters are: zhiligongcheng. Zhili, again, is govern. However, in the English version, we do not see the word, govern. As early as the mid-1980s, local


cadres used the term, zhili, when they tried to analyze the environmental problems in their xiang (township). As a second example, in the October 15, 2007 edition of Jiefangjunbao (Liberation Army Daily) on page 2, zhiguoli-zheng has been mentioned, and in the October 16, 2007 edition of the same newspaper on page 3, shehuizhianzonghezhili has been mentioned. The for-mer applies to governance at the national level, emphasizing the country and administration/politics, and the latter has to do with comprehensive governance related to security and order in the society.13 As a third example, we see in the September 1992 white paper the following sentence: “some undesirable environment problems do sometimes arise.” However, in the Chinese version, we do not see the translation for the word, problems. The opposite is also true. In the English translation, we see the word, govern. However, the Chinese version does not have the two Chinese characters. For example, in the March 2004 white paper, Progress in China’s Human Rights in 2003, the Chinese characters for “governing the country for the people” are: zhizhengweimin. The Chinese characters for “the concept of governing the country” are: zhiguolinian. And the Chinese characters for “an idea and value of the party and government regarding its governance and administration” are: danghanzhengfuzhizhengxingzhengdelinianhanjiazhi. In The Development of China’s Marine Programs, the following regulation was mentioned: Regula-tions Governing the Laying of Submarine Cables and Pipelines. However, we see the Chinese characters, guanliguiding, for the first two words in English. In other words, the Chinese translation for governing is guanli, which could also mean management. And, in The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Is-sue, it was written that “[o]ne principle governing New China’s establish-ment of diplomatic representing the whole of China, severs or refrain from establishing diplomatic relations with the Taiwan authorities,” the Chinese characters for the word, governing, were not mentioned.

It was not until later that one can detect the Chinese characters, zhili, in the following sentence, which was mentioned in the February 2005 white paper, Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities in China: “The central authori-ties of the Qing dynasty adopted different measures for governing the ethnic-minority areas in accordance with local characteristics.” Here, the Chinese characters for the word “governing” has been zhili. In China’s Progress in Hu-man Rights in 2004, dated April 2005, the following sentence in Section II mentioned that “[t]he [National People’s Congress (NPC)] and its Standing Committee are playing a more and more important role in governing the country according to law and guaranteeing the people’s democratic rights.” Here, the Chinese characters for governing the country according to law are yifazhiguo/jiansheshehuizhuyifazhiguojia, which was incorporated into the Constitution in March 1999. In other words, zhi in this context means gov-ern, not rule. In the October 2005 Building of Political Democracy of China, zhili was spelled out very clearly: Burgeoning in the early 1980s, developed


in the 1980s and popularized in the 1990s, the self-government by villagers as a basic system “has become an effective way to develop grassroots democ-racy and improve the level of governance in rural China.” In the February 2008 China’s Efforts and Achievements in Promoting the Rule of Law, we see in the Foreword and Conclusion the term, (law-based) governance.

Fourth, we cannot tell the order of importance between IR, mechanisms,14 and measures.15 Related to the third caveat is that some translators at Xin-huashe [China News Agency (CNA)] do know the term, IR, because we saw different words being used: (evolution of the Renminbi) exchange rate re-gime, exchange rate policy, (market-based, managed, floating) exchange rate mechanism, and exchange rate system.16 In Section IV of the December 2005 white paper, China’s Peaceful Development Road, we see the following terms in the same paragraph: the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settle-ment mechanism and the floating exchange rate regime. However, all the words in bold had been translated as jizhi, which is mechanism in Chinese. Certainly regime is somewhat different from mechanism. The former is very abstract, while the latter can be categorized in terms of device(s) and institution(s), which could be practices and/or organizations. When it comes to the question of military affairs, IR, such as the nonproliferation regime, and mechanisms, such as regional security mechanism, the verifica-tion mechanism, or even the nonproliferation mechanism, are still being translated as jizhi in the September 2005 white paper, China’s Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation. In China’s Non-Proliferation Policy and Measures, the Chinese characters for regime in the phrase, interna-tional nonproliferation regime, were tixi. Yet, in the January 2009 white pa-per, China’s National Defense in 2008, which for the first time, for example, pledged not to conduct research and development of new nuclear weapons, the translation in the first section, The Security Situation, is tizhi. However, in English, readers can tell that IR come first, to be followed by mechanisms and measures in that order of importance.

Fifth, sometimes, a Chinese concept may be translated into different Eng-lish words. The case in point is zhengfu, which could be either government or administration. At other times, the English word, administration, has been translated as guanli, which could also refer to the English word, management. In the June 1994 white paper, Intellectual Property Protection in China, the last three words in the following sentence were translated as sifagongzuo: “Ernest execution of the law is the core of the administration of justice.” To be sure, gongzuo could be translated as work(ing). Certainly, there is a distinction be-tween the terms, management, administration, and work(ing).

In passing, it should be noted that model (as opposed to framework17) and formula (such as the two German states formula), and mode18 can be translated as moshi. To be sure, if we are talking about the mode of opera-tion, the Chinese characters are: huodongfangshi. However, when the April


2005 New Progress in China’s Protection of Intellectual Property Rights men-tioned patent rights of inventions, utility models, and exterior designs, the Chinese characters for utility models are shiyongxinxing. Xinxing definitely are different from moshi. In passing, it should be noted that the English term, model city (with prominent features as “azure sky, blue water, green land, tranquility, and harmony), as mentioned in the June 2006 white pa-per, was translated as moufanchengshi.

Sixth, in the ROC, IR has been popularly but incorrectly translated as guojijianji. A check of the Chinese characters, jianzhi, in the 1989 edition of A New Chinese–English Dictionary, which is published in Hongkong, tells us the following translations in English: organizational system/establishment. However, in Section IV of the December 2002 white paper, China’s National Defense, which is the third one in a series, we see the phrase, perfect an or-ganizational system and an operational (yunzuo) mechanism. The original Chinese version of this white paper was written in the following Chinese characters for organizational system: tizhi. Yet, in China’s National Defense in 2008, organizational system for equipment procurement was translated as zhuangbeicaigouzhuzhitixi. In passing, it should be noted that the Chinese characters for structure in military structure, structure and organization (bi-anzhi), or organizational19 structure as mentioned in the December 2006 white paper is also tizhi.20

Are the words and Terms Related to Regimes used in the white Papers?

First of all, it should be noted that IR is part of international governance in or an indispensable and, at least, theoretically, best tool of international governance, because one does not have to be engaged in power struggle, for instance. Governance in Chinese is zhili. In A New Chinese–English Diction-ary, we see zhili as govern/administer, such as administer a country, bring under control, such as bring waters under control/harness rivers. However, sometimes the word, governing, in English has been mentioned in, for ex-ample, the Law of the PRC Governing Regional National Autonomy. Yet, we do not see the Chinese characters for the word, governing, in the Chinese version. We only see the following Chinese characters: minzuquyuzizhifa.

Some of governance’s synonyms can be found in the white papers: arrange-ment (anpai), management, governing management (xingzhengguanli); opera-tion (jingying), (prison) regulations or code of conduct (jianguijilu), to har-ness pollution by military units (buduidanweiwuranzhili), etc. Some of the related terms or sentences include the education-through-labor administra-tive committee (laodongjiaoyangguanliweiyuanhui), the administrative law (xingzhengfagui), the Law of Administrative Procedure (xingzhengsusongfa), “. . . the government has reformed the job assignment system [fenpaizhidu] by combining the students’ own choices with the state’s guarantee of jobs,” etc.


Second, the IR is the highest level of analysis, as mentioned earlier. Under it, we see terms like mechanisms and measures. The former has usually been translated as jizhi. Yet, in China’s National Defense in 2008, the last word was translated as tixi: the existing international arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation mechanisms. The white paper, China: Arms Control and Dis-armament, dated November 1995, mentioned the safeguard regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In the December 1995 white paper on human rights, the word, mechanism, was mentioned in a law: Regulations for State-Owned Enterprises (quanminsuoyouzhi) for Changes in Operating Mechanism. In the November 1995 white paper on arms control and disarmament, the term, transparency measures, was mentioned. In an-other white paper, we were told about a series of measures adopted by the political power of the people to stimulate growth in the economy and main-tain social stability. As another example, “many measures have been taken to protect grasslands. . . .” To be sure, in the December 1995 white paper on human rights, we see the following sentence: “Children are the future of the country and society. In recent years, through legislative, judicial, administra-tive and other types of measures, the state has greatly improved children’s conditions.” In short, all of the concepts have positive connotations.

Third, each regime at the international level has to do with an issue (wenti as opposed to the usage of yiti in the Taiwan area) in a given area, issue-areas, or issue-regimes. Beijing does regard human rights as an issue, and the term, human rights issues, has also been mentioned in the Novem-ber 1991 Human Rights in China. In the December 1995 white paper on human rights, terms like system of human rights, sphere (lingyu) of human rights, and theories of human rights were mentioned. In the September 1992 Tibet—Its Ownership and Human Rights Situation, the following words were written: “the issue of a regional national autonomy within a country as a relationship between a suzerain and a vassal state. . . .” It also regards combating crime as a major issue confronting every country in the modern world, as can be seen in the August 1992 Criminal Reform in China. And, in the November 2000 white paper on outer space, the term, the issue of space debris, was mentioned as a big challenge to further expansion of space activities.21

Fourth, a regime at the international level is related to an area, which could be the Earth itself, if we regard it in the context of an asteroid striking against the planet. From the first white paper to the latest one, this author does see many terms related to the abstract or concrete concept, area: liberated area, provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities, prefectures (cities), counties/districts, townships (towns), the minority region, the inland and coastal ar-eas, the system of regional autonomy for the 55 minority nationalities, which has 159 national autonomous areas including five autonomous regions, 30 autonomous prefectures, and 124 autonomous counties [or banners (qi)],


etc. In this connection, Information Technology (IT) can be stretched into multidimensional space which includes the land, sea, air, outer space, and electron. The concept, sphere can also be noted, such as the sphere of human rights, which was mentioned in one of the white papers.

Fifth, the February 2000 white paper on the Taiwan issue mentioned the term, under compelled circumstances (qingshi), and the December 2006 white paper on national defense, mentioned complex circumstances. This implies that the PRC does understand or is aware that each IR is formed under objective circumstances, due to urgency, insecurity, convergent expec-tation, and perception.

Sixth, in the November 1991 Human Rights in China, the adjective, urgent (jinpo), was used. However, the context is not directly related to human rights: “[I]t is the fundamental wish and demand of the Chinese people and a long-term urgent task of the Chinese government to maintain national stability. . . .” The June 2000 Narcotics Control in China alerted readers that drug control is imminent. And the September 2000 white paper on national defense urged the universality of the January 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), because a certain state party has made de facto reservations regarding the provisions of the CWC in the form of domestic legislation and some state parties have been very slow destroying their chemical weapons stockpiles.

Seventh, we cannot find the word, insecurity, in any white paper. What can be said is that Beijing would say, for example, in the July 1998 China’s National Defense, which is the very first one in a series,22 that, regarding the issue of Taiwan, it is fearful of being split by a country or a person. In the Fifth Years of Progress in China’s Human Rights, the PRC stressed that “stabil-ity is the prerequisite, development is the key, reform is the motive power, and government according to law is the guarantee.” And, the June 2000 Narcotics Control in China, the first sentence in the Foreword said: “The pres-ent globalization of the drug issue has posed a grave menace to human well-being and development. . . .” In the second paragraph, readers were reminded that mainland China’s southwestern border is adjacent to the Golden Triangle, one of the main sources of drugs in the world.

Eighth, matters on perception can be easily detected. For example, in the August 1995 white paper on family planning, the Foreword said that exces-sive population growth is an extremely serious problem for the PRC and other countries. So, the government, while against induced abortion, start-ing from the 1960s began to distribute contraceptives free of charge, to re-duce the fees for birth control technical services, etc. And the March 2004 white paper on human rights, mentioned that the “Plan for the Establish-ment of a National Public Health Monitoring and Information System” and the “Plan for the Establishment of a Medical Treatment System in Case of Public Health Contingencies” helped establish a sound early warning and emergency mechanism concerning public health contingencies.


Ninth, things related to the concept, convergent expectation can be found. For example, in the August 1995 white paper, Family Planning in China, it was stated that the mainland will continue to work in concert with all the nations on stabilizing world population, so as to ensure a happier future for man-kind. The June 2006 white paper on environmental protection said it is nec-essary to enhance early-warning capability in case of environmental emergen-cies and to improve the all-round (quanmian) environmental supervision and management capabilities. And, the Preface in the December 2006 white pa-per on national defense mentioned that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will strive to realize an all-round, coordinated and sustainable development in national defense and military capabilities.

Tenth, it should be noted that the more IR in the world, the more the order in the international community. But, does Beijing understand the mitigation of anarchy? Indirectly, it does, because, in the China’s National Defense in 2000, the following paragraph was written:

China actively supports international efforts to address the issue of small arms. It is in favor of taking necessary measures to combat illicit activities related to small arms, and prevent the proliferation and excessive accumula-tion of such arms, so as to mitigate (jianhuan) the armed conflicts and turbu-lences in the countries concerned and curb the further spread of terrorism23 and drug trafficking.

Eleventh, the mainland certainly understands cooperation at various levels: bilateral, regional, multilateral, multinational, supranational, international, global, etc. For example, the November 1995 white paper, China: Arms Con-trol and Disarmament, mentioned the safeguard regime of the IAEA, adding, since becoming a party to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in March 1992, it has been cooperating fully with the IAEA. And the December 2005 China’s Peaceful Development Road specifically men-tioned the following international cooperation fields: antiterrorism, arms control, nonproliferation, peacekeeping, economy and trade, development, human rights, law-enforcement, and the environment.

Coordination is closely associated with cooperation. The June 1994 white paper, The Situation of Chinese Woman, mentioned the following phrase: “Coordinating their efforts and acting together.”

Twelfth, this author did not come across the term, community-centered arrangement, in the white papers. In the East, we do not easily or readily understand such a term. However, we do see the term, for example, ad hoc arrangement, being used. This refers to Taipei’s participation in the activities of those organizations only as a region of China and under the designation of Taipei, China in the Asian Development Bank (ADB) or Chinese Taipei in the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). We also noticed the term, proper arrangement of family planning in the August 1995 white paper on


family planning. In the December 1995 white paper, The Progress of Human Rights in China, it was mentioned that, from 1991 to 1994, arrangements have been made for more than 29.21 million Chinese people to find jobs in cities and towns. The June 2000 Narcotics Control in China reminded us that drug control is the “common responsibility incumbent to international society.” In the December 2002 white paper on national defense, we were told that, in January 2002, the PRC formally participated in the Class-A standby arrange-ments mechanism for the UN peacekeeping operations (lianheguoweicihep-ingxingdongdiyijidaiminganpaijizhi). And, to implement the strategy of sustain-able development, to take a new road to industrialization, and to strive to increase the ability of the mineral resources to guarantee its socioeconomic development, in China’s Policy on Mineral Resources, dated December 2003, we were told how the PRC make the arrangements: It will strengthen its survey, prospecting, exploitation, planning, management, protection, and rational utilization of mineral resources.

In passing, it should be noted that the concept, international community, does appear in the white papers. In the August 1995 Family Planning in China, the term, government—and community (shequ)—supported policies and programs in the area of reproductive health, has been mentioned. In the March 1997 white paper, On Sino–U.S. Trade Balance, the term, world busi-ness community, was mentioned. In the June 2000 white paper on Tibet, the term, concentrated community (jujudiqu), was used. And the June 2000 white paper on narcotics, the term, drug-free communities, was used.

Thirteenth, in the June 1994 white paper on intellectual property protec-tion, the authors noticed the following sentence, which is closely related to an IR: The PRC adheres to “the principle of equal treatment for nationals and non-nationals and reciprocity of protection to foreigners’ intellectual property rights. . . .” Other concepts related to principle can be seen: “The unity between rights and duties is a basic principle of China’s legal system [fazhi].” However, it should be noted the following subtle difference in the order of importance: At the end of 1994, the PRC government formulated the “Programme of China’s Family Planning Work (1995–2000),” setting clear demands on the task, target, principle, and measures in deepening the development of family planning work; the government has gradually set up principles, policies, measures, and methods that reflect the basic interests of the people, etc.24

Fourteenth, the concept, norm, has been mentioned: “According to in-ternational norm [guanli], Chinese students who are sponsored by govern-ment to study abroad have the duty to return to serve their home country.” In the July 1998 white paper on national defense, the term, international legal norms and practices, was mentioned. And, in the same month and year, the white paper on the PRC’s marine programs has mentioned the following:


Upholding the principles of the international marine law as defined by the United Nations [UN] Convention on the Law of the Sea, maintaining the wholesomeness of the oceans, protecting the marine environment and guaran-teeing the sustainable utilization of marine resources and maritime safety have become common norms for all the people in the world to abide by

Norm can also be indirectly seen: “The unity between rights and duties is a basic principle of China’s legal system.” The concept, obligation, has also been mentioned when the first white paper was talking about the religious freedom.

Fifteenth, an IR also embraces rule (guiding).25 In July 1987, the SC of the PRC issued the Interim Rules on Labor Dispute in State-Owned Enterprises. In the August 1992 Criminal Reform in China, the term, prison rules and decrees (jianguanfagui), was mentioned.

Sixteenth, decision-making procedure is also involved in an IR. However, the authors have not seen terms related to scientific meetings, technical meetings, financial meetings, etc. Nevertheless, the October 2005 Building of Political Democracy in China did mention procedure (chengxu) several times. And, the December 2006 China’s National Defense in 2006 mentioned decision-making mechanism and strict procedures in approving exports, to ensure effective export control.

Seventeenth, the PRC does rely on mass media and research institutes plus nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) (and volunteers) to safe-guard women’s interests and advancement, as noted in the June 1994 white paper, The Situation of Chinese Women.

Eighteenth, in a November 1943 paper on the Danube River, the follow-ing terms were used: the Danube River system and the Danube River re-gime.26 Many white papers do mention the word, system (zhidu), to cite several important ones:

1. “China has adopted the socialist system after abolishing the system of exploitation and eliminating the exploiting classes.”

2. “The system of multi-party cooperation and political consultation under the leadership of the [CPC] is the basic political system that gives expression to people’s democracy.”

3. “The distribution system adopted in China is mainly based on the principle of ‘from each according to his ability, to each according to his work.’”

4. “The people’s courts carry out a public trial system.”5. The human rights system.6. One country, two systems.

However, the Chinese characters, tixi, could also mean system, such as “set up various workers’ schools to perfect education system.” In the last


section of the March 1997 white paper, On Sino–U.S. Trade Balance, we even see the following sentence: “By the year 2000, China will have initially es-tablished a system of socialist market economy and built up a unified and standard foreign-related economic regime, which will create better condi-tions for the world’s business communities including those from the United States to develop economic and trade co-operation with China.” In the June 2006 Environmental Protection in China (1996–2005), we see the following words: “China has established a system of environmental protection stan-dards at both the national and local levels.” By the end of 2005, the PRC has promulgated over 800 national environmental protection standards. And, in the October 2006 white paper on the PRC’s space activities, Section II stated that: “From 2001 to 2005, China’s space industry has developed rapidly, making many achievements. A group of research and development and testing bases of the advanced world level has been built, and the system of research, design, production and testing has been further improved, markedly enhancing the country’s basic capabilities in space science and technology.” Here, the English translation for the term, system, is tizhi, and, for regime, also tizhi. Tizhi could be the following combination: tixi plus zhidu. Yet, the two words in English do not mean the same. [In September 2007, the PRC president, HU Jintao, pledged in a speech delivered at the business summit of the APEC forum that his country will continue to sup-port the establishment of a fair, open, equitable, and nondiscriminatory multilateral trading regime. Here, regime has been translated as tizhi in People’s Daily (Chinese edition)].

And, in the foreword of the July 1998 white paper, The Development of China’s Marine Programs, it was written: “The ocean, which covers 71 per-cent of the earth’s surface, is a basic component of the globaal [sic] bio-support system.” Here, the word, system, has been translated as xitong. In the same white paper, terms like a modern loading-unloading-hauling system, a container transport system with advanced freight-handling tech-nologies, a system of marine monitoring and disaster forecasting and alarm, and a data quality control system were mentioned, and the Chi-nese characters, xitong, were used.

Nineteenth, some academics in the West use IR and international institu-tions interchangeably, which is a mistake, because some institutions may be bad, such as the slavery institution. In this connection, an IR is usually fragile. When it breaks down, one has to form it again, at least conceptually. The positive concept, welfare institution (shehuifuliyuan), was mentioned in the first white paper on human rights. Another sentence related to institution is as follows: “. . . China has instituted a multi-ownership economic system with public ownership of the means of production taking the dominant position [Zhongguoshixingyigongyouzhiweizhutideduozhongsuoyouzhijingji].” The Chinese characters, jigou [as opposed to jiguan (organ), such as state organs (guojia-


jiguan or guojiajigou)27 or organs of self-government (zizhijiguan)], could also refer to institution, such as research institution or “[i]nstitutions specialized in handling these disputes include enterprise labor dispute mediation com-mittee, local labor dispute arbitration committee and the people’s court.” The December 2006 white paper on national defense mentioned 67 military edu-cational institutions, and the Chinese characters are junduiyuanxiaoxiany-ou67suo. And, the Chinese term, chengzhenqiyedanwei, has been translated as urban state institutions. And Section IV of the same white paper on national defense, the term, political and medical institution, was mentioned, and the Chinese characters for institution are xitong.

However, the sale of women was also mentioned in the same white pa-per. The March 2004 white paper on human rights admitted that in the mainland there is still abduction and selling as well as other criminal ac-tivities against women and children. In other words, the term, institution, could be negative. And, in the same white paper, we see the following sen-tence: “At present there are in all 680 prisons and reform-through-labor institutions in China.” However, the term, reform-through-labor institu-tions, has been translated as laodonggaizao changsuo. Changsuo can be trans-lated as place and arena.

Twentieth, pan is a word related to IR, because an issue could be here and there. In the September 2000 white paper on national defense, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was regarded as “the only pan-Asia–Pacific official multilateral security dialogues and cooperation forum.” Here, pan in Chi-nese characters is: fandiqu. In other words, Beijing does understand what pan means.

findings

Some important findings can be noted. First, to Beijing, regime at the na-tional level can be positive. For example, HU in September 2007 talked about the fair, open, equitable, and nondiscriminatory multilateral trading regime. As another example, the term, state regime (guojiazhengquan), has been used, as we can see in the following sentence in the first white paper on the human rights: “Among the religious people who were dealt with ac-cording to law, some were engaged in subversion against the state regime or activities endangering national security. . . .” In the October 2005 Building of Political Democracy in China, the following sentence was written: “A social-ist law regime with Chinese characteristics and with the Constitution at its core has been preliminarily formed.” Here, the Chinese characters for the term “law regime” is falutixi.

Second, Beijing is aware of the existence of IR. Sometimes, it should have used the term, IR. Yet, it did not. The reason could be that it does not regard the issue-area, issue-areas, or issue-regimes as being urgent. For example, in


the October 2006 white paper on space activities, IR should have been men-tioned. However, we only see the word, mechanism, such as the mechanism of the Sino–French Joint Commission on Space Cooperation or a disaster mitigation mechanism (miezaijizhi) consisting of space organizations. For example, Section V, specifically mentioning the Declaration on Interna-tional Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Ben-efit and in the Interest of All States, Taking Into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries, stated that: “The Chinese government holds that outer space is the common wealth of all mankind, and each and every country in the world enjoys rights to freely explore, develop and uti-lize outer space and celestial bodies; and that of all countries’ outer space activities should be beneficial to the economic development, social prog-ress of nations, to security, subsistence and development of mankind, and to friendly cooperation between people of different countries.” In short, what the mainland said has to do with IR.

Third, to the PRC, the term, mechanism, is applied at the regional or even multilateral level. For example, Section X in the June 2006 white paper on environmental protection mentioned that “China has consolidated and promoted its cooperation with neighboring countries and regions involved, and actively participated in the construction of a regional cooperation mechanism.” Section I in the December 2006 white paper on national de-fense, the term, multilateral mechanism, was used.

Fourth, unless there is urgency, Beijing would not form a human rights regime or regard human rights as a regime. In other words, perception plays a role in deciding whether something can be called an IR. Its preferred term is the human rights system, as can be seen in the November 1991 Human Rights in China. In the Chinese version, the Chinese characters, zhidu (as opposed to guizhi, jianzhi, tizhi, tixi, or xitong), were used, implying that there is a distinction between the system and regime, with the former as having larger scope than the latter. By using those two characters, the main-land is acknowledging that its human rights record is not perfect,28 al-though there is improvement or room for improvement, just as, since March 2003, the SC began to criticize the American record of human rights. Its foreign ministry in April 2007 expressed its strong dissatisfaction and firm opposition to the U.S. Department of State’s annual report on main-land China’s poor human rights record in the year 2006, adding even the United States used its campaign against terrorism as an excuse to torture people around the world and violated the rights of its own citizens.29 Some Americans also urged the United States to ratify the long overdue November 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC): “The United States is blocking unanimous global support of this treaty, whose sole purpose is to protect the right of children, citing concerns about sovereignty, federalism, family-planning issues, and parental rights.


Unbelievably, we were the only nation besides Somalia that has not ad-opted UNCRC.”30

Beijing also recognizes that there are imperialist systems, feudalist sys-tems, bureaucratic capitalist systems, etc., as we see in the February 2000 white paper on human rights. In other words, under different systems, people enjoy different kinds of human rights. To the PRC, sixty-plus years of its history is but a brief moment in human history. However, the main-land does acknowledge that “[i]t has been a long-cherished ideal of man-kind to enjoy human rights in full sense of the term.” It, in September 1988 at the fourty-third session of the UN General Assembly, considers the December 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as the first international instrument which systematically sets forth the spe-cific contents regarding respect for and protection of fundamental human rights. This is certainly related to convergent expectation. However, it also urged foreigners to have “a real understanding of Chinese conditions,” plus its history. For example, during the Qing dynasty, foreign imperialists imposed more than 1,100 unequal treaties on China and plundered Chi-nese wealth on a large scale.31 Beijing is also proud of itself for proclaim-ing, since the founding of the PRC, that Chinese women can enjoy equal rights with men in all aspects of political,32 economic, cultural, social and family life and for eradicating the Tibetan feudal serf system with its hier-archy of three classes and nine grades, which was bolstered by cruel pun-ishment, such as gouging out eyes, cutting off feet, removing the tongue, chopping off hands and arms, pushing an offender off a cliff or drowning, etc.33 Fifty Years of Democratic Reform in Tibet also tried to expose the dark side of the Dalai Lama clique. In other words, one cannot evaluate an-other country’s record in terms of a preconceived model. In short, the CPC, feeling insecure sometimes and perceiving that time is not yet ripe to provide full-fledged human rights, is more concerned about maintain-ing itself as the ruling party.

However, under urgency, the CPC will make sure that, for example, “pub-lic property owned by the state [quanminsuoyoudecaichan],34 collective prop-erty owned by the working people, and the legitimate property owned by the individuals [geren] are all protected by law.”

The same logic can be said of the intellectual property (rights). Mainland China, proceeding from its actual conditions, would not say intellectual property regime. Its choice of words is intellectual property protection sys-tem (tixi). In June 1980, the PRC became a member of the World Intellec-tual Property Organization (WIPO). And, in April 1986, the National Peo-ple’s Congress (NPC) passed the General Principles of the Civil Law of the PRC. For the first time, this legislation affirmed the rights of citizens and legal persons’ right of authorship (copyright). In any case, while working on it, Beijing realizes that there is still a long way for the people on the Chinese


mainland to have a complete understanding of and respect for intellectual property rights, hence the usage of the word, system.

However, a word must be said regarding the millennia-old feudal mar-riage system, as characterized by forced marriage, male superiority and fe-male inferiority, etc. It was abolished by the Marriage Law of the PRC in May 1950. The question which ought to be asked is: How come the June 1994 white paper, The Situation of Chinese Women, still used the word, sys-tem—not regime or mechanism, in the following description: “Implemen-tation of the new system was marked by freedom of men and women in marriage, monogamy, sexual equality and protection of the legal rights of women and children.” One possible explanation is that, when stressing monogamy, it is not one for all or even all for one. Another explanation is that, as admitted by Beijing, the protection of women’s rights and interests at the primary stage of socialism still needs to be improved and perfected, and government organs, social organizations, enterprises and institutional, rural and urban mass groups at the grass roots are working on it.

Fifth, any party to an IR must be altruistic, as forced by the objective cir-cumstances. Why does Beijing only mention regime, when it comes to the issue of arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation? This is because it does not regard itself as being militarily powerful. In other words, if the United States and other military powers can first control or even get rid of their arms and so on, all the nations, countries, states, political entities, economic entities, and so on can be benefited. In short, the PRC is playing politics by on purpose using the word, regime, when it comes to the issue of arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. The same logic can be applied to the exchange rate regime, because it is advantageous for it to do so. However, when it comes to the issue of human rights, Beijing would rather emphasize the differences in political systems. Deep down in their heart the Chinese Communists know that each human being’s basic needs are food, water, air, shelter, etc.

Sixth, Beijing may not realize that, under urgency, there is no time or room for an IR to have dialogue, consultation, negotiation, bargaining, democracy, face, self-respect, etc. It is also not necessary for it to coin terms like multilat-eral mechanism or collective security mechanism, because all the parties are on the same side regarding one issue to IR. For example, in the June 2006 white paper on environmental protection, terms like the China–Europe mechanism of ministerial dialogue (buzhangjiduihuajizhi) on environmental policy were mentioned. In other words, on the issue of environmental protec-tion, the mainland and France are on the same side, and, therefore, there is no need to have dialogues. And the December 2006 white paper on national defense mentioned collective security mechanism.

Several things should also be noted: 1) In the August 1993 The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China, Beijing said that in order to put an end


to hostility and achieve peaceful reunification, both sides of the Taiwan Strait should enter into contacts and negotiations at the earliest possible date. While an adversary regime can be formed between the two arch ene-mies, Beijing should realize that negotiations are not necessary for it to cooperate with Taipei on certain issues, such as cleaning up the hazardous chemicals in the Taiwan Strait. This is because, if they do not, at least their fishermen on both sides will suffer. Thus, it is not necessary for Beijing to state in its February 2000 white paper on the Taiwan issue that “. . . we have never spoken of negotiations between the ‘central and local authorities.’ The Chinese government has also proposed that dialogues may start first, in-cluding political dialogues, which may gradually move on to procedural consultations for political talks to the solve the name, the topics for discus-sion, and the forms of official talks before political talks are held.”

2) In the August 1993 white paper, Beijing stated that Taiwan is a part of China. As such, it cannot represent China in the international community and it cannot establish diplomatic relations or enter into official relations with foreign countries. However, it chooses to ignore the fact that the (military) diplomatic regime does apply to all the countries and political entities, including the ROC, from its perspective. Without such a commu-nity-centered arrangement, both the Taipei Economic and Cultural Repre-sentative Office in the United States (TECRO) in Washington, D.C., and the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) in Taipei will not be secure, because no one embassy wants to be targeted by ballistic missiles.

3) Because the mainland does not treat human rights as an urgent matter, at the forty-first session of the UN General Assembly, “China energetically supported the Commission on Human Rights [CHR] in conducting world-wide consultation on the implementation of the right to development and supported the proposal that the right to development be discussed as an in-dependent agenda item in the [CHR],” by eliminating factors such as racism, colonialism, hegemonism, foreign aggression, occupation, and interference as well as apartheid, racial discrimination, genocide, slave trade, and serious violations of human rights by international terrorist organizations.35 It should be noted that, however, in April 2009, the Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, for the first time, issued the National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009–2010), pledging to further protect and improve the Chinese mainland’s human rights conditions in an all-round way.

4) It should be pointed out that there is no need to say that the CPC es-tablished democratic governments in the liberated areas, to point out that “[i]n rural areas, efforts have been made to continue to conduct rural grass-roots mass self-management activities that focus on villagers’ democratic elections, democratic policy-making, democratic management and demo-cratic supervision,”36 or to say “[t]hat the people are masters of their own country is the essence of China’s democratic politics,”37 because, under ur-


gency, there is no time to practice democracy so as to see which side is, for example, the majority.

5) Similar to the fourth point, in the September 2005 white paper on arms control, Beijing urged that nonproliferation mechanism should be strengthened and improved under the framework of international law and on the basis of equal and universal participation of all countries and demo-cratic decision-making. However, the mainland failed to realized that, when we talk about IR, all the countries, etc., are on the same side. In other words, we do not need to have democracy, because all the voices, opinions, etc., are the same, that is, the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. In Septem-ber 2009, the UN Security Council vowed at an unprecedented summit hosted by American president Barack H. Obama II to work to stop the spread of atomic weapons and rid the planet of all nuclear weapons.

6) The July 1998 white paper on marine programs mentioned that, in February 1992, the NPC adopted the Law of the PRC on its Territorial Seas and Adjacent Zones, which provides a legal basis for the country (guojia) to exercise sovereignty over its territorial seas and jurisdiction over the adja-cent zones and safeguard the state (guojia)’s safety and marine rights and interests. The white paper also stated that “[w]ith regard to issues that can-not be solved for the time being, China stands for pigeonholing them and for strengthened cooperation and joint development.” To be sure, we only see the term, new international marine legal system, not the new interna-tional marine legal regime, because, once conducting a joint development, a regime can be said as being formed, thereby clipping sovereignty. Here, it may be implying that Beijing is compromising or even suffering under such a community-centered arrangement for the sake of all.

Seventh, in the West, the word, regime, can be easily used, when the writer thinks that a community-centered arrangement can be beneficial to all. In the July 1998 white paper on national defense, the following legal documents were mentioned: the July 1994 Agreement on Prevention of Dangerous Mili-tary Activities and the Joint Statement by the President of the PRC and the President of the Russian Federation on Non-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons and Detargeting of Strategic Nuclear Weapons Against Each Other (the Agree-ment and Joint Statement, for short).38 In the West, such Agreement and Joint Statement could be easily regarded as a regime. Yet, we do not see such a term in the white paper. We only see words like mechanism and measures in the name of other legal documents, mentioned in the same white paper: the November 1996 Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the China–India Border Areas and the January 1998 Agreement Between the Ministry of National Defense of the PRC and the Department of Defense of the USA on Establishing a Consulta-tion Mechanism. In the November 2000 white paper on outer space, the issue of space debris was brought up. In the West, one would coin the term, the


space debris prevention regime. Yet, in that white paper, we do not see such a term. We only read the following sentences: “The relevant departments in China pay great attention to the problem, and have carried out research on this issue with related countries since the beginning of the 1980s. In June 1995, [China National Space Administration (CNSA)] acceded to the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee. China will continuously make efforts to explore, together with other countries, ways and means to mitigate and reduce space debris, and promote international cooperation on this issue.” In Section VI of the July 1998 white paper, The Development of China’s Marine Programs, we were told that the PRC attended the International Seabed Authority (ISA) meetings of the preparatory committees and that the mainland has taken part in international activities to protect tunas, whales, and other endangered species of marine life. However, no IR was mentioned. And the June 2000 Narcotics Control in China talks about the necessity of im-minent drug control. Yet, nowhere in the white paper do we see terms like the antidrug manufacturing, trafficking, and transporting regime, although it did mention the term, the building of China’s antidrug legal system (zhongguojin-dufazhijianshe) or a preliminary antidrug legal system (chubujindufalutixi), and that “[f]for many years, the Chinese government has taken drug control as a fundamental objective, and has formulated and implemented a series of principles, policies and measures39 in this regard.”

Eighth, IR did exist before and after October 1949, when the PRC was created. In other words, there is no Socialist or Communist style of IR, es-pecially under urgency.

Ninth, while the Chinese PLA is aware of the natural disasters,40 serious communicable diseases, environmental degradation, international crime, and other transnational problems as mentioned in Section I of the Decem-ber 2006 white paper on national defense, the PRC sometimes is suspicious of foreign powers’ words and deeds or ulterior motives, making use of the issue of human rights to advance its own values, ideology, political stan-dards, and mode of development,41 as seen in the November 1991 white paper: “China is opposed to interfering in other countries’ internal affairs on the pretext of human rights and has made unremitting efforts to elimi-nate various abnormal phenomena and strengthen international coopera-tion in the field of human rights.” In the June 1994 white paper, The Situa-tion of Chinese Women, the following words are being mentioned: “women are a great force in maintaining world peace. . . . [I]n today’s world, acts which go against the United Nations Charter and the principles of interna-tional law still exist. These include such practices as bullying the small, the strong domineering over the weak, interfering in the affairs of other coun-tries and violating their sovereignty, and armed aggression and occupation of the territory of other states.” The September 2000 white paper on na-tional defense, Section I said: “Under the pretexts of ‘humanitarianism’ and


‘human rights,’ some countries have frequently resorted to the use or threat of force, in flagrant violation of the UN Charter and other universally rec-ognized principles governing international relations.” In this connection, in Section VI, Beijing said “[a]t present, there are intentions, plans, and actions to pursue unilateral military and strategic superiority in, and control of, outer space,” which is supposed to belong to all countries in the world. And Section I in the December 2006 white paper on national defense men-tioned hegemonism and power politics (qiangquanzhengzhi) remain key factors undermining international security.

Tenth, sometimes an IR may fail, derail, be violated, etc. It is usually fragile. For this reason, Beijing cannot trust what superpowers do. In China’s Non-Proliferation Policy and Measures, unilateralism and double standards are urged to be abandoned. For example, after becoming presi-dent, George W. Bush scrapped the May 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, which can be regarded as a regime. How-ever, Beijing sometimes is also practicing double standard. For example, in the June 1996 white paper on freedom of religious belief, it stated that “no country that practices the rule of law in the world today would toler-ate illegal and criminal activities being carried out under the banner of religion.” Yet, in Section IV of the same white paper, we were told that the PRC government “will, as always, support Chinese Catholicism which holds aloft the banner of patriotism, sticks to the principle of indepen-dence and self-management, and stands for selection and ordination of bishops by itself.” Another example of the mainland’s double standard is as follows: The November 2000 white paper on outer space mentioned space debris, as mentioned earlier, and it stated that it is a big challenge to further expansion of space activities. Yet, in January 2007, Beijing per-formed a successful antisatellite (ASAT) weapons test using a high kinetic energy kill vehicle, at 530 miles altitude, destroying its own aging weather satellite, resulting in more than 2,750 pieces of debris.42 One of its rank-ing military officials said the West overreacted to what it had done, be-cause they had prior knowledge.43

Eleventh, mainland China sometimes mentions words like (multilateral) negotiations and dialogue, in the context of a fair and rational international nonproliferation system, as mentioned in the July 1998 white paper on national defense. The problem is that, when we talk about IR, all the parties are on the same side, as mentioned before. In other words, no negotiations or dialogues are needed or even necessary, when the circumstance is urgent. Why Beijing is concerned is probably the lack of an effective system to monitor compliance of signed agreements by the nations, countries, or states plus other political and economic entities (as well as human beings like you and me) and the failure to implement provisions to mete out pen-alties if all of them are breaching promises made.


The September 2000 white paper on national defense mentioned that “[t]he ARF is the only pan-Asia–Pacific official multilateral security dialogue and cooperation forum at present.” However, it did not realize that when engaging in the following things, the ARF can be rightly called the ARF mechanism, just as it refers to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) or Shanghai Five (Shanghaiwuguo) as “a regional mechanism (diquji-zhi) for their multilateral cooperation in all fields,” as the white paper said representatives of the Chinese Ministries of Foreign Affairs and National De-fense have attended official or unofficial meetings and both ministries had hosted in Beijing the ARF Seminar on Tropical Hygiene and Prevention and Treatment of Tropical Infectious Diseases, the ARF Professional Training Pro-gram on China’s Security Policy, the fourth ARF Meeting of Heads of Defense Colleges, and the ARF Seminar on Defense Conversion Cooperation related to them: confidence-building measures, peacekeeping, maritime search and rescue, emergency rescue and disaster relief, preventive diplomacy, nonprolif-eration, and guiding principles within the framework of the ARF.

Twelfth, things constantly change or evolve. So, we see the following words in the December 1995 white paper on human rights: “The Regula-tions for Rural Five-Guarantee Work, adopted by the State Council enables the five-guarantee program to become a system (zhiduhua).” In the same white paper, the term, unemployment insurance system, was mentioned. Since this is a good thing, can this system have a mechanism, because we were told in the same white paper that a mechanism has been adopted to adjust the basic pension regularly?

Thirteenth, Beijing does have a sense of priority.44 The December 2002 white paper on national defense, while in Section VII mentioning the term, the establishment of a fair, rational and effective multilateral nonproliferation regime (jizhi) based on the participation of all countries, it was stated that “[i]t is China’s consistent view that maintaining the global strategic stability and the international system of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation is vitally important (zhiguanzhongyao) and in conformity with the fundamen-tal interests (genbenliyi) of all countries.” Beijing sometimes uses words like “the central government has attached great weight [shifenzhongshi] to the training of Cadres of Tibetan nationality.” In the July 1998 white paper on national defense, we were told that “China attaches great importance to, and takes an active part in, international security cooperation by sticking to its principles and promises, treating others in a sincere and friendly way, and developing cooperation.” In the November 2000 China’s Space Activities, we were informed that “China attaches importance to developing all kinds of application of satellites and satellite application technology.”

Fourteenth, the March 1997 white paper, On Sino–U.S. Trade Balance, men-tioned the term, economic regime. The November 2000 white paper on space activities had this phrase: “[w]ith the establishment and improvement of


China’s socialist market economic mechanism.” The December 2000 China’s Population and Development in the 21st Century mentioned the following phrase: “Establishing and improving the interest-oriented mechanism related to population and family planning.” The Chinese characters for “interest-oriented mechanism” is liyidaoxiangjizhi. In the April 2001 white paper on human rights, we see the term, the internal supervisory and circumscribing mechanism (jinaduzhiyuejizhi) of the courts. The October 2001 white paper, The Development-Oriented Poverty Reduction Program for Rural China, men-tioned the Seven-Year Priority Alleviation Program, which is for poverty re-duction with clear and definite objectives, targets, measures, and a time limit. This is something new, because, in the West, I have not come across these terms in the literature on IR. So, the question which ought to be asked is: Is there a difference in the Chinese and Western thinking regarding the usage of regime, mechanism, and measure? Apparently, there is, because the concept, system, can be seen here and there in many white papers.

Fifteenth, the lead author detected a negative usage for the term, measures in the February 2000 white paper on the Taiwan issue: “if a grave turn of events occurs leading to the separation of Taiwan from China in any name, or if Taiwan is invaded and occupied by foreign countries, or if the Taiwan authorities refuse, sine die, the peaceful settlement of cross-straits reunifica-tion through negotiations, then the Chinese government will only be forced to adopt all drastic measures possible, including the use of force, to safeguard China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and fulfill the great cause of reuni-fication.” In short, one of the measures could be the use of force.

Sixteenth, the PRC is aware of the non-state actors (feiguojiaxingweizhe). The September 2005 white paper, China’s Endeavors for Arms Control, Disar-mament and Non-Proliferation, specifically mentioned that the PRC will prevent and combat proliferation activities by non-state actors, who traffick weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Gender Equality and Women’s Development in China mentioned that the Chinese Communist government also attaches importance to the role of NGOs related to the development of women, while mentioning the All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF) as the largest NGO in the mainland.

Seventeenth, Beijing is also aware of the concept, collectivity, because in any IR, there is collective cooperation. For example, the October 2005 Build-ing of Political Democracy in China said “[w]e are against the anarchic call for ‘democracy for all,’ and against anybody placing his own will above that of the collective.”

Suggestions

Several suggestions can be made. First, the typical Chinese thinking is dia-lectical. It can be traced back to the Yin and Yang plus the Five Elements. It


is very easy to detect dialectical terms in the white papers: contradiction (as mentioned in the August 1995 white paper, Family Planning in China) or interwoven contradictions and frictions (maodundouzhengjiaozhi) (as men-tioned in the September 2000 China’s National Defense in 2000); democratic centralism; a change over the world pattern from the old to the new (shijiex-injiugeju); “China’s criminal law has set clear demarcations between crime and non-crime”; semifeudal, semicolonial China of the past; the principles of combining centralization and decentralization, as mentioned in the April 2002 Labor and Social Security in China.

For the PRC to accept IR, academics especially in the West must present IR in terms of dialectics. So far, Beijing is accepting IR half-way. Many, if not most, academics and experts are resisting Western theories, fearful of being drifted or entrapped by them.45

Second, IR is a relatively new area. The authors think that the following dialectical arrangement of some related concepts can be made in terms of my dialectical model:46 system, regime, policy, mechanism, and measure.

Third, government officials are usually busy. They do not have time to do homework. Here, academics must play an important role in helping them to understand IR. To convince government officials takes time. Mass media must also play an important role in educating the public about IR. To do so, they must find a proper, standard translation.

Fourth, the PRC actively takes part in the work of the UN Security Council’s Anti-Terrorism Commission (ATC). However, the SCO cannot be regarded as a mechanism, if it is, as the December 2002 white paper on national defense states, taking effective measures to fight against separatism and (religious) extremism. While countering terrorism (as opposed to cross-border orga-nized crimes or transnational crimes as smuggling, piracy, drug trafficking, and money laundering47) is beneficial to mankind as the SCO is doing that and prioritizing it, countering separatism and extremism (or even national chauvinism, a term mentioned in the May 2003 History and Development of Xinjiang) may only benefit the SCO members. For this reason, Beijing may have to drop the fight against separatism and extremism.

CoNCLuDING RemARkS

A few remarks can be made. First, most Chinese Communist officials do not fully understand IR. This can be demonstrated by their incorrect trans-lations of the term, IR. According to a former Beijing University Depart-ment of Political Science head, ZHAO Bao, academics, especially political science research, must serve politics by using their scientific knowledge.48 It is interesting to learn that at China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU) in Beijing only a few professors understand IR. As to translators, they do, if


they work at Xinhuashe. However, they could not come up with the pre-cise Chinese characters. It is urgent that more Chinese people can under-stand IR.

A lot of work still needs to be carried out in-depth to find out the main-land’s understanding of IR. For example, why does Section VI of the Sep-tember 2000 white paper on national defense mention the term, interna-tional mechanism of nuclear nonproliferation as opposed to IR of nuclear nonproliferation? To be sure, in this context, the word, mechanism, has been translated at tizhi. If one were not taking the context into consider-ation, tizhi could be translated as system or even regime, as point 17 in the section, Are the Words and Terms Related to Regimes Used in the White Papers?, noted.49 Yet, the Foreword of the December 2003 China’s Non-Proliferation Policy and Measures mentioned that “the international com-munity has established a relatively complete (xiangduiwanzheng) interna-tional nonproliferation regime (tixi), which has played a positive role in preventing and slowing down the proliferation of [weapons of mass de-struction] and their means of delivery, and in safeguarding peace and secu-rity both regional and global.” In Section II of the same white paper, the Chinese characters for the word, mechanism, in the phrase, the missile nonproliferation mechanism, were jizhi. Later in Section III, the Chinese characters for the Technical Annex of the Missile Technology Control Re-gime, were daodanjiqijishukongzhizhidu. In other words, regime’s translation is zhidu. One may also wonder why the April 2002 white paper, Labor and Social Security in China, use the term, the natural disaster relief system (zhidu), not mechanism? Does it imply that Beijing acknowledges that it is not yet doing a good job in relieving the sufferings of victims of unex-pected natural calamities?

Last but not least, the PRC claims that Taiwan Province is a part of China. However, the June 2000 Narcotics in China acknowledged that “[t]he statisti-cal data mentioned here do not include the Hong Kong Special Administra-tion Region, Macao Special Administrative Region and Taiwan Province.” What this implies is that all the Chinese people in mainland China, Taiwan, Hongkong, Macao, Singapore, and overseas must come up with a unified translation of the term, IR.

NoTeS

1. More than 600 years ago, ZHENG He, the navigator of the Ming dynasty, led the then largest fleet in the world and sailed seven voyages to the “Western seas,” reaching more than 30 countries and regions in Asia and Africa. According to one study, he even reached America in 1421. What he took to those places were tea, chinaware, silk, and technology, and he did not occupy an inch of any other’s land. According to the December 2005 China’s Peaceful Development Road, Beijing has


joined more than 130 intergovernmental international organizations and it is com-mitted to 267 international multilateral treaties.

2. China Post (hereinafter CP) (Taipei), October 26, 2008, p. 6. 3. For approaches of content analysis, see H. D. Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What,

When, How (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936) and The Structure and Function of Commu-nication in Society (New York: Harper, 1948). See also K. Krippendorf, Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2004).

4. Promoting transparent governance of mainland China, improving public services, and safeguarding citizens’ rights to know, according to the head of the website, www.gov.cn began trials on October 1, 2005 and formal operation on January 1, 2006.

5. I.e., peacekeeping norms, which can be traditional and nontraditional (e.g., do not have consent of all parties).

6. Beijing has been promoting harmonious society for some time. A theoreti-cian in the mainland said it is fundamentally Daoist. When you think of wuwo, there will be no comparison and contrast as well as competition, all of which would lead to struggle. See www.chinareviewnews.com, search dated March 10, 2007.

7. The Democratic Action Party leader, ZAHNG Shoujiang said fighting for de-mocracy is all for one and one for all for the sake of the public. See Hua Daily News, February 12, 2007, p. A11.

8. John Vogler, The Global Commons: A Regime Analysis (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1995), p. 18.

9. It is one of the five autonomous areas in the mainland at the provincial level where regional ethnic autonomy is exercised. It has been able to basically maintain itself as a pristine state and it is the place where the environment is best protected, according to the May 2004 white paper, Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet. It has been called the Roof of the World, Third Pole of the Earth, and Shangri-La. In April 2007, Dalai Lama again said that Tibet is part of China but it is ruled by terror. See CP, April 8, 2007, p. 11.

10. According to LEE Seng Giap, “[s]ince as of now there seems to be no Chinese translation capable of doing what the English original term can do, you may, at least for the time being until there is such a Chinese coinage, consider the ‘dichotomy’ approach of separating the ‘software aspect’ from the ‘hardware aspect’ in terms of Chinese translation. The Chinese language seems to be more ‘specific,’ less ‘em-bracing’ and less ‘liquid’ than the English. The ‘dichotomy’ approach may hopefully show you the way out of this ‘Chinese linguistic rigidity or bind.’” Email from him, dated December 14, 2006.

11. english.gov.cn/official/2005-07/28/content_18115.htm. 12. In Section V, we see the term, comprehensive control of the rural develop-

ment. Here, the word, control, in Chinese is zhengzhi, not zhili. 13. media.people.com.cn/BIG5/22114/67020/68024/4827962.html. Obviously,

their understanding of governance differed from the usage in the West.14. Section VII of the June 2006 white paper on environmental protection men-

tioned the following sentence: “A mechanism to share fees for renewable energy resources has been established.” In China’s Efforts and Achievements in Promoting the Rule of Law (February 2008), we see in Part I the following words: “the mechanism


for safeguarding rights and interests” and “a power operating mechanism featuring decision-making authority.”

15. Section VI of the June 2006 white paper on environmental protection men-tioned the following sentence: “By means of a series of measures taken to control the intensity of fishing, reduce the number of fishing boats, improve the morato-rium system, establish marine sanctuaries, and practice zero growth rate, marine fishery resources have been protected and revived.” The Chinese Communist trans-lation for the term, electronic countermeasures is dianziduikang and information countermeasures units, zixunduikangbudui.

16. www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/1027/2915599.html and english.people .com.cn//200410/eng20041013_160038.html, dated October 13, 2004. See also english.people.com.cn//200507/22/eng20050722_197772.html, dated July 22, 2005, when one U.S. dollar equals 8.11 Renminbi (RMB). The word system has been translated as tizhi in the context of the socialist market economy system. But, in the context of floating exchange rate system, it is translated as zhidu.

17. The mainland translates the term, the framework of international law, as xianxingguojifakuangjia or the term, security framework, as anquankuangjia.

18. In the October 2005 Building of Political Democracy in China, it was stated that “[t]he establishment of New China marked a great leap from the 2,000-year-old autocratic feudal political system and the unsuccessful trials in contemporary China imitating the mode of Western democratic political systems to the new people’s democratic political system.” Section I of the December 2006 white paper on na-tional defense mentioned a new mode of state-to-state relations (xinxingguojia-guanximoushi), with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as an example. The same white paper mentioned the term, procurement modes, and the Chinese characters are caigoufangshi.

19. There is no Chinese character for this adjective. 20. In the same white paper, industrial structure was mentioned, and the Chinese

character for the second word is jiegou.21. Aviation Week & Space Technology in January 2007 reported that Beijing per-

formed a successful antisatellite (ASAT) weapons test at 530 miles altitude, destroy-ing an aging Chinese weather satellite with a kinetic kill vehicle launched onboard a ballistic missile, which can leave considerable space debris, which could be more than 1,600 pieces in an orbit used by many different satellites. The United States and the former Soviet Union also did such things. See aviationnow.printthis.click-ability.com/pt/cpt?, dated January 17, 2007, realtime.zaobao.com/2007/01/070119-01.thml, dated January 19, 2007, and China Times (hereinafter CT) (Taipei), April 24, 2007, p. A13.

22. One of the authors is CHEN Zhou, who is a researcher at the Academy of Military Sciences of the Chinese PLA.

23. Here, it did not mention separatism and extremism.24. In the August 1995 white paper on family planning, one also sees the follow-

ing words: government- and community-supported policies and programs. The Gender Equality and Women’s Development in China stated the following words: for-mulated rules, policies, and measures.

25. Regulation in Chinese is also guiding.26. www.jstor.org/view/00167398/ap020607/02a00040/0.


27. Government department is translated as guojiabumen.28. Thus, for example two Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agents were tortured

on the mainland in December 1952. See CT, April 23, 2007, p. A13.29. CP, April 8, 2007, p. 11.30. Ibid., April 22, 20007, p. 4.31. www.china.org.cn/e-white/7/7-II.htm. 32. The June 1994 white paper, The Situation of Chinese Women said that in some

countries in the West only one or two centuries after their founding did the law stipulate that women have equal voting rights with men.

33. However, in the first white paper on human rights, Beijing does admit that drowning or abandoning female infants is still a practice in some remote areas. This is partly due to the fact that Beijing does not allow blind growth in births, given its huge population.

34. Both country and state can be translated as guojia and nation, minzhu.35. www.china.org.cn/e-white/7/7-II.htm.36. www.china.org.cn/e-white/prhumanrights1996/index.htm. 37. www.china.org.cn/e-white/7/7-II.htm.38. In January 1994, Beijing formally presented a draft for the Treaty on the Non-

First-Use of Nuclear Weapons to the United States, Russia, Britain, and France. Only the mainland and Russia made such a promise to each other in July of the same year.

39. Such as conducting aerial surveillance of suspected planting in the primeval forests in the Greater Hinggan Mountains in northeast China and in the Lianhua Mountains in northwest China, with modern scientific and technological methods.

40. In May 2008, there was a big earthquake in Sichuan Province, and many troops were mobilized in the relief work.

41. The Federal Security Service (FSB), still headquartered in Lubyanka Square, Moscow, is the leading secret police organization of the Russian Federation (RF) and main successor of the Soviet Checka, NKVD, and KGB. Today, its power has penetrated into many parts of the country, in the name of antiterrorism. See news .chinatimes.cm/Chinatimes/newslist/0,4066,110504+112006121300077, dated December 13, 2006.

42. CT, October 26, 2008, p. A9.43. Ibid., January 23, 2007, p. A13 and April 24, 2007, p. A13. However, Beijing

has promised not to do it again. See ibid., October 26, 2008, p. A9.44. Beijing speaks of the unity between priorities and conditions as well as rights

and obligations. 45. Zhongguoguofangbao (hereinafter ZGGFB)(Beijing), February 8, 2007, p. 3.46. See my books, Bicoastal China: A Dialectical, Paradigmatic Analysis (New York:

Nova Science Publishers, 1999), The Crab and Frog Motion Paradigm Shift: Decoding and Deciphering Taipei and Beijing’s Dialectical Politics (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2002), and Hu Jintao and the Ascendancy of China (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish International Academic Publishing, 2005).

47. See the December 2004 white paper, China’s National Defense in 2004. In the same white paper, the term, counterterrorism military exercise, was used. The Chi-nese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) regards the following as nontraditional security fields (feichuantonganquanlingyudehezuo): joint counterterrorism, maritime search


and rescue, combating piracy, and cracking down on drug production and trafficking. See the same white paper.

48. ZHAO Bao also said that academics cannot just explain the meaning of higher-ups. See chinadigitaltimes.net/2007/04/phoenix_weekly_on_gao_qinrongs_jail_blues_kims_successo.php, dated April 10, 2007.

49. In the same paragraph, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safe-guard system was used. The word, system, is translated as tixi.

RefeReNCeS

Krippendorf, K., Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2004).

Lasswell, H. D., Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936).

_______, The Structure and Function of Communication in Society (New York: Harper, 1948).

Vogler, John, The Global Commons: A Regime Analysis (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1995).

YU, Peter Kien-hong, Bicoastal China: A Dialectical, Paradigmatic Analysis (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1999).

_______, The Crab and Frog Motion Paradigm Shift: Decoding and Deciphering Taipei and Beijing’s Dialectical Politics (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2002).

_______, Hu Jintao and the Ascendancy of China (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish In-ternational Academic Publishing, 2005).

_______, The Second Long March (New York: The Continuum, 2009).


55

An edited book by Robert Ash, David Shambaugh, and Seiichiro Takagi, China Watching: Perspectives from Europe, Japan and the United States, was reviewed by a business expert on China in the May 2007 issue of Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER).1 The November 2006 book provided insight into the world of China studies as well as China itself. In the epilogue, we see International China Watching in the 21st Century.

In the same issue, Hugo Restall’s article, China’s Bid for Asian Hege-mony,2 was published.

Our simple and straightforward challenge to all of those authors is: When can the non-Chinese scholars and experts and Chinese academics and ex-perts like Willy Wo-lap Lam ever learn about the dialectical Chinese (Com-munist) mind, so that their analysis can be closer to reality? To the lead author, scholarship means the following order of importance: logic, contri-bution, preciseness, closeness to reality, etc. In other words, if what we write is logical, we should all accept this piece of writing. The ultimate, important question is, of course, whether one’s publication is closer to reality? If we applied a wrong approach and methods, which could either be dialectical or nondialectical, we will not be able to be closer to reality. Distortion in-evitably follows.

ANALySIS

Chinese people are very familiar with Yin and Yang plus the Five Elements. A typical, dialectical Chinese mind works in the following way: First, he or she would first think of a dot,3 be it a symbol, a concept, a sentence, a

4Beijing’s Hegemony under International Relations and International RegimesPeter Kien-hong YU and Chun-chi CHIANG

house, the Earth, the solar system, or even the universe or multiple uni-verses. Second, the dialectician would find its opposite or extreme, namely, a nondot. For example, one would think of China, and its opposite or ex-treme would be non-China and vice versa, in between the two extremes. A nondialectical thinker may ask: What is a non-China? Well, it could mean a zillion things, tangible or intangible, such as the United States, Japan, peace, war, etc. A non-China could also be a green apple or red apple. In September 2009, a British farmer showed an apple with both green and red colors. Third, he or she would make sideways moves like a crab.4 Fourth, if this China versus non-China model or framework cannot describe and ex-plain, if not infer or predict, a certain phenomenon, the dialectician would right away construct another dialectical model. A jumping motion can be said as having taken place. Hence, we would see a series of dialectical frame-works at work. Needless to say, one must figure out the largest dialectical model, which constitute the whole picture, and all other models would be part of that largest one. In other words, the dialectician would play a role of a frog, leaping from this model to another model.5 The same person would apply another model to link the two models, which could be entirely dif-ferent.

In September 1994, the lead author constructed the following Crab and Frog Motion model and later it was somewhat modified four times:

1 2 3 4 5 A B C D Etime/space sequence (1)time/space sequence (2)………………………..time/space sequence (n)1 (or 100 percent of the concept or whatever); 3 (or 50 percent of the concept or whatever);5 (or 1 percent of the concept or whatever);E (or 100 percent of the concept or whatever) C (or 50 percent of the concept or whatever)A (or 1 percent of the concept or whatever)

The 1 2 3 4 5 spectrum is equivalent to what I call the safe zone, and the A B C D E spectrum, danger zone. The middle way/road/path is 5 in the safe zone and A is the middle way/road/path in the danger zone, when we look at the 1 2 3 4 5 A B C D E spectrum.

We are glad that Hugo Restall, editor of FEER, which folded in December 2009 after sixty-three years of publication, cited MAO Zedong’s method of playing politics and engaging in military affairs. The name for the method, as mentioned by Restall, is walking on two legs. Other synonyms or related concepts include dialectics, scientific method, double-faced tactics, double

56 Peter Kien-hong YU and Chun-chi CHIANG

dealing, etc. However, he should have applied the Maoist method through-out his piece from the first word to the last word. Otherwise, he is mislead-ing readers or we can only get a partial picture, for example, only looking at the 1 2 3 4 5 spectrum. In a word, Restall should have mentioned both the positive and negative dimensions of hegemony at the outset. Failure to do so will lead many, if not most readers, to having the impression that he wants us to accept his perception that mainland China is threatening oth-ers. There are many publications on the so-called China threat, since the meltdown of the Berlin Wall in late 1989. Twenty years later, there are still some people in the West who perceive that promoting a harmonious world by Beijing is a Communist plot!

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, at least three theories have surfaced, and each one of them does not favor the mainland. The first one argues that Beijing is practicing the neotributary state system and relationship’s modern version of tributary state system and relation-ship.6 The Japanese rightists also mentioned this term. This theory can be easily falsified or negated 50 percent, due to the existence of the West-phalian Treaty system since October 1648. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is neither a dynasty nor an empire. In addition, the mainland, on the whole, has not been mistreating other countries, international organiza-tions, international institutions, etc., just like what ancient Chinese dynas-ties did to the uncultured or uncivilized barbarians by offering them trea-sures, gifts, etc. More than 600 years ago, ZHENG sailed to other parts of the world seven times, including today’s America, and yet we did not see Chinese colonies here and there in the world. In December 2008, the Chi-nese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) embarked on a counterpiracy regime mission to waters off the Federal Republic of Somalia (FROS), and we have yet to see the Chinese PLA Navy taking an inch of that country’s territorial sea. Up to that time, the Chinese PLA Navy had already visited close to forty countries on thirty-one goodwill missions.7 As to the United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Operations from April 1990 to November 2008, it had al-ready dispatched 12,443 observers/staff officers and police officers,8 rank-ing number one in terms of total number of troops.9

The second theory has to do with the peaceful rise of China. It was for the first time put forward by Beijing in November 2003 at the Boao Forum, which is headquartered in Hainan Province. In the late 1980s, the China threat theory began to surface in Japan. Later, when the Soviet Union col-lapsed, more academics and experts in the West joined the chorus. However, the skeptics treat the peaceful rise of China theory as a façade, because, if and when ready, the PRC will show its true colors by threatening others. In late 2008, some observers have already labeled the Chinese PLA Navy as a blue-water navy. At the sixtieth anniversary of the founding of the PRC, some new weapons were displayed. When the latter launches its aircraft carrier, more

Beijing’s Hegemony under International Relations and International Regimes 57

people could be led to believe that the PRC is a real threat to other countries, especially those Southeast Asian claimants of the South China Sea (SCS).

Is it not true that the American military forces are more powerful than the Chinese PLA since the creation of the PRC? On three occasions, Washington contemplated the use of atomic or nuclear weapons to attack the Chinese mainland (neidi). If the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) were set up, which country will be more worried—the United States or the PRC? The answer is too obvious, because, unprotected by or unable to counter it with another type of TMD system, mainland China simply is on the defensive. That is why the then Russian president Vladimir Putin in May 2007 strongly op-posed the U.S. plan to deploy missile interceptors in the Republic of Poland (ROP) and radar units in the Czech Republic (CR) as part of a project to extend the missile defense system in Europe, which may renew the Cold War. In March 2009, the Barack H. Obama II administration offered to make an exchange with the Russian Federation (RF). That is to say, the United States can scrap this system in Europe, and RF would stop helping the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI).10 Why? The reason for the Russian strong objection is that Washington can make the first move to attack its enemies, while being shielded by the system.

In February 2007, Beijing leaders visited Africa and promised many things to the African leaders. Yet, some observers pointed out that Beijing is practicing neocolonialism.11 Needless to say, mainland China is not alone, because the French Republic (FR)’s security policy in sub-Saharan Africa is likened to practicing new imperialism.12 Again, this theory can be easily negated by at least 50 percent, because even the Africans do not agree that this theory can withstand the test of time.13 Besides, in Chinese history, has China ever occupied one inch of foreign land? To be sure, Chinese regard themselves as being peace loving since ancient times, because they would not militarily venture abroad. Besides, there are several other reasons: 1) There is no need to take over foreign land, because the Chinese culture centuries ago has been more superior than the non-Chinese culture; 2) the Chinese heroes were only interested in taking over Zhongyuan (Central Plains) with Beijing as part of it; 3) the Chinese characters belong to what we called ideogram/ideograph, and the Chinese characters for country or state are guojia, the first character of which tells us China is enclosed or sur-rounded by four walls, that is to say, the Chinese are defensive players;14 4) the Chinese were more interested in receiving “barbarians” from abroad and to convert them into Chinese, such as the Mongolians and the Man-chus, the latter of whom ruled China up to 1911; 5) merchants were at the bottom of the social strata and, therefore, the merchants would not receive support from emperors and empresses to venture overseas; 6) after ZHENG’s seventh trip abroad, the Ming dynasty basically closed its doors to foreign-ers; 7) the Chinese emphasize filial piety, meaning they must obey their


parents and ancestors and, therefore, one would be regarded as lacking filial piety if he or she died abroad; and 8) Chinese philosophers and scholars in ancient days are fond of collating everything in terms of Yin and Yang. As such, they prefer balance, if not harmony.

Restall’s theory, or the fourth one, is that the PRC is seeking Asian hege-mony. To be sure, this theory can be easily challenged, because by “hege-mony,” most people know that it has a negative connotation under interna-tional relations or even international affairs. However, hegemony can also have a positive connotation or what we called benign hegemony, under international regimes, a term which should be familiar to most people in the West. Let us elaborate.

Applying the lead author’s model, the positive dimension of hegemony can be placed at 1, while the negative dimension, 5. By making this kind of dialectical arrangement, the Chinese Communist action is not what LAM had mistakenly described—it appears schizophrenic, because it is pursuing contradictory policies.15 In other words, there is no contradiction whatso-ever, because whenever Beijing makes a move, it is only thinking of one thing or concept at a time. There could never be a single contradiction, if applying the lead author’s dialectical model.

Restall on page 10 of his writing pointed out that there exists a “natural desire among Asians for self-reliance and freedom from outside interfer-ence.” If so, why would Beijing want to be a second hegemon or trouble-maker? Since ZHU Rongji became the PRC premier, he called for a smaller government and a bigger society. Up to the end of 2008, there are close to 400,000 registered nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the PRC.16 Among them are 1,390 foundations, think tanks, etc. In this connection, is Restall also referring to the United States, if not other countries, as an intru-sive hegemon? This is because he acknowledged that “[i]n order to gain leverage over [the] rogue regimes, the United States may have to acquiesce to a greater Chinese role in East Asia,”17 and, as he cited, the conclusion of the U.S. Council on Foreign Affairs (CFA) in which it was stated that there is “no evidence to support the notion that China will become a peer com-petitor of the United States” by 2030.18 Restall also mentioned that Wash-ington is trying to prevent either Beijing or Tokyo “from gaining preeminent power,”19 implying that the former has long been a hegemon in Asia. Under the George W. Bush administration, we often hear that the United States had been practicing unilateralism, which ended in April 2009, when the United States also suffered a lot in the global economic downturn, espe-cially in September 2008.

“International regimes” is a term which many people, especially Asians, do not fully understand. It is simply too abstract. One can sense it. The adjective, palpable, could be mentioned at this juncture. Examples are the arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation regime, the human rights regime, the


international business policy regime, the environmental regime, the whaling regime, etc. They are beneficial to all countries, political entities, and indi-viduals like you and me, if formed, maintained, or sustained. If Beijing wants to be a hegemon in maintaining and sustaining many, if not all, international regimes, it is fostering a more benign image in the international community. For this reason, Restall observed that the “ASEAN has gone from being the anti-China club to China’s partner in trade.” The ASEAN + 1 Free Trade Area (FTA) became a reality in January 2010. Federation of Malaysia (FOM), for example, eliminated 2,123 items from tariff. In November 2001, the negotia-tions began.

In sum, Restall has misled many readers. We are pretty sure that Beijing in the years ahead will maintain and sustain more international regimes, to the benefit of all. PRC president HU Jintao was certainly serious when he talked about a harmonious world at the UN again in September 2009. Do not forget that not all regimes are favorable to the mainland, such as the human rights regime, which will certainly make the Beijing regime on the defensive.

Here, we can say something about the swarm theory. Like the interna-tional regimes theory, they share similarities. Scientist Lain Couzin and his colleagues used computer programs and models to discover the rules that swarming animals—from ants, to Mormon crickets, to humans—follow.20 Some of the important facts are as follows, to cite Carl Zimmer’s report at length:

Couzin et al. started to discover simple rules that allow swarms to work so well. Those rules allow thousands of relatively simple animals to form a collective brain able to make decisions and move like a single organism.

Deciphering those rules is a big challenge, however, because the behavior of swarms emerges unpredictably from the actions of thousands or millions of individuals.

“No matter how much you look at an individual army ant,” the scientist said, “you will never get a sense that when you put 1.5 million of them to-gether, they form these bridges and columns. You just cannot know that.”

To get a sense of swarms, the scientist built computer models of virtual swarms. Each model contains thousands of individual agents, which he can program to follow a few simple rules. To decide what those rules ought to be, Couzin et al. head out to jungles, deserts, or oceans to observe animals in action.

He built a computer model based on some basic ant biology. Each simulated ant laid down a chemical marker that attracted other ants, while the marker was still fresh. Each ant could also sweep the air with its antennas; if it made contact with another ant, it turned away and slowed down to avoid a collision.

The scientist analyzed how the ants behaved when he tweaked or to pinch and pull with a sudden jerk and twist21 their behavior. If the ants turned away too quickly from oncoming insects, they lost the scent of their trail. If they did not turn fast enough, they ground to a stop and forced ants behind them to


slow down. Couzin found that a narrow range of behavior allowed ants to move as a group as quickly as possible.

Eventually Couzin and others found that the real ants were moving in the way that the scientist had predicted would allow the entire swarm to go as fast as possible. They also found that the ants behaved differently if they were leav-ing the nest or heading back. When two ants encountered each other, the outgoing ant turned away further than the incoming one. As a result, the ants headed to the nest end up clustered in a central lane, while the outgoing ants form two outer lanes.

The more Couzin studies swarm behavior, the more patterns he finds com-mon to many different species.

Just as liquid water can suddenly begin to boil, animal swarms can also change abruptly thanks to some simple rules.

However, understanding how animals swarm and why they do are two sepa-rate questions.

In some species, animals may swarm so that the entire group enjoys an evo-lutionary benefit. All the army ants in a colony, for example, belong to the same family. Thus, if individuals cooperate, their shared genes associated with swarming will become more common.

But, in the deserts of Utah, U.S.A., Couzin and others discovered that giant swarms may actually be made up of a lot of selfish individuals.

When Mormon crickets cannot find enough salt and protein, they become cannibals. “Each cricket itself is a perfectly balanced source of nutrition,” Couzin said. “So the crickets, every 17 seconds or so, try to attack other indi-viduals. If you don’t move, you’re likely to be eaten.”

This collective movement causes the crickets to form vast swarms. “All these crickets are on a forced march,” Couzin said. “They’re trying to attack the crick-ets who are ahead, and they’re trying to avoid being eaten from behind.”

Couzin et al. have been finding support for this computer model in real groups of animals. They have even found support in studies on mediocre swarmers—humans.

Finally, as the scientist’s model predicted, the human swarm made a quick, unconscious decision to follow the largest group of leaders.

The moral of the above-mentioned story is that it is possible for countries to cooperate and coordinate to tackle an issue-area, issue-areas, or issue-regimes, which are related to an international regime or international re-gimes. This author perceives that Beijing will participate in more regimes at the international level, knowing that each regime transcends sovereignty, which is a sensitive but noninternational regimes issue.

Last but not least, Beijing should have publicized my dialectical CHINA, China, and china theoretical framework22 at Boao in November 2003. CHINA is 1; China, 5, and China, E. The dynamics of the movement is from the right extreme to the left extreme. Another way of saying the same thing is Non-China Threat (or 1) versus China Threat (or E). It is in between those two extremes that Beijing has been playing political games and engaged in


military affairs since October 1949, if not earlier. There is no doubt that the mainland has definitely chose to make moves in the safe zone since Novem-ber 2003, including its attempt to peacefully reunify both sides of the Taiwan Strait by first agreeing to signing a legal document, such as the Taipei-pro-posed Liangan (Cross-Strait) Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), as first proposed by the MA Ying-jeou government in February 2009, which is modeled after the FTA or Comprehensive Economic Coop-eration Agreement (CECA), or Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) between many countries or between the PRC and its Special Admin-istration Regions (SARs) like Hongkong and Macao. Beijing also wants to sign an agreement with Taipei to end the civil war hostility, which techni-cally, or at least conceptually, still exists.

CoNCLuDING RemARkS

Beijing has been opposing to become a hegemon for a long period of time. It is for multilateral interactions among nation-states. This can be regarded as Confucian governance, recognizing that each country is different, while promoting harmony at the international level. For this reason, it will try to participate in more international regimes in the future.

PoSTSCRIPT

Taipei and the International health Regulations

In February 2009, one ranking official of the ruling party, Nationalist Party of China (KMT), said he was quite optimistic about Taipei getting the ob-server status in the World Health Organization (WHO).23 Two months later, it was confirmed.

This postcript attempts to highlight the main points in the process of returning to the WHO, which tries to maintain and sustain the world health regime.

There are many concepts foreign to the Chinese in the last few hundred years, such as democracy and anarchism.24 Thus, the former had been trans-lated as Mr. De and the latter, being partially transliterated as annaqi-zhuyi.

In the early twenty-first century, the term, “international regimes,” both-ered most government officials and common people alike, on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. To this day, there is no proper, standard Chinese transla-tion for such an abstract term.

Simply put, each regime at the international level has to do with an issue in a given area of international relations. The following terms can be derived from this partial definition: issue-area, issue-areas, and issue-regimes. Hence,


my definition is: A set (or sets of) at least fifteen criteria/core elements/fea-ture in the context of (fragmented) issue-area, (fragmented) issue-areas, and issue-regimes. To be sure, we cannot discuss two or more contradictory or clashing regimes at the same time. We can only describe, explain, and infer, not predict, positive regimes.

To grasp a fuller understanding of this term, it must be pointed out that each regime has at least fifteen criteria, core elements, or features, such as its 100 percent positive nature, one for all and all for one, cooperation, co-ordination, community-centered arrangement, transparency, and mitiga-tion of (scientific) uncertainty.

In late January 2009, the WHO, for the first time, agreed to let Chinese Taipei be part of the International Health Regulations 2005 (tiaoli) (IHR), which entered into force in June 2007 and are binding in 194 countries or states across the globe, including all 193 Member States of the WHO. At this time, Beijing did not sign the Implementation of the Memorandum of Un-derstanding (IMOU) between the WHO Secretariat and China.25 This is certainly a result of the two major developments.

First, MA Ying-jeou’s workable, viable, and flexible diplomacy has been working since May 2008, when he became the president of the Republic of China (ROC), calling for diplomatic truce between Taipei and Beijing, al-though we still hear rumors saying Latin American countries like the Repub-lic of Haiti (ROH), Republic of Paraguay (ROP), and Republic of Panama (RP) are ready to switch diplomatic relations from the ROC to the PRC at any time.

Second, in January 1979, Beijing began to call for three links and four ex-changes between Taiwan and the Chinese mainland (neidi). In December 2008, the last important link, to wit, direct shipping and air flight service, had finally been realized, and the opposition political party, Democratic Progres-sive Party (DPP), did not really oppose it, so long as the sovereign, indepen-dent status of Taiwan can be maintained and sustained. In August 2009, we witnessed the first direct flight between both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

Why did it take the ROC so long to be part of the WHO system? A brief description and explanation is first in order. Then, I will again talk about the international regimes.

There are a few intergovernmental organizations in the world, which are seemingly not political to begin with, but which can be politicized. One good example is the WHO.

According to its Constitution, only members of the UN can officially join it. So, in November 2002, when the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) or the commonly called new killer strain pneumonia, began to spread to parts of Asia like the Taiwan area, Hongkong, and Macao, a WHO official in Beijing said Taiwan is not a country but days later the interna-tional health body chose to treat it as Taiwan (China) or Taiwan, China.


To be sure, the Constitution also states that “other countries may be ad-mitted as members when their application has been approved by a simple majority vote of the World Health Assembly (WHA).”

There is still another option by becoming an associate member of the WHO or an observer just like the Vatican, Liechtenstein, the Palestinian Authority (PA), the International Red Cross (IRC), and the Knights of Malta (KM). Thus, Taipei, in its January 2002 application form, used the title of “Republic of China, Taiwan.”26

To test the Beijing resolve, Taipei, as early as the annual May 1997 WHA, tried to convince other capitals, saying it can make contributions to enhance the public health, and therefore, it should be allowed to join the assembly.27

From 1997 to 2009, it proposed to use various names to play a role in the WHA or the WHO, to wit, ROC (Taiwan) from 1997 to 2000; Taiwan (ROC) in 2001; Taiwan in 2002; Health Authorities of Taiwan in 2003; Tai-wan in 2004; Taiwan, Health Entity28 in 2005; Taiwan from 2006 to 2008; and Chinese Taipei in 2009.29

In April 2007, Washington threw cold water on Taipei’s hopes of gaining membership simply under the name Taiwan, in the WHA but pledged to work to find new ways for the latter as an observer to continue to meaning-fully participate in WHO technical meetings and regional activities as well as activities outside of the WHA, namely, the Global Outbreak Alert & Re-sponse Network (GOARN) and IHR 2005, which is a set code of practices and procedures, dating back to the International Sanitary Regulations (ISR) adapted at the International Sanitary Conference (ISC) in Paris from July 1851 to January 1852, designed to prevent the international spread or cross-border transmission of epidemics and serious diseases, due to increased international travel and trade.30

It goes without saying that the Chinese mainland has been using all of its might to block the Taiwan area’s participation in the WHO, up to April 2009. Its fear is very simple and straightforward. If Taipei succeeds in enter-ing the WHA or the WHO, it will most likely make other moves or de-mands, such as using it as a stepping-stone to return to the UN General Assembly or other intergovernmental organizations. In January 2009, the new Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton said the United States will con-tinue to support the ROC’s efforts to gain more international space, includ-ing becoming an observer at the WHA.

In May 2005, as a result of revision, the concept universal application (pushiyuanzhe) became part of the IHR 2005. And, on May 14th of 2005, Beijing signed an IMOU with the WHO as a special arrangement prior to resolving a political stalemate between Taipei and Beijing. There were three points.

First, the WHO Secretariat can invite Taiwan’s medical and public health experts to individually attend its technical activities. If necessary,


Taiwan’s experts can say that they come from “Taiwan, China.” Second, the WHO Secretariat can send its staff and experts to Taiwan to examine the public health and contagious disease situation, as well as discuss health issues with Taiwan’s medical and public health experts and provide medical and public health technical assistance. Third, if Taiwan faces a serious outbreak, the WHO Secretariat will, if necessary, send experts to Taiwan as soon as possible and give technical assistance, or invite Taiwan’s medical and public health experts to join technical activities initiated by the Secretariat.

In March 2006, the WHO included Taiwan as a province of China in which humans and poultry were affected by the virulent H5N1 avian flu virus. Later, it made the correction, deleting Taiwan. And, in January 2008, Beijing blocked a draft resolution, calling for wider IHR coverage to in-clude nonmembers, implying, for example, “Chinese Taipei,” during a meeting.

Despite numerous setbacks, Taipei did score points. In October 2002, Japan’s Foreign Ministry for the first time said it would speak on behalf of the ROC in Geneva if the United States takes the lead in May 2003.31 In June 2003, for the first time in more than thirty years, Taipei was able to dispatch several officials to attend the WHO Global Conference on SARS in Kuala Lumpur. On March 31, 2005, Beijing, for the first time, said Taipei can tech-nically participate in the WHA as an observer under the name “Taiwan, China.” So, from April 2005 to April 2006, Taipei’s health experts did par-ticipate in more than ten WHO-sponsored events.32

To be sure, the IHR 2005 can be regarded as a regime at the international level, beneficial to all the countries and political/economic entities in the world. Since it is part of the WHO system, Taipei has been making efforts to be part of the IHR 2005 regime. For example, in the year 2006, it declared that, even though it is not part of the IHR 2005, it would comply with its regulations (forming international law).33

Arguably, unless the WHO revises its constitution by declaring itself as the World Health Regime (WHR) and all the countries and political/eco-nomic entities in the world are part of its community-centered arrange-ments, the chance of Taipei joining it as a WHA member is still slim in the foreseeable future, and, when it tries to join it each time, Beijing will put pressure on the WHO members with which have diplomatic relations, not to admit Taipei. This is unless it is done under the One China Principle, as HU said in April 2004, or as stipulated in the December 1992 consensus.

In sum, many political observers are not aware that MA’s workable diplo-macy embraces the spirit of international regimes, which transcend sover-eign, national boundaries, and regimes can certainly work well, if under urgency, as opposed to other scenarios like insecurity, convergent expecta-tion, and perception.


NoTeS

1. Robert A. Kapp, Far Eastern Economic Review (hereinafter FEER) (Hongkong), vol. 170, no. 4 (May 2007), pp. 74–76.

2. Hugo Restall, “China’s Bid for Asian Hegemony,” FEER, vol. 170, no. 4 (May 2007), pp. 10–14.

3. Ibid., and see also Peter Kien-hong YU and W. Emily CHOW, “The Study of Politics and Non-Politics Should Begin with One Dot,” The One-dot Center Occa-sional Working Papers Series, forthcoming.

4. There are crabs which could move forward. 5. See Peter Kien-hong Yu, The Crab and Frog Motion Paradigm Shift: Decoding and

Deciphering Taipei and Beijing’s Dialectical Politics (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2002).

6. Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Knopf, 1997) and Pan Xiaotao, “ZhongguoDe’XinChaogongTixiZhujianXingcheng.” See www.atchinese.com/index.php/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=11099&Itemid=47, dated December 9, 2005.

7. Jiefangjunbao (hereinafter JFJB) (Beijing), December 26, 2008, p. 4. 8. www.china-un.org/eng/zt/wh/t534321.htm, dated March 4, 2009. 9. JFJB, January 4, 2009, p. 7.10. United Daily News (hereinafter UDN)(Taipei), March 4, 2009, p. A12.11. C. Alden, D. Large, and R. Soares de Oliveira, eds., China Returns to Africa: A

Superpower and a Continent Embrace (London: Hurst, 2008). 12. Bruno Charbonneau, France and the New Imperialism (Hampshire, UK: Ash-

gate, 2008).13. www.libertytimes.com.tw/2006/new/jul/4/today-o3.htm, dated July 4,

2006. 14. The first one is the Great Wall of China, the second one is the desert in the

western part of the Chinese mainland, and the third and fourth ones are the oceans or seas, which serve as natural barriers from foreign invasion in ancient times.

15. Cited in Restall, p. 12.16. www.zaobao.com/yl/tx090303_501.shtml, dated March 3, 2009. There are

more than 50,000 NGOs. In Taiwan, Republic of China (ROC), there are 2,162 NGOs. See www.cna.com.tw, dated December 31, 2009, 13:06:19, accessed on the same day.

17. Cited in Restall, p. 13.18. Cited in ibid.19. Ibid.20. Carl Zimmer, “Ants and Humans: Peas in a Pod,” Taipei Times (hereinafter TT)

(Taipei), November 18, 2007, p. 19.21. www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/tweak. 22. See my book, HU Jintao and the Ascendancy of China (Singapore: Marshall

Cavendish International Academic Publishing, 2005). 23. www.chinareviewnews.com 2009-02-18 21:17:28. 24. The South Africa tribes began to use this term. Conversation with SHIH

Chih-yu, dated March 17, 2009.25. Taipei Times (hereinafter TT) (Taipei), May 13, 2009, p. 1.


26. In May 2002, the ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) announced that Taipei will treat itself as a “health entity” and, therefore, it will simply use “Taiwan” to apply for a seat at the WHA as an observer. In April 2003, the U.S. Senate major-ity leader said he will help Taipei to achieve that goal.

27. The voting result was 128 against Taipei and 19 for Taipei, with 5 absentees (including the United States). In May 2003, the ROC president, Chen Shui-bian, in a letter to the editor of Washington Post said Taipei should be able to join the WHA as an observer. A pro-ROC professor in the United States, Chiu Hungdah, said in 1999 Wang Daohan was planning to go to Taiwan and tell the latter that it can join the WHO. See news.chinatimes.com/chinatimes/newlist/newlist-con-tent/0,3546,110505+112003062300069,00.html, dated June 23, 2003.

28. There is an article in the WHO, mentioning the term public health entity.29. United Daily News (hereinafter UDN) (Taipei), April 30, 2009, p. A3. The Re-

public of China (ROC) Ministry of Education (MOE) in April 2009 asked ROC citi-zens to follow the following guide when they participate in international organiza-tions (including nongovernmental organizations), meetings, and activities: Officially in writing: 1. ROC; 2. Taiwan; 3. Taiwan, ROC; 4. ROC (Taiwan); 5. Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen & Matsu. Semiofficially in writing: 1. Taiwan; 2. Chinese Taipei. Verbally calling the Chinese mainland/mainland China: 1. China or People’s Republic of China (PRC); 2. Beijing. Verbally calling ourselves: 1. Taiwan; 2. Taipei.

30. Taipei Times (hereinafter TT) (Taipei), May 11, 2006, p. 3 and May 20, 2006, p. 1. See also China Post (hereinafter CP) (Taipei), May 20, 2006, p. 19.

31. www.taipeitimes.com/news/front/archives/2003/03/01/196320, dated March 1, 2003.

32. TT, May 11, 2006, p. 3.33. See Hua Daily News (hereinafter SHDN) (Kuching, Sarawak, Malaysia), Janu-

ary 23, 2009, p. 12.


69

5Adaptation and Strategic Calculation: China’s Participation in International Regimes and InstitutionsSuisheng ZHAO

For a long time in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) history, China was reluctant to participate in international institutions because of the concern over possible erosion of state sovereignty. A contradiction between multilat-eralism and bilateralism, therefore, has constantly tested China’s foreign policy makers.1 The post–Cold War era has witnessed a rise of multilateral-ism in international politics, which is creating more and more pressure on China’s traditional diplomacy. In response, while China still feels more comfortable with bilateralism, it has sought memberships and actively par-ticipated in more and more multilateral institutions at both global and re-gional levels. As a rising power in the Asia–Pacific, China has not only ex-pressed particular enthusiasm to participate in regional institutions such as Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN + 3, and East Asia Summit but also launched the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and hosted the Six-Party Talks to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis.

This chapter attempts to explain China’s turn to international institutions by examining the following three variables: China’s adaptation to the evolv-ing transnational norms in the context of globalization; China’s strategic calculation in shaping the distribution of power in the international system; and China’s evolving position over state sovereignty. It argues that because China needs to create a stable and peaceful external environment for do-mestic economic growth, on which the political legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) now depends, and raise its positive profile and dispel concerns and misgivings about China’s growing economic and mili-tary strengths, China has made a positive response to emerging transna-tional norms associated with globalization. This is an adaptation behavior,

reflecting China’s increasing involvement in an increasingly interdependent world and signifying its growing commitment to a rule-based and norm-driven international order. China’s turn to multilateralism is also based on a strategic calculation in shaping the distribution of power to China’s favor. Frustrated by what it sees as a structural conflict between China as a rising power and the United States as the sole superpower in the post–Cold War world, China has adopted a soft balancing strategy against the U.S. prepon-derance, relying on participation in international institutions and other diplomatic maneuvering. International institutions, therefore, become in-strumental in China’s strategic maneuvering.

Setting on a path to become a stakeholder in the international economic and security system, the Chinese government has moved from the position of staunchly advocating state sovereignty to a more flexible one. China’s position, however, has not fundamentally changed. China’s comfort level for participating in multilateral institutions and hence its behavior in these organizations is guided by its consideration of the ability to maximize its relative power, national interest, and autonomy within these organiza-tions. Defending China’s sovereignty, therefore, remains a central concern in China’s conduct of diplomacy, including participation in international institutions.

ADAPTATIoN To The TRANSNATIoNAL NoRmS AND GLoBAL ReGImeS

China’s embrace of international institutions is first of all a reflection of its gradual adaptation to the evolving transnational norms, such as coopera-tive development, interdependence, human rights, and common security, which give shape and substance to the international system in the process of globalization. These transnational norms were alien to Chinese leaders for many years in PRC history when Chinese leaders insisted on the West-phalian principles of state sovereignty, equality, and nonintervention in the domestic affairs. Chinese leaders felt particularly comfortable with the state sovereignty principle because the historical memories of victimization dur-ing the long century of national humiliation produced a deeply rooted fear among Chinese elites about the possible erosion of sovereignty by imperial-ist powers. In addition, Chinese leaders found the state sovereignty princi-ple instrumental to China as a relatively weak power for many years in the contemporary world because they permit all states, big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, to participate in international affairs on an equal foot-ing, manage their own domestic affairs free from foreign interference, and coexist peacefully with other nations. The state sovereignty principle was a sword of the Chinese government to cut down democratic dissidents and

70 Suisheng ZHAO

ethnic separatists at home and a shield with which to ward off external criticism of China’s domestic practices, including political suppression and human rights abuses.

The prevailing international norms, nevertheless, have been evolving. While the core principles of the Westphalian system continue to be ob-served in the international affairs, their unbridled premises on state sover-eignty have been challenged by the emerging transnational norms in asso-ciation firstly with the creation of the United Nation (UN) system and then with the development of globalization. The UN system brought about new transnational norms and institutions to enforce peace and promote eco-nomic development through collective actions that required nation-states to give away some elements of sovereignty such as conducting war and con-trolling cross-border economic activities to international institutions. The UN system thus “laid the basis for unprecedented levels of cooperation and shared authority over the global system.”2 The transnational norms have been reinforced by globalization that renders national economies increas-ingly subject to the disciplines of global economy and susceptible to the influence and activities of international investment, capital, personnel, and technology flows. As a result, the rigid territorial boundaries of nation-states can no longer be barriers of resolving borderless economic problems. While the nation-state is still sovereign, its authority over transnational economic activities has been inevitably weakened. Globalization has also given rise to many nontraditional security threats such as infectious disease, environmental degradation, and transnational crimes of human trafficking and drug trafficking. Dealing with these threats, many international institu-tions have to look beyond territorially bounded nation-state systems and regulate the behavior of often conflicting states in response to transnational requirements of globalization. These developments have posed serious challenges to the state sovereignty principle. Some scholarly writings even claimed the death-knell of the nation-states and hence an “end of sover-eignty.”3 Although “the end of sovereignty” has never come through, the state sovereignty has become more fluid and diminished under the impact of globalization, and its role in the international system has been redefined in the relationship with the translational norms and institutions.

Chinese leaders began to encounter the transnational norms after China’s entry into the UN and its Security Council in 1971. The most important mo-tivation of China’s participation in the UN system was, ironically, to reinforce China’s state sovereignty and equality. Beijing saw its UN membership as an international recognition of the PRC sovereignty and regime legitimacy and took advantage of its UN membership to advance the so-called Five Princi-ples of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, noninterference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mu-tual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. Insisting that the core of the Five

Adaptation and Strategic Calculation 71

Principles is mutual respect for sovereignty, for many years, China’s attitude toward transnational norms and international regimes remained very passive and skeptical, and its participation in the UN institutions was highly selective and symbolic. China began to gradually converge toward the emerging trans-national norms only after it started an economic modernization program that brought China into an unprecedented interdependence with the global economy in the early 1980s. As a function of China’s position in the global political and economic system or a “global logic,”4 the growing global eco-nomic interdependence has created an international context in which sig-nificant constraints are placed on China’s international behavior.

China’s attitude shift toward the transnational norms has come, however, at a different pace with regard to different issue areas, reflecting China’s real-ization of their relevance to its modernization programs. Although China struggled to achieve self-reliance and Chinese participation in international economic cooperation was minimal in the early years of the PRC, as Chinese economy was quickly integrated into the global economy, China quickly be-came receptive to economic interdependence as a means of pursuing its modernization programs. China’s participation in international institutions, therefore, took place first in the international economic issue areas in the 1980s when China began actively seeking memberships in international eco-nomic institutions. China joined the World Bank and the International Mon-etary Fund (IMF) in 1980 and established a proactive relationship with these international institutions to facilitate China’s reform process and advance its modernization programs. As Pieter Bottelier, former World Bank Chief of Mission in Beijing, indicated, both the World Bank and the IMF “provided unique opportunities for China to learn from the experience of other coun-tries in a professional and politically neutral international setting.” According to Bottelier, China’s relationship with the IMF was centered on economic consultations and technical assistance in the development of macroeconomic institutions, policies, and statistics. The relationship with the World Bank quickly became very broad and deep, covering most sectors of the economy, social and regional development, environmental protection as well as macro-economic reforms. China became the World Bank’s largest borrower and one of the largest recipients of technical assistance in the early 1990s before the program began to shrink toward the end of the decade.5

After fifteen years of difficult negotiations for the accession to the GATT/WTO that started in 1986, China finally became a member of the WTO in 2001. “China’s WTO membership signifies China’s full integration into the global economy from the position of previously isolated and planned economy.”6 Embracing economic interdependence, China has become a major beneficiary of globalization after it transformed its development strategy from self-sufficient to fully participating in the international divi-sion of labor in light of its comparative advantages. These changes have

72 Suisheng ZHAO

brought about a fundamental transition of Beijing’s view about the trans-national norms guiding international economic transactions. Not only is transnational economic cooperation now accepted as positive activities, they are treated as a kind of global collective goods that China has fully taken advantage of for its economic modernization drive.7

While China quickly shifted its stance on economic issues in the direction of boundary transgression, it was reluctant to become part of the contest over the emerging transnational norms on sensitive security and human rights issues until the 1990s when China proposed a “new security concept” (xin anquan guan), which is a “Chinese version of cooperative security.”8 A Chinese scholar said that this new concept came from the realization that “given the comprehensive and complex nature of security threats in the world, no single state, even the most powerful country, can cope with all the challenges alone.” According to him, “many threats in the untraditional se-curity field are not aimed at any specific countries but challenges facing many states. The new features of security environment in today’s world en-hance the common interests and interdependence of countries in the man-agement of security.” China, therefore, has begun to promote “cooperative security on the basis of common security.”9 Accepting the concepts of com-mon and cooperative security, China has shown a growing interest in gain-ing membership in international security regimes, including international arms control and disarmament regimes and UN peacekeeping activities.

China viewed nuclear test bans and nonproliferation regimes as ploys of the United States and other Western powers intended to monopolize nu-clear weapons and solidify the large nuclear powers’ advantages before the late 1980s. Its position experienced a significant transformation from suspi-cion and dismissal to guarded endorsement of the international norms in arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation in the 1990s when Beijing began undertaking serious efforts to accession of key treaties and conventions and active participation in multilateral negotiations. China signed the Com-prehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and ratifying the Chemical Weapons Conven-tion (CWC) during the 1990s. China’s changing position came because China gradually realized that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction could affect its own security interests negatively and the international non-proliferation regimes could prohibit such countries as Japan, the Koreas, and Taiwan to acquire nuclear weapons. By adhering to international treaties and conventions, China not only commits to nonproliferation principles, but also places itself, to some extent, under international legal constraints on its own nuclear weapons modernization programs. Beijing, however, is willing to pay the price if such mechanisms would prevent its neighboring coun-tries that may pose a security threat from joining the nuclear club. In addi-tion, with its rising national comprehensive capacity, China does not want


to be seen as an outcast or impediment to international nonproliferation efforts, which would damage its efforts to establish an image as a respon-sible power.10

As China has turned from rejecting to participating in international secu-rity regimes, China’s attitude toward sensitive UN peacekeeping and human-itarian intervention has experienced a significant change. Treating as docile special detachments of the international imperialism for many years, China took a very negative attitude toward UN peacekeeping activities and human-itarian interventions and characterized these activities as a fringe of individual country’s sovereignty and interference in their domestic affairs. Refusing par-ticipation in UN peacekeeping for some years after China’s entry into the UN, Beijing stopped simply casting negative votes on authorizing resolutions in the 1980s when China for the first time voted for the extension of UN peace-keeping forces in Cyprus and sent military observers for the first time to serve in the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East. In the 1990s, China participated in UN-sponsored nontradi-tional peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, Somalia, and East Timor that were involved heavily in state-building, which China regarded as a violation of state sovereignty principles. Since then, China has become a major contrib-uting country to the UN peacekeeping forces all over the globe. According to a study, as of December 2008, China was the fourteenth largest contributor to UN peacekeeping operations, providing more troops, police, and observers to UN operations than three other permanent members of the UN Security Council—Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. This trend re-flects China’s overall effort to become more responsive to international ex-pectations while making positive and tangible contributions to global peace and security. Positive engagement with the outside world helps China project a more benign and “harmonious” image beyond its borders, reassure neigh-bors of its peaceful intentions, and softly balance the influence of other major players—such as the United States—while gradually but more firmly estab-lishing China’s acceptance as a great power.11

China’s attitude toward the most sensitive human rights regimes has also become more flexible since the 1990s as it found itself increasingly isolated against international sanctions and condemnations of its human rights abuse following the Tiananmen crackdown on pro-democracy demonstra-tions in 1989. China now faced an international community that was more coherent of the human rights issue. More and more countries came to the agreement that states cannot insist on the absolute sovereignty in their do-mestic affairs if they abuse the fundamental human rights of their citizens. While the U.S. government sponsored resolutions in the UN to condemn China’s human rights abuse every year in the 1990s, President Clinton is-sued an Executive Order in May 1993 to link China’s MFN status in the United States to “overall, significant progress” in specific human rights ar-

74 Suisheng ZHAO

eas. Although the U.S.-sponsored resolution never passed in the UN and President Clinton delinked China’s MFN status with its human rights re-cords a year later, Chinese leaders came to the realization that China could no longer simply reject the criticism of its human rights abuse without con-fronting the most power members of the international community. This situation would not only damage China’s international reputation but also hurt its economic modernization programs, which depended heavily on foreign trade and investment at the time.

In response, although China continued to reject international criticism of its human rights record, it took a more pragmatic approach to accepting the international human rights norms but reinterpreting them to its favor rather than confronting them. Starting with the Vienna international Con-ference on Human Rights in 1993, China has actively participated in the global and regional conferences on human rights and proclaimed its close association with the international human rights regimes. China’s constitu-tion amendments in 2004 included an article to ensure human rights pro-tection for the Chinese people. Conducting an international human right diplomacy, China signed and ratified five of the six core Human Rights trea-ties, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cul-tural Rights. The only one that China did not ratify is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. China has constructed a favorable interpretive community by pouring “new meanings into the human rights norms in the way that would make China less susceptible to international isolation and condemnation.”12 Claiming that the priority of the human rights protection in developed countries like China is different from the priority in the West, the Chinese government has asserted that human rights are first the rights of economic development and survival, not individual civil rights. As a Chinese analyst suggested, “For a country aimed to realize democracy, freedom and human rights, the fundamental way is to promote economic development and the progress and stability of the society.”13 China is, therefore, at the forefront of an effort to deconstruct the notion of universal human rights and replace it with a concept in which some rights, i.e., economic and social rights, are more “fundamental” than others, i.e., civil and political rights, the proper balance of which is to be determined according to “national circumstances.”

China’s participation in international regimes has certainly modified its rigid position on state sovereignty, growing more reflective of the new real-ity in an increasingly interdependent world. To create a peaceful environ-ment for economic development, Chinese leaders have come to the realiza-tion that conforming to, rather than challenging, the prevailing norms of the existing international system is in China’s interests. As Zbigniew K. Brzezinski said, “the Chinese leadership is not guided by rigid ideology in which their future depends on the imposition of their value system on the


world like, for example, Stalinist Russia or Hitler’s Germany. They are guided much more by the thought that they have to be part of the world and are trying to figure out how to do it.”14 As a result, China has been in-creasingly receptive to the emerging international norms and generously sought membership in a variety of international institutions.

China’s adoption behavior, however, has not fundamentally changed China’s position on state sovereignty. As one study finds, the Chinese gov-ernment is aware that the impact of globalization on state sovereignty varies from one state to the other and the determining factors are the strength and development level of individual states. For weak or small states, globaliza-tion can represent a significant threat to state sovereignty. A strong and powerful state, however, could resist the threatening of globalization in its sovereignty. China as a rising power and with an enhanced state capacity, therefore, “may integrate into the global economy and participate in the international economic institutions in its own terms and to reap the bene-fits of globalization without an undue loss of autonomy and . . . a necessary erosion of the sovereignty of the nation-state.” China’s adaptation to the transnational norms, therefore, “relies on a realist perspective of the world, one that is more ‘intern-national’ than ‘global.’”15 Consequently, a study finds that “the norm of human rights has not been completely internalized in China and is controversial if it is confronted with the norm of sover-eignty.”16 Even in the domain of international economic cooperation, Chi-nese leaders have not allowed the participation in international institutions to erode the Chinese state sovereignty. As one case study of Chinese par-ticipation in two environmental treaties—the Montreal Protocol on Sub-stances that Deplete the Ozone Layers and the Framework Convention on Climate Change—reveals, China has selectively joined only the interna-tional environmental regimes that do not hinder China’s economic devel-opment, infringe on its sovereignty either through monitoring by external actors or determination of how China utilizes its resources, or permit the advanced industrialized countries to further the already unequal techno-logical or economic advantage they enjoy.17 It is from this perspective that a scholar suggested that China has been pursuing a neofunctionalism, i.e., China is pursuing state-enhancing, not state-diminishing, functionalism, for long-term statist ends through short-term functionalist means. China wants to have its political independence cake and eat its global economic interdependence one too.18

STRATeGIC CALCuLATIoN AND SofT BALANCING

Indeed, adapting to the transnational norms and participating in interna-tional institutions, Chinese leaders remain realists and have always seen

76 Suisheng ZHAO

changes in the international affairs in a realist sense of power politics. Chi-nese leaders have paid special attention to liliang duibi (balance of forces), a Chinese term similar to the realist conception of distribution of power. The dynamics of international politics have been perceived as a change of power distribution across the world that is structured around great powers or poles. According to a Chinese publication, “the term ‘pole’ represents the interests of one party which has the capacity to exert influence on interna-tional affairs and has certain control over other world forces. Each country deals with international affairs in accordance with its own interests and exerts its influence.”19 Consequently, Chinese leaders have been particularly sensitive to China’s position in the changing international environment, which Beijing has only a limited role in shaping. Beijing always carefully examines the changing alignment and China’s relative power position and tries to adjust foreign policy accordingly. As a Chinese scholar said, “with-out a study of liliang duibi, policy-makers in Beijing presumably would not be able to adjust foreign policy accordingly.”20

Chinese leaders have worked hard to find and shape an international distribution of power that is in its favor or at least not to its disadvantage. Mao Zedong saw two camps and decided to lean to one side in the 1950s. In the early 1970s, Beijing put forth a structure of three worlds and believed that, in cooperation with third world developing countries, a developed Japan and Western Europe, which were the second world, could be a force to counter the alleged hegemonism of the two superpowers that constituted the first world. After the United States extended diplomatic recognition to Beijing in 1979, Beijing maneuvered a Washington–Moscow Cold War bi-polar rivalry and played a balancing role in a strategic triangle often to its advantage. The sudden collapse of the Cold War bipolar system in the early 1990s, however, “left China’s leaders without a definition of their place in the world.”21 While Chinese leaders began to feel vulnerable and marginal-ized in the wake of the anticommunist revolution across Eastern Europe, they were particularly concerned about the speculation that the world en-tered a unipolar moment in which American hegemony was to be perpetu-ated. They understood that a U.S.-dominated unipolar world would be the worst of all possible power distributions for China because the troublesome issues such as human rights and nuclear weapon proliferation would be-come real problems with which the Chinese leadership had to deal.

After the initial shock at losing China’s leverage, some Chinese scholars began to see that the end of the Cold War bipolar system started a transition toward multipolarization.22 The official view was uncertain at first. Foreign Minister Qian Qichen said in December 1990 that the world was in a tran-sitional phase. The old order had dissolved but no new one had emerged to take its place.23 Premier Li Peng also told the National People’s Congress in March 1991 that “the old world structure, which lasted for over four decades,


disintegrated and a new one yet to take shape.”24 Qian Qichen, however, changed his position and stated in a 1991 year-end assessment of the inter-national situation that “although the world is in the transitional period and a new pattern has not yet taken shape, there is a rough structure in interna-tional relations, in which one superpower and several powers depend on and struggle against each other . . . this is the initial stage of the evolution towards multipolarization.”25 In a press conference on March 23, 1992, Qian said once again, “The breakup of the old world pattern means the end of the post-war bipolar system characterized by the hostility between the two superpowers. A new world . . . is likely to be a multipolar pattern.”26

China began to envision and promote multipolarity against the formation of a unipolar system because Beijing quickly identified tremendous oppor-tunities in the transformation toward multipolarization in which China was on the upward trajectory and could play a balancing role again in global geopolitics. As one scholar observed, “China would prefer to find itself in a multipolar world in which U.S. global power declines absolutely and re-gional powers, such as China, are able to resist external interference in their respective region.”27 Beijing’s foreign policy analyst anticipated that “the multipolarization (duojihua) since the end of the Cold War would result in a relative balance of power that could effectively check on all global pow-ers.”28 “As a balancing and stable factor in a turbulent world, China could overcome constraints and explore opportunities.”29 In particular, China has to find a way to balance the U.S. power dominance because, as one Chinese scholar said, “China’s rise has led the rapid development of the structure conflict between the United States and China. Many previously hidden is-sues have begun surfacing saliently, such as economic and trade issues, geo-political frictions, foreign policy conflict, etc. Some new issues, such as en-ergy and environment, have come up one after another.”30

China, however, was not in the position to adopt a traditional hard bal-ancing strategy based on arms build-up and countervailing military alli-ances against the United States because of the following two strategic con-siderations. One is that China generally ruled out a major war with the United States in the post–Cold War era, especially after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and, therefore, did not fear losing its “sovereignty and existential security to the reigning hegemon, a necessary condition for such (a hard) balancing to occur.”31 In other words, if its survival was not at stake, China would not be willing to pay the extremely high cost of an arms race that could delay China’s economic modernization programs.

The second consideration for China to forgo hard balancing is that it is unappealing to other powers. Chinese leaders believed that “in the long term, the decline of U.S. primacy and the subsequent transition to a multi-polar world are inevitable, but in the short term, Washington’s power is un-likely to decline, and its position in world affairs is unlikely to change. . . .

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The Chinese–U.S. relationship remains beset by more profound differences than any other bilateral relationships between major powers in the world today.”32 Chinese leaders, therefore, had to admit to the reality that the United States remained the sole superpower due to its comprehensive na-tional strength, whether in terms of its economy, scientific and technologi-cal strength, military might, or foreign influence. What they envisioned was an unbalanced multipolarity “distinguishable from a unipolar world by the existence of at least one state that can mount a reasonable defense, at least for a time, even against the multipolar leader.”33 In the term of Chinese literature, the multipolarity was characterized by “one superpower and sev-eral big powers” (yi chao duo qiang).34 The one superpower refers to the United States and the big powers of the European Union, Japan, Russia, Germany, China, India, etc. Because of the existing gap between China and the United States in national power and fundamental differences between their political systems, emphasizing the desirability and likely emergence of a multipolar world of sovereign states mutually respecting the principle of noninterference and at the same time trying to retain its independent power aspirations by working with other great powers against the U.S. hegemony, the Chinese leaders are aware of the fact that very few countries would be willing to participate in a China-led alliance against the United States. As a result, Chinese leaders have to make pragmatic accommodations in its steadfast effort to maintain a cooperative relationship with the United States. As a Chinese scholar said, in spite of the frustrations in the signifi-cant ups and downs of relationship with the United States, the Chinese leadership has made efforts in “learning to live with the hegemon,” i.e., making adaptation and policy adjustment to the reality of the U.S. domi-nance in the international system since the end of the Cold War.35 With such a strategic calculation of living with rather than challenging the reign-ing power, Chinese leaders have emphasized the common interests and the opportunities for cooperation between these two countries and are careful not to take the lead or carry the banner against the United States.

Abandoning the traditional hard balancing strategy, China discovered a soft balancing strategy that makes “use of international institutions, eco-nomic leverage, and diplomatic maneuvering to frustrate American inten-tions.”36 This is a limited, tacit, and indirect approach to contain the Ameri-can power in a low intensity of competition. It assumes that although the international power hierarchy gives meanings to the international norms and institutions, international norms and institutions may in turn shape the prac-tice of power relations and the behavior of nation-states. Because interna-tional institutions are an important tool of soft balancing, the soft balance strategy is also known as “institutional balancing strategy.”37 China’s partici-pation in international institutions, therefore, became a strategy to bring about a change of world order from superpower domination toward a multi-


polarization in which China could joining other powers balancing against the prevailing power. It could be a world of multiple opportunities for China to assert itself forcefully on multiple chessboards and to enhance China’s domestic modernization and to improve its international relations. It is from this perspective that a Chinese strategist claimed that China’s acceptance of cooperative security and participation in international security institutions, traditional and nontraditional, is a response to “the unilateralist approach of the United States to international security cooperation.”38

China could resort to the soft balancing strategy because of the following two developments in the post–Cold War world. First, while the United States has commended unparalleled military power, it has failed to enact an effective strategy of controlling the globe unilaterally. The U.S. government is not only subject to strong domestic resistance to foreign military inter-vention due to the American public’s concern with their domestic problems and the exorbitant cost of the wars abroad but also faces the reality that the traditional control of its allies has become more difficult as other big pow-ers have adopted more independent policies. The end of the Cold War bi-polarity has brought about multiple contradictions and conflicts in the world. While the North–South contradictions have been intensified be-cause of the increase of racial, religious, territorial, and resource conflicts and the widening gap between rich and poor third world countries, West–West contradictions have been rising because U.S. relations with its allies have become more difficult to manage in a multipolar world. According to a Chinese analyst, under the Cold War bipolar system, even though the situation was tense, it remained a “strained stability.” With the end of the Cold War, the West lost its common enemy and other conflicts of interest began to damage the Western alliance. Some problems, held down by the two superpowers’ strife for hegemony and by the two blocs’ confrontation, surfaced, making the situation tumultuous and capricious. This is a situa-tion of “turbulent détente” in which West–West contradictions have in-volved economic frictions, political control and anti-control, and division in defense matters. It is no longer an easy task for the United States, Europe, and Japan to coordinate their relations.39 Therefore, in the transition toward multipolarization, from Beijing’s vantage point, an imbalance of power in Europe and other parts of the world would produce new conflicts between the United States and its allies, preventing unipolarity from occurring. One major feature of global politics after the end of the Cold War is that a grow-ing number of big powers have become bold enough to say no to the sole superpower.

Second, in contrast to the contradictions and turbulence that had taken place in many parts of the world, China has been on a stable and upward trajectory in the world of transition toward a multipolar system. As a Chi-nese scholar put it, “with the turmoil in other parts of the world, China has

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already become a power with enormous economic and military potential. It is generally agreed that many world issues cannot be solved without the participation of China.”40 As a rising power, China has shared more and more interests with the leading members of the international community and therefore can engage with them in the multilateral institutions in mu-tual beneficial and more or less equal base.

These developments have made China more comfortable in taking a soft balancing strategy against the U.S. predominance in international institu-tions open to a variety of members within and outside the UN system.

Within the UN system, although China has participated in the UN peace-keeping operation and voted on many occasions in favor of U.S. interven-tion, Chinese officials have always argued that the UN Securty Council is not the venue for dealing with internal affairs of individual UN members without the concurrence of the country involved. Taking advantage of its UN Security Council permanent membership position, it has on several occasions successfully checked the U.S.-proposed resolutions in the UN Security Council that would give permission to use military force or sanc-tions against some of its economic and strategic allies and friends, such as Iran, Burma, and Zimbabwe. While China worked with Russia and blocked a U.S.-led UN Security Council effort to criticize human rights violations in Myanmar in January 2007, it again exercised a veto together with Russia and South Africa in July 2008 to quash an American-led effort to impose sanc-tions against Zimbabwe in the Security Council, which China believed represented excessive interference in the country’s domestic matters.

Outside the UN system, China played a leadership role in the Six-Party Talks of the United States, China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and North Korea to check the U.S. intentions. Initially, Beijing was reluctant to join the multilateral effort after U.S. intelligence uncovered North Korea’s nuclear program in the summer of 2002, not only because China was uncertain about North Korea’s nuclear capabilities but also because Beijing was un-sure about U.S. intentions toward North Korea and suspected that the Bush administration’s main objective was regime change. China began to assume a constructive role in 2003 when Beijing worried that the United States might launch a preemptive strike on North Korea’s nuclear complex, esca-lating into a war and resulting in a flood of refugees into northeast China in the absence of diplomatic progress to shut down North Korea’s nuclear facilities after North Korea’s reactivation of its nuclear power plant in Yong-byon, withdrawal from the NPT, and expulsion of the IAEA inspectors.41 The Chinese government persuaded DPRK to participate in the first trilat-eral meeting with the United States and China in Beijing in April 2003. The trilateral talk was expanded into Six-Party Talks in August 2003. After four rounds of talks, China’s draft of an agreement was accepted by all six parties and a joint statement was released in September 2005. Even though the


agreement lacked specificity, and Washington and Pyongyang soon seized upon its ambiguity to start another round of disagreement, the joint state-ment was the first of its kind reached at the Six-Party Talks and laid the foundation for the February 13, 2007 accord that detailed an action plan to fulfill the September 2005 Joint Statement.42

China’s role in the Six-Party Talks is a milestone in establishing China’s strategic importance as a rising power in regional multilateral diplomatic negotiations. Making it more difficult for the United States to use force, China gained leverage over the United States on occasions to consider the potential impact on Beijing’s cooperation on North Korea when deliberating on other issues. As a U.S. policy analyst found, although “China did not blatantly put pressure on Washington or threaten to curtail cooperation on North Korea unless the United States took a specified action, U.S. diplomats simply became more mindful of avoiding actions that would irritate Beijing, especially at sensitive junctures in the Six-Party negotiations.”43 One exam-ple the analyst cited is that Washington opposed the timing of an initiative by Tokyo in late 2006 to create a four-way dialogue among Japan, India, Australia, and the United States, fearing that China might take offense, which could jeopardize efforts to reconvene the Six-Party Talks. According to this analyst, concern about affronting China also factored into the delibera-tions in preparing the May 2007 Joint Statement of the U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee, widely known as the 2 + 2 Statement. In contrast to the February 2005 2 + 2 Statement in which encouraging peaceful resolu-tion of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue had been high-lighted among U.S.–Japanese strategic objectives, there was no explicit men-tion of the cross-strait issue in the new list of shared goals.

In addition, China has designed a global network of strategic partner-ships covering all the major powers and regional organizations since the mid-1990s. The network of strategic partnerships with many big powers is an instrument not only for China to secure the multipolar world, in which the major powers would establish relationships based on equality and checks and balances to provide a guarantee of regional and global balance and stability, but also part of Beijing’s efforts to prevent their participation in any potential U.S. policy to contain China. The Chinese leadership has envisioned the China–U.S. relationship within the framework of strategic partnerships in a multipolar world and taken advantage of the network of partnerships to prevent the U.S. actions from harming China’s vital na-tional interests. The network of the strategic partnerships is thus part of soft balancing against the U.S. preeminence short of formal military alliances.

China has even begun to engage with multilateral organizations such as G-8, G-20, OAS, and IADB, in which the United States and other Western powers have played a dominant role. This is a departure from the previous practice of criticizing American-led alliances. One powerful expression of

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China’s engagement with Western power-dominated alliances by the Chi-nese leadership is President Hu Jintao’s acceptance of the invitation to at-tend the dialogue between by the G-8 and emerging economies in 2003. Hu became the first Chinese leader present at the G-8 Summit and continued his presence. Since then China has attended the dialogue of the G-8 and G-5 emerging economies every year and has taken a positive attitude toward various suggestions of G-8 expansion to include China as a formal member. This is a reflection of China’s realization that it has become more and more difficult for any single country, including the United States, to dominate the international institutions in the world of moving toward multipolarization. From this perspective, China’s participation in international institutions is part of a soft balancing strategy to counter the unilateralist tendencies of the United States without harming China’s economic ties with it.

PARTICIPATIoN IN ASIA–PACIfIC ReGIoNAL INSTITuTIoNS

China has been an active member and a primary mover of the institution-building processes in the Asia–Pacific since the early 1990s. China’s enthusi-asm in the regional institutions is first of all an adaptation to the increasingly interdependent Asia–Pacific economies, which has called for building re-gional institutions based on geographic proximity and historical linkages as well as on comparative advantage to facilitate cooperation transcending po-litical boundaries. Second, participation in regional institutions is based on China’s strategic calculation to balance the U.S. influence in the Asia–Pacific, a region where China may not only exert great influence but also find the most important economic and foreign policy interests. Finally, China has felt more comfortable participating in Asia–Pacific regional institutions defined by voluntarism and consensus decision-making process than global institu-tions dominated by the United States and European powers where formal procedure, rule-making, and enforcement are emphasized because they would be less likely to infringe on sovereignty of member states.

China began actively participating in Asia–Pacific regional institutions in the early 1990s when they came to see the following three developments in the region. The first was the prospect of a “pacific century,” which Beijing embraced with the hope that fast economic growth in the region could offer new opportunities to China’s economic prosperity. The second was the emergence of “new Asianism,” which claimed that the success of Asian modernization was based on its unique values. This concept resonated in the hearts of many Chinese leaders because it challenged the Western ideo-logical and economic centrality. The third was the development of regional or subregional blocs.44 In addition, Chinese leaders also gradually came to the realization that China’s rapid economic growth not only forged a new


pattern of interdependence but also a perception of China threat among some of its Asia–Pacific neighbors. In response, Beijing decided to take part in the Asian collectivism that may not only provide new mechanisms for China to face the West but also convey the image of a responsible power willing to contribute to regional stability and cooperation.

China joined the APEC in 1991, and Chinese president Jiang Zemin at-tended the first APEC Summit in 1993 and hosted the 2001 APEC Summit in Shanghai. China became the ASEAN’s consultation partners in 1991, and its status was upgraded to dialogue partner in 1996. While China has insti-tutionalized the practice of sending its foreign minister for consultation and dialogue with the ASEAN foreign ministers on the occasion of the ASEAN’s annual gatherings since 1999, its relationship with ASEAN increased dra-matically after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, which “was a turning point in the history of regional cooperation in East Asia.”45 In the wake of the crisis, many Asian countries looked for the assistance and leadership of the United States and Japan to bail them out. Nevertheless, both the United States and Japan responded slowly. In contrast, China made a highly symbolic move to announce its “stand-by-Asia” policy by firmly refusing devaluation of its cur-rency. A Chinese devaluation would set off competitive devaluation across the region. This “beggar thy neighbor” competition would have devastating economic and political consequences for the whole region.

China’s positive role during the financial crisis led to the creation of two leading regional institutions, ASEAN + 1 and ASEAN + 3 summits. To cope with the crisis, the Chinese president was invited to meet with his counter-parts of the ASEAN countries in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in November 1997, and then joined the leaders of Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN coun-tries the next month, which turned out to be the beginning of the annual ASEAN + 1 Summit and the annual ASEAN + 3 Summit process. Chinese president Jiang Zemin attended the first annual ASEAN + 1 Summit and announced he would establish a good-neighboring and mutual-trust part-nership with ASEAN in the twenty-first century. Chinese vice president Hu Jintao participated in the second summit the next year and these summit mechanisms have become institutionalized and gained the status of impor-tant regional regimes. Since 1999, based on their internal division of labor, the Chinese premier has always been at the annual ASEAN + 1 and ASEAN + 3 Summit, while the Chinese president has attended the APEC leaders’ annual summit.46 As the original goal of the ASEAN + 3 mechanisms was to stabilize East Asia’s economies after the Asian crisis, the finance ministers of all ASEAN + 3 states came together in the Thai city of Chiang Mai in May 2000 and worked out a regional currency-swap mechanism, known as the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), a network of currency swap arrangement to provide short-term liquidity for countries facing financial pressures. China has been part of this multilateral regional arrangement from very begin-

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ning. In addition, at China’s initiative in 2001, a China–ASEAN Free Trade Agreement was reached to establish a free trade area in ten years. At the sixth ASEAN + 3 Summit in Phnom Penh on November 4, 2002, China an-nounced that it would waive all or most of the debt owed to it by Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Burma.

China’s active participation in ASEAN + 3 and ASEAN + 1 process has created an opportunity for China to establish an image as a responsible power in the regional cooperation so that China could have a relatively peaceful periphery environment for its economic modernization. It also helped dissipate the skepticisms about “China threat” in Southeast Asia. Before the 1997 financial crisis, China was perceived as a threat by many Southeast Asian countries. China’s positive response helped to convince many Southeast Asian states that China’s rise would not threaten the re-gional order and their national interests. After the Asian financial crisis, China has become an enthusiastic proponent of regional economic coop-eration in the Asia–Pacific. China even changed its position toward multi-lateral aid institutions. China had a long history as a donor to developing countries on a bilateral base. Now China has not only increased its bilateral assistance to many third world countries, but also began to give aid through international institutions in the Asia–Pacific region, becoming more in-volved in the multilateral donor community. One of the well-publicized efforts in this regard is China’s donation of $20 million to the Asian Devel-opment Bank (ADB) to set up a regional poverty reduction center in 2005 with a special emphasis on assisting Indochina. This was the first fund set up by China at a multilateral regional institution.47

China’s active participation in regional institutions also serves its interest of soft balancing the U.S. influence in the Asia–Pacific. China began to take a leadership role in regional institutions in the early 1990s because it came to realize the importance of building good relations with Asian countries to break out of U.S. sanctions and expand its diplomatic space after the Ti-ananmen incident in 1989. As one study indicated, through participation in the ASEAN + 3, a product of “the region-wide resentments toward the United States and U.S.-led global financial institutions . . . China has gradually replaced the United Statesto become a new leader in Asia.”48 A 2008 U.S. National Defense University report also indicated that while “the balance of power in East Asia is stable and favors the United States,” the balance of influence is tipping toward Beijing” because of China’s “diplo-matic engagement with other Asian countries, skillful use of commercial diplomacy, and a more welcoming approach to participation in regional institutions.”49

China’s balancing strategy is facilitated by some of its neighbors’ defini-tion of Asian regionalism principally in geographic term. In light of this definition, although the United States has been a Pacific power with sig-


nificant interests in the Asia–Pacific region, the United States is not able to take its membership in the regional institutions for granted. At the creation of the APEC, there was a controversy over closed regionalism versus open regionalism. The United States pushed for an open regionalism that would include Asian–Pacific as well as American–Pacific members. However, most East Asian leaders were reluctant to accept the idea because of “the fear that APEC could become a field for power projection by the United States.”50 Some East Asian countries also had a concern over a two-faced approach as the United States claimed to be an Asia–Pacific nation yet formed its own exclusive trading group, NAFTA. In a 1991 speech to the UN, Malaysian prime minister Mahathir said, “In East Asia we are told we may not call ourselves East Asians as Europeans call themselves Europeans and Ameri-cans call themselves Americans. We are told that we must call ourselves Pacific people and align ourselves with people who are only partly Pacific, but more American, Atlantic, and European.”51

Although an exclusive East Asian bloc was proposed as a counterweight to European and North American blocs, the American version of open re-gionalism prevailed because of the support of its allies in the region. This situation led Mahathir to announce the idea of forming an East Asia Eco-nomic Grouping (EAEG) where only bona fide Asian nations were included and the United States was excluded. Mahathir argued that EAEG would give greater bargaining power to East Asian countries in negotiations with the United States and Western Europe, which he felt were moving precipitously toward exclusive trading blocs. Mahathir’s proposal was sharply criticized by the United States and eventually aborted. An exclusive Asia–Pacific re-gional organization, however, remained alive and led to the creation of the East Asian Summit (EAS) in 2005. The United States was not invited to the EAS because it could not meet three criteria of EAS membership: the aspir-ing countries must have substantive relations with the region; they must be a Full Dialogue Partner of ASEAN status; and they must have acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC).52

The SCO is another regional organization that the United States is not invited to for membership. Launched at China’s initiative and known as the “Shanghai Five” of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgystan in 1996, it began to meet under the name of the SCO after a new member, Uzbeki-stan, was accepted in 2001. At first a talking shop on issues of borders and territory among China and its Central Asian neighbors, the SCO has gradu-ally expanded to include economic and security cooperation as the six coun-tries have agreed to take actions on political, military, and intelligence coop-eration for the purpose of cracking down on terrorism, separatism, extremism and to maintain regional security. Although the SCO claims that it is not against any third country, China played a leadership role in the SCO obvi-ously with the goal of balancing the U.S. influence in mind. As an Australian

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newspaper stated when the first SCO Summit was convened, “The newly formed Shanghai Co-operation Organization, bracketing China, Russia and four Central Asian republics, is poised to emerge as a potent force against United States influence.”53 A Christian Science Monitor report also believed that the SCO “is an effort to develop an organization that could one day of-fer a modest geopolitical counterweight to Western alliances.”54

Indeed, the SCO has gradually evolved into a semialliance, with its Bei-jing-based secretariat, a regular annual summit, ministerial meetings, joint military exercises to address political and military crisis, and shared transna-tional problems. The SCO conducted the first counterterrorism joint mili-tary exercises in Kyrgyzstan in 2002 and one in China in 2003. These exer-cises were followed by the Peace Mission 2005, a joint Chinese–Russian military exercise, in which observers from four other member states of SCO were invited to attend. In the 2005 war-games scenario, a fictitious central Asian state became plagued by terrorist violence and sought assistance from neighboring states (i.e., China and Russia) to restore law and order. This scenario was a practice for a joint intervention of China and Russia to keep a friendly Central Asian regime in power. Coincident with the military exer-cises, the SCO 2005 Summit published a declaration on “World Order in the Twenty-first Century” and called for Washington to set a timetable for the withdrawal of its military from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. One observer believed that the SCO declaration was “to target perceived U.S. domination in international affairs.”55 U.S. Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen also said at a hearing that the SCO intensified Russia and China’s efforts “to iso-late the U.S. politically, militarily, and economically from Central Asia.”56

China’s special interest in Asia–Pacific regional institutions has also been reinforced by the Asian-way of institution-building that stresses consensus, consultative procedures, voluntarism, and noninterference in member states’ internal affairs. For one thing, considering the Taiwan issue as inter-nal affairs of the Chinese nation, the Chinese government has successfully prevented the status of Taiwan to be discussed at any of these regional fo-rums. The Asian-way of institution-building is rooted in “the traditional Asian distaste for treaty-defined institutions,”57 reflecting the region’s unique culture, history, and evolving socioeconomic and political condi-tions. To a great extent, past humiliating experiences of many Asian–Pacific countries in the hands of imperialist powers still shadow their perception of the future. Therefore, while many Asia–Pacific countries were victimized by colonial powers in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, they have ironically embraced the Western concept of sovereignty with a ven-geance, which has heightened many Asian nations’ concerns about ceding sovereignty in the name of regional integration. As one scholar observed, no nation in the Asia–Pacific, however willing to compromise in the inter-est of attaining the common objectives of regional institutions, “is ready to


surrender sovereign rights over its domestic affairs and foreign relations.”58 Small or weak nations are suspicious of what they see as attempts by the great powers to reassert influence in new ways. So, too, is China reluctant to abandon elements of sovereignty to regional institutions without strong evidence that there is more to be gained from doing so.

As a result, China has felt very comfortable with the relationship-based interaction and consultation in Asia–Pacific regional institutions, particu-larly the APEC and ASEAN. The APEC has followed a consultative approach toward regional cooperation, known as “APEC way.” As one Chinese scholar describes, the main characteristics of the APEC way are “acknowledging diversity; emphasizing flexibility and gradualness; observing the principles of respect, equality and mutual benefit for each other; reaching unanimity through consultation; respecting rights of self-determination and auton-omy.”59 One study pointed out that China has found APEC the only eco-nomic organization covering the Asia–Pacific region as a whole, “an easy forum to operate in, saying it works in the ‘Asian-way’—not requiring signed agreements, but working according to gradual negotiations to reach a consensus.”60

The ASEAN has explicitly avoided building an enforcement mechanism that would interfere in the internal affairs of member states. China has es-tablished many relationships with the ASEAN. In addition to the consulta-tive ASEAN + 3 forum and China–ASEAN axis (ASEAN + 1), Chinese foreign ministers have, except for 2005, attended all the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) annual meetings since its inception in 1994.61 The ARF is a security institution covering the entire Asia–Pacific region but not a military alliance that member states come to military assistance to each other in the event of their being attacked. Instead, ARF seeks to establish cooperative security through arrangements between states, neither as allies nor enemies, and mitigate or resolve potential conflicts among member states by diplomatic means of confidence building measures, preventive diplomacy, and conflict resolution. One study pointed out that the Chinese indicated a degree of discomfort with the initial drafting of the ARF concept paper and openly rejected the term “conflict resolution” because China would prefer a more consultative approach. China changed its position only after it discovered that one way of avoiding diplomatic isolation over the crisis with Taiwan and the United States was to respond positively to overtures from the ASEAN states. Working with the ARF, China was able to assure much of Southeast Asian countries’ concerns arising from China’s earlier years of unilateral ac-tions regarding the Spratly Islands and present itself as cooperative and so-licitous to the concerns of the Southeast Asian countries about the maritime territorial disputes. In this case, participation in the multilateral ARF helped China build mutual confidence but did not touch on the question of dis-putes about sovereignty over the Spratlys themselves.62

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CoNCLuSIoN

China has changed from a reluctant position to an active and sophisticated approach toward participation in the international regimes and institutions since the end of the Cold War. The study of this chapter demonstrates that, as an adaptation behavior and based upon China’s strategic calculation, China’s participation in international institutions has been shaped mostly by the following three variables. One is the importance of the issues that the specific institution has set up to deal with, particularly in relation to China’s modernization. Second is the distribution of power among the member-ships, particularly whether or not the United States plays a leading role and whether or not the leading members are well disposed toward China. The third is the level of institutionalization that the international institutions have achieved, particularly if they make binding decisions that require en-forcement and lead to the possible erosion of China’s state sovereignty.

Rising as a great power after two decades of phenomenal growth, China has generally felt comfortable with the current international system that has enabled its success and therefore has accepted more and more of the evolv-ing transnational norms and principles. In the meantime, as China has in-creasingly become a part of a larger international environment that pro-vides constraints as well as opportunities on its policy options, Chinese leaders have taken part in international institutions in its efforts of promot-ing multipolarity against unipolarity. This is a soft balancing strategy to defend China’s economic and political interests without coming to a direct confrontation with the United States. In this process, sovereignty remains a central concern of the Chinese leadership. China has expressed a special interest in participating in regional institution in the Asia–Pacific because these institutions have coped with the issues most important for China, the distribution of membership in these institutions are mostly disposed to China’s favor; and they have operated mostly based on the principle of noninterference in the domestic affairs of member states.

NoTeS

1. Wu Xinbo, “Four Contradictions Constraining China’s Foreign Policy Behav-ior,” Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 10, no. 27, May 2001, pp. 293–302.

2. G. John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2008, p. 28.

3. Allen Carlson, Unifying China, Integrating with the World: Securing Chinese Sovereignty in the Reform Era, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005, p. 8.

4. Tom Moore and Bixia Yang, “Empowered and Restrained: Chinese Foreign Policy in the Age of Economic Interdependence,” in David M. Lampton, The Making


of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001, pp. 191–229.

5. Pieter Bottelier, “China and the World Bank: How a Partnership Was Built,” Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 16, no. 51, May 2007, p. 341.

6. Wei Liang, “Bureaucratic Politics, Interministerial Coordination and China’s GATT/WTO accession negotiations,” in Ka Zeng, ed., China’s Foreign Trade Policy: The New Constituencies, London, UK: Routledge, 2007, p. 20.

7. Samuel Kim, “Mainland China and New World Order,” Issues & Studies, vol. 27, no. 11, November 1991, p. 19.

8. Michael Yahuda, “China’s Multilateralism and Regional Order,” in Guoguang Wu and Helen Lansdowne, eds., China Turns to Multilateralism: Foreign Policy and Regional Security, London: Routledge, 2008, p. 78.

9. Xu Jian, “Comparing Security Concepts of China and the United States,” in Suisheng Zhao, ed., China–U.S. Relations Transformed, Perspectives and Strategic Inter-actions, London, UK: Routledge, 2008, p. 78.

10. Jing-dong Yuan, “The Evolution of China’s Nonproliferation Policy since the 1990s: Progress, Problems, and Prospects,” Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 11, no. 31, May 2002, pp. 209–234. Bates Gill, “Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: The Dynamics of Chinese Nonproliferation and Arms Control Policy-making in the Ear of Reform,” in David M. Lampton, ed., The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001, pp. 257–288.

11. Bates Gill and Chin-Hao Huang, “China’s Expanding Role in Peacekeeping,” PacNet, no. 7, February 2, 2009.

12. Jeremy Paltiel, “Peaceful Rise? Soft Power? Human Rights in China’s New Multilateralism,” in Guoguang Wu and Helen Lansdowne, eds., China Turns to Mul-tilateralism: Foreign Policy and Regional Security, London: Routledge, 2008, p. 204.


14. Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft, America and the World, Conversations on the Future of American Foreign Policy, New York: Basic Book, 2008, p. 114.

15. Nick Knight, Imaging Globalization in China: Debates on Ideology, Politics and Culture, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2008, pp. 146, 147.

16. Jing Chen, “Explaining the Change in China’s Attitude toward UN Peacekeep-ing: A Norm Change Perspective,” Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 18, no. 58, January 2009, pp. 157–173.

17. Elizabeth Economy, “The Impact of International Regimes on Chinese For-eign Policy Making: Broadening Perspectives and Policies . . . But Only to a Point,” in David M. Lampton, The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001, pp. 230–256.

18. Samuel Kim, “Mainland China and New World Order,” Issues & Studies, vol. 27, no. 11, November 1991, p. 17.

19. Beijing Review, vol. 34, no. 47, Nov. 25–Dec. 1, 1991, p. 11. 20. Wang Jisi, “International Relations Theory and Study of Chinese Foreign

Policy: A Chinese Perspective,” in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, Oxford, UK: Claredon Press, 1995, p. 489.

90 Suisheng ZHAO

21. Michel Oksenberg, “The China Problem,” in Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, no. 3, 1991, p. 9.

22. Chen Qimao, “A Study of the Development of the World System from Bipo-larity to Multipolarity,” in Guojiwenti Yanjiu (The Studies of International Issues), 1990, no. 4, pp. 1–6; Song Yimin, “The New Problems Associated with the Chang-ing World Situation,” in Liaowang Zhoukan (Outlook Weekly), no. 36, 1990, pp. 39–42; Wang Guang, “What New World Order Does the West Want?” in Liaowang Zhoukan, 1990, no. 37, pp. 38–43; and Huang Dingwi and Wang Yulin, “The Rap-idly Changing World Situation,” Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (Contemporary International Relations), no. 3, 1990, pp. 1–8.

23. Remin Ribao, Haiwaiban (People’s Daily, Overseas Edition), December 17, 1990.24. Beijing Review, vol. 34, no. 15, April 15–21, 1991, Document XX.25. “Adhering to Independent Foreign Policy,” in Beijing Review, vol. 34, no. 52,

Dec. 30, 1991–Jan. 5, 1992, pp. 7 and 10.26. Beijing Review, vol. 35, no. 14, April 6–12, 1992, p. 15.27. David Shambaugh, “China’s Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era,” in

Survival, Summer 1992, p. 92.28. Feng Lidong, “An Interview with Yang Chengxu, Director of International

Studies Institute,” Banyuetan (Bimonthly Talk), January 10, 1995, p. 67.29. Beijing Review, vol. 34, no. 52, Dec. 30, 1991–Jan. 5, 1992, p. 8.30. Yuan Peng, “Mei dui hua jueche huanjing de bianhua ji yingxiang” (The

Change and Influence of the China Policy Making Environment in the US), Zhong-guo Zhanlie Guancha (China Strategic Review), no. 8, 2006, p. 7.

31. T. V. Paul, “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy,” International Security, vol. 30, no. 1, 2005, p. 47.

32. Wang Jisi, “China’s Search for Stability with America,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 84, no. 5, September/October, 2005, pp. 40, 46.

33. Robert A. Pape, “Soft Balancing against the United States,” International Secu-rity, vol. 30, no. 1, 2005, p. 12.

34. Suisheng Zhao, “Beijing’s Perception of International System and Foreign Policy Adjustment after the Tiananmen Incident,” Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2004, pp. 141–144.

35. Jia Qingguo, “Learning to Live with the Hegemon: Evolution of China’s Pol-icy toward the U.S. since the End of the Cold War,” Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 14, no. 44, August 2005, pp. 395–498.

36. Keir A. Lieber and Gerard Alexander, “Waiting for Balancing, Why the World Is Not Pushing Back,” International Security, vol. 30, no. 1, 2005, p. 125.

37. Kai He, “China’s Peaceful Rise and Multilateral Institutions: In Search of a Harmonious World,” in Sujian Guo and Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, eds., Harmonious World and China’s New Foreign Policy, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008, p. 67.


39. Chen Xiaogong, “The World in Transition,” in Beijing Review, vol. 35, no. 5–6, Feb. 3–16, 1992, pp. 13–14.

40. Xi Shuguang, Shijie Xinjiegou. Quoted from the Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 2, no. 1, Winter/Spring 1993, pp. 98–99.


41. Shi Yinghong, “China and the North Korean Nuclear Problem: Diplomatic Initiatives, Strategic Complexities, and Relevance of Security Multilateralism,” in Guoguang Wu and Helen Lansdowne, eds., China Turns to Multilateralism: Foreign Policy and Regional Security, London, UK: Routledge, 2008, p. 93.

42. Christopher Twomey, “Explaining Chinese Foreign Policy toward North Ko-rea, Navigating between the Scylla and Charybdis of Proliferation and Instability,” Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 17, no. 56, August 2008, pp. 411–419.

43. Bonnie Glaser and Liang Wang, “The North Korea Nuclear Crisis,” in Suish-eng Zhao, ed., China and the United States, Cooperation and Competition in Northeast Asia, New York: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2008, p. 162.

44. You Ji and Jia Qingguo, “China’s Re-emergence and Its Foreign Policy Strat-egy,” in Joseph Y. S. Cheng, ed., China Review, 1998, Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1998, p. 128.

45. Chung Jin-yong, “East Asian regionalism: Moving forward, South Korea and East Asian Regionalism: Which Path Ahead?,” in Challenges Posted by the DPRK for the Alliance and the Region, Washington, DC: Korea Economic Institute, 2005, p. 35.

46. Ren Xiao, “Between Adapting and Shaping: China’s Role in Asian Regional Cooperation,” Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 18, no. 59, March 2009, pp. 303–320.

47. Michael A. Glosny, Meeting the Development Challenge in the 21st Century: American and Chinese Perspectives on Foreign Aid, Washington, DC: National Commit-tee on United States–China Relations, 2007, p. 7.

48. Kai He, “China’s Peaceful Rise and Multilateral Institutions: In Search of a Har-monious World,” in Sujian Guo and Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, eds., Harmonious World and China’s New Foreign Policy, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008, pp. 73, 75.

49. Ellen L. Frost, James J. Przystup, and Phillip C. Saunders, “China’s Rising Influence in Asia: Implications for U.S. Policy,” Strategic Forum, no. 231, April 2008, p. 1.

50. Donald K. Emmerson, “Organizing the Rim: Asia Pacific Regionalism,” Cur-rent History, vol. 93, no. 587, December 1994, p. 438.

51. Susumu Awanohara, “Rich Man, Poor Man,” Far Eastern Economic Review, vol. 154, no. 40, October 3, 1991, p. 13.

52. Ren Xiao, “Between Adapting and Shaping: China’s Role in Asian Regional Cooperation,” Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 18, no. 59, March 2009, p. 303–320.

53. John Schauble, “Russia–China Alliance Emerges as a Foil to U.S.,” Sydney Morning Herald, June 16, 2001.

54. Robert Marquand, “Central Asians Group to Counterweigh U.S.: Russia, China, and Four Republics Meet to Expand Solidarity and Oppose Separatism,” Christian Science Monitor, June 15, 2001.

55. Sergei Blagov, “Calculated Muscle-Flexing,” Asia Times, August 6, 2005.56. Breffni O’Rourke, “Central Asia: U.S. Wary of Shanghai Grouping,” RFE/RL,

July 27, 2006.57. Jonathan Clarke, “APEC as a Semi-Solution,” Orbis, vol. 38, no. 1, Winter

1995, p. 94.58. Ryokichi Hirono, “Future Prospects for Economic Cooperation in Asia and

the Pacific Region,” in Robert A. Scalapino and Masataka Kosaka, ed., Peace, Politics

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& Economics in Asia: The Challenge to Cooperate, Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defense Publishers, 1988, p. 101.

59. Ma Ying, “Searching for a Peace Community: Regional Cooperation in Northeast Asia,” Journal of East Asian Affairs, vol. 20, no. 1, Spring/Summer 2006, p. 34.

60. Margaret M. Pearson, “China’s Integration Into the International Trade and Investment Regime,” in Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg, eds., China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999, p. 185.

61. Ren Xiao, “Between Adapting and Shaping: China’s Role in Asian Regional Cooperation,” Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 18, no. 59, March 2009, pp. 303–320.

62. Michael Yahuda, “China’s Multilateralism and Regional Order,” in Guoguang Wu and Helen Lansdowne, eds., China Turns to Multilateralism: Foreign Policy and Regional Security, London: Routledge, 2008, pp. 76–77.


95

6The PRC’s Governance Diplomacy in the Asia–Pacific RegionRosita Dellios

INTRoDuCTIoN

When U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates observed that rising powers in Asia would help determine whether the region had an “open, transparent and mutually beneficial future” or risked “blundering into a future where competition and exclusion set the pattern,”1 it was not difficult to detect who he had in mind with regard to the latter. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has long been criticized by the United States for not clarifying the “strategic intentions” underlying its enhanced military capability. Ad-dressing a security summit in Singapore in 2008, Gates illustrated his con-cerns by indirect reference to China’s antisatellite test of January 2007. The space debris it produced attracted international condemnation and the event itself was both unannounced and unexplained. Gates spoke of a similar but transparent exercise by the United States when in February 2008 it brought down its own debilitated USA-193 reconnaissance satellite: “We did this in an open manner where the plan to engage the satellite was made public well in advance of the intercept date.”2

In this comparison alone the United States appears to be the supporter of an “open, transparent and mutually beneficial future,” while China comes across as the opposite. Yet international relations, unlike the global news networks, are not primarily events-driven. If they were one could point to an example of a positive image for the PRC, such as when the Chinese navy rescued an Italian ship from pirate attack off Somalia in February 2009; and any number of negative images for the United States including treatment of terrorist suspects under the Bush administration. While actor behavior drives international relations, it is its understanding

or explanation—and hence remedial or predictive possibilities—that makes it intelligible.

To this end, many theories have been formulated in order to address the vexing and perennial quest for security in an anarchical system. Better known among them is the contemporary realist understanding of the inter-national system. To the traditional realist emphasis on power as the cur-rency of international politics, neorealists regard the distribution of power as the ordering principle for maintaining the structural stability needed for security. It is here that the merits or demerits of various power configura-tions are discussed, such as the hegemony of unipolarity, the familiar bipo-lar system of the Cold War and the more equal power distribution associ-ated with multipolarity.

By contrast, some theorists who come from the idealist-liberal approach favor international regimes and institutions as the mechanism for world order. These political constructs underpin global governance and may be defined as follows: an international regime (for example, one dealing with arms control or international trade) represents “a set of rules, norms and procedures around which the expectation of actors converge on a certain issue area”; while an international institution (such as the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or the International Monetary Fund) is normally viewed as a regime’s “tangible manifestation of shared expectations as well as machinery for coordinating international actions based on those expectations.”3 State power in the pursuit of national inter-ests is still important but it is deployed through regimes and institutions that regulate this activity via “rules, norms and procedures.”

A third theoretical direction that develops the socialization of state power through regimes and institutions but takes a more critical approach is that of social constructivism.4 It regards the “international system” as “interna-tional society” and seeks to “understand” rather than “explain” events (as neorealists would, on the basis of causal relationships in international rela-tions). To the realists, constructivists say that states not only pursue interests and material power but also values that relate to ideational power. Institu-tionalists are told that norms are more than a vessel to contain and con-strain state behavior and to socialize those who would pursue power poli-tics. Rather, norms color the way a state views itself, its interests, and other states. International relations become an intersubjective experience that can bring about change in identity and therefore behavior.

While the pursuit power—even through institutional means—cannot be readily dismissed as a plausible instigator of behavior in the current security environment, the constructivist perspective is intriguing in that it may help to explicate China’s governance diplomacy in Asia Pacific. At the same time it reveals a degree of correlativity with realist and institutionalist modalities, as will be elaborated in the discussion of Chinese traditional thought.

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IS ChINA A CoNSTRuCTIvIST STATe IN SeARCh of A CoRReLATIve ReGIoN?

On the basis of its intersubjectivity, social constructivism regards a nation’s identity to be a work-in-progress. Its willingness to incorporate the influ-ences of history and culture endear it to Chinese thinking; its very mutabil-ity, its constitutive nature, are reminiscent of the Chinese theory of correla-tivity: the yin-yang philosophy of a mutually determining relationship that is dynamic across time and circumstances. This is a discernible feature, too, of regional “governance,” as distinct from “government” in which there is a legal overriding authority. Regional governance is more interactive and fluid. It provides, in the words of constructivist pioneer, Alexander Wendt, the ground for “the micro or bottom-up process of self-organization, and the macro or top-down process of structural constitution.”5

From a constructivist perspective, China is changing. Even in declaratory policy it has become more peaceful: from a hostile country in the past to its current advocacy of a “harmonious world” represents a huge shift. Equally profound has been the accompanying change from a self-contained econ-omy to global interdependence. In discussing these changes, Chinese con-structivist scholar, Qin Yaqing, agrees that there are other factors that con-strain China’s behavior: most obviously, the material aspect of economic development since Deng Xiaoping’s opening and reform policy. China’s dependence on the world economy has grown significantly. From 2004 onward, 60 to 70 percent of China’s GDP has come from international trade. This represents a high level of global interdependence.6 The global economic crisis in 2008–2009 has demonstrated in an adverse way just how interdependent China has become.7

Despite the obvious influence of global interdependence on China’s policy choices, Qin Yaqing believes that international multilateral institu-tions are more important in effecting change in China’s behavior:

China has experienced identity change and that is my main argument for a peaceful China. China began with 20 memberships and in 2007 it was a mem-ber of 208 international institutions—bringing it on a par with other countries. This began in the 1990s. National identity is undergoing a fundamental change. Identity change means a nation’s security concept is affected.8

Indeed, China’s “new security concept,” noted in its defense white papers from 1998,9 holds for a more inclusive and multilateral doctrine that per-meates Beijing’s whole governance diplomacy in Asia Pacific. The “new se-curity concept” in its features of “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination with a view to securing a long-term and favorable interna-tional and surrounding environment”10 is not so much new but adapted for

The PRC’s Governance Diplomacy in the Asia–Pacific Region 97

the present era. It dates back to 1982 when China’s reformist leader, Deng Xiaoping, pronounced the international situation to be sufficiently stable for China to focus on economic development. This was in contrast to the theme of “war and revolution” that characterized the strategic thought of his predecessor, Mao Zedong. Despite contrasts in leadership preoccupa-tions, the “new security concept” remains faithful to the original “five prin-ciples of peaceful coexistence” which located China as a nonaggressive power in the 1950s,11 and which are still evoked in the 2006 defense white paper: “China maintains military contacts with other countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and develops cooperative military relations that are non-aligned, non-confrontational and not di-rected against any third party.”12

These foundational five principles (mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, noninterference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence) may also be regarded as the diplomatic ancestor of the post-2005 “harmonious world” policy, much the same way as China’s Confucian–Taoist–Buddhist culture is deemed its spiritual ancestor. Other markers on the road to the early twenty-first century harmonious world-oriented diplomacy were China’s so-called “charm offensive” of the 1990s and the 2004 “peaceful rise” and “peaceful development” slogans. Looking at the results regionally, it is worth asking what this “peace and harmony” message from Beijing sets out to achieve for its foreign policy. According to Yang Yanyi, deputy direc-tor general of the Asian Department in China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

The purpose of China’s regional cooperation policy is to facilitate China’s de-velopment and promote regional peace and common development. China wants to maintain a peaceful stable environment, especially on its periphery. It is using multilateral means to promote economic growth.13

Here one sees an expression of China’s “win-win” diplomacy which pro-poses that it is possible to serve one’s own and other nations’ national in-terests.14 Yang Yanyi pointed out that Beijing was now engaged in multilat-eral activities that included over thirty cooperation mechanisms in Asia. Subregional cooperation has been most active, for example in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Plus Three (APT, the three being China, Japan, and South Korea). Transregional cooperation was gaining strength, for example, in the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Asia–Europe Meetings (ASEM). Economic regionalism remained China’s priority. In the past de-cade, twenty-four new arrangements were concluded. Cooperation in other sectors was expanding, including finance, agriculture, and forestry. Coop-eration in security had begun, notably in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

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China’s role in hosting the Six-Party Talks on the North Korean nuclear is-sue was widely acknowledged. Moreover, China–ASEAN relations had de-veloped practical governance in nontraditional security issues.15

Critics point out that the institutions China favors are those like the ASEAN-based system of informal institutions (such as APT, ARF, EAS) that are governed more by consensus than rules.16 Following a tradition of “agreeing to disagree without being disagreeable,” the “ASEAN Way,” according to Simon Tay:

comprises a number of interlocking norms and practices, including the norm of nonintervention, habits of informal consultation, the preference for consen-sus over conflict, and the desire to avoid making the ASEAN secretariat a supra-national institution with initiative, resources and independence.17

Yet it is this institutional modality that has been blamed for ASEAN’s fail-ure to socialize its more recent member, Burma, whose repressive govern-ment has gained international infamy. At ASEAN’s 2005 summit, the non-interference principle appeared to be compromised when the ASEAN foreign ministers called on Burma’s military junta to undertake democratic reforms and free opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest. By the 2009 summit, neither reforms nor the freeing of political prisoners had occurred.

While results may appear slow or inadequate in informal institutional structures, this does not necessary mean that they are failures on the gover-nance landscape. China’s modus operandi in governance diplomacy—like ASEAN’s—is marked by flexibility and informality, as regional cooperation has tended to start with informal dialogue and then progress to practical projects. According to Qin Yaqing, there is also an emphasis on process rather than results. This is in accordance with Confucian cultural dynamics. For ex-ample, in the East Asia Summit, the “comfort level principle” exists. Progress may be slow but process ensures it is sustainable.18 In his writings with Wei Ling, the idea is crystallized as “a process-focused model of social construc-tion” and that “the ability to socialize or absorb major powers through the integrating process is the soul of this model.”19 In this respect, it is pertinent to note that an aspect of China’s governance diplomacy is that it prefers to see small and medium-sized countries taking the lead, not itself. So, too, ASEAN has had historical concerns about big power interference: from its perspective, regional integration could not be led by any of the big powers.

Another international multilateral institution that manages to accommo-date great powers is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), estab-lished in 2001. Membership includes the regional giants, Russia and China, and a number of former Soviet republics—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajiki-stan, and Uzbekistan. It is through the new form of regional governance represented by SCO that the Russia–China relationship may be better un-


derstood as having “largely transcended the past practice of alliances.”20 This was demonstrated by China’s and SCO’s “neutrality” over Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia. China and Russia as SCO’s big powers may be mutually restrictive in their behavior within the organization but they also combine to give the SCO the strategic clout it needs to address Western (particularly NATO) influence in the region.

This recalls the structural realists’ perspective concerning the primacy of the distribution of power in understanding the international system. To this end, the SCO is commonly referred to as a security organization designed to keep the United States out of Central Asia, with Sino–Russian military exercises seen as evidence of the securitization of the region. Yet the SCO evolved from its 1996 predecessor, the “Shanghai Five,” whose original mis-sion was to demilitarize the old Sino–Soviet border and resolve border de-marcation disputes. It evolved into an organization focused on the fight against “terrorism, separatism and extremism” (a major concern for China regarding its own Uyghur separatists in Xinjiang), and from there went on to specialize in “multifaceted political, economic and cultural coopera-tion.”21 The effects of the global economic crisis, for instance, were ad-dressed in a practical fashion. Chinese premier Wen Jiabao announced to an SCO heads of government council meeting in Kazakhstan, on October 30, 2008, that China would give loans for food security, notably in the es-tablishment of agricultural infrastructure and facilities.

Thus beyond the “win-win” rhetoric of the new security concept, its day-to-day expression may be seen in the governance of SCO as a new kind of security organization.22 It is one that includes under its purview: energy security, food security and food safety, climate change, health risks, terror-ism, and transnational crime. Moreover, the charter of the SCO is open and does not require member states to support one another in time of war (as noted above, the members did not rally behind Russia in its war with Geor-gia). Rather, there is “considerable space for individual members to pursue their own policies for their own interests.”23 Another governance character-istic, as in Southeast Asia, is avoidance of hierarchical relations through consensus decision-making. Russia, too, it should be noted, had signed the SCO’s Dushanbe summit declaration that occurred after the Russo–Georgian conflict. The joint statement exemplifies the interpretation of security as inclusive of nontraditional security, as well as reflecting the openness of the SCO’s charter. Indeed, it represents a model document for constructivist regional governance even if some of the members themselves fall short in governance indicators when judged by international norms (but well within the norm for their group’s values). The document states, in part:

In the 21st century interdependence of states has grown sharply, security and development are becoming inseparable. None of the modern international

100 Rosita Dellios

problems can be settled by force, the role of force factor in global and regional politics is diminishing objectively.

Reliance on a solution based solely on the use of force faces no prospects, it hinders comprehensive settlement of local conflicts; effective resolution of existing problems can be possible only with due regard for the interests of all parties, through their involvement in a process of negotiations, not through isolation. Attempts to strengthen one’s own security to the preju-dice of security of others do not assist the maintenance of global security and stability.”24

Because disparities in power cannot be ignored even if great power influ-ence is exercised indirectly or discreetly, it has been suggested that a hierar-chic order is in fact the de facto position favored by the Southeast Asian nations: the United States at the top, China as the regional great power, fol-lowed by India, Japan, and South Korea as “second-tier regional powers.”25 This represents a hierarchy of power distribution rather than an institu-tional governance scenario as represented by the European Union (EU) model at the far end of the realist–institutionalist spectrum.

However, the arrangement could also be viewed as one of a “mandalic” nesting of states that allows relations to be established through functional engagement from the center, for it is usually easier to interconnect than inte-grate. Hence the system of a core set of states “plus” other states or organiza-tions. Clearly ASEAN has been the leader in this respect, but SCO is develop-ing it too—for example SCO + Afghanistan.26 Transregional relations are one outcome, as shown by ASEAN signing a cooperation agreement with SCO in 2005. Meanwhile the EU is looking at an “ad hoc dialogue” with SCO, and similar arrangements are being considered for SCO–NATO.27 The implica-tions here for a cooperative rather than competitive dynamic are apparent. As with the notion of process being more important than results, so too correla-tive relationships are a feature of China’s regional security thinking. Working with others on the basis of equality means recognizing them as being part of one’s identity-cum-security.

PRoBLemS AND PoSSIBILITIeS

However, from another viewpoint, the diversity of cultures and religions in Asia poses a problem for identity, while mutual confidence is hindered by historical legacies or current conflicts of interests. Thus conflict and suspi-cion often characterize the “mutuality” of relations, thereby conjuring the negative side of the constructivist coin.28 The region is also geographically scattered, impeding a stronger sense of regional cohesion. So does eco-nomic underdevelopment in many parts of the region. Still, regionalism


through various multilateral governance regimes is probable when consid-ered from a “multi-track, multi-speed, and multi-institutional perspec-tive.”29 China exhibits a realistic appreciation of the complexity and magni-tude of the task, including the need to be cautious not to be seen as manipulative of others in view of its size and influence. China’s familiarity with the constraints imposed by magnitude derives from philosophical, geopolitical and historical experience.

The above-noted “mandalic” nesting of relations—with its Buddhist connotations of codependent origination which stresses the interdepen-dent existence of all phenomena, that they are empty of their own exis-tence and therefore contingent—is indicative of a correlativity in Chinese philosophy. This may be represented variously in: the dynamic circle of the yin-yang diagram; as focus and field; as center and periphery with the periphery responding to the center. Between center and periphery there are numerous foci that not so much compete but “respond,” just as the center and periphery respond to one another.30 Although recognizably Buddhist and Taoist in thought, there is also a Confucian understanding here. It concerns the concept of “rule of man” which is disdained in West-ern political thought because of the imputed untrustworthiness of human nature, but is viewed differently in Chinese philosophy. This is because “rule of man” means exemplar—rule of ren—the junzi is a cultivated per-son. Thus the Chinese believe there could be a good government. In cor-relativity there is no dualism between government and people: “The ruler is the heart and people are the body,” explains Chinese philosopher, Tian Chenshan. “Also people are the priority. This is the role of government in Chinese tradition. If the center tries to leave the field we see the end of a dynasty.”31

By implication, China’s governance diplomacy needs to be responsive to its periphery, but without the “ruler” metaphor lest the region finds this to be a troubling hegemonic claim. Nor should China philosophically fail to keep itself “centered” in terms of equilibrium between Heaven (the moral universe) and Earth (economic and political affairs). In other words, ideal-ism and ideology need to be moderated by pragmatism.

From the geopolitical and historical perspective, the “periphery” phe-nomenon of understanding the “many” to populate the rim of the “one,” is indicative of a country that is both blessed and condemned to be the “Middle Kingdom”: geopolitical centrality bestows power but it also de-mands an outlook of perpetual vigilance and diplomatic dexterity. This has been honed over centuries of tributary relations. The system was at its stron-gest in the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) and included as many as 100 king-doms. With the Chinese emperor being recognized as the symbolic head of the international household, foreign affairs were thus transformed into in-ternal affairs. This arrangement yielded security and economic benefits

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without the costs of militarism or isolationism. The challenge was how to disarm the barbarians at the gates by encouraging them to partake of the Chinese world through tribute relations. While tribute meant a symbolic submission to civilization (China) it also entailed attractive rewards, both in terms of trade opportunities and the conditions of peace in which they could be pursued. In short, the regional periphery of old was a Sinocentric one in which many nations participated on a hierarchy-of-power basis. As the Qing dynasty weakened in the face of Western imperial demands, the Westphalian system of international relations overtook the tribute system. Its demise was evident in the signing of “unequal treaties” occasioned by military defeats: most notably by Britain through the Opium Wars of 1839–1842 and 1856–1860. The fatal blow came from Meiji Japan in the First Sino–Japanese War of 1894–1895.

Among the lessons for China were the hazards of internal weakness, the importance of technological competitiveness, and affirmation that force ultimately underpins the international order in which it must live. The last of these is a notion familiar to Confucian China which recognized the im-portance of a “hard core” of power within the “soft pulp” of moral author-ity.32 Lest the core be taken as a militaristic one in this metaphor, it is well to recall that Taoism places defensive force in the strategic second phase (exemplified by Sunzi’s The Art of War classic) of a practitioner’s education, which comes after isolation from human affairs to learn the laws of nature, but before the poststrategic level of transcendence when the world is one—datong.33

Viewed from today’s perspective of China’s (historically instructed) need to be strong (realist) and inspirational for the implementation of a new security concept (constructivist), it has followed the route of multi-lateral institution-building. Its own 2008 defense white paper acknowl-edges as much: “China is playing an active and constructive role in multi-lateral affairs, thus notably elevating its international position and influence.”34 This statement echoes the earlier one made by PRC govern-ment representative, Ambassador Yang Yanyi, on “win-win” diplomacy: “The purpose of China’s regional cooperation policy is to facilitate Chi-na’s development and promote regional peace and common develop-ment.” The correlativity between China’s constructivist and calculative strategy is even more direct in her subsequent statement that China “is using multilateral means to promote economic growth.” Such growth is defined under the current administration as one that requires a greater balance between material and societal-environmental values. This is cap-tured by the “harmonious society” slogan for internal development, the counterpart to the PRC’s foreign policy of “harmonious world.” An eye to balanced internal development also assists in improved external percep-tions of China’s governance capabilities.


CoNCLuSIoN

China has participated in a range of multilateral organizations and advocates a layered regional cooperation in its governance diplomacy. If China’s behav-ior is to determine whether the region has an “open, transparent and mutu-ally beneficial future” or “risk blundering into a future where competition and exclusion set the pattern,” then it is apparent that Beijing will need to continue to engage seriously with all players and organizations, including those of which it has tended to be wary or demonize in the past. In this re-spect, relations with Washington and progress in cross-strait relations are on the ascent. It remains to be seen whether Beijing’s proverbial “win-win” for-mula will fuel the anticipated benefits of greater regional integration. It is unlikely that China is trying to “govern” the Asia–Pacific region. Rather, the relationship is mutually constitutive. As with the notion of process being more important than results, so too correlative relationships are a feature of East Asian security thinking. Thus this chapter has also explored a number of possible theoretical underpinnings of China’s governance diplomacy and its regional context in terms of East Asian modalities of thought, leading to the conclusion that, on balance, China’s multilateralist behavior—or governance diplomacy in the pursuit of cooperative regionalism—will in fact contribute to greater stability and less exclusion in regional affairs.

NoTeS

1. Robert Gates, “Challenges to Stability in the Asia-Pacific,” International Insti-tute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The 7th IISS Asia Security Summit Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, 31 May 2008. See also Peter Spiegel, “Gates Warns Asia on Arms Risk,” Los Angeles Times, 31 May 2008, articles.latimes.com/2008/may/31/world/fg-gates31 (accessed 10/1/08).

2. Ibid. 3. Joshua S. Goldstein, International Relations, 6th ed., New York, Pearson Long-

man, 2005, pp. 106, 109. 4. See Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge: Cam-

bridge University Press, 1999. 5. Alexander Wendt, “Why a World State Is Inevitable,” European Journal of Inter-

national Relations, vol. 9, no. 4, 2003, p. 498. 6. Qin Yaqing, Vice President and Professor of International Studies at China

Foreign Affairs University (CFAU), presentation, “Power: Interdependence and Insti-tutions,” 23 June 2008, China’s Perspective on Emerging Security Issues, workshop sponsored by the University of New Haven Global Studies Program and hosted by the CFAU, East Asian Studies Center, Beijing, 23–27 June 2008.

7. By early 2009, 20 to 30 million people in China became unemployed because of a collapse in export markets. Meanwhile, the Obama administration wanted

104 Rosita Dellios

China, its largest holder of American government debt—$700 billion in 2008—to continue buying U.S. Treasuries in order to fund President Obama’s $800 billion stimulus package.

8. Qin Yaqing, “Power: Interdependence and Institutions.” 9. See Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China,

China’s National Defense in 1998 (White Paper), www.shaps.hawaii.edu/security/china-defense-july1998.html#2, and China’s National Defense in 2004 (White Paper). www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/natdef2004.html (both accessed 2/26/09).

10. China’s National Defense in 2004, ibid.11. See Bates Gill, Rising Star: China’s New Security Diplomacy, Washington, D.C.:

Brookings Institution Press, 2007.12. Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Chi-

na’s National Defense in 2006 (White Paper), english.peopledaily.com.cn/whitepaper/defense2006/defense2006(2).html (accessed 2/26/09).

13. Yang Yanyi, Ambassador, Deputy Director General, Asian Department, Min-istry of Foreign Affairs, PRC, presentation, “China’s Policy to Its Neighbors,” 25 June 2008, workshop sponsored by the University of New Haven Global Studies Program and hosted by the China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU), East Asian Studies Cen-ter, Beijing, 23–27 June 2008.

14. See Yan Xuetong, “China’s First Step Forward in Its ‘Harmonious World- Oriented’ Diplomacy,” People’s Daily Online, 19 December 2006, english.people-daily.com.cn/200612/19/eng20061219_333955.html (accessed 9/20/08); as well as his article that describes the zero-sum nature of an international system that relies on power status: Yan Xuetong, “The Rise of China and Its Power Status,” Chinese Journal of International Politics, vol. 1, no. 1, 2006, pp. 5–33, cjip.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/1/1/5 (accessed 3/22/09).

15. Yang Yanyi, “China’s Policy to Its Neighbors.”16. See discussion in Marc Lanteigne, China and International Institutions: Alternate

Paths to Global Power, London and New York: Routledge, 2005, p. 12.17. Simon S. C. Tay, “Understanding ASEAN,” Foreword, in Mohamed Bin Salim

(ed.), Changing Faces of ASEAN: A Select Booklist, Singapore: National Library Board, 2002, p. 8.

18. Qin Yaqing, “Power: Interdependence and Institutions.”19. Qin Yaqing and Wei Ling, “Structures, Processes, and the Socialization of

Power,” in Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng (eds), China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008, p. 125.

20. Yu Bin, “China Still On-side with Russia,” Asia Times Online, 6 September 2008, www.atimes.com/atimes/China/JI06Ad01.html, accessed 5/11/08.

21. See Shanghai Cooperation Organization (2004–2005), www.sectsco.org/news (accessed 10/23/07).

22. A notable difference between SCO and ASEAN Plus Three is that the first began as a security organisation and later developed into a wider socioeconomic and cultural entity; while its Southeast Asian counterpart was the opposite, moving from economic cooperation to security cooperation in ARF.

23. Yu Bin, “China Still On-side with Russia.” See Charter of SCO, Shanghai Coop-eration Organization, 2001, www.sectsco.org/news_detail.asp?id=96&LanguageID=2 (accessed 11/11/08).


24. Dushanbe Declaration 2008, SCO, www.sectsco.org/news_detail.asp?id=2360 &LanguageID=2 (accessed 9/18/08).

25. Evelyn Goh, Meeting the China Challenge: The U.S. in Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies, Washington D.C.: East West Center Washington, 2005.

26. Personal communication, November 2007, Shanghai, with Center for Shang-hai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Studies within the Shanghai Academy of So-cial Sciences at www.coscos.org.cn.

27. Ibid.28. I am grateful to Richard Mansbach for pointing out after a conference presen-

tation of an earlier version of this paper that constructivism can have destructive tendencies too. (The One-dot Center for the Study of International Governance, Regimes, and Globalization, GSIA, Ming Chuan University, Taiwan, 14 March 2009.)

29. Yang Yanyi, “China’s Policy to Its Neighbors.”30. See David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, Thinking Through Confucius, New York:

State University of New York, 1987, p. 17.31. Tian Chenshan, Director, Center for East–West Studies, Beijing Foreign Stud-

ies University and Center for China Studies, University of Hawaii, presentation, “Culture and Foreign Policy,” 23 June 2008, workshop sponsored by the University of New Haven Global Studies Program and hosted by the China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU), East Asian Studies Center, Beijing, 23–27 June 2008.

32. A contemporary historian’s metaphor cited in Wang Gungwu, “Early Ming Relations with Southeast Asia: A Background Essay,” in John King Fairbank (ed.), The Chinese World Order, Traditional China’s Foreign Relations, Cambridge, MA: Har-vard University Press, 1968, p. 61.

33. See Fung Yu-Lan, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, New York: Free Press, 1966.

34. China’s National Defense in 2008 (White Paper). www.china.org.cn/govern-ment/central_government/2009-01/20/content_17155577.htm (accessed 2/26/09).

106 Rosita Dellios

107

7Governing the Taiwan Strait in a Globalizing World: Using Military and Nonmilitary Adversary Regimes as a ToolShawn S. F. KAO and Peter Kien-hong YU

There are three major concepts or terms in the title of this chapter, namely, governance, regimes, and (collective, driving forces or varieties of) global-ization. Those concepts can be applied at the supranational level, at the international level, and to the adversary relationship between politically divided Taiwan and mainland China which has existed since the late 1940s. The second author calls these places bicoastal China (lianganzhongguo), with the former maintaining the official title of the Republic of China (ROC) and the latter, the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

Both Taipei and Beijing can govern the Taiwan Strait. It is what the second author called the Bicoastal Chinese governance. If another country were involved such as the United States, we will use the term, international gov-ernance. To be sure, there are many international regimes, which can be applied to the Taiwan Strait. Under each regime, we see mechanisms and measures.1 Mechanisms refer to devices and/or institutions, which are used to maintain and sustain each regime. A hot line is one good example, which can be traced back to the June 1963 agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Expand the U.S.–USSR Direct Communications Link. Institution can be subdivided into practices and/or organizations. Measures are steps planned or to be taken as a means to achieve an end. However, when the focus is on Taiwan and mainland China, the term Bicoastal Chinese regimes, mechanisms, and measures, respectively will be employed. Certainly, relations between the ROC and the PRC differ from bicoastal Chinese regimes, because bicoastal Chinese relations include regimes and nonregimes.

In the first section, we will describe and explain what is governance as well as spell out the qualifications for using the term. In the next section,

we will identify, with some qualifications, some important regimes or regime-oriented practices and/or clauses in a treaty, pact, convention, pro-tocol, covenant, agreement, accord, armistice, truce, moratorium, memo-randum of understanding (MOU), etc., at the international level, which can be applied to the Taiwan Strait. In the third section, we will compare and contrast the Taiwan Strait experience with that of the Strait(s) of Malacca (and Luzon) in Southeast Asia, to see whether the former experience can be globalized to the latter and/or elsewhere, such as the Strait of Hormuz in the Middle East. To be sure, the 9-Degree Channel in the Northern Indian Ocean is also important to mainland China.

GoveRNING The TAIwAN STRAIT: whAT IS IT ALL ABouT?

Oceans cover 71 percent of the Earth’s surface, and smaller regions of the oceans are given names like seas, gulfs, straits, etc. International waters ac-count for more than 50 percent of the world’s surface.2 There are more than 1,000 straits in the world. About 130 of them can be navigated.3 Efforts have been made to bring about or foster order in those waters, including 116 straits in the world.

At the outset, it is necessary to have a rough idea of the Taiwan Strait.4 It is located at 24 degrees (30 minutes) North latitude and 120 degrees (00 minutes) East longitude, covering an area about 60,000 square kilometers.5 Part of the South China Sea (SCS) and connecting to the East China Sea (ECS) to the northeast, it is 180 kilometers (km) wide. The narrowest part is 131 km wide. At high tide, the speed of a fishing boat, which is capable of sailing up to a maximum of ten nautical miles per hour, can be only six nautical miles.6 The length of Taiwan Island itself is 394 km. Fujian Prov-ince on the Chinese mainland is to the west of the Strait, while important islands like Jinmen/Quemoy Islands, Mazu Islands, Xiamen/Amoy, and Hainan Province, are nearby. To the east are the west coast of Taiwan and Penghu/Pescadores. The Minjiang and Jiulong Rivers of Fujina Province empty into the Strait.

Is the Taiwan Strait strategic? On the one hand, some Chinese and non-Chinese government officials and politicians regard the Strait as strategi-cally important. In January 1960, Chiang Kai-shek was invited to visit a U.S. nuclear submarine, which was anchored in the ROC waters for the first time. Statistics show that, every day, around 300 Japanese ships pass by the Strait.7 One day, perhaps the world’s largest ocean liner or floating city, Oasis of the Seas, which was launched in October 2009, or Sun 21 translan-tic solar catamaran, which for the first time left the cargo port of Basel, Switzerland in October 2006 and which is the world’s first solar powered boat without using a drop of gas, may also sail through the Strait. Others

108 Shawn S. F. KAO and Peter Kien-hong YU

say this stretch of water is an essential (as opposed to optional) sea route for oil and other commodities shipments from the Middle East via, for ex-ample, the Strait(s) of Malacca8 to, for example, the Republic of Korea (ROK). For the PRC, it is a short cut, connecting the third ranking Guang-zhou Port, the second ranking Xianggang/ Hongkong/Fragrant Port and the largest Shanghai International Shipping Center (SISC) with a deep-water port around the Yangshan Isles,9 and beyond, such as Port of Haiphong of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV).

On the other hand, some hold the opposite view. There are times when even the United States does not have a firm idea as to what it should do with the Taiwan area and its surrounding bodies of water. In August 1945, Imperial Japan surrendered to the Allied Powers. The U.S. Navy immedi-ately regarded Tokyo’s colony, Taiwan, as being strategically important. Yet, it did not want the ROC to get involved.10 (Ironically, in November 1943, CHIANG Kai-shek in Cairo twice refused an offer by the then U.S. presi-dent, Franklin D. Roosevelt, to jointly administer Diaoyutai/Senkakus.11) However, it had no choice but to scrap its plan to militarily administer the biggest island of China, Taiwan, when the ROC government dispatched its 70 Jun (70th Army) on October 15, 1945. It should be noted that the 70 Jun, established in March 1943, sailed from Ningbo Harbor, Zhejiang Province, to Jilong Harbor, Taiwan Province, and was, ironically, escorted by ten ves-sels of the U.S. 7th Fleet.12

On February 28, 1947, an incident resulting in bloodshed took place in Taipei. In June 1947, five native Taiwanese in Shanghai City formed an al-liance called Taiwanzaijiefanglianmeng (literally the Alliance for Reliberating Taiwan) and in July and August 1947, they submitted an eight-point gan-gling (program/guiding principles), which included the idea of having a temporary United Nations (UN) trusteeship, to the special one-month-long fact-finding, roving American ambassador Albert C. Wedemeyer, for the then American president Harry S. Truman. On September 19, 1947, the lieutenant-general submitted to Truman a damaging report, which strongly criticized the elder CHIANG government.

On January 5, 1950, Truman said “the U.S. government will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in civil conflict in China” nor “provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces.”13 In essence, Washington virtually abandoned Taipei until the outbreak of the Korean War in June of the same year. In March 1950, the elder CHIANG in his dairy wrote that the Chinese Communists had made plans to attack Taiwan in May of the same year.14

In any case, the Taiwan Strait is important to the PRC. Once in control of the Taiwan Province, its naval ships can easily project its power beyond the First Island Chain. As for the United States Department of Defense (DOD), the Taiwan area must not fall into the hands of the undemocratic and au-thoritarian Chinese Communists.

Governing the Taiwan Strait in a Globalizing World 109

Since the end of World War II, the Strait has been the theater for several major military confrontations between the ROC and the PRC. From the late 1940s to the late 1960s, we witnessed three such crises. The first one started on September 4, 1954, when Chinese Communist artillery began shelling Jinmen, and the Chinese Nationalists returned fire. The latter also launched large-scale air strikes against the Chinese mainland. The main reason for the shelling was because the ROC planned to sign a mutual defense treaty with the United States in December of the same year, and the PRC wanted to warn the latter not to legally divide China. It was several months before December 1954 that the One China Principle was formulated for the first time by the Chinese Communists.15

The second major crisis took place in August 1958, which subsided in October of the same year, when the then PRC Minister of National De-fense, PENG Dehuai, sent a second message to his compatriots in the Tai-wan area, saying shelling of the Jinmen area would only be on odd (as opposed to even) days of the calendar. Again, Beijing, accusing Washing-ton, London, and Tokyo of manufacturing two Chinas,16 wanted to make sure that Jinmen and other remote islands would remain in the ROC hands.

There was another Taiwan Strait crisis, which took place in the first sev-eral years of the 1960s. In April 1961, the ROC’s Ministry of National Defense (MOND) began to map out a plan to retake the Chinese main-land, code-named Operation Guoguang (National Glory). By late 1965, it was clear that the ROC could not succeed in doing so.17 Not until 1968, did the Nationalist Party of China (NPC) or Koumintang (KMT) air force stop intruding into the PRC’s airspace or harassing the coastal area of the Chinese mainland.18

From May 1995 to the present, politico–military tension continues to exist. From July 1995 to March 13, 1996, the mainland conducted seven waves of military exercises. By now, some 1,300 PRC ballistic missiles have been targeted at the Taiwan area. In February 2007, the ROC armed forces at the Jiupeng Missile Testing Range for the first time test-launched a land-attack cruise missile, Hsiung Feng (Brave Wind)-2E, which could be equipped with BCU-114/B softbombs or CBU-94 blackout bombs that could short-circuit electrical power distribution equipment such as trans-formers and switching stations with minimal risk of collateral damage and is capable of hitting the Shanghai Municipal City (SMC). However, in Oc-tober 2007, the supersonic antiship missile was not displayed during the Double Ten National Day parade. Everything started with the invitation in May 1995 to the then ROC president LEE Teng-hui by the American Con-gress. They invited Lee to visit his alma mater, Cornell University, in the following month. Suspicious of LEE’s intention of legally separating the Taiwan area from China as demonstrated in his speech at the Ivy League


university, by uttering the ROC on Taiwan (as opposed to merely the ROC or the ROC in Taiwan), the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) began its military exercise in July 1995 by launching unarmed ballistic missiles from its Nanping Missile Base, Fujian Province.19 Those missiles splashed not far away from the waters of northern Taiwan. Because the ROC planned to hold its first direct presidential election in March 1996 as scheduled, tension mounted.

To elaborate, on December 19, 1995, the United States sent the USS Nimitz from the Eastern Pacific to the Strait. This marked the first time American ships had patrolled the politically treacherous waterway between Taiwan and mainland China. In November 1969, the 7th Fleet quietly ended its nineteen-year presence.20 (In May 1975, the United States re-moved its last squadron of 18 F-4 Phantom jet fighter-bombers from the Taiwan area and, in June 1976, it withdrew its small military advisory teams from Jinmen and Mazu.)

The U.S. 7th Fleet monitored Chinese Communist military live-fire exer-cises off the coast of Taiwan Province in March 1996.21 The Strait became one of the four flash points in Asia (defined as a place where weapons of mass destruction might be used by the major powers22). The forward-deployed USS Independence aircraft carrier battle group, with embarked Carrier Air Wing Five, responded to rising tensions between the Chinese mainland and the Taiwan area by taking station off the eastern coast of Taiwan. USS Bunker Hill, operated south of Taiwan, using its SPY-1 Aegis radar and other means to observe the missile tests. Other ships operating with the USS Independence included USS Hewitt, USS O’Brien, and USS McClusky. The USS Nimitz, ac-companied by six other naval ships, transited at high speed to arrive near the Taiwan area on March 21, 1996, two days before the ROC presidential elec-tion, which signaled the intensity of U.S. resolve. However, the then PRC premier LI Peng warned Washington not to make a show of force by sending its navy through the Taiwan Strait. The then American Secretary of Defense, William J. Perry, responded, saying that, while the Chinese PLA is “a great military power, the premier—the strongest—military power in the Western Pacific is the United States.” In any case, the U.S. Navy kept away from the choppy Strait.

In September 1979, the ROC declared its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In February 1992, the Law of the PRC on Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone was ratified. In May 1996, its National People’s Congress (NPC) in Beijing passed the December 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN-CLOS). And, in June 1998, the PRC EEZ and Continental Shelf Law was rati-fied and promulgated. We should also not forget that the broken U-shaped line in place since December 1947, which ended up at Guishan Island and is part of Yilan County, Taiwan Province, still exists.23 In this connection, in January 1984, a tacit agreement, for the first time providing the precise coor-


dinates for the dividing line (jiexian)/middle line (as opposed to median line in the international legal parlance)/demarcation line, was announced by the Fujian Provincial Service in Fuzhou City. This action enabled the ROC’s oceanographic scientists and workers to take part in the joint survey work in the Strait.24 This kind of arrangement is favorable to Taipei, because its re-mote islands (or enclaves), such as Jinmen and Mazu, can still be in its hands.25 What both Taipei and Beijing mean is that the Taiwan Strait is defi-nitely not the high seas [as opposed to the open sea (kaikouhai or gonghai), which is not a legal term26]. This certainly does make some difference as to whether both Taipei and Beijing are ruling or governing the Taiwan Strait, because countries like the United States and the Russian Federation (RF) in-sist that, traditionally, the Strait has been an international navigation route and should remain so. Under the following explanation, USS Kitty Hawk and its five supportive vessels in November 2007 transited the Taiwan Strait: “This was a normal navigational transit of international waters, and the route selec-tion was based on operational necessity, including adverse weather.”27 Be-sides, airspace over the EEZ is still international. So, Washington attempted to test Beijing’s resolve. For example, not long after July 1997, when Hong-kong was returned to the PRC, U.S. naval ships, after receiving permission from Beijing, pulled into its port.28 In addition, former commander-in-chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Dennis Blair, while observing the ROC’s Hanguang (Chinese Glory) No. 22 War Games in April 2006, said that Washington would not shrink from a cross-strait military conflict, so long as the ROC did not provoke the PRC in the first place.29

In a separate development, in March 1995, the State Council of the PRC promulgated the Procedures for International Navigation Ships Entering and Exiting Ports of the PRC (PINSEEPPRC). Especially because of the exis-tence of this decree, the word, govern, as opposed to rule, should be used. That is to say, Beijing has no intention of nationalizing the Taiwan Strait by building, for example, many artificial islands. Rule refers to a prescribed guide for conduct or action or an accepted procedure, custom, or habit.30 Control and command can be its synonyms. However, so long as there are countries, which resist or challenge such guide, procedure, custom, or habit, both Taipei and Beijing, even if united, cannot rule the Strait as they wish. In this connection, upon joining an international regime, a country’s sover-eignty should be understood as being less than 100 percent, because all the countries and multiple political and/or economic entities involved must cooperate and coordinate first, rather than competing, challenging, negoti-ating, bargaining and so on and so forth with one another, because all the countries are on the same side regarding an issue-area, issue-areas, or issue-regimes at the international level. Besides, because nonmilitary regimes could involve nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or, in the coinage of Anthony Judge, Necessary-for-Governance Organizations (NGOs), the au-


thority of determining basic policy31 by either side or both sides of the Taiwan Strait could be further decreased. In short, synonyms for governance include exercise authority over, as of nations; implement regional and inter-national regulatory frameworks;32 apply multilateralism;33 administration; management; operation; arrangement; regulation, facilitation, etc. There is no doubt that, by the turn of the twenty-first century, no one leader can say that he or she is ruling the country, not to mention the whole world, and there are many issues whereby no country can act on its own to solve them in a given area, be it the land, sea, seabed, electron, airspace, outer space, or nonterritorial dimensions or spheres such as the human rights.

ReGImeS: mILITARy AND NoNmILITARy

International regimes are an indispensable tool or niche for Bicoastal China or international governance. They function differently from, for example, international organizations. Any regime at the international level has a conceptual boundary34 but can benefit all the nations, countries, or states, political and/or economic entities, and Earthlings like you and me, whereas a particular international body should only take care of its members first. One international organization may challenge another international orga-nization or be at odds. For example, during the Cold War, the North Atlan-tic Treaty Organization (NATO), deterred, if not confronted, the Warsaw Pact. International law could also be socialist-oriented or capitalist-oriented. Europe has its own version of law, which is quite different from the Ameri-can legal experience, due to the latter’s very specific form of government.35 Sometimes, due to limited tangible and intangible resources, NGOs, for example, cannot do as good a job as a wealthy national government, which usually has enough budget for foreign aid. Due to the objective circum-stances of an issue-area, issue-areas, or issue-regimes, nations, countries, or states and so on have to cooperate and to coordinate with one another in order to resolve a pressing or critical problem, out of urgency, insecurity, perception, or convergent expectation.

Periodically, Beijing and Taipei have been politically and/or militarily at odds since the late 1940s. Despite that, (traditional) adversary regimes can still be created, maintained, and sustained, resulting in less anarchy, ten-sion, (scientific) uncertainty, and mistrust, when adversaries, due to objec-tive circumstance, have (learn) to cooperate and coordinate with one an-other in resolving an issue in a given area.

In August 2002, the then ROC president, CHEN Shui-bian said there is one country on each side of the Taiwan Strait. A few months before that, a study authorized by CHEN and conducted by a ranking military official of the ROC on the confidence-building measures (CBMs) was completed for the first


time.36 [In April 1998, the then ROC premier, XIAO Wanchang, mentioned the CBMs at the Legislative Yuan (Branch)]. Speaking to the Time reporter two months later, LEE Teng-hui mentioned the same. In this section, we will first identify some important military regimes and mechanisms/subregimes 37 in their order of importance. If the word mechanism has been used, it still has a positive meaning. Sometimes, an agreement contains certain regimes or community-centered arrangements but, in this context, the agreement itself does not constitute a regime, because it could not benefit all of the nonsigna-tories. Only until such time that the same agreement can benefit the non-signatories, can we use the term agreement regime. Then, we will describe and explain some nonmilitary regimes and mechanisms,38 which are relevant to the Taiwan Strait. In the third part, we will also identify some regimes, which need to be formed, maintained, and sustained.

When we implement a regime or ask a country to comply with or adhere to it in the Taiwan Strait, it does not matter who owns the Strait in the first place. If there is delay in the implementation, compliance, etc., of a certain regime, it implies that there is no urgency, insecurity, perception, and conver-gent expectation among the parties involved. Thus, Beijing and Taipei did not conduct the very first proposed rescue exercise in September 2006 in the Tai-wan Strait, as reported in the press. As another example, in late May to early June 2006, mainland China, although being slated for a central role, and the ROK, one after another, dropped out of a maritime joint antiterrorism exer-cise, which was part of the U.S.-led May 2003 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). However, the Chinese PLA guided missile destroyer, Qingdao, and a refueling ship arrived from Naval Station Pearl Harbor in September 2006, for the first time practiced the use of internationally accepted communication signals to talk to the American naval ships off Hawaii and conducted a search-and-rescue exercise off the Port of San Diego, California. In November 2006, the second phase of the exercise was conducted off the Hainan Province in the SCS. For the record, the PSI operates outside of the UN framework. There are many variations of regimes, in order of importance: strategic weapons mechanism, nuclear weapons mechanism, missile technology control mech-anism, arms reduction mechanism, arms regulation mechanism, arms limita-tion mechanism, arms control mechanism, disarmament mechanism, nu-clear nonproliferation mechanism, ban on the use of chemical and biological weapons mechanism, conventional weapons mechanism, conflict avoidance mechanism, code of conduct mechanism, demilitarized zone mechanism, buffer zone mechanism, etc.

military Regimes

Beijing has on numerous occasions said it is willing to set up Bicoastal Chi-nese regimes related to military affairs. For example, on May 17, 2004, the


Office for Taiwan Affairs under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (OTACCCPC) and the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Coun-cil were authorized to issue a statement on current Bicoastal Chinese rela-tions, later dubbed the “May 17 Authorized Statement.” Part of one of the seven policies is to establish a mechanism of mutual trust in military field.39

In November 1985, the Chinese PLA navy began to visit other coun-tries. As of April 2009, the Chinese PLA navy has sailed to thirty-one ports or to close to forty countries.40 In October 2000, both Beijing and Tokyo agreed to engage in naval port-calls. In November 2007, a Chinese PLA navy guided missile cruiser, Shenzhen, basking in a flurry of welcoming ceremonies, honor bands, and smiling assurances, for the first time docked at a Tokyo pier. The last time was in August 1886 during the Qing dynasty. In December 2008, three Chinese PLA naval ships for the first time sailed to waters off Somali Republic to counter pirates.

Beijing has also set up military regimes with other countries. For example, as a measure to build up mutual trust, an agreement between the MOND of the PRC and the DOD of the United States of America on Establishing a Consultation Mechanism to Strengthen Military Maritime Safety was signed by the then General CHI Haotian, Minister of National Defense of the PRC and William S. Cohen, the then Secretary of Defense of the United States during the latter’s visit to Beijing in January 1998. This was intended to improve the ability to deal with incidents at sea and increase mutual under-standing of naval and navigational practices for both ships and aircraft, and to reduce the chances of miscalculation, misfire, etc. This consultation mechanism came about as a result of an incident in October 1994, in which a U.S. aircraft carrier stalked a PRC nuclear submarine in the Huanghai/Yellow Sea. In October 2006, a PRC conventional submarine stalked USS Kitty Hawk. Under the agreement, the DOD and the Chinese Communist defense ministry will meet annually to discuss mutual concerns that relate to activities at sea by their naval and air forces. In February 2008, both the PRC and the United States signed an agreement, saying they will have such a twenty-four-hour link, which became operational in April 2009, the first of its kind Beijing has ever established with a foreign country at the defense ministry level, so as to avoid misunderstanding during any moments of crisis in the Pacific. However, it seems that they do not have to worry too much about the submerged passage through the shallow Taiwan Strait.41

In this connection, all the parties should also comply with the March 1988 UN Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUVA Convention) and the October 2005 Protocols as well as the March 1988 Protocol related to Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf.

In October 2003, the first meeting under the mechanism of China- Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) maritime affairs consultation


was held in Guangzhou City, Guangdong Province. Issues related to sailing safety, maritime emergency response, and others were discussed.

In December 1976, the East Sea Fleet of the Chinese PLA navy, which has a contingency command center (yingjizhihuizhongxin), conducted, for the first time, an exercise beyond its First Island Chain strategy. The United States was certainly concerned. In April 2006, the PRC navy for the first time conducted a joint patrol exercise with a foreign navy, namely, the SRV, in semiclosed Beibu Bay/Tonkin Gulf. Would Beijing also invite Washington to conduct a similar exercise in the Taiwan Strait, since Japan hosted the first Asian PSI exercise in October 2004? In September 2005, a new concept, comanagement of the Taiwan Strait, was first proposed by the PRC leader, HU Jintao, to the then American president George W. Bush, when they met each other at the UN.42 Although it did not materialize as a U.S. policy, this is intended to be a preventive measure, because both Beijing and Washing-ton do not want to see another crisis flare up in the Strait. To be sure, Beijing has on numerous occasions said it can discuss issues that concern Taipei. At the negotiations table, can Taipei, under the Strait for Peace Plan, propose to be in charge of managing the entire Taiwan Strait up to the territorial sea of the mainland?43

According to Samuel P. Huntington, after the collapse of the former So-viet Union, the focal point of international tension is the clash of seven or eight civilizations. Terrorism comes with it, especially when we see one civilization trying to impose its values on another civilization. More atten-tion has been focused on terrorism since the U.S. homeland was for the first time attacked by terrorists based in the Middle East in September 2001. In November 2005, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing issued a worldwide caution announcement on the continuing threat of terrorist actions. In June 2006, the American Embassy in the PRC capital again issued a travel warning say-ing there was a terrorist threat against U.S. interests in the mainland. In August 2006, terrorists who attempted to blow up some airplanes in the United Kingdom (UK) were arrested.

In November 2007, the then Indian Defense Ministry spokesman, Sitan-shu Kar, said that both the PRC and his country will hold the first joint military exercise in the following month, focusing on counterterrorism measures in Southwest China’s Yunan Province. Thus, force may have to be used on issues, such as counterterrorism, fighting against smuggling, piracy, armed robbery of ships, the (sex) slave trade, unauthorized broadcasting, human trafficking, drug trafficking, etc. As pointed out by Beijing, some-times a maritime power such as the United States would put forward a re-gional maritime security initiative as a first step to “garrison” a state under the guise of “counterterrorist measures.”44 The scale of terrorism could be big or small. In the year 2006, the U. S. government regarded close to 20,000 people as potential terrorists.45 A regime is needed, because terror-


ists can easily escape by boat from either Taiwan or the mainland.46 In April 2006, black-clad, antiterror police of the Republic of Indonesia (ROI) raided the heart of radicalism in Central Java and some parts of East Java.47 Although two hiding terrorists, who had bomb-making capabilities, were slain and two suspects arrested, the key leader of the al-Qaeda linked group, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Noordin M. Top, who was a Malaysian citizen and who became Asia’s most wanted terrorist, escaped. In June 2007, the JI’s military chief, Abu Dujana, was captured. In September 2009, Noordin was shot dead by Indonesian antiterrorist police during a raid in Solo, Central Java. This meant a major blow to the extremist group. However, it still has the ability to bounce back, according to the analysts.48 Indonesian terrorists survived for several years because some of them were financed by outsiders and sometimes they laundered money. The islands surrounding the Celebes Sea have become highways or what some Americans call “ratlines” for ter-rorists moving people and materiel to and from Indonesia, Federation of Malaysia (FM), and the Republic of the Philippines (ROP).49

Up to now, the PRC may perceive the matter on combating global terror-ism as not yet that serious between both sides of the Taiwan Strait, although it is a party to the International Convention for Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (ICSTB), International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (ICSFT), etc., and although it has, under the People’s Bank of China (PBC) set up the China Anti–Money Laundering Monitoring and Analysis Center (CALMAC) in April 2004, and put an anti–money laundering law in October 2006, which identified drug trafficking, orga-nized crime, terrorist crimes, smuggling, corruption and bribe taking, vio-lating financial management regulations, and financial fraud, into effect since January 2007. Thus, the U.S. Department of State, in its April 2006 annual report on world terrorism trends and counterterrorism activities, said that the PRC has been making efforts to block the ROC’s participation in international counterterrorism and nonproliferation initiatives.50 In one case, Beijing has opposed Chinese Taipei’s participation is an Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) initiative to inspect civilian airports in the region to assess vulnerabilities. Although, under APEC’s economic and technical cooperation agenda, Chinese Taipei had in May 2006 signed a MOU committing US$1 million to strengthen human security in areas such as counterterrorism, health security, emergency preparedness, and energy security. In another incidence, the PRC balked at joining the Financial Ac-tion Task Force (FATF), a broad international coalition of 101 countries whose mission is fighting money laundering by terrorist groups. In this connection, mainland China’s “refusal to recognize the Egmont Group, an umbrella body coordinating the activities of over 100 Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) worldwide, because the group includes an FIU from Taiwan, remains a substantial obstacle to joining FATF.”51 The Group has created


centers to collect information on suspicious or unusual financial activities from the countries’ financial industries to combat terrorist funding and other financial crime. In the Taiwan area, the FIU name for it is Money Laundering Prevention Center (MLPC). Taipei is also a member of the Steering Committee of the Asia–Pacific Group on money laundering. In January 2005, a cabinet-level Counterterrorism Office (CTO) was estab-lished to oversee and coordinate an interagency response to terrorism in the Taiwan area and the region. In September 2005, the ROC, which promul-gated the July 2003 Statute Governing Establishment and Management of Free Ports or the Free Port Initiative, also joined the United States’ Con-tainer Security Initiative (CSI) with operations in the Gaoxiong Port, so as to identify and target shipping containers that pose a terrorist risk. Jilong Port also became a participant in the CSI activities. This will also apply to Taipei Port, which began its operation in March 2009. And Taipei has ex-pressed its willingness to join an American “Megaports” program to help curb trafficking in radioactive materials.52

In another development, in April 2006, the U.S. DOD announced the name-list of twenty-two Chinese mainland Muslim Uyghur terrorists de-tained in its Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, which is the only American base in operation on Communist, Cuban soil. Five of them were released in May 2006 and were flown to the Republic of Albania (ROA) for resettlement. As to the other seventeen Chinese Muslim Uyghurs, they were still deemed “enemy combatants.”53 In September 2009, it was reported that the United States planned to transfer eight of them to the Republic of Palau (RP). In response, the PRC’s MOFA spokesman in a regular press conference made the following remarks: “Terrorism is the public enemy of the entire man-kind and international community. The U.S. should proceed from the in-ternational anti-terrorist cooperation and China–U.S. relations and handle the Chinese suspects detained in Guantanamo in line with the interna-tional law and in a prudent, responsible and proper way.”54

To achieve their sacred cause, terrorists could attack a nuclear power plant, which should be powered by enriched uranium with a cascade of 164 centrifuges. Once purified to a much higher level, atomic or nuclear bombs can be made.55 Guangdong Province has, for example, the Daya Bay Nuclear Power Station, which is located east of Shenzhen City or only 50 km away from Hongkong. There are 97,672 barrels of nuclear fuel waste being stored on Orchid Island, Taiwan Province.56 To be sure, Fujian Province also has a Ningde Nuclear Power Company in Fuding County. It will build new nu-clear power plants. Even without terrorists’ attack, they carry grave security risks and a horrendous proliferation problem on the global level.57 In short, a regime on safeguarding nuclear power plants must be created between both sides of the Taiwan Strait, for two reasons. First, we still live in the shadow of the April 1986 disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in


the former Soviet Republic, Ukraine. Second, in May 2006, China Daily (CD) reported that the state-run energy provider, China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), and China Huadian Group (CHG) had signed an agreement to build six nuclear reactors of 1,000-megawatt capacity in Fu-jian Province.58 Fortunately, the then American president, Bill J. Clinton, in January 1998, signed the formal certifications and reports required by U.S. law to implement the July 1985 Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the PRC Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.

A nuclear war or, for that matter, dumping of low-level radioactive waste, still cannot be ruled out in the Taiwan Strait.59 Four residents of the Hunan Province were tried in August 2007 for selling 8 kilograms of uranium.60 The U.S. military has developed a comprehensive operational plan, dubbed Oplan 5077-04, which includes provisions for the possible use of nuclear weapons. While Oplan 5077 has been around since the Ronald W. Reagan presidency, it was elevated from a conceptual plan to an operational plan with assigned forces and detailed annexes shortly after George W. Bush, II took office. The then U.S. president said in April 2001 that the United States would do “whatever it takes” to defend the ROC. This go-it-alone plan does not take the ROC military capability and use it as a force multi-plier.61 This plan is certainly related to his September 2002 new doctrine or a watershed in American foreign policy since the Truman Doctrine of March 1947, which called for the containment and deterrence of totalitarian Com-munist regimes worldwide—when threatened, fire first, talk later, in an era defined by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland. The Bush document said “we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively” against hostile states and groups developing weapons of mass destruction.62 Bush also signed the Military Commissions Act (MCA) into law in October 2006, which empowers the United States to declare anyone, including American citizens, without charge as an “unlawful enemy combatant,” a term un-known in international humanitarian law, and which contradicts the Inter-national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to which the United States is a signatory.63 To be sure, leaders of both Washington and Moscow in September 1998 only signed a joint statement, reaffirming their commit-ment to ultimately reach the goal of nuclear disarmament.64

In view of some 1,300 ballistic missiles targeting the Taiwan area by the end of October 2009, a mechanism on evacuating expatriates should be sought. In March 1996, Tokyo was making such a plan, and, at the same time, the ROC was holding its first direct presidential election in the 10,000-year history of China. In April 2006, when the ROC MOND conducted its Chinese Glory No. 22 War Games, airports in northern Taiwan and two ports, to wit, Jilong and Suao were simulated as corridors for the evacuation of American


and Japanese citizens. In this connection, a ceasefire monitoring mechanism could be added to the evacuation arrangement.

Smuggling between the Taiwan area and mainland China is another is-sue.65 In May 1985, Haicang Taiwan Businessmen–Investment Zone (HT-BIZ) was founded in Xiamen, which is facing Jinmen. In January 2001, a mini-link between Jinmen as well as Xiamen Port and Fuzhou Port of Fu-jian Province finally began. It was first proposed by the Chinese mainland in March 1992. But, xiaoemaoyi/small-scale trading between them in amounts up to US$100,000 began in January 1994, and the weight of the ship should also not be more than 100 tons.66 In March 1998, the first non-foreign PRC merchant ship made a port call in Jilong Port via Ishigaki Is-land of Japan’s Ryukyu Islands.67 In June 2006, residents in Jinmen started to visit Quanzhou68 in Fujian Province by relying on ferry services. The ships only fly company flags in deference to political sensibilities. So long as Taipei does not internationalize or dezincify/desinicize/desinify the Tai-wan Strait, Beijing can permit ROC-registered merchant vessels to operate shipping routes across the Strait. In January 2002, Regulations of the PRC on Ocean International Shipping (OIS) came into force. On March 19, 2004, a day before the ROC presidential election in the Taiwan area, Hatsu Marine Ltd. of the Evergreen Marine Corporation (EMC), which has been headquartered in London since January 2002, for the first time, in compli-ance with Article 58, directly sailed in the same voyage number from else-where to Gaoxiong Port and, then, to the Chinese mainland’s oldest special economic zone, Shenzhen, which has a port called Yantian Port. In March 2006, the State Council of the PRC for the first time at the NPC said it plans to develop Fujian Province into a haixiaxianjingjiqu/“Peaceful Cooperation Experimental District on the West Coast of the Taiwan Strait,”69 which is aimed at attracting more businesses and industries from the Taiwan area to relocate their operations to Fujian. In May 2009, its premier, WEN Jiabao, approved the plan. It also means that politicians from the Taiwan area can serve in certain government positions and play politics in Fujian Province.

However, there are side effects. For example, a total of fifty-eight PRC citizens in the guise of fishermen were nabbed off northeastern Taiwan Is-land in March 2006. In another development, a search was conducted of a ROC fishing vessel, which was contracted to bring PRC fishermen over from a Fujian Province boat at the tacit dividing line in the Taiwan Strait. Twelve out of the forty workers were using doctored identification cards.70 In re-sponse to interpellation at the Legislative Yuan (Branch), the ROC’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) said in March 2006 that its principal target in the year 2006 was to fight smuggling.71 Other goals related to this issue are: conducting better cooperation with the police, strengthening information-sharing mechanisms, seeking international cooperation, and beefing up coast guard training.


Nonmilitary Regimes

These islands of governance, using Robert O. Keohane’s term, are equally necessary, and there are many of them, including the whaling or panda protection regime.72 In May 2006, a ROC Coast Guard vessel for the first time charged a fishing boat from the SRV for violating laws governing wild-life conservation. It was catching jingtun (dolphins), which are a protected species,73 in the Taiwan Strait, off Yunlin County. In passing, it should be noted that the U.S. Navy Marine Mammal Program facility at Naval Base Point Loma in San Diego, California, trains Koa, an Atlantic bottlenose dolphin, to alert American navy handlers to potential terrorists and to find mines and swimmers in murky waters. In a separate development, in July 2004, melon-headed whales congregated in Hanalei Bay off the Hawaiian Island of Kakuai. U.S. government scientists, in a April 2006 report, said the navy ships’ use of medium-frequency sonar during nearby maritime exer-cises may have contributed to the mass stranding of more than 150 whales, and one of the marine mammals was found dead after the phenomenon. A senior consultant with the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) said, “[i]t’s time for the Navy to stop this needless infliction of harm.”74 The same logic applies to the Taiwan Strait.

Beijing has become more conscious about regimes-formation, although many, if not most, academics and experts are yet to fully understand the term, international regimes. It already has created the China Maritime Search and Rescue Center (CMSRC). In June 2004, the CMSRC and China Ocean Ship-ping Company (COSCO) launched the first antiterror drill, thereby activating the emergency response mechanism. In June 2004, the first massive maritime exercise between the PRC and the Hongkong Special Administrative Region (SAR) was held in waters off Sanya, a harbor-city in the southernmost island province of Hainan. And, as of July 2005, the largest maritime rescue drill during peacetime was held in Yangshan Port in Shanghai, involving rescuing drowning sailors, fire fighting, cleaning up oil pollution, and thwarting a ter-rorist attack. Maritime officials from the United States, FR, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) of the UN, and the ASEAN were also invited to observe the exercise.75 In October 2008, an emergency rescue and disaster relief joint operation at sea was carried out for the first time between Jinmen and Xiamen City, Fujian Province.76

In another historic development, as briefly mentioned earlier, PRC naval vessels including the destroyer Qingdao conducted military search and res-cue drills with their U.S. counterpart for the first time in September 2006 in waters off the Port of San Diego, California. These exercises are part of a joint antiterrorism operation, which was an arrangement reached between both sides in July 2006. The second phase took place in the SCS in Novem-ber 2006.77


On May 1, 2006, the PRC’s central government announced the establish-ment of a new office under the General Office of the State Council to deal with emergencies.78 The General Watch Office will issue warnings, gather information, and coordinate emergency efforts. It will mainly be responsi-ble for disaster prevention and control, industrial safety and accidents, major epidemics, terrorist activities, and other disruptive incidents. To be sure, a 100 meter-high mega-tsunami took place in northeastern Taiwan at least 12,000 years ago, destroyed vast tracts of land and wiped out entire populations across the Pacific Rim.79 Tsunami also struck Gaoxiong and Tainan areas in April and May 1781, and it took place in December 1867 off Jilong. In December 2007, a ROC professor warned that a tsunami would follow an earthquake, which originated in the Manila Trench, damaging southwestern, if not northeastern, parts of Taiwan. To be sure, in May 2006, a powerful earthquake struck near the South Pacific Kingdom of Tonga (KOT), triggering tsunami warnings for as far away as the Republic of Fiji Islands (ROJI) and New Zealand (NZ). Yet, word of the imminent danger never reached the tiny country closest to the epicenter.80 In April 2006, the PRC’s China National Tourism Administration (CNTA) for the first time issued a plan on three-scale emergency response for Chinese mainland tourists going abroad.81 In the same month, it activated the emergency re-sponse mechanism when the capital of Solomon Islands (SI), Honiara, had a riot, severely affecting the local China Town. The PRC embassy in Inde-pendent State of Papua New Guinea (ISPNG) managed to gather around 500 Chinese from mainland China, including five Hongkong compatriots, and settled them in the SI police headquarters.82

A regime related to satellites must be formed. At the end of 2006, the Commission of Science and Technology and Industry for National Defense (CSTIND) said its scientists plan to put into orbit the Haiyang-1B (Ocean-1B), an advanced version of the Haiyang-1A oceanic color satellite, so as to monitor marine environment and disasters and to observe sea sur-face height, waves, currents, and temperatures, including the Taiwan Strait. In April 2007, the Haiyang-1B was successfully sent into orbit. Right after that, Beijing said it would develop five more oceanic satellites in the me-dium term, for the purpose of developing marine economy, providing ma-rine disaster early warning, and safeguarding the country’s legitimate ma-rine rights.83 There are only five countries operating more than thirty oceanic satellites in orbit around the planet. The PRC Ministry of Civil Af-fairs (MCA) announced in August 2006 that three small disaster-monitor-ing satellites would be launched in 2007 and another five satellites will be shot into orbit in 2010. In July 2006, both Beijing and Tokyo, after ending their sixth round of ECS talks, agreed in principle to set up a maritime hotline to deal with the unpredictable situations in the ECS, for example. In this connection, during the fifteenth round of talks between Taipei and


Tokyo in July 2005, both sides also expressed an interest in setting up a hotline or a permanent mechanism for resolving bilateral fishery disputes. Indeed, such a line is needed, because in June 2006 the ROC’s CGA said the Japanese coast guard attempted to board a fishing boat from the ROC, shooting paint balls and spraying it with water.84

Environmental regimes are certainly needed.85 In October 2006, it was reported that scientists have found 200 “dead zones” in oceans, places where pollution threatens fish, other marine life, and the people who de-pend on them for living. The State Oceanic Administration (SOA) in Janu-ary 2007 said a total of 149,000 square km of sea failed to meet acceptable standards in the year 2006, and this reflects an increase of 10,000 square km over the previous year. In addition, a total of 12.9 million tons of waste was discharged into the sea. The SOA will also limit the building of man-made islands, especially the linking of islands to the land, because they can alter sea currents and thus change (the life) of marine animals, water flows, and the lay of the ocean floor.86 Another climate expert in the West warned that the world’s oceans are becoming more acidic, because they have absorbed a third of carbon dioxide (CO²), threatening sea life or marine organisms and the Earth’s fragile food chain.87 In April 2006, the Chinese Petroleum Corporation (CPC) of the ROC said it had discovered undersea natural gas off the coast of Gaoxiong County, and it is expected to begin mass produc-tion of gas from the ten wells beginning the year 2009.88 In May 2009, it was reported that both sides of the Taiwan Strait will sign a contract before the end of the year to exploit and extract oil.89 The field is assessed to con-tain enough for commercial exploration for ten years, and a 120 km under-sea pipeline will be built to convey the natural gas to a refinery in Yon-ganxiang in the same county. Both Taipei and Beijing can consult the framework convention for an international environmental regime in the SCS, which includes: a forum to raise issues, define the problem, and set criteria and standards for a solution; a way to formulate prevention and remedial policies; a mechanism to set targets and timetables for imple-menting solutions; and an ability to ensure compliance by annual reviews and financial incentives.90 Seismic survey in the Taiwan Strait basin should be undertaken, with environmental protection of coral reefs, mangrove forests, and seaweed beds in mind.91 The CPC said it will implement the December 1997 Kyoto Protocol (KP), emphasizing more on promoting environmental accounting system and greenhouse management, in order to attain its goal of sustainable (and sound) growth.92

Passengers and crew members on ships sailing through or traversing the Taiwan Strait could be stranded. Aircraft flying over the Strait could also break up, due to metal fatigue. In May 2002, an ROC China Airlines com-mercial airplane fell into waters off Pescadores.93 The April 28, 2006 edition of Taipei Times showed a photograph, captioned “Acting Up.” The following


story was printed on page 1: “Three men ‘stranded’ in the middle of Xinjie/New Street River in Taoyuan County wave for help as part of a rescue exer-cise yesterday. The drill proved too realistic, as passersby thought they were in danger and flooded the fire department with calls.”

Fishing boats registered in the Taiwan area and mainland China do use the Strait as a fishing resource.94 In September 1990, the Red Cross Societies representing both sides of the Taiwan Strait signed the Jinmen Accord, which contains provisions for the repatriation of individuals, criminals, and suspects who illegally enter the territory of the other. However, they have not touched upon other issues, such as what to do with the jurisdiction of fishing boats, which are held up by the other side’s navy or which hoist PRC or even ROC flags. For example, in July 1994, a Chinese mainland anti-smuggling cutter, Xiagongqi No. 2, shot at the Taiwan area fishing boat, Xinhuaguo No. 12, in the contiguous zone of the Taiwan area. Then, the ROC navy held up and detained the former.95 A bicoastal Chinese mecha-nism should also be set up when crimes are being committed in the Strait. In April 2006, a fishing boat from Hainan Province was ransacked by a foreign armed ship close to the ROP in the SCS.96

GLoBALIzING The TAIwAN STRAIT exPeRIeNCe To The STRAIT(S) of mALACCA?

There are over 116 straits in the world.97 Among them, sixteen are consid-ered most crucial strategic chokepoints to the United States.98 Interest-ingly, the Taiwan Strait is not among them. But, the Strait(s) of Malacca and the Strait of Lombok are, because more than half of the world’s maritime trade passes through them or through the Strait of Malacca and the SCS pass more ships every year than through the Panama and Suez Canals combined. For example, in the year 2006, more than 65,000 ships passed through the Straits.99 There are many similar developments be-tween them. For example, the Taiwan Strait is a hot spot, according to the Pentagon. In June 2005, Lloyd’s Joint War Committee, a London-based advisory body for insurers, based on the Aegis Defense Services (ADS)’s assessment, again designated the Malacca Strait(s) as a “war risk” zone, adding the sea lane to a list of twenty-one areas such as the Republic of Iraq (ROI), that it deemed high risk and vulnerable to war, strikes, and terrorism, although the Straits were deleted from the list in April 2006.100 As another example, in October 2005, an accident took place in the Tai-wan Strait, off Xinzhu County, Taiwan Province, whereby a Korean chem-ical ship sunk. In April 2006, a Panama-registered oil super-tanker of the Republic of Singapore (ROS), Suva, exploded in the Strait(s) of Malacca, and four mainland Chinese workers died. It seems that experience of pre-


venting accidents of one kind or another can be globalized. There are also differences. For example, the PRC does not have to use the Taiwan Strait to transport its oil. Yet, about 80 percent of its oil from the Middle East and elsewhere has to use the Strait(s) of Malacca.101 As another example, the Taiwan Strait, unlike the SCS,102 is not festered with pirates, at least not for the last several decades. Thus, it is not necessary for the Japan government to offer patrol boats to either or both sides of the Taiwan Strait. On June 1, 2006, Tokyo announced for the first time that it would provide other countries with weapons, Jarkata being the first one to re-ceive three patrol boats for use in the Malacca to combat against pirates, although the problem has been mitigated.103 It is also not necessary for both Taipei and Beijing to ask the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the Paris-based International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), an ocean crime watchdog, or the Information Sharing Center (ISC) in Singapore, which began its operation in November 2006, to provide assistance and information related to pirates in the Taiwan Strait.

To be sure, there are many definitions or varieties for the shifting, over-used concept,104 globalization, to name twenty of them or what I called the driving forces of globalization, in alphabetical order:105 Americanization; deterritorialization; digitalization; globalization as a “compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole”; globalization as “a respatialization of social life opens up new knowledge and engages key policy challenges of current history in a constructively critical manner”; globalization as territorialization; globalization as “the spread of transplanetary—and in recent times more particularly supraterri-torial—connections between people”; globalization in terms of communi-cation, market, and direct; globalization as hybridization; interdependence; glocalization; internationalization; liberalization; modernization; privati-zation; regionalization; reterritorialization, weaponization; universaliza-tion; and Westernization. Others have defined globalization as integration and centralization. Anthony Giddens was one of the early well-known writ-ers who tried to define globalization. To him, it is “[t]he intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa.” It is “action at distance.”106 To this author, globalization is a capital-ist tool. In sum, each definition is not a catch-all. I will discuss several of them, which are applicable to the Taiwan Strait.

Deterritorialization can be discussed along with territorialization. The former is put forward by a professor teaching in the UK. The latter was my finding when I realized that globalization could still be territorialization. For example, many countries, including the developing ones, want to launch satellites. Once the satellites are in outer space, they occupy a space. Each satellite is part of that particular country, and each one of them can


monitor the Taiwan Strait and the Strait(s) of Malacca. As another example, landlocked countries also can build artificial islands, installations, and structures as well as declare safety zones in the high seas. As a third example, an island is up for sale. A capitalist from another country bought it, only to be nationalized or confiscated by the first country. In short, both deterrito-rialization and territorialization cannot be ruled out.

If globalization were to be defined as interdependence, it is acceptable. This is because both sides of the Taiwan Strait have to cooperate and coordinate their words and deeds. In other words, they cannot do without the other.

Globalization could be defined as internationalization. If so, would Beijing be willing to internationalize the Strait, if it denies that an inter-national navigation route exists? By the same token, would Indonesia and Malaysia plus the ROS be willing to do the same? If they do not under-stand what international regimes are, they will mistakenly think of their sovereignty first.

Modernization is possible, because parties involved have to move for-ward by understanding and accepting new (scientific) knowledge, such as the definition of international regimes. They may also have to possess better equipment in coping with, for example, haze, long-range transport of air pollutants, or land-based pollution of the ocean, sea, etc.

Several questions can be posed about privatizing the Strait, as globaliza-tion can be defined as privatization, which, in turn, may mean territorial-ization. Is it possible? Who has an interest to privately manage the tidal Strait? Do they include owners of underwater turbines, which is a new source of kinetic energy and which can use the tide to produce electricity?107 Should more or fewer parties be involved? Would it be profitable? Would there be more or fewer problems? Would privatization further mitigate an-archy, tension, (scientific) uncertainty, and mistrust? Would it facilitate sharing of resources, including wells in the Strait?108 Can the private owner of the Strait charge toll fees?109 If so, how much is fair? In this connection, is privatization similar to my definition, which equates globalization to a capitalist tool? They are similar but with one major distinction. Privatiza-tion refers to businessmen in the ROC and the PRC who want to jointly manage the Strait and operate the ports and harbors, whereas capitalists in the world, such as those belonging to the Group of 8 (G-8) or G-20 may pool all the money for the purpose of privatizing the Taiwan Strait and the Strait(s) of Malacca. This possibility cannot be ruled out, if the condition for leasing is only for, say, ninety-nine years.

Universalization could be the ultimate goal. This is because all the in-ternational regimes should be applied here and there in the world. When universalization has been achieved, Americanization and Westernization, for example, should have disappeared, due to emergence of a global vil-lage.


mAJoR fINDINGS

Many findings can be noted. First, when we write from a certain perspective, we can have a different interpretation of the same source materials. A geo-political study of the Taiwan Strait can yield findings, which differ from a geoeconomic perspective. Our study relies on the international or bicoastal Chinese governance approach. Once having taken this perspective, one has to touch upon the indispensable tool, namely, international regimes or bi-coastal Chinese regimes as the context may be. When the concept regime is applied, it does not matter whether there is the U-shaped line; the tacit di-viding line or coordinates since January 1984, or even the median line be-tween mainland China and the Taiwan area; EEZ; continental shelf; con-tiguous zone; maritime area for the navigation; such as the PRC’s Expansion Project of Pinghu Oil and Gas Field in the ECS from March 1 to September 30, 2006, but the operation which does not cover the disputed area be-tween the mainland and Japan, etc. By the same token, the One China Principle, as insisted by the PRC since the mid-1950s110 or, for that matter, the One China policy, as adopted by the United States since the mid-1970s, has to be set aside, because parties concerned under urgency have to resolve critical issues first and they will have no time to negotiate or bargain with each other. The same thing speaks for whether the Strait is managed by ei-ther side of the Taiwan Strait, both Taipei and Beijing, or simply by Taipei or Beijing, whether the coast guard of the Taiwan area is called “ROC Coast Guard” or “ROC Taiwan Coast Guard,”111 or whether the (dynamic) status quo can be maintained.112 By the same token, it does not matter whether Beijing can, in five years’ time or less, launch its first aircraft carrier, which is to be docked at the Yalong Bay of Sanya City, Hainan Province, but which can be dispatched to, as described by an American academics, the danger-ous Taiwan Strait.113 This is because pollution at sea, for example, has no boundary. Straddling stocks of fish, highly migratory fish stocks, and shrimps will spawn and breed when the time comes.

Second, one political observer wrote the following words: “As with all Southeast Asian nations, anticolonial legacy is still strong and they are sen-sitive to actions they perceive to be an intrusion on their sovereignty.”114 For example, the Piracy Reporting Center of the IMB, which was created in Oc-tober 1992, also does not want foreign intervention.115 The ROS hosts an Information Sharing Center (ISC) for the Japanese-initiated group, Re-gional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), which was launched in November 2004. In April 2006, Minister of Transport, CHAN Kong Choy, of the federal gov-ernment of Malaysia since July 2003, said the PRC is willing to assist his country in defending the Strait(s) of Malacca by providing intelligence and training of Malaysian personnel, adding the latter will not intrude into the


former’s sovereignty.116 To be certain, the sovereignty issue will remain sen-sitive, if government officials do not fully understand international regimes, they will be unable to transcend their basic positions for the sake of all.

Third, arguably, it is possible to say that the more regimes at the interna-tional level, the lesser degree of anarchy, tension, (scientific) uncertainty, and mistrust. However, the regimes do not constitute a whole picture. Na-tions, countries, or states, international organizations, international institu-tions, etc., may still pose a threat, challenge, etc., to the regimes. In other words, some regimes may have to be set aside, frail, ineffective, be derailed, violated, break down, fail, etc. For example, when there is renewed armed conflict between Taiwan’s Jinmen and Mazu as well as mainland China, the currency exchange system between them which started in October 2005 may have to be suspended.117

Fourth, a Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking Accord was signed in Manila in March 2005 among China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC), the Vietnam Oil and Gas Corporation (VOGC) and the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC). The joint marine seismic undertaking by the oil companies of the PRC, SRV, and the Philippines in a part of the SCS has been considered an important measure to implement the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS. According to the PRC’s MOFA, it will make historic contributions to the peace, stability, and development in the SCS, adding that Beijing has been actively discussing with relevant ASEAN on ways to conduct pragmatic cooperation in the SCS in a spirit of “shelv-ing differences and engaging in common development” in recent years, and is devoted to making the SCS a sea of friendship and cooperation linking mainland China and ASEAN.118 Can this kind of spirit be applied to the Taiwan Strait? From a regime perspective, it seems rosy, because state-owned petroleum companies have already signed contracts to explore the Taiwan Strait. However, it should be noted that, in March 2009, the Philippine president signed the Republic Act 9522 or the Philippine Archipelagic Base-line Law, a move that chilled Beijing–Manila ties.

There are other areas of cooperation and coordination. China has 7,372 islands over 500 square meters each and is allowed to claim domination of 3 million square km according to related international laws, its territorial land amounting to 380,000 km. The State Bureau of Surveying and Mapping (SBSM) of the PRC in February 2006 said it will in the coming five years, us-ing a high-precision stereo mapping satellite for the purpose of quickly cap-turing geographic information, enforce the mapping of its offshore islands and reefs, so as to maintain its marine rights and interests. The ROC should work with the PRC in this endeavor, including surveying the Diaoyutai/Sen-kakus and Suyan Islet/Leodo (in Korean)/Socotra Rock. In February 2007, it was reported that the mainland is selecting pilots for its first 7,000-m bathy-scaphe, which was to be tested in Qingdao in the second half of 2007. The


bathyscaphe is designed by the No. 702 Institute of China Shipbuilding In-dustry Corporation (CSIC). This 8-m-long, 3.4-m-wide, and 3-m-tall ellip-soid bathyscaphe is made of special titanium alloy, capable of holding 710 tons of extra weight even at 7,000 meters (m) below water, which means that it will be able to reach 99.8 percent of the seafloors in the world. Currently, only the United States, Japan, France, and Russia are able to build bathy-scaphes, but none of their bathyscaphes can dive deeper than 6,500 m.119

Fifth, a measure for extinguishing fire on a ship may have to be formed. In October 2004, the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) for the first time held a “China–Philippines Cooperation 2004” table top exercises with the Mari-time Safety Administration (MSA) of the PRC, simulating an oil tanker vessel with twenty-eight crew members on board, developing a fire somewhere in the middle of the SCS.120 Both sides of the Taiwan Strait have to draw up a contingency plan for search and rescue (SAR) cooperation in case of need.

Sixth, another regime may have to be set up to deal with underwater weapons, which can carry multiple-nuclear-warheads, in the Strait. Moscow has concrete submarine C (or C-subs) designed to master the waves by set-ting on the ocean floor. The heavier-than-water C-subs, operating as silent predators, would lie at impossible depths and attach surface vessels with vertically launched torpedoes.121 In May 2006, Moscow succeeded in launching its first satellite from underwater. The Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) in April 2006 announced that it has test-fired what it described as the world’s fastest domestically produced underwater Fajr-3 missile or hoot/whale torpedo, which is better than the Russian-made VA-111 Shkval/Squall, tested in August 1995, which can evade sonar and outpace any en-emy warship, in the Gulf of Iran.122 Western nations are concerned about the IRI’s missile capabilities, amid a standoff over the Iranian nuclear pro-gram, which is, to this day, aiming at building atomic bombs.

A related regime can be set up so as to regularly fund research in develop-ing more sophisticated technology, such as underwater robots and snake robots. Since the 1990s, the Shenyang Institute of Automation (SIA) has developed underwater robots, and it has invented mainland China’s first cable-controlled remotely operated vehicle (ROV) and autonomous robot vehicle (AUV).123 Its underwater robot fleet includes two types of AUVs, which can dive to a depth of 6,000 m under water and which are useful for exploring seabed mineral resources and helping maintain offshore oil rigs. To be sure, Beijing and Moscow since the mid-1990s have again joined in upgrading the deep sea robot that can operate at a depth of 7,000 m.124

Snake robots are an alternative to sniffer dogs, the best search tool for rescue workers so far. Snake robots are designed to carry cameras and electronic sensors and can be controlled with a joystick and which wrig-gle with the help of small electric motors, or servos, commonly used by hobbyists in model airplanes. An American professor has put years into


developing robots that behave like the slippery reptiles in a bid to im-prove high-profile or postdisaster search and rescue operations. Other snake-like robots have being developed mainly at universities. However, his robot, which comes in the size of a human arm or smaller, can climb up and around pipes in flooded houses. Depending on funding, it was reported that his rescue-related robots may not be ready for another five to ten years.125

Such robots are needed in the future. This is because the idea of build-ing a tunnel under the Strait was initially conceived in late 1995, when a mainland Chinese academic was visiting a United Kingdom university.126 Seminars on the subject have been held between both sides of the Taiwan Strait, and Beijing has the money to carry out this project.127 The Fujian provincial government in May 2006 announced that it is planning to first link Fuqing/Pingtang Island of the mainland with Xinzhu County of Tai-wan.128 In March 2007, the Fujian provincial government made the prepa-ratory moves by inviting close to 100 academics and experts to make suggestions. In April of the same year, three options surfaced.129 If there were a direct link,130 it takes less than four hours by sea from, for example, Xiamen, via Jinmen to Taipei. By air, it is within thirty minutes. And, if it is by car, the time spent for driving between the two places is within thirty minutes.131 Due to lack of a direct shipping link, up to December 2008, it would have taken six or seven days for agricultural products from south-ern Taiwan to reach the Chinese mainland.132 As for air service, two days are required.

Besides, it should be noted that there are undersea communication cables in the Taiwan Strait, which are lying on the surface of the seabed down to about 4,000 m.133 A powerful earthquake in December 2006 hit southern Taiwan damaging a group of cables linking Asia to the rest of the world. Millions of people suffered Internet and telephone blackouts. There are also underwater cities near Pescadores and Okinawa; some of them were possi-bly submerged at the end of the last Ice Age.134 An underwater hotel could also be built in the Strait in the future.135 This is not impossible, because, scheduled to be open in the near future, the world’s first underwater hotel, Hydropolis Qingdao, could be completed by Crescent Hydropolis Resorts PLC of the UK in Qingdao City’s Laoshan District, Shangdong Province.

Seventh, in April 2006, on its way to the Middle East, a Panama-registered oil super-tanker owned by the ROS, Suva, exploded in the Strait(s) of Mal-acca, and four mainland Chinese workers died. Such an accident or inci-dent could also take place in the Taiwan Strait. However, from the website of the PRC government, we did not see help from the ROC government,136 although it does have the National Disasters Prevention and Protection Commission (NDPPC) under the Executive Yuan (Branch), the Central Di-saster Response Center (CDRC), and the National Fire Agency (NFA) of the


Ministry of the Interior (MOI), etc. There should be more cooperation and coordination between all the heavy-users of the Taiwan Strait and the Strait(s) of Malacca.

Eighth, regime formation has to do with urgency, insecurity, convergent expectation, and perception. Thus, it is necessary to mention the following possible development regarding the Taiwan Strait, whereby we do not need regimes at sea. There was no such strait since ancient times. However, due to tectonic plate shift, a strait eventually developed. Yet, according to some scientists in mainland China, Taiwan, the United States, and Japan, each year the east coast of Taiwan Island has been moving 7 or 8 centimeters toward mainland China, and, after several million years, the Strait will dis-appear again in 15,000 years.137 In short, the regimes for the Taiwan Strait will no longer be needed, should it disappear.

Ninth, a regime may be needed to salvage ancient vessels. In August 1987, a Song dynasty ship was discovered in waters off Chuanshan Archipelgo, Guangdong Province. The ship is estimated to be more than US$100 bil-lion.138 There could also be valuable sunken ships at the bottom of the Tai-wan Strait. How to salvage them intact requires knowledge, skill, etc.

Tenth, a regime should be created for a man-made reef. In May 2006, U.S. divers from the Pensacola Naval Air Station, Gulf of Mexico, got the first underwater look at the retired USS Oriskany, which became the world’s larg-est man-made reef for divers and marine life.139 Taipei is usually slow when it comes to protecting its coral reefs. In May 2006, members of the Taiwan-ese Coral Reef Society, Society of Wilderness, etc., called upon the ROC’s Environmental Protection Administration (EPA), the CGA, the Ministry of Transportation and Communications (MOTC), and the Council of Agricul-ture (COA) to establish an agency exclusively devoted to the protection of coral reefs in waters near Taiwan and to the removal of underwater wreck-age, so as to spur new coral growth in those areas.140

In March 2009, it was reported that a desert in the seabed of the Taiwan Strait was found, and there was enough sand to be used by builders of houses on both sides of the Taiwan Strait for more than 100 years.141 Per-haps another regime should be set up.

CoNCLuDING RemARkS

In the twenty-first century, we simply cannot neglect nor ignore interna-tional regimes or bicoastal Chinese regimes, because the study of interna-tional governance will replace the realism/neorealism paradigm and other schools of thought, including Constructivism or the Social Construction school of thought,142 in ten to fifteen years.143 Moreover, the central govern-ment in each country may sometimes need the help of, for example, NGOs.


Even the UN since December 1997 has a list of some 1,500 NGOs which may be invited to attend certain workshops, meetings, conferences, etc.

Sovereignty is increasingly at bay. The globalization process will con-tinue. Human beings have been globalized, since there were only Adam and Eve to begin with. Since the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in January 1995, the momentum for the globalization process has been accelerated. Recognition of this trend is important, because both sides of the Taiwan Strait will be able to focus more on cooperation and coordi-nation than conflict. Since the early 1990s, Beijing began to resolve its border problems with other countries. As of August 2006, the mainland has signed twelve border treaties or agreements with twelve other countries. The remaining unsettled ones are with ROI and Kingdom of Bhutan (KOB). If the Strait is peaceful, tranquil, equitable, and sustainable, both Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia, if not other areas, will be benefited.144

NoTeS

1. See Confidence-building Measures; Successful Cases and Implications for the Taiwan Strait, sponsored by New Taiwanese Cultural Foundation in cooperation with Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, dated January 16–17, 2008, at the Westin Taipei.

2. Taipei Times (hereinafter TT) (Taipei), May 20, 2006, p. 6 and en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ocean.

3. Jiefangjunbao (hereinafter JFJB) (Beijing), February 25, 2009, p. 6. 4. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taiwan_Strait. 5. Phiphat Tangsubkul, An Asian Viewpoint on the Status of Straits in East Asia,

no date, no publisher, p. 10. 6. This means that it takes a half-day to reach from the mainland coast to the

Taiwan coast. See United Daily News (hereinafter UDN) (Taipei), May 17, 2009, p. A5. 7. english.people.com//200510/16/eng20051016_214601.html, dated October

16, 2005. 8. Malaysia maintains the Maritime Enforcement Agency (MEA), which is

headquartered at Tabuan Jaya. 9. Other nearby competing ports include Ningbo Port and Suzhou Port. See

UDN, November 1, 2005, p. A5. A Greater Xiamen Port, including Haicang Port, was formed in January 2005. See ibid., December 22, 2005, p. A13.

10. www.zaobao.com/special/newspapers/2006/04121dnn060428b.html, dated April 28, 2006.

11. www.chinareviewnews.com, dated 2009-03-04 09:50:46. 12. big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/www.fj.xinhuanet.com/hxlw/2003-11/08/

content_1170824.htm. 13. Quoted in Winberg Chai and May-lee Chai, eds., Chinese Mainland and Tai-

wan: A Study of Historical, Cultural, Economic and Political Relations, with Documents, 2nd edition (Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1996), p. 160 and


Congressional Quarterly, China: U.S. Policy since 1945 (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1980), p. 88.

14. UDN, December 11, 2007, p. A10. 15. China Times (hereinafter CT) (Taipei), May 1, 2006, p. A15. 16. Congressional Quarterly (note 12), p. 114. 17. China Post (hereinafter CP) (Taipei), March 27, 2006, p. 1; CT, March 27,

2006, p. A4; and UDN, March 28, 2006, p. A15. 18. Zhongguorenminjiefangjunquanshi (The History of the Chinese PLA) (Vol.1)

(Beijing: Junshikexuechubanshe, January 2001), p. 358. 19. Liberty Times (hereinafter LT) (Taipei), March 5, 2006, p. A3. 20. Congressional Quarterly (note 12), p. 187–188. See also www.globalsecurity

.org/military/ops/taiwan_strait.htm, mentioning the year 1976. Another source said January 1, 1979, because the United States established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). See my book coauthored with Martin L. Lasater, Taiwan’s Security in a Post-Deng Xiaoping Era (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), p. 178.

21. www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/taiwan_strait.htm, LT, March 5, 2006, p. A3, and CT, March 8, 2006, p. A10.

22. John F. Copper, Taiwan: Nation-State or Province? 4th edition (Boulder, CO: Westview Press), p. xi.

23. See my article, “The Chinese (Broken) U-shaped Line in the South China Sea: Points, Lines, and Zones,” Contemporary Southeast Asia (Singapore), vol. 25, No. 3 (2003), pp. 405–430. In January 1998, the Republic of China (ROC)’s Legisla-tive Yuan (Branch) decided not to mention the term, historic waters, nor the line, from the January 1998 Statute on Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone as well as the Statute on Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Continental Shelf. See UDN, Janu-ary 3, 1998, p. 4; January 7, 1998, p. 11, and January 10, 1998, p. 11 and CT, January 8, 1998, p. 8 and January 11, 1998, p. 8. The ROC in February 2006 began building an airport in Taiping/Itu Aba Island. It may take two years to finish building it. However, Beijing is still maintaining the U-shaped line.

24. For the exact coordinates, see my article, “The Choppy Taiwan Strait: Changing Political and Military Issues,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis (herein-after KJDA), vol. XI, no. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 39–66 at p. 40. See also ibid., p. 46. See also Lasater and Yu, pp. 153–154. This line can also be called the imaginary line, which was initiated by the United States with the signing of the December 1954 Sino–U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty. See ibid., p. 45. In December 2007, a former ranking official of mainland China said that, in early 1990s, JIANG Zemin agreed to meet LEE Teng-hui in the middle line of the Taiwan Strait. How-ever, the latter chickened out. See www.udn.com/2007/12/7/NEWS/WORLD/WOR1/4128462.shtml, dated December 7, 2007. In December 2007, it was re-ported on Beijing’s plan to draw up an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) within the Taiwan Strait to submit to the International Civil Aviation Organiza-tion (ICAO) and pass it on to other countries. ADIZ is an area of airspace usually along a national boundary within which identification of all aircraft is required for national security reasons. Germany has the world’s most modern research ves-sel or floating laboratory, Maria S. Merian, which explores the northern seas along the ice rims. See CP, June 11, 2006, p. 3.


25. However, the dividing line was politically broken in June 1991, when state-owned vessels from mainland China crossed it in an effort to exercise their power in handling the Yinwanghao incident. See ibid., pp. 46–47. In other words, do Jin-men and Mazu belong to Taipei’s jurisdiction?

26. Jeanette Greenfield wrote: “if the breadth of the strait is wider than twice the breadth of the territorial sea declared by the coastal state, the sea area outside the territorial sea should be open sea. The Taiwan Strait was held to conform to this situation.” See her book, China’s Practice in the Law of the Sea (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 310–312.

27. TT, December 1, 2007, p. 1. 28. Just before the Hongkong handover, naval ships from the mainland and the

United Kingdom confronted each other off the British colony. 29. TT, April 30, 2006, p. 3. 30. www.m-w.com/dictionary/rule. 31. www.m-w.com/dictionary/govern. 32. Rorden Wilkinson, “Introduction,” The Global Governance Reader (London:

Routledge, 2005), pp. 1–22, especially p. 1. John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos studied range of regulatory regimes that currently impinge on global businesses, which come from transnational interest groups, including associations of progres-sive firms attempting to impose the same costs for environmental and social stan-dards on their competitors and traditional consumer groups, labor groups, environ-mentalists, etc. See Craig N. Murphy, “Global Governance: Poorly Done and Poorly Understood,” in ibid., pp. 90–104, especially p. 95.

33. This is similar to a bottom-up system of representation. See ibid., p. 8. 34. Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of

Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 60. This is because we are talking about a given area or islands in Robert O. Keohane’s term.

35. Alain Marciano and Jean-Michel Josselin, eds., The Economics of Harmonizing European Law (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2002), pp. 7–9.

36. CT, March 5, 2009, p. A10. 37. For mechanisms of global governance, see James N. Rosenau, “Governance

in the Twenty-first Century” in Wilkinson (note 31), pp. 45–67. 38. Decision-making a mechanism. See, for example, Johan Lammers, “The

Mechanism of Decision-making under the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol for the Protection of the Ozone Layer” in Gerard Kreijen et al., eds., State, Sovereignty, and International Governance (London: Oxford University Press, 2002).

39. english.peopledaily.com.cn/200405/17/eng20040517_143467.html, dated May 17, 2004. It was reported in April 2006 that useful intelligence to the ROC amounted to only 37 in one year, out of more than 300,000 pieces collected. See CT, April 5, 2006, p. A12.

40. chinareviewnews.com/doc/1009/4/3/4/100943442.html?coluid-45 &kindid, dated April 16, 2009. See also JFJB, January 23, 2007, p. 11 and December 26, 2008, p. 4.

41. W. Michael Reisman, “The Regime of Straits and National Security,” Ameri-can Journal of International Law, vol. 74, no. 1 (1980), pp. 48–76. The author argued that freedom of navigation under the United Nations (UN) Law of the Sea


(UNCLOS)’s Article 38(2) on rights of transit passage does not include freedom of submerged transit through territorial waters in straits. See pp. 48, 52–54, 62–64, 66–77, and 69–75. Authoritative American sources stated that “[s]hallow estuaries of large rivers are among the world’s most difficult geophysical environments, where only relatively small, highly manoeuverable, and properly ballasted submarines can survive.” Cited in Douglas Brubaker and Willy Ostreng, “The Military Impact on Regime Formation for the Northern Sea Route,” in Davor Vidas and Willy Ostreng, eds., Order for the Oceans at the Turn of the Century (The Hague: Kluwer Law Interna-tional, 1999), Ch. 19, especially p. 271. Regarding the issue of submerged passage, the Russian and American practices diverge. The latter relies on rare limited stealth, and the former would only quietly protest in its Arctic Straits, due to pressures from international trade. See p. 282.

42. CT, December 3, 2005, p. A13 and March 4, 2006, p. A15. 43. Washington said Taipei, as a member of the World Trade Organization

(WTO), has to allow its member economies to use the Strait. See my article (note 22), p. 47. See also Kenneth Dombroski, Peacekeeping in the Middle East as an Inter-national Regime (London: Routledge, 2006).

44. taiwansecurity.org/AFP/2006?AFP-051006.htm, dated October 5, 2006. 45. Guojiribao (hereinafter GJRI) (Sarawak, Malaysia), August 26, 2007, p. A17. 46. See, for example, William M. Carpenter, “Terrorism and Piracy: Converging

Maritime Threats in East and South Asia,” American Journal of Chinese Studies, vol. 11, no. 2 (October 2004), pp. 119–132.

47. TT, April 30, 2006, p. 5. 48. Ibid., June 17, 2007, p. 5. 49. Ibid., March 7, 2006, p. 9. 50. Ibid., April 30, 2006, p. 1. 51. Ibid. 52. For related books, see Tae-woo LEE, ed., World Shipping and Port Development

(New York: Palgrave, 2005) and Kevin Cullinane, ed., Asian Container Ports: Develop-ment, Competition and Cooperation (New York: Palgrave, 2006).

53. TT, May 7, 2006, p. 1. 54. www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t247790.htm. Later in the same

month, Communist Chinese ambassador to the Republic of Albania (ROA) said the five Chinese from the Xinjiang Autonomous Region in the northwest of China were members of the terrorist organization, East Turkistan. The five Chinese fought on the side of Taliban during the Afghan War and had close relations with al-Qaeda. The United States had asked about twenty countries to offer settlements to the de-tainees. But, countries such as Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, and Turkey turned down the request. See english.people.com.cn//200605/09/eng20060509_264164.html, dated May 9, 2006. In the May 2006 antiterror Multilateral Planners Confer-ence, which was attended by ninety-one countries, the United States Pentagon did not invite the mainland.

55. CP, April 29, 2006, p. 1 and May 14, 2006, p. 1. In April 2006, the Interna-tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that Tehran had the enriched ura-nium.

56. Ibid., April 29, 2006, p. 20. 57. Ibid., p. 6.


58. By the end of 2006, the Chinese mainland’s nuclear power generation ca-pacity will be over 9,100 megawatts. By 2020, the capacity could reach 40,000 mega-watts or 4 percent of its total power output. See TT, May 20, 2006, p. 4. A French study showed that there was no evidence of an increase in the rate of childhood leukemia in the vicinity of twenty-three French nuclear plants between 1990 and 2001. See CP, June 10, 2006, p. 11.

59. In October 2006, it was reported that the State Administration of Quality Super-vision, Inspection and Quarantine (SAQSIQ) suspended or revoked the qualifications of seventeen foreign companies from exporting waste materials to the mainland.

60. See Hua Daily News (hereinafter SHDN) (Sarawak, Malaysia), August 25, 2007, p. 9.

61. TT, June 5, 2006, p. 3. 62. www.straitstimes.com.sg/primenews/story/0,1870,144424,0.html, dated

September 21, 2002. The United States fired the first shot and sunk an Imperial Japanese midget submarine an hour before the main attack on December 7, 1941 on Pearl Harbor. See www.straitstimes.com.sg/asia/story/0,1870,140802.00.html, dated September 1, 2002.

63. Respected legal experts in Europe had been using the same term for de-cades to refer to “individuals who fight in a conflict but who do so in an unlawful way so that they are not benefiting from prisoner of war status.” See CP, October 28, 2006, p. 2.

64. TT, March 5, 2006, p. 7. In the same news report, head of the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) said “I do not see any chance of the po-litical conditions for abolition arising in my lifetime.”

65. There are ten dangerous beaches or waters in Taiwan Island. See UDN, May 14, 2006, p. A10.

66. Lianhezaobao (hereinafter LHZB) (Singapore), June 13, 1999, p. 12. 67. By the end of 2006, Taipei will change the Sino–Ryukyuan Cultural and

Economic Association (SRCEA), its private diplomatic representation in Okinawa, into the Naha Branch of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in Japan. Naha is the capital of Okinawa Prefecture. Taipei said it “has never denied” that Okinawa belongs to Japan. See TT, May 31, 2006, p. 1.

68. Beijing claims Jinmen as part of Quanzhou. 69. CT, March 6, 2006, p. A13. 70. CP, March 18, 2006, p. 20. 71. Ibid., March 23, 2006, p. 19. In May 2006, the first conflict between the

ROC’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) in Jinmen and fishermen from the main-land took place.

72. See, for example, Steinar Andresen, “The Whaling Regime” in Steinar An-dresen, et al., Science and Politics in International Environmental Regimes: Between In-tegrity and Involvement (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2000), pp. 35–69. See also Steinar Andresen, “The International Whaling Regime: Order at the Turn of the Century?” in Vidas and Ostreng (note 40), pp. 215–230. According to a U.S. scientist, the rapid extinction of many large mammals 10,000 years ago or the sixth great extinction may be attributed to a radical climate change at that time, but not to human overkill. Mammals, which had been blossoming for 60 million years, retreated for the first time between 13,000 and 10,000 years ago, because of


the sixth great extinction. Other theories include the Blitzkrieg model which argue that humans killed off some big mammals almost simultaneously; human coloni-zation may have destructed some keystones of the ecological system; or humans may have induced some diseases deadly to other mammals. See english.people.com .cn//200605/11/eng20050511_26461.html, dated May 11, 2006.

73. Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) said too much demand for sushi from Japan may finish off stocks of red tuna in the Mediterranean.

74. CP, April 29, 2006, p. 11. 75. www.china.org.cn/english/2005/jul/134285.htm. 76. Some observers say that it was the first step toward having confidence building

measures between both sides of the Taiwan Strait. See CT, February 23, 2009, p. A8. 77. U.S. Congress has imposed restrictions on the scope of the military ex-

changes, such as forbidding contacts that would enhance the Chinese PLA’s combat, logistical, or surveillance capabilities. See TT, September 24, 2006, p. 5.

78. english.gov.cn/2006-05/01/content_272622.htm. 79. TT, November 13, 2005, p. 17. 80. CP, May 7, 2006, p. 2. 81. For the Chinese version, see big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/news/travel/2006-

04-26/content_4475131, dated May 26, 2006. 82. In May 2006, a new Solomon Islands prime minister was elected, and he paid

a personal visit to the ROC’s ambassador in the capital. See TT, May 11, 2006, p. 3. 83. english.people.com.cn/200704/11/print20070411_365515.html, dated April

11, 2007. 84. taiwansecurity.org/TT/2006/TT-010706.htm, dated July 1, 2006. 85. See, for example, Edward L. Miles, et al., Environmental Regime Effectiveness:

Confronting Theory with Evidence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), especially Fig-ure 1.3 on p. 12.

86. CP, April 7, 2007, p. 7. 87. TT, January 11, 2006, p. 6. 88. Ibid., April 1, 2006, p. 11. 89. CT, May 12, 2009, p. A12. 90. www.middlebury.edu/SouthChinaSea/why.htm1. 91. In the late twentieth century, Zhongyuan Petroleum Exploration Bureau

(ZPEB) was paid US$5.6 million by the Ethiopian government to undertake a seis-mic survey in the Calub gas field in the Ogaden basin to make eight gas wells for production. See english.people.com.cn//200605/12/eng20060512_264929.html, dated May 12, 2006. A 2005 earthquake off the coast of Indonesia pushed an island 1.2 m out of the water, causing one of the biggest cases of coral death recorded. See TT, April 14, 2007, p. 5.

92. eng.cpc.com.tw/Future_Development_Plan.htm. See Tora Skodvin, “The Ozone Regime” in Andresen, et al. (note 71), pp. 122–145.

93. The eighty-four-year-old retired engineer who did not do a good job in maintaining the airplane was sentenced to a two-year imprisonment. See UDN, April 29, 2006, p. A11.

94. In April 2009, for the first time, both Taipei and Tokyo tried to help a fishing boat from the Republic of China (ROC) which was hit by an unidentified vessel in Diaoyutai/Senkakus waters. See CT, April 18, 2009, p. A8.


95. Ibid., July 14, 1992, p. 3. In July 2006, two ROC coast guards were forced to go to mainland China by PRC fishermen. This is the fourth time in ten years. See SHDN, July 3, 2006, p. A25.

96. Ibid., May 2, 2006, p. A13 and www.mpinews.com/htm/inews/20060502/ca21458c.htm, dated May 2, 2006.

97. International Straits of the World, initially funded by the Rockefeller Founda-tion, is a series organized and edited at the Graduate College of Marine Studies of the University of Delaware. See one of its books, Gerard J. Mangone, ed., The Russian Arctic Straits (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005).

98. UDN, March 20, 2006, p. A13. 99. Commercial Times (hereinafter CT) (Taipei), April 5, 2009, p .A5. See also www.

epochtimes.com/b5/1/7/9/n107854p.htm; www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rn/2001-02 /02rm05.htm; and TT, March 7, 2006, p. 9. See also J. Ashley Roach, “Enhancing Maritime Security in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore,” Journal of International Af-fairs (hereinafter JIA) (U.S.), vol. 59, no. 1 (Fall/Winter 2006), pp. 97–116. One source said 62,621 ships passed through those straits. See www.chinareviewnews.com/crn-webapp/doc/docDetail.jsp?coluid=4&kindid=16&docid=100153611. In the year 1999, there were 43,965 ships using the Straits. See also SHDN, August 2, 2006, p. 2.

100. www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?t=222510&page=2; eaglespeak.blogspot.com/2005/08/piracy-and-terrorism-stuff.html; CP, March 22, 2005, p. 5; and SHDN, August 9, 2006, p. 4.

101. www.chinareviewnews.com, dated March 19, 2006, 07:49:33.102. www.chinareviewnews.com/doc/1003/8/6/2/100386253.html?coluid=6&ki

ndid=27&docid=100386253, dated June 11, 2007.103. From January 2007 to July, there was no piracy reported. However, some

shipowners chose not to report to the authorities. Usually, it is the third party which reported piracy to the authorities. Malaysia does not require shipowners to install satellite-tracking or reporting devices on vessels. See www.chinareviewnews.com/crn-webapp/doc/docDetail.jsp?coluid=4&kindid=16&docid=100153611 and SHDN, August 9, 2006, p. 4 and August 25, 2007, p. 7. See also Graham Gerard Ong-Webb, ed., Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006).

104. Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question: The Interna-tional Economy and the Possibilities of Governance, 2nd edition (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1999).

105. For others, ranging from the narrowly economical to global, see, for exam-ple, Andreas Busch, “Unpacking the Globalization Debate: Approaches, Evidence and Data” in Colin Hay and David Marsh, eds., Demystifying Globalization (Hamp-shire, UK: Palgrave, 2001). Writing in June 1996, S. Brittan defined globalization as referring “to a world in which, after allowing for exchange rate and default risk, there is a single international rate of interest.” See p. 21.

106. Anthony Giddens, Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics (Stan-ford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 4.

107. The United States for the first time is considering using the giant turbines in the murky waterways around New York City. See CP, April 15, 2007, p. 3.

108. See Mark J. Valencia, Jon M. Van Dyke, and Noel A. Ludwig, Sharing the Re-sources of the South China Sea (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997). In


July 2007, it was reported that a well was for the first time drilled in May 2007 in the East China Sea (ECS).

109. Malaysia is calling upon the international community to share the expenses in maintaining the Strait(s) of Malacca safe. See www.zaobao.com/yx/yx070314_506 .html, dated March 14, 2007.

110. When Beijing learned that Washington will sign a mutual defense treaty with Taipei in December 1954, it began to talk about the principle. See CT, May 1, 2006, p. A15.

111. In late 2005, the ROC’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) rectified the name from ROC Coast Guard to ROC Taiwan Coast Guard on each vessel. See UDN, March 12, 2006, p. A4. In late 2005, ROC ships sailing between Taiwan and Jinmen and Mazu cannot have the proper noun, Zhongguo (China). See ibid., December 22, 2005, p. A13.

112. The United States said it will define the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. For example, in February 2006, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said “[t]he best course is to have a situation in which neither side tries to change the status quo unilaterally. We also believe that the Chinese should not provoke Taiwan.” Cited in TT, February 18, 2006, p. 1. See also Sinchew Ribao (hereinafter SCRB) (Malaysia), February 3, 2006, p. 24. For a Taiwan area perspective on the same issue, see TT, February 20, 2006, p. 8 and Taiwan News (hereinafter TN) (Taipei), February 6, 2006, as cited in Taiwan Security Research, dated February 6, 2006.

113. www.mpinews.com, dated May 1, 2006. Taipei perceives that the mainland is planning to build its second aircraft carrier by 2020. See UDN, November 26, 2006, p. A10. See also Nancy B. Tucker, ed., Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).

114. TT, March 7, 2006, p. 9.115. www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/GD09Ae02.html, dated April 9,

2005.116. getmsg?msg=09E18A79-EF4E-4DBD-BA08-8c69872, dated April 20, 2006. 117. In May 2006, some rules and regulations were further relaxed. Each Jinmen

and Mazu resident can exchange up to Renminbi $20,000.118. www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2535/t187607.htm. 119. www.practicalmachinist.com/cgi-bin/ubbcgi/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_

topic;f=15;t=000006;p=4. 120. www.china.org.cn/english/international/109969.htm. 121. Straits Times (hereinafter ST) (Singapore), April 13, 1998, p. 9.122. CP, April 3, 2006, p. 1 and April 4, 2006 p. 1. The Iranian torpedo, called

hoot/whale moves at 360 kilometers per hour, while the Russian Shkval has a speed of over 200 meters per hour. The former is about four times faster than normal underwater torpedoes.

123. english.people.com.cn//200603/16/eng20060316_251029.html, dated March 16, 2006.

124. english.people.com.cn/200612/01/print20061202_327074.html, dated De-cember 1, 2006.

125. TT, April 15, 2006, p. 7.126. In 1996, the academic presented a paper on the subject. He pointed out that the

idea of building a Taiwan Strait tunnel was suggested more than half a century ago.


127. by106fd.,sg=Cobdcd4-6-854f-4627-83e-385bf95, dated October 19, 2005. 128. CT online, dated May 8, 2006.129. CT, April 23, 2007, p. A13.130. In April 2007, the TKM-World Link was announced by Moscow. The planned

undersea tunnel would contain a high-speed railway, highway, and pipelines, as well as power and fiber-optic cables. It is the world’s longest 6,000-kilometer (3,700-mile) transport corridor from Siberia into New York, U.S.A. Investors are described as a public-private partnership.

131. The State Council of the PRC has a thirty-year plan for constructing super-highways, which can connect the Taiwan area. It was unveiled for the first time in January 2005.

132. In July 2005, Beijing permitted the import of the Taiwan area’s eighteen agricultural products. Beginning May 1, 2006, four more products were added. See CT, April 22, 2006, p. A13.

133. The first international submarine cable was laid between the United King-dom and France in 1850.

134. TT, November 13, 2005, p. 17.135. In Pingdong County, Taiwan Province, the first section of the three-story

National Museum of Marine Biology and Aquarium (NMMBA) was opened in Feb-ruary 2000.

136. big5.gov.cn/gate/big5/www.gov.cn/jrzg/2006-05/02/content_272832.htm. 137. UDN, August 15, 1990, p. 9; CT, April 7, 1997, p. 1; www.chineseworld.com/

publish/today/11_0900.4w/4wms(011106), html, dated November 5, 2001; and LT, April 19, 2006, p. A8.

138. Ibid., May 7, 2007, p. A9.139. CP, May 20, 2006, p. 6.140. Ibid., May 5, 2006, p. 16.141. www.chinareviewnews.com, dated March 29, 2009, 09:35:10. 142. As constructivists will say poverty is a social construction. 143. This is a prediction made by James C. Hsiung of New York University on

December 22, 2005 at Ming Chuan University (MCU), Taoyuan County, Taiwan, ROC.

144. John F. Copper perceives that “[t]he future looks, if anything, worse. There will be more confrontations and it is very possible one of them will escalate out of con-trol.” See his book, Playing with Fire: The Looming War with China over Taiwan (West-port, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), p. 237. In his lecture, Taipei and Bei-jing in a Globalizing World, which was presented at Ming Chuan University (MCU) on April 24, 2007, Copper said probably in five years we will see the confrontations.


141

8Globalization, East Asia, and the Future of Global PoliticsRichard W. Mansbach

Every one of us is touched by globalization. The forces driving the process are said to include “deterritorialization, digitization, internationalization, liberalization, modernization, privatization, regionalization,1 universaliza-tion, weaponization, Westernization, etc.”2 But the process is poorly under-stood, and its impact is fiercely debated. Are globalizing trends making for the continued advance of a “human web,”3 a global “network society,”4 a “flat”5 or “spiky”6 world, selective “denationalization,”7 or “fragmegra-tion”8? Or, is the world becoming “round” again in the face of global finan-cial and economic crises?9 And, “East Asia,” as Lowell Dittmer observes, “has been a conspicuous beneficiary of economic globalization.”10

Is globalization still advancing, stalling, or is it in retreat? Are sovereign states losing influence or merely adapting to globalizing processes? Is “sov-ereignty” absolute, or has it always been “organized hypocrisy”?11 Are we seeing “the end of history,”12 reflecting a consensus around free market capitalism and political democracy?

For East Asia,13 globalization poses challenges even as it affords opportu-nities. Thus, China’s integration into the world economy has produced rapid development but has exposed the country to the chill winds of a global fi-nancial and economic crisis.14 The two sides of globalization in the case of China are captured by the Economist: “[E]ven as officials trot out a litany of achievements they attribute to the country’s ‘reform and opening’ pol-icy—200 million fewer citizens living in poverty, a 6 percent share of global GDP compared with 1.8 percent in 1978, a nearly 70 percent increase in grain production—the world financial crisis weighs heavily on their minds, and their leaders are struggling with unfinished business.”15 It is, as Doug Guthrie puts it “a story of the forces of globalization, played out locally.”16

142 Richard W. Mansbach

This chapter seeks to clarify what globalization means, elaborate on some of its positive and negative consequences, and capture its impact on East Asia. The globalizing process knits people everywhere together, thereby producing worldwide interdependence and featuring the rapid and large-scale movement of persons, things, and ideas across sovereign borders. As such globalization may undermine traditional norms and elites, erode na-tional autonomy, and dilute individual and collective identities that, as Suny explains it, “are embedded in the stories we tell about ourselves indi-vidually and collectively, implied in the way individuals and groups talk and give meaning to their being, their selves, their roles” and “are part of a search for a usable past and an acceptable modernity to stave off anxiety about the present and future.”17

Globalization challenges the unity and capacity of states and cultures, including those in East Asia, threatening unique traditions and cultures, reducing the authority of nation-building leaders, and “denationalizing” their economies.18 The result has been a combination of acceptance and resistance on the part of local elites bent on anchoring nationalism, preserv-ing power, and reinforcing traditional normative structures linked to reli-gion, language, and/or ethnicity.

How East Asian states meet this challenge varies. According to Vivienne Shue, for example: “In the Chinese case . . . the state has struggled to adjust its course so as to steer between the paradigmatic extremes of modernism, on the one hand—which it finds ineradicably contaminated by Western ideals and values—and of nativism, on the other hand—which it finds in-eradicably contaminated by popular mysticism and magic.”19

The meANING AND feATuReS of GLoBALIzATIoN

David Held and his colleagues define globalization as “the widening, deep-ening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life, from the cultural to the criminal, the financial to the spiritual.”20 It consists of the “multiplicity of linkages and interconnec-tions that transcend the nation-state (and by implication the societies) which make up the modern world system.” It “defines a process through which events, decisions, and activities in one part of the world can come to have significant consequences for individuals in quite distant parts of the globe.”21 In a globalized world, contacts among people and their ideas are growing as a result of advances in communication, travel, and commerce that produce mutual awareness among individuals.

Still, there remain competing definitions of globalization that reflect di-vergent empirical and normative views of the phenomenon. Held and his colleagues identify three distinct perspectives toward globalization that they

label hyperglobalist, skeptical, and transformationalist. Hyperglobalists, who consist of both neoliberals and Marxists, focus on the economic dimension of globalization. They believe that changes in the global economy are ush-ering in “a new epoch of human history”22 in which territorial states have become obsolete economic units. Globalization, in their view, has pro-duced a single global market in which transnational corporations from many countries vigorously compete with one another. “Hyperglobalizers argue that economic globalization is bringing about a ‘denationalization’ of economies through the establishment of transnational networks of produc-tion, trade, and finance,” “a ‘borderless economy’” in which “national gov-ernments are relegated to little more than transmission belts for global capital.”23 Neoliberal hyperglobalizers applaud the growth in overall wealth and minimize the fact of growing inequality within and among states, whereas Marxist hyperglobalizers focus on the growth of inequality.

Skeptics argue that contemporary globalization is not new or revolutionary. Interdependence, they argue, is no higher today than it was in the late nine-teenth century. In their view, developments such as the linkage between the lowering of American interest rates by the Federal Reserve in 2008 accompa-nied by a strong yen and a reduction in Japanese exports reflect traditional interdependence. Like hyperglobalizers, skeptics focus on the economic di-mension of globalization, arguing that it features high levels of interstate trade and the expansion of regional common markets such as the European Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade Agreement that, they claim, reduce global economic integration. In their view, states retain a dominant role in these activities, including an ability to regulate and unravel economic processes. The power of governments, in other words, has not ebbed; state sovereignty has not eroded; and transnational corporations remain under national control and retain national attitudes. States, especially the United States, are responsible for higher levels of economic intercourse and the exis-tence of global institutions like the World Trade Organization (WTO).

For their part, transformationalists are convinced that “globalization is a central driving force behind the rapid social, political and economic changes that are reshaping modern societies and world order”24 and has no historical parallel. According to transformationalists, two consequences of interconnectedness are a merging of the foreign and domestic policy arenas and, owing to the microelectronic revolution, the erasing of physical dis-tance and reduced role of territory. Thus, Held describes “the growing deter-ritorialization of economic activity as production and finance increasingly acquire a global and transnational dimension.”25 “Internalizing globaliza-tion is about how people are changing their domestic political worlds in the context of growing complex interactions—economic, social, and political—across national borders. In addition, states are weakening as they are pulled in different directions in a process that involves the simultaneous impact of

Globalization, East Asia, and the Future of Global Politics 143

globalization and localization.”26 According to transformationalists, inter-national, subnational, and transnational groups are growing more impor-tant as state power ebbs. And with the declining capacity of sovereign states and the reduced importance of territory, the role of identity based on fea-tures such as religion and ethnicity has grown.

Globalization has several interrelated features, all apparent to some de-gree in East Asia.

(1) The spread of communications technologies that shrink the role of geo-graphic distance and the role of territory. Globalization is built on the prolif-eration of powerful computers and microelectronic technologies that allow individuals and groups to communicate virtually instantaneously by e-mail, cellular and satellite telephones, and fax machine and move vast amounts of money and information via these technologies. It also involves the spread of satellite technology for television and radio, as well as the global marketing of films and television programs. Overall, these techno-logical revolutions overcome physical distance in politics, economics, and war and reduce the importance of territory. Could Alexander Graham Bell, who invented the telephone, have imagined that some day people could acquire an MSAT Mobile System to allow them to make or receive calls and e-mail from vehicles, planes, or ships, or an Immarsat satellite service that provides telephone and fax access to over 98 percent of the world, including areas beyond the reach of any other communications?

The lessening importance of territory will reduce the desire to conquer and occupy other countries. Some territories will remain important, espe-cially if they are sources of critical raw materials like oil, but on the whole, geography is growing less relevant. Distance no longer poses a significant obstacle to many important global activities from economic transactions and mobilization of political activity to projecting military force and ex-changing ideas and information by e-mail and mobile telephone.

The proliferation of subnational, transnational, international, and supra-national institutions and actors in global politics, alongside of and sharing adherents with states, have returned global politics in some respects to the overlapping and crosscutting political life of medieval Europe and away from the neat, exclusive territorial boxes characteristic of state-centric maps.27 Declare Inayatullah and Blaney: “Thus, alternative constructions of space—as overlapping, heterogeneous, and relative—may compete with modern visions that subscribe to the magic of straight lines.” Consequently, “the separate and overlapping character of group relations and ambitions might be recognized and negotiated where relative notions of space . . . are also put into play.”28 But, why, as they suggest, should we accept “the as-sumption that property/sovereignty should be governed by the logic of straight lines”? Instead, they argue, “territorial spaces are historically con-structed, entailing a set of social relationships and processes, and not a


universal and fixed category within a Euclidean geometry or Newtonian cosmology.”29

(2) The spread of knowledge and skills and an explosion in political participa-tion. The communications and transportation revolutions enable ever more people, even in remote corners of the globe, to be informed about the world, form opinions about events, and get involved in politics in ways that were previously unimaginable. This is the case throughout Asia, where so-cieties are open to the acquisition of “the necessary skills and habits of mind to function in the competitive market.”30 Cable and satellite televi-sion provide exposure to an almost infinite variety of opinion and informa-tion. And the Internet31 is becoming the most important tool of all in fa-cilitating the exchange of views, the dissemination of information and propaganda, and the coordination of activities because it is inexpensive and accessible. Internet blogs and bloggers are already influencing people around the world by transmitting information and opinion.32

Although globalization may weaken conventional forms of democracy and produce a “democratic deficit,” the desire of people to control their destinies is likely to intensify. Thus, political participation will continue to grow and manifest itself in a variety of unconventional ways ranging from street demonstrations and formation of new political groups to political agitation and even terrorism. Rosenau argues that the revolutions in trans-portation, information, and communication technologies, combined with the spread of education in much of the world, are having a profound im-pact at what he calls the “micro level.” People, Rosenau believes, are getting smarter, and microelectronic advances such as the Internet give them the information needed to discover whether their interests are being sacrificed to those of sovereign states and their governments. A growing sense of self-efficacy, Rosenau believes, is the consequence of the acquisition of new skills and orientations by individuals. The “printing press, telephone, radio, television, and personal computer have created conditions for skill develop-ment among citizenries that governments could not totally control and that have helped make citizenries more effective in relation to the centers of authority.”33

One consequence is that it will become more difficult for countries to conquer and occupy one another as they did for centuries. Colonialism was only possible when populations were politically inert, and foreign rulers only needed to conquer or co-opt local elites to impose their will. Today, the mobilization of whole populations against foreign occupation, as il-lustrated by the Iraq debacle, is likely to make the costs of such efforts prohibitively high.

(3) The global triumph of capitalism and emergence of a global market that transcends state boundaries. The global triumph of market capitalism and neoliberal orthodoxy are responsible for driving and sustaining economic


globalization. With the end of the Cold War, free-market capitalism, but-tressed by a desire for “modernization,” as an economic ideology triumphed in much of the world, including China, Russia, and the developing world. Its triumph has been accompanied by an expansion of transnational corpo-rations, the rapid movement of investments, the shifting of jobs and indus-tries “off shore,” the proliferation of global networks of production and distribution, the emergence of “world cities” such as New York, Tokyo, Frankfurt, and Shanghai, and the emergence of a new urbanized economic and cultural elite, and the privatization of government functions as part of national efforts to become economically competitive. As Cerny argues: “The main task or function of the contemporary state is the promotion of eco-nomic activities, whether at home or abroad, which make firms or sectors located within the territory of the state competitive in international mar-kets. . . . [W]hile the state has always been to some extent a promoter of market forces, state structures today are being transformed into more and more market-oriented and even market-based organizations themselves, fundamentally altering the way that public and private goods are pro-vided”34 Nevertheless, post-Soviet societies, as elsewhere, reveal “the reflex-ive embrace of neoliberal ideas underpinning the market” even though “state-society relations—like the boundaries between public and private—vary across issue-area depending on intersubjective understandings of or-der.”35 Thus, in East Asia, economic decentralization is not only a conse-quence of the pressures of globalization but also reflects the efforts of local politicians to retain autonomy from the center.

Although most countries have come to applaud free trade and invest-ment, this enthusiasm is unlikely to persist if global prosperity diminishes. A significant and prolonged economic slump may, as in the past, renew support for protectionism and other forms of economic nationalism. Nev-ertheless, globalization “is most often viewed as primarily concerning exter-nal economic changes and how these constrain domestic actors, under-mines the state’s capacity to make economic and social policy, and put international capital in the driving seat.”36

(4) The spread of a global culture. Globalization has been accompanied by the spread of culture through mass media, migration, tourism, music and the like, originally Western, featuring shared norms based on mass consum-erism. The homogenization of mass culture can be seen in everything from dress, diet, and education to advertising and spreading the belief in human rights. Globalization ranges from Big Macs and designer jeans to abhor-rence of torture. “McDonald’s,” writes Benjamin Barber, “serves 20 million customers around the world every day, drawing more customers daily than there are people in Greece, Ireland, and Switzerland together.”37

This process, however, undermines older local cultures and religious be-liefs and has produced a backlash. “Modernization, economic develop-


ment, urbanization, and globalization,” argues Samuel Huntington, “have led people to rethink their identities and to redefine them in narrower, more intimate, communal terms.”38 “In the former Soviet Union,” writes Douglas Blum, “one finds a veritable preoccupation with cultural globaliza-tion,” experienced by many “as Westernization (or, often, as ‘Americaniza-tion’), which is widely understood as conveying a massive pressure for ho-mogeneity. This in turn generates a powerful mix of emotions: excitement, pride, anxiety, and disgust.”39

The popularity of religious zealotry in the Middle East reflects this back-lash, especially owing to fears of social pollution and moral collapse. Para-doxically, globalization can reinforce states by threatening sovereignty, tra-dition, and national identity, focusing attention on “outsiders,” and triggering internal efforts to emphasize shared values and reinforce collec-tive identity. Thus, cultural homogenization is not a necessary consequence of globalization. “Rather,” argues Featherstone, “the globalization process should be regarded as opening up the sense that now the world is a single place with increased contact becoming unavoidable, we necessarily have greater dialogue between various nation-states, blocs, and civilizations: a dialogical space in which we can expect a good deal of disagreement, clash-ing of perspectives and conflict, not just working together and consensus.”40 Throughout Asia globalized culture has been mixed with and modified by efforts to update and assert traditional values and norms.

(5) The spread of English as a global language. English links elites across the globe much as Latin and French did in earlier epochs and enjoys a special status in seventy-five countries. It is spoken as a native language by between 300 and 400 million people and as a second language by about 375 million more. Everywhere, the demand to learn English is intense because it is the language of commerce, science, and technology. Although many more people are native speakers of Mandarin Chinese41 and Hindi, what makes English dominant is that it is spoken so widely compared to other languages—in 104 countries. “Based on English as its lingua franca and on the rise of the internationally mobile knowledge worker,” writes Michael Talalay, “a type of international citizenry is appearing. In the office of one of my consultancy clients in Switzerland, the native languages of the staff include Italian, Croatian, Russian, Serbian, Portuguese, Hindi, French, Greek, and German. The working language, however, is English. This is the official policy of the company, not merely a de facto development.”42 De-clares another observer: “It is no longer just top execs who need to speak English. Everyone in the corporate food chain is feeling the pressure to learn a common tongue as companies globalize and democratize.”43 As a result: “On the back of modern technology and the consequent spread of English as the global language. The entire world is heading for a common culture.”44 Even in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan the “ability to speak English


is also considered essential, providing not only a gateway to knowledge but also a tool for national development.”45

(6) The spread of democracy. Globalization has been accompanied by the spread of democratic norms from the core areas of North America, Western Europe, and Japan to Latin America, Asia, the countries of the former Soviet bloc, and even to Africa.46 This process, it has been suggested, is partly a result of neoliberal economic policies that create wealth and enlarge the middle class who demand democratic rights. Although it is premature to declare the triumph of liberal democracy, globalization is witnessing grow-ing acceptance of individual rights, including that of choosing one’s own leaders. Democracy remains fragile at best in some regions, nonexistent in others, and is violently contested by those whose authority would vanish in the face of free elections.

In East Asia, it is revealing that in terms of globalization relatively demo-cratic Japan ranks twenty-eight and authoritarian China sixty-six of the seventy-two countries in Foreign Policy’s 2007 Globalization Index.47 Yet, even in China, “[p]ro-democracy unrest in the late 1980s played a bigger role in turning China capitalist than either officials or admirers of China’s supposed gradualist approach suggest,” because they “triggered fierce debate among Chinese leaders about the direction of reform.”48 For its part, South Korea has become even more embedded in globalization since 1997–1998 when the “Asian Contagion” presented the country with an unprecedented economic crisis even as it was making a transition to a more democratic polity. By con-trast, authoritarian North Korea remains a “hermit kingdom,” largely un-touched by globalization. In Blum’s words: “Democratic ideas have also found broad discursive resonance, as evidenced by the widespread idea that it is ‘normal’ or ‘civilized’ for people to express different views, to tolerate others’ opinions, and to seek compromise solutions when disagreements arise.”49

(7) The spread of global civil society. The proliferation of international and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), including giant transnational firms, has led some to suggest that a global civil society is beginning to coalesce and that states are sharing some degree of authority with them. Such a society “champions the political vision of a world founded on non-violent, legally sanctioned power-sharing arrangements among many dif-ferent and interconnected forms of socio-economic life that are distinct from governmental institutions.”50 A growing number of NGOs are com-mitted to finding cooperative solutions to collective dilemmas. These NGOs are sources of activism and expertise and are welcomed by many countries seeking to manage change in nonviolent ways.

Writing of economic globalization, Sassen argues that: “While the state participates in enabling the expansion of the global economy, it does so in a context increasingly dominated by deregulation, privatization, and the growing authority of non-state actors, some of which assume new normative


roles. In many of these new dynamics and conditions, the state continues to play an important role, often as the institutional home for the enactment of the new policy regimes we associate with economic globalization.”51 Al-though these organizations and movements have different aims, many col-laborate in confronting global challenges.

Today, there exist global networks of individuals and NGOs52—made possible by the communications revolution —concerned with issues such as capital flows, human rights, women’s rights, and the environment, and leaders in some countries like Russia fear the democratizing effects of these networks and have taken steps to suppress them. By contrast, NGOs are finding greater acceptance in Japan where “a more audible civil society is beginning to make itself heard,” although it could be argued “that many NGOs and citizens’ movements have been subject to approval from and supervised by government, and as a result are beholden to and suffer from the same symptoms of fatigue and rigidity as traditional structures of gov-ernment in responding to the demands of globalization.”53 And, in China, “it is the void left by declining Communist Party power that we began to see autonomous organizations and the makings of a civil society.”54

International institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the WTO play key roles in sustaining globalization, and their future is tied up with their ability to persuade less-developed countries that they are genuinely dedicated to ending poverty and encouraging growth. However, the United States, EU, Japan, and China must demonstrate that they are willing and able to maintain an open trading system.

(8) The growth of complex transgovernmental linkages. The proliferation of economic, environmental, security, and other issues that transcend national boundaries and provoke bureaucratic divisions within governments have produced transgovernmental alliances and networks. Cerny, for instance, describes “systematic linkages between state actors and agencies within particular jurisdictions and sectors, cutting across different countries and including a heterogeneous collection of private actors and groups in inter-locking policy communities.”55 And Sassen writes of “transnational net-works of government officials” and “novel types of networks” that “connect corporate globalization and the globalizing of governmental responsibili-ties and aims,” examples of which include “judges having to negotiate a growing array of international rules and prohibitions that require some measure of cross-border standardization,” “immigration officials needing to coordinate border controls,” and “police officials in charge of discover-ing financial flows that support terrorism.”56

(9) The diffusion of global power. With the end of the Cold War, many ob-servers concluded that the world had entered a period of unipolarity, with the United States as undisputed top dog. Today, the United States remains the world’s leading military power. However, its military superiority is no


guarantee that it can realize its objectives. American efforts to spread de-mocracy have had some successes but also have triggered considerable re-sistance. The U.S. goal to win the War on Terror remains elusive, and U.S. efforts to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have had little success. The United States also remains the world’s leading economic power, but its superiority in this realm is eroding as other centers of economic power, especially the EU, Japan, India, and China, prove able competitors in global trade and as American dependence on foreign energy remains high.

(10) Environmental degradation. Depletion of fossil fuels, fish, fresh water, and arable land continues. Human wealth and welfare are challenged by global warming, deforestation, desertification, and the loss of biodiversity. To date, global responses have been spotty, and vested economic interests have resisted concerted global policies. It is difficult for people to focus on these trends because many of them pose long-term rather than imminent hazards. However, as such threats pose greater economic burdens, markets may begin to facilitate investments in solutions such as wind and solar energy. In addition, science may provide partial answers to some of these problems, for example, the use of nonpolluting hydrogen as a fuel in auto-mobiles. Finally, concerned individuals have mobilized their skills and in-fluence transnationally to find answers and have created global networks to lobby for cooperative responses to environmental challenges.

(11) A shift from conventional to irregular warfare. Although interstate war-fare between uniformed and organized armies will erupt from time to time, a combination of factors will minimize its occurrence. These include the declining importance of territory and the growing difficulty in occupying countries, the role of economic interdependence, the proliferation of WMD, and the spread of civil strife. The distinction between legitimate war and crime will blur, and violence among groups competing for power over the carcasses of failed or failing states or over sources of wealth like diamonds, oil, and cocaine will increase. Terrorism will persist, as dissatisfied individu-als and fanatical nonterritorial groups seek vengeance for real or imagined wrongs endeavor to prevent the erosion of local cultures, or try to spread messianic ideologies. The United States and perhaps other countries may launch preemptive wars, but they will have only limited success as long as poverty, religious and political intolerance, and political oppression persist, as these are the fundamental conditions that give rise to dissatisfaction and hate.

(12) The proliferation of WMD. One major challenge of the near future involves the spread of WMD. U.S. anti-proliferation policy is in tatters, and the use of force against countries such as Serbia and Iraq may actually pro-voke other countries to acquire WMD to deter the United States. North Korea has acquired nuclear weapons, and Iran is nearing that goal. And as


these countries acquire WMD, those who fear them will be tempted to ac-quire their own. Although deterrence threats may prevent countries from using WMD, terrorist groups are far more difficult to deter because they consist of fanatics who are seeking to become martyrs, and, unlike coun-tries, it is difficult to find them.

(13) The erosion of state autonomy. The sovereign boundaries of states are becoming more penetrable every day. Even the United States is virtually helpless in the face of streams of migrants moving northward or in slowing down the flood of drugs coming to American cities and towns from around the world. In addition, despite America’s extraordinary precautions, dedi-cated foreign terrorists are likely to penetrate its defenses. Global commu-nications technologies make it virtually impossible to prevent subversive ideas and ideologies from crossing a state’s boundaries. Nor can countries control their own economy or protect themselves from the vagaries of global markets. “Globalization,” as Peter Taylor argues “has two broad im-plications for the discourse on sovereignty. First, political, social, and eco-nomic activities are becoming global in scope and dissolving the internal/external distinction crucial to the orthodox definition of sovereignty. If the line between internal supremacy and external equality can no longer be maintained, sovereignty must be reformulated. If globalization has blurred the distinction between national and international, transformed the condi-tions of nation decision-making, altered the legal framework and adminis-trative practices of states, obscured lines of responsibility, and changed the institutional and organizational content of national politics, then sover-eignty as a doctrine is of limited relevance. In this sense, globalization refers to more than the erosion of autonomy. It highlights a change in the politi-cal landscape and requires an adaptation of political practice.”57

(14) The spread of non-state identities. The weakening of states, the growing separation of nationalism from citizenship, the degree to which new tech-nologies have made it easier for ideas to be communicated at vast distances, and the dehumanizing and homogenizing impact of the global economy and culture suggest the growing importance of identities associated with religion, ethnicity, and civilization. Groups based on these identities are likely to proliferate and lead a backlash against globalization. And, their aspiration for autonomy within or for secession from existing states will threaten the integrity of heterogeneous societies such as Nigeria, Russia, Indonesia, and Pakistan.

(15) Growing acceptance of human rights and a “law of people.” Human-rights norms have spread globally as part of the gradual replacement of the “law of nations” by a “law of peoples.” However, human-rights abuses in-cluding genocide and ethnic cleansing remain widespread as well. Never-theless, despite setbacks in countries like Russia and Uzbekistan and the continued reluctance of countries like China and Belorus to accept human


rights, human-rights norms are deepening and will continue to elicit wide-spread support, especially as more people become prosperous and as states and international organizations adopt new human-rights conventions and set legal precedents that can gradually earn broad acceptance.

(16) The changing definition of security. A variety of global problems, in-cluding poverty, environmental deterioration, drugs, famine, crime, and disease, imperil human well-being. As awareness of these problems grows, so does recognition that security encompasses more than guarding against military threats. Recognition of these additional threats is widening as more information becomes available to more people, as networks of interna-tional and NGOs form, and as potential solutions emerge to problems that for most of history have been regarded as insoluble.

GLoBALIzATIoN AND LoCALIzATIoN

One unresolved question about globalization is whether the process is in-exorable or whether it can be reversed. Hyperglobalists and transformation-alists regard this as the era of globalization in which peoples organized in territorial states become ever more interconnected by and enmeshed in global political, economic, cultural, and knowledge networks that reduce state and local autonomy and link the fates of people geographically re-mote from one another. Globalization is believed to deterritorialize and denationalize state activities. Its advocates believe that as globalization thickens, it will be accompanied by cosmopolitan identities in which indi-viduals view themselves as members of a single global community.

Globalization and localization are interdependent in a variety of ways. “Globalization,” argue Cerny, Menz, and Soederberg, “itself is . . . reshaped by and through local conditions and domestic political objectives; it is not just imposed from outside. It starts from the competing goals of people in everyday politics and economics . . . and seeps into the deepest nooks and crannies of everyday life. International and domestic politics are therefore not two separate arenas, but parts of an interpenetrated set of webs of poli-tics and governance that increasingly cut across and entangle the nations of the world, summoning forth and molding the actions of ordinary people.”58 In East Asia, as elsewhere, globalization “must be conceptualized as a rela-tionship between the global and the local.”59

However, as regards identities, globalization, at least in part, is anti-thetical to localization60 in which individuals identify with disparate and exclusive communities that evaluate their well-being relative to “outsiders.” A basic fact of global politics is that the world remains divided into groups that mistrust one another. Among the most significant “local” communi-ties are nations and ethnic communities, and “nationalism” is the ideology


that places nations and ethnicities at the acme of human loyalties. Global-ization advocates believe that nationalism is waning, but, as we shall see, nationalism remains a powerful though changing force and an ideology that appeals to innumerable people in both the developing and developed worlds. Its persistence reveals an intensification of identity politics in which individuals and groups assess goals and policies on the basis of “who they are.”

It is difficult to say whether globalization is irreversible.61 Held and his colleagues elaborate several dimensions along which to conceptualize and measure the direction and magnitude of change in globalization. They offer several “spatio-temporal” dimensions: “(1) the extensiveness of networks of relations and connections; (2) the intensity of flows and levels of activity within these networks; (3) the velocity or speed of interchanges; and (4) the impact of these phenomena on particular communities.”62 They also iden-tify several descriptive organization variables: infrastructures, institutional-ization, stratification, and modes of interactions that should be kept in mind in considering the nature of globalization over time.63

Globalization owes much to American hegemony after World War II and the end of the Cold War and the desire of American leaders to encourage and sustain an open trading system, global economic growth, and the spread of values such as individualism, democracy, and free enterprise. Some argue that globalization could not survive if the United States and major countries such as Japan and Germany no longer supported it. They believe that if today’s major powers became disillusioned with globaliza-tion, their withdrawal could bring about the collapse of key public and private institutions that sustain it. Others argue that the process is so far along that it can no longer be reversed, that it is no longer controlled by any country or countries, and that the costs for a country to cut the web of in-terdependence in which it is enmeshed is simply too high to consider.

Recent years have been testing ones for globalization, and a number of events have challenged the globalization process, including the growth of protectionism in reaction to the financial crisis, the collapse of the Doha trade negotiations; the proliferation of U.S.–European trade disputes; the rejection of the EU64 constitution by French and Dutch voters; America’s unilateralist foreign policies, especially the Iraq imbroglio; the growing complaints about the outsourcing of jobs from the developed world; and growing resistance in the developed world to the flow of migrants and asy-lum seekers from poor countries. But probably the most important threats to globalization were the 9/11 terrorist attacks and America’s subsequent “War on Terror.” These events suggested that state frontiers were again criti-cally important and that the world was breaking up into hostile “tribes” and cultures rather than uniting within a single, homogenized culture of moder-nity based on democracy, secularism, and consumerism.


Overall, the evidence is mixed about whether these challenges have curbed globalization, at least so far, but the years since 9/11 have not shown any marked reduction in globalization. A measure developed jointly by A. T. Kearney, Inc. and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace scores countries in four categories, each of which consists of several factors that re-flect the degree to which countries and their societies are embedded in the global system and interact with one another. These categories are Economic Integration, Personal Contact, Technology, and Political Engagement.65

Of the ranked countries, the most globalized were mainly small highly developed countries such as Singapore, Hongkong, the Netherlands, Switzer-land, Ireland, and Denmark. For the most part, they are also democracies. By contrast, the least globalized, including Iran, India, Algeria, Indonesia, Ven-ezuela, Brazil, China, and Turkey—were large, for the most part relatively poor, and with some notable exceptions, subject to authoritarian govern-ments.66 Nevertheless, the globalization index is a state-, not a system-level, measure, and the factors it uses to measure globalization are contested.

Recent years have also witnessed an apparent revival of nationalism in reaction to the homogenizing impact of globalization and the end of the Cold War’s ideological bifurcation of global politics, and, as Connor ar-gues, the essence of nationalism “is a psychological bond that joins a people and differentiates it, in the subconscious convictions of its mem-bers, from all nonmembers in a most vital way.”67 Dramatic resurgence in identity theory is apparent in scholarship as diverse as Huntington’s civi-lizational thesis and the several strands of constructivist thought. National movements reflect the unleashing and manipulation of old (or forged) identities and memories. Thus, the passionate separatist yearnings that gripped Bosnian Muslims, Croatians, Albanians, Armenians, Tibetans, and others reminded Daniel Moynihan of Milton’s “Pandaemonium,” that “was inhabited by creatures quite convinced that the great Satan had their best interests at heart.”68

In recent years nationalist fervor has been encouraged and manipulated by political leaders, for example, Russia’s Vladimir Putin who has used sym-bols ranging from the canonization of the murdered Tsar Nicholas II and his family in order to link the Russian Orthodox Church to the regime and the restoration of the Soviet national anthem to citing the threat posed by Russia’s “enemies” such as Chechen rebels, American hegemony, and Geor-gian adventurers. An “ugly nationalism,” declared The Economist, “is abroad in Russia.”69 For their part, leaders of former Soviet republics like Georgia, Moldova, Latvia, and Ukraine and former Soviet bloc countries like Poland have pointed to resurgent Russian power to mobilize nationalist sentiments to reinforce their political positions. Indeed, on every continent “[n]ational movements are regaining popularity, and nations that had once assimilated and ‘vanished’ have now reappeared.”70 Today, as in past centuries, nation-


alism is a companion of rapid change; it was and remains “a subversive and revolutionary force.”71

In recent decades, nationalism and national self-determination have be-come critical sources of localization, eroding collective state identities and challenging globalized political authority. National self-determination, which can mean either autonomy for a “people” within an existing state or a “people’s” ownership of its own state, has been very much in the air since the second half of the nineteenth century, especially as it was applied to multinational empires like Austria–Hungary. Referring to the Versailles Conference, U.S. president Woodrow Wilson declared on September 25, 1919, that: “There was not a man at the table who did not admit the sacred-ness of the right to self-determination, the sacredness of the right of any body of people to say that they would not continue to live under the Gov-ernment that they were then living under.”72 With great prescience, Wilson’s Secretary of State Robert Lansing was aghast at the prospect. “Will it not breed discontent, disorder and rebellion?” he asked. “The phrase,” he con-tinued, “is simply loaded with dynamite. It will raise hopes which can never be realized. It will, I fear, cost thousands of lives.”73

In the 1950s and 1960s, nationalism and national self-determination—enshrined in the UN Charter, Article 1(2)—were the ideological bases of decolonization. Today, nationalism, as Rosenau contends, is “a form of exclusionary localism” because “it emphasizes boundaries and the dis-tinction between us and them, with the result that even in the United States the idea of a melting pot has tended to give way to what some re-gard as a multicultural regime in which different minorities stress their ethnic and racial ties even as they downplay the relevance of an inclusive identity that links them to the varied groups that reside in their coun-try.”74 In other words, nationalism and ethnicity are identities that are associated with closure and with the thickening of vertical barriers. “Wherever nationalism is highly salient in states today, or wherever na-tions aspire to become states, exclusionary localism can be readily dis-cerned, with the ethnic cleansing policies of Serbia in the 1990s the most notorious recent example that can be cited in this regard.”75

Contemporary nationalism no longer reinforces state power. Although the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries witnessed the wedding of “nation” and “state” and the creation of powerful territorial polities, the trend toward separation of the two identities has accelerated since World War I. There is a growing queue of groups in global politics that want their own state, even if this means the collapse of existing states like the Soviet Union and Yugo-slavia or state failure. In much of the developing world, ethnic and tribal loyalties threaten the integrity of existing states. Bloody examples in Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and elsewhere illustrate how politicians ma-nipulate ethnic divisions. Not only did the USSR split into quarreling na-


tionalities, but several remain at each other’s throats—Armenians and Az-eris, Georgians and Ossetians, Russians and Georgians, and Russians and Moldovans. According to one analysis, there were over two hundred politi-cally active ethnic movements by the mid-1990s.76

“If we don’t find some way that the different ethnic groups can live to-gether in a country,” asked former U.S. secretary of state Warren Christo-pher, “how many countries will we have?” His answer: “We’ll have 5,000 countries rather than the hundred plus we now have.”77 Since almost any group can claim to be a distinctive “people,” there is a risk of fragmenta-tion of political authority into ever smaller and less viable polities. Even on the marchlands of Europe and Canada, there are “ethno-national” groups that claim that their culture is being swallowed up by majorities within nation-states—Spanish Basques, French Bretons and Corsicans, Canadian Québeçois, Canadians Inuits and Native Americans, Northern Irish Catholics, Celtic Scots and Welsh, and others. In Québec’s case, efforts by the Francophone advocates of secession have had to confront the op-position of non-Francophone English and other minorities (allophones), as well as the threat of the Cree and other indigenous Indian groups who claim large areas of Québec to secede on the basis of the same right to national self-determination claimed by Francophone Québéçois.

However, nationalism and ethnicity need not imperil globalization. Peo-ple have multiple identities and are simultaneously members of many polities that may overlap. There is no reason, for example, that one cannot identify oneself both as a Basque or a Scot, and as a European. The first identity may be relevant for some issues and the latter for others. “Europe” provides economies of scale that would be unavailable for a tiny island of psychological security. In this sense, it is rational to advocate ethnonational secession from existing states. Thus, national movements such as those of the Basques and Catalans in Spain, the Flemish and Walloons in Belgium, or the Bretons in France may reduce the cohesion of their state but are un-likely to impede globalization. Indeed, globalization may benefit small polities and allow them greater autonomy from existing states. Problems arise if nationalism and ethnicity prove to be Hobbesian categories based on passion rather than reason. Thus, Horowitz suggests that ethnic conflicts are frequently intractable and that the “contest for worth and place is the common denominator of ethnic conflict among unranked groups” that are divided “by a vertical cleavage.”78 Whether such conflicts are zero-sum de-pend on the degree to which national or ethnic cleavages crosscut or rein-force other social cleavages such as economic status. If the latter, conflicts may prove irreconcilable and produce state collapse.

Although national pride can reinforce healthy collective identities, it can also produce negative localism that impedes globalization. The negative localism associated with nationalism and ethnicity afflicts both the devel-


oping and developed worlds and may assume several forms, including state failure and the division of polities into ever smaller islands of authority, opposition to migration, and neomercantilism.

State failure

Failure to build viable and stable states after the retreat of colonialism and the post–Cold War upsurge in violence within and across states in much of Africa and parts of Asia are partly associated with national, tribal, and ethnic rivalries, revived and manipulated by ambitious politicians seeking political power and loot. In Africa, Europeans imposed states and politics that inhabitants never fully accepted and that divided ethnic groups or enclosed ethnic rivals within the same states. The governments of such states may be in the hands of one of the ethnic contenders, may be deemed illegitimate by members of other ethnic groups, may be unable to exercise authority over a state’s territory, may be unable to provide security or essential services to citizens, and, frequently, they may confront armed opponents. Such states “can no longer reproduce the conditions for their own existence.”79 Not surprisingly, the “civil wars that characterize failed states usually stem from or have roots in ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other intercommunal enmity.”80 When combined with poverty and un-even economic development, overpopulation, refugee communities, and environmental stress, state institutions collapse, resulting in failed states. According to Foreign Policy’s Failed States Index, of the twenty states “most at risk of failure” eleven are in Africa (Somalia, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ivory Coast, Central African Republic, Guinea, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Nigeria), six are in Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma, North Korea, and Sri Lanka), two are in the Middle East (Iraq and Lebanon), and one (Haiti) is in the Caribbean. Virtually all are multiethnic societies.81

opposition to migration

A second form of negative localism, is partly a reaction to globalization, is reflected in the fence being built along America’s border with Mexico, the tightening of immigration controls in the EU, and failure to achieve im-migration reform in the United States. Ethnic xenophobia of resident na-tional groups is one consequence of the large-scale movement of persons as refugees and as illegal migrants across state frontiers, combined with fear of terrorism. Residents argue that such migrants cannot assimilate into dominant cultures and create economic and social problems for their ad-opted societies including lower wages, human smuggling, street crime, and spiraling welfare costs. The issue of economic migration from poor to rich


countries has become a focus of political contention both within and among states. Migration is largely a product of demographic forces and economic inequality. Population growth has ended and in some cases populations are decreasing in wealthy countries owing to factors such as urbanization and greater opportunities for women. Simultaneously, popu-lations are “graying.” In Europe and Japan, the consequences include spi-raling costs for health care and social security and a declining tax base with fewer young people to fill jobs, especially lower paying jobs. By contrast, burgeoning populations in Africa, the Middle East, and parts of Asia are producing a surplus of young workers in search of employment and higher wages. “These movements of people, often from former colonies,” writes Modood, “whether welcome or not, have created a multiculturalism that is qualitatively different from the diversity of personal difference or lifestyles of historic, territorially based that already characterize some Western Euro-pean countries.”82

Until recently, Europe was dominantly Christian and Caucasian, but large numbers of Muslims arrived after World War II as a result of guest-worker programs, filling poorly paid jobs that Europeans avoided. Although initially guest workers, notably Turks, were only supposed to be temporary residents, many remained and were joined by family members. By 2005, Europe’s Muslim population reached between 15 to 20 million or 4 to 5 percent of Europe’s total population and will double by 2025.83 Excepting Germany, most Muslim immigrants in Europe originated in the country’s former colonial territories. Following 9/11, Europeans grew uneasy about the increasing numbers of Muslims in their midst, even as many of the children and grandchildren of the first generation of Muslim migrants were alienated from Western culture. “Jihadist networks,” writes Leiken, “span Europe from Poland to Portugal, thanks to the spread of radical Islam among the descendants of guest workers. . . . In smoky coffeehouses in Rot-terdam and Copenhagen, makeshift prayer halls in Hamburg and Brussels, Islamic bookstalls in Birmingham and ‘Londonistan,’ and the prisons of Madrid, Milan, and Marseilles, immigrants or their descendants are volun-teering for jihad against the West.”84

Among European and North Americans, fear of Muslim extremism is highest in Russia, Spain, and Germany and lowest in Canada, the United States, and Poland.85 For their part, many Muslims in Europe—51 percent in Germany, 42 percent in Britain, 39 percent in France and 31 percent in Spain—believe that Europeans are hostile toward them. In addition, large majorities of European Muslims—81 percent in Britain, 69 percent in Spain, 61 percent in Germany, and 46 percent in France—identify them-selves as Muslims first and only secondarily as citizens of their country.86 Among Europeans, fear has fueled xenophobic nationalism and has in-creased support for right-wing, anti-immigrant politicians.


Although America’s multicultural tradition allows immigrants greater latitude to express their identities than in Europe, even in the United States, there is nationalist concern about the assimilation of the country’s Mexican immigrant community. This sentiment is controversially represented by Samuel Huntington who argues that Hispanic immigrants are not assimi-lating into American society.87 In his view, Hispanics are establishing insu-lated cultural islands, and the sheer number of Hispanics in the United States threatens to undermine America’s culture. Huntington’s provocative claim rests on the assertion that Hispanics do not assimilate into American society as did earlier waves of immigrants from Europe. The result, he con-tends, will be “a culturally bifurcated Anglo-Hispanic society with two na-tional languages.”88 The density of links across the U.S.–Mexican border “could produce a consolidation of the Mexican-dominant areas into an autonomous, culturally and linguistically distinct, economically self-reliant bloc within the United States.”89

Huntington’s analysis is an extension of his view—the antithesis of glo-balization—that we are entering an era of clashing civilizations.90 He fears that relentless globalization will undermine existing national cultures and perhaps even national integrity and independence. To his critics, Hunting-ton is a xenophobic nationalist, whose belief that American culture is rooted in Anglo-Protestant tradition is false and whose fears are overheated. To his supporters, he summarizes the resentment toward a global tidal wave that threatens national identities, boundaries, and traditional values.

Neomercantilism

Globalization is generally seen to have gone farthest in the economic realm. Cerny writes of the “competition state.” “The key to the new role of the state,” he argues, “lies in the way that economic competition is changing in the world.” “[S]tate structures today are being transformed into more and more market-oriented and even market-based organizations themselves, fundamen-tally altering the way that public and private goods are provided.”91 “The func-tions of the state,” Cerny maintains, “although central in structural terms, are becoming increasingly fragmented, privatized and devolved.”92 Thus, the “on-going division of labor (‘globalization’)” places states “under ever-increasing pressure, and with it sovereignty-based IR theory.”93

Economic nationalism or neomercantilism is experiencing a revival. Contemporary neomercantilists, in Buzan’s words “seek to make the inter-national economy fit with the patterns of fragmentation in the political system by reducing the scope of the global market. They emphasize the integrity of the national economy and the primacy of state goals (military welfare, societal). They advocate protection as a way of preserving integrity, but may be attracted to the construction of their own economy dominating


at the centre.”94 Currently all major trading states have developed sophisti-cated nontariff barriers to free trade such as America’s “antidumping” poli-cies and China’s managed currency float. Moreover, China’s currency is still not fully convertible; capital flows are managed; prices of staples such as water, electricity, and fuel are controlled; and well over 100,000 enterprises remain state-owned.

Although indications of a revival of economic nationalism abound, the most striking evidence is the failure of Doha Round of global trade talks that were begun in 2001. In Doha, it was agreed that negotiations would focus on freeing trade in agriculture and services, both contentious issues, with an eye toward reaching agreement by 2005. However, none of the three impedi-ments identified by Bergsten as preventing agreement, which requires WTO consensus, has been overcome: “massive current account imbalances and cur-rency misalignments pushing policy in dangerously protectionist directions in both the United States and Europe; the strong and growing antiglobaliza-tion sentiments that stalemate virtually every trade debate on both sides of the Atlantic and elsewhere; and the absence of a compelling reason for the political leaders of the chief holdout countries to make the necessary conces-sions to reach an agreement.”95 The “most contentious issue” involved agri-cultural subsidies in the developed world that prevent developing countries from selling their products overseas.96 Efforts to reach agreement collapsed in July 2006 as the United States and the Europeans failed to agree on agricul-tural subsidies and, in response, developing countries like Brazil refused to open their markets to developed countries’ manufactured goods and services. One view is that this outcome threatens “long-term damage to the notion of multilateralism.”97 However, others decry “the ‘bicycle theory’ of trade nego-tiations—the view that the trade regime can remain upright only with con-tinuous progress in liberalization.”98

Additional evidence of economic nationalism emerged with dramatic increases in grain and commodity prices in 2008. Confronted with domes-tic unrest, countries as varied as Ukraine, Argentina, Pakistan, India, and China99 reacted by imposing export taxes and export bans on grains and fertilizers thereby worsening food shortages elsewhere, especially in East Africa. In addition, cooperation in the face of global recession has been spotty. On the one hand, for instance, Germany has refused to adopt as vigorous fiscal-stimulus programs as other European governments. In con-trast Japan, South Korea, and China have agreed to cooperate closely in responding to recessionary strains.100

Finally, opposition in the United States to concluding bilateral trade agreements with countries such as Colombia and South Korea, along with unwillingness to make the hard decisions to rescue the Doha Round and the election of a president who has expressed skepticism about free trade, suggest that Washington is no longer willing to exercise leadership in main-


taining a liberal economic system. Without a hegemon to lead, economic liberalism may slow or even be reversed in some respects. Indeed, all of the elements in economic nationalism described above were exacerbated by the global financial and economic crisis that unfolded in 2008–2009.101

The question of whether globalization is reversible is linked to views of whether the globalization process is, on balance, beneficial or harmful. After all, globalization has “losers” as well as “winners,” and individuals everywhere are increasingly discovering that their welfare is determined by remote forces beyond their control or the control of their governments.

NoRmATIve ImPLICATIoNS of GLoBALIzATIoN

Globalization incites passionate supporters and critics. Many opponents of globalization reserve their highest loyalties to the sovereign state, which they believe exists to protect their interests. Globalization “challenges clearly defined national boundaries which have traditionally demarcated the basis on which individuals are included and excluded from participa-tion in decisions affecting their lives,” and states “are vehicles to achieve self-determination, which means that nationalism or the search for a lost identity becomes a solution to the privatizing effects of the market.”102 In particular, anti-globalizers argue that in democratic states, such as those in Europe and North America, citizens have a voice in determining their own fates but have little or no voice in the boardrooms of giant corporations, remote international bureaucracies like the EU or the WTO, or economic markets. In other words, globalization has created a “democratic deficit” by empowering institutions in which people have no voice and by unleashing economic and cultural forces over which people have no control. The result is growing alienation and anxiety, as people’s lives are buffeted by remote forces beyond their control or understanding.

Opponents denounce an era in which the rigors of the global market-place force countries and industries to shed jobs, reduce welfare programs, and become more efficient to survive in a cut-throat capitalist world. As Cerny argues: “The state itself—although still the most important single organization level and institutional structure in the world—has been trans-formed by and through the globalization process. . . . This transformation involves a fundamental shift of organizational goals and institutional pro-cesses within state structures themselves, as the ‘industrial welfare state’ has been replaced by the ‘competition state.’”103 If states lose authority, who will assume responsibility for welfare, uphold citizens’ rights, or tend to their economic needs and deliver justice? “No one,” answers anti-globalizers, certainly not the elite of corporate executives and shareholders who are the main beneficiaries of globalization. Thus,


An emerging community of scholarship is . . . focusing attention on whether the webs of monetary and financial interdependence now being so tightly woven together will someday constitute the sinews of new forms of governance beyond the territorial state. Simply put, is the raw power inherent in border-spanning capital markets . . . reconstructing fundamental political relations across the international system and creating a new kind of governing author-ity? If so, the sense of disquiet that global economic integration has long stimulated among domestic social reformers promoting equity and distributive justice becomes understandable. The legitimacy of such an order is at issue.104

The diverse range of international regimes that have emerged in recent decades is among the most important of these new forms of global gover-nance.105

According to critics, the operations of giant transnational conglomerates and financial institutions undermine national economic and social policies and, consequently, constitute a form of structural violence against the poor. International institutions like the IMF and the WTO serve corporate inter-ests, force countries to adopt policies that are not in citizens’ interests, and place harsh conditions on loans against which populations can only feebly protest. As events from the 1997–1998 “Asian contagion” to the 2008 col-lapse of subprime mortgage instruments suggest, huge and rapid move-ments of capital, often speculative in nature, can overwhelm central banks and may create financial volatility that threatens national and even global economic stability. Another consequence, it is argued, is greater inequality within and among countries.

Anti-globalizers also argue that the movement of investment capital to countries with poor environmental and labor standards threatens reduc-tions in living, working, and environmental conditions. In a globalized world, oligarchic corporations and banks scour the world for cheap labor, moving jobs from country to country, forcing workers into sweatshop con-ditions, using child labor, and destroying the environment in an effort to remain competitive in a “race to the bottom.” In sum, globalization threat-ens a reduction in the rights and responsibilities of citizenship, in the state’s capacity to ensure public welfare, and in the possibilities for serious demo-cratic participation.

Anti-globalizers decry the way in which the global economy and culture have homogenized distinctive local tastes, traditions, and even languages. Ancient cultures are giving way before the onslaught of a superficial “Coca Cola/McDonald’s/Levi’s Jeans” culture. This consumerist culture promotes individualism, narcissism, and greed; spreads pornographic and violent im-ages; and eats away at moral standards and religious beliefs. Some argue that globalization, as Kinnvall puts it, “is only another term for Western colonization and a buzzword to denote the latest phase of capitalism” with “no place” for “non-Western values have no place within this process.”106


Thus, ethnic, national, and religious groups bridle at the threat they per-ceive to their uniqueness, dignity, and values. If nation-states provided a measure of physical and psychological security for citizens, a clear identity, and a sense of belonging, globalized culture leaves a psychological void. “Citizens may respond to this crisis by turning to leaders who they hope will solve their problems of material deprivation, psychological uncertainty, and ideological absence.”107

Other consequences of globalization, according to opponents, are mas-sive migrations of people, who leave in search of jobs or to flee violence that disrupt communities, create cultural ghettos, and foster transnational criminal industries in drug smuggling and human trafficking, as desperate people seek work, and women become trapped in domestic or sexual slav-ery.108 In addition, globalization, it is argued, facilitates international terror-ism and global arms flows.

Advocates seem to be looking at a different world than globalization’s opponents. They view states as created to wage wars that benefit rulers but not citizens. Despite the spread of popular sovereignty, decisions about war and peace and the distribution of wealth, they believe, remain in the hands of ruling elites who cultivate and manipulate nationalism to rally followers over domestic woes. Pro-globalizers claim that nationalism erected barriers between peoples, stymied efforts to deal with global problems, and pro-duced ever bloodier wars. They applaud processes that erode the state, dis-solve the barriers of nationalism, and make people more prosperous and interdependent. As a result, the number of interstate wars is declining, and the human-rights abuses committed by governments are losing the protec-tion of state sovereignty.

Also, the forces of globalization are replacing ideologies that divided the world in the twentieth century with a single ideology based on liberal de-mocracy that will assure the “democratic peace.” Thus, international law has expanded to protect people rather than states. As publics come to recog-nize that states cannot deal with collective dilemmas like environmental degradation, they are placing their faith in NGOs and international institu-tions that can coordinate their activities, thereby enabling the world to cope with global challenges.

Despite inequality, the economic pie as a whole is growing, and global poverty is declining dramatically, notably in formerly impoverished re-gions such as Southeast Asia, China, and India. A global market with ever fewer barriers to trade provides consumers an unprecedented choice of increasingly inexpensive goods. Overall, globalization has been accompa-nied by sustained growth and has brought countless workers around the world new jobs and higher living standards. Losers are associated with obsolete or uncompetitive enterprises, but without losers, there could be no winners.


Pro-globalizers dismiss opponents as a mixture of Marxists who still hope to destroy capitalism; militant anarchists like the members of the Black Bloc; animal-rights activists and environmentalists who value snail darters more than jobs; labor unionists trying to keep alive industries that should peacefully die; and xenophobic nationalists.

Also, declare globalization’s proponents, the threat of cultural homogeni-zation is exaggerated. Local cultures can thrive alongside the global culture of modernity. Argues Latin American novelist Mario Vargas Llosa: “[C]on-trary to the warnings of those who fear globalization, it is not easy to com-pletely erase cultures . . . if behind them is a rich tradition and people who practice them, even in secret. And, today, thanks to the weakening of the nation-state, we are seeing marginalized, and silenced local cultures re-emerging and displaying dynamic signs of life in the great concert of this globalized planet.”109 Moreover, the defense of local cultures means the defense of reprehensible practices and conditions that should disappear, such as genital mutilation of women in Africa, the Muslim practice of po-lygamy, or the Indian caste system.

Pro-globalizers reject the criticism of modern technology, arguing that anti-globalizers are Luddites who reject modernity, ignoring the impact that such technologies play in expanding the global economy and widening political participation. More information creates an informed citizenry, makes it harder for politicians to mislead citizens, enhances democracy and the ability to mobilize in cyberspace that contribute to a diversity of views and the networking of NGOs for civil society. And, although a digital divide exists between rich and poor, new communications and transportation technologies such as mobile phones are speeding up economic develop-ment in poor countries.

Pro-globalizers view the decline of state sovereignty as a great achieve-ment. Sovereignty, they believe, legitimated a world in which states domi-nated war-making, economic policy-making, and even cultural and social policy. Yet, today’s trade is largely among transnational corporations or the subsidiaries of such corporations, and national economic units are no lon-ger compatible with markets. At present, the resources controlled by large corporations and banks, and by certain super rich individuals, dwarf the resources of most governments, and the wealth of large corporations ex-ceeds the gross domestic product of most countries.

Sovereignty should assure a state’s right to exist and its freedom from ex-ternal intervention. In fact, it often does not do so, and provides fewer privileges to states. Today, sovereignty tells us little about real states. The world’s two hundred states includes one superpower and a host of “mini-states” that are scarcely viable. Eighty-seven countries have fewer than 5 million inhabitants, fifty-eight have less than two-and-a-half million, and thirty-five fewer than 500,000.


Consider the dramatic contrast between the prosperous city-state of Sin-gapore and the state-like remains of Somalia, which features dozens of warring clans that engaged in looting and the terrorizing of citizens. In countries like Somalia, the idea of sovereignty is turned on its head; in-stead of providing citizens with security from foreign aggression by guard-ing the country’s borders, armed militias are the source of insecurity for citi-zens who desperately flee them by crossing those very borders. All in all, in recent decades sovereignty has offered little protection against military predation, amounting to what Robert Jackson calls “negative sovereignty,” that is, little more than protection for corrupt regimes in what Jackson calls “quasi-states.”110

Thus, there is a growing gap between the promise of sovereignty and the reality of global politics. With few exceptions, states are less autonomous and less able to protect or inspire citizens than at any time in recent centu-ries. Erosion of state institutions and frontiers is least evident in rich states in Europe, East Asia, and North America and most evident in poor post-colonial countries in Africa and Asia.

One response to claims of state erosion might be that citizens are pre-pared to die for their country but not for international or NGOs. Yet, it is hard to imagine citizens of modern states lining up as they did between 1914 and 1918 to join armies in battles that cost thousands of lives. In fact, readiness to die for a cause is found more frequently among ethnic or reli-gious minorities than among the ordinary citizens in most countries.

In sum, globalization is revolutionizing global politics. According to Switzerland’s 2009 KOF Index of Globalisation, globalization continues to thicken.111 It will have its ups and downs in coming years, but it is unlikely to be reversed barring a major global war or other catastrophe such as the collapse of the U.S. dollar and the global trade system.

DILemmAS fACING eAST ASIA

Overall, East Asian countries rank surprisingly low in terms of overall glo-balization. Of the 72 countries ranked by Foreign Policy in 2008, only Hong Kong was near the top (2nd globally), while Japan ranked 28th, Taiwan 37th, and China 66th.112 East Asia fared worse in the 2009 KOF Index. South Korea ranked 59th, Japan 70th, China 91st, South Korea 59th, Japan 70th, and North Korea 181st of the 208 entities in the survey.113 However, East Asia was home to some of the most globalized cities in the world; of the 60 major urban areas surveyed by Foreign Policy, Tokyo ranked 4th, Hong Kong 5th, Seoul 9th, and Beijing 12th.114

East Asia, as noted at the outset, is a leading regional beneficiary of eco-nomic globalization. Economic globalization has helped produce dramatic


reductions in overall poverty, but nowhere more so than in Asia. Between 1990 and 2002, the world’s poor, defined as those earning $1 or less per day, declined from 28 to 19 percent of the population of the developing world between. However, a high proportion of that reduction took place in one country—China—where 400 million people emerged from poverty. Intensifying economic interdependence is reflected in China’s enormous dollar reserves and the degree to which America’s trade deficits are financed by Chinese purchases of American securities.115

Huge amounts of foreign direct investment have flowed into East Asia, and China in particular has been the destination of ever more direct invest-ment by major transnational corporations (TNCs). Overall, East Asia is the leading regional recipient of FDI increasing by 19 percent in 2007 to $157 billion, and China, the recipient of some $84 billion in FDI,116 “is the most preferred investment location.”117 Moreover, increasingly investments in China, Hongkong, and Taiwan have shifted from low-cost and labor-intensive manufacturing to services and technologically sophisticated products.118 However, there has been a shift of FDI from East Asia to India and South-east Asia, although China and Hongkong remain the two largest regional recipients.119 FDI to South Korea “dropped for the third consecutive year” to “the lowest level since 1997” owing to “slower economic growth, high oil prices, appreciation of the won, and a decline in cross-border M&A sales.”120

In East Asia, as a whole, continuing globalization was reflected by the growing number of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Among emerging economies, Taiwan and Hong Kong account for the largest num-bers of transnational corporations, with China ranking third.121 Beijing and Shanghai alone host some 220 regional corporate headquarters,122 and sov-ereign wealth funds, for example, the China Investment Corporation with $200 billion in assets,123 have been created throughout Asia. East Asia, nota-bly Hongkong, has thus become a major source as well as recipient of FDI.

Chinese investments in raw material extraction in Africa and Asia, espe-cially in countries politically shunned by the West such as Sudan and Myan-mar, have attracted considerable public attention. Nowhere is globalizing China more visible than in Africa. In November 2006, China invited Afri-can leaders to Beijing, where President Hu Jintao announced a broad aid package including $5 billion in loans, debt relief, and technical assistance, and China has become Africa’s third largest trading partner after the United States and France, increasing from some $14 billion in 2000 to almost $40 billion in 2005, with estimates that it would reach $100 billion by 2010. China has invested heavily in infrastructure, including railroads in Nigeria and Angola, roadways in Rwanda, and Africa’s largest hydroelectric dam in Ethiopia. China’s interest in Africa is fueled by its appetite for fuel and raw materials. Angola and Sudan alone provide China with 25 percent of its oil


imports,124 and the dramatic rise in global commodity prices prior to the 2007–2008 global financial crisis was widely attributed to Chinese imports of raw materials to feed that country’s economic expansion.

In return for raw materials, China exports finished manufactured goods to Africa. In Kano, Nigeria, for example, numerous Chinese restaurants have appeared, a Chinese shoe factory employs over 2,000 workers, and Chinese products fill store shelves. Declared the owner of a Kano textile factory who had to cut his workforce dramatically: “Without a little protection, if the Chinese bring their finished cotton to Nigeria, you cannot compete with them. . . . The gap is so wide that if you just allow them to come in, you are killing Nigerian companies.”125

However, globalization entails trade-offs for East Asia. Economic inequal-ity is growing more evident in much of the region.126 Divisions between prosperous coastal and impoverished rural China threaten serious political and social unrest. Although economic globalization offers the prospect of rapid economic development, Selected personality traits, notably individu-alism,127 are needed to prosper in a neoliberal world, but entrepreneurial talent (as well as corruption) produces significant economic and social in-equality.

Globalized culture threatens what Sassen calls “denationalization.”128 Asian states have to contend with a growing population of ambitious, skilled, and self-confident individuals as well as a host of transnational NGOs, including those engines of globalization—transnational corpora-tions. Most importantly, states must cope with the exigencies of global markets. Thus, as Dittmer suggests, although opposition to economic glo-balization in Asia is relatively low, “Asian adoption of globalization has always been highly selective. The realm of ultimate values has typically been excepted, in part to preserve indigenous cultural traditions, partly in defer-ence to the interests of political and social elites. The result has been a dis-tinctively Asian hybrid of pell-mell economic globalization and political–cultural exceptionalism.”129

Concern about the impact of globalization, equated with Westernization, led some Asians to argue that their values were different than those of the West. Some have claimed that Western values, however useful in Europe and America, are unsuited to Asian conditions and violate Asian traditions. Western social values such as deregulation, weak unions, and a minimalist welfare state, some Asians still claim, are fundamentally incompatible with their own practices and traditional social values.130 As Guthrie suggests, “economic systems are themselves cultural systems, where learned practices and behaviors become embedded in the norms and rules by which indi-viduals operate over time.”131

Until the economic crisis of 1997–1998, East Asians had pursued a path to economic growth featuring a high degree of state involvement in eco-


nomic planning. As first Japan and then Asia’s newly industrializing coun-tries, especially South Korea and Taiwan, and finally the little tigers of Southeast Asia clawed their way from poverty to prosperity, Asian politi-cians began to speak of the superiority of “Asian values.” As articulated by regional leaders like Lee Kwan Yew, the Asian path to economic growth combined political authoritarianism with “managed” or state capitalism.

For many of Asia’s leaders, Western emphasis on individual liberty—a cornerstone of the liberal democracy—as essential to economic growth was mistaken. “I do not believe,” declared Lee, “that democracy necessar-ily leads to development. I believe that what a country needs to develop is discipline more than democracy.”132 While Westerners emphasized in-dividual freedom and prosperity, many East Asians remained loyal to so-cial values like equality of outcome that are associated with the teaching of Confucius. “Asian values,” in the words of one commentator “are dif-ferent in kind, not in degree. They are self-reliant, yet somehow commu-nitarian rather than individualistic; built on personal relationships and mutual obligation . . . respectful of authority and hierarchy; and state in-terventionist, even into the private space of individuals. The word that summed up this—in part self-contradictory—spirit was Confucianism.”133 Asian leaders emphasized “Confucian precepts of work, frugality, and hi-erarchy” that they believed, “underlie the dramatic economic growth achieved in East Asia by Japan in the 1970s and 1980s, the four ‘tigers’ (Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore) in the 1980s and mid-1990s, and the three aspiring tigers (Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia) until the middle of 1997.”134

The question of whether democracy characterizes governance in East Asia is contested. Some argue that democratic norms have accompanied eco-nomic globalization in East Asia but that these norms are different than those that underpin Western liberal democracy. “The notion that democ-racy is a peculiar Protestant Europe cultural project,” declares Edward Fried-man, “is belied by the strength of democracy all over Asia.”135 Friedman continues by observing that, although many Chinese contend that “au-thoritarian China is morally superior,” “this does not stop Chinese villagers from organizing and demonstrating for fair treatment, understood as insti-tutionalizing a politics where they have a political voice and leaders can be rendered accountable.”136 Guthrie argues that a gradual sequence of changes involving the growing autonomy of markets, declining communist control of workplaces, emergence of alternative careers in the private sector, and growing access to information, along with the evolving role of people’s congresses, local self-governance, reform-minded elites, and the impact of foreign economic penetration make democratization of China over time a virtual certainty.137 Regarding the authoritarian implications of Confucian-ism, Friedman responds that “South Korea, the most Confucian society in


the world is democratic.”138 So are Confucian-infused democratic Japan139 and Taiwan.” “Taiwan’s democracy is both as democratic and Taiwanese as Germany’s is German and democratic.”140

Dittmer argues that the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 gave the re-gion’s “hybrid globalizers their first sharp setback,”141 forcing elites to recon-sider many of the practices they had used to achieve rapid economic develop-ment. “The East Asian pattern of adaptation to globalization had been one-sided and partial, promoting exports while barring imports, grafting export-led growth onto continuing import substitution. . . .” Moreover,

The Asian values that had facilitated the Asian miracle were now seen to be a double-edged sword. The tight family structure that fostered achieve-ment-oriented socialization and a voluntary welfare safety net was also condu-cive to nepotism and cronyism. The bonds of community that underpinned social stability and civility also gave rise to corporatism, lack of transparency, and moral hazard. The respect for authority so conducive to industrial disci-pline also permitted blind obedience to elite corruption. Paradoxically, the same cultural values that made Asia the late twentieth century’s miracle of non-Western modernization suddenly seemed to be a grave liability, giving rise to a highly effective but clearly flawed form of capitalism.142

The degree to which Asian and Western values differ is hotly debated. Surveys conducted by Japan’s Dentsu Institute for Human Studies in Japan, China, South Korea, Thailand, Singapore, and India (1998) and in Britain, France, Germany, Sweden, and the United States (1997) suggest that Asian and Western values are less dissimilar than observers had thought and that Asians themselves differed significantly when asked about the relative im-portance of “financial wealth,” “acquiring high-quality goods,” “family re-lationships,” “success in work,” “mental relaxation,” “leisure activity,” “liv-ing for the present,” “striving to achieve personal goals,” and “having good relationships with others.” On only two of the nine dimensions of value measured were Asians and Westerners significantly different.143

CoNCLuSIoN

Interconnectedness, the essence of globalization, continues to intensify despite opposition. The spread of modern technologies continues to make national frontiers more porous and produces a “compression of the world and the intensification of the consciousness of the world.”144 In the words of Marc Williams: “It is this interpenetration of national societies which subverts the competence of national authorities and erodes their auton-omy,” while “the development of transnational networks and global au-thority structures dislocates and fractures national decision-making.”145


Although individual countries like Burma may opt out of globalization, the costs to do so will be high.

Problems associated with globalization—for example, the rapid spread of disease and economic crises, transnational crime, and migration from poor to wealthy societies—are likely to become more pressing. Recent history involving issues like global warming does not provide grounds for opti-mism about their solution. Several factors reflect continuing globalization.

States remain, but they have been thoroughly penetrated by global eco-nomic forces over which they have little control. In this world, governments have grown less significant than the global market. The global market, along with giant transnational corporations, distributes global resources and determines the well-being of individuals everywhere, sometimes for better and sometimes for worse.

For increasing numbers of people, especially those in business and poli-tics, national and communal identities have softened. What it means to be American, Canadian, or Chinese is less important than the opportunities available to individuals and previously marginalized groups. Migration continues despite efforts to manage it, especially in the West. Notwithstand-ing setbacks in countries from Venezuela and Russia to Thailand and Zim-babwe, democratic aspirations continue to spread and animate political life. In a world of multiple identities, people can retain subnational, na-tional, and transnational identities at the same time, although intrastate and interstate economic inequality and backlash against cultural homoge-nization and the erosion of traditional values and weakening of traditional elites will continue to mobilize opponents of globalization. Globalization’s greatest impact is already the developed world, and the growing gap be-tween rich and poor countries, the proliferation of failed states, and the spreading impact of ethnic and religious intolerance suggest that this will continue to be the case. In addition, the globalization process entails pre-venting a new economic depression and the proliferation of beggar-thy-neighbor policies and coping with the threats like transnational terrorism and large-scale migration from poor to rich countries.

To date, the institutions of globalization ranging from transnational cor-porations to international organizations have remained in reasonably good health despite American unilateralism, Russian and Chinese nationalism, and the resurgence of protectionism. A panoply of NGOs continue to pro-vide humanitarian relief and protection for civilians despite the opposition of authoritarian regimes like Putin’s in Russia. International organizations like the UN, the EU, and NATO, aided by a variety of NGOs and wealthy states, continue to intervene to restore peace or provide for the welfare of citizens living in countries that have failed or are in imminent danger of doing so, and the norms that underpin interstate and transnational col-laboration remain strong.


In coming years, however, these norms will be sorely tested by ethnic and religious “neotribalism” in regions such as Darfur, Bosnia, Congo, and Ti-bet. At present, it is not clear whether major states will have the political will or vision to oppose oppressive regimes such as those in Zimbabwe and Sudan or provide the wherewithal for international institutions to manage the use of force during civil strife. Thus, humanitarian intervention has been haphazard, depending on the attitude of major powers like the United States (which opposed declaring Rwanda the victim of Hutu genocide against Tutsis) and China (which opposed intervention in Darfur).

Such neotribalism makes Huntington’s vision of conflicting civilizations a real possibility, as well as Robert Kaplan’s apocalyptic vision of a world as dominated by “poverty, the collapse of cities, porous borders, cultural and racial strife, growing economic disparities, weakening nation states,” a world of “disease pandemics like AIDS, environmental catastrophes, orga-nized crime.”146 “I believe,” argues Kaplan, “that, for a number of reasons, we’re going to see the weakening, dilution, and perhaps even crackup of larger, more complex, modern societies in the next 10 or 15 years in such places as Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Pakistan”147 and that a combination of political upheavals, demographic factors, resource scarcity, and climate change will produce global chaos.

In Kaplan’s world of failed states and failed institutions, political author-ity has broken down, and local militias, criminal gangs, and religious ter-rorists roam freely. It is a Mad Max world of terrorists with nuclear weapons in suitcases, snipers on street corners, bioterror outbreaks, and resource scarcity. This despairing vision owes much to events like the terror attacks of al Qaeda, waves of suicide bombers in Israel and Iraq, the Washington D.C. Beltway sniper, the Bali nightclub bombing, and the acquisition of WMD by Iran, North Korea, and potentially even terrorist groups.

The kind of chaos described in this model is likely to afflict parts of the developing world like Somalia and Congo where a toxic combination of poverty, population growth, ecological disaster, and corruption foster state failure. Such conditions might usher in a revival of authoritarian solutions in reaction to popular anxiety. This was the path that publics in Germany, Italy, and Japan chose to follow after the Great Depression in what Eric Fromm described as their “escape from freedom.”148 It is the path taken by Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina in the 1970s. Contemporary Russia illustrates how creeping authoritarianism can occur as a way of restoring “order.”

As long as globalization does not rob states of their political indepen-dence, many governments will view events through the prism of the national interest, especially as long as territorial issues like those that divide India and Pakistan and Israel and the Palestinians persist. A more dangerous prospect would be heightened fear in the United States if it appeared that a rising state like China posed a serious challenge to American hegemony. Such an event


would challenge the global status quo and trigger a U.S. effort to increase its power. To date, both countries have recognized this danger and the con-straints imposed by their growing economic and political interdependence.

Global transformation and changing patterns of authority, identities, and resource distribution in any era provoke anxiety and instability. Whatever form it assumes, tomorrow’s world is likely to be complex and unpredict-able. This leads Kaplan to conclude that “We are not in control.”149 Complex-ity produces misunderstanding; misunderstanding creates unpredictability; unpre-dictability breeds instability; and instability threatens conflict. Political leaders are not, however, entirely helpless in the face of unpredictability. In the words of one observer of Asian politics: “Local actors do not remain passive targets and learners as transnational agents acting out a universal moral script to produce and direct norm diffusion in local politics. Local agents also produce norm diffusion by actively borrowing and modifying transna-tional norms in accordance with their preconstructed normative beliefs and practices,” and “norm-takers perform acts of selection, borrowing, and modification in accordance with a preexisting normative framework to build congruence between that and emerging global norms.”150

The rapid spread of financial and economic distress globally suggests that major economic outcomes remain the result of market forces that govern-ments can try to soften but cannot resist. Asia’s 1997 financial crisis was a foretaste of the present global crisis. The institutions of globalization, nota-bly the IMF, did not serve Asia well at that time, but the Asian economies recovered quickly and East Asia did not turn its back on globalization. Whether the current crisis will have a similar outcome remains to be seen, but East Asia’s experience with globalization and its stake in maintaining a liberal economic system suggest that, while it may seek a different institu-tional architecture in which it has a greater voice, it will not reject globaliza-tion in a wholesale way.

NoTeS

1. Regionalization has not taken root in East Asia because, as one observer ex-plains, of “modernization with insufficient globalization.” Gilbert Rozman, Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 7.

2. Peter Kien-hong YU, International Governance, Regimes, and Globalization: An East Asian Perspective (Boca Raton: BrownWalker Press, 2008), p. 76.

3. J. R. McNeill and William H. McNeill, The Human Web: A Bird’s Eye View of World History (New York: Norton, 2003).

4. Manuel Castells, The Rise of Network Society, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000).

5. Thomas L. Friedman, The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Cen-tury (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005).


6. Richard Florida, “The World Is Spiky,” Atlantic Monthly (October 2005), pp. 48–51.

7. Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).

8. James N. Rosenau, Along the Domestic–Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

9. During the second half of 2008, global trade experienced a significant de-cline led by the United States whose combined imports and exports dropped by 18 percent between July and November of that year. Kelly Evans, John W. Miller, and Mei Fong, “Global Trade Posts Sharp Decline,” Wall Street Journal, January 14, 2009, pp. A1, A10.

10. Lowell Dittmer, “The Twilight of Asian Exceptionalism,” in Catarina Kin-nvall and Kristina Jönsson, eds. Globalization and Democratization in Asia (New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 22.

11. Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Prince-ton University Press, 1999).

12. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992).

13. East Asia includes China, South and North Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. 14. See Loretta Chao and Andrew Batson, “China’s Small Factories Struggle,”

Wall Street Journal, January 31–February 1, 2009, p. A6, and Ian Johnson and An-drew Batson, “China’s Migrants See Jobless Ranks Soar,” Wall Street Journal, February 3, 2009, pp. A1, A10.

15. “The Second Long March,” The Economist, December 13, 2008, p. 30. For a sense of China’s immense role in the global economy, see James McGregor, One Billion Customers (New York: Free Press, 2005).

16. Doug Guthrie, China and Globalization (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 3. 17. Ronald Grigor Suny, “Provisional Stabilities: The Politics of Identities in

Post-Soviet Eurasia,” International Security, vol. 24, no. 3 (Winter 1999/2000), p. 144.

18. See, for example, A. Claire Cutler, “Locating ‘Authority’ in the Global Political Economy,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 43, no. 1 (March 1999), pp. 59–81.

19. Vivienne Shue, “China: from Heshang to Falun Gong,” in Kinnvall and Jöns-son, eds. Globalization and Democratization in Asia, p. 225.

20. David Held and Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton, “The Globalization Debate,” in Stuart Hall, David Held, and Tony McGrew, eds. Classic Readings and Contemporary Debates in International Relations, 3rd ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2006), pp. 547–570.

21. Tony McGrew, “A Global Society,” in Stuart Hall, David Held, and Tony McGrew, eds., Modernity, and Its Futures (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), pp. 13–14.

22. Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, and Perraton, “The Globalization Debate,” p. 549. 23. Ibid., p. 550. 24. Ibid., p. 554. 25. Ibid., p. 555. 26. Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier, pp. 99–117. 27. See Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, Remapping Global Politics:

History’s Revenge and Future Shock (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).


28. Naeem Inayatullah and David L. Blaney, International Relations and the Prob-lem of Difference (New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 191, 210.

29. Ibid., pp. 189, 191. 30. Douglas W. Blum, National Identity and Globalization: Youth, State, and Society

in Post-Soviet Eurasia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 161. 31. For the impact of the Internet and other information technologies in China,

see Guthrie, China and Globalization, pp. 282–286. 32. See Daniel W. Drezner and Henry Farrell, “Web of Influence,” Foreign Policy,

vol. 145 (November–December 2004), pp. 32–40. 33. James N. Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Conti-

nuity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 239. See also Rosenau, Distant Proximities: Dynamics beyond Globalization (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer-sity Press, 2003).

34. Philip G. Cerny, “What Next for the State?” in E. Kofman and G. Youngs, eds., Globalization: Theory and Practice (London: Pinter, 1996), pp. 124–125. See also Rodney Bruce Hall and Thomas J. Biersteker, eds., The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

35. Blum, National Identity and Globalization, pp. 76, 192. 36. Philip G. Cerny, Georg Menz, and Susanne Soederberg, “Different Roads to

Globalization: Neoliberalism, the Competition State, and Politics in a More Open World,” in Soederberg, Menz, and Cerny, eds., Internalizing Globalization: The Rise of Neoliberalism and the Decline of National Varieties of Capitalism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 1–2. Emphasis added.

37. Benjamin Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism Are Reshap-ing the World (New York: Times Books, 1995), p. 23.

38. Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005), p. 13.

39. Blum, National Identity and Globalization, p. 74. 40. Mike Featherstone, Undoing Culture: Globalization, Postmodernism and Identity

(London: Sage, 1995), p. 102. 41. Peter Kien-hong Yu points out that “there are many Chinese characters that

cannot find their equivalent in English.” International Governance, Regimes and Glo-balization, p. 80.

42. Michael Talalay, “Technology and Globalization: Assessing Patterns of Inter-naction,” in Randall D. Germain, ed., Globalization and Its Critics (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), p. 220.

43. Stephen Baker and Inka Resch, with Kate Carlisle and Katharine A. Schmidt, “The Great English Divide,” in Business Week Online, August 13, 2001. www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/01_33/b3745009.htm.

44. Talalay, “Technology and Globalization,” p. 211. 45. Blum, National Identity and Globalization, p. 163. 46. David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton,

Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univer-sity Press, 1999), pp. 69–70.

47. “The Globalization Index,” Foreign Policy 163 (November/December 2007), pp. 70–71. However, by almost any measure such as receipt or export of FDI, corpo-rate mergers and acquisitions, or entry into the WTO China is rapidly globalizing.


See Guthrie, China and Globalization, pp. 316–329. He concludes (p. 330) that “all indications are that China’s growth will continue to integrate the country into the global economy.”

48. “The Second Long March,” p. 31. See also Guthrie, China and Globalization, pp. 257–303.

49. Blum, National Identity and Globalization, p. 184. However, Blum notes that “arguments in favor of democracy tend to be couched in neoliberal terms, as being inseparable from the market and individualist values” (p. 81); democracy, in other words is a precondition for economic development.

50. John Keane, Global Civil Society? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 62.

51. Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights, p. 269. Emphasis added. 52. See, for example, Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond

Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998) and Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

53. Hugo Dobson, “Social movements and society in Japan,” in Kinnvall and Jönsson, eds. Globalization and Democratization in Asia, p. 146, 147.

54. Guthrie, China and Globalization, p. 271. 55. Philip G. Cerny, “Globalization and Other Stories: Paradigmatic Selection in

International Politics,” in Axel H. lsemeyer, ed., Globalization in the Twenty-first Cen-tury: Convergence or Divergence? (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2003), p. 65. Pio-neering enquiries into transgovernmental politics include Robert W. Russell, “Trans-national Interaction in the International Monetary System, 1960–1972,” International Organization, vol. 27, no. 4 (Autumn 1973), pp. 431–464; C. Robert Dickerman, “Transnational Governmental Challenge and Response in Scandinavia and North America,” International Organization, vol. 30, no. 2 (Spring 1976), pp. 213–240; Raymond F. Hopkins, “The International Role of ‘Domestic’ Bureaucracy,” Interna-tional Organization, vol. 30, no. 3 (Summer 1976), pp. 405–432; and Robert O. Keo-hane, “The International Energy Agency: State Influence and Transgovernmental Politics,” International Organization, vol. 32, no. 4 (Autumn 1978), pp. 929–951.

56. Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights, p. 298. Another area of transgovernmental bureaucratic cooperation is in civil liberties. See Abraham L. Newman, “Building Trans-national Civil Liberties: Transgovernmental Entrepreneurs and the European Data Pri-vacy Directive,” International Organization, vol. 62, no. 1 (Winter 2008), pp. 103–130.

57. Peter J. Taylor, “The Modern Multiplicity of States,” in Eleonore Kofman and Gillian Youngs, eds., Globalization: Theory and Practice (London: Pinter, 1996), pp. 117–118.

58. Cerny, Menz, and Soederberg, “Different Roads to Globalization,” p. 1. 59. Catarina Kinnvall, “Analyzing the Global-Local Nexus,” in Kinnvall and

Jönsson, eds. Globalization and Democratization in Asia, p. 4. Emphasis in original. 60. Peter Kien-hong YU, International Governance, Regimes, and Globalization, pp.

79–80. 61. Niall Ferguson, “Sinking Globalization,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 84, no. 7 (De-

cember 2005), pp. 64–77. 62. Held, et al., Global Transformation, p. 17.


63. Ibid., pp. 16–20. 64. The EU is already something of an anomaly of a globalizing era. The Euro-

pean Union, writes Stephen Krasner, “has territory, recognition, control, national authority, extranational authority, and supranational authority. . . . Is it a state, a commonwealth, a dominion, a confederation of states, a federation of states?” Sov-ereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 235. Held, et al. conclude that “it is best described neither as an international re-gime nor as a federal state, but as a network of states involving the pooling of sov-ereignty.” Global Transformations, p. 74.

65. “Measuring Globalization,” Foreign Policy, vol. 141 (March/April 2004), pp. 58–59.

66. “The Globalization Index,” pp. 70–71. 67. Walker Connor, “Beyond Reason: The Nature of the Ethnonational Bond,”

in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, eds., Ethnicity (Oxford: Oxford Univer-sity Press, 1996), p. 70.

68. Daniel P. Moynihan, Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 174.

69. “Obama’s World,” The Economist, November 8, 2008, p. 34. 70. Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,

1993), p. 3. 71. Roman Szporluk, “Thoughts about Change: Ernest Gellner and the History

of Nationalism,” in John A. Hall, ed., The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 27.

72. Woodrow Wilson, “Appeal for Support of the League of Nations at Pueblo, Colorado,” in Mario DiNunzio, ed., Woodrow Wilson: Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President (New York: NYU Press, 2006), p. 415.

73. Cited in David Binder, with Barabara Crossette, “As Ethnic Wars Multiply, U.S. Strives for a Policy,” New York Times, February 7, 1993, query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F0CEFD9113AF934A35751C0A965958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all.

74. James N. Rosenau, Distant Proximities: Dynamics beyond Globalization (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), p. 107.

75. Ibid. 76. Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts

(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996). 77. Cited in Binder, “As Ethnic Wars Multiply.” 78. Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University

of California Press, 2000), pp. 186, 197. 79. Jonathan Di John, “Conceptualising the Causes and Consequences of Failed

States: A Critical Review of the Literature,” Development as State-Making, no. 25 (January 2008), Crisis States Research Centre, se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=ISN&fileid=E23CB, p. 10.

80. Robert I. Rothberg, “The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair,” in Rothberg, ed., When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), p. 5.

81. “The Failed State Index 2008,” Foreign Policy, vol. 167 (July/August 2008), p. 67.


82. Tariq Modood, “Introduction: The Politics of Multiculturalism in the New Europe,” in Modood and Prina J. Werbner, eds., The Politics of Multiculturalism in the New Europe: Racism, Identity and Community (London: Zed Books, 1997), p. 1.

83. Robert S. Leiken, “Europe’s Angry Muslims,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 84 no. 4 (July/August 1995), p. 122.

84. Ibid., p. 120. 85. Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for

Muslim and Western Publics” (July 14, 2005), pewglobal.org/reports/display.php? ReportID=248.

86. Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries Top Con-cerns about Religious and Cultural Identity” (June 6, 2006), pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=254.

87. Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005).

88. Ibid., p. 221. 89. Ibid., p. 247. 90. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of World Order (New

York: Simon & Schuster 1996). Huntington especially fears a “Confucian–Islamic con-nection” (p. 188) reflected in Chinese and North Korean nuclear and conventional arms transfers to Iran and Pakistan

91. Cerny, “What Next for the State?” p. 124. Cerny’s competition state is echoed by Philip Bobbitt’s “market-state” (The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History [New York: Random House, 2003]), p. 211.

92. Cerny, “Globalization and Other Stories,” p. 65. 93. Andreas Osiander, “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the West-

phalian Myth.”International Organization, vol. 55, no. 2 (Spring 2001), p. 283. 94. Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear (New York: Columbia University Press,

2008), p. 252. 95. C. Fred Bergsten, “Rescuing the Doha Round,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 84, no. 7

(December 2005), www.foreignaffairs.org/20051201faessay84702/c-fred-bergsten/r, p. 1. See also Alan Tonelson, “The Real Lessons in the Doha Round’s Failure,” AmericanEconomicAlert (August 15, 2006), www.americaneconomicalert.org/view_art.asp?Prod_ID=2537.

96. Arvind Panagariya, “Liberalizing Agriculture” Foreign Affairs, vol. 84, no 7 (December 2005), www.foreignaffairs.org/20051201faessay84706/arvind-pana-gariya/liberalizing-agriculture.html, p. 4.

97. Peter D. Sutherland, “Correcting Misperceptions,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 84, no. 7 (December 2005), www.foreignaffairs.org/20051201faessay84705/peter-d-sutherland/correcting-misperceptions.html, p. 1.

98. Dani Rodrik, “Don’t Cry for Doha,” Policy Innovations, August 19, 2008, www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/commentary/data/000077. See also Philip G. Cerny, “Thinking Outside the Bicycle: Shifting Gears on Global Trade Talks,” Policy Innovations, December 10, 2008, www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/commentary/data/000097.

99. China imposed controls on food prices in January 2007 but lifted them in December 2008.

100. “Asian giants agree economic plan,” BBC News, December 13, 2008, news .bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7781027.stm.


101. See, for example, Neil King Jr., Alistair MacDonald, and Marcus Walker, “Cri-sis Fuels Backlash On Trade,” Wall Street Journal, January 31–February 1, 2009, pp. A1, A6, and Bob Davis and Carrick Mollenkamp, “Financial Protectionism Is Latest Threat to Global Recovery,” Wall Street Journal, February 2, 2009, p. A2.

102. Kinnvall, “Analyzing the Global-Local Nexus,” p. 14.103. Cerny, “Globalization and Other Stories,” pp. 63–64.104. David M. Andrews, C. Randall Henning, and Louis W. Pauly, “Monetary

Institutions, Financial Integration, and Political Authority,” in David M. Andrews, C. Randall Henning, and Louis W. Pauly, eds., Governing the World’s Money (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), p. 10. Emphasis added.

105. Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), and Oran R. Young, International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univer-sity Press, 1989).

106. Kinnvall, “Analyzing the Global-Local Nexus,” p. 6. 107. Ibid., p. 13.108. For an analysis of female migration in and from Asia and of the efforts of

regional governments to cooperate around the issue, see Nana Oishi, Women in Mo-tion: Globalization, State Policies, and Labor Migration in Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005).

109. Mario Vargas Llosa, “The Culture of Liberty,” Foreign Policy, vol. 112 (January/February 2001), pp. 66–71.

110. Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Jackson argues that, even if there is an abyss between reality and aspiration, sovereignty does provide states with a degree of legitimacy denied other actors.

111. KOF Swiss Economic Institute, “KOF Index of Globalisation 2009” (January 27, 2009), www.kof.ethz.ch/news/.

112. “The Globalization Index,” pp. 70–71.113. Hong Kong and Taiwan are not among the countries ranked in the KOF In-

dex. The index is an aggregation of economic, social, and political indicators, and the East Asian countries ranked highest in political globalization and lowest in eco-nomic globalization. globalization.kof.ethz.ch/static/pdf/rankings_2009.pdf.

114. “The 2008 Global Cities Index,” Foreign Policy, vol. 169 (November/Decem-ber 2008), p. 70.

115. Guthrie, China and Globalization, p. 7.116. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Re-

port 2008: Transnational Corporations and the Infrastructure Challenge, Part I, www.unctad .org/en/docs/wir2008p1_en.pdf, p. 47.

117. Ibid., p. 33.118. Ibid., p. 51.119. Ibid., p. 8.120. Ibid., p. 47.121. Ibid., p. 29.122. Ibid., p. 47.123. Ibid., p. 50.124. Jill McGivering, “China’s Growing Focus on Africa,” BBC News, January 17,

2006, news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4619956.stm; Peter Ford, “China Woos African


Trade,” Christian Science Monitor, November 3, 2006, p. 1, 4; Craig Timberg, “From Competitors to Trading Partners: Africans Adjust as Business Ties with China Grow,” Washington Post, December 3, 2006, A23.

125. “From Competitors to Trading Partners.” 126. For a contrary view in the context of Asia, see Machiko Nissanke and Erik

Thorbecke, eds., Globalization and the Poor in Asia: Can Shared Growth Be Sustained? (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2007).

127. There is concern, however, that excessive individualism may produce “social atomization.” Blum, National Identity and Globalization, p. 88.

128. Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights, pp. 13–14.129. Dittmer, “The twilight of Asian exceptionalism,” p. 22.130. For a balanced analysis of this issue, see Takashi Inoguchi and Edward New-

man, “Introduction: ‘Asian Values’ and Democracy in Asia,” Proceedings of 1997 First Shizuoka Asia–Pacific Forum: The Future of the Asia–Pacific Region, www.unu.edu /unupress/asian-values.html.

131. Guthrie, China and Globalization, p. 16. Emphasis in original.132. Cited in “Asia’s Different Drum,” Time, June 14, 1993, 18.133. C.O. Khong, “Asian Values: The Debate Revisited,” Proceedings of 1997 First

Shizuoka Asia–Pacific Forum: The Future of the Asia–Pacific Region. www.unu.edu /unupress/asian-values.html.

134. Charles Wolf, Jr., “Are ‘Asian Values’ Really Unique?” Hoover Institution, Hoover Digest, no. 2, (2000), www.hooverdigest.org/002/wolf.html.

135. Edward Friedman, “On Alien Western Democracy,” in Kinnvall and Jöns-son, eds. Globalization and Democratization in Asia, p. 54.

136. Ibid., p. 56.137. Guthrie, China and Globalization, pp. 276–303. “A totally democratic sys-

tem,” Guthrie concludes, “may be decades down the road, but the party is now at a point where there is no turning back” (p. 303), and “a rule-of-law society is emerg-ing in China” (p. 22, also pp. 217–255).

138. For a more critical version of South Korean “democracy,” see Geir Helgesen, “Imported democracy: The South Korean experience,” in Kinnvall and Jönsson, eds., Globalization and Democratization in Asia, pp. 73–91. Helgesen describes South Ko-rean democracy as “strongly supported, yet weak in practice” (p. 74), and he con-cludes that “the present, commonly shared social morality in Korea does not sup-port a liberalist version of democracy which hails individual freedom, freedom of choice, and political pluralism as the supreme good” (p. 88).

139. By contrast, Hugo Dobson approvingly quotes Chalmers Johnson’s description of the Japan’s political process as one of “soft authoritarianism” in which bureaucracy is the chief political actor. Dobson, “Social Movements and Society in Japan,” p. 132.

140. Friedman, “On Alien Western Democracy,” pp. 58, 59. Emphasis in original. 141. Dittmer, “The Twilight of Asian Exceptionalism,” p. 22.142. Ibid., pp. 34–35.143. Khong, “Asian Values: The Debate Revisited.”144. Roland Robertson, Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture (London:

Sage Publications, 1992), p. 8.145. Marc Williams, “Rethinking Sovereignty,” in Kofman and Youngs, eds. Glo-

balization, p. 117.


146. Robert D. Kaplan, The Ends of the Earth: From Togo to Turkmenistan, from Iran to Cambodia, a Journey to the Frontiers of Anarchy (New York: Vintage Books, 1996), p. 436.

147. “Mr. Order Meets Mr. Chaos,” Foreign Policy, vol. 124 (May/June 2001), p. 54.148. Erich From, Escape from Freedom (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1941).149. Kaplan, The Ends of the Earth, p. 436. Emphasis in original.150. Amitav Acharya, “How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localiza-

tion and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism,” International Organization, vol. 58, no. 2 (Spring 2004), p. 269.


181

9Universality Claims and “Failures” across Cultures: Liberalism vs. Asian ValuesJames C. HSIUNG

INTRoDuCTIoN

This chapter is concerned with two highly elusive questions: (a) How certain gems of ideas or theories acclaimed in the West to be universally true should fail to have their validity vindicated in another cultural context such as in much of Eastern Asia;1 and (b) Why they failed the way they did. Un-doubtedly, the latter (the Why) is even more elusive than the former (the How), although neither one is an easy task to tackle. I am aware that to try to do so is to sail into largely uncharted and even stormy waters. But, I am willing to brave the storm because of the theoretical importance of the sub-ject and the possible intellectual payoff of the undertaking.

At the outset, I must make it clear that this chapter does not question the wisdom of the quest for certain transcendental principles that may attest to some universal human aspirations. Rather it is guided by a curiosity over whether any set of principles, ideas, or institutions developed in one cultural context, no matter how sensible and preferable within it, can expect to have the same meanings and appeal (including explanatory power) in another cultural context, and if the answer is no, Why no.

More specifically, under scrutiny is the puzzle confronting the apparent “failures” of the universal validity of certain keystone Western ideas when introduced, for example, into the cultural context of nations imbued with what critics pejoratively call “Asian values.”2 I am referring to such keystone Western ideas as liberal democracy (more particularly the democratic the-ory of development) and laissez faire economics, here lumped together under the general rubric of “liberalism,” as the title suggests. “Failures,” as used in this discussion, include the instances in which the promises or pre-

182 James C. HSIUNG

scriptions inherent in the democratic theory of development or laissez faire economics were not borne out, or were even proven false, in the course of events in the Asian region over time.

In order to trace the gestalt of the modern Asian values, I will go back to their roots in the classical formation and evolution of Confucianism in China, which left off indelible far-reaching effects throughout the Sinic circles of nations long before the coming of the Western colonialists—and have continued on long after their departure. In doing so, I hope to be able to find a way that will illuminate why the said Western ideas failed to make good in the region of our study. Ultimately, I will try to build an inchoate cognitive model of the Confucian roots of the Asian values, in order to ascertain why the said Western keystone ideas failed either in presaging the course of events or in guiding their unfolding. I will attempt to explore the corresponding question of how the so-called Asian values have helped shape the modern, postcolonial developments in the vast array of societies ranging from East Asia (China, Japan, the two Koreas, and Taiwan) to southeast Asia (or ASEAN-9, sans Myanmar, formerly known as Burma).3 The methodology so used, I hope, will prove to be of some use in a larger study of problems of transplanting Western ideas, theories, or institutions across different cultural and, hence, societal, contexts. First of all, I shall provide some concrete ex-amples of what I meant by “failures” used in this discussion.

emPIRICAL fAILuReS of uNIveRSALITy CLAImS: Some exAmPLeS

It is customary in the West to assume that the validity of such keystone ideas as democracy and laissez faire economics transcends all bounds, cultural or societal. At the empirical level, especially in a non-Western milieu, however, these noble wishes may oftentimes remain what they are, namely: noble wishes. I choose to examine the universality of these cardinal Western ideas not because I have any doubts about them per se, but because their as-sumed universality is rarely questioned in the West. Methodologically speaking, I am using the Asian region as a testing ground. Below are a num-ber of examples of “failed” universality claims.

Until in recent decades, a prevailing view in the West, echoing the origi-nal suggestion of Max Weber, was that China’s Confucian legacy would hamper the nation should it attempt to catch up with the West economi-cally. Weber (1951: 229–232), reputedly the father of modern Western so-cial science, took an unreservedly dim view of Confucian ethic, as con-trasted to the Protestant ethic. He found the dominant teachings of Confucianism—though rationalistic in form—lacking “an ethical prophecy of a supra-mundane God” and thus without “an inward core, of a unified

way of life flowing from some central and autonomous value position.” Without the “religiously systematized utilitarianism” of the Protestant faith, Weber found Chinese enterprises to lack the compulsive urge to reinvest earnings as in a truly capitalist system (p. 248). Besides, he found that the Confucian emphasis on harmony did not adequately prepare the Chinese for a competitive mode of life in the capitalistic world.

Therefore, Weber divined that China would be ill-equipped, in the lan-guage of his day, to adopt capitalism and make it flourish. To translate it into modern-day English, it means that China because of the influence of its Confucian legacy would not be able to achieve economic development in similar ways as the West. It is noteworthy that Weber did not think it was the country (China), so much as its culture (the Confucian values), that presented an obstacle to economic development. Hence, China’s neighbors that were likewise tainted by the Confucian ethic would share the same fate of nondevelopment.

Ironically, despite Weber’s prognostication to the contrary, a World Bank study (1993) identified eight Asian societies4 (including China) as the “high performance” economies constituting a special region, not dupli-cated elsewhere, following their sustained “miraculous” growth for decades on end. Among other reasons, the World Bank attributed their phenomenal success to government “intervention” with its typical “macro-management” (rather than laissez faire economics) plus high savings and reinvestment rates (contrary to Weber’s view). Not only did this region of Asian high-performance economies outstrip all other regions, it also achieved some-thing not quite found in the history of rapid economic growth, namely “growth with equity” (that is, free of the severe widening gaps of income distribution that plagued other regions or countries going through rapid economic growth). The World Bank eschewed any mention of precondi-tions or cultural overhead, but made vague references to factors like “creat-ing human capital” (p. 43ff) and upholding “cognitive skills” (p. 70ff), al-though without explicitly linking them to the region’s Asian values that put special premium on education. Other analysts were more explicit. Herman Kahn (1979: 121–123), the late guru of the Hudson Institute, for example, identified the ultimate source of the economic success of the four Asian “Tigers”—South Korea, Taiwan, Hongkong, and Singapore—as their shared “cultural heritage,” referring to their common linkage to the Confucian legacy. The unasked question remains: Was Weber wrong?

During the 1960s, when former Western colonies, exercising their newly found right of self-determination, were crossing the threshold of statehood en mass, well-meaning Western scholars and aid officials alike collectively echoed a common warning to the effect that without prior political devel-opment (a code word for democracy) there cannot be economic develop-ment (prosperity).5 A rare dissent to this literature came from David Apter

Universality Claims and “Failures” across Cultures 183

(1965), who cautioned that the new nations in the developing world should not be expected to see democracy at work until they had first gained economic stability and begun to industrialize, thus reversing the sequence endorsed by the mainstream academics.

Now, four and a half decades later, what have we learned about the rela-tionship between political development and economic development? Ashutosh Varshney (2000) conducted a survey of the “long-standing de-mocracies in the developing world” in three continents, and found that all of them “failed to eliminate poverty.” In other words, those new, postcolo-nial nations in his study that had an early head-start on democratization (political development)6 failed dismally in their economic performance. Contrary to what the mainstream Western academics had preached, politi-cal development (democracy) did not spawn economic development (pros-perity) in the postcolonial world. I would add that the high-performance economies in the Asian region, on the other hand, followed a very different path, and had very different results. In two of the Asian Tigers, the sequence was just the reverse. South Korea and Taiwan opened up to democracy only after, not before, achieving their miraculous economic success. Hongkong remained until 1997 a British colony and, as such, did not have a demo-cratic system. But the absence of democracy did not hamper Hongkong in its economic achievements. Singapore, the remaining member in the Asian Tigers group, is a country known for its rule by law, but not rule of law. Thus far, democracy has eluded the Singaporean economic power house.

The most notable challenge to the Western democratic theory of develop-ment is China, whose economy increased over eight-fold in twenty-five years since 1978 and continues to grow at a 9.6 percent clip or even better annually. It was the only economy that withstood the ravaging attack of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–1999 almost totally unscathed. Yet, without a doubt, it is the country that has the least to show for democratic creden-tials, although concededly elections were introduced at the village level, again following, not preceding, its initial economic advances.

Throughout the Asian region, to reiterate, none of the high-performance economies identified by the World Bank showed evidence that prior politi-cal development (democracy) was a precondition for achieving stunning economic progress, defying what countless Western pundits had prescribed for the developing world since the 1960s. Critics might retort that postwar Japan’s fast track to an economic superpower status is a glowing example that bailed out the mainstream Western developmental theory. I must say that before we make Japan a glowing example of the democracy-qua-pros-perity thesis, we have to examine a few crucial factors related to Japan’s saga of economic success, which, because of its importance, will be discussed in a separate section below. For now, let us continue with another example of “failed” universality claims.

184 James C. HSIUNG

During the second half of 1997, when a financial crisis hit the Asian re-gion, nearly all the vibrant Asian economies were sent tumbling down, with the sole exception of China. In a few weeks, their once-strong currencies faced a sordid meltdown. The severity of the crisis can be fully appreciated only in a comparative perspective. During the Great Depression of 1929–1932, the assets of Standard and Poor’s 500 fell by 87 percent. During the Asian crisis, the asset value crash ranged from 75 to 85 percent in South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand (Prybyla 2000; Hsiung 2001: 79). Immediately, nearly every critic in the West blamed the trouble on Asian “crony capitalism.” A swarm of sarcastic laments and gloating denunciations greeted the temporary misfortune of the Asian tigers and cubs. The former optimists and “apologists” for the Asian miracle were shut up like the pro-verbial cicada in the winter. Instead, all that could be heard was the “I told you so” refrain from Western commentators who apparently had bottled-up contempt for the Asian model of economic dynamism all along. Among the Western media and community of economists, there was a chorus of despair, nay, ridicule, but not a single word of consolation, let alone a cool-headed plea for suspending final judgment until more was known about what hap-pened. Christopher Patten (1999), the bitter last British governor of Hong-kong before it was returned to China in 1997, could hardly wait to rub it in with a petulant, in a way self-serving, book celebrating “that all the tigers are skinned and stuffed.” But, alas, the Patton and Co. did not have the last laugh. In just two years, the Asian economies shook off the bite of the finan-cial crisis, stunning even the International Monetary Fund, which had an-ticipated years, if not decades, of suspense before these economies could ever hope to regain their vibrancy again. While the story of their relatively speedy recovery is the concern of chastened economists (cf. Yu and Xu 2001), our interest here is in the non-laissez faire strategy that the Asian na-tions adopted in coping with the ferocious assault, pulling themselves from the brink of collapse, and repositioning themselves to rise again.

We shall not waste time on the intricate origins of the Asian financial crisis, except to note that contrary to the assertions of the critics of Asian “crony capitalism,” the crisis was largely precipitated by exogenous sources following a series of similar currency crises that began in Europe (1992–1993) and later hit Latin America (1994–1995). The culprit was globalized capital creating a casino syndrome (hot money in and hot money out). Manipulations by the predatory international currency dealers and mammoth hedge funds out to make a kill, at the victim nations’ expense, made the attack more devastating. I have summarized the results of an extensive study of the subject in an earlier study (Hsiung 2001: 81–84). But, here, I think we should be concerned with how the government intervened, employing a strategy of control forbidden to teachings of laissez faire economics, in each and every Asian nation that successfully fenced off the rapacious onslaughts of the financial crisis. The


successful outcome of government intervention as such, which flew in the face of the pleadings of laissez faire economics for more liberalization, in-stead of control, deserves our scrutiny.

CoNTRoL, NoT moRe LIBeRALIzATIoN: how ASIAN NATIoNS fouGhT off The fINANCIAL CRISIS

Laissez faire economists, in condemning the Asian nations for their “crony capitalism,” were laying the blame for the financial crisis at these nations’ door step, for the simple reason that their economies were not liberalized enough—thus, they had to pay for their own sins. But, from the Asian na-tions’ point of view, unguarded liberalization unduly exposed their domes-tic stock and assets markets to both the ravaging effects of the casino syn-drome created by globalized capital and the manipulations by professional international currency speculators. For any nation to indulge in more liber-alization in the face of the ongoing financial crisis would incur greater dam-age beyond repair. Hence, they chose an opposite tack. And, the key word of the day was control, not more liberalization.

Malaysia, for example, which had been among the most open economies on the capital account, went the furthest among the crisis victims in rein-troducing capital controls, taking a leaf from China’s standing system. Be-ginning in August 1998, its exchange controls removed the Malaysian ring-git from international currency trading. The new system made the ringgit convertible on the current account, as before, but not on the capital ac-count. It thus prevented the buying of foreign exchange for speculative purposes. Holders of offshore ringgit accounts were given one month’s time to repatriate their riggits, after which repatriation would be illegal. Thus, contrary to fears of capital flight, imposition of exchange controls as such—a taboo to laissez faire theory—yielded a short-term, debt-free, mea-sured capital inflow (Wade 1998: 367; World Bank 2000: 32f). Other Asian economies followed suit. True to the same principle, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, etc., each in its own way introduced or reintroduced measures of currency control (Hsiung 2001: 84–86). In Hongkong, for example, the government intervened to fend off imminent attacks on the Heng Seng In-dex futures of the local stock market and the foreign exchange market. The immediate purpose was to ease pressure on the Hongkong dollar, which is pegged to the U.S. dollar. On one single day, August 14, 1998, the govern-ment bought about 6 percent of the stock market, infusing enormous amounts of cash and acquiring a government stake in the private sector (including shares of thirteen leading companies). Despite criticisms that the act contravened Hongkong’s laissez faire tradition, the intervention pushed up the Heng Seng Index by 564 points, a rise of 8.5 percent. The

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rally had immediate global impact, for instance, on the London and New York stock exchanges (Kueh 2000: 249).

In Taiwan, the policy response was to insulate the New Taiwan (NT) dol-lar, by barring foreign short-term investors while encouraging local inves-tors. In a measure allowing the authorities to control demand for the cur-rency, central bank approval was required for inflows of funds destined for the stock market. The offshore market in NT dollars was also closed. In ad-dition, the government established four stabilization funds, one of them alone totaling US$16.3 billion, designed to stave off any turbulence, be-yond a certain level, in the stock market driven by external attacks by for-eign speculators (New York Times, 14 March 2000, p. 10).

South Korea, where some capital account restrictions had been in place on the convertibility of the won, likewise became much more intervention-ist, although the government did not impose Malaysian-type exchange controls. In the financial sector, the government moved fast to buy up bad loans from the banks and forced small banks to merge with larger ones (Wade 1998: 368f). The government adopted tighter monetary and fiscal policies and accepted slower growth to keep inflation below 5 percent of GDP (Sikorski 1999: 120). Like elsewhere, these were measures taken with a view to enhancing government controls, contrary to the structural reforms that Western critics had urged.7

As a perceptive but nonorthodox commentator (Wade 1998: 369–370) observed, these financial controls, installed in the nick of time, were badly needed for two reasons: (a) to protect against excessive inflows of foreign capital, especially short-term loans (i.e., the casino effects); and, more im-portant, (b) to make the fairly open economies in the Asian region “less vulnerable to the whims and stampedes of portfolio and hedge fund man-agers, and to reestablish stable growth” following the whirlwind of the fi-nancial crisis.

The ultimate lesson learned from a somber scrutiny of the Asian financial crisis reveals a tale of two sides on the shibboleth of free market (and liberal-ization). Other than its intrinsic value, the idea of free market can be used as a weapon by an offensive side to pry open the target nations’ domestic mar-kets (i.e., liberalization). But, the latter nations, being on the defensive, often have to cover their flanks. Under the pall of the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1999, prudence called for protective controls of one’s own markets against the offensive attacks unleashed by the combination of the casino ef-fects of globalized capital and the willful manipulations by international currency dealers. The defensive game hence called for less, not more, liberal-ization. This point helps place in proper perspective the more recent (sum-mer 2005) U.S. Congressional action in blocking an $18 billion bid by the Chinese National Overseas Oil Corporation (CNOOC) to acquire UNOCAL, described by the media as a fourth-echelon American oil company. In pulling


off its protective coup, Congress never bothered with the niceties of free trade or liberalization, because in doing what it did, Congress was on the defensive side. In a hypothetical case in reverse, however, should it be acting on behalf of American businesses trying to further pry open the China market, Con-gress in an offensive mode would hardly hesitate about harping on the can-ons of free market and would most likely throw the book of liberalization at the Chinese. Such is the hypocrisy spawned by the political use of the relevant Western keystone ideas, thus undercutting their credibility and universal ap-peal, out of no fault of these ideas.

DID JAPAN BeAR ouT The DemoCRACy TheSIS?

Before we leave the umbrella question of the relationship between political and economic development, we have to return to the question raised earlier as to whether Japan’s fast track to becoming an economic superpower was attributable to its post–WWII democratic system. The answer is extremely complicated, and we should note that there is no solid consensus on this point. Chalmers Johnson (1982), the dean of American scholars on Japanese political economy, believed it was the country’s “developmental state” that moved it to the forefront of economic powerhouses. By definition, the “de-velopmental state” model, in contrast to the American “regulatory state” model, means that the government actually intervenes in the country’s econ-omy and sets its directions, even though employing what Johnson calls “market-conforming” methods. As such, it does not strictly conform to the principles of laissez faire economics or the democratic developmental theory, which posits democracy as a precondition of sustained economic growth.

Besides, whether Japan is a bona fide democracy is more controversial than meets the eye. On the one hand, there is staunch support among most America’s Japan experts in both academe and government, especially those who were somehow identified with the American Occupation’s drafting of the post–WWII “peace Constitution” for defeated Japan. This latter group had an understandable personal pride in seeing postwar Japan become a democ-racy of the Anglo-American tradition, under the American tutelage. Their disciples and writings duly influenced the ensuing generations of America’s Japan scholars. But, on the other hand, there is no lack of dissenting opinions among the larger international pool of Japan specialists. One such example is a naturalized Japanese citizen and former German Jesuit priest, Professor Peter J. Herzog (1993) of Sophia University. Mobilizing massive evidence and documentation in support of his dissenting view, Herzog concludes that Ja-pan only has a “pseudo-democracy.” He pounced on a few things, such as the lack of independence of the Supreme Court, which despite its Constitution-empowered right of judicial review, was rarely not taking the government’s

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side in cases against the government. The prime ministers’ habitual visits, over the years, to the Yasukuni Shrine represented to Herzog a failure to separate state and church in Japan. The reason was that among the war-dead heroes enshrined in Yasukuni are many Class A War Criminals tried and con-victed by the Allies’ postwar Tokyo Trials. Among the enshrined War Crimi-nals was Hidoki Tojo, the general who ordered the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 as well as Japan’s military pushes into other Asian countries. To Prof. Herzog, Japan’s election system also followed an “unequal equation,” al-though his book was published before the more recent reforms aimed at eliminating the very inequities that he criticized.

This debate may be inconclusive. But, in the context of our discussions here, concerning the universal validity of the Western democratic develop-mental theory, I do wish to single out for evaluation a general proposition held to be sacrosanct by the theory’s adherents. That proposition holds out a causal relationship between increases in accountability (or increased degrees of democracy in the political system) and corresponding improvement in the performance of the economy. But, this thesis was not empirically borne out in the Japanese case. Let us recall that one single party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), was able to dominate the Japanese political scene for thirty-eight years straight, 1955 through 1993. Only in 1993 did the LDP lose its majority control in the lower house of the parliament (known as Diet). As a result, a coalition of parties including the LDP filled the ranks of the cabinet, and to-gether they ruled Japan. At one point in time, a Socialist even headed the coalition, and became the country’s first and only Socialist prime minister. By any definition, the loosening up of one-party domination as such would qualify as a change that brought about more “accountability” of the political system. But, let us also recall that despite its miraculous economic success story before, Japan’s economy hit the snags after the early 1990s, coinciding with the decline of the LDP’s monopoly of political power. When these two facts are juxtaposed together, the obvious conclusion is that, as accountability increased (or greater democracy surfaced) in the Japanese polity, its economy contrarily headed for serious but steady declines (cf. Hsiung 2001: 88). If anything, the economy showed only some slight improvement after 1996, when the LDP began to gain back more seats in the Diet and was within reach of resuming its majority control between 1996 and 2004. It did regain major-ity control in 2005, and Japan’s economy also showed signs of improving. Hence, the Japanese example did not lend empirical support to the particular point in the democratic prosperity thesis just noted. The evidence showed the opposite was true in Japan, where increased accountability was correlated with decreased efficiency in the economic performance.

Another important point to consider is that if indeed Japan, contrary to Herzog’s views, has a bona fide democracy that was responsible for fostering the country’s pre-1990 economic boom, then how come Japan has been


mired in chronic economic woes after 1990, as its political system did not change and, in fact, witnessed greater degrees of accountability throughout the 1990s. Unless this puzzle can be solved, it would be hard to try to trace Japan’s once economic superpower status to origins in a democratic precondition.

To simplify matters, we will not belabor the revisionist view that the re-cently revealed postwar “M Fund” of the CIA, backed by a reservoir of $500 billion at its peak, played a decisive role in helping push Japan economi-cally forward as well as keep LDP in power during the Cold War years.8 It is nevertheless instructive that Japan’s economic miracle reversed course after the Cold War era ended in 1989, while the LDP’s grip on power also began to slip. In view of these developments, which may or may not be coinciden-tal, it is nevertheless questionable whether it can be maintained that Japan’s fast track to an economic superpower status in the 1980s was simply the result of its prior political development (democracy), as the democratic theory of development would have it.

ASIAN vALueS: whAT They ARe AND why They mATTeR

As noted above, Herman Kahn and other scholars since him have held out the thesis that the “Asian values,” and the Asian developmental model they underpinned, were responsible for the general phenomenal success of the high-performance East Asian economies. As this thesis holds the key to an answer to the question why the Asian developmental path diverges from the Western developmental theory, we need to discuss it at some length. To begin with, we have to make a few fine distinctions.

First, Asian values do not fall into a monolithic order. There can be, and are, as many different versions of Asian values as there are nations in the region, although they all share the same Confucian roots. What are usually called Asian values in the literature are in fact equated with the virtues ex-tolled by the Singaporeans, or the Singaporean School (Jones 1994).9 But, the irony is that the Singaporeans were originally raising a genuine episte-mological question as to whether Asian values and the liberal democratic values should be dichotomized, a question that inscrutably evoked the specter of the rise of conservatism in Asia. This specter, as Richard Robinson (1995: xv) points out, aroused fears in the West that conservatism might tilt the global balance against liberalism and skew the ideological contest within Western societies. Hence, the debate on Asian values often got shunted into a polemical battle waged by self-designated defenders of lib-eralism. We need therefore to keep in mind the differentiation between intellectual debate and polemics.

Second, the spirit of liberalism and the views held by its self-designated de-fenders may not necessarily be the same. For instance, an essential hallmark of

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true liberalism is its tolerance of diversity and pluralism, but its self-designated defenders are obviously not so tolerant of the Singaporean dissent.10

Third, by the same token, a fine distinction should be made between Con-fucianism and Asian values. Even as we accept the former as a short-hand label for the latter, to denote in abstract something found in common among East and Southeast Asian nations, it is necessary to distinguish the Confucian culture as developed in China, on the one hand, and the Confucian-imbued Asian values found in the other contemporary Asian na-tions, on the other. In China’s long past, Confucianism meant the rise of learning and acquired knowledge, a noninheritable achievement, as a crite-rion of social mobility, replacing wealth as a measure of all things. This crucial shift not only led to the creation of a system governed by the learned literocrats (in effect, an “epistemocracy,” as it were) but also the tempering of brute political power by Confucian humanism and a Confucian censorial system (Creel 1953: 39–44; Hucker 1965: 50–76). Even the emperor had to bow to the teachings of Confucius. The hereditary nobility in government was replaced by a cadre of plebeians recruited through the keju regimes, hu-mankind’s first civil service system. Shortly after Confucianism was adopted as the national ethos by Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty in 136 B.C., it was possible for Kung Sun-hung (also Romanized as Gong Sunhong, d. 121 B.C.) to be the first commoner to become the nation’s prime minister, setting a precedent for all the ensuing dynastic governments in China (Hsiung 1985: 7–9). Parenthetically, critics should ask themselves: When was the first time that plebeians were ever able to reach such heights in the West?

Confucianism as a shorthand label for modern Asian values, as attributed to the Singaporean School and applicable to the region as a whole, consists of the following attributes: (1) respect for elders and authority, (2) strong family, (3) reverence for education, (4) hard work, (5) frugality, (6) team-work, and (7) a balance between the individual’s interests and those of society (Hitchcock 1994: 2). If this inventory embodies Asian values in the running debate, one wonders what it is that Western critics found so repug-nant. Some of the attributes (such as hard work, frugality), in fact, are con-sistent with Max Weber’s Protestant work ethic. The value laid on team-work jives with a principle in modern business and industrial management. Some of the others (respect for authority, and familism) are conducive to social and political stability, a sine qua non for development.11 With frugal-ity comes high savings, which is conducive to recapitalization and invest-ments. The stress on education is exactly what is needed for today’s high-tech society, in which “knowledge economy” is the rising star of tomorrow (Subramanian 2000: 24). Specifically, Gilbert Rozman (1992: 312) has put his stamp of approval on the stress on education: “The increasingly knowl-edge based management of pre-modern East Asian societies was to prove beneficial for their modern development.”


Thus, the fuss about Asian values is not really about the alleged inherent faults or flaws of their Confucian content. Rather, as Robinson reminds us above, it is because Asian values have unfortunately been implicated in a polemic war in the West between the self-appointed defenders of liberalism and challengers from a rising school that has caught fire on communitarian thought. While the buried roots of communitarian thought in the West go far back, even to Socrates’ polis and Rousseau’s general will, as Markate Daly (1994) has documented, the self-designated defenders of liberalism, whose focus is on the rights and freedoms of the individual, have great fears that the Confucian legacy, with its inherent emphasis on the collective will of the community, will further erode their own support both at home and abroad.12 The Asian financial crisis of 1997–1999, therefore, afforded them a gratuitous opportunity to pull off a fusillade in a vain attempt to kill off the target of their fears, Asian values, for good. Without waiting for the death certificate, the Economist (July 25, 1998), quite typically, was running an obituary for Asian values in jubilation.

The bottom line here is that the blind trust placed in Western liberalism by its self-designated defenders—and their oblivion to the formidable problem arising from the cultural differential—made them unable, in fact unwilling, to see why their cherished Western keystone ideas “failed” to fulfill their universal potentials in Asia. To wind up this long discussion of Asian values, I wish to note that while the distinct identity of the Confucian roots inherent in the region’s Asian values are obvious, what is not so obvi-ous is that the exclusivist bent in the body of liberal democratic values makes itself unacceptable to Asian cultures. The inclusivist tenor of the Confucian culture has been fully explored by Charles A. Moore and his as-sociates (Moore 1967). I would merely add that this inclusivism makes it possible for the Confucian core values to take root in various cultural mixes in contemporary Pacific Asia. While the Confucian ethic constitutes the bedrock of Asian values, it is blended to varying degrees with other cultural elements, such as with Islam (as in Malaysia, Indonesia, etc.), Buddhism (Taiwan, Thailand, etc.), Shinto (Japan), Marxism (China), and Christianity (South Korea, the Philippines, etc.). Most important of all, the Confucian-based Asian values do not reject the modern industrial culture radiating from the West. Hence, Asian nations imbued with Confucian-based values can comfortably absorb Western-derived hi-tech and managerial culture, to excel in ways that overtake Western nations in their comparable times of developmental takeoff.

The varying mixes of the Confucian core with native cultural elements in different Asian countries manifested their practical effects during the recent Asian financial crisis. From the records of the various nations’ ability to cope with the onslaught of the crisis, Wang Gangmao (1999), a Singapor-ean economist, mapped a composite table of projections for the likely post-

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crisis recovery and growth in the region. He identified five groups in a de-scending order of their economic vitality, as gauged by their comparative standing on five indicators.13 He placed Singapore, Taiwan, Hongkong, and mainland China in the top pack, or Tier One, in terms of their ability to resume their developmental path beyond the crisis. In an earlier work, I tried to map a taxonomy of zones showing varying degrees—from high, medium, to low—of Confucian influence among the Asian countries. All the four named by Wang as belonging to Tier One seem to fall into the zone most highly influenced by the Confucian ethic. Malaysia, South Korea, and Thailand are in the medium zone. They are followed by the Philippines, Indonesia, and Japan, which are in the zone where the Confucian influence is comparatively the weakest in the region. This taxonomy happened to coincide with Wang’s projections of fast, medium, and slow recovery from the Asian financial crisis (Hsiung 2001: p. 367f).

The correlation may or may not suggest a causality. Nor does it mean that a re-Confucianized Japan, for example, would necessarily be better able to cure its lingering economic setbacks. Nevertheless, the comparison as such leads us to a crucial point, which is that it was not Asian values that sent the Asian economies tumbling down during the financial crisis of the late 1990s, as many Western economists had initially alleged.

Furthermore, as Eiichi Shibusawa, the nineteenth-century guru often hailed as the father of Japanese capitalism, had cogently put it, Confucian ethic made it possible to foster what he called a “union of righteousness and profit” (see Kuo-hui Tai 1989: 78), thus anticipating the rare “growth with equity” noted earlier in the World Bank’s 1993 report on the record of economic develop-ment of the contemporary Asian high-performance economies.

Many Western pundits take a jaundiced view of the Eastern Asian nations because of their peculiar “Asian values.” The Economist obituary of these values and Christopher Patten’s celebration of the transfiguration of the Asian Tigers into “stuffed animals,” noted above, are but two handy exam-ples of the West’s cynical reaction to the misfortunes of the Asian region while under attack during its recent financial crisis. Another example is a blanket negative comment by an enthusiast of Western capitalism, Jeffrey Henderson of the Manchester Business School. While addressing a United Nations audience, Henderson announced that a “tragedy” of the Asian fi-nancial crisis was that “non-Anglo-American routes to prosperous econo-mies have been delegitimated (emphasis added).” In its wake, Eastern Eu-rope, Africa, and other parts of Asia were left with no alternative model “to counterpoise . . . Anglo-American capitalism” (Henderson 1998). The real tragedy from hindsight, however, is that if Western analysts keep taking this jaundiced view of Pacific Asia in like manner, their credentials as serious scholars will be “delegitimated” in no time. Paradoxically, their bias only detracted from the universal appeal of the Western values they purport to


uphold. Sadder still, applying their Western cultural exclucivist view, some analysts reacted with utter disdain to any upbeat reports or prognostica-tions about the potential rise of Pacific Asia. One such example is a review of a book provocatively titled: “Thunder from the East: Portrait of a Rising Asia,” coauthored by Nicholas D. Kristof and Sheryl WuDunn (2000), both of the New York Times. Reviewing it for Foreign Affairs (November–December issue, 156–162), Walter Russell Mead unabashedly declared that, contrary to the coauthors’ trumpeting for a rising Asia, the twenty-first century will see the “end of Asia.” He gave two reasons: (a) The spread of capitalism and “Abrahamic ideology” (i.e., Judeo–Christian culture) will wipe out the re-gion’s “pre-Abrahamic culture,” and (b) that the rise of individual Asian societies, especially China and India, will make it “finally impossible to talk about ‘Asia’ as a political or cultural unit.” On the second point, the re-viewer–critic was inadvertently echoing Winston Churchill, whom he mo-mentarily ridiculed, in his viewing of Asia as a geographic unit. Hence, the rise of strong, organized human societies such as China and India would make the maintenance of “Asia” as a mere geographic name no longer ten-able.

But, more crucial was Mead’s belief that the spread of capitalism and “Abrahamic ideology” would obliterate Asian culture, which he calls the “last traces of pre-Abrahamic culture.” The implied premise that all cultures must head toward oblivion, to be replaced by the “Abrahamic culture,” is as alarming as it is arrogant, bordering on the preposterous. The unilinear view recalls to mind the Western obsession in the 1960s that a Western-type democracy (described as “political development”) would be an indispens-able precondition for economic development for the non-Western world. This view has since been discredited, as the empirical examples scrutinized in Varshney’s study (2000) above have clearly shown. Our discussion of the distinct role of Asian values seems to suggest an alternative model of devel-opment and governance to the Western capitalistic path to prosperity.

The uNILINeAR vIew AND “fAILeD” uNIveRSALITy CLAImS

By now, I hope it is apparent that much of the reason for the “failure” of the universality of the Western keystone ideas in question is the habitual unilin-ear view held by Western analysts, like Walter Russell Mead, that sees all things in the human world as having sprung from the same root substance and as following the same path of development. Another version of the uni-linear view of human progress is represented, for example, by the “end of history” vision propagated by writers like Francis Fukuyama (1992). It sees liberal democracy as the “end point of mankind’s ideological revolution” and the “final form of human government.” In agreement with Mead, Fukuyama

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believes that all societies, despite their different cultural and other roots, will end up going the same direction as shown in the Western experience.

The boldness in this prognosis deserves serious reflection. Ultimately, as we will see, the answer to the universality of ideas across cultures boils down to the question of whether wittingly or unwittingly we hold out a unilinear view of human history. It really depends on whether we put our faith blindly in the monogenesis and unidirectionality of all things in all times and all places, or whether we allow for an alternative antiunilinear perspective.

For an illustration of this alternative perspective, a metaphor may be found in the field of evolution theory. According to its adherents, the Dar-winian model of evolution, which benefited from the method of classifica-tion pioneered by the great Swedish biologist Linaeus, is supposedly ap-plicable to all species in all cases, hence unilinear. On the other hand, an alternative evolutionary paradigm is offered by Alfred Wallace, a contempo-rary of Darwin’s, who exemplified the antiunilinear view. The paradigm of this process is found in the giraffe, which, by reaching upward for a long period of time, somehow willed itself to lengthen its neck. The relevant les-son gained from this paradigm of acquired traits, despite the controversy and challenge mounted by its critics, is that one should always be keen on an alternative explanation. In Wallace’s case, the alternative explanation of-fered is something not reducible to the lottery of heredity or to the cruel vagaries of the environment, which are held to be the only truth that mat-ters in the unilinear view (Iyre 1984: 3). The skepticism inherent in this moral embodies the essence of a nonunilinear approach.

What is true of natural science is true of social science. As will be shown below, the nonunilinear perspective has the potential of opening to us a new vista on the whole question of challenge to the alleged universality of certain of our pet ideas and values. More specifically for the concerns of this chapter, it holds the key to finding an explanation for (a) why the universal-ity claims of the pet Western keystone ideas failed to hold true in the Asian region; and, no less important, (b) why the societies imbued with the Asian values have to be understood in the logical context of their Confucian roots, in contrast to the Abrahamic roots of Western values.

A NoNuNILINeAR APPRAISAL of vALueS: CoNfuCIAN–ASIAN vS. ABRAhAmIC

Each culture or value system has its inherent logic, emanating from a body of first principles that permeates and connects all derivatives. The Asian values that we find so resistant to the Western keystone ideas above are rooted in the Confucian ontology that was transplanted to nations tradi-


tionally under the sway of Chinese cultural influence. In order to get to the gestalt of the Confucian tradition, I would argue, we need briefly account for both its fundamental premises (first principles) and the historical cir-cumstances that helped shape its flowering in China. Failing this, not only will we never be able to understand fully the true meaning of the Confucian tradition and the Asian values it gave rise to. More important, we will never fully comprehend why keystone Western ideas lose their universal validity or appeal in the Eastern Asian region.

first Principles in the Confucian Tradition

Two fundamental but interrelated premises in the Confucian tradition merit particular attention: (a) its peculiar assumption about human nature, and (b) the Confucian conception of man-in-society. Before elaborating on them, I wish to stress that these premises deserve particular attention because they provide a stark contrast, a counterpoint, to the Abrahamic ontology. In due course, we will see why the keystone Western ideas of an Abrahamic origin failed to live up to their universality claim, when introduced in Asian nations. Parenthetically, I think it necessary to keep in mind that by “Confucian tradi-tion” we mean more than just the teachings of Confucius. The term “tradi-tion” here implies that while Confucius himself had inherited essential ele-ments from pre-ancient Chinese philosophy and weltanschauung before him, his teachings were later elaborated and expanded by his followers.14 More than that, the Confucian tradition takes on additional coloration as it blends into the native cultural contexts of the nations on China’s periphery that embraced its influence. Despite its amplifications over time, however, the basics of the tradition that are being addressed here have remained.

Contrary to the Abrahamic ideology in the West, which is rooted in the logic of the original sin, the Confucian tradition stakes out a view that sees human nature as corrigible, or potentially disposed toward good. I say “po-tentially” because Confucius (551–479 B.C.) never explicitly spelled it out beyond indicating that human nature, far from being originally wicked, was moldable to become good. Hence, while it was possible for Xun Zi (Hsun Tzu; 298–238 B.C.), a disciple, to claim human nature was innately bad, another disciple, Mencius (Meng Zi; 372–289 B.C.?), developed an elabo-rate theory of Confucian humanism inspired by the notion of the innate goodness of human nature.15 Future Confucians and most of the Chinese ever since accepted the Mencius interpretation, which made him the second sage after Confucius. His interpretation is consistent with the original Con-fucian tenet that what determines human nature is the conditioning effects of the human environment (society), including moral education (li jiao).

Two related prescriptions ensue from this prognosis of human nature: (i) that society be cleansed of corrupting influences; and (ii) that man finds

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fulfillment, not in isolation, but in his social environment; hence, the con-cept of man-in-society. This man-in-society conception, as Donald Munro’s earlier work (1969) has found, begins with the premise of man’s natural equality (contrary to the usual Western impression of Confucian values) and ends with the prescription that proper education (a social added value) will help individuals fulfill their respective potentials. According to the Confucian tradition, society should be an enlarged lifetime school. True to his belief in universal education, Confucius would not turn away whoso-ever came to him to be educated (you jiao wu lei). The elite should be en-dowed with a sense of mission so that one does not think of advancing just oneself, but aims at advancing the collective self (ji yu li er li ren). The end result from this social variable is a hierarchy of individuals of varying po-tentials and accomplishments.

Thus, it would be futile trying to square the Western notion of the indi-vidual-unto-himself with the Confucian notion of man-in-society. Many ramifications emerge from this contradistinction, such as in the competing priority of the free will and rights of the individual vs. the collective will and rights of society; of the welfare of the individual vs. the collective well-being of men-in-society. The moral of this contrast is that while the concept of (and urge for) human fulfillment is universal, it may take different forms in different cultural and societal contexts. This is not a suggestion of cultural relativism, but a crucial fact we must face in search of a true answer to the question concerning the universality of human aspirations.

Although to my knowledge no systematic study has been made of the possible links, if any, between the Judeo–Christian premise of the wicked individual and modern Western political theories, nevertheless, I think it appropriate to raise a question whether a logical connection can be identi-fied. A cursory examination seems to suggest that there is a connection. For example, for modern Western political theorists from Machiavelli to Hobbes, the central premise of the wickedness of the individual seems com-patible with their characterization of human beings as antisocial power seekers by nature. Hence, a logical deduction is that the state exists to pro-vide security for the people, by putting the necessary safeguards (like laws, or wills of the sovereign) between wicked individuals fighting for their own aggrandizement. The state, in this light, does not engage in moral educa-tion, as classical (basically Greek) and Confucian thinkers advocated.

As Hobbes saw it, unless there be a sovereign, society is a fiction. How-ever, just as the state is necessary to protect the self-seeking individuals from one another, institutional guarantees must be erected to preclude abuse of power by the wicked individuals running the government. For this purpose, democracy would be the ideal answer as such an institution: The built-in checks and balance in a democracy would minimize the danger of the wicked officials abusing governmental power.


On the other hand, as we have seen, given its different assessment of hu-man nature, the Confucian ideal is that the state be the agent mandated to keep society from corrupting influences. Thus, government must engage in the moral education of its people (in reality, because of the concomitant Confucian stress on familism, the extended family is often the practical agent of moral education in all Chinese communities). Likewise, it is incumbent upon the government to intervene in aiding society’s collective search for fulfillment and in engendering societal macrodevelopment. But, to do so, the government must be strong, efficient, and citizen-friendly. Only such a gov-ernment can transcend any special interests and control them.

The above contrast should not be construed to be endorsement of one or the other approach to human nature and the suitable mode of governance, but it serves to demonstrate that because of differences in the fundamental assumptions (first principles) between the two traditions, the deduced goals plus the instruments for their fulfillment are also drastically different and incompatible. Understanding this point may shed new light on how ade-quately to evaluate the question of the universality of human aspirations.

The historical Circumstances Surrounding the Growth of Confucianism in China

The ideal of the government’s function in fostering societal development (and social justice) was institutionalized early on in China. Following the adoption of Confucianism as the guojiao (national learning) by Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty in 136 B.C., China saw the introduction of the keju system (a civil service examination system writ large) by which the state became the certifying agent of social mobility for the Chinese nation (not just the bureaucracy). An unexpected side-effect from this development, however, was that the state became bigger than society. It also created a one-career society in China in that all eyes were fixed on acquiring a good enough education to make it through the keju system so as to join the en-vied ranks of the literocrats, the elite who helped the emperor rule the country, while all other professions became trivialized. This remained so until the keju system was abolished in 1905.

Although the Confucian tradition that seeped through Chinese borders to neighboring nations did not bring with it the Chinese keju system—hence sans its state-dominance side-effect—it is nevertheless true that the inherent Confucian exaltation of respect for authority did rub off in various places. In Japan, for example, the legacy of the Tokugawa jusha Confucian-ism, abetted by the samurai bushido, anticipated the advent of the develop-mental state model that brought instant modernity to the Meiji era (1868–1912) and post–WWII Japan’s rise as an economic superpower. That the model spread from Japan to other Asian nations is a familiar story; but, I

198 James C. HSIUNG

wish to stress that the common Confucian legacy shared by these other Asian nations paved the way for their embrace of the ideal of the interven-tionist state in promoting economic welfare.

Before leaving the subject of a nonunilinear view of history, I wish to add a cognate point about the different “time zones” that complicate our com-prehension of the problems confronting the universality of human aspira-tions. As Paul Bracken (2000: 147) wisely notes, the year 1998, for example, may look the same on a calendar to all nations on earth, but its meaning may be vastly different. For Asia, the year 1998 represented the 500th an-niversary of Vasco da Gama’s landing in India, an event that opened the West’s infamous inroads in Asia, a history that the West would rather have the world forget. Instead, he adds, the West spent the 1990s celebrating its victory in winning the Cold War. The new epoch, in the views of many, marked the triumphal spread of a Western form of globalization, a linking of economics and cultures; and in it “American values and norms would spread to countries who would willingly embrace the superior ways that gave the United States the world’s greatest military force as well as the world’s richest economy” (148).

The trouble with this view, Bracken cautions, is that “the post–Cold War era never came to Asia. It was a Western deceit.” Without using the term “nonunilinear,” Bracken suggests an alternative line of interpretation that sees Asia and the West not to live in the same historical time zone (my term) and, hence, have different horizons.16 The very term “post–Cold War era,” he notes, presumes that the U.S.–Soviet struggle was a central event of our time and that its end marked a completely new beginning for the entire world. But, the Cold War was not a world war. In Asia, the Cold War was not merely different from that in Europe; it was also relatively less important, observes Bracken, adding: “The central motor of Asia’s history in the second half of the twentieth century was postcolonialism, the efforts of China, Vietnam, In-dia, and others to create viable nation-states after the long period of foreign rule” or, as in China’s case, foreign domination (p. 148; emphasis added).

To carry Bracken’s view one step further, we may say that throughout the East and Southeast Asian region, the second half of the century just past ush-ered in a new era in which, with the rare exception of Japan (which was itself a colonial power), all nations—both the newly independent postcolonial states and China plus Thailand (the only two other independent Asian states before the end of World War II)—share a common jubilance over the demise of colonial rule or, in the Chinese case, the end of Western “imperialist” dominance. Postcolonial nationalism and the tasks of state- and nation-building that go along with it, as contradistinguished from the technology-led search for power in the West, lie at the heart of all social and political pursuits in postcolonial Asia.17 In this context, the tasks of securing socio-political stability and economic development to overcome poverty merit


greater priority than political development (democratization) and the pro-motion of individual liberties and self-centered rights. This is why the Confu-cian ideals inherent in the region’s Asian values that highlight the fulfillment of collective well-being (man-in-society) make much more sense to most of the nations concerned. In this light, therefore, it is not that the Western liberal ideas per se are wrong, but merely that they do not answer postcolonial Asia’s immediate needs and concerns. Besides, when weighed against centuries of Western colonialism and “imperialist” domination, the liberal ideas that the West touts as universally treasurable cannot but have a hypocritical ring to them, as viewed by many Asian nations.

CoNCLuDING RemARkS

This lengthy discussion of a cognitive model of Confucianism and its mod-ern influences, I hope, does not just throw new light on Asian values. Ulti-mately, I hope it offers a new perspective on the ultimate question of why Western keystone ideas, conceived in the Abrahamic ideology, should lose their supposed universal appeal, and even explanatory power, when applied to the Asian region. The fault, to reiterate, is not with the Western liberal ideas themselves. Rather, as we have seen, they do not answer the immedi-ate needs and concerns of postcolonial Asia. Nor does their intellectual tenor tally with the Confucian roots in the Asian values.

This anomaly lies at the very root of the puzzle why the Western demo-cratic theory of development and laissez economics neither can explain the actual path of Asian development, nor could have served as a guide. Only after, not before, their economies had reached phenomenal levels of suc-cess—resulting in the rise of a growing middle class—did Korea and Taiwan begin to be embarked on the road of democratization (political develop-ment). The good news is that in all Asian nations, a common feature is the emergence and expansion of a middle class, following on the heels of sus-tained economic growth. If what has happened in South Korea and Taiwan is any guide, this trend anticipates the coming of the second stage of devel-opment, beyond economic success, which will likely see the sprouts of de-mocracy, ushering in a convergence age with the industrial and democratic West. When that happens, it will lend support to the universality claims of the Western keystone values of liberalism.

In the final analysis, if this chapter has anything of theoretic value to offer, it is the suggestion that the ultimate root of the “failures” of the universality claims of the Western keystone ideas can be grasped only from a nonunilinear perspective on cultural traditions. What is found true with the Asian region may very well be true with other regions, but it is beyond the ken of this chapter to look into the other regions. I hope that the methodology used here, more in

200 James C. HSIUNG

particular the cognitive model I ventured to build as an explanatory device, can offer an example as to how similar testings, mutatis mutandis, of the universality claims of the Western keystone ideas can be pursued for other regions.

NoTeS

1. In this chapter, Eastern Asia includes both East and Southeast Asia. A synony-mous term would be “Pacific Asia.”

2. I shall define and discuss what these Asian values are below. 3. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) now has ten members,

including: (a) the original five founding members, Thailand, Malaya, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines, (b) Brunei; (c) the Indochina states, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia; and (d) Burma.

4. The eight are: Japan, the four “Asian Tigers” (Hongkong, South Korea, Tai-wan, and Singapore), China, and three newly industrializing economies (NIEs) of southeast Asia: Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia.

5. Cf. the series of publications on development sponsored by the Committee on Comparative Politics, under the Social Science Research Council, the last of which was the volume edited by Pye and Verba (1965).

6. In Varshney’s Table 1, he lists the following as among the democracies in the developing world that have not been able to shake off poverty: India, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Botswana, Jamaica, Trinidad-Togago, Costa Rica, and Venezuela (p. 719).

7. In a change of heart, the Korean government did allow more access to domes-tic markets by foreign banks and insurance companies. But it at the same time re-quired improvement in corporate and state disclosure to increase the transparency of the financial system, so as to upgrade the government’s control in such matters as borrowing, a crucial cause for Korea’s succumbing to the financial contagion. See Sikorski (1999: 120).

8. For this revisit view, see Chalmers Johnson, et al. 2000 (esp. p. 90). 9. In parts of this discussion, I am relying on Subramanian (2000).10. In the Singaporean view, Western liberal democracy is but one variant, among

many, of democratic systems of government. See Kausikan (1998: p. 17).11. To what extent Indonesia suffers from social instability because its predominant

culture is not Confucian is a moot question bordering on racism. But it would be tan-talizing to ask if there is any correlation between Indonesia’s lack of social stability and its relative lagging behind the region’s other Asian nations in economic development.

12. Defenders of liberal democracy consider communitarianism as the culprit for the rise of what they call “illiberal democracy.” See Fox (1997: 561); and in general Bell (1996), and Zakaria (1997).

13. The five indexes are: GDP growth rate, interest rate, inflation rate, external debt to GDP ratio, and the exchange rate.

14. For a discussion of this point, see Hsiung (1970: pp. 143–147).15. Donald Munro 1969: pp. 74–81.16. The idea of time zones is developed Arthur Stein (1990). 17. For many Asian nations, political institutionalization was the main task of

state-building in the postcolonial period. Cf. Robert Scalapino, et al. (1986).


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205

Abrahamic ideology, 194, 195–200action popularis, 14adversary regime, 42, 113Asian Development Bank, 85Asian Values, 168, 181, 191, 192, 195–

200Asian-way, 88Association of Southeast Asian

Nations, 84

Beijing, 57, 62bilateralism, 69Brzezinski, Zbigniew K., 75 Bush, George W., 16, 119

Central Intelligence Agency, 190central plains, 58. See also ZhongyuanCHEN, Shui-bian, 3CHIANG, Kai-shek, 109Chiang Mai Initiative, 84China Airlines, 123 China threat, 85Civil Aviation Organization, 13Clinton, Hillary R., 64collective security, 11comanagement of the Taiwan Strait, 116community of states, 14community-centered arrangement, 43

confidence building measures, 46, 113Confucian tradition, 196Confucianism, 182, 191 Confucius, 168convergent expectation, ix, 20cooperative regionalism, 104 countervailing military alliances, 78Crab and Frog Motion model, 56 crony capitalism, 185, 186

DAI, Bingguo, xDemocratic Progressive Party, 63DENG, Xiaoping, 98dialectical terms, 48Duvall, Raymond, 10

exclusive economic zone, 111

Ferguson, Yale H., 1Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,

98Free trade, 188

Gates, Robert M., 95global governance, ix, 3globalization, 69, 72, 159; antithesis

of, 159; definitions, 2, 125; normative implications of, 161–165

Index

206 Index

globalization index, 154good governance, 3governance diplomacy, 5, 102, 104 Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, 118

Haicang Taiwan Businessmen–Investment Zone, 120

harmonious society, 103harmonious world, 103hegemon, 78hegemony, 59, 62, 79Held, David, 142Hermit kingdom, 148HU, Jintao, 83 human rights, 32, 39, 42, 45, 70, 74humanitarianism, 44 Huntington, Samuel P., 116 hyperglobalizers, 143, 152

institution, 30interdependence, 72 international community, 35international governance, 1, 2, 3, 10, 11;

prerequisites, 11International Health Regulations 2005, 63international regimes, 22, 59; core

elements, 4; criteria, 4; definitions, ix, 26

Japan, 190Jinmen Accord, 124 jus cogens, 13, 14

keystone Western ideas, 181, 201Khan, Herman, 183, 190Krasner, Stephen D., 26

laissez faire economics, 181–182 law regime, 38LEE, Teng-hui, 110legitimacy, 11, 69LI, Peng, 111liberal democracy, 181–182liberalization, 188. See also free tradeLibyan, 18

MA, Ying-jeou, 63, 65; Diplomacy, 63

Malaysia, 186Mandalic nestling of relations, 102Mansbach, Richard W., 1MAO Zedong, 77, 98Marx, Karl, 3, 4measures, 30, 47mechanism, 30, 31, 35, 39, 43, 47, 49,

84, 115 Ming Chuan University, 2Missile Technology Control Regime, 18Moscow, 129Multilaterism, 5, 69Multipolarization, 78Myanmar, 20

9-Degree Channel, 108nationalism, 155Neocolonialism, 58neofunctionalism, 76neoliberalism, 3 neorealism, 2, 9neotribalism, 171neotributary state system, 57new Asianism, 83new security concept, 73, 100Necessary-for-Governance

Organizations (NGOs), 112normative power, 10norms, 12, 15, 16, 19, 22, 35, 69, 70;

and American values, 199

Obama, II, Barack H., 3One China policy, 110

Pacific century, 83Papua New Guinea, 122pareto-optimal bailout, 11peaceful rise of China, 57Peacekeeping operations, 74Perry, William J., 111 ploys of the United States, 73postinternational universe, 1Powell, Colin, 16power, 10–11, 17, 19, 149

QIAN, Qichen, 77, 78Qing dynasty, 40, 103

Index 207

realism, 17, 96 regimes of international law, 18regional governance, 97Roosevelt, Franklin, D., 109Rosenau, James A., 155 rule of man, 102

Sanction, 15self-help, 11, 17Shambaugh, David L., 55Shanghai Five, 86, 99–100Singapore School, 191Six-Party Talks, 69, 82–83skeptics, 143Social constructivism, 97Sovereignty, 71space debris prevention regime, 44, 45Spratlys, 88straits in the world, 124Straits of Malacca, 124, 126superpowers, 45superstructure, 3swarm theory, 60

system, 36, 37, 41

Taiwan, 49, 63, 169, 183Taiwan Strait, 130three links and four exchanges, 63transformationalists, 143 turbulent détente, 80

unequal treaties, 40, 103

Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, 14

Wedemeyer, Albert C., 109WEN, Jiabao, 120 Wenzao Ursuline College of

Languages, 1World Health Organization, 63

Yin and Yang plus the Five Elements, 47, 97, 102

Zhongyuan, 58

Chun-Chi ChIANG received his Ph.D. from the National SUN Yat-Sen University. He is an assistant professor at Da-ren University in Pingdong County, Taiwan Province, Republic of China (ROC). CHIANG was also an honorable member of the Phi Tau Phi Scholastic Honor Society in 1997 and one of the national outstanding university students in 2000. His thesis on military education was awarded by the Ministry of National Defense (MOND), ROC in 2002. His teaching and research interests include meth-odology, philosophy of science, international relations, and international strategy.

w. emily Chow (Ph.D., University of Cambridge, 2001) is an assistant professor at the Graduate School of International Affairs (GSIA), Ming Ch-uan University (MCU). She served as the vice director of the Division of International Education & Exchange at MCU, voluntary worker of many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and lectures for various social training programs.

Rosita Dellios is associate professor of international relations at Australia’s Bond University. She lectures on Chinese defense and foreign policies as well as trends for the international future with an emphasis on Asia. She has published widely on these topics, has written one book on China’s defense policy, and is working on a second. She applies Eastern philosophy to in-ternational problems and has engaged in original research on “mandalic” regionalism that employs traditional and contemporary forms of regional governance in Asia.

209

About the Contributors

James C. hSIuNG teaches international–politics theory, international law, and international governance in the Graduate School of Arts and Science (GSAS), New York University (NYU). His teaching and research interests also include Asian Pacific politics and international relations. He is the author and editor of nineteen books, including: Twenty-First Century World Order and the Asia Pacific (2001); Anarchy and Order: The Interplay of Politics and Law in International Relations (1997); and Asia Pacific in the New World Politics (1993). His latest, edited book is China and Japan at Odds (2007).

A former advisor to the Singaporean government, he was visiting chair professor and head, department of Politics and Sociology, Lingnan Univer-sity, Hongkong, 1997–1999. In May 2007, he also became the senior direc-tor of the One-dot Center for the Study of International Governance, Re-gimes, and Globalization, Graduate School of International Affairs (GSIA), Ming Chuan University (MCU).

Shawn S. f. kAo (Ph.D., University of Virginia) is associate professor of international politics, Department of Political Science, Tung-hai University, Taiwan, Republic of China (ROC). He has been working in various capaci-ties, such as dean of International College, director of Graduate School of International Affairs (GSIA) at Ming Chuan University (MCU); senior staff officer, Taipei Office on Education Forum, Asia-Pacific Economic Coopera-tion (APEC); deputy secretary general, People-to-People International (PTPI-ROC). His teaching and research interests include China in Southeast Asia, East Asian regional security, and international relations. His publica-tions include: U.S. Strategic Policy Toward Occupied Japan (1985); A Potential Threat to the Peace of the Southeast Asian Region: A Study of the Problems in the South China Sea (1999); State Sovereignty in the Internet Era: Puzzles and Pros-pects (2000); Whether CHINA, China, china: Threatening or Non-threatening? (2007); and China Rise and the Myth of ASEAN/East Asian Regional Integration (2009).

Richard w. mansbach earned his B.A. at Swarthmore College and his D.Phil at Oxford University where he was a Marshall Scholar. He served as chair of political science at Rutgers University–New Brunswick and Iowa State University and as coeditor of International Studies Quarterly for five years, spent two years as a visiting ACE scholar at the National Intelligence Council (NIC), and one year as visiting professor at Glasgow University. He has also been Fulbright Professor at the National University of Singapore, Chung-Ang University in Seoul, the National University of Mongolia, and the Diplomatic Academy in Vienna.

Mansbach has authored, coauthored, or edited fifteen books: The Do-minican Crisis of 1965 (1970); Northern Ireland: Five Decades of Partition (1973); Structure and Process of International Politics (1973); The Web of World

210 About the Contributors

Politic: Nonstate Actors in the Global System (1976); In Search of Theory: A New Paradigm for Global Politics (1981); The Elusive Quest: Theory and International Politics (1988); The State, Conceptual Chaos, and the Future of International Relations Theory (1989); The New Order in Northeast Asia and the Korean Pen-insula (1993); Polities: Authority, Identities, and Change (1966); The Global Puzzle: Issues and Actors in World Politics (3rd edition, 2000); The Elusive Quest Continues: Theory and Global Politics (2003); Remapping Global Politics: History’s Revenge and Future Shock (2004); Introduction to Global Politics (2007); Global Politics: A Reader (coedited with Edward Rhodes) (4th edi-tion, 2008); and A World of Politics: Essays on Global Politics (2008).

He has also published twenty-four book chapters and innumerable arti-cles in journals, including: International Studies Quarterly, International Orga-nization, Millennium, Geopolitics, International Studies Review, International Politics, Asian Perspective, Global Governance, The Journal of East Asian Affairs, British Journal of Political Science, Polity, Journal of Politics, and Comparative Politics.

Suisheng zhAo is professor and executive director of the Center for China–U.S. Cooperation at Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver. He is founder and editor of the Journal of Contempo-rary China, a member of the Board of Governors of the U.S. Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (USCSCAP), a member of National Committee on U.S.–China Relations, a research asso-ciate at the Fairbanks Center for East Asian Research in Harvard University, and a honorary jianzhi professor at Beijing University, Renmin University, Fudan University and Shanghai Foreign Studies University. A Campbell National Fellow at Hoover Institution of Stanford University, he was associ-ate professor of political science/international studies at Washington Col-lege in Maryland, associate professor of government/East Asian politics at Colby College in Maine, and visiting assistant professor at the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California–San Diego. He received a Ph.D. degree in political science from the University of California–San Diego, a M.A. degree in Sociology from the University of Missouri, and a M.A. degree in economics from Peking Uni-versity. He is the author and editor of nine books, including: China and the United States, Cooperation and Competition in Northeast Asia (Palgrave/Mac-million, 2008); China–U.S. Relations Transformed: Perspectives and Strategic Interactions (Routledge, 2008); Debating Political Reform in China: Rule of Law versus Democratization (M. E. Sharpe, 2006); A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism (Stanford University Press, 2004); Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior (M. E. Sharpe, 2003); China and Democracy: Reconsidering the Prospects for a Democratic China (Routledge, 2000); and Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Tai-

About the Contributors 211

wan, and the Crisis of 1995-96 (Routledge, 1999). His articles have appeared in Political Science Quarterly, The Wilson Quarterly, Washington Quarterly, In-ternational Politik, The China Quarterly, World Affairs, Asian Survey, Asian Af-fairs, Journal of Democracy, Pacific Affairs, Communism and Post-Communism Studies, Problems of Post-Communism, and elsewhere.

Peter kien-hong yu (Ph.D., New York University, October 1983) is profes-sor of political science/international relations at Swinburne University of Technology (Australia) and director of the One-dot Center for the Study of International Governance, Regimes, and Globalization at Ming Chuan Uni-versity (MCU), Taiwan, Republic of China (ROC). From October 1983 to July 2009, he worked in various capacities, such as the dean of Research and Development at an institution of higher education, director of the Graduate School of International Affairs (GSIA) at MCU, professor at the National SUN Yat-sen University, senior research fellow at the National University of Singapore (NUS), etc. He is the author, coauthor, editor, and coeditor of fifteen books in both English and Chinese and some ninety journal articles and book chapters published in the West. He is the recipient of many fel-lowships, awards, and grants. His latest books are Hu Jintao and the Ascen-dancy of China (2005), part I of which deals with the Central Military Com-mission (CMC) of the Communist Party of China (CPC), and The Second Long March: Struggling Against the Chinese Communists Under the Republic of China (Taiwan) Constitution (2009), which is published by The Continuum (U.S.). His April 2010, coedited book is entitled International Governance, Regimes, and Globalization: Case Studies from Beijing and Taipei.

212 About the Contributors